Kant’s
“Theory of Music”
Oliver Thorndike·
Peabody
Institute of the Johns Hopkins University, USA
Abstract
One thing
to expect from a theory of absolute music is that it explains what makes it so
significant to us. Kant rightly observes that the essence of absolute
music is our affective response to it. Yet none of the standard 18th
century theories, arousal theory and aesthetic rationalism, can explain both
the universality of a judgment of taste and its subjective emotional content. The
paper argues that Kant’s own aesthetic theory of aesthetic ideas is on the
right path for explaining the emotive significance of music, but that Kant does
not further pursue this route because his interest in a “theory of music” is
only peripheral to his systematic interest as a transcendental philosopher. For
both philosophical and historical reasons, Kant does not have a “theory of
music.” Nevertheless, if we free Kant’s conception of aesthetic idea and its
restriction to Geist from the background of its 18th century humanism,
then Kant’s aesthetics of free play becomes a good theory to account for the
broad variety of emotions in absolute music as a fine art proper.
Keywords
Kant, Hume, Hutcheson, absolute music, paradox of subjective
universality, arousal theory, aesthetic rationalism, aesthetic ideas
Introduction
Paradox
of Subjective Universality
In
his famous 1757 essay “Of the Standard of Taste,”
David Hume presents us with the following paradox of subjective
universality: on the one hand, judgments of
taste are based on feeling. Thus, they
merely seem to express personal preferences molded by the contingencies
of individual human existence. On the other hand, we treat aesthetic judgments
as if they were a matter of impersonal cognitive judgment, and so we demand
that others agree with us. We think that there is better and worse aesthetic
taste, as we criticize and praise each other’s tastes. Thus, there is a paradox of subjective universality. The question
arises how we can make sense of normative judgments that are based on sentiment?
Kant’s 1790 Critique of the Aesthetic Power of
Judgment purports to present a solution to this problem.[1] Meeting the 18th
century demand that aesthetic principles be formulated in such a way as to
apply to all forms of art, Kant presents us with one principle underlying all aesthetic
experience. Thus, we may test his theory by applying it to a specific case:
music.
To
make room for normatively binding aesthetic judgments in music, the 18th
century literature presents two theories: first, the arousal theory of
emotions, which holds that tones express human affects either by convention or
nature; second, aesthetic rationalist theories that put the mathematical
structure of tones at the center. Kant discusses and rejects both theories. The
question is whether his own theory of aesthetic ideas and the free play of our
cognitive faculties can explain the beauty of sound. This question will be
answered in the negative. Nevertheless, I think that Kant is on the right path
for explaining the emotive significance of music. This paper falls into five
parts: Kant’s discussion of (1) the arousal theory, (2) aesthetic rationalism,
(3) Kant’s own account of free play and aesthetic ideas, (4) discussion, and
(5) key takeaways.
1.
The paradox of subjective universality
Subjectivity: Arousal theory of emotions.
Feeling, sentiment, affect
1.1 In
§53 of the Critique of the Aesthetic Power of Judgment, Kant presents an
18th century theory on how music arouses emotions in the listener. The passage
begins with the words “if what is at issue is charm and movement of the mind” [Reiz
und Bewegung des Gemüts] then one notices that music moves the mind in
manifold and deep ways. This charm of music, “which can be communicated so
universally, seems to rest on the following”[2]:
(1) every expression in language has a tone that is adequate to its sense; (2)
this tone designates an affect of the speaker; (3) music imitates the
intonation of the human voice; (4) hereby arouses the passion that is commonly
associated with it in the hearer; (5) music is thus a “language of the affects.”[3]
The
first thesis for which I would like to argue is that Kant does not endorse this
theory because it does not account for the universality of a judgment of taste.
Why is this so? The arousal theory suggests that music
alone –even though it is non-representational– has content after all, namely
content that is derived from something external to the music, i.e., the
modulation of speech, and that it is in virtue of this association between tone
and affect that we can generally communicate about the emotive content of music.
Kant concedes that it “seems” that the emotions that music arouses are thus felt
universally. However, he is very clear on the point that we cannot make a
legitimate claim to their universality after all, because they are derived from
empirical association: music “speaks through mere sensations without concepts”
[Empfindungen ohne Begriffe], does not “leave behind something for
reflection,” is thus “more enjoyment than culture,” and the emotions it arouses
are the product of “mechanical association.”[4]
Kant discusses the arousal theory of music in terms of charm and movement of
mind, which for Kant are non-universalizable empirical aspects of art, opposed
to the free pleasure of beauty that is the product of a judgment
of reflection.
One must not
seek the pleasure in music in reflection. [5]
There is also
a manifold of sensation and charm in music. Every tone is similar to certain
expressions of the passions. Perhaps the pleasure in music arises from the
similarity between the tone and the sensations that one likes to remember. [6]
In
these passages, just as in KU §53, Kant points to the manifold sensations and
charm that are essential to our enjoyment of music. Kant labels this enjoyment “pleasure
of sensation” [reizt nur die Empfindung], which his own aesthetic theory
opposes to “pleasure of reflection” (i.e., the basis of a proper aesthetic judgment).
“Charm” [Reiz] is a technical term for Kant. It denotes a relationship
to subjective sensation. It is thus not surprising that Kant uses the phrases “mechanical association” and “law of
association” in his discussion of music. For Kant, the arousal theory is
an empirical theory based on association.
1.2
Even though the arousal theory is a widely held view in 18th century
philosophy (various variants are discussed for example by Rousseau, Du Bos,
Mendelssohn),[7] I
like to suggest that Kant’s summary of the arousal theory in KU §53 might come
directly from Hutcheson’s 1726 An Inquiry into the Original of our Ideas of
Beauty and Virtue. Since, to my knowledge, this connection has not yet been
made in the literature, let me point out some key aspects of Hutcheson’s theory
of music to flesh out Hutcheson’s significance for interpreting Kant.[8]
Hutcheson
cites the contingent association of ideas as laying at the basis of many
aesthetic disagreements. Thus, he says that “there is also another charm [Reiz]
in music to various persons, which is distinct from the harmony, and is
occasioned by its raising agreeable passions.”[9]
Let me explain.
On
the one hand, pleasure of harmony is
based on our inner beauty sense insofar as “the form itself” of music, its harmony,
can be expressed mathematically.[10]
Hutcheson’s internal beauty sense is just as natural as the external sense of
hearing. It is “antecedent to custom, habit, education, or prospect of
interest.”[11]
“There is as necessary a
perception of beauty upon the presence of regular objects, as of harmony upon
hearing certain sounds.”[12]
So, harmony is the proper cause of aesthetic pleasure, because it alone can be
asserted universally. Therefore, Hutcheson subsumes harmony under what he calls
original or absolute beauty. Aesthetic disagreement is not possible here. Note
that establishing the universality of taste is important for Hutcheson because
he intends his theory of the sense of beauty to prepare the way for his theory
of the universality of the moral sense.
However,
there is also pleasure in music that is not derived from this universally communicable
basis, but is rather based on contingent associations, which give rise to agreeable passions. It is this kind of pleasure that is based
on contingent associations that gives rise to aesthetic disagreement.
And now follows Hutcheson’s version of the arousal theory of emotions:
The human voice is
obviously varied by all the stronger passions; now when our ear discerns any
resemblance between the air of a tune, whether sung or played upon an
instrument, either in its time, or modulation … to the sound of a human voice
in any passion, we shall be touched by it in a very sensible manner and have
melancholy, joy, gravity, thoughtfulness excited in us by a sort of sympathy or
contagion. The same connection is observable between the very air of a tune,
and the words expressing any passion which we have heard it fitted to, so that
they shall both recur to us together, though but one of them affects our
senses.[13]
For
Hutcheson, the emotions of melancholy, joy, gravity, etc. that we associate
with music are not based on our universal beauty sense. They are not independent of antecedent custom,
habit, or education. Quite to the contrary, they presuppose these contingent
associations. It is thus no wonder that people disagree about “beauty,” despite
the fact that they have a uniform sense of beauty and harmony: based on
individual tempers, circumstances, and experiences people associate a broad
variety of pleasing or displeasing ideas with various tunes.[14]
For this reason, Hutcheson subsumes the arousal theory of emotions not under
absolute beauty (beauty proper, or to use Kant’s language: a pure judgment of
taste), but rather under “relative or comparative beauty.” So, Hutcheson
notices the great variety in judgments of taste, and explains these via a
person’s contingent association of ideas. We think we make absolute judgments
of taste, whereas in fact our judgments are relative:
And this may help us in
many cases to account for the diversity in fancy, without denying the
uniformity of our internal sense of beauty.[15]
Kant
almost literally repeats this point at the end of §16 of his Critique of the
Aesthetic Power of Judgment:
By means of this
distinction one can settle many disputes about beauty between judges of taste,
by showing them that one is concerned with free beauty, the other with adherent
beauty.[16]
Now,
a case in point for relative beauty are the emotions aroused by music.
Hutcheson sees expression of feelings in music as based on passed associations.
Even though Hutcheson devotes much of his discussion of musical beauty to
objective criteria (unity, form and proportion are discussed under “harmony,”
i.e., absolute beauty), he declares judgments of taste based on
association as relative. I cite again: “there is another charm in music to various persons,
which is distinct from the harmony, which is occasioned by its raising
agreeable passions.” Compare this to Kant again:
It is the proportion in
music that makes it beautiful. … However, there is also a manifold of sensation
and charm in music. Every tone is similar to certain expressions of the passions.
Perhaps the pleasure in music arises from the similarity between the tone and
the sensations that one likes to remember.[17]
The
parallels between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s discussion of the arousal theory are
striking.
In
summary, we may thus say that Kant does not support the arousal theory of
emotions because it does not explain the universality of pure judgments of
taste. It merely explains the subjective preference of listeners, as affects
are based on contingent associations. Kant’s choice of language:
·
“charm” as opposed to “beauty”,
·
“mechanical association” as opposed to “free delight”,
· “enjoyment” as
opposed to “culture”
clearly
indicate Kant’s rejection of the arousal theory as a proper foundation for the normativity
of aesthetic judgments regarding music. In addition, I have pointed out that
Kant’s discussion of the arousal theory of music in §53 seems to mirror the
views of the inner-sense theorist Hutcheson, who likewise rejects the arousal
theory as a proper basis for aesthetic judgments.
Having
dealt with the arousal theory, Kant continues his train of thought in §53 by
following the standard framework of 18th century theories of music,
as he discusses the mathematical proportions of music as the sole foundation of
the universality of the judgment of taste next. It is just one paragraph (!),
in which Kant deals with both theories in one sweep. Here is Hutcheson’s
version of it:
- Relative
or comparative beauty: based on contingent association. Not universally
valid. Example: melodies and their association with moods and passions.
- Absolute or
original beauty: based on internal beauty sense. Universally valid.
Example: harmony as expressible in mathematical terms.
Similarly,
Kant declares the affects aroused by music to be charming, moving, and entertaining,
but he does not consider them to be a proper basis for accounting for the
universality of judgments of taste in music in virtue of the contingency of their
arousal. The proximity of Kant’s position to Hutcheson’s distinction between relative
and absolute beauty seems to me to be further evidence that Kant does not
endorse the arousal theory.
But
how about the harmonious form of music as expressible in mathematical terms? Why
does this theory fall short of explaining the significance of absolute music?
2.
The paradox of subjective universality
Universality: Formalism, aesthetic rationalism
2.1 Since
the universality of a judgment of taste cannot be based on the “charm” (Reiz)
of music, it now seems that reflection
on the mathematical form of air vibration that constitutes a tone elevates the
charming sensation to a judgment of beauty. Kant says:
On this mathematical
form… alone depends the satisfaction that the mere reflection connects with
this play of [sensations] as a condition of its beauty valid for everyone; and
it is in accordance with it alone that taste may claim for itself a right to
pronounce beforehand about the judgment of everyone.[18]
The second thesis for which I would
like to argue is that this theory cannot explain the emotional content of music.
Not much argument is needed to establish this second thesis, because Kant explicitly
tells us so. Immediately after the passage just quoted, Kant continues as
follows:
However,
mathematics certainly has not the least share in the charm and the movement of
the mind that music produces; rather, it is only the indispensable condition …
of that proportion of the impressions … by means of which it becomes possible
to grasp them together.[19]
In
other words, there is no connection between the mathematico-relational
structures in music and the subjective-affective pleasure we take in listening
to music.
2.2 Theories
dealing with the mathematico-relational structure of music can be found, for
example, in Leibniz, Wolff, Baumgarten, Euler, Hutcheson (under original
beauty), as well as the textbook authors of Kant’s physics lectures, Karstens
and Erxleben.[20] For
Leibniz, for example, aesthetic pleasure in music derives from the perception
of its harmonious structure, i.e., its unity-in-variety.[21]
However, Kant is not an aesthetic rationalist, as he rejects the classic
trinity of the unity of truth, goodness, and beauty, and argues for the
autonomy of taste. Yet, he has its own transcendental version of the significance
of the mathematical structure of music, the general upshot of which is the
following: beautiful forms are those forms of objects
that are purposive for an effortless apprehension through our cognitive
faculties. In this way, the possibility of the universal value of aesthetic
judgments is explained through the form of human cognition:
A
large object such as a building pleases when it is symmetric, because this
facilitates the intuition of the building. The accords in music please because
of the simple relations of the tones. Octave is 1:2, fifth 1:3. Euler. ...
Thus, there are certain laws of sensibility with respect to its form. …
However, the charm must be completely separated from this.[22]
Whatever
facilitates [erleichtert] … sensory intuition, pleases us according to
objective laws that hold for everybody.[23]
Beauty
consists in the agreement of the form –appearance– with the laws of
sensibility. Order. Unity.[24]
In these passages, the standard of beauty
consists in an effortless apprehension of a sensible manifold. The feeling of
aesthetic pleasure is rooted in “laws of sensibility”
which we experience in proportional and symmetrical forms. What lies at
the foundation of our beauty sensation is not the affect anymore that music
arouses in the listener due to its analogy with modulation of the human voice,
i.e., something outside of music itself (arousal theory). Rather, it is the
form of sound itself that lies at the basis of the feeling of pleasure for
which we assert universal validity in a judgment of taste: certain mathematico-relational
structures in music (octave, fifth, etc.) facilitate sensible representation, they
are in harmonia with the human forms of intuition, and since the forms
of intuition hold for all human beings, we can expect that the accompanying feeling
of pleasure in music will also hold for all human beings and is thus
universally communicable.
The
problem with this position is the following: Yes, the feeling of pleasure thus
conceived is universally communicable, but what does it have to do with the
affects and Gemütsbewegungen that music produces? Answer: Nothing. I
cite again: “Mathematics certainly has not the least share in the charm and the
movement of the mind that music produces; rather, it is only the indispensable
condition … of that proportion of the impressions … by means of which it
becomes possible to grasp them together.”[25]
So, where does this leave us?
The
two positions outlined so far (arousal theory, formalism) do not resolve the
paradox of subjective universality with respect to music.
(1)
Arousal theory lacks universality. Kant views the arousal
theory throughout in an empirical context. Thus, Kant discusses the bodily
effects of music on digestion and health together with jest.[26]
In this empirical context, music always belongs to what is agreeable (angenehm) or charming (reizend),
but not to what is beautiful (schön).
The agreeableness of music insofar as it is based on sensation lacks
universality. The distinction between charm and beauty is rooted in Kant’s
distinction between form and matter, which in turn is central to his
transcendental philosophy.[27] For example, KU §14 and §39 argue at length that the matter produces the charm,
but only form produces beauty.[28] For Kant, charm, agreeableness, or emotive connotations of a tone
cannot be tied to the forms of intuition, and thus emotive responses
become part of the matter of sensation and fall outside the territory of
beauty. Charm and beauty are opposed to each other. The former belongs to the
taste of the senses (Sinnengeschmack) which only holds for individuals (Privaturteil).
The latter belongs to the taste of reflection (Reflexionsgeschmack) and
demands universal agreement.[29] Nowhere does Kant say
that the charming affect of music (Gemütsbewegung) could be derived from
the form. Just consider the title of §13: “The pure judgment of taste is
independent from charm and emotion.”[30] The arousal theory of
emotions and the mathematico-relational formalism are exclusive alternatives
for Kant; they are not complementary despite the efforts of Kant’s interpreters
to connect both theories.
For Kant, we must not confuse “material aesthetic judgments”
(which are “judgments of sense” and deal with “charm or emotion”) with “proper
judgments of taste” (which are judgments of “reflection” and deal with
“beauty”).[31] The mere tone of a violin, Kant says, is beautiful only as
regards its mathematico-relational form, but not as regards the subjective
“quality of the sensations” the tones produce in the listener: “because the
quality of the sensations themselves cannot be assumed to be in accord in all
subjects, and it cannot be assumed that the agreeableness of one color in
preference to another or of the tone of one musical instrument in preference to
another will be judged in the same way by everyone.”[32] So, for Kant, there is no
connection between the arousal of emotions through music and its
mathematico-relational form. If the arousal of emotions is seen as lying at the
basis of our pleasure in music, then music belongs to the class of the
agreeable arts, Kant says. It lacks universality.[33]
(2) Formalism lacks subjectivity. In §51, Kant leaves it
undecided whether music should be “defined” as an agreeable or beautiful art.[34] Kant says that if the
mathematico-relational structure of music is seen as lying at the basis of our
pleasure in music, then music would belong to the class of the beautiful arts.
But note: “aesthetic pleasure proper,” which is the product of
judgment that reflects on the formal unity of a sensible manifold, is not identical
with the emotive content of music, i.e., its charm and Gemütsbewegung.
When Kant says, following Euler, that he does not doubt that a single tone is
beautiful because “through reflection” we perceive the mathematical order of
the impressions,[35] he
is referring to the form of a tone, which has nothing to do with the emotive
content of music: melancholy, joy, anger, cheerfulness, resignation, i.e., the
whole range of emotive human life that we encounter in music. The intellectual
pleasure in a tone insofar as it is reduced to the physical structure of its
harmonious vibrations is independent of the affective emotional content of
music. It lacks precisely that sort of subjectivity that according to Kant and common-sense
matters most in music, namely, our various emotive responses, which are perceived
as a constitutive part of our experience of musical beauty. As Kant
points out: Above all, music contains sensation and charm [Empfindung und Reiz].[36]
Putting
the point into a historical perspective: When Kant speaks of “music” in the
context of Euler, he is speaking about music theory as a branch of the
canonical seven liberal arts. “Music” as a liberal art goes back to
antiquity and is a branch of theoretical knowledge originating with the
Pythagorean discovery of numerical proportions underlying musical intervals.[37]
The liberal arts represent what in the humanistic tradition a good student
should learn to count as educated. However, music considered as a liberal
art is quite different from the experience and performance of music, i.e.,
music as one of the five fine arts.[38]
(3)
Neither arousal theory nor formalism provides an answer to the problem of
subjective universality with respect to music. One theory gives us
subjectivity, the other universality. On both standard 18th century theories,
the broad variety of affective sensations that we associate with music is only contingently
connected with music. I suggest that Kant’s remarks on the two standard
theories should be distinguished from his properly philosophical argument in
the 3rd Critique: free play and aesthetic ideas.
3. Kant’s solution: Free Play of the Faculties /
Aesthetic Ideas
Kant’s
aesthetic of free play of the faculties and aesthetic ideas is meant to resolve
the paradox of subjective universality. The third thesis of this paper is that
this theory of free play cannot explain the beauty of music. Why is this so?
Kant’s
properly philosophical argument for addressing the paradox of subjective
universality is the theory that aesthetic experience is a product of the
pleasurable free play of our mental powers.
By contrast,
the pleasure in the beautiful is neither a pleasure of enjoyment, nor of a
lawful activity … but of mere reflection. … This pleasure accompanies the common
apprehension of an object by the imagination, as a faculty of intuition, in
relation to the understanding, as a faculty of concepts, by means of a
procedure of the power of judgment. … This pleasure must necessarily rest on
the same conditions in everyone, since they are subjective conditions of the
possibility of a cognition in general … that one may presuppose in everyone.
For this very reason, one who judges with taste (as long as he does not err in
this consciousness, and does not take the matter for the form, the charm for beauty)
may also require … his satisfaction in the object of everyone else, [i.e.,] may
assume his feeling to be universally communicable.[39]
Kant argues that it is only in virtue of such a free play of the faculties that we can demand universal assent regarding our aesthetic feeling of pleasure, because the aesthetic feeling such conceived is natural to all human beings, as opposed to other emotions that are merely contingently connected to our experience. Let us grant Kant this “transcendental” foundation of aesthetic pleasure, and ask one more question: what initiates the free play? Answer: What initiates the free play of the faculties of cognition, in virtue of which aesthetic pleasure in beauty is defined, are aesthetic ideas:
Beauty (whether it be
beauty of nature or of art) can in general be called the exhibition of
aesthetic ideas.[40]
Here is one of Kant’s examples illustrating what it means to say that the free play of the faculties with respect to fine art essentially involves the exhibition of aesthetic ideas:
A certain
poet says in the description of a beautiful morning: “The sun streamed forth,
as tranquility streams from virtue.” The consciousness of virtue, when one puts
oneself, even if only in thought in the place of a virtuous person, spreads in
the mind a multitude of sublime and calming feelings, and a boundless prospect
into a happy future, which no expression that is adequate to a determinate
concept fully captures. In a word, the aesthetic idea is a representation of
the imagination, associated with a given concept, which is combined with
such a manifold of partial representations in the free use of the imagination
that no expression designating a determinate concept can be found for it, which
therefore allows the addition to a concept of much that is unnameable, the
feeling of which animates the cognitive faculties.[41]
Here Kant says that the feeling of aesthetic pleasure promoted by fine art requires that imagination play with a concept. Kant’s example is very clear: the enlivening experience of aesthetic pleasure —which is constitutive of beauty—has its roots in the contemplation of aesthetic ideas. What is an aesthetic idea? Using Kant’s technical language, the essence of an aesthetic idea is that it makes sensible a rational idea that surpasses experience or makes intuitive an idealized object of experience.[42] Avoiding Kant’s technical language, we could say that an aesthetic idea makes intuitive those topics to which a person embracing 18th century humanism would attribute objective value, i.e., topics regarding human existence that every human can be assumed to have an interest in.[43] Kant’s examples include virtue, the supersensible, love and death, which are presented by the artist to an audience in such a way that they ‘occasion much thinking’ and ‘arouse a multitude of sensations and supplementary representations for which no expression is found,’ i.e., occasion a free play of imagination and understanding.[44]
The problem is that music alone has no conceptual content whatsoever, and thus, for Kant, it leaves nothing to reflect on: music speaks through mere sensations without concepts (“durch lauter Empfindungen ohne Begriffe”), Kant says. Whereas poetry moves from determinate ideas to sensation, and thus always leaves a determinate idea behind, music is transitory,[45] it does not “leave behind something for reflection.”[46] Thus music is more enjoyment (Genuss) than culture. It lacks Geist, i.e., those serious and profound ideas regarding human existence that Kant considers to be the essence of aesthetic ideas.[47] True, music “moves the mind in more manifold and, though only temporarily, in deeper ways.”[48] But the foundation of these affects (Gemüthsbewegungen) is not the free play of the faculties enlivened by aesthetic ideas, –for, there are none in music alone. Rather, the affective content of music is the product of mere mechanical association (as opposed to free association). Because of its lack of Geist, music, like all enjoyment (Genuss), requires frequent change and cannot bear frequent repetition without producing antipathy, Kant concludes.[49]
This means that music does not fit into Kant’s theory of beauty with respect to the fine arts, because it does not sustain a free play of the faculties.[50] Free play of the faculties presupposes the exhibition of aesthetic ideas,[51] and this requires that imagination play with a concept. Such a concept is not provided by music, because, unlike a poem or painting, it is non-representational. A “fine art” that does not exhibit aesthetic ideas, cannot give rise to a chain of representations “of the imagination that occasions much thinking,”[52] cannot engage the free play of the faculties, and thus cannot be experienced as aesthetically beautiful. Hence, considered as a fine art, the only spot left for music within Kant’s taxonomy is that of an agreeable, not beautiful, art. Kant’s theory of free play of the faculties and aesthetic ideas might work for poetry and other representational forms of art but not for music.[53]
4. Discussion
4.1 A note on interpreting
Kant. Some Kant scholars have tried to unite Kant’s notes on the arousal
theory, formalism, and aesthetic ideas into one coherent theory. Mohr, for
example, writes:
Music as a beautiful art is
a mathematical form of affects
expressing an aesthetic idea.[54]
In this paper I have argued that (1) for Kant, there
is no connection between affect (arousal theory of emotions) and the
mathematical form of air vibration (aesthetic rationalism), and (2) both
arousal theory of emotion and formalism are independent of Kant’s theory of
aesthetic ideas. Whether it is desirable or not to unite all three theories is
a legitimate philosophical question that Kant did not ask, and need not ask,
because his aesthetics of free play transforms the problem of aesthetics: both
arousal theory and aesthetic rationalism work within a framework that considers
art as imitation of nature (mimesis). Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas
and free play breaks with this framework. Imagination becomes central in art,
as an audience reflects on aesthetic ideas. From a historiographical point of
view, it is important to point out that Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas stands
on its own, because it is here that Kant makes an original contribution to
otherwise standard 18th century positions: aesthetic pleasure is the
product of the open-ended reflection of an audience. This insight (with its
transcendental foundation) is original and not contained in either arousal
theory or aesthetic rationalism, and it opens the door to make the entire
spectrum of inner emotive life the topic of absolute music (although Kant does
not go this path).
4.2 If open-ended reflection is the basis of aesthetic
pleasure, why exclude music alone from beauty proper? Kant thought that music
leaves nothing to think about, it is a non-propositional, non-representative
form of art. It lacks spirit. Well, but a flower or the song of a bird likewise
lacks semantic content,[55] and yet beauty of nature
is the starting point for Kant’s aesthetic theory. In §16, Kant
explicitly compares the beauty of music with the beauty of flowers, birds,
marine crustaceans, and designs á la grecque [on] foliage for borders or on
wallpaper,” all of which represent nothing, and yet please by themselves, and
are thus labeled “free beauties.” So,
why exclude music from beauty proper?
The
answer to this question has to do with the overall motivation to write the Critique
of the Power of Judgment: what makes the fact of beauty in nature so
central for Kant is that it shows that nature itself is purposively organized
for human cognition and moral agency. Natural beauty in its self-sufficiency [selbständige
Naturschönheit][56]
points to the indeterminate concept of an intelligible substratum underlying
the world and ourselves;[57]
it reveals a “technique of nature” in “analogy with art” that surpasses nature
“in its purposeless mechanism.”[58]
For Kant, it is always the same cluster of ideas expressed by the beauties of
nature, namely, that nature is designed for us: “natural beauty (being
self-sufficient) carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the
object seems as it were to be predetermined for our power of judgment, and thus
constitutes an object of satisfaction in itself.”[59]
Even though music, abstract designs, and beauties of nature equally lack
semantic content, only natural beauty gives occasion for reflective judgment to
ponder the idea that nature itself is purposively designed for our cognitive
faculties. It is this a priori principle of purposiveness that
justifies the inclusion of “aesthetics” into the Critique of the Power of
Judgment, as Kant outlines in the two Introductions to this work. The principle
of purposiveness of reflective judgment is a piece of Kantian metaphysics
mainly motivated by the systematic need to unify the realms of nature and
freedom, on the one hand, and the thought of the systematic unity of diverse
empirical laws, which Kant’s epistemology outlined in the Critique of Pure
Reason could not guarantee, on the other hand.[60]
In other words, the “free beauty” of music is only at the periphery of Kant’s
interest as a transcendental philosopher, whereas the free beauty of nature
lies at its very center. In fairness to Kant, we should not forget that Kant
does not look at music through the lens of someone genuinely interested
in music. For that to be possible, he lacked broad access to classical music,[61]
such that he predominantly talks of music as Tafelmusik, i.e., music
accompanying dinner, but not as the kind of music of the concert hall.[62]
Kant’s
interest as a transcendental philosopher and his limited knowledge of absolute music
as fine art makes it understandable why he does not further pursue the parallel
between free natural beauty and music alone. So, let us pursue this
parallel further: Unlike natural beauty, music is an intentional product
of human beings. Therefore, it lacks the idea of independent design, and thus
cannot exhibit the set of aesthetic ideas that the transcendental philosopher
is most interested in. This fate music shares with all other fine arts. However,
like natural beauty, fine art may bring about the free play of our
cognitive faculties, if it is expressive of aesthetic ideas. In both cases, a historically situated audience engages in
an open-ended reflection on aesthetic ideas. This might include –as it does for
the transcendental philosopher Immanuel Kant– open-ended reflection on the
universal forms of space and time as universal forms of human intuition
underlying the mathematical structure of music, or beauty as the symbol of morality,[63] or the purposiveness of
nature itself for our power of judgment.[64] My point is that both
artistic and natural beauty require form and content to set the imagination and
understanding into a genuinely free play. To say that aesthetic ideas are the mark
of the beautiful in both nature and art, as Kant does,[65] means to say that both
natural beauty and fine art always need to be interpreted by an audience. The exhibition
of an aesthetic idea in a manifold of related representations is nothing that
would be already either in a work of art or nature. Rather, it is the result of
the active listener’s imaginative encounter with an object that she judges
beautiful. From this point of view, it does not matter whether we contemplate beauty
of nature or music alone, because the experience of
beauty always involves personal and cultural background contingencies.
So why insist so vehemently on the exclusion of emotive content from music?
Paul Guyer rightly points out:
Although the
ideas of reason that are the core of the “aesthetic ideas” that according to
Kant give works of fine art their spirit are precisely the kinds of ideas that
might be thought to stir our deepest emotions, Kant went to great lengths to
exclude all “charm and emotion” from aesthetic experience.[66]
His view that
fine art has “spirit” only when it deals with the highest ideas of reason and
otherwise quickly becomes dull and distasteful shows that he was far from
advocating the autonomy of fine art. [67]
To
which I would add: The reason for this position lies in the fact that Kant’s
conception of “aesthetic idea” and its restriction to “Geist” stands in
the tradition of 18th century humanism in general, and
transcendental idealism in particular. For example, Kant sees immediacy,
disinterest, freedom, and universality as analogous features of aesthetics and
morality.[68] For Kant, these
are not contingent assumptions. Kant would reject the suggestion that the
analogy between beauty and morality is dependent on cultural background
contingencies of 18th century humanism. For Kant, transcendental idealism
is not a contingent standpoint to take after all. –However, it is a contingent
standpoint for us to take today. We do not necessarily share Kant’s position on
immediacy and universality regarding morality, and accordingly we also do not
look for it in aesthetics.
If
we focus on Kant’s idea of aesthetic ideas and go beyond Kant by freeing his
theory from its historical embeddedness, then we could develop the following
train of thought: Music alone is obviously less suggestive of concepts than a
poem. But what if I just preface a piece with one word, say, melancholia? Or
what if I tell you that this piece of music was composed in a concentration
camp? Or what if I don’t tell you anything at all, and simply let you reflect
on the immediate emotional impact that music makes on you? Beauty is the
expression of aesthetic ideas. The active engagement of an audience with a
propositional/representative work of art commences with the semantic content
provided by the artist. In non-propositional forms of art, such as absolute music,
what Kant calls “fantasia,” as well as the free beauties of nature, the
starting point of an audience’s engagement will be something else, depending on
the individual person. It might just be a mood or emotional impact.
Kant
also draws this connection when he says that the
arousal of emotions in music evokes “aesthetic ideas” and an “unutterable
fullness of thought” triggered by the affect that is normally expressed in
language by means of such a tone.[69] Passages like
these where Kant suggests that music evokes aesthetic ideas or that the broad
range of emotions is compatible with beauty proper[70]
are good starting points to include broad empirical emotional content into
Kant’s aesthetic theory. Unfortunately, Kant never follows through on this
path. In the above passages, Kant ends up emphasizing the essential distinction
between what pleases in judging (proper aesthetic judgment) and what gratifies
the senses (broad range of emotions), and concludes that music is merely
gratifying, belongs to sense pleasure, is mere entertainment, or that the broad
variety of emotions is compatible with but does not contribute anything to
aesthetic pleasure proper. Kant thus misses the opportunity to make emotional content
essential to the aesthetic experience of music. Again, I think it is obvious
why Kant must take this position: neither charm nor emotion can be the
determining ground of a judgment of taste because the dichotomies of his
transcendental idealism (form-matter, universal-particular, a priori-a
posteriori, etc.) and his idea of the autonomy of the faculty of judgment
prohibit him to do so.
For
this reason, Kant’s injection of aesthetic ideas into the arousal theory is
restricted to the ideas of 18th century humanism, i.e., ideas to
which all human beings can allegedly assent: e.g., the mathematical form of the
tone exhibiting the universality of human cognition, or the “affect” of the
sublime as expressive of universal morality.[71]
The manifold of contingent affects is excluded because it indicates a sort of
subjectivity that Kant deems incompatible with the demand for universal assent
made in a judgment regarding beauty (as opposed to a judgment regarding
the agreeable).[72]
However, if we focus on Kant’s theory of free play and open-ended reflection
–and bracket the historically contingent conception of “Geist”– it
really does not follow that we must exclude the broad variety of emotions as
content of aesthetic ideas, and thus music, from fine art proper.
Beauty
invites us to sustain imaginative exploration of its meaning, Eldridge writes.[73]
For an audience standing in the humanistic tradition of the 18th
century, this might mean one thing, for the 21st century this might
mean something entirely different. We always encounter free beauties of nature
and fine art as persons, i.e., contingent historical products of nature and
socialization. This includes Kant. Just look closely at how he reflects on the
poetic description of a beautiful morning that he cites as an example of an
aesthetic idea: “The sun streamed forth, as tranquility streams from virtue,”
upon which Kant comments: “The consciousness of virtue, when one puts
oneself, even if only in thought in the place of a virtuous person, spreads in
the mind a multitude of sublime and calming feelings, and a boundless
prospect into a happy future…”[74]
The calming feelings and the prospect of a happy future, which Kant here
mentions, are affective experiences that are rooted in Kant’s conception of a
priori morality and thus have –for Kant– a universal rational basis. But it
is not only the transcendental philosopher speaking here. It is also the
historically situated person Immanuel Kant, whose contingent psychological
make-up longs for the comforting thought that the universe is designed
with humanity in mind, which he here inserts into the poetic description of a
beautiful morning. A universe that is blindly mechanistic gives us a hint that
it is friendly to human purposiveness. It takes a certain character to long for
this comfort. In other words, aesthetic ideas are bound to the aesthetic
choices that individuals have made. ‘One learns a point of view, a way of
looking at the world,’ Wittgenstein says.[75]
5. Key Takeaways
The
four key takeaways of this paper are:
5.1
Kant’s theory of the free play of the imagination is independent of arousal
theory and aesthetic rationalism. Unlike Kant’s commentators, Kant does not try
to unify arousal theory (aesthetic of emotion), aesthetic rationalism
(aesthetic of truth, formalism), and free play (aesthetic of open-ended
reflection on aesthetic ideas). Kant’s aesthetics of free play is independent
of the 18th century standard theories on music.
In
the context of Kant’s rejection of the arousal theory, I have pointed to the hitherto
unnoticed similarity between Hutcheson’s and Kant’s discussion of the arousal
of emotions in music as a non-universalizable aspect of aesthetic experience. Further,
Kant’s remarks on the formal nature of
beauty as tied to the forms of intuition stem from Kant’s reflections on the principle
of unity-in-variety, i.e., harmony, which Kant encountered in both the
inner-sense theorist Hutcheson and various aesthetic rationalists. It is in
these passages that Kant denies that colors, emotional quality of tones,
“beautiful” views and rippling brooks can be properly called beautiful, and
claims that only formal aspects, i.e., shape, composition, and what facilitates
a sensible manifold to be unified in apprehension, are a proper basis for
aesthetic experience (as opposed to our subjective associations and emotions
connected with music or a rippling brook, etc.).[76] I
have argued that it is not our task as Kant interpreters to make these passages
on the formal nature of beauty consistent with Kant’s theory of aesthetic
ideas, because both groups of thought stem from quite different contexts
(mathematical physics and theory of cognition, on the one hand, universal
objective values, on the other hand). The common denominator of these theories is
the cultural perspective of what Kant labels a Zeitalter der
Vernünftigen Beurtheilung [an era that judges in accordance with reason],[77]
but not a philosophically compelling argument.
5.2
Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas does not apply to absolute music. Despite the analogy that Kant draws between
music alone and natural beauty, it is only the latter that interests him as a
transcendental philosopher. Hume’s
paradox of subjective universality, which so haunted Kant’s contemporaries, did
not interest Kant as someone interested in the fine arts. As a transcendental
philosopher –and unlike Hume—the problem of resolving particular aesthetic
controversies was not at the center of Kant’s interest, and thus he only mentions
in passing how “disputes about beauty” may be settled.[78] For Kant,
there is no doctrine (science) in aesthetics, just criticism.[79] For him it was enough to have shown the
transcendental possibility of aesthetic judgments, which became the key to a
hitherto undiscovered principle of the purposiveness of the power of judgment
and the “key stone” in his philosophical system. This was at the center of Kant’s
interest, not the resolution of particular disputes or the defense of alleged
masterpieces, i.e., works of art that stood the test of time, from which Hume
starts.[80] Accordingly, Kant’s notion of disinterestedness
is quite different from Hume’s. For Hume, “disinterestedness” refers to
sentiments and judgments natural to and universal in humankind, independent of
historical and personal context. For Kant, “disinterestedness” is a way of
attending to objects that can neither be captured by theoretical nor practical
interest. Kant’s notion of “disinterestedness” is compatible with the
open-ended reflection of an audience on aesthetic ideas, which Kant considers
to be the basis of aesthetic pleasure proper, and which, as I have argued, always
involves the personal background of an audience. If this is so, then music
should be regarded as beautiful. However, this is a position that Kant fails to
take. For Kant, the transcendental philosopher, the emotional content of music
is not part of aesthetic experience proper.
5.3 Kant’s conception of aesthetic idea and its restriction to Geist stands
in the tradition of 18th century humanism, which itself is a
contingent standpoint to take. If we free Kant’s theory from its humanistic
background, it really does not follow that we must exclude the broad variety of
emotions as content of aesthetic ideas, and thus music, from fine art proper.
5.4 One thing to expect from a theory of music is that it explains what makes
absolute music so significant to us. Kant rightly observes that the
essence of absolute music is our affective response to it, which does not refer
to things outside of us or copies already found content. In absolute music, as
a fine art, we encounter ourselves emotively as it were. The aesthetic
experience of absolute music is not about reference to extra-musical features,
but about an emotional self-experience of the listener. Even a mere chord or
tone can be experienced as beautiful: it does not refer to anything beyond
itself, makes us feel a certain way, and –like the famous Tristan chord— promotes
a free play of reflection due to its opacity and ambiguity. Neither arousal
theory nor aesthetic rationalism is a good theory to account for our aesthetic
experience of music alone because both think of music as imitation of reality:
the arousal theory presupposes a reference to the modulation of speech, and
aesthetic rationalism conceives of the human mind as a vis representativa,
where aesthetic feelings are representations of perfections in the world. Kant
freed the path for us from the two standard 18th century theories,
and he indicated a new one, which, historically speaking, became the gateway to
modernity. This is why it is so important to point out
(1) to Kant scholars that:
·
Kant did not include the
standard 18th century theories into his own account,
·
Despite various publications on
Kant’s “theory of music”, Kant does not have a theory of music –or a theory of
any other particular artform—because he is interested in the conditions of the
possibility of aesthetic experience as a transcendental philosopher. He is neither
interested in the fine arts per se, the concept of which was just
arising in the 18th century, nor in the question of the value of
pure instrumental music.
·
In line with the 18th
century cultural role of absolute music as mere entertainment and a mechanical craft,[81] Kant
did not approach absolute music as we do in the concert hall today, but rather associates
music with Tafelmusik, tea circles, gambling, dance, and smoking
tobacco.[82]
·
The types of music Kant refers
to are neither the emotionally moving arias and duets expressive of poetic
content (for that type of music is full with aesthetic ideas and thus a
candidate for beauty) nor the Romantic fantasias that we associate today with
absolute music, e.g., Beethoven’s 1802 Quasi una fantasia “Moonlight” sonata
(Op. 27), Schubert’s 1822 Fantasie in C major “Wanderer Fantasie” (Op. 15),
Chopin’s 1841 Fantasie in F minor (Op. 49), or Brahms’ 1893 pieces Op. 118, but
rather earlier types of fantasias such as Bach’s already then famous Chromatic
fantasia and fugue in D minor (BWV 903) or perhaps –if Kant had the chance to
listen to it— Mozart’s 1785 Piano Fantasia in C minor (K 475). If we add to
this cultural background Kant’s own personal appreciation of music (or lack
thereof), the intellectual background of arousal theories and aesthetic
rationalism, and the terminological distinctions that Kant draws in his transcendental
philosophy, Kant’s often noted ambiguous statements and derogatory remarks on
music become understandable.
·
This should not hinder us to
see the path that Kant’s philosophy opens to come to grips with the puzzling
and deeply moving aesthetic experience of absolute music.
(2) to artists and those interested in aesthetics of
music more generally that
both arousal theory and aesthetic rationalism stand
in the tradition of art as imitation of reality, which presupposes a way of
looking at reality that was prominent in the 18th century, and is
deeply rooted in the terminology, psychology, and epistemology of the 18th
century. Not many people outside of humanities departments would endorse this
perspective today, for example, the conception of the human mind standing
opposed to an independently existing world, which it mirrors (vis
representativa). Yet, insofar as the value of music is seen to either
reside in the imitation of emotions or in the perception of truth, there is an
implied assumption of a correspondence between musical elements and the
extra-musical world. It is because of this false implied assumption that
Plato’s attempts to strictly link given musical modes to moral values (ethos
theory) or the 18th century project of a dictionary of affects
corresponding to musical phrases (Affektenlehre) had to fail. Both contemporary
artists and philosophers think confusedly about what they do if they see
themselves to stand in the tradition of either arousal theory or aesthetic
rationalism.[83]
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Abbreviations
All
references to Kant’s works are in accordance with the Akademie-Edition Vol.
1– 29 of Kants Gesammelte Schriften, Deutsche Akademie der
Wissenschaften (formerly: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften),
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter (1902–). References indicate an abbreviation of
Kant’s individual work, followed by volume and page number of the Akademie-Edition.
Unless otherwise indicated, all English translations are from the Cambridge
Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1992—). The following abbreviations are used:
AA Immanuel Kants Schriften. Ed. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften
(formerly: Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften). Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1902–.
Anth Anthropologie in Pragmatischer Hinsicht (Anthropology from
a Pragmatic Point of View). In AA, Vol. 7.
KU Kritik der Urteilskraft (Critique
of the Power of Judgment). In AA, Vol. 5.
Refl
Reflexion (Reflection). In
AA, Vols. 14–19.
VAnth Vorlesungen über
Anthropologie (Lectures on Anthropology). In AA, Vol. 25.
VL
Vorlesungen über Logik (Lectures
on Logic). In AA, Vol. 24.
VP
Vorlesungen über Physik (Lectures
on Physics). In AA, Vol. 29.
VT Von
einem neuerdings erhobenen vornehmen Ton in der Philosophie. (On a
recently prominent tone of superiority in philosophy). In AA, Vol. 8.
