1. Introduction
The concept of ‘citizen of the world’ has been for long associated
with the idea “that all human beings, regardless of their political
affiliation, are (or can and should be) citizens in a single community”
(Kleingeld, Brown, 2019). In recent years, cosmopolitanism has become an
increasingly important theoretical stance in the social sciences,
especially influential within normative political theory, “in the
context of issues relating to globalization and transnational movements
of all kinds” (Delanty 2008, p. 218). Its significance is so great that
some authors speak of a cosmopolitan turn in the social sciences. However, this cosmopolitan turn, in
a certain sense, is far from being the first in the history of social
thought. Its roots go back to the Enlightenment of the 18th century,
which was essentially the heyday of the ideas of cosmopolitanism in
Europe with Kant’s concept of cosmopolitanism at its apex, uniting the
entire complex of ideas associated with the era of enlightened
cosmopolitanism.
Though cosmopolitanism was one of the mainstream ideas in political
thought of the Enlightenment, it did not last long after Kant’s death,
just “until the intellectual climate grew increasingly nationalist in
the early nineteenth century” (Kleingeld 1999, p. 506). The French
Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic Wars engulfed a significant
part of the European continent and became an important catalyst for
national awakening in Europe and beyond (for instance, in Latin
America). The idea that each folk or nation, like an individual, has its
own special identity and national character, and, for this reason, has
the right to self-determination and the exercise of their rights and
freedoms in an independent political state, turned out to be more
attractive to many of the divided nations of Europe than the abstract
cosmopolitanism of the Enlightenment. Therefore, already in the early
19th century, the cosmopolitan idea had face up to the idea of a nation
state and local patriotism. The Enlightenment idea
of world unity and world citizenship lost much of its appeal to the
political thinkers of that time and their contemporaries (cf. Meinecke
1970, pp. 45–6, 55, 61–2).
Nevertheless, despite the significant rise of the national idea after
1789, there was no decisive break with cosmopolitan views in political
thought in the period following The French Revolution. On the contrary,
both nationalism and cosmopolitanism remained the most important
political ideas throughout the 19th century with “a marked tendency to
conflate irreconcilable elements within the two ideas (Kaufmann 2003, p.
14). Still, there are striking examples of a conflation of these
seemingly irreconcilable ideas within the same political theory. One of
them can be found in the theory of political utilitarianism, with its
so-called ‘cosmopolitan patriotism’ (Varouxakis 2008, p. 295). Classic
utilitarians are primarily known for their moral philosophy, which is
based on the understanding of utility or happiness as the highest good.
But they also made significant contributions to political theory, “the
largest contribution by the English to political theory” (Plamenatz
1949, p. 2) profoundly influencing the shape of nineteenth century
political thought and discourse. For this reason, it seems important to
identify meeting points and possible alignments between Kant’s
cosmopolitan theory and the cosmopolitan concept of John S. Mill, one of
the most prominent and influential representatives of
utilitarianism.
My paper’s major goal is to respond to the topic of how Kant’s
cosmopolitanism influenced the evolution of political thought in the
19th century using John S. Mill’s political utilitarianism as an
example. In my paper, I will show that despite Mill’s criticism of
Kantian ethics, his political philosophy shares with Kant the pathos of
Enlightenment humanism and has some significant parallels with Kant’s
theory of cosmopolitanism. I will begin by providing an overview of
Kant’s concept of ‘citizen of the world’ as a part of the system of
Kant’s pragmatic anthropology. In this part of my paper, I will try to
define the place of the concept of ‘citizen of the world’ in Kant’s
pragmatic anthropology and describe a special kind of Kantian
cosmopolitanism, based on Kant’s anthropological views. Next, in the
second part, I’ll focus on John Stuart Mill’s ‘political
cosmopolitanism’. And then, in the third part, I’ll compare Kant’s
pragmatic cosmopolitanism and John S. Mill’s political (or patriotic)
cosmopolitanism. Finally, in the last part of my paper, I will summarize
the results obtained in the previous parts and draw a general
conclusion.
2.
The emergence and development of Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism:
‘citizen of the world’ vs. ‘man of the world’
Kant’s theory of cosmopolitanism, especially in his later version of
the 1790s, is multifaceted and can be differentiated in a variety of
forms or aspects: epistemological, economic or commercial, moral,
ethico- theological, political, cultural, juridical or legal etc. (see
more on this topic, for instance: Kleingeld 1999; Cavallar 2012).
However, among all these aspects, one more can be distinguished, based
on Kant’s understanding of the social nature of human beings, that is,
their skill at using their knowledge and ability to use other people for
common aims - that means, it is about the pragmatic aspect in a special
Kantian sense. In other words, pragmatic cosmopolitanism is another kind
of cosmopolitanism that may be discussed within the framework of Kant’s
theory of cosmopolitanism.
This kind of cosmopolitanism is historically probably the earliest in
Kant. Its roots go back to the time of the appearance of Kant’s
pragmatic problematics - i.e. at least to the beginning of the 1770s,
when Kant began to lecture on anthropology, and perhaps to even earlier
times, to the years of ‘the elegant magister’ if we take into account
Kant’s interest to social life in form of kind of ‘world knowledge’ and
collecting of various information on other countries inspiring him to
start his lectures on physical geography (1755), his thoughts on
‘urbanity’, this means about
socially acceptable behavior, what it should be for effective
communication and socialization in society. Pragmatic cosmopolitanism
was largely formed in the process of a kind of competition between two
concepts – ‘citizen of the world’ and ‘man of the world’ (see also on
this topic Salikov, Sturm, Zhavoronkov 2025, pp. 20-24). Both terms –
‘citizen of the world’ and ‘man of the world’ – relevant for Kant’s
pragmatic cosmopolitanism, are connected in a certain way by their
constituent first part – Welt- (‘world’) denoting belonging to the world
in the social sense, to humanity in all its diversity on the planet,
being a part or member of a global community, and in this way, making
them cosmopolitan.
The process of rivalry between the two concepts - ‘man of the world’
and ‘citizen of the world’ begins in the first half of the 1770s, when
Kant comes to cosmopolitan (and pragmatic) issues. From this point on,
they are used in parallel by Kant in a social and pragmatic aspect, with
‘citizen of the world’ appearing regularly in his printed works, while
‘man of the world’ appears mainly in lecture notes or in marginal
notes. Both concepts had undergone a
significant evolution since their first appearance in Kant by the 1790s,
which can be characterized as a gradual ‘socialization’ and
‘pragmatization’ of the term ‘citizen of the world’. From the very broad
universal understanding of the 1760s, through to its narrower human and
social subtypes in the 1770s and socio-historical cosmopolitanism in the
first half to mid-1780s. It continues on to the complex cosmopolitanism
of the late 1780s–1790s, with explicit ‘social’ (and ‘pragmatic’)
overtones to characterize a person who not only considers himself a part
of the world (human) community and doesn’t simply follow the existing
legal, moral, religious and other norms of society, but plays an active
role in it. In other words, able to participate in its formation and
development (i.e. mitspielen in Kant’s words): „the expressions
“to know the world” and “to have the world” are rather far from each
other in their meaning, since one only understands the play that one has
watched, while the other has participated in it“ (AA VII, 120; Kant
2007, p. 232). From a pragmatic point of view ‘citizen of the world’
means in this late period a person obtaining ‘citizen of the world’
(Weltkenntnis) and prudence (in the form of ‘world prudence’,
Weltklugheit), using them for common goals and benefits. As for
the term ‘man of the world’, it becomes almost or completely identical
in meaning to ‘citizen of the world’ (AA VIII: 277; Kant, 1991, p. 63).
It practically merges with ‘citizen of the world’ in the last period,
giving the latter a pragmatic overtone: Kant’s ‘citizen of the world’
not only has a sense of belonging to the world society, but he knows how
to use other members of the human community for the benefit of all
mankind. Taking into account the context of use of ‘citizen of the
world’ in Kant’s late writings, it becomes clear why the main notion of
his pragmatic anthropology is not the egoistic ‘man of the world’, but
the socially active ‘citizen of the world’: this type of world person
does not only know people, social norms and how to use them for his own
purposes, but he has also obtained a developed social consciousness and
uses his social knowledge and skills for the benefit of the whole
society. This is particularly clear in Anthropology, when Kant notes
that the ubiquitous (logical, practical, and aesthetic) “egoism” of
human beings can only be superseded by the “pluralism” of the ‘citizen
of the world’: “The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is,
the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the
whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen
of the world” (AA VII, 120; Kant 2007, p. 232).
But why is it reasonable to single out this type of cosmopolitanism
in Kant, and how does it differ from other forms of Kantian
cosmopolitanism? First, pragmatic cosmopolitanism differs from its other
varieties in Kant in that it emphasizes the social nature of a human
being, who, precisely by its very nature, is aware of the commonality of
its interests with other people. This awareness promotes active
interaction with other members of their species, wherever they live on
the planet, and the desire to form a community with them and actively
participate in its development. Second, pragmatic cosmopolitanism
differs from other types of Kantian cosmopolitanism in its aim, which is
the most effective social structure that would allow humanity to achieve
the greatest development of its abilities (both on the social and on the
individual level). Thirdly, a feature of pragmatic cosmopolitanism is
the instrumentalization of other members of the community, which is
necessary to achieve set goals. The pragmatic point here is that the
more each person understands others and the traits of their social
behavior (Weltkenntnis), the more successful they will be in interacting
with others to achieve a common goal—the happiness or common good of all
mankind (Weltklugheit).
Obviously, pragmatic cosmopolitanism is closely related to other
varieties of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, each of which is not a separate
cosmopolitan theory, but only a separate aspect, a separate part “of a
greater system and are compatible with each other” (Cavallar 2012, p.
97). It intersects especially closely with Kant’s political
cosmopolitanism, since social interaction takes place within a certain
socio-political structure and humans ultimately tend to unite within the
framework of a single global confederation or world republic); with
economic or commercial cosmopolitanism, for the focus of both types is
effective interaction with other people to achieve certain goals
(individual or social); with the juridical type, because the
participation of members of the world community in social interaction
can be most effective only in the case, when all these members have
equal rights in it and that these rights are steadily observed.
The pragmatic aspect of Kant’s cosmopolitanism is also connected with
the issue of the practical and most effective ways of the implementation
of the political and legal unity of the whole of mankind, since it is
obvious that the achievement of a global civil law state on the planet
will require a number of intermediate steps, including at the local
level, i.e. through the achievement of a high level of civil law status
within some certain states and nations, which, then, through regional
associations, could eventually unite later into one single global whole
(AA VIII, 356; Kant 1991, p. 104). From here it quite logically follows
that at least until the moment when humanity is completely and finally
united into a single political and legal whole, people will have to deal
with the arrangement of their local political entities, of which they
are citizens. At this point, Kant’s political thought comes very close
to the ideas of political utilitarianism of John S. Mill, to his
so-called ‘patriotic cosmopolitanism’, which will be in the focus of
discussion in the next part of my paper.
3. John Stuart
Mill’s ‘Patriotic Cosmopolitanism’
John S. Mill’s political philosophy certainly belongs to the
cosmopolitan tradition. This is mainly because of the egalitarian and
liberal character of utilitarian moral philosophy which recognizes a
human being as part of a global moral community whose members obtain the
equal moral dignity and freedom to choose the means to achieve their own
individual happiness, as long as it does not harm the happiness of other
persons and «the collective interests of mankind» (CW X, p. 218). The
utilitarians consider utility or happiness as the directive rule of
human conduct, happiness is for them the highest aim of man. But since
for utilitarians we, humans, are social beings, endowed with a sense of
sociability and having “the desire to unite with our neighbors”, the
highest goal of a person “is not the agent’s own greatest happiness, but
the greatest amount of happiness altogether” (CW X, p. 213), and
ultimately the happiness of the whole of mankind. This means that all
individual happiness is inextricably linked with the happiness of other
people, ultimately with the happiness of all mankind. This makes
achieving the general happiness of all mankind a condition for achieving
the greatest happiness for certain individuals and motivates them to
contribute to the happiness of other people, to some kind of ‘pragmatic’
relationships and cooperation with other people in society.
Three factors, according to Mill, impede human happiness: people’s
selfishness, lack of intelligence, and bad state laws. On an individual
level, this means, first of all, the need to reject selfishness and
realize oneself as a social being, so that “one of his natural wants
that there should be harmony between his feelings and aims and those if
his fellow creatures” (CW X, p. 233). For Mill, secondly, the lack of
intelligence among the members of the human community can be overcome
through the improvement of individual abilities and this means, that
social progress needs, in order to achieve its main aim - happiness of
all mankind – a full realization of the potential of all individuals,
and not only the improvement one’s individual abilities, but also
personal contribution to their development in other members of society
(Cf. Robson 1968, p. 186). Human’s superior intelligence combined with
their superior social sensibilities enables a person “to attach himself
to the collective idea of his tribe, his country, or mankind in such a
manner that any act hurtful to them raises his instinct of sympathy and
urges him to resistance.” (CW X, p. 248). This developed sense of
sociability, which is inherent to human nature, is what propels human
progress to the point where people’s interests and well- being become “a
thing naturally and necessarily to be attended to” in the same way as
their own interests and well-being do (CW X, p. 232).
However, despite the obvious moral tone of utilitarian
cosmopolitanism with its priority of the common human good over the
individual, the recognition of equal moral dignity of all people on
Earth, regardless of race and gender, utilitarian cosmopolitanism was
not only moral, one-dimensional and abstract, but implied different
levels of social organization, a kind of hierarchy of human communities,
beginning from very small local groups in some areas to nations and
populations of entire countries, with the whole of mankind at the top of
this hierarchy. As Varouxakis rightly remarks, Mill obviously did not
see a contradiction between a person’s feelings of belonging to a
particular nation or region and feelings of being a citizen of the world
at the same time (Varouxakis 2002, pp. 118- 119). Moreover, love for
one’s own local community, for one’s own country, in Mill’s view, not
only did not contradict the feeling of belonging to global humanity, but
also contributed to the good of the larger country and the world, since
patriotism, in Mill’s opinion, consists in a feeling of pride for your
country, for the contribution to the common well-being and happiness of
all mankind, to its improvement, which your nation, country or local
community can make (see, for instance: CW XXI, 115; Cf. Varouxakis 2002,
pp. 122-123). At the same time, Mill believes that the contribution of
different nations to the well-being and happiness of all mankind is not
the same among various nations, and nations like individuals can or
cannot think regarding „for the good of other nations”, that their own
good and the good of others compatible or not, be more or less selfish
(CW XXI, p. 115 f.). This stems from the uneven development of mankind
in its different parts, from the fact that certain communities or even
entire nations can be at different stages of evolution, be more
progressive or ‘civilized’, to be more open to the world and doing more
than others for the benefit of the whole of humanity, like, for example,
most European nations. Or they can be backward, barbaric and egoistic,
like, for example, many nations in the other parts of the world. These
nations are, according to Mill, not yet ready for complete independence
and need control from more developed nations (CW XXI, pp. 118119). Mill
considered his native Britain to be the most civilized of the
contemporary European countries that made the greatest contribution to
the development of mankind, and he described the British (obviously
highly idealised) in his article A Few Words on Non-Intervention (CW X,
p.111 f.) like “the quintessential cosmopolitan nation.” (Varouxakis
2008, p. 293). In Mill’s opinion, Britain, unlike other countries, never
enters the outside world for imperialist purposes (CW X, p. 113 f.). And
when Britain decides to act outside its borders at all, it does so in
order to improve the world, for instance ending conflicts, bringing
civilization, etc. Unlike other nations, writes Mill, “There is no such
base feeling in the British people. They are accustomed to see their
advantage in forwarding, not in keeping back the growth in the wealth
and civilization of the world.” (CW X, p. 117). So, as we can see, Mill
himself was not only a citizen of the world in his views but also a
great patriot of his homeland, even if he was obviously inclined to a
clear overestimation of Britain’s merits to humanity.
This combination of love for the fatherland with the awareness of
belonging to the whole of humanity gives grounds to characterize Mill’s
position as patriotic cosmopolitanism, or, in the words of Georgios
Varouxakis, as cosmopolitan patriotism (Varouxakis 2002, pp. 122-123).
According to Varouxakis, Mill’s cosmopolitanism does not consist in
abandoning one’s nation or homeland, but in striving to influence the
behavior of one’s own nation in such a way that it contributes as much
as possible to the progress and the good of the whole of mankind, so
that one could be proud of this contribution. In fact, for Mill,
patriotism is a necessary practical step on the path to cosmopolitanism,
since in the 19th century (and, perhaps, even today), pride in the
contribution of one’s nation to the development of mankind could have a
greater influence on human behavior than the love for the whole of
humanity, since the latter may seem to many only an abstract idea, while
the love of your country and to your fellow-countryman could seem much
more concrete and tangible. In Mill’s cosmopolitan conception,
patriotism plays an important role because it contributes to the
stability of the political system promoting “cohesion among the members
of the same community or state” (CW VIII, p. 923). Moreover, this local
patriotism can be improved with the intellectual development of
individuals, with their introduction to education and culture, and
finally replaced by global patriotism, by a sense of belonging to a
bigger country and to a bigger group of people – the sense of being a
citizen of the world (CW X, p. 232). In this essentially pragmatic and
cosmopolitan interpretation of the idea of human progress through the
intellectual and moral improvement of individuals, the movement to
global cosmopolitan unity (be it a world union of republics or a world
republic) through the development of local communities, countries and
nations, Mill is so close to the ideas of Kant’s pragmatic anthropology,
to his idea of the moral and socio-political progress of mankind, that
the question of whether this rapprochement is the result of the direct
or indirect influence of the German philosopher suggests itself. In the
next paragraph, I will outline my idea on how this question сan be
answered.
4.
Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and John S. Mill’s patriotic
cosmopolitanism
John S. Mill rarely explicitly refers to Kant - at least in his main
works - there are very few of them. On the whole, Mill’s interest in
Kant is limited to ethics and when he turns to Kant, as, for example, in
the one of his main writings - in Utilitarianism, he usually criticizes
Kant’s moral philosophy, his categorical imperative, while at the same
time being willing to accept the latter in a kind of utilitarian and
cosmopolitan interpretation: “we ought to shape our conduct by a rule
which all rational beings might adopt with benefit to their collective
interest” (CW X, p. 249).
Mill was obviously quite familiar with Kant’s main works, at least
the ethical one. As for the rest of Kant’s writings, there is no clear
indication that Mill was acquainted with them or that he was generally
interested in other parts of Kant’s philosophy - for example, whether
Mill was acquainted with Kant’s political writings or with Anthropology
from a pragmatic point of view. However, there are a number of
significant points of agreement between the social and political ideas
of Kant and Mill, which are especially well traced in their cosmopolitan
views on human nature.
The first and most obvious similarity between the cosmopolitan views
of Kant and Mill can be found in the moral aspect of their
cosmopolitanism, since both share liberal ideals of equality, “that all
persons have unique and equal worth as human beings” (Fitzpatrick 2006,
p. 15), “that all human beings are members of a single moral community,
and that they have moral obligations to others regardless of their
nationality, language, religion, customs, and so on” (Kleingeld 2003, p.
301). Though Kant’s and Mill’s moral cosmopolitanism are based on
completely different, rather even largely opposite, moral doctrines: in
Kant’s ethics, morality is based on the special nature of the motivation
of human actions, on the a priori principle of duty, while in Mill’s
ethics, morality is based on the empirical principle of utility.
However, a much deeper similarity between the cosmopolitan views of
Kant and Mill is revealed when comparing the anthropological foundations
that underlie Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s patriotic
cosmopolitanism. At the heart of Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism is the
concept of “unsocial sociability” (ungesellige Geselligkeit),
that humans are meant by nature to provide, by their own efforts,
whatever they enjoy of happiness and perfection (AA VIII, 20-22; Kant
1991, pp. 44-45), but at the same time, as a social being, they are able
to achieve it only through interaction with other people, being members
of society. Therefore, it is in the interests of each person not only to
have knowledge and the skill in using other people to achieve their own
goals, but to do this to achieve the common goals of mankind, to promote
the development not only of their own abilities, but also the abilities
and inclinations of other people, the progress of social institutions
and, ultimately, the development of all mankind. This pragmatic picture,
on the whole, is quite consistent with the utilitarian idea of the
social nature of man (with the possible exception of Kant’s
‘unsociableness’, for Mill does not have this dialectic). Mill’s human
being also strives for interaction with other people in order to achieve
common happiness, since it is an important prerequisite for individual
happiness, for individual happiness is impossible if it contradicts the
common happiness. And for this, according to Mill, it is necessary to
promote the intellectual development of other people, to raise the level
of culture and civilization of society, and, ultimately, to promote the
progress of all mankind (CW X, p. 232). At the same time, as in Kant’s
pragmatic anthropology, the public good and general happiness in Mill
take priority over personal interests and individual happiness.
Based on these points in understanding the social nature of humans,
in which Kant’s pragmatism approaches the position of utilitarians, we
can trace some further parallels in the socio-political views of Kant
and Mill. In contrast to the more abstract moral cosmopolitanism, Kant’s
pragmatic cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism are more
focused on practical day-to-day activities in real life rather than
abstract human communities. And here the question arises of how a person
can contribute to the progress and the common good of all mankind, still
rather abstract, while being a member of a local community, one of the
many people living on the planet. Is it possible to simultaneously be a
member of a local community, be a patriot of your local homeland,
nation, country, and at the same time perceive oneself as a ‘citizen of
the world’ and a part of the whole of humanity? For Mill, the answer to
this question is obvious: love for one’s global homeland, for all of
humanity, can and should be realized at the current stage of development
through love for the fatherland, for one’s country and people.
Contributing to the development of their cultural, civilizing influence
and the progress of other countries and peoples, can at the same time
contribute to the development of all mankind (CW X, p. 232). However,
Mill is far from the nationalism so popular in the 19th century, at
least from the vulgar nationalism that implies a sense of superiority or
even hatred towards other nations, and which he openly rejects. Instead
he advocates in essence an ‘enlightened’ nationalism or patriotism,
which is essentially a kind of ‘local cosmopolitanism’ preceding global
‘world’ cosmopolitanism.
It might seem that for Kant, whois considered being the classico f1
8th century enlightened cosmopolitan ism, cosmopolitanism ought to be
incompatible with patriotism. But in fact this is not the case, and Kant
succeeds quite well in combining both positions. First, Kant, like Mill,
is opposed to vulgar nationalism, opposed to a ‘national delusion’
(Nationalwahn), as evidenced by his notes in
Reflexionen on Anthropology (AA XV, Refl. 1353, p. 591).
Secondly, in the Metaphysics of Morals Vigilantus (lecture
notes to lectures he most likely gave in 179394) Kant essentially calls
patriotism and cosmopolitanism just different varieties of love “for the
entire human race”, while the former is local and aimed at the national
community and the latter is global and “directed to our common world
ancestry”. And, he says, “both are required of the cosmopolitan” (AA
XXVII.2.1, p. 673-4). Thus, exactly as for Mill, patriotism and
cosmopolitanism for Kant are essentially two sides of the same coin, a
local and global form of love for all of humanity. At the same time, for
both philosophers it is quite obvious that awareness of oneself as a
‘citizen of the world’, one’s duties to all of humanity represents a
higher level of development of the human mind (primarily social) in
comparison with awareness of oneself as only a part of a local
community. That is why Kant and Mill consider those enlightened peoples
(almost exclusively European peoples) who are aware of their belonging
to global humanity and strive to do something for its good as more
developed peoples. Both philosophers are patriots and consider their own
nations the most cosmopolitan in the world: Kant - the Germans, Mill -
the British. These cosmopolitan nations should contribute to the
development of other peoples and countries. They should introduce them
to culture and civilization, involve them in their political influence -
so that in the end all the peoples of the world can unite into a single
political entity - a world confederation - members of which will be all
the inhabitants of the planet.
In addition to many common conceptual features, Kant’s pragmatic
cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism share a number of
separate prejudices with each other, which is especially evident in
their assessment of other peoples, that is in the
combination of patriotism and cosmopolitanism inherent in both
philosophers. However, this can hardly be considered the result of
Mill’s borrowing this combination of cosmopolitanism and patriotism from
Kant or Kant’s direct influence. In fact, the combination of patriotism,
nationalism (and in the 18th century they were practically
indistinguishable) and cosmopolitanism was quite common in the 18th
century. As Pauline Kleingeld rightly points out in her article Kant’s
Cosmopolitan Patriotism (Kleingeld 2003, p. 305): “this patriotic
cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitan patriotism was defended by a number of
Kant’s contemporaries”: “by Wilhelm von Humboldt, Schiller, Novalis, and
the Schlegel brothers”, until pride in one’s country turned into
aggressive, or, in Mill’s words, “vulgar” nationalism in the 19th
century. In this sense, Mill, with his enlightened nationalism or
patriotism, just followed Kant’s and other cosmopolitan’s steps,
developing his patriotic concept of ‘citizen of the world’.
5. Conclusion
Finally, the following brief conclusions should be noted. First of
all, despite significant differences in their moral philosophies, Kant
and Mill have many points of agreement in their socio-political thought.
This is especially noticeable when comparing Kant’s pragmatic
cosmopolitanism and Mill’s patriotic cosmopolitanism. Pragmatic
cosmopolitanism is one of the earliest varieties of Kant’s
cosmopolitanism, which appeared in Kant along with pragmatic problems at
least from the beginning of the 1770s and developed through the rivalry
between the concepts of ‘man of the world’ and ‘citizen of the world’
until the late period, with the disappearance of the former concept and
gradual pragmatisation and socialization of the later one. Kant’s
pragmatic cosmopolitanism shares with Mill’s political cosmopolitanism
the focus on achieving practical goals, benefits, and individual
happiness, however, in both concepts of ‘citizen of the world’, the
priority is not individual happiness, but public happiness, over and
above which stands the happiness of all mankind. This means that in some
sense Kant’s pragmatic cosmopolitanism is somewhat utilitarian, and
Mill’s political cosmopolitanism is to some extent pragmatic.
Kant was not among those thinkers who directly influenced Mill’s
political philosophy. Unlike Kant’s moral writings, we have no clear
certainty that Mill was familiar with Kant’s anthropological and
political writings. However, conceptually, Kant’s pragmatic
cosmopolitanism and Mill’s political cosmopolitanism are quite close and
seem to rely on similar anthropological ideas, liberal and egalitarian
in their nature. Therefore, we can assume at least an indirect influence
of Kant on Mill, through the general set of ideas of the late
Enlightenment, which were established in European socio-political
thought under Kant’s influence. The similarity of their socio-political
views, liberal and cosmopolitan in essence, clearly demonstrates that
the cosmopolitan tradition of the Enlightenment, most prominently
expressed in the philosophy of Kant, continued to exist in the 19th
century, although it was undergoing some transformations under the
influence of the ideas of nationalism.
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