Kant is considered one of the main theorists of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism; it reaches its apotheosis in his formulation of cosmopolitan law, bringing together practically the entire complex of ideas associated with cosmopolitanism of the 18th century. However, even if cosmopolitanism was one of the mainstream ideas in political thought of the Enlightenment, already in the early 19th century the cosmopolitan idea faced the idea of a nation-state and local patriotism; the Enlightenment idea of world unity and world citizenship lost much of its appeal to the political thinkers of that time and their contemporaries. Nevertheless, despite the significant rise of the national idea after 1789, there was no decisive break with cosmopolitan views in the political thought in the following period of time. On the contrary, cosmopolitanism remained one of the most important political ideas throughout the 19th century. My paper’s primary goal is to respond to the topic of how Kant’s cosmopolitanism influenced the evolution of political thought in the 19th century using John S. Mill’s political utilitarianism as an example. In my paper, I will show that, despite Mill’s criticism of Kantian ethics, his political philosophy shares with Kant the common pathos of Enlightenment humanism and has some important parallels with the Kantian theory of cosmopolitanism. This suggests that Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, his thoughts on the civil and political development of mankind, in particular his concept of citizen of the world, could serve as one of the sources of political ideas of utilitarianism.
The concept of ‘citizen of the world’ has been for long associated
with the idea “that all human beings, regardless of their political
affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single
community” (Kleingeld, Brown, 2019). In recent years, cosmopolitanism
has become an increasingly important theoretical stance in the social
sciences, especially influential within normative political theory,
“in the context of issues relating to globalization and transnational
movements of all kinds” (Delanty 2008, p. 218). Its significance is so
great that some authors speak of a cosmopolitan turn in the social
sciences
Though cosmopolitanism was one of the mainstream ideas in political
thought of the Enlightenment, it did not last long after Kant’s death,
just “until the intellectual climate grew increasingly nationalist in
the early nineteenth century” (Kleingeld 1999, p. 506). The French
Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars engulfed a significant
part of the European continent and became an important catalyst for
national awakening in Europe and beyond (for instance, in Latin
America). The idea that each folk or nation, like an individual, has
its own special identity and national character, and, for this reason,
has the right to self-determination and the exercise of their rights
and freedoms in an independent political state, turned out to be more
attractive to many of the divided nations of Europe than the abstract
cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. Therefore, already in the early
19th century, the cosmopolitan idea had face up to the idea of a
nation state and local
patriotism
Nevertheless, despite the significant rise of the national idea after 1789, there was no decisive break with cosmopolitan views in political thought in the period following The French Revolution. On the contrary, both nationalism and cosmopolitanism remained the most important political ideas throughout the 19th century with “a marked tendency to conflate irreconcilable elements within the two ideas (Kaufmann 2003, p. 14). Still, there are striking examples of a conflation of these seemingly irreconcilable ideas within the same political theory. One of them can be found in the theory of political utilitarianism, with its so-called ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ (Varouxakis 2008, p. 295). Classic utilitarians are primarily known for their moral philosophy, which is based on the understanding of utility or happiness as the highest good. But they also made significant contributions to political theory, “the largest contribution by the English to political theory” (Plamenatz 1949, p. 2) profoundly influencing the shape of nineteenth century political thought and discourse. For this reason, it seems important to identify meeting points and possible alignments between Kant’s cosmopolitan theory and the cosmopolitan concept of John S. Mill, one of the most prominent and influential representatives of utilitarianism.
My paper’s major goal is to respond to the topic of how Kant’s cosmopolitanism influenced the evolution of political thought in the 19th century using John S. Mill’s political utilitarianism as an example. In my paper, I will show that despite Mill’s criticism of Kantian ethics, his political philosophy shares with Kant the pathos of Enlightenment humanism and has some significant parallels with Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism. I will begin by providing an overview of Kant’s concept of ‘citizen of the world’ as a part of the system of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. In this part of my paper, I will try to define the place of the concept of ‘citizen of the world’ in Kant’s pragmatic anthropology and describe a special kind of Kantian cosmopolitanism, based on Kant’s anthropological views. Next, in the second part, I’ll focus on John Stuart Mill’s ‘political cosmopolitanism’. And then, in the third part, I’ll compare Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and John S. Mill’s political (or patriotic) cosmopolitanism. Finally, in the last part of my paper, I will summarize the results obtained in the previous parts and draw a general conclusion.
Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism, especially in his later version of the 1790s, is multifaceted and can be differentiated in a variety of forms or aspects: epistemological, economic or commercial, moral, ethico- theological, political, cultural, juridical or legal etc. (see more on this topic, for instance: Kleingeld 1999; Cavallar 2012). However, among all these aspects, one more can be distinguished, based on Kant’s understanding of the social nature of human beings, that is, their skill at using their knowledge and ability to use other people for common aims - that means, it is about the pragmatic aspect in a special Kantian sense. In other words, pragmatic cosmopolitanism is another kind of cosmopolitanism that may be discussed within the framework of Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism.
This kind of cosmopolitanism is historically probably the earliest
in Kant. Its roots go back to the time of the appearance of Kant’s
pragmatic problematics - i.e. at least to the beginning of the 1770s,
when Kant began to lecture on anthropology, and perhaps to even
earlier times, to the years of ‘the elegant magister’ if we take into
account Kant’s interest to social life in form of kind of ‘world
knowledge’ and collecting of various information on other countries
inspiring him to start his lectures on physical geography (1755), his
thoughts on
‘urbanity’
The process of rivalry between the two concepts - ‘man of the
world’ and ‘citizen of the world’ begins in the first half of the
1770s, when Kant comes to cosmopolitan (and pragmatic) issues. From
this point on, they are used in parallel by Kant in a social and
pragmatic aspect, with ‘citizen of the world’ appearing regularly in his printed works, while ‘man of the world’ appears mainly in
lecture notes or in marginal
notes
But why is it reasonable to single out this type of cosmopolitanism in Kant, and how does it differ from other forms of Kantian cosmopolitanism? First, pragmatic cosmopolitanism differs from its other varieties in Kant in that it emphasizes the social nature of a human being, who, precisely by its very nature, is aware of the commonality of its interests with other people. This awareness promotes active interaction with other members of their species, wherever they live on the planet, and the desire to form a community with them and actively participate in its development. Second, pragmatic cosmopolitanism differs from other types of Kantian cosmopolitanism in its aim, which is the most effective social structure that would allow humanity to achieve the greatest development of its abilities (both on the social and on the individual level). Thirdly, a feature of pragmatic cosmopolitanism is the instrumentalization of other members of the community, which is necessary to achieve set goals. The pragmatic point here is that the more each person understands others and the traits of their social behavior (Weltkenntnis), the more successful they will be in interacting with others to achieve a common goal—the happiness or common good of all mankind (Weltklugheit).
Obviously, pragmatic cosmopolitanism is closely related to other varieties of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, each of which is not a separate cosmopolitan theory, but only a separate aspect, a separate part “of a greater system and are compatible with each other” (Cavallar 2012, p. 97). It intersects especially closely with Kant’s political cosmopolitanism, since social interaction takes place within a certain socio-political structure and humans ultimately tend to unite within the framework of a single global confederation or world republic); with economic or commercial cosmopolitanism, for the focus of both types is effective interaction with other people to achieve certain goals (individual or social); with the juridical type, because the participation of members of the world community in social interaction can be most effective only in the case, when all these members have equal rights in it and that these rights are steadily observed.
The pragmatic aspect of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is also connected with the issue of the practical and most effective ways of the implementation of the political and legal unity of the whole of mankind, since it is obvious that the achievement of a global civil law state on the planet will require a number of intermediate steps, including at the local level, i.e. through the achievement of a high level of civil law status within some certain states and nations, which, then, through regional associations, could eventually unite later into one single global whole (AA VIII, 356; Kant 1991, p. 104). From here it quite logically follows that at least until the moment when humanity is completely and finally united into a single political and legal whole, people will have to deal with the arrangement of their local political entities, of which they are citizens. At this point, Kant’s political thought comes very close to the ideas of political utilitarianism of John S. Mill, to his so-called ‘patriotic cosmopolitanism’, which will be in the focus of discussion in the next part of my paper.
John S. Mill’s political philosophy certainly belongs to the cosmopolitan tradition. This is mainly because of the egalitarian and liberal character of utilitarian moral philosophy which recognizes a human being as part of a global moral community whose members obtain the equal moral dignity and freedom to choose the means to achieve their own individual happiness, as long as it does not harm the happiness of other persons and «the collective interests of mankind» (CW X, p. 218). The utilitarians consider utility or happiness as the directive rule of human conduct, happiness is for them the highest aim of man. But since for utilitarians we, humans, are social beings, endowed with a sense of sociability and having “the desire to unite with our neighbors”, the highest goal of a person “is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether” (CW X, p. 213), and ultimately the happiness of the whole of mankind. This means that all individual happiness is inextricably linked with the happiness of other people, ultimately with the happiness of all mankind. This makes achieving the general happiness of all mankind a condition for achieving the greatest happiness for certain individuals and motivates them to contribute to the happiness of other people, to some kind of ‘pragmatic’ relationships and cooperation with other people in society.
Three factors, according to Mill, impede human happiness: people’s selfishness, lack of intelligence, and bad state laws. On an individual level, this means, first of all, the need to reject selfishness and realize oneself as a social being, so that “one of his natural wants that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those if his fellow creatures” (CW X, p. 233). For Mill, secondly, the lack of intelligence among the members of the human community can be overcome through the improvement of individual abilities and this means, that social progress needs, in order to achieve its main aim - happiness of all mankind – a full realization of the potential of all individuals, and not only the improvement one’s individual abilities, but also personal contribution to their development in other members of society (Cf. Robson 1968, p. 186). Human’s superior intelligence combined with their superior social sensibilities enables a person “to attach himself to the collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind in such a manner that any act hurtful to them raises his instinct of sympathy and urges him to resistance.” (CW X, p. 248). This developed sense of sociability, which is inherent to human nature, is what propels human progress to the point where people’s interests and well- being become “a thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to” in the same way as their own interests and well-being do (CW X, p. 232).
However, despite the obvious moral tone of utilitarian cosmopolitanism with its priority of the common human good over the individual, the recognition of equal moral dignity of all people on Earth, regardless of race and gender, utilitarian cosmopolitanism was not only moral, one-dimensional and abstract, but implied different levels of social organization, a kind of hierarchy of human communities, beginning from very small local groups in some areas to nations and populations of entire countries, with the whole of mankind at the top of this hierarchy. As Varouxakis rightly remarks, Mill obviously did not see a contradiction between a person’s feelings of belonging to a particular nation or region and feelings of being a citizen of the world at the same time (Varouxakis 2002, pp. 118- 119). Moreover, love for one’s own local community, for one’s own country, in Mill’s view, not only did not contradict the feeling of belonging to global humanity, but also contributed to the good of the larger country and the world, since patriotism, in Mill’s opinion, consists in a feeling of pride for your country, for the contribution to the common well-being and happiness of all mankind, to its improvement, which your nation, country or local community can make (see, for instance: CW XXI, 115; Cf. Varouxakis 2002, pp. 122-123). At the same time, Mill believes that the contribution of different nations to the well-being and happiness of all mankind is not the same among various nations, and nations like individuals can or cannot think regarding „for the good of other nations”, that their own good and the good of others compatible or not, be more or less selfish (CW XXI, p. 115 f.). This stems from the uneven development of mankind in its different parts, from the fact that certain communities or even entire nations can be at different stages of evolution, be more progressive or ‘civilized’, to be more open to the world and doing more than others for the benefit of the whole of humanity, like, for example, most European nations. Or they can be backward, barbaric and egoistic, like, for example, many nations in the other parts of the world. These nations are, according to Mill, not yet ready for complete independence and need control from more developed nations (CW XXI, pp. 118119). Mill considered his native Britain to be the most civilized of the contemporary European countries that made the greatest contribution to the development of mankind, and he described the British (obviously highly idealised) in his article A Few Words on Non-Intervention (CW X, p.111 f.) like “the quintessential cosmopolitan nation.” (Varouxakis 2008, p. 293). In Mill’s opinion, Britain, unlike other countries, never enters the outside world for imperialist purposes (CW X, p. 113 f.). And when Britain decides to act outside its borders at all, it does so in order to improve the world, for instance ending conflicts, bringing civilization, etc. Unlike other nations, writes Mill, “There is no such base feeling in the British people. They are accustomed to see their advantage in forwarding, not in keeping back the growth in the wealth and civilization of the world.” (CW X, p. 117). So, as we can see, Mill himself was not only a citizen of the world in his views but also a great patriot of his homeland, even if he was obviously inclined to a clear overestimation of Britain’s merits to humanity.
This combination of love for the fatherland with the awareness of belonging to the whole of humanity gives grounds to characterize Mill’s position as patriotic cosmopolitanism, or, in the words of Georgios Varouxakis, as cosmopolitan patriotism (Varouxakis 2002, pp. 122-123). According to Varouxakis, Mill’s cosmopolitanism does not consist in abandoning one’s nation or homeland, but in striving to influence the behavior of one’s own nation in such a way that it contributes as much as possible to the progress and the good of the whole of mankind, so that one could be proud of this contribution. In fact, for Mill, patriotism is a necessary practical step on the path to cosmopolitanism, since in the 19th century (and, perhaps, even today), pride in the contribution of one’s nation to the development of mankind could have a greater influence on human behavior than the love for the whole of humanity, since the latter may seem to many only an abstract idea, while the love of your country and to your fellow-countryman could seem much more concrete and tangible. In Mill’s cosmopolitan conception, patriotism plays an important role because it contributes to the stability of the political system promoting “cohesion among the members of the same community or state” (CW VIII, p. 923). Moreover, this local patriotism can be improved with the intellectual development of individuals, with their introduction to education and culture, and finally replaced by global patriotism, by a sense of belonging to a bigger country and to a bigger group of people – the sense of being a citizen of the world (CW X, p. 232). In this essentially pragmatic and cosmopolitan interpretation of the idea of human progress through the intellectual and moral improvement of individuals, the movement to global cosmopolitan unity (be it a world union of republics or a world republic) through the development of local communities, countries and nations, Mill is so close to the ideas of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology, to his idea of the moral and socio-political progress of mankind, that the question of whether this rapprochement is the result of the direct or indirect influence of the German philosopher suggests itself. In the next paragraph, I will outline my idea on how this question сan be answered.
John S. Mill rarely explicitly refers to Kant - at least in his main works - there are very few of them. On the whole, Mill’s interest in Kant is limited to ethics and when he turns to Kant, as, for example, in the one of his main writings - in Utilitarianism, he usually criticizes Kant’s moral philosophy, his categorical imperative, while at the same time being willing to accept the latter in a kind of utilitarian and cosmopolitan interpretation: “we ought to shape our conduct by a rule which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective interest” (CW X, p. 249).
Mill was obviously quite familiar with Kant’s main works, at least the ethical one. As for the rest of Kant’s writings, there is no clear indication that Mill was acquainted with them or that he was generally interested in other parts of Kant’s philosophy - for example, whether Mill was acquainted with Kant’s political writings or with Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view. However, there are a number of significant points of agreement between the social and political ideas of Kant and Mill, which are especially well traced in their cosmopolitan views on human nature.
The first and most obvious similarity between the cosmopolitan views of Kant and Mill can be found in the moral aspect of their cosmopolitanism, since both share liberal ideals of equality, “that all persons have unique and equal worth as human beings” (Fitzpatrick 2006, p. 15), “that all human beings are members of a single moral community, and that they have moral obligations to others regardless of their nationality, language, religion, customs, and so on” (Kleingeld 2003, p. 301). Though Kant’s and Mill’s moral cosmopolitanism are based on completely different, rather even largely opposite, moral doctrines: in Kant’s ethics, morality is based on the special nature of the motivation of human actions, on the a priori principle of duty, while in Mill’s ethics, morality is based on the empirical principle of utility.
However, a much deeper similarity between the cosmopolitan views of
Kant and Mill is revealed when comparing the anthropological
foundations that underlie Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s
patriotic cosmopolitanism. At the heart of Kant’s pragmatic
cosmopolitanism is the concept of “unsocial sociability”
(
Based on these points in understanding the social nature of humans, in which Kant’s pragmatism approaches the position of utilitarians, we can trace some further parallels in the socio-political views of Kant and Mill. In contrast to the more abstract moral cosmopolitanism, Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism are more focused on practical day-to-day activities in real life rather than abstract human communities. And here the question arises of how a person can contribute to the progress and the common good of all mankind, still rather abstract, while being a member of a local community, one of the many people living on the planet. Is it possible to simultaneously be a member of a local community, be a patriot of your local homeland, nation, country, and at the same time perceive oneself as a ‘citizen of the world’ and a part of the whole of humanity? For Mill, the answer to this question is obvious: love for one’s global homeland, for all of humanity, can and should be realized at the current stage of development through love for the fatherland, for one’s country and people. Contributing to the development of their cultural, civilizing influence and the progress of other countries and peoples, can at the same time contribute to the development of all mankind (CW X, p. 232). However, Mill is far from the nationalism so popular in the 19th century, at least from the vulgar nationalism that implies a sense of superiority or even hatred towards other nations, and which he openly rejects. Instead he advocates in essence an ‘enlightened’ nationalism or patriotism, which is essentially a kind of ‘local cosmopolitanism’ preceding global ‘world’ cosmopolitanism.
It might seem that for Kant, whois considered being the classico f1
8th century enlightened cosmopolitan ism, cosmopolitanism ought to be
incompatible with patriotism. But in fact this is not the case, and
Kant succeeds quite well in combining both positions. First, Kant,
like Mill, is opposed to vulgar nationalism, opposed to a ‘national
delusion’ (
In addition to many common conceptual features, Kant’s pragmatic
cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism share a number of
separate prejudices with each other, which is especially evident in
their assessment of other
peoples
Finally, the following brief conclusions should be noted. First of all, despite significant differences in their moral philosophies, Kant and Mill have many points of agreement in their socio-political thought. This is especially noticeable when comparing Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s patriotic cosmopolitanism. Pragmatic cosmopolitanism is one of the earliest varieties of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, which appeared in Kant along with pragmatic problems at least from the beginning of the 1770s and developed through the rivalry between the concepts of ‘man of the world’ and ‘citizen of the world’ until the late period, with the disappearance of the former concept and gradual pragmatisation and socialization of the later one. Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism shares with Mill’s political cosmopolitanism the focus on achieving practical goals, benefits, and individual happiness, however, in both concepts of ‘citizen of the world’, the priority is not individual happiness, but public happiness, over and above which stands the happiness of all mankind. This means that in some sense Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism is somewhat utilitarian, and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism is to some extent pragmatic.
Kant was not among those thinkers who directly influenced Mill’s political philosophy. Unlike Kant’s moral writings, we have no clear certainty that Mill was familiar with Kant’s anthropological and political writings. However, conceptually, Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism are quite close and seem to rely on similar anthropological ideas, liberal and egalitarian in their nature. Therefore, we can assume at least an indirect influence of Kant on Mill, through the general set of ideas of the late Enlightenment, which were established in European socio-political thought under Kant’s influence. The similarity of their socio-political views, liberal and cosmopolitan in essence, clearly demonstrates that the cosmopolitan tradition of the Enlightenment, most prominently expressed in the philosophy of Kant, continued to exist in the 19th century, although it was undergoing some transformations under the influence of the ideas of nationalism.
See, for example, the special issue of the British Journal of Sociology. Vol. 57. No. 1 (2006) on Cosmopolitan Sociology, edited by U. Beck and N. Szaider and the Special issue of the European Journal of Social Theory. Vol. 10. No. 1 (2007) on cosmopolitanism.
See, for instance, Fichte’s Addresses to the German Nation (1806), and also Hegel’s criticism of Kant’s cosmopolitanism in Philo- sophy of Right (1820).
See, for example, an episode that happened in 1758 and is described by Ludwig Borowski in his Kant biography, when Kant, in one of his ‘Disputatorio’, explains to his students the difference between ‘urbanity’, i.e. essentially the skill of effective social commu- nication between free and equal citizens, and ‘courtesy’ (Höflichkeit), as the skill of effective social communication in conditions of inequality and hierarchical relations within the court environment (Borowski 1804/1993, pp. 53–54).
This undoubtedly indicates that ‘man of the world’ was a rather significant concept for Kant, which he thought about quite a lot, taking into account that Kant’s lectures on anthropology can be considered a kind of sounding laboratory of his socio-political thought (Salikov, 2018: 15; Salikov, 2020: 121), but which he did not find a place in his ‘official’ philosophy, in his published writings.
So, Kant, for example, sometimes mentioned colonial practices and slavery without a share of any criticism, as something quite natural and acceptable (see AA II, 438; AA VIII, 174; AA XXV, 362-5), and Mill justified imperialism and the colonial policy of the British Empire. Though it must be admitted that Mill’s ideas were more modern from our point of view, he even actively supported the North American States in their war against the slave-owning south, while there is no record of whether Kant, for example, supported the revolution in Haiti (Cf. Salikov 2024, p. 66; Huseyinzadegan 2024, p. 9; Zhavoronkov, Salikov 2018, p. 288; Kleingeld 2014, pp. 64-65).