Kant’s
Teleology and the Problems of Bioethics[1]
SVETLANA MARTYNOVA·
Herzen State Pedagogical University of
Russia, Russian Federation
Abstract
One of the issues with which bioethics is
concerned is defining the limits of the organism’s transformations by technology
in order for humanity to avoid evil. Kant’s teleological power of judgment
enables us to identify an organism and it allows nature to be transformed only
insofar as it affirms a moral subject acting on the basis of autonomy as
reason. I propose a new way of utilizing Kantian philosophy in bioethical
knowledge. I ask: can we make judgments about nature via the principle of
purposiveness? In answering this question, I clarify the following points. The
first is Kant’s research into the foundations and reasons for using the
teleological power of judgment. The second is the role of digital technology
and how it complicates the use of the teleological power of judgment within the
framework of bioethical knowledge. And the third is the preservation of the
foundations for using the teleological power of judgment.
Keywords
Technology, Organism,
Autonomy of Reason, Morality
Introduction
It is a feature of the contemporary world
that people desire to prolong their lives and make them as comfortable and successful
as possible, while minimizing pain and stress. To this end, individuals are
willing to change the state of their own organism, and indeed that of others
too. (Of course, earlier humanity was also aware of its own biological
limitations and suffered from them. But today there is an unprecedented push to
alter or overcome these characteristics.) The contemporary human being looks to
scientific and technical progress as an instrument to ameliorate biological deficiencies.
Attempts to correct the state of an organism via such means gives rise to moral
problems. Many fear that such technical equipment might be used for evil and
mercenary purposes, and that the regulation of human life by machines can lead
to the violation of natural human rights (right to life, health care,
nondiscrimination) and human dignity, and the triumph of injustice.[2]
Bioethics
is an interdisciplinary field of knowledge about the moral behavior of man on
account of his ability to learn and change the natural order. As Potter puts it,
“Man’s survival may depend on ethics based on biological knowledge; hence
Bioethics” (Potter 1971, p. 1). One of bioethics’ principal aims is to define the
limits of technological transformation to human beings. Experts in bioethics
try to understand how it is possible to protect human characteristics and
ensure social justice in cases when technology is used to threaten life,
provide natural/artificial reproduction, undertake plastic surgery, clone
organisms or cells, conduct genetic experiments, etc. Specialists in bioethics
endeavor to explain how we might avoid or at least minimize evil for humanity
and establish what counts as evil in the context of technological research and
transformation.
Many
problems in bioethics are contentious, with no final decision or definitive answer
to be found. Specialists in bioethics have to pay attention to sociocultural
transformations and particularly our possibilities to improve organic processes
and bodies by technical devices and means. As a result, specialists have to
define what is evil and what is good in different particular cases (The
Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, International
Declaration on Human Genetic Data). Indeed, one can find and deploy different
philosophical principles as a foundation for bioethics.[3]
In
considering the potential grounds for bioethical knowledge, the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant remains underexplored. While some commentators have sought to
connect Kant’s thought with bioethics, the existing approaches are limited. Let
us briefly summarize them. In the first approach, researchers consider the
problem of understanding human rights and dignity in contemporary medicine and
point to the need to address the Kantian concepts of human rights and dignity.[4]
In this approach, researchers explore the problem of the use of technology in
the contemporary world. Central to this approach is an understanding that
technology is a tool that can help a person to preserve their dignity, while
prohibiting those technical innovations that do not coincide with the ends of morality
(Shell 2008, p. 347).
The
second approach examines the problem of preserving patient autonomy in modern
medicine and tries to explain the difference between the Kantian understanding
of autonomy and the bioethical understanding of autonomy. This approach defends
the importance of autonomy as liberty (Jennings 2017, p. 85). I believe that
this approach does not sufficiently acknowledge the problem of autonomy as
reason or “obedience to self-imposed law” in bioethics. Later, I will explicate
this problem and why it ought to be addressed.[5]
I
propose a new way of utilizing Kantian philosophy in bioethical knowledge. I
ask: how can we judge nature in the contemporary world? Can we make judgments
about nature via the principle of purposiveness? Such questions have been
largely neglected to date, with many disciplines deeming them irrelevant. Yet,
I believe such questions speak to one of the most pressing issues for
bioethics, since the teleological power of judgment fulfills some crucial
functions. It enables us to identify organisms and it allows nature to be
transformed only insofar as it affirms a moral subject acting on the basis of
autonomy as reason. In bioethics, the teleological power of judgment can be used
to protect the ability to recognize an organism in the case of it being
observed by digital technologies, and to avoid the potential loss of morality
arising from a person becoming excessively oriented toward digitally altering
an organism.
Kant’s
view of organisms as teleological does not imply the leading role of technology
in observing organisms and ensuring their transformation. Indeed, in this
regard, the following points need to be clarified. First, we need to understand
how Kant explains the foundations for using the teleological power of judgment
and the reasons for using this power. Second, it is necessary to clarify the
role of digital technology and how it complicates the use of the teleological
power of judgment within the framework of bioethical knowledge. Third, it is crucial
to understand why and how the foundations for using the teleological power of
judgment can be preserved.
One
can define several methods to investigate the teleological ability of judgment
and its use in the contemporary world. To clarify the reasons for the use and
foundations of the teleological ability of judgment, I refer to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment. In
this work, Kant’s understanding of organisms as natural purposes, and of a
moral subject as an ultimate purpose of nature, is of fundamental importance
for our purposes here. I turn to developments in the field of digital
humanities to explain the difficulties in identifying organisms with the help
of technology. Research on heteronomous human behavior via the concept of
“desiring machines” allows us to explain the problem of preserving autonomy as
reason amid a technocentric world.
1. The Reasons
and Foundations behind the Teleological Power of Judgment in Kant’s Philosophy
I would like to now appeal to Kant’s
conception of teleology and set out why we should think about nature via the
principle of purposiveness. What are the foundations of the teleological power
of judgment? First, it is wrong to think that something can demonstrate real
purposiveness in objective nature. Kant notes that the teleological ability of
judgment appeals to the reflective power of judgment and is a subjective
position, not an objective one. We cannot transfer the principle of
purposiveness to nature as its law because nature cannot be determined through
the concepts developed by theoretical reason (Kant 2000, p. 257).
Kant
explains the necessity of the teleological power of judgment as a subjective
principle in the framing of the antinomy (Kant 2000, pp. 258-259):
1.
The thesis is: all generation of material things and their forms must be judged
as possible in accordance with merely mechanical laws.
2.
The antithesis is: some products of material nature cannot be judged as
possible according to merely mechanical laws (judging them requires an entirely
different law of causality, namely that of final causes).
There
are different views on how Kant defines “mechanical”. McLaughlin supposes that
mechanical is a combination and operation of parts which determine the whole,
but are not determined by it (McLaughlin 1990, p. 153). Ginsborg describes the mechanical
as the unaided action of physico-chemical forces which lead to the result
(Ginsborg 2004, p. 42). To explain something mechanistically is to fix the
combination and operation of the independent parts or moving forces and the
result of this work.
The
teleological power of judgment is necessary because it denies judging nature by
way of merely mechanical laws. This means that mechanical judgment cannot be
exclusive.[6]
What could not be described only mechanistically? Kant thinks that the
self-organization of organisms (growth, reproduction, and regeneration) is
inexplicable merely in mechanistic terms. In this case, the organism is both
the cause and effect of itself (natural purposes), meaning that there are
effective causes which produce themselves by their activity in organisms and a
whole determines its own parts. Thus, we can observe such processes as
reproduction, growth, and regeneration via the teleological power of judgment.
Kant
describes the teleological principle of judging as follows: “An organized
product of nature is that in which everything is an end and reciprocally a
means as well”. Quarfood offers an interpretation of this statement as follows:
“The function of x in organism O is y if x is a part or a trait of O, x is a
means to y, and y is one of O’s ends or a means of such an end” (Quarfood 2004,
p. 152). I can illustrate this. For instance, the function of a tongue in
organism O is speaking if tongue is a part of O, tongue is a means to speaking
and speaking is one of O’s ends. In comparing this position with Kant’s
statement, it becomes clear that this explanation only grasps Kant’s thought
partially. Kant said that “everything is an end and reciprocally a means as well”.
According to this thought, speaking is not merely the end of tongue, but a
means for a tongue or a brain, because they may be developed in such a way.
Thus, Kant claims that the teleological power of judgment finds every part as a
means and an end and a part’s ability to develop itself and other parts in the
frame of the whole.
As
a subjective principle, the teleological power of judgment does not allow one
to explain the organisms. In terms of the heuristic potential of the
teleological power of judgment, Kant notes that it could restrict the
application potential of mechanical laws. I think that it is vital to highlight
another positive result. The teleological power of judgment is the instrument
for an organism’s identification. Quarfood supposes that this identification
makes biological objects open to study. “The teleological identification of
objects as functional units (natural purposes) demarcates a separate ‘order of
things’ […] [A] non-teleological consideration of such objects could only identify
them as complexly built aggregates of matter”.[7]
Therefore, there are good reasons to apply the teleological power of judgment.
It is a normative point of view, which restricts the mechanical view and
prevents the mechanical explanation from being applied to all organisms. In
addition, it is a way of identifying organisms among other natural and
artificial products.
The
possibility of using the teleological principle not objectively, but for the
purposes of identification and restriction of mechanical laws, is determined by
the two foundations of the teleological power of judgment. The first foundation
is experience. As Kreines writes:
Kant
thinks that living beings appear to be organized […] [T]he fit between their
parts is so great that those parts seem as if they must be present in order to
fulfill coordinated purposes within the whole. Living beings thus present a
case in which ‘experience leads our power of judgment’ to the concept of a
Naturzweck (Kreines 2005, p. 284).
According
to Kreines, this foundation allows for the concept of Naturzweck. However, he
adds that “our experience ‘exhibits’ but nonetheless cannot ‘prove’ the
existence of natural organized beings or Naturzwecke”.
Therefore, Kant’s suggestion to use the teleological principle only seems to be
useful for the explanation of organisms. Experience as the foundation is not
sufficient to know the organisms like natural ends (Naturzweck). The experience
merely leads reason to this concept and a man can presuppose the organisms like
natural ends.
The
second foundation of the teleological power of judgment is reason’s capacity to
think about natural purposes via the analogy with human, rational, purposive
activity. Breitenbach supposes that the artefact analogy is not sufficient to
illustrate the self-organizing character of organisms. She writes that we think
about nature’s self-organization as we think about our own ability to act
rationally according to our purposes. This analogy does not allow us to explain
organisms, because human reason transfers its intention to nature, and it is
impossible to be certain of the real purposiveness in nature. However, this
analogy has good implications for biology. As Breitenbach puts it, according to
the Kantian approach, “we may thus understand the use of explicitly
teleological language in the life sciences as a heuristic means of structuring
projects and formulating questions in biology” (Breitenbach 2008, p. 46).
Steigerwald also points to the analogy with human rational and purposive
action. This analogy enables us to regard both normativity and spontaneity in
organisms and as a result “identify organisms as natural objects with distinct
capacities and as subject to unique laws or norms and forms of causality”
(Steigerwald 2006, pp. 726-727). Both interpretations signal the limits to
reason’s analogy, because they do not help us explain organisms as ends of
nature. The analogy may be merely a means for studying and identifying
organisms among other natural and artificial products.
We
can conclude that the analogy with human rational purposive activity is
connected to experience, which “exhibits” the self-organization of the
organism. In checking the data of experience, reason finds only one way to
adequately judge organisms. It assumes that they are natural purposes and have
normativity and spontaneity like a person (although unlike human actions, all
processes in nature are conditioned). Nevertheless, experience cannot be an
absolute foundation and prove this statement. Reason as the foundation of this
concept could not prove real purposiveness in nature. As a result, nobody can
be sure that organisms are natural purposes and explain them as such. By using
the teleological power of judgment, humanity merely restricts the application
of mechanical laws and identifies organisms in the process of their study.
According
to Kant, the teleological ability of judgment has a heuristic sense and is also
an instrument for solving ethical problems. Teleology is the method for
establishing how the linkage between human reason and physical nature is
possible. Kant writes about the problem of the distinction between reason and
physical nature in the Critique of
Practical Reason:
The
morally good as an object is something supersensible, so that nothing
corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition; and judgment under
laws of pure practical reason seems, therefore, to be subject to special
difficulties having their source in this: that a law of freedom is to be applied
to actions as events that take place in the sensible world and so, to this
extent, belong to nature (Kant 1996, p. 195).
It is not obvious that nature is suitable
for moral actions in it. According to Kant’s Critique of the Power of Judgment, this problem admits of only one
solution: moral actions determined by reason are possible in the physical world
if a subject can judge organic processes via the principle of purposiveness.[8]
What
does this mean for the ethical sphere, that is to say, what does it mean to
judge organic processes via the principle of purposiveness? We need to clarify
the connection between making judgments about organic processes and moral
conduct. In ethics, we cannot be satisfied with thinking about organic
processes only as purposes of nature. We should also think about the ultimate
purpose of nature, about what is beyond to nature. Kant suggests that the
teleological power of judgment leads to the statement that the ultimate purpose
of nature is a moral subject. This means that a man is able to set purposes by
himself “using nature as a means appropriate to the maxims of his free ends in
general” (Kant 2000, p. 299). Nature also supports this human intention. “Nature
still displays <…> a purposive effort at an education to make us
receptive to higher ends than nature itself can afford” (Kant 2000, pp.
300-301). Therefore, Kant’s conception furnishes the idea that it is important
for a moral subject to think about the common intentions of nature and
humanity. It consists in following the purposes of the moral subject.
As
the instrument for the explanation of morality in nature, the teleological
power of judgment could also be seen as protecting nature from unnecessary
human interference. Kant does not suggest this directly. Nevertheless, he
thinks that nature and culture have certain boundaries. A moral subject as the
final end is outside of nature. When a man gives to nature and to himself a
relation to an end, he rejects these boundaries. This end is morality. It leads
to the next conclusion. As the telos of nature, man can influence the organisms
only if morality in nature has to be established. Morality is the limit of
nature’s transformation. So, the teleological power of judgment allows us to
understand that nature is not against morality; man as the ultimate end of
nature can have moral conduct in the natural order and change it only according
to the ratio’s law.
What
can we say about the foundation of the teleological power of judgment in the
context of ethics? Reason’s ability to make an analogy with human rational
purposive activity is developed in the ethical context. There is the comparison
between natural purposes and human ends provided by reason in Kant’s teleology.
I can demonstrate this through two operations of reason. The first is the
understanding of the unity of natural order and moral order. A man can think
that natural order is similar to the human ability to act according to
purposes. Compliance with purposes (self-organization in the frame of
normativity) is a common principle of nature and humanity. The second operation
is understanding the difference between the two orders. Organic processes and
organisms are necessary parts of nature as a whole. “For there is nothing in
nature (as a sensible being) the determining ground of which, itself found in
nature, is not always in turn conditioned” (Kant 2000, p. 302). By contrast, a
man must set purposes according to reason’s law, which is necessary and
independent from nature. The human capacity to set purposes only by way of
reason is the autonomy of will, regarding the moral subject.[9]
The ability to be independent and unconditioned is the cause of Kant’s
statement that a moral subject is the final end of nature.[10]
There
are at least two reasons to use the teleological power of judgment, according
to Kant. First, as noted previously, it restricts the mechanical approach and
allows organisms to be identified. Second, it leads to the establishment of
morality in the natural order. Furthermore, there are two foundations for the
use of the teleological power of judgment. The first is experience through
which we can presuppose an organism’s self-organization. The second is the
human ability to set purposes solely through reason (autonomy of will) and
compare it with the natural order.
2. Difficulties in Using the Teleological Power of
Judgment Today
Kant’s teleology can provide a good basis
for bioethical knowledge. In bioethics, the identification of organisms is
important in determining the state of an organism and choosing its treatment. It
is necessary to delineate the limits of change in the natural order so as to
avoid the loss or diminution of morality. It arises from the ethically
uncontrolled correction of the imperfections of an organism (for example, by changing
the human genome without moral restrictions). But can we think of nature via
the principle of purposiveness in the contemporary world? Kant proposes two
foundations for using the teleological power of judgment (experience through
which we can presuppose an organism’s self-organization and the ability of a
person to set purposes according to free will). In order to discover whether it
is possible to use the teleological power of judgment in the contemporary
world, we need to clarify whether these two foundations are still relevant.
In
my view, the two foundations of the teleological ability of judgment are
destabilized by technology. The latter plays a major role, especially in
biology and microbiology (genome change). In its functions, technology replaces
human experience and questions the autonomy of reason. First, it is necessary
to explain how technology replaces human experience.
The
replacement of human experience is related to the functions of the technics
that a person is unable to perform. One of the significant functions is that of
observing the organisms, which human beings can do far better with the aid of
technology than without it. When witnessing organs and biological processes,
technology gives the most accurate results. As such, studying the organism with
the help of digital devices makes it possible to detect impaired functionality,
to monitor, control, and support the work of different organs and processes
(the onset of pain, symptom pathologies, the processes involved in childbearing
and childbirth, and so on).
There
is a loss of the ability to presuppose the organism’s self-organization in the
process of digital monitoring. To explain this situation, it is necessary to
refer to medical practice. What happens in some departments of microbiology
cannot be discussed here, because at this level (genetic transformation), while
the technology can simulate processes, it is not the best witness, which
prompts scientists to turn to the functions of bacteria, for example (CRISPR
CAS 9). The loss of experience as a basis for the teleological power of judgment
is particularly noticeable in the use of digital monitoring, where the
technology observes the processes in organs, tissues, etc. and determines the
state of the organism on that basis (data reading).
Why
is it not possible for technology to capture an organism’s self-organization?
First, digital technology has its own logic of determination of the organism.
This logic is one of digital code. Digital code is the basis for digital
devices and, as Berry writes, code can be described as
the
mechanism that operates upon and transforms symbolic data, whether by
recombining it, performing arithmetic or binary calculation or moving data
between different storage locations. As such code is operative and produces a
result (sometimes after several sub-goals and tasks), often in an iterative
process of loops and conditionals (Berry 2011, p. 52).
Digital code establishes a new order of
things and processes via the recombination of data. This recombination of data
is an important function in medicine. For instance, it allows a digital
monitoring system (DMS) to define human health/illness after reading data.
The
difficulties lie in how technology restricts the self-organizing of organisms.[11]
As Kant supposes, we might expect from the organism what we might not expect from
the watch. There is the self-organization of the organism in growth,
regeneration, and reproduction. In contrast, technology cannot presuppose that
an organism has its own form of self-organization. For instance, DMS can
determine destroyed organs, but it cannot represent the teleological
transference of a function of a destroyed organ to (an)other organ(s). As such,
an organism is determined as abnormal because one organ is not able to fulfill
its function, but in reality (an)other organ(s) fulfill(s) this function or
process. While the DMS can determine an infected organism, it cannot reveal the
protective functions taking place (Martynova and Bugaev 2019, p. 132).
As
technology replaces human beings, as it observes and determines organisms by
itself, we lose the first foundation of the teleological power of judgment. We
do not witness organisms by themselves and so we no longer expect that they
have the ability to self-organize. Instead, technology witnesses and determines
the state of the organism. Such a decision is not based on a presupposition of
what may occur according to natural purposes. As a result, digital devices
restrict the human ability to make judgments about organic processes as
purposes of nature.
What
about the autonomy of will as the foundation of the teleological power of
judgment? Well, according to Kant, a man loses his autonomy when he is
determined by nature. Nowadays, we might also speak of the weakness of a man
who is determined by his feelings, fears, genes, and so on (nature in general).
However, the problem is also man’s determination by technology. In 1978,
Langdon Winner argued that a man could not use technology as he pleases: “He
must see to it that the appropriate operating procedures and techniques are
followed and that all of the material conditions for operation are met”. The
author concludes that in the contemporary world, we have a “technological
version of Kantian heteronomy – the governance of human activity by external
rules or conditions” (Winner 1978, p. 198).
Digital
technology’s influence on the human inability to act autonomously is a key
issue in contemporary philosophy. For instance, researchers point to the lack
of autonomy in the use of digital code. As Bianco writes: “Work in computation
and digital media is, in fact, a radically heterogeneous and a multimodally
layered – read, not visible – set of practices, constraints, and
codifications that operate below the level of user interaction” (Bianco 2012,
p. 109). The problem lies in the difference between accessible interfaces and
inaccessible processes of technological functioning. We transfer some functions
to technology and use the results of its functioning.
But
I want to insist that we also need to consider the loss of human autonomy on
account of desire, which is engendered and supported by digital machines. It
was Deleuze and Guattari who introduced the concept of “desiring machines”.
Indeed, it is not about technology per se, but what is inside technology (Deleuze and Guattari 2009, p. 106). They wrote that
desiring machines produce desire and are “the ensemble composed of a full body
that engineers, and men and tools engineered on it” (Deleuze and Guattari 2009,
p. 111). Desiring machines thereby integrate separate elements and form the
analog of the will of power. The crucial point here is that desiring machines
could break down independent parts (Bogue 1989, p. 92).
In
my view, the transformation of human bodies in medicine can be explained in a
similar way. It is possible to say that computer technologies produce the human
desire to transform the organism via digital devices. Technology’s ability to
improve the state of the human organism is clearly very appealing to people,
not least because some biological aspects of human beings do not allow individuals
to do what they really want.[12]
Humanity plans to correct some processes by way of technical devices because of
the latter’s ability to provoke the desire to do so. And technological devices
really can enhance and support organic processes. It is possible today to save
and prolong life, to make it more comfortable and less painful, via genetic
modification, the transplantation and preservation of organs and tissues, the
creation of artificial organs and bionic prostheses, etc. As a result, we have
an ensemble of bioengineering and engineered men and tools.
Technology,
as an agent of desiring machines, breaks down the human ability to set purposes
and leads beyond moral intentions and toward heteronomy. One can discern the
loss of human autonomy when considering the discussion of morality. Patients
and doctors first try to find an instrument to address biological imperfections
and to enhance the organism, and only then think to ask whether its use is
moral. For instance, is it moral to deploy genetic modification? Is it moral to
transplant organs or perform plastic surgery? Such transformations of nature
are necessary not because of any moral act taken as a single condition, but
rather because of technology’s ability to change the human organism. People
discuss their actions via moral positions after observing technology’s
possibilities and advantages. Morality is (sometimes) able to restrict the
organism’s transformations, but it is not the sole reason behind the use of
biotechnology.
Appealing
to the problem of heteronomy in the use of digital devices is in accordance
with Kant’s position in this regard. Heteronomy in both interpretations marks
an inability for a person to be determined solely by one’s own reason. This
fact leads to the impossibility of using the teleological power of judgment.
Today, there is a real risk that human autonomy will be replaced and subsumed
by humanity’s desire to be biologically upgraded, while the human ability to
set purposes will be taken over by the machine’s ability to change these
purposes. As a result, we have lost the theoretical foundation for the
teleological power of judgment.
In
the contemporary world, technology functions like a mediator, redefining
biological and social connections. Biological processes are problematic,
because the logic of technology spreads to the organic sphere. The logic of a
machine determines organic processes and does not allow us to grasp the
self-organization of the organism. Therefore, we have lost the empirical
foundation of the teleological power of judgment. This also problematizes moral
and social connections. The desire to harness technology to correct biological
imperfections replaces the human ability to act autonomously. In doing so, we
lose the capacity to give purposes to our activity. As such, there is little
evidence today of our ability to think about purposiveness in nature.
3. Relevance
and Conditions in Using the Teleological Power of Judgment Today
In my view, it is not in our interests to
welcome all technical innovations that force us to reject the teleological
power of judgment. We must understand the relevance of the teleological power
of judgment in a new light. To this end, we need to understand what will be
lost if we neglect the two key foundations of the teleological power of
judgment. At the same time, we might ask: what do we set to gain by rejecting
the teleological power of judgment?
First,
if a person cannot use the teleological power of judgment, this leads to a
restricted view of the organism in the field of medicine. Doctors would not be
able to identify organisms and make the right decisions about those organisms,
which can lead to evil outcomes for humanity. This is evident in cases of an
organism’s regeneration (some organs and functions replace one another, or an
organ’s bad state is a condition of its regeneration), growth (some organs and
functions can become stronger), and reproduction (some organs and functions of
embryos can be late, or appear or transform during the organism’s development).
These processes are presupposed only via experience in which an individual can
catch sight of an organism’s self-organization and the ability of a person to
act rationally according to their purposes.
Second,
if human beings reject the teleological power of judgment, then morality is no
longer a necessary part within the processes of nature’s transformation.
People’s actions will only occur as a result of technology and its potential. In
this case, autonomy as reason is impossible and man cannot transform nature as
a moral subject. This will involve different ways of transforming nature
(including ones that violate human rights and dignity) and negative or (at
best) uncertain consequences for humanity. For example, doctors and patients decide
to undertake plastic surgery, but they ignore the negative consequences for the
organism. The government and citizens may agree with the general principle
behind genetic modification, but it may be that the methods used are ignored and
nobody is sure about the wider implications of this for human health. In
all such examples, the use of technology and its potential is not always
necessary, is not determined by morality, and may cause damage to the human
being. Such damage may come about as a result of people’s refusal to act
according to their own reason. To be able to have a moral standing in the
transformation of nature, individuals must have the ability to set purposes
solely by way of reason, to be independent, and to be unconditioned.
How
is it possible to save the foundations of the teleological power of judgment?
The doctor’s observation of the body’s creativity must be the instrument of
correction of medical conclusions, based on the device’s witnessing. We cannot
entirely trust technical devices, because they have their own logic. What they
can do is couched in digital code. Technology cannot capture or presuppose the
creative ability of organisms. Nowadays, only human beings have the capacity to
presuppose the organism’s creative ability and thereby utilize the teleological
power of judgment. For in using the teleological power of judgment, we also
need to protect the ability to set purposes and to act autonomously. Autonomous
behavior cannot be based on a technological logic, but it is possible to utilize
technical innovations for moral ends.
Conclusion
Humanity should not totally reject
innovations on account of their ability to ignore the specificity of organisms
and lead us away from the concept of natural purposes. Yet, it is vital that,
as human beings, we are able to remain vigilant and to question the decisions
(promises) of technology and to observe nature’s law for ourselves. To this
end, we can refuse technical innovations and their promises in order to salvage
the two main foundations of the teleological power of judgment: namely the
ability to presuppose an organism’s self-organization, and the ability to set
purposes through the use of reason. If we retain these foundations of the
teleological power of judgment, we can avoid not only the risk of making wrong
decisions in a medical setting, but also the loss of a moral context in the
transformation of organisms. Thus, we can conclude that Kant’s explanation of
the reasons and foundations of the teleological power of judgment is a
necessary and worthwhile area of consideration in the field of bioethical
knowledge.
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