Critique
of the Public Sphere: A Kantian Measure of the Enlightenment of Societies
Martin Hammer·
University of Trier, Germany
Abstract
I
propose a method of assessing the degree of enlightenment of a society based on
(specific characteristics of) its discourses. My hypothesis is that the more
objectivity prevails in a society’s spheres of discourse, the more enlightened
it is; the more subjectivity dominates, the more
unenlightened. This relationship can be made evident through the reconstruction
of Kant’s Theory of Prejudice by taking into account
the handwritten notes and fragments and the lectures on logic. First, I will
discuss some key aspects of Kant’s concept of prejudice. Secondly, I will
address the epistemological function of the public sphere in
order to show what conditions it must satisfy to fulfil its function.
Thirdly, I will argue that not only Selbstdenken but also participatory reason (teilnehmende Vernunft), and therefore the public
sphere itself, are both fundamental elements of enlightenment in that they
function as counter-maxims against prejudice.
Prejudices,
enlightenment, discourse analysis, communication, the public sphere, maxims of
the common human understanding, the mechanical use of reason
Contemporary public
discourses can be characterized by a dominance of opinions. Social media
promote a culture of discussion which is focused around
the idea of expressing one’s private feelings and thoughts. Talk shows thrive
on spectacle, on clashing opposed, often deadlocked, arguments – a battlefield
of subjective convictions. All too often, reports are
aimed at emotion, indignation and entertainment, at
the price of simplifying the complexity of truth. In a nutshell it might be said
that the public spheres of discourse have a tendency towards the subjectivity
of both senders and receivers.
Conversely, public
discourses are rarely constructive discussions with the aim of a collaborative
ascertainment of truth wherein arguments are exchanged with respect to their
object. In the majority of cases, I suspect, discourses
are public manifestations of subjective views, opinions and emotions which
often clash in an unmediated way. A common disinterest in the truth and the
subsequent dominance of a (mutually uninterested) pluralism of opinions might reinforce
this tendency. By contrast, academic discourses interested in the truth function
by excluding subjectivity[1],
thus letting objectivity prevail. This is demonstrated by the history of scholarship,
in which “acting subjects relate to each other in the context of a
transgenerational, diachronic division of labour” (Städtler
2019, p. 16; translation M.H.).
In the following,
I propose a method of assessing the degree of enlightenment of a society based
on (specific characteristics of) its discourses. This is based on
epistemological reflections on Kant’s theory of prejudice.[2]
At the same time, following Kant, this allows for demands on cultural policy to
be made concerning the structural conditions of the public spheres of discourse.
As my brief contemporary diagnosis might suggest, these are of great relevance
today and serve to promote emancipation of mankind.
The Hammer-Kant-Measure: My hypothesis is that the more objectivity prevails in
a society’s spheres of discourse, the more enlightened it is;
the more subjectivity dominates, the more unenlightened.[3]
This connection
between the degrees of subjectivity in public discourse and the enlightenment
of a society as a whole has not yet been taken into
account from the perspective of Kant’s theory of prejudice, although his much-discussed
concept of Enlightenment is indirectly based on it.
A society can be assessed as enlightened if it realizes in its spheres
of discourse the claim
to be guided by reason and objectivity. A pointed Kantian
definition of
enlightenment is the “liberation
from prejudices in general”
(KU, AA 5: 294;
Kant 2000, p. 174). This objective can only be reached if the public spheres of discourse comply with certain conditions (see section
2). Since modern democratic
societies generally understand themselves
as enlightened, they tend not
to pay sufficient attention
to the question of whether they really fulfil said conditions. In short, the claim to enlightenment is often blindly assumed to be fulfilled
without further inquiry.
In the context of this paper, several elements of the concept of enlightenment will be of particular significance:
autonomy, Selbstdenken and freedom (in the narrower
sense of freedom of speech, assembly, publicity and science), as well as education with the objective of one’s autonomy. A
fundamental notion of Kant’s with respect to the concept of Enlightenment, allgemeine Menschenvernunft will
also play an important role. This concept does not arise from the basic
problems of the Critique in a strict sense,
but “it is rather Kant’s inner affiliation with the German Enlightenment that
gains validity in the idea of the allgemeine Menschenvernunft”. (Hinske
1993, p. 65) Kant’s understanding of the public sphere as an external criterion
of truth as well as the second maxim of the common human understanding are based
on this concept.
In this paper, I take
a very broad concept of the public sphere into account. All kinds of media, but
also interpersonal communication in the public, such as a discussion between scholars,
a talk show or a congress with subsequent discussions
and even a public speech belong to the public in this broad sense (cf. Gerhardt
2019, p. 4). Kantian requirements of a medium of public reasoning are that one’s
reasoning “can be universalized and appropriately disseminated” (Pasquarè 2020,
p. 108).[4]
A further key requirement is reciprocity: that others have the possibility to
object and to have their objection listened to. For without this possibility of
mutual (critical) reference, the public sphere cannot serve as an external
criterion of truth.
I aim to develop
this measure in three steps: First, I will discuss some key aspects of Kant’s concept
of prejudice. This discussion also already touches on the
requirements of Selbstdenken, which section 3 will assess more thoroughly
with respect to Kant’s first maxim of the common human understanding. Secondly,
following Fonnesu (2019), I will address the
epistemological function of the public sphere in order to
show what conditions it must satisfy to fulfil its function. Here it will be
shown that the requirements of Selbstdenken must
be understood as integrated into the public sphere. The autonomous use of
reason has preconditions outside of one’s own reason: Objectivity must first be
established in the public sphere and is not validated by thinking for oneself
alone. Thirdly, I will argue that not only Selbstdenken but also participatory
reason (teilnehmende Vernunft), and therefore the public
sphere itself, are both fundamental elements of enlightenment in that they
function as counter-maxims against prejudice.[5]
1 Critique of passive reason
Kant defines the
Enlightenment as “the human being’s emergence from his self-incurred minority”
and this minority (Unmündigkeit, immaturity) as the “inability
to use his understanding without direction from another” (WA, AA 08: 35; Kant 1996a, p. 17). It is therefore unenlightened to
use one’s own understanding by subordinating oneself to the direction of
another. By contrast, Selbstdenken,
the first maxim of the common human understanding, is the first necessary
condition for enlightenment. Kant defines enlightenment in a notably negative
way as a rejection of its main opponent, namely prejudice. In the case of
prejudices, one’s thinking is directed by something other than one’s own reason.
Kant points this out when he refers to experts (scholars, doctors, pastors) who
have established themselves in the course of the
division of labour and who relieve individuals of specific thinking tasks (cf. WA, AA 08: 35; SF, AA 07: 31; Refl 1508, AA 15: 822). “Precepts and formulas”[6],
too are understood as “the ball and chain of an everlasting minority”, “those
mechanical instruments of a rational use, or rather misuse, of his natural
endowments” (WA, AA 08: 36; Kant 1996a,
p. 17). Thus, the direction of one’s own understanding by others does not only
take place through real superiors or as part of one’s profession, but also
through the prestige of experts, whose guidance people like to trust, and through
certain formulas. Both constitute a kind of intellectual guidance of one’s own
thinking.
Kant developed his
multi-layered theory of prejudice during his 40 years of lecturing on logic.
Basically, prejudice is a maxim[7],
i.e., a subjective principle (Grundsatz) (cf. WDO, AA 08: 140). Thus, prejudices have the character of rules.
However, to emphasise the subjective, psychological character of these maxims, Kant
replaced the term ‘principle’ by ‘tendency’/’propensity’ (Hang) or ‘habitus’. By using this terminology, Kant refers
to the dimension of practical philosophy, stressing arbitrariness and – in the
context of negativity that we are dealing with when discussing prejudice – self-incurring.[8]
Three layers of
Kant’s concept of prejudice are relevant here:
1) The Injudiciousness
Layer: First, prejudices are judgments without
reflection (Überlegung),
“i.e., that we seek out the connection of a cognition with our power of
cognition from which it is supposed to arise” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 863; Kant 1992, p. 314). In these cases, people
do not give themselves an epistemic account of the origin of a judgment, whether
it is subjective or objective[9],
based on intuition or cognition. In his critical period, Kant insists that the
critical method be used in cognition: The critical method investigates the
sources, “thereby to illuminate the truth” (V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 885; Kant 1992, p. 332). If we “accept some judgments without reflection
and without attention to the power of cognition that has an influence on the
judgment [... then] prejudices arise.” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 863; Kant 1992, p. 314).[10]
The Injudiciousness Layer is closely related
to the “Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflections” (see Heßbrüggen-Walter
2004). But Kant also connects it with the other layers of prejudice: Due to the
lack of reflection on the sources, sensibility can interfere with a judgment
unnoticed (cf. Refl
2533, Refl 2541,
Refl 2548).
This leads to confusion (see the Confusion Layer). The absence of reflection
leads to a false assessment of the validity of one’s own judgments (des Fürwahrhaltens), since I
have not given any reflection at all to the subjective origins of my judgment.
This is why Kant associates illusion, which arises from
the tendency to one’s own persuasion, with prejudice (cf. Refl
2541, AA 16:410). On the other hand, the reflection is relevant to one’s own
conviction, and as a reflection of one’s power of judgment it refers to Selbstdenken: I
am convinced only if I have “thought this through myself” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 867; Kant 1992, p. 317)[11],
whereas otherwise I am only persuaded. Only reflection gives rise to conviction.
As Kant points out, although not investigation, reflection is nonetheless a
necessary condition of every judgment; for without reflection, no claim to
objectivity can be made (cf. V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 862-863; Kant 1992, pp 313-314, and V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 737). Avoiding the lack of reflection
calls for Selbstdenken
and therefore refers to the first maxim of common human understanding (see
section 3).
2) The Confusion Layer. Secondly, Kant also
explicates the concept of prejudice in such a way that it corresponds “at the
most general level” to a basic definition of the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’ (“the
phenomenon Kant calls ‘transcendental illusion’, which at the most general
level consists in [sic] mistaking subjective principles and ideas for objective
ones (KrV, A
296-7/B353-4).” Willaschek 2020, p. 306):
A
prejudice is a principium for judging
based on subjective causes that are regarded as objective. Subjective causes
all lie in sensibility. Objective grounds lie in the understanding (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 863.30-32; Kant
1992, pp. 314-315; cf. V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 865.01-03; Kant 1992, pp. 315-316).
As already
mentioned, Kant basically understands prejudices as maxims, i.e., subjective
principles for judging, a propensity/tendency (Hang) that has become our own through frequent practice (cf. V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 864; Kant 1992, p.
315). As maxims, prejudices are not single false judgments, but rather sources
of erroneous judgments. Kant calls prejudice in sensu subjectivo the propensity to persuasion.
Persuasion is the taking to be true (Fürwahrhalten) due to subjective causes. In sensu objectivo,
prejudice is the semblance (Schein)
that is turned into the principle of the truth of one’s own judgments (cf. V-Lo/Pölitz,
AA 24: 547.34-548.03). The special feature of the Confusion Layer is the problem
of perversion, which plays a prominent role in the ‘Transcendental Dialectic’.
The self-deception produced by prejudice follows from taking subjective causes as
valid for everyone. From such misjudgement follows a misjudgement of the
validity of one’s own judgment (des Fürwahrhaltens). Prejudice as a maxim to judge objectively
on subjective grounds (cf. Refl 2550, AA 16: 412) makes it nearly impossible for the
claim somebody has on his own judgment to stand the test of the agreement in
the public sphere. The notion that prejudices are a “principium (tendency) for
judging based on subjective causes which are mistakenly regarded as objective grounds
principles” (Refl
2530, later addition after 1780, AA 16: 407,05-08; translation M.H.)[12]
can be found in many Kantian notes (cf. Refl 2524, Refl 2528, Refl 2530, Refl 2545, Refl 2547, Refl 2550 and all lectures on logic). But what exactly does
Kant mean by subjective here? In the context of logic Kant calls subjective
causes ‘sensibility’ (Sinnlichkeit); this
is quite a broad concept:
Logic,
since it abstracts from all content, cannot say more of the influence of sensibility
than that it presents the subjective ground of our judgment. The understanding
is the objective ground of our judgment. But when something subjective, which
in fact belongs to sensibility, flows into our judgment, then sensibility has
mixed itself in, and this is the source of errors. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 825; Kant 1992, p. 282)
In a negative
sense, subjectivity means everything that has its ground neither in the object
of cognition nor in the functions of the human understanding. Expressed positively,
this means that something is subjective when the grounds of the judgment are to
be found not in the general (the conditions of thought or the object) but in
the subject, e.g. in feelings, attitudes or
preferences. Inverting subjective causes into their straight opposite –
objective grounds – indicates a perversion.[13]
We might understand this as an inversion of the epistemological hierarchy which
is necessary for true reasoning: Neither the epistemological priority of the
object nor the epistemological priority of the general rules of reasoning
remain respected. This inversion (perversion) is to be understood as based on a
free act (see the Mechanism Layer).
By subjective
causes Kant essentially refers to the three sources of prejudice: imitation, custom
and inclination (cf. V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24:
865; Kant 1992, p. 316; V-Lo/Pölitz, AA 24: 548; V-Lo/Dohna, AA 24: 738 and 741). Subjectivity in this sense
always has something of arbitrariness. An example of inclination may illustrate
how subjectivity flows into judgments: “E.g., someone who adheres to an opinion
holds the opinion to be something probable. Probability is an objective ground.
But subjective adherence brings the effect that is taken to be objective.” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 825; Kant 1992, p. 282)
By “subjective causes” Kant means that “a certain condition operates in man”, a
mere psychological propensity, e.g.: “One judges the maxims of others critically, and holds his own to be good. Here is the
prejudice […] whose subjective cause is self-love.” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 864; Kant 1992, p. 315)
Subjective causes
turn out to be quite varied and psychological. It is not necessary for the subject
to have a clear awareness of its own taking to be true (Fürwahrhalten). Furthermore, to
gain an awareness of this confusion of one’s own is, if not impossible, at
least highly improbable. The best way to become aware that we are deceiving
ourselves and that our judging is based on semblance, i.e., that we are
mistaking subjective causes for objective grounds, is to test our judgments in the
public sphere. This is the immanent connection of the Confusion Layer with both
the epistemic function of the public sphere and the second maxim of common
human understanding (see section 2 and 3). Prejudice disguises one’s own judgment
as objectively valid and implies that the latter is actually
persuasion. What all subjective causes have in common, despite their
great diversity, is that one’s own understanding is guided by arbitrary grounds
alien to reason. The comprehensibility of one’s own judgment by others, which is
founded in the general conditions of human understanding, is no longer given in
such cases of confusion due to the arbitrariness and individuality of
subjective reasons. This infiltration of subjective causes, which are alien to
the general conditions of human understanding, leads to the Mechanism Layer.
3) The Mechanism Layer. The paradoxical concept of the “mechanization of
reason in principles” (V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 863; Kant 1992, p. 314), a mechanism also called “habitus of a passive use” of reason (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 866; Kant 1992, 316; cf. Refl
2532, Refl 2548,
Refl 2550) provides
the third layer of Kant’s concept of prejudice. This “tendency [Hang] towards mechanism in the use of
reason” (V-Lo/Dohna,
AA 24: 738; Kant 1992, p. 474) is promoted in particular by imitation, to which
belong all kinds of formulas which are able to direct thought[14] –
and, following this direction, people encourage themselves to adopt a passive attitude
of reason (cf. V-Lo/Dohna,
AA 24: 738, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 866-867).
As in his answer to the question: What is
enligthenment?, Kant states: “Such
mechanization prevails in formulas” (V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 867; Kant 1992, p. 317; cf. Refl 2526, Refl 2527).
In this sense prejudice is a performative
contradiction to the nature of human reason itself: The orientation of one’s
own thinking towards models and patterns, which Kant counts among the prejudices
of prestige, promotes a “passive use of reason”, a “contradictio
in adjecto”, because “reason, as to its nature, is a self-active principium of thought” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 866; Kant 1992, p. 316;
cf. V-Lo/Pölitz,
AA 24: 548.34-549.03). Reason, while (still) free, can adopt a passive attitude
by choosing not to be free, by following alien rules – this is related to the
paradox of the self-incursion of
one’s minority, whereby Kant implies a responsibility that has its epistemological
root in the Mechanism Layer of prejudice. A conversion takes place, insofar as
the passive sensibility is given an active role, while on the other hand reason
loses its genuine activity and turns passive. Put differently, reason
subordinated itself to subjective laws that it considers to be its own (subreption). This is a perversion of
reason. From now on, it follows an alien mechanism: “Tendency towards a
mechanism of reason instead of spontaneity of the same, subject to laws. let
themselves be guided.” (Refl
2527, addition after 1780, AA 16: 406; translation M.H.)[15]
Kant’s notion of a mechanical use of reason is deeply
interwoven with the entire project of the critique of reason. A sufficient
analysis of the mechanical use of reason remains a task for further research.
Nevertheless, I would like to at least clarify some interesting implications.
The term mechanical
is first to be understood as opposed to free,
just as the passive use of reason is
opposed to the active use in a
certain way. The designation of reason as free
is just as much an unnecessary duplication as is the designation of reason as active or of a stallion as male.
Freedom, spontaneity and activity are analytically
inherent in the concept of reason; they are simply essential characteristics of
it. Consequently, the particular determination ‘mechanical’
or ’passive’ indicates a perversion that corrupts the concept of reason without
destroying it. This is logically related to Kant’s theory of infinite
judgments.
While freedom
refers to the intelligible sphere of the human being, mechanism refers to the external sphere, in which not spontaneity
but the mechanism of nature, i.e., causality, prevails. Following Kant’s
practical philosophy, we can speak here of a choice of the subject to subject
its use of reason to heteronomous conditions. With the concept of a mechanical
use of reason, attention – within the framework of Kant’s philosophy – is thus
explicitly drawn to the fact that (through a transcendental choice) the double
position of Man, heautonomy (his characteristic of
being situated between autonomy and heteronomy), has been renounced. For this
reason, too, Kant declares the passive use of reason to be a “tendency [...]
toward heteronomy of reason” (KU, AA 05:
294; Kant 2000, p. 174).
The parallelisation with the radical evil in Kant’s
practical philosophy makes it possible to grasp more precisely the explanation
of the self-infliction of minority, which is rooted in the mechanical use of reason.
According to Allison’s incorporation theory,
motivating forces cannot motivate anything on their own. They only possess this
capacity for motivation when they are incorporated into one’s maxims. Only
under this condition they become motivating forces in a strict sense (cf.
Allison 1990, p. 208). The term propensity
indicates that “one is dealing with the subject”, where the mechanical use of reason
is concerned. “From the moment” this happens, “it is true of every relation of
cause and effect that it presupposes and involves an act (a decision, even if
it is not ‘conscious’) by which a motivating force is established as a (sufficient)
cause, i.e., it is incorporated into the maxim.” (Zupančič 2001, p. 40, translation M.H.) According
to Kant, the decisive reason for adopting maxims is an (unconscious) decision
at the level of the Gesinnung.
His most important thesis in this context is: “The Gesinnung, the orientation of the
subject, must itself have been freely chosen.” (Zupančič 2001, p. 42, translation M.H.; cf. RGV, AA 06: 21) Therefore, even in the
case of minority, there is responsibility and attributability (cf. Zupančič 2001, p. 43). The Gesinnung, as the principle of
the adoption of this or that maxim, is self-chosen by an act of spontaneity (cf.
Zupančič 2001, p. 123 and pp. 42-43). This act
of spontaneity is to be distinguished from the Gesinnung itself. The passive use
of reason is not only the formal principle of every wrong way of thinking, but
is itself based on such an act, “an actus of freedom” (RGV, AA 06: 21).
Just like the propensity to radical evil, the propensity to the mechanical use
of reason is self-chosen and therefore attributable as “a free choice of
non-freedom” (Zupančič 2001, p. 125,
translation M.H.).
The mechanical use of reason does not refer to a particular
epistemic error, but to the root of all epistemic errors (alien-determined
thinking). According to Kant, the passive use of reason is not wrong in content
but in form – irrespective of the fact that there may be a modicum of truth in prejudices
or proverbs (Kant agrees with Meier on this), or that these may be quite
adequate to the object. The voluntary renunciation of the activity of thinking
is a perversion. It is not the consequences of such thinking – the actual prejudices
or errors – that are to be criticised, but the act as such. By freely choosing
to be un-free, one voluntarily renounces the power to govern one’s cognition
according to the rules of understanding and thus one renounces the spontaneity
of reasoning itself, thus reducing oneself to the status of a phenomenon and
placing oneself absolutely in the realm of heteronomy.
In his lectures on logic from the 1770s, Kant does not
yet treat the mechanical use of reason but he already
emphasises that “in respect of the object” a “cognition gained by prejudice can
very often be very true”, “but not in respect of the form” (V-Lo/Blomberg, AA 24: 169, translation
M.H.). In the critical period it still remains valid for
Kant that an assumption made on the basis of a prejudice can be true in terms
of its content: “In this connection it is to be observed, however, that what I
accept out of prejudice can also, accidentally, be true.” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 872, Kant 1992, p. 322) Kant now also emphasises
his insight that the real error is one of the form
with the transcendental principle of a mechanical use of reason. The
reprehensible aspect of such knowledge is the illegal way in which it is gained:
“The propositions are not always false because they come from prejudice, often
they are correct but only the modus acquirendi (as the
jurists say) is illegal, I have thereby opened a wide path for false cognition,
and the manner is often more important than the cognition itself” (V-Lo/Pölitz,
AA 24: 554, translation M.H.). Again, an analogy to radical evil arises: “The
maxim of the action may agree with the law, but when this case is present, it
is always for reasons other than those which derive solely from the law.” (Zupančič 2001, p. 124, translation M.H.) The same
is true of a prejudice – should it be ‘accidentally true’ in content, it is always
for reasons other than those of understanding itself.
The passive use of reason is a logical paradox (cf. Schneiders 1983, p. 301), since in this way
reason destroys itself. It is a kind of self-alienation, which increasingly
distances one from one’s talents and abilities as a human being (cf. Refl
2543, AA 16: 410). This third layer is the keystone in Kant’s systematization
of prejudice, for he ultimately traces back the concept of prejudices to a
pre-empirical ground in reason itself (cf. Schneiders 1983, p. 298). A passive
reason is a contradictio in adjecto and in actu.
The possibility of the first two types of
prejudice is based on the mechanical use of reason. Only the Mechanism Layer
makes these epistemological failures compatible with the freedom of the subject,
through which process it becomes evident, that minority is indeed self-inflicted.
Thinking can fail. Not everyone follows the transcendental conditions Kant
outlined in the ‘Logic of Truth’, the ‘Transcendental Analytic’. This is why Kant writes the Amphiboly-Chapter as an
appendix, which at the same time establishes the transition to the ‘Transcendental
Dialectic’.
The absence of reflection (the Injudiciousness
Layer) is rather a description of the epistemic process, an explanation of how
it is possible for one to include subjective reasons in one’s judgment without
noticing it. The contradiction here is that one judges without reflection, although
reflection is a necessary condition of any judgment. The propensity to claim
subjective causes as objective reasons (the Confusion Layer) can be understood as a consequence of this lack of reflection.
The Confusion Layer emphasises the
psychological dimension more strongly by conceiving of it as a propensity, i.e.,
it is an acquired bad epistemic habit. This way of explaining prejudice,
however, also allows us to grasp the epistemic problem more clearly: The
respective individual, arbitrary (subjective causes) is asserted as the
universal (objective grounds). The term ‘objective grounds’ has two
significations in this context which are both disturbed by the subjectivity
that has been mixed in: the reference to an object, and the objective rules of
human understanding. However, the condition of the possibility of both
disturbances of the epistemically correct use of reason is not even comprised by
these explanations themselves. For this, it must be explained how this
inclination can be compatible with human freedom.
Not by accident
Horkheimer’s Eclipse of Reason revives
this Kantian critique of the mechanization
of reason in principles. Horkheimer fought against ideology and prejudices throughout
his research, not only by writing the Dialectic
of Enlightenment, but in a broad sense. For Horkheimer, autonomous thinking
that is not bound to a specific purpose, fantasy and the joy of intellectual
activity are the conditions that, to put it this way, deprive the soil of
prejudice – and antisemitism in particular – of its fertility. As the last sentence
of Horkheimer’s speech Über das Vorurteil (cf. Horkheimer 1963, p. 11) illustrates, he
identifies the greatest problem for a lack of enlightenment in the factors that
obstruct Selbstdenken.
In doing so, he refers indirectly to Kant’s first maxim of the common human
understanding (see section 3). Neither the public nor its framework conditions
appear in this investigation on prejudice. However, this misses the
significance of the second maxim and, with this, of the public sphere for the
liberation from prejudice (see section 2). The resulting gap has been the subject
of much of Habermas’ work.
2 Functions of the
public
In his lectures on logic Kant ascribes to
the public a fundamental importance as an external criterion of truth[16]:
[C]onsequently it is an
external criteriumL of truth, i.e., the
agreement of the universal human understanding is a ground for the supposition
that I will have judged correctly. It is a kind of testing of judgment on more
than one understanding. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 871; Kant 1992, p. 321)
The approval of others is an external criterion of truth, an external indication that one’s own judgment is objectively valid. As an external criterion it is not a
sufficient criterion at all. According to Kant, there can be no general criterion of truth in terms of
content, because “the nominal definition of truth, namely that it is the agreement
of cognition with its object” (KrV, A 58/B 83;
Kant 1998, p. 197) refers to the content
and therefore a general criterion is self-contradictory. On the other side, the
principle of contradiction is a general but only a formal (logical) criterion
of all truth which, at least for synthetic judgments, allows only a negative
use: It “annihilates and cancels” (KrV, A 151/B
190; Kant 1998, p. 280) judgments that are recognised as contradictory. In the
light of Kant’s critical attitude towards his own and others’ claims to truth,
it is all the more important that there can be a
criterion of truth, albeit not an absolutely reliable one: the test of one’s
own judgment in the public sphere. The possibility of this test is based on the
allgemeine Menschenvernunft.
To put a judgment up for public scrutiny is always a risk that requires courage[17]
because of the finite nature and fallibility of human cognition (cf. Hinske 1980, pp.
36-38).[18]
The public servers both as a touchstone (cf. KrV, A 820/B 848;
see Fonnesu 2019) and as a corrective to my judgments:
For although it is not a sole criteriumL,
it is a joint criteriumL. For in
discursive cognitions of reason, where we present everything through concepts,
one can never hold the agreement of others to be dispensable, the cause being that mistakes […] are so easy here. The mistake that I
committed arose out of an illusion, which arose from the condition of how I
cognized the cognition[;] hence I cannot hold the
judgment of others to be dispensable. For they can correct my judgment […]. (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 874; Kant 1992, p. 323)
In taking
something to be true, the subject ascribes a certain validity to the judgment.
There are two forms of taking something to be true (as I pointed out in section
1): persuasion and conviction. According to Kant, in a merely reflexive
self-examination, persuasion cannot be subjectively distinguished from
conviction at all (cf. KrV, A 821/B 849; Kant 1998, p. 686). On my
own, therefore, I have no way of checking whether my assertion is a conviction
or a mere persuasion. Only the test in public of whether the judgments I assume
as valid also meet with approval in the thinking of others can assure me of my
judgment as a conviction. What is even more important is to fail, i.e., to be
criticised by others: I can only become aware of subjective causes which I
mistakenly believed to be objective grounds or which I unknowingly mixed into
my judgment by the fact that others cannot be convinced by the reasons that
seemed sufficient to me. Through the failure of my own judgments, I am
empowered via self-critical reflection to recognise that such blending in has happened,
and thus I am enabled to correct myself.
Semblance (Schein) is possible at every stage of the process of taking something to be
true (Fürwahrhalten),
i.e. subjective reasons can be considered objective. This
corresponds to the Confusion-Layer of Kant’s account on prejudice. In the Critique,
Kant calls this kind of confusion persuasion (Überredung): “Persuasion
is a mere semblance, since the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the
subject, is held to be objective.” (KrV, A 820/B 848; Kant 1998, p. 685)
Persuasion is particularly relevant to the
case of (merely putative) ‘knowing’ (Wissen) because I can be aware that
something is objectively certain because I am convinced of the reasons for my
belief both subjectively and objectively, but I have only persuaded myself
because I have held subjective causes to be objective grounds.
Contrary to the first impression, this
confusion is also relevant in the cases
of having an ‘opinion’ and of ‘believing’. Although in these cases, while I do
not have sufficient objective grounds, I still have insufficient ones, and
therefore I can take subjective causes for objective – although insufficient – grounds.
There is a certain ‘knowing’ in every ‘having an opinion’ or ‘believing’ and
this is their nexus with truth:
I must never undertake to have an opinion without at
least knowing something by means of which the in itself
merely problematic judgment acquires a connection with truth which,
although it is not complete, is nevertheless more than an arbitrary invention. (KrV, A 822/B 850; Kant 1998, p. 686)
In this respect, if I only think or
believe something, I cannot “pronounce it to be a judgment necessarily valid
for everyone” (KrV,
A 821/B 849; Kant 1998, p. 685)[19], but I can pronounce the ‘knowing’ it contains, i.e.
the objective reasons for my opinion.
Due to the diversity of individuals and
their subjectivity (and thus their prejudices as maxims by which one holds
certain subjective causes to be objective grounds), in the end, the controversy
of arguments in public tends to neutralize subjectivity. Objectivity is first
and foremost established by means of a public discourse in which the claim to
universal validity of judgments is proven through practice.[20] If supposedly objective reasons do not stand the test in the public
sphere, one has evidence (or at least a presumption) to have fallen prey to prejudices
and is called upon to rethink and reflect.
The possibility of establishing objectivity through
public communication is based on the common ground, the object (cf. KrV, A 821/B
849).[21] In
the end, objectivity is established not in spite of,
but because of the many different participants in the discourse and their
individual prejudices, because the only common ground is the object in question.
Truth, however, rests upon agreement with the object, with regard to which, consequently, the judgments of every
understanding must agree (consentientia uni tertio, consentunt
inter se). The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction
or mere persuasion is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating
it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to take it to
be true; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of
the agreement of all judgments, regardless of the difference among the
subjects, rests on the common ground, namely the object, with which they
therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgment is proved. (KrV, A 820-821/B 848-849; Kant 1998, p. 685)
Public
discourse therefore has a specific epistemological function. As an external
criterion of truth, it serves to establish consistent concepts of
intersubjectively shared objectivity. This is mediated by the common human
reason, which establishes its generality only with respect to the common object
of its argument and by means of controversial judgments. Humans are in constant
danger to mix subjectivity, inclinations, customs, personal ends, etc. in judgments
without noticing it. According to Kant (cf. KrV, A 820/B 848), subjective
causes as such are not even communicable (see Fonnesu
2019, who argues that communicability
does play the role of the touchstone or criterion for the distinction between
the private and the public).[22] Following
Fonnesu “mere expression is always possible for every
kind of mental state, including a private one such as persuasion” but “simple
expression does not imply proper communication” (Fonnesu
2019, p. 16; see also O’Neill 1986, pp. 30-31 and Arendt 2012, p. 110, twelfth
lecture). Furthermore: Epistemologically, a subject, on its own, cannot
distinguish at all whether it is convinced, i.e.
whether it has sufficient objective grounds, or whether it only persuades
itself to think it has. In this case one’s judgment actually “has only private
validity” (KrV,
A 820/B 848; Kant 1998, p. 685), so ultimately it is not a judgment at all. By its very concept, a judgment always claims to
be objective. If subjective causes interfere with one’s own judgment, this
claim cannot be fulfilled. This is the case when a judgment only has private
validity, i.e., when one’s taking to be
true is based on persuasion and not on conviction. Judgments, in principle,
make a claim to objectivity (cf. Baum 2021).
Just
as with Marx the commodity must first realise itself on the market in order to be a commodity, so with Kant the claim of agreement
from every human being must first realise the judgment as such in the public
sphere. Judgments are not transformed in the objective realm of the public sphere,
but here they are realized through the validation of the conceptually
presupposed claim to objectivity.
Whether something is objectively as I subjectively
suppose it to be, or whether it only seems so to me
cannot be distinguished […] subjectively, when the
subject has taken something to be true merely as an appearance of his own mind;
but the experiment that one makes on the understanding of others, to see if the
grounds that are valid for us have the same effect on the reason of others, is
a means, though only a subjective one, not for producing conviction, to be
sure, but yet for revealing the merely private validity of the judgment, i.e.,
something in it that is mere persuasion. (KrV,
A 821/B 849; Kant 1998, p. 685)
Precisely because
the subject has taken something to be true as an appearance of her/his own mind,
she/he cannot distinguish whether she/he has only persuaded her-/himself (by
means of prejudice) or whether she/he is convinced (by means of objective grounds).
The only way of figuring it out is to take the risk of
testing the judgment in public. The public sphere plays a certain role here as
the only touchstone or criterion for recognizing subjective influences
in judgments (cf. Fonnesu 2019, pp. 15-16). The test
of one’s judgments in the public sphere is the best way to the certain Selbsterkenntnis,
whether my judgment is still only private or if it withstands.
If my judgment, which has been convincing to myself,
is also convincing to the reason of others, I have good reasons to hold my judgment
to be true and objectively justified. Kant’s assertion is that we only judge,
i.e., assert something to be true, if we are convinced. “I cannot assert
anything, i.e., pronounce it to be a judgment necessarily valid for everyone,
except that which produces conviction.” (KrV, A 821-822/B 849-850; Kant
1998, p. 685) The effect of conviction affects both myself
and others. I must be convinced and others too. But there is also the
possibility of persuasion. “I can preserve persuasion for myself if I please to
do so, but cannot and should not want to make it valid
beyond myself.” (KrV,
A 822/B 850; Kant 1998, p. 685) The will to communicate in the public sphere subjective
causes I hold to be objective grounds is morally
illicit.[23] Thus
Kant morally prevents manipulation, deliberate persuasion. But since the
subjects of a discourse cannot know whether they are persuaded or convinced,
this moral ban seems paradoxical.
As has been shown, even in the case of persuasion, I have to rely on objective reasons, supposed knowing, for my
judgment; pretexts, objective grounds which are not sufficient to make the judgment
likely. Kant is not saying that I cannot claim persuasion, but I cannot want
persuasion to be claimed. This is based on a far-reaching moral reflection: I
cannot want a society where all people follow the maxim to make public (and valid) not only their convictions
but also their persuasions, because then the function of the public sphere as
an external criterion of truth would be undermined and, consequently,
persuasion would be indistinguishable from conviction. But the epistemic
function of the public sphere is to be able to uncover my persuasion, the
subjectivity in my judgment through the lack of conviction that it has on
others.
The mere exchange of opinions is not enough for
recovering objectivity in our own judgments. Rather, for this it is required
that the respective sphere of communication fulfil certain standards. With
respect to the self-conception of modern societies as enlightened, demands for
cultural policy can be articulated on the basis of the
epistemic function of the public sphere. A critical public sphere that serves
enlightenment in the Kantian sense requires an interest in truth. A basic
condition for such a communication sphere is that here, people do not simply
express opinions, but exchange substantial judgments. The interest in truth
implies a seriousness and truthfulness on the part of the participants in the
discourse, that is not nowadays often found (see Menasse
2019). Public statements should aim at collaborative and discursive truth-finding
and not be based on motives alien to reason, such as achieving a certain effect
on the audience or pinning down opponents. This also implies that public statements
critically relate to each other, instead of being placed merely next to each
other as inconvertible and unconnected individual opinions. Furthermore, the
guiding interest in truth would demand that a spirit of contradiction prevail
in the public sphere, a spirit that is not concerned with defaming opponents
but with the critical examination of truth claims – judgments and their
justifications must be subjected to critical review (see also footnote 23).
3 Ways of thinking
In the Critique
of Judgment, Kant resumes his concept of prejudice as passive reason or “tendency […] toward heteronomy of reason” (KU, AA 05: 294; Kant 2000, p. 174) on
occasion of explicating common human
understanding. This is “the need to be led by others” (KU, AA 05: 295; Kant 2000, p. 175). Contrary to first glance, all “maxims
of common human understanding” (KU, AA
05: 294; Kant 2000, p. 174) are based on averting prejudices and serve to “avoid
the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be
held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment.” (KU, AA 05: 293-294; Kant 2000, pp. 173-174).
Since Kant understands prejudices as maxims, the maxims of the way of thinking
are counter-maxims of the correct use of the power of judgment. From this point
of view, their order cannot be derived only from the Kantian systematics,
according to which in a trichotomic division the first moment is assigned to
understanding, the second to the power of judgment and the third to reason (cf.
KU, AA 05: 295, Kant 2000, p. 174); but
the order or systematic progression of these maxims can also be developed on the basis of the danger of certain prejudices. These
maxims are “1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone
else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself.” (KU, AA 05: 294; Kant 2000, p. 174)
“To think for oneself” is directed against what Kant called
“servile prejudices” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA
24: 870; Kant 1992, p. 319), i.e. prejudices of prestige
(praejudicium auctoritatis),
which please human laziness by calling for a passive-mechanical use of reason. The
broad-minded way of participatory
understanding (teilnehmende Vernunft) (cf. Refl 2564, AA 16: 418-419) is
directed against the opposite danger of logical
egoism, called “egoistical prejudice” (V-Lo/Wiener,
AA 24: 870; Kant 1992, p. 319).[24] These types of prejudice are binary opposites: “Opposed
to the prejudices of prestige is logical egoism, i.e., the prejudice in
accordance with which we hold the agreement of our understanding with the
reason of others to be unnecessary as a criteriumL of wisdom.” (V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 873; Kant 1992, p. 323) The first maxim,
opposing the mechanical use of reason, is indeed the answer to servile prejudices. But by following
this maxim, the danger of egoistical prejudice, i.e. logical
egoism, arises.[25]
The unprejudiced
way of thinking is followed by the broad-minded
way,
if he sets himself apart from the subjective private
conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed,
and reflects on his own judgment from a universal standpoint (which he can only
determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). (KU, AA 05:
295; Kant 2000, p. 175)
The second maxim opposes logical egoism, to which Selbstdenken tends
(cf. Fonnesu 2019, p. 22). The latter, moreover, is
generally faced with a risk of confusing subjective causes and objective grounds.
Kant hints at this risk using the phrase “subjective private conditions of the
judgment”. In the second maxim one’s own point of view
is merely one possible judgment among many others, and therefore it is indifferent.
This
relative impartiality is achieved by distancing oneself from one’s own judgment.
And according to Arendt (2012, p. 113 and p. 115) and Fonnesu (2019, p. 22), it is precisely this
broad-minded way of thinking that enables us to communicate. Taking
into account the function of the public sphere, we can follow the second maxim
in two ways: In a logical one,
through virtual reflection, i.e. “by
one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible
judgments of others, and putting himself into the position of everyone else” (KU, AA 05: 295; Kant 2000, p. 175); on
the other hand, in a real way by taking
into account the real judgments we
actually encounter in the public sphere (cf. La Rocca 2004, p. 355).
The third maxim is “the consistent way of thinking […]
[which] can only by achieved through the combination of the first two” (KU, AA 05: 295; Kant 2000, p. 175). But
what danger threatens the second maxim and thus represents the transition to
the third, necessitating it? If just the second maxim is applied, this poses the
danger of scepticism because, if I reflect all possible or real judgments within
the scope of a judgment without thinking for myself, I will lose myself either
in the plurality of possible judgments or in following others. Guided by the
second maxim alone, either I cannot judge because I am only comparing numerous
judgments, so I am confused, undecided and thus suspending my judgment (cf. V-Lo/ Dohna, AA
24: 737, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 884-886)[26],
or, if I still want to make a judgment, I decide to follow an authority, such
as the majority opinion or respected scholars (cf. Refl 2575, Refl 2577, V-Lo/Wiener, AA 24: 872-873 and 869,26-37). Both dangers in
themselves amount to relinquishment of Selbstdenken.
While the first maxim averts the prejudices of prestige
– although if one applies this maxim alone, the danger of logical egoism arises
–, the second maxim rejects the danger of logical egoism but at the same time
provokes, once again, the danger of a passive use of reason, and therefore
precisely what Selbstdenken
was supposed to guard against – a vicious circle.
As shown, the maxims of the way of thinking can be
reconstructed as a “mere movement of shedding one’s prejudices” (La Rocca 2004,
p. 354; translation M.H.)[27].
Here we can expand on La Rocca’s (2004) account: As counters of prejudices, not
only Selbstdenken
but also teilnehmende Vernunft, and by consequence the public
sphere of discourse, are inherent in the concept of enlightenment and are mutually
dependent.
4 Conclusion
How can we thus establish a Kantian measure of a
society’s enlightenment on the basis of the
subjectivity or objectivity of its discourses? Prejudices
are subjective principles in the sense of counter-enlightenment: Subjects
subject themselves to the guidance of something other than their own reason.
For the public, the process of emerging from minority is a difficult task and
involves active participation and a deliberative practice. Without such
practice, a culture of Selbstdenken
and thinking in the position of everyone
else is difficult to imagine, since it must be learned by everyone. Such a practice requires courage: of the participants in a
discourse as well as of those who provide the public sphere of discourse, i.e.,
ultimately the people in power. The detrimental thing about deep-rooted prejudices,
which has always helped and still does help to ensure domination by the few
over the many, is that the ruled lose their ability to think for themselves,
which not only pleases their human need for comfort, but also allows for them
to be easily ruled.
Kant’s reflections on the public sphere
are epistemological. The public sphere has a twofold function: Individual
participants in the discourse should be enabled by the public to recognise
subjective causes, which they mistakenly consider to be objective grounds, in order to apprehend their own structure of prejudice – to
know themselves –, thereby to enable themselves to get rid of prejudices.
Moreover, intersubjectively shared objectivity is first and foremost
established through public discourse.
Both functions are difficult to imagine if
the moral duty not to make persuasion valid beyond myself is frequently violated
in the public spheres of discourse. For then the discourse sphere itself tends
towards subjectivity and loses its general character, which lies in “the common
ground, namely the object” (KrV, A 821/B 849; Kant 1998, p. 685).
A fundamental condition which a public discourse must fulfil in
order to fulfil the function of an external touchstone of truth is the general interest in (consistent, universal,
intersubjective, objective) truth and a practice of truthfulness (prohibition
on intentional untruthfulness). A discourse in which the participants have no profound
interest in the truth but rather, for example, an interest in entertainment or
self-staging, is not suitable to serve people in testing the validity of their own
judgments for the reason of others as well. The least harmful freedom “to make public use of one’s reason in all
matters” (WA, AA 08: 36; Kant
1996a, p. 18) is based on the condition of a communicative practice where
people are interested in truth. Only then human beings can become “more than
a machine” (WA, AA 08: 42; Kant 1996a, p. 22), because the “very
existence of reason depends upon this freedom” (KrV, A 738/B 766; Kant 1998, p.
643; cf. WDO, AA 08: 144).
Public discourse has a double effect: It
educates the subjects exposed to it by confronting them with its content, and it
acts as a platform, providing the framework of communication as an external touchstone
of truth. Both have an impact on people’s self-education, namely, whether they develop
the habit of using their own reason in an active or in a passive way. This can
contribute more or less to enlightening a society, but
it also indicates how enlightened a society is. The
measure can be helpful to systematically address problems of the public sphere.
It allows to analyse and criticise societal conditions. It provides a fresh perspective
on the media, which have changed dramatically over the last decade. With Kant, the degree of subjectivity within public
discourse is a seismograph of minority; on the other hand, the objectivity of
discourse, i.e., the exchange of objectively justified arguments, is a sign of
enlightenment.
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