On Allen W. Wood’s Kant and Religion
James J. DiCenso·
University of Toronto, Canada
Review of: Wood, Allen W., Kant and Religion, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 2020, 250 pp. ISBN: 978-0521799980
Allen W. Wood’s
new book on Kant and religion offers considerable insight into this rich and
contested area of inquiry (Wood, 2020; cited in the text by page number). Wood,
a leading scholar who has made noteworthy contributions to many topics within
Kantian and post-Kantian studies, is well-positioned to engage the subject. His
encyclopedic mastery of the material is evident throughout this new book. In
the following, I will explicate some of Wood’s main arguments, highlighting the
relation between rational faith and historical religious forms as a focal concern.
Here, the key question concerns the points of compatibility and incompatibility
between practical reason and historical religions.
Religion as a
theme traversing Kant’s critical writings
Inquiries
into religious and theological concepts appear throughout Kant’s writings, even
if we bracket Kant’s pre-critical writings. The first Critique refutes
theoretical proofs for the existence of a divine being; the critical epistemology
underpins his negative assessment of the ontological argument and other traditional
arguments (A592/B620ff. and cf. KpV 5:138, KU 5:463, 5:466, and 5:473). As Kant summarizes: “The
concept of a highest being is a very useful idea in many respects; but just because
it is merely an idea, it is incapable all by itself of extending our cognition
in regard to what exists” (A601-02/B629-30). At the same time, the first Critique
develops constructive regulative and practical approaches to the concept of God
(A619/B647;
A796/B824; A814/B842). The methodology of later writings, including the Religion,
is continuous with these critical innovations: excluding knowledge of the
supersensible while focusing on practical reason. The second Critique, in describing the moral
law, emphasizes its unconditioned nature (KpV 5:31-32) and refers to “the majesty of this holy law [das heilige Gesetz]” (KpV 5:77-78; and cf. 5:123).
More directly, Kant formulates the practical postulates of God and an immortal
soul (KpV 5:125-26). He
consistently argues that the practical idea of God generates “attributes” that “can
never be used for a theory of supersensible beings, so that … they are quite
unable to ground a speculative cognition and their use is, instead, limited
solely to the practice of the moral law” (KpV 5:137, 5:138). The third Critique interweaves a regulative
approach to teleological thinking with an explication of moral theology. Kant refers to the
“purely moral need for the existence of such a being, by means of which our
morality acquires either more strength or (at least as we represent it) more
scope” (KU 5:446). In this way, the “concept of the supreme cause as author of
the world in accordance with moral laws” leads “to religion, i.e., the
recognition of our duties as divine commands” (KU 5:481). Additionally, Kant devotes several shorter pieces to religious
themes, and references to the concept of God appear in his legal and political
philosophy as well. These points are well-known, but it is important to emphasize
two issues. First, as he does with metaphysics generally, Kant reorients
religious concepts so that they are grounded in practical reason. In this way,
Kant makes a distinct and invaluable contribution to the Enlightenment
tradition of linking universal laws of reason with divine law.[1] Secondly, “religion” is not a
separate, compartmentalized topic for Kant; it constitutes a domain of inquiry
that intersects with virtually every facet of his mature work, especially his
practical philosophy.
There
is no textual evidence that the Religion departs in any respect from the
principles elaborated in Kant’s mature critical philosophy, i.e., interpreting
religion and theology through practical reason. However, one major way in which
the Religion (along with its sequel, Conflict of the Faculties) are
unique is in analyzing doctrines of historical faith or revelation. While other
critical writings mostly address concepts of rational theology as a subset of
metaphysics, the Religion also examines scriptural sources and ecclesiastical
history. These historical and cultural elements make the Religion an
important resource for understanding how Kant connects religion with questions
of social, political, and ethical advancement. Wood, accordingly, underscores
the practical and social contributions of the Religion. He does not attempt a comprehensive discussion of the
text, but he emphasizes core themes in Kant’s ethical interpretation of
theological concepts, while drawing upon a wide range of writings.[2] In so doing, he further demonstrates the continuity in
Kant’s mature thinking about religion in the three Critiques, the Religion,
and later works; in every case practical reason remains the criterion.
Symbolism,
Religion, Enlightenment
Wood
focuses on symbolism as an individual and collective resource for
disseminating ethical ideas and furthering the self-reflection essential to ethical
development. He rejects the opinion that Kant “reduces” religion to morality
(3), a view that assumes a supernatural standard and downplays how the moral
law (as universal and unconditional) cannot meaningfully be understood as a reduction
of something greater. To be sure, elements of historical faith, i.e., those
that counteract the moral law, are excluded from rational religion. While
insisting that practical reason is the interpreter of religion, Wood argues
that “religion goes beyond morality, adding something to it that enriches the
moral life” (3). That extra “something” turns out to be collective systems of
representation, transmitted through scriptures and other means. Chapter 1.2,
“Religion as essentially Symbolic,” offers an account of the role of religious symbolism
in facilitating access to ideas of reason (pp. 4-5ff.). As Wood stresses, “For
Kant it is only through symbolism that the pure concept of God can be presented
in a way that is meaningful to human beings and therefore truly religious” (7).
Symbolism, in other words, offers linguistic and representational resources for
expanding our access to concepts that do not merely designate empirical
objects, or designate conceivable supersensible objects modelled after empirical
ones. For Kant, valid symbolic interpretation of religious concepts is guided
by practical reason (13-19). The moral interpretation of historical religions facilitates
the gradual realization of moral religion, also called rational faith and true
religion. This interactive relation between ethical ideas and existing
institutions across an indefinite temporal frame is a topic Wood explores with considerable
insight later in the book, and I will return to it.
The
theme of symbols is also given concentrated attention in Chapter 5.2 and 5.3 on
symbolism and analogy, and on symbolism and religion respectively. As he does
throughout the book, Wood draws on a variety of Kant’s writings, showing the
consistent approach to symbolism in the three Critiques, the Religion,
and elsewhere. Wood demonstrates how specific areas of inquiry related to the
theme of religion develop over numerous works, thereby enriching our
understanding of key concepts. Hence in discussing symbolism, Wood cites the Anthropology:
“it is enlightenment to distinguish the symbolic from the intellectual…, the
temporarily useful and necessary shell from the thing itself” (Anth 7:192;
Wood, 121). Wood emphasizes how Kant’s approach to religion, symbolism, and
practical reason is representative of his focus on Enlightenment (210).
Enlightenment requires a process of approximating rational morality by
combining inner reflection with rational modification of cultural resources. Kant
succinctly makes this point when he writes,
“Should one now ask, Which period of the entire church history in our ken up to
now is the best? I reply without hesitation, The present. I say
this because one need only allow the seed of the true religious faith now being
sown in Christianity—by only a few, to be sure, yet in the open—to grow
unhindered, to expect from it a continuous approximation to that church, ever
uniting all human beings, which constitutes the visible representation (the
schema) of an invisible Kingdom of God on earth.” (R 6:131-32, Wood, 214).[3] The “true seed” emerges and grows through
an understanding of Christianity predicated on rational ethical principles and
disseminated by the freedom to exercise reason publicly. Kant clarifies how Enlightenment
and practical reason are conjoined in describing “a true enlightenment (an order
of law originating in moral freedom)” (R 6:123n). These comments encapsulate
Kant’s progressive model of a collective movement toward autonomy, driven by
rational and ethical interpretation of existing forms. Building on the pivotal
role of symbolism in expressing non-empirical concepts, a central contribution
of Wood’s book is to distinguish the valid interpretations of religious
concepts from invalid ones. Wood highlights literalism, superstition, and
anthropomorphism as antitheses of an enlightened approach to religion (5-7, 14,
120-21, 177). However, as I will discuss below, Wood does not equate this
enlightened, symbolic understanding of religion with “secularism.”
Faith or Belief
In
Chapter 2, Wood links moral faith with the pursuit of the highest good in the world
and explicates the “moral arguments” in the three Critiques. This
analysis demonstrates that moral faith is associated with the pursuit of an
ethical life by finite, imperfect rational beings. As Wood explains, practical
assent and practical faith do not abrogate the standards of rational judgment
to which Kant subscribes; they are in fact a resource for practical purposes.
Summarizing arguments in the second Critique, Wood notes that Kant
“denies that either belief or assent can be commanded, but he does describe the
result of the moral arguments as ‘maxim of assent for moral purposes’ and a
‘voluntary (freiwillig) determination of our judgment’ (KpV 5:144-146)”
(58). The stress on faith as non-coercible, and as a feature of human agency in
pursuit of long-term ideal ends is essential.
Wood
frames his inquiry into practical faith by drawing on Josiah Royce’s idea of a
“lost cause,” defined as “any cause that cannot be fulfilled within the
lifetime of the loyal community or any of its members” (36). This unlikely
reference clarifies how moral faith emerges directly from Kant’s practical
philosophy as positing ends that can only be approached asymptotically. Wood
argues that “the highest good in Kant’s conception of it—as an end that is a
duty for each of us, and a shared end for the ethical or religious community as
Kant conceives of it—can be seen as a ‘lost cause’ precisely in Royce’s sense”
(36, citing R 6:97). Faith in this sense is operative in all human efforts at
individual and collective ethical advancement. Wood eloquently offers a
personal reference to pursuing the “lost cause of advancing the work of science
and scholarship” (36). Clearly, these noble pursuits are not hopeless,
but they are uncertain and imperfect in their outcomes, and subject to
contingencies beyond one’s control. One needs to be sustained by a faith and
devotion to invest in moral effort while acknowledging that complete
realization will never occur. All practical endeavor by fallible human beings
is of this kind: even if guided by rational principles, it remains open-ended
and future-directed, subject to the day-to-day contingencies of individual and
historical life. It is because of the antagonisms endemic to phenomenal and
social life that Kant introduces the concept of moral courage as a
capacity for fidelity in the face of opposition. Moral courage is a concept
that also links the Religion with Kant’s rallying call to Enlightenment (R
6:57, 6:68, 6:183-84, E 8:35).
Less
helpful, in my judgment, is Wood’s recourse to Andrew Chignell’s “Belief”
(51ff.), differentiated by capitalization from the standard use of belief to
designate accepting low evidence doctrinal claims. The capitalized term is used
to render rational faith (Vernunftglaube KpV 5:126), practical faith (praktischen
Glauben, R 6:62) or moral faith (moralischen Glauben, R 6:110). However,
Wood must continually alert readers to the significance of the capitalized
usage by stating, for example, that “Kant argues that there are rational
grounds, based on practical rather than theoretical reason, for a morally
committed person to have faith (or Belief) in God or representing your duties
as divine commands” (139). Similarly, he later reminds us how “Belief (rational
assent on practical grounds), [is] distinct from belief in the ordinary sense,
habitual unconditional assent according to theoretical evidence,” while noting
that the former is compatible with “evidentialism” and the latter is not (202).
Repeated clarifications of an artificial terminology are necessary because the
English ‘belief’—whether capitalized or not—is associated with commitment to
dogmatic propositions and to the authority of inherited traditions however incompatible
with reason and evidence. This latter form of belief is entirely different from
“moral faith” as active ethical striving based on rational principles.
Because
practical faith guides action by human agents, it is in this sense “subjective.”
That is, faith concerns the encompassing orientation or attitude governing the
course of our lives as we seek to advance ethically under experiential
conditions (54). Throughout the book, Wood contrasts one mode of religiosity with
another. He observes that “Kant’s moral arguments …simply cannot deliver the
comforting confidence of unquestioned certainty, if that’s what people want
religious consolation to be. Religion should be more honest than that” (55).
The book is filled with insights along these lines, distinguishing rational
faith from what Kant often refers to as mere wishing (see R 6:51 on cult-like
practices and “mere wishing,” R 6:184-85 on servile submission and wishing, and
R 6:201 on “deedless wishes”).
Wood
establishes differentiations internal to the concept of religion that eschew simplistic
dichotomization of religious and secular in favor of a more nuanced, ethically
oriented approach. On this point, Wood repeatedly uses Kant’s “as if”
formulations—specifically, that of understanding one’s ethical duties
(following the Moral Law) as divine commands (KU 5:481-82, R 6:99, 6:153-54, SF 7:36, OP 22:127-128). The “as if” or regulative
approach to concepts, which permeates the Religion and the third Critique
in particular, is essential to Kant’s unremitting focus on human agency guided
by rational representations. However, as noted, Wood does not want to call this
approach “secular.” He argues that “there is no ground for Reath’s distinction
between a merely ‘secular’ conception of the highest good, for which merely
human effort might suffice, and the larger (‘religious’) conception, for which
we cannot reasonably suppose it does” (48, citing Reath 1988). In his
concluding remarks, Wood likewise insists that “Kant most certainly did not
intend to embrace ‘secularism’ as opposed to religion” (210). In a certain way,
this is correct; as noted, religious and theological concepts infuse Kant’s work
and are deeply connected to ideas of reason irreducible to phenomenal
experience. If secularism means abandoning rational ideals and principles
irreducible to cultural contingency, then Kant is not secular in that sense.
However, if religion signifies literalist conceptions of higher supernatural powers,
based on uncritical internalization of official doctrines, and secularism means
grounding our judgments and practices on the autonomous exercise of practical
reason, then Reath’s differentiation between “human effort” and divine
intervention is significant. Kant does not invoke the
sacred/secular distinction, but he repeatedly stresses “natural” over “supernatural”
interpretations. For example,
in concluding the Religion he clearly emphasizes that “specially favored”
individuals who feel “the special effects of grace” within them can “hardly
withstand comparison” with “naturally honest human beings” (R 6:201-202;
translation modified).[4] Unfortunately, Wood does not
address this distinction, and never explains what he means by secularism.
Combined with his otherwise consistent emphasis on the symbolic and morally-focussed
interpretation of religious concepts, this generates a degree of confusion.
Evidentialism
Wood’s
overall position is, in the overview, consistent in upholding Kant’s focus on
practical reason, despite occasional passages that call for further clarification.
A crucial feature of Wood’s approach, already noted in formulating the
distinction between rational faith and dogmatic belief, is the emphasis on evidence-based
criteria for judgment. Wood introduces “evidentialsm” in the Preface,
citing W. K. Clifford that “it is wrong, always and everywhere and for anyone to
believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (xx). Here, after noting Hume’s
doctrine of “proportionality” between beliefs and the evidence on which these
are based, and “Kant’s ‘deduction’ of freedom and the moral law,” Wood observes:
“I do not regard assent based on such philosophical arguments as violating the
evidentialist principle” (xx). In other words, Wood is concerned not merely
with empirical evidence for assent, but also with rational evidence, including
that of practical reason. Subsequently, Wood reiterates that “moral Belief [i.e.,
practical faith] does not violate Clifford’s evidentialist principle” (57).
Wood consistently adheres to this principle, although on occasion, when working
with symbolic representations deriving from religious sources, he may appear to
depart from it when he writes from the standpoint of Christian symbols (e.g. 17,
49, 121, 127, 137, 152, 155). Most importantly, Wood argues that evidentialism
is not merely about testing facts but has moral consequences as well: “Violations
of Clifford’s principle [of evidentialism] are among the most insidious, as
well as the most common, form of evil” (58, cf. 177). To
this I would only add: given the claims, unsupported by textual evidence, made
over the years about Kant’s Religion, evidentialism could be extended to
include scrupulous, properly documented use of sources.[5]
Rational and
Historical Religions
The
Preface to the first edition of the Religion contains an “experiment” summarized
by Wood as “considering [biblical theology and pure rational religion] as a
unity” (Wood 11, citing R 6:10). This is slightly misleading, as Wood disregards
Kant’s statement that “the sciences [of biblical theology and philosophy]
profit simply from being set apart, insofar as each science first constitutes a
whole by itself; only after that shall the experiment be made of considering
them in association [or, as a unity]” (R 6:10). Clearly, Kant is stressing that
philosophy, especially practical philosophy formulating the moral law as
foundational for rational faith, must establish clear principles based on
reason alone (mere reason) before being mixed up with biblical theology and historical
faith. In the second edition Preface, Kant briefly considers another experiment
using the analogy of two concentric circles (R 6:12-13). Wood analyzes
the Religion as interpreting various elements of the “outer circle,”
i.e., historical religions, as symbolic representations of the moral principles
constituting rational faith, the inner circle (11ff.). Theological concepts that
represent ideas of practical reason can thereby be taken into the inner circle
constitutive of moral faith.
Wood
takes the outer circle of historical faith as synonymous with Christianity,
although he makes brief references to Judaism and Islam late in the book. He
states, “Kant’s Religion considers ‘fragments’ of an alleged
revelation—namely, the Christian. Specifically, it takes up these: Original
Sin, the Son of God as savior, divine grace, and the church” (Wood, 19).
Indeed, it might be expected that Kant, writing in 1793 for an audience Wood
describes as “orthodox Lutheran Christians” (140), would focus exclusively on Christianity.
Yet, the rubric of historical faiths is inclusive in principle. Apart from
repeated references to classical sources, especially Stoicism, Kant references
Indian (Vedic) traditions at R 6:19, 6:73 note, Tibetan and Mongolian religions
(R 6:108 note), some Indigenous traditions at R 6:176, and trinitarian formulations
in “the religion of Zoroaster… Hindu religion…the religion of Egypt” (R 6:140
note).
I
am not claiming that Kant’s passing comments reveal serious familiarity with religions
other than Christianity. However, these wider references take on greater significance
in relation to the underlying principle governing his approach to historical
religions. This is stated forcefully: “There is only one (true) religion; but
there can be several kinds of faith.—We can say, further, that in the various
churches divided from one another because of their kinds of faith, one and the
same true religion can nevertheless be met with” (R 6:107-8). Kant then
enumerates “(Jewish, Mohammedan [Muslim], Christian, Catholic, Lutheran) faith”
(R 6:108). The “true religion” inherent in every faith is the moral law. In an
important passage explaining a core objective of the Religion, Kant discusses
how universality (the moral law) needs to be accompanied by “something that the
senses can hold onto”; therefore, “some historical ecclesiastical faith or
other, usually already at hand, must be used” (R 6:109). Although Kant is
inconsistent in using the terms “religion” and “faith,” he understands the historical
domain as having a global, inclusive scope. Kant stresses the need for a moral
“interpretation of the revelation we happen to have” even if “this
interpretation may often appear to us as forced, in view of the text (of the
revelation), and be often forced in fact” (R 6:110, and Wood, 14). In making
this point, Kant reiterates “all types of faith,” and by way of illustration
writes: “the moral philosophers among the Greeks and, later, the Romans did exactly the same thing with their legends
concerning the gods… Late Judaism, and Christianity too, consists of such in
part highly forced interpretations … the Mohammedans [Muslims] know very well ...
how to inject a spiritual meaning in the description of their paradise… and the
Indians do the same with the interpretation of their Vedas” (R 6:111). Therefore,
with regard to the multitude of historical faiths, “they all deserve equal respect,
so far as their forms are attempts by poor mortals to give sensible
representation to the Kingdom of God on earth, but equal blame as well, when
(in a visible church) they mistake the form of representation of this idea for
the thing itself” (R 6:175n, and see the comparative examples at R 6:176). The
“kingdom of God on earth” is a biblical concept and would not likely be accepted
by different religions as the way to define their goals. Yet, insofar as “the
Kingdom” designates a moral order, the realm of ends, Kant is arguing that all
cultural systems can and should be directed toward that end, even if their
modes of expression are radically different.[6] Moreover, ethical interpretations that have arisen within
various traditions, even if only by a small minority, are indicative of this
potential for harmonization with rational moral principles, and this is
especially important in his cosmopolitan vision of the ethical community. These
points are consistent with Wood’s focus on traditional religions as offering
symbols for ethical practice. Embracing rational religion means drawing upon
the resources of traditions to cultivate ethical awareness embracing all of
humanity, rather than fixating on culture-specific dogmatic details. Clearly,
in today’s globalized world this inclusive emphasis is more important than
ever.
Autonomy versus
heteronomy
Although
Wood stresses the primacy of practical faith, he is concerned to show that practical
reason is compatible with traditional religiosity: “rational religion does not
deny those doctrines of revealed religion that it does not include” (13). This
is correct, if “deny” means theoretically disprove. On the other hand, Wood is
clear that “both rational and revealed religion must reject certain doctrines,
or the apparent teachings of certain scriptures, when these are given certain
(anthropomorphic or merely literal) interpretations” (14). This is consistent with
Kant’s emphasis on ethically focussed interpretations (15). The frequently
reiterated critique of superstition, anthropomorphism, and literalism in Wood’s
book crystallizes in this ethical focus: there is something about these popular
modalities of belief that caters to heteronomy and obstructs a focus on rational
principles.
Wood
opposes the view that there is “a ‘disparagement’ of Christianity” in the Religion.
He argues that rather than denying “important Christian truths” and using “agreement
with the religion of reason [as] a standard that any purported revelation must
meet,” and rather than imposing his views on theologians, Kant instead “is
merely offering his own interpretation of these doctrines: an interpretation
that enables them to be reconciled with a religion of reason” (Wood, 24-25). I
am not sure where Wood finds the word “disparage”; certainly, Kant is doing
nothing of the sort. However, he is
engaging in a serious critical endeavor in which the stakes are high: the
furthering or the obstructing of rational ethical principles among global
communities. The tremendous influence of religions in Kant’s time is attested
to by his concern with “dominion over minds” (R 6:79, cf. SF 7:21-22, 36),
which is explicitly attributed to “priestcraft” (R 6:200, and cf. SF 7:60).[7] Whether Kant perfectly grasps and conveys the principles
of the moral law, he is certainly attempting to be a spokesperson, as it were,
for rational principles. To say that “he is offering his own interpretation” is
to dampen rational ethical inquiry, leading us to a mere difference of opinions.
Kant’s statements, like all others, must be evaluated with reference to
rational principles such as universalizability, consistency, inclusivity,
equality, and justice; the standard remains practical reason itself. By
contrast, heteronomous forms of religion, just as with heteronomous political
systems, dismiss or override such rational principles and suppress the free
exchange of ideas, in favor of dogmatic systems of authority, usually founded
on unfalsifiable supernatural claims.
Attempts
to heal rifts with more traditionally oriented thinkers appear in Wood’s
discussions of grace, where he stresses that a symbolic reading does not
conflict with Christian doctrine (e.g., 133-38, 180-81). In discussing the
question of “God’s causality,” Wood refutes scholars who try to attribute a
doctrinal position on theological questions to Kant, stressing “Kant’s total
agnosticism about the metaphysical relation of freedom to either natural or divine
causality” (156-57n). Because of the critical limits on supersensible knowledge,
Kant cannot make, and does not make, any theoretical or dogmatic assertions
whatsoever about divine activity. This also means, as Wood shows, that Kant
does not criticize theological doctrines from a theoretical standpoint
(154-156). Rather, for Kant, “the problem is moral self-knowledge, not
metaphysical knowledge” (153, citing SF 7:54). This does not mean that Kant
takes an uncritical stance concerning these doctrines: they are engaged in
terms of their compatibility with the moral law. Discussing views on grace,
Wood states, “Kant holds that unaided reason can neither affirm nor deny any of
these doctrines… Any of them might be welcome if it serves the ends of religion
by symbolizing parts of our moral and religious life in a way that furthers our
moral improvement” (161). In other words, practical criteria remain primary for
Kant.
The
underlying issue concerns competing sources of normativity, especially
principles of autonomy versus heteronomy (G 4:432-33, 4:440-43). Autonomy means
freely limiting oneself in relation to the freedom of others; it is quite
distinct from the lawless freedom unregulated by concern for others (G 4:446). In
addressing human responsibility for evil maxims and actions, Wood offers a helpful
discussion of “practical freedom” (63-66). In an earlier work, Wood summarizes
Kant’s argument that: “the principle of autonomy is the only possible solution
to the riddle of obligation, and that all other principles of obligation must
fail to solve it because they must be grounded on heteronomy of the will”
(Wood, 1999, 159). This distinction is central to understanding the differences
between Kant and Wood on the one side, and more traditional approaches to divine
action and grace on the other. Despite Kant’s agnosticism, there are serious moral
concerns about placing agency in a higher power, inscrutable to reason and
therefore open to the manipulations of priestcraft, or investing unquestionable
authority in literally read scripture, or in institutions stemming from
antiquity. These are not necessarily dispensable, but in a Kantian framework
they remain subject to the same rational principles as other products of human
history. For this reason, Kant steadfastly counteracts passive reliance on
“foreign influences” (R 6:117-18, 6:191, SF 7:42-43; Wood 157, 160). Wood
notes, citing Kant, that revelation is synonymous with “a historical system,”
which means that revelations contain a wide range of non-rational and
culturally contingent features.[8] When Kant proposes examining fragments of a revelation
in relation “to moral concepts” he is not assuming that all such fragments will
lead back “to the same rational system of religion” (Wood, 17, citing R 6:12).
He is only proposing to test them to see if they harmonize with a religion of
reason; some will not. Wood obviously knows this. He is clear that the moral
standard, and hence the standard of autonomy, is fundamental: “we can
reasonably judge that something claimed to be divinely revealed is not genuine,
if what is supposedly revealed is contrary to reason or the moral law” (18,
citing SF 7:63, R 6:87).
To
establish clear criteria differentiating autonomy from heteronomy, both in
terms of ways of thinking and public institutions, Kant employs several
“principles of distinction” in the Religion. These principles do not
necessarily correspond to the “concentric circles” motif, and are drawn from
practical, rather than theoretical reason as the touchstone for assessing historical
forms of faith. A crucial instance appears in the following: “All religions, however,
can be divided into the currying of favor
(of mere cult) [der Gunstbewerbung (des
bloβen Cultus)] and the moral [die moralische],
i.e. the religion of good life conduct”
(R 6:51, translation modified).[9] Kant’s analysis of Christianity as a “Natural Religion”
(R 6:157ff), and as a “Learned Religion” (R 6:163ff.) applies this moral versus
favor-seeking paradigm. While the former concerns moral teachings that are universalizable,
especially the Sermon on the Mount, the latter concerns historically formed
teachings and practices that are not. The parerga discussed in “Remarks”
added to each Part of the Religion
also distinguish religious ideas outside the boundaries of mere reason; “it [reason]
just cannot incorporate them into its maxims of thought and action” (R 6:52).
The theoretically and practically inadmissible concepts explored in each
section are: Effects of Grace; Miracles; Mysteries; and Means of Grace (R 6:52). In the concluding passages to the Religion, Kant analyzes “Priestcraft [Pfaffenthum]” as “the dominion which the clergy has usurped over
minds by pretending to have exclusive possession of the means of grace” (R,
6:200). The ethical significance of these distinctions is clear.
The Holy One of
the Gospels as Urbild
Chapter
5 discusses the status of “the Holy One of the Gospels” in the Religion.
Wood explores how doctrinal theology concerning “hope for redemption through
the saving work of Jesus Christ” as “the outer circle of revealed faith… leads
back to the inner circle of revealed religion” (115). However, Wood emphasizes
that this is a philosophical, not a theological inquiry, and that “it is
therefore worse than gratuitous to speak, as many writers do, of Kant’s
‘Christology’” (116). He explores various attributes of Jesus presented in
Scripture: the “ideal of humanity well-pleasing to God” (R 6:61), the
“personified idea of the good principle” (R 6:60), and “humanity in its full
moral perfection” (R 6:60) (116). Crucially, Kant argues that “it is our duty
to elevate ourselves to this ideal of
moral perfection, i.e. to the prototype [dem
Urbilde] of moral disposition in
its entire purity, and for this the very idea, which is presented to us by reason for emulation, can give us force” (R,
6:61). As always with Kant, the emphasis is on human agency and activity,
guided by practical reason and by religious representations that express
practical principles.
Unfortunately,
the status of the Holy One as representing an ideal of reason is obscured by
the rendering of the term Urbild as “prototype” in the di Giovanni
translation, and Wood passes this along without comment. (This poor translation,
like many others, is not corrected in the “revised” 2018 edition.) The
technical status of the term Urbild is further obscured by inconsistency
of translation. For example, the “church
invisible” is defined by Kant as “the mere idea of the union of all upright
human beings under direct yet moral divine world-governance, as serving for the
archetype [zum Urbilde dient] of any
such governance to be founded by human beings” (RGV, 6:101). Kant also
discusses “complete religion,” cognized through reason, as “a prototype [Urbild]
for us to follow” (R 6:162). The variations in translation within the same text
obscure how Kant is employing the same concept, Urbild, as a fundamental
image that is historically informed, yet also representing ideas of reason.
Indicative
of the potential confusion here is the case of Firestone and Jacobs who, seemingly
based on mistranslation alone, weave a neo-Platonic vision of the “prototype” (2008,
156ff). They engage in anthropomorphization and shift moral agency away from humans
in referring to “gracious condescension on the prototype’s part” (2008, 164). Wood
correctly remarks that this Platonic rendering “plays a role in medieval (especially
Scotistic) and early modern Christology. These speculations have textual support
only if we suppose Kant has these historical allusions in mind, which seems to
me highly doubtful because it would involve transcendent metaphysical
commitments inconsistent with the critical philosophy” (116n).
Yet,
Wood, one of the most important translators of Kant’s work in the past 30
years, does not clarify how Kant uses a specific term, Urbild, to refer
to a wide range of representational ideals throughout the critical philosophy,
which would help place Kant’s understanding of the “Son of God” in its proper conceptual
context.[10] It is a symbol expressing rational moral principles actualized
by rational agents. Wood is aware of this, and discusses religious symbols as
representing various aspects of morality and the moral path, again utilizing a
variety of Kant’s writings (117-126). This culminates in section 5.4, “The Son of
God as a Symbol.” Wood summarizes how “the moral striving for which we hope is
represented symbolically as our striving to become well-pleasing to God,” how
“the Son of God is a religious symbol for the change of heart or, more
specifically, for the good disposition resulting from it,” and finally how “the
end of this striving is represented symbolically in religious terms as God’s
acceptance of us” (125). These points illuminate how Kant draws upon this scriptural
narrative to exemplify the moral path.
However,
Wood runs into difficulties here that go beyond inattention to Kant’s
terminology. He notes that “the ideal is thought as a human individual,” and
“that it serves as a standard for our moral striving” (117). The question is, how
feasible is it to interpret the Son of God, presented as a supernatural or
divine as well as a human being, as a model for human ethical striving? Wood
concludes that “the ideal cannot be thought by us as ‘an example to be
emulated’” (117, citing R 6:64). A few pages later Wood cites the same passage
and reiterates, “we cannot think of ourselves as emulating the ideal because
its purity of will is achieved innately and without effort” (126). However, while
Kant argues that we need not “absolutely deny that he might indeed also be a
supernaturally begotten human being,” he insists that “from a practical point
of view any such presupposition is of no benefit to us, since the prototype [das Urbild]
which we see embedded in this apparition must be sought in us as well (though natural
human beings), and its presence in the human soul is itself incomprehensible
enough” (R 6:63-64). In other words, while Kant maintains an agnostic stance concerning
doctrinal claims, he argues that as a symbol for the actualization of the moral
law in human life, the Urbild should not be considered
supernatural. In this vein, Kant states: “the elevation of such a Holy One
above every frailty of human nature [i.e., making of him a supernatural being]
would rather, from all that we can see, stand in the way of the practical
adoption of the idea of such a being for our imitation [unsere Nachfolge]”
(R 6:64). The Urbild can have this representational efficacy because it
is an ideal of reason to which we, as rational beings, can have access. In the
technical meaning of Urbilder as representing ideas of reason, and hence
as potentially accessible to and actualisable by human beings, the Son of God
is indeed an “example to be emulated.”
Instead,
rather than understanding the Son of God as a human being courageously striving
to remain true to the moral law in the face of persecution, Wood argues that
“The Son of God can, however, serve as a symbol for the purity of disposition
to which a human being aspires and even hopes to attain by undergoing a moral revolution
or change of heart” (126). This is not incorrect, but it restricts the symbolic
reference to the ideal or holy disposition and dissociates this from the
travails of human life. By contrast, it is especially important that Kant
presents the narrative of Jesus’s life as personifying “rational beings in the world
[des vurnünftigen Wesens in der Welt]” (R 6:60; 6:61). Kant refers to the
“sufferings, up to the most ignominious death” that the ideal human endures,
and observes: “human beings cannot form for themselves any concept of the
degree of strength of a force like that of a moral disposition except by
representing it surrounded by obstacles and yet—in the midst of the greatest possible
temptations—victorious” (R 6:61).[11] The moral challenges represented in
accounts of his life also concern our ethical endeavors in the world,
and here Kant uses a term explicated in the third Critique, Nachfolge,
to describe the ethical emulation we undertake voluntarily (KU 5:283, R 6:62,
6:64). Kant explicates the narrative framework of Jesus’s life as a rational model,
an archetype or Urbild, for human ethical striving in the face of uncertainty
and adversity. It is only if the Son of God is “taken as” divine that this
representational force for practical purposes falters. Once again, the central interpretive
issue for Kant concerns how religious symbols, without violating autonomy, help
us become oriented to and motivated by the moral law.
Autonomy and Grace
As noted, Wood argues that Kantian autonomy is not incompatible
with traditional religious ideas, including that of grace (Wood 151, 158,
180-81). However, grace must be understood as a supplement to, rather than a
substitute for, our autonomous practical endeavors; in Kant’s words, “the human
being must make himself into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense,
good or evil.” In an oft-cited passage, Kant continues: “Supposing [Gesetzt] that some supernatural cooperation
is also needed to his becoming good or better, whether this cooperation only
consist in the diminution of obstacles or be also a positive assistance, the human
being must make himself antecedently worthy of receiving it” (R 6:44,
translation modified). Although it has contributed to misreadings of Kant as
explicitly invoking divine assistance, Wood downplays the significance of Gesetzt being translated as “granted” by
di Giovanni, rather than the more appropriate “suppose” or “supposing” (as it
is at e.g. A551/B579, G 4:398, and KU 5:451). He states, “the meaning of what
Kant has said is quite clear, however it might be translated. In the German,
and in both translations, the import of the antecedent clause is simply
conditional” (158n). That
is, even
if we assume divine assistance, our autonomous efforts remain primary and
indispensable. Kant argues that the idea of grace can support ethical practice in
the face of the inevitable hindrances that finite rational beings encounter.
However, one “must incorporate this positive increase of force into his maxim:
in this way alone is it possible that the good be imputed to him, and that he
be acknowledged a good human being” (R 6:44). Kant is concerned with the
attitude and freely chosen maxims of moral agents; this is crucial to the
doctrine of moral evil, predicated as it is on reason, choice, and responsibility
(Wood, 66). Once again, one “must be able to hope that, by the exertion of his own power, he will attain to the
road that leads in that direction [i.e., to a “new heart”], as indicated to him
by a fundamentally improved disposition” (6:51; italics original).
In trying to reconcile Kant with more traditional
thinking, Wood also cites R 6:88: “A human being’s moral improvement is
likewise an affair incumbent upon him, and heavenly influences may indeed
always co-operate in this improvement, or be deemed necessary to explain its
possibility” (Wood, 151n). Wood comments: “Kant here allows that God’s
unilateral action might be necessary even for the change of heart. He regards it
as unknowable whether this divine action is needed or actually occurs. But he
holds we must strive to make ourselves worthy of it antecedent to depending on
it” (ibid). Although “unilateral action” by God is never mentioned by Kant,
Wood correctly emphasizes Kant’s focus on human effort. However, it should be
observed that the cited passage appears in “General Remark” to Part II, on the
topic of miracles (one of the parerga excluded from rational religion). Kant’s
agnosticism is not as nonjudgmental as Wood portrays. The passage continues:
“Yet he [the person seeking moral improvement] has no understanding of himself
in the matter: neither how to distinguish with certainty such influences from
natural ones, nor how to bring them and so, as it were, heaven itself down to
himself. And, since he knows not what to do with them, in no case does he sanction
miracles but rather, should he pay heed to the precept of reason, he conducts
himself as if every change of heart and all improvement depended solely on the application
of his own workmanship” (R 6:88). The stronger point is that much confusion can
arise from passively awaiting supernatural signs and interventions; one must
follow what is clear and known to us, the precept of reason (the moral law). Therefore,
miracles, mysteries, effects of grace and means of grace, are classified as
parerga.
Finally, whether Kant’s practical inquiry into the
significance of the concept of grace is more like Augustinianism or Pelagianism
is irrelevant, precisely because Kant’s focus is practical, not metaphysical.
As Wood stresses, “Kant holds that unaided reason can neither affirm nor deny
any of these doctrines” (161).
The Ethical Community
A
crucial issue emerging from Kant’s analysis of radical evil in Part I concerns
the need to address evil on a societal level without abrogating individual freedom
and responsibility. Wood cites the Religion concerning how our sense of
self-worth is gauged in relation to others, how the individual, for example,
“is anxious that other human beings will consider him poor and will despise him
for it.” Kant stresses the mutual corruption arising from this amour propre, to use Rousseau’s term, or
unsociable sociability, to draw from “Idea
for a Universal History,” in which the mere presence of others fuels a
relentless comparative and competitive dynamic. As Kant concludes, “they will mutually
corrupt one another’s moral predisposition [Anlage] and make one another
evil” (Wood 78-79, citing R 6:93-94, translation modified). The predisposition
to the good, as Kant details in his discussions of the predispositions to animality
and humanity, must be developed through interpersonal relations. Hence it can be
corrupted by various forms of self-love, including the “striving for
ascendency” from which arise “jealousy and rivalry” and “the greatest vices of
secret or open hostility to all whom we consider alien to us” (R 6:27). As Wood
summarizes: “to say that for Kant the radical human propensity to evil has a
social and historical origin is only to report what Kant explicitly says” (78).
In
chapter 7, turning to Part Three of the Religion where the ethical
community is introduced, Wood summarizes Parts One and Two of Kant’s project as
concerning the internal change of heart in relation to Christian concepts such
as grace and the Son of God. He states, “the Religion has still not
asked how the struggle against evil could be carried on effectively. What can
we do now to effect a change of heart in ourselves or in others?” (164). This
last concern, he argues, is taken up only in Part Three, and he returns to the issues
of mutual corruption and unsociable sociability. However, the social element is
not suddenly introduced in Part Three of the Religion; it is there from
the start. As noted, Wood places great stress on symbolic interpretations of
inherited religious traditions. These traditions are not individually
created—they are culturally and historically formed and transmitted. The same
applies more generally to scriptures and sacred texts in all traditions, as
well as to doctrines, codes of conduct, and other practices. These are collective
and social, and yet have a tremendous impact on the psychological and ethical
formation of individuals. Kant is concerned throughout the Religion to
reinterpret Christian faith (and by extension other historical faiths, Wood 188)
to render them more suitable as vehicles for the moral law. Wood sees this
connection, and inserts a section, 7.6, on “The Interpretation of Scripture”
into his discussion of the ethical community (174ff.). Kant makes rational
interventions into shared cultural and religious institutions, thereby actively
contributing to the conditions supporting a change of heart, and a change of Denkungsart.
Wood
explains that, “the ethical community is in its concept universal, encompassing
all humanity,” and is distinguished from any political community by that
universality as well as its non-coercive focus on inner states (165-66). It is
vital that moral religion and ethical community concern all of humankind—they
are not culture or tradition specific. Wood explicates how the ethical community,
as rational and universal, is “an ideal in the sense that no existing community
ever fully lives up to it” (167). The ideal ethical community is also called
the church invisible, because it concerns internal ethical matters, but it does
not correspond to existing, visible churches. As noted, Kant describes the
“ethical community” as “the church invisible (the mere idea of the union of all
upright human beings under direct yet moral divine world-governance, as serves
for the archetype [zum Urbilde] of any such governance to be
founded by human beings” (R
6:101). Wood notes that the four features of the church invisible are given
under “the four headings of the table of categories” (168, citing R 6:101-102).
It could also be noted that the moral law grounds the four basic characteristics
of the church invisible: universality, purity, freedom, and “the unchangeableness of its constitution” following “secure
principles a priori.” The moral law is defined as universal at G 4:402, 4:421, 4:431, 4:436,
as pure, i.e., strictly a priori, at
G, 4:405, 4:410, 4:411, 4:426; as establishing human relations under the
principle of freedom at 4:433ff.,
4:438; its unchanging nature, i.e.,
resistance to exceptions and historical contingencies, is stated at 4:424.[12]
One
of Wood’s strongest contributions is explicating the active interface of the
ideal with existing communities: “In order effectively to combat evil, the
ethical community must exist here on earth, as a human institution” (168). Because
of the need to work with existing historical structures, “Kant cannot be
understood as rejecting revealed (Christian) religion … as the outer circle of
religion” (170). At the same time, this does not mean Kant accepts revealed
traditions on heteronomous terms. Moral religion “consists solely in the
performance of our ethical duties, symbolically presented in religious terms” (170).
Because of this tension between existing churches and the moral ideal, Wood
argues, “religion must be subjected to a historical dynamic, through which the
two contrasting thoughts can be brought together” (171). Noting the patterns of
priestcraft and domination in historical traditions, including Christianity, Wood
observes how human institutions can be “far removed from, even in certain ways
directly opposed to, the rational aims that human beings must realize through
them” (171). At the same time, Wood emphasizes “that an ethical community is
possible only through the historical progress of existing churches” (172). While
this is true, the question remains: what drives this progress toward
universal moral principles, which does not occur without the intervention of
rational agents? We are returned to the need for an enlightened, ethical
interpretation of existing institutions, accompanied by freedom of speech in
the public sphere, so that the heteronomous and contra-rational elements of
religions are reformed into vehicles of moral autonomy. Wood also makes this
point, noting the problems of idolatry and literalism; avoiding these involves
“accepting the responsibility to interpret religious symbols” (173n, R 6:199).
Wood
notes significant parallels in Kant’s approaches to religious and political
transformation: “politics should begin with an imperfect or even despotic state
and seek to bring it closer to a true condition of right” (182). One might
exchange “should” for “must,” since all existing states are imperfect.
Nevertheless, the point is important; Kant is not a naïve utopian who thinks we
can disregard existing political or ecclesiastical institutions and replace
them with purely rational ones. This is a recipe for chaos or, as Kant puts it,
“anarchy” (TP 8:302 including Kant’s footnote). Kant prioritizes an
“evolutionary” over a “revolutionary” model of progress (SF 7:87-88).
Concerning religious reform, Kant likewise emphasizes how “equality springs
from true freedom, yet without anarchy, for each indeed obeys the law (not the
statutory one),” and how “the basis for the transition to a new order of things
must lie in the principle of the pure religion of reason… inasmuch as it is to
be a human work, through gradual reform” (Wood 182-83, citing R 6:121-22). The use of the
term “statutory” to describe both political and religious codes indicates that,
in each case, historically formed institutions are gauged in relation to ideas
of reason. However, since
ideal models cannot be imposed on reality, there must occur a gradual
interaction between ideal and real, to which each contributes. In the final
chapter, Wood reiterates that “Kant’s project must be to advocate gradual
reform of these [religious] practices from within” (187). As he further explains, “If pure rational
religion is simply the telos of a process of religious reform that Kant hopes
will take place in ecclesiastical faiths, then we cannot know what pure
rational religion truly is until that process of reform has taken place” (187).
This is a crucial point, i.e., that any ideal must be applied through the
judgment and action of rational beings living under existing societal and political
conditions; depending on the particulars of those conditions, the outcomes will
vary. This is also why Kant emphasises approximation to the ideal rather than
completion, and why, as Wood also notes, the application of the ideal to
ecclesiastical faiths includes all historical religions (188)—hence there will
be different versions of the “rational religion” should it ever come into
being.
However,
Wood ends chapter 7 on a melancholy note, lamenting that Kant’s “hopes for
religion have not been borne out.” More pointedly: “Ecclesiastical religion
fails in its religious vocation when it becomes an enemy of enlightenment, when
it defends traditional, backward ways of thinking rather than leading the way
to enlightened social reform” (184). Likewise, in his conclusion, Wood observes:
“If Kant errs at this point, it is in his overestimation of the capacity of
religious thought and institutions to develop and reform” (211). In fact, because
of its heteronomous systems of thinking and authority, statutory faith can become
a “fetter” blocking progress in autonomy and enlightenment (Wood 214, citing R 6:121).
The
question of over-riding criteria is essential: for ethical reform to occur, the
principles governing moral religion, the moral law and its correlate autonomy, must
have primacy over heteronomous mores. This is where Kant poses a challenge to traditional patterns of
religious thinking and is one reason why Kant’s hope for an enlightening of
ecclesiastical institutions has gone largely unfulfilled. Wood advances the
process of religious enlightenment in several respects with his clear
treatments of symbolic interpretation in the service of practical reason.
However, his position sometimes becomes weakened or muddled in his efforts to
emphasize the harmony of rational faith and historical, especially Christian
institutions, thereby downplaying Kant’s cosmopolitan project grounded in
practical reason.
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