The Kantian Non-Moral Saint
Ali Sharaf·
Kuwait University, Kuwait
Abstract
In Moral Saints, Susan Wolf raises a question
for morality in general: should we strive to be perfectly moral, even though
being a moral saint does not entail having a perfectly good life? Wolf answers
that moral saints represent an undesirable and unattractive human ideal because
they lack the “ability to enjoy the enjoyable in life” (Wolf 424). Accordingly,
Wolf objects to both utilitarianism and Kantianism, claiming that these ethical
theories present moral sainthood as an ideal. While this paper does not object
to Wolf’s account of moral sainthood, it argues against Wolf’s objections to
Kantianism in three parts. First (1), I explain Wolf’s argument and objections
to Kantianism; second (2), I respond to Wolf’s objections against the
‘non-ideal’ Kantian saint interpretation; and third (3), I respond to Wolf’s
objections against the ‘ideal’ Kantian saint interpretation. This paper
concludes that Kantianism does not present moral sainthood as a human ideal.
Key Words
Kantian Ethics, Sainthood, Human Ideal, Moral Saint,
Moral Ideal
In
Moral Saints, Susan Wolf argues that moral saints represent an
undesirable and unattractive human ideal because they lack the “ability to enjoy
the enjoyable in life” (Wolf 424). To see how the moral saint’s life is
unattractive, we need to imagine the ideal form of such a life. According to
Wolf, a moral saint is a person “whose every action is as morally good as
possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be” (Wolf 419).
This person only appreciates moral interests and does not value non-moral ones.
He always devotes his life to making others happy. He always prefers donating extra
money to charity instead of, for instance, watching Star Wars movies or reading Agatha Christie’s crime novels. If you
ask him to hang out with you and have some fun on a Friday night, he will reply
that he does not have time for such things. He is always worried that he will
fail in fulfilling his duty to improve the welfare of others. In short, this person
will not have time for so-called desirable activities, because his mind is
always consumed with how he can be a perfectly moral person.
The
undesirable life of a moral saint raises a question for morality in general: should
we strive to be perfectly moral, even though being a moral saint does not
entail having a perfectly good life? Wolf answers that we should not strive to
be moral saints, because being perfectly moral entails ignoring other essential
goods, such as gourmet cooking or fashion (Wolf 422). Accordingly, Wolf objects
to any ethical theory that presents moral sainthood as an ideal, arguing that
moral saints represent an undesirable and unattractive ideal. For this reason,
she objects to utilitarianism and Kantianism, because these ethical theories
present moral saints as the ideal.
Wolf’s
argument that moral saints represent an unattractive human ideal has received much
comment and scrutiny. Some philosophers object to Wolf’s argument on the grounds
that her account of moral sainthood is inaccurate and does not reflect real
examples (Adams 1984). Others argue that Wolf’s account of a moral saint is not
as unattractive as she claims (Carbonell 2009). In
this paper, I do not object to Wolf’s account of the moral saint. However, I argue
against Wolf’s objections to Kantianism, in three sections. First (1), I
explain Wolf’s argument and objections to Kantianism; second (2), I respond to her
objections against the ‘non-ideal’ Kantian saint; and third (3), I respond to
Wolf’s objections against the ‘ideal’ Kantian saint.
- Wolf’s Argument.
In
the first section of Moral Saints, Wolf begins her paper by discussing a
pre-theoretical notion of what we consider a “moral saint.” She claims that our
common-sense understanding of moral sainthood necessarily includes that “one’s
life be dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of others or of
society as a whole” (Wolf 420).[1] Moreover, Wolf claims that two differing
conceptions of moral saint emerge from our common-sense notion: the loving
saint and the rational saint. The loving saint is a person whose own well-being
and happiness lie in the well-being and happiness of others. On the other hand,
the rational saint is a person whose actions are determined by adherence to
moral duties (Wolf 420). Even though the rational and the loving saints have
different motives, Wolf claims that their “public personalities” would be similar
(Wolf 421). Both of them would “have the standard
moral virtues to a nonstandard degree” (Wolf 421). Therefore, Wolf argues that
if a moral saint’s life is determined and dominated by morality, other
non-moral interests and goods are crowded out.
Furthermore,
Wolf distinguishes between two types of obstacles that prevent a moral saint from
pursuing non-moral interests: practical and logical. For instance, Wolf claims
that, in most cases, a moral saint cannot practice hobbies, because “reading
Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving [one’s] backhand” requires time
that otherwise would be spent promoting the welfare of others (Wolf 421).
Therefore, a moral saint is prohibited from pursuing non-moral interests
because of practical obstacles, such as lack of time, to performing moral
duties. Moreover, a moral saint cannot pursue non-moral activities because of
logical obstacles that are “in more substantial tension” with being a moral
saint, because these activities are “against the moral grain” (Wolf 421-422).
For instance, Wolf claims that a moral saint will not be able to laugh at a
“cynical or sarcastic wit, or a sense of humor that appreciates this kind of
wit in others, [as it] requires that one take an attitude of resignation and pessimism
toward the flaws and vices to be found in the world” (Wolf 422). Hence, Wolf concludes
that a moral saint represents an unattractive ideal because he does not embody
the sort of non-moral ideals we admire in “athletes, scholars, artists—more
frivolously, out of cowboys, private eyes, and rock stars” (Wolf 422).
In
the second section of her paper, Wolf objects to utilitarianism and Kantianism
on the grounds that these moral theories represent the moral saint as an ideal.
According to Wolf, the loving saint characterizes the utilitarian ideal, and
the rational saint characterizes the Kantian ideal. The rational saint’s actions
are determined by adherence to moral duties (Wolf 420). Since my goal is to
defend Kantianism against Wolf’s critique, I will not discuss Wolf’s account of
the loving saint, nor her objection to utilitarianism.
According
to Wolf, there are two ways to interpret the relationship between her view of
moral sainthood and Kantianism; each interpretation has two objections. The
first interpretation implies that a Kantian saint believes in morality, which
requires acting in accordance with the categorical imperative, such as the
universal law formula and the humanity formula. I call this interpretation the
“non-ideal Kantian saint”. Wolf believes that this interpretation does not entails
her concept of the ideal moral saint, which is proposed in the previous sections
of her paper. She thinks that this interpretation does not swallow up the
entire agent’s personality, and that the agent can still pursue non-moral
interests (Wolf 432). Although Wolf approves of this interpretation, she raises
two objections to it: first, the non-ideal Kantian saint interpretation assigns
lower value to non-moral interests when these are not arrived at through
deliberation by the rational part of our being; second, it denies the necessity
of devotion to benevolence and the maintenance of justice, all of which go
beyond the threshold set by the categorical imperative.
On
the other hand, the second interpretation implies that a Kantian saint believes
in morality which requires acting in accordance with two duties: first,
benevolence to take up others ends as one’s own; and second, to develop natural
and moral perfection (Wolf 30). I call this interpretation the “ideal Kantian
saint.” Wolf raises two objections to this interpretation: firstly, the life of
this Kantian saint is dominated by unlimited moral duties; secondly, it implies
the “one thought too many” objection, which is explained in the third section
of my paper.
Wolf
claims that contemporary moral theories should be revised in terms of appreciation
of non-moral interests. Wolf’s answer to the question ‘how should people live?’
is that “they must do more than adjust the content of their moral theories in
ways that leave room for the affirmation of non-moral values” (Wolf 438). In
other words, it is not sufficient only to leave a little space to value
non-moral interests. She argues that these contemporary theories should assign
the same level of value to both moral and non-moral interests.
2. A Response to Wolf’s Objections Against the Non-Ideal
Kantian Saint Interpretation.
Wolf
raises two objections to the non-ideal Kantian saint interpretation. First,
Kant does not “give an unqualified seal of approval to the non-morally directed
ideals” that were advocated by Wolf (Wolf 432); second, Kant’s moral theory
does not explain supererogatory actions when morality is limited by an upper
boundary (Wolf 432). Therefore, she concludes that this interpretation of
Kantianism is objectionable.
According
to Wolf, even if the non-ideal Kantian saint interpretation leaves some room for
non-moral interests and does not swallow up the agent’s entire personality,
Kant argues that the rational part of our being should always control our
passions, and not the other way around, because we have duties of apathy and
self-mastery. So, Wolf’s objection suggests that, at least sometimes, passion
should not be controlled by reason. To respond to this objection, we need to
answer two questions: what is Kant’s account of passion? Why should passion not
command reason?
Kant defines passion as “a sensible desire
that has become a lasting inclination” (MM 6:408). Moreover, passions are
“inclinations that make all determinability of the faculty of choice by means
of [rational] principles difficult or impossible” (CJ 5:272). He adds that
passion is “an inclination that excludes mastery over oneself” (R 6:29). Kant
distinguishes between two types of passion: that from natural inclination and
that which results from human culture. Therefore, a passion is a very strong motive
that prevents the agent from controlling himself on rational grounds.[2]
At
first glance, it may seem as though Kant claims that we should not let passion
control reason, because the latter is the source of governing ourselves.
However, this is an incomplete understanding of Kant’s argument for the duties
of apathy and self-mastery. According to Kant, we should not let passion
command ourselves because of its overwhelming force. This power prevents the
agent from recognizing other motives, such as feeling, desire and duty. Therefore,
Kant says that passions “please one inclination by placing all the rest in the
shade or in a dark corner” (AP 7:266). This entails that
passions force the agent to focus on only one interest and completely forget
others, whether they be moral or non-moral. In this case, passions would
swallow up the whole personality of an agent, and this is precisely what Wolf
objects to.
One
may claim that not all passions are immoral, because they could support duty in
morality when the passionate agent is blind to non-moral interests, and when he
only values moral interests. At first glance, it seems that Kant would agree
with this claim. However, he explicitly objects to it when he says that “beneficence
[is] … morally reprehensible, as soon as it turns into passions” (AP 7:266). For
instance, when an agent acts from the passion of benevolence, he would commit
any action to satisfy his passion, even if this requires committing immoral
actions such as lying or killing. Hence, even if passion might serve morality,
it would destroy other inclinations and feelings that are important in Kant’s
moral theory.
Kant and Wolf are on the same page. Both agree
that we should not let any motive or interest swallow up the agent’s
personality. Kant does not claim that we should not pursue an end simply
because this end is morally valuable, or because our rational part does not
control other motives. However, Kant’s argument entails that an agent can pursue an end among others without
ignoring other ends. Since passion would blind the agent from recognizing other
ends and disable the rational part from fulfilling its natural function, Kant
claims that we should not let passion command our lives, and that we have a
duty of apathy and self-mastery.
Here,
we respond to Wolf’s second objection that Kantianism does not leave room for
supererogatory actions, i.e., that Kantianism only requires the minimum
conditions of morality to be met, and that it does not go beyond what the agent
is required to do. I respond to this objection in two ways: first, a moral
theory does not require leaving room for supererogatory actions; second, Kant’s
moral theory, in fact, does leave such room.
To
follow the first response to Wolf’s objection, we need to distinguish what is
admirable from what is morally right. An action is morally right if it fulfills
what is required to be done in a particular situation. However, an action is
admirable if it goes beyond what is required. Hence, supererogatory actions
belong to the second type. Truly, we admire those who sacrifice themselves to
save other people, but that does not entail that this action is morally good. For
instance, in Lectures of Ethics, Kant mentions an example from history
to illustrate that although an action is admirable, that does not necessarily mean
it is a morally right one. In this example, Cato commits suicide to influence
his army “to fight to the bitter end in defense of their freedom” (LE 149). According
to Kant, even if Cato’s action is admirable and honorable within Roman culture,
it is not morally justifiable. Cato’s act is honorable and admirable for
cultural values, but not for moral reasons. We can see further instances in
which supererogatory actions are morally wrong. For instance, where the agent
is certain that he cannot save a drowning man and will die trying, it is
morally wrong to try to save the man, because both would die. Hence, if a
supererogatory act does not necessarily entail that it is a morally right one,
we have good reason to argue that a moral theory should not include this
category of action.
Still, one may claim that a moral
theory without this category of action fails to accord with our common-sense
morality.[3] To respond, I argue that Kant’s
account of imperfect duty does leave room for supererogatory actions. To do
this, I should explain the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties.
In Groundwork,
Kant distinguishes between two types of duty – perfect and imperfect moral
duties – and each type is divided by first-person moral agency: myself, and others. They
are detailed as follows:
|
|
Perfect
duty |
Imperfect
duty |
|
Re: oneself |
No suicide |
Self-development |
|
Re: others |
No false promising |
Helping
others in need |
The
form of each type of duty emphasizes an important feature of Kant’s moral
theory. Imperfect duties have a positive form: helping others and developing
yourself. Kant does not claim that the agent must fulfill this duty in a
specific way or by specific actions. However, the positive formulation of imperfect
duty indicates that the agent should be aware of it; he is free in deciding how
and what to develop, so long as he does not violate any perfect duty. For
instance, if an agent has a musical talent, it is up to him to decide which
instrument to play, which genre of music to play, and how much time to spend
practicing. However, the musician should not cheat or lie to improve his
musical skill. Another important feature of Kant’s distinction between moral
duties is that imperfect duties are affected by external conditions. For
instance, in countries where there is civil war, people should learn how to
defend themselves by improving their skill in using weapons. Otherwise, they are
likely to die.
The
other imperfect duty – helping others in need – also has a positive form. Again,
the agent should recognize that he has a certain duty, but it is up to him to
decide how to fulfill this duty without violating perfect duties. For instance,
if an agent has money that can cover more than his essential needs and walks by
a homeless person, the agent is free to decide how to help the person. The
agent can offer shelter, give some money, or teach a skill that can help in
covering basic needs. Additionally, this imperfect duty is affected by external
conditions beyond our control. For instance, in the case above, if the charitable
agent were blind, he would not be able to help the homeless person.
On
the other hand, perfect duties have negative forms: do not lie; do not commit
suicide. The negative form does not require performing an action,
but abstaining from performing one. The distinction between the negative
and positive forms may suggest that one type of duty is more important than the
other. This is not the case. To explain why this distinction does not dictate a
hierarchy of importance, we should explain the relationship between perfect and
imperfect duties.
In
their simplest form, perfect duties are the necessary conditions of imperfect
duties. For instance, not committing suicide is a necessary condition of imperfect
duty of self-development. By the same token, perfect duty not to make a false
promise is a necessary condition of imperfect duty to help others in need.
Clearly, if I want to help someone, I should not lie to him or break a promise;
otherwise, I would contradict my intention to help
him.
After
explaining the distinction between perfect and imperfect duties, we can respond
to Wolf’s objection that Kantianism does not leave room for supererogatory
actions. According to the discussion above, the positive form entails that the
agent should recognize a certain duty as a principle, and the agent may freely
decide how to fulfill this imperfect duty, and to what extent, as long as he does not violate any perfect duty. Hence, the
agent is free to do more than what morality requires to be done in a situation,
as long as he does not violate any perfect duty. In
fact, in the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant says imperfect duties “leave a playroom
for free choice in following the laws” since “the law cannot specify precisely
in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an end
that is also a duty” (MM 6:390). Hence, Kant’s moral theory leaves room for
supererogatory actions under imperfect duties of self-developing and helping
others in need.
3. A Response to Wolf’s Objections Against the Ideal
Kantian Saint Interpretation.
Wolf raises
two objections against the ideal Kantian saint interpretation. The first
objection is that the agent is dominated by the motivation to be moral; the
second is that this interpretation entails the “one thought too many” problem.
To defend against the first objection, I argue that imperfect duties are
limited by perfect ones and by external conditions. To defend against the
second objection, I argue that Kant values non-moral interests, even if they are
not manifestations of respect for moral law.
Wolf
bases her first objection on two premises: first, that imperfect duties are
unlimited; second, that “it is natural to assume that the more one performs
such actions, the more virtuous [one] is” (Wolf 430). Hence, she concludes that
Kantianism entails that the more one performs actions in accordance with imperfect
duties, the more virtuous one is. In other words, the ideal Kantian saint interpretation
entails her account of a moral saint, because the agent is dominated by the
motivation to be moral.
To
defend Kant’s moral theory against Wolf’s first objection, I object to Wolf’s
first premise that imperfect duties are unlimited. We have seen above that the
positive form of imperfect duties entails that the agent is free to choose how
to fulfill these duties and to what extent, as long as
he does not violate any perfect duty. Hence, imperfect duties are limited by perfect
ones that only require abstaining from performing definite actions. For
instance, if the agent decided to kill himself and to donate his organs to
those who need them, he would violate a perfect duty: not committing suicide.
So, in this case, even though the agent’s intention is morally good, Kant would
evaluate this action as morally wrong, because the agent violates a perfect
duty.
A second
reason to object to Wolf’s first premise, that imperfect duties are unlimited,
is that these duties are limited by external conditions. These external conditions
are beyond our control. To clarify this limitation, let us consider the
following case: a man lives in a very poor society where people die from
starvation. This man decides to help these starving people by donating his
food. However, if he donated his food, he would die from starvation. In this
case, Kant would say that the agent should not donate his food, because the
poor man’s action is limited by an external condition: his own poverty. In
addition, the agent fulfills his duty as long as he
wills the maxim of helping others, even if he does not perform any action to
help them, because imperfect duties represent principles. Therefore, if the
agent is free to choose how to fulfill his imperfect duties, as
long as he does not violate any perfect duty, and his duty to help others
in need is constrained by external conditions, Kant’s moral theory does not need
to be dominated by the motivation to be moral.
Let
us now turn to Wolf’s second objection of the ideal Kantian moral saint
interpretation. According to Wolf, it is dubitable to assume that moral motives
are behind one’s inspirations to paint as well as Picasso, and behind one’s
actions on behalf of beloved ones. Hence, Wolf argues that Kantianism contains
a “one thought too many” objection, because the agent’s activities and
character traits would be valuable only if they “were manifestations of respect
for the moral law” (Wolf 431). In other words, for an action to be morally
worthy, it should only arise from duty rather than any other motive. Against this
“one thought too many” objection, I argue that Kant’s moral theory does not necessitate
that, for an action to be morally worthy, it must only arise from duty or be
dominated by moral motivations. To do this, we should explain why one may argue
that Kant’s moral theory entails that for an action to be morally worthy, it
should only arise from duty.
In Groundwork,
Kant explicitly criticizes the naturally kindhearted person that acts out of
natural feelings or inclinations:
To be beneficent where one can is a duty, and besides
this there are some souls so sympathetically attuned that, even without any
other motive of vanity or utility to self, take an inner gratification in
spreading joy around them, and can take delight in the contentment of others
insofar as it is their own work. But I assert that in such a case the action,
however it may conform to duty and however amiable it is, nevertheless has no
true moral worth, but is on the same footing as other inclinations, e.g., the
inclination to honor, which, when it fortunately encounters something that in
fact serves the common good and is in conformity with duty, and is thus worthy
of honor, deserves praise and encouragement, but not esteem; for the maxim lacks
moral content, namely of doing such actions not from inclination but from
duty. (G 4:398)
This passage suggests that the kindhearted person
might do the same thing that the dutiful man does, but that does not mean that
their actions are equal. In fact, this passage entails that Kant values acting
out of moral duty more than out of inclination.[4] However, there are several indications suggesting
that inclinations and feelings are necessary but not sufficient conditions in
Kant’s moral theory. To see how inclinations and feelings are necessary conditions
in Kant’s moral theory, we need to answer the following questions: does Kant’s
moral theory necessitate that morally worthy action requires acting only from
natural inclination? Or does it require acting only from moral duty? Or acting
out of both inclination and duty?
There
are three reasons to argue that Kant condemns the view
that the morally worthy action requires acting only from natural inclination. The
first is that acting only from natural impulses undermines Kant’s essential
principle of freedom, because “true character is character of freedom”
(LA 25:1384). Because, when an agent acts only from natural inclinations, his
action is determined by external motives rather than his freedom. The second reason
is that acting only from natural impulses violates Kant’s autonomy formula: “the Idea of the
will of every rational being as a will that legislates universal law”
(G 4:432). According to this formula, Kant emphasizes that we should act as we
are law-givers and not followers. Hence, we should not
let ourselves be controlled by our natural impulses such as inclination and
feeling, because these motives prevent us from being legislators of our own
laws through our will.
The third reason is that acting only
from our natural impulses violates
Kant’s universal formula, because our natural feelings and inclinations are
inherently contingent. In Groundwork, Kant states the formula of
universal law of nature: “So act as if the maxim of your action were to become
through your will a universal law of nature” (G 4:421). Acting only from
natural feelings and inclinations violates this formula, because these motives
are unreliable and changeable from situation to another one. In other words, we
cannot will the maxim of our actions as a universal
law of nature because the law should be consistent in all situations and
circumstances. To understand why our feelings and inclinations are contingent,
we need to discuss Kant’s example of a case of suicide:
One person, through a series of evils that have
accumulated to the point of hopelessness, feels weary of life but is still so
far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it might be
contrary to the duty to himself to take his own life. Now, he tries out whether
the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. But his maxim
is: ‘From self-love, I make it my principle to shorten my life when by longer
term it threatens more ill than it promises agreeableness’. The question is
whether this principle of self-love could become a universal law of nature. But
then one soon sees that a nature whose law it was to destroy life through the
same feeling whose vocation it is to impel the furtherance of life would
contradict itself, and thus could not subsist as nature; hence that maxim could
not possibly obtain as a universal law of nature, and consequently it entirely
contradicts the supreme principle of all duty (G 4:421-22).
In this case, two natural feelings are competing:
self-love and a feeling for life. The agent has a desire, motivated by
self-love, to end his miserable life. On the other hand, a feeling for life
motivates the agent to continue his life, regardless of his troubles. According
to Kant’s example, the feeling for life overrides the feeling of self-love.
However, if one feeling ‘wins’ in this case, it does not entail that it ‘wins’
on every occasion. In other words, if something can ‘win’ in a certain
situation at a particular time, it can also ‘lose’ in another situation at a
different time. Hence, our natural inclinations and feelings are insufficient
for morality. We need support from another type of motive that strengthens and
protects the right feelings or inclinations. According to Kant, this motive is
duty.
To
sum up, acting only from natural feelings and inclinations undermines Kant’s
essential principle of freedom, and violates both autonomy and the universal
law of nature formulas. Therefore, Kant clearly condemns the view that the morally worthy action requires acting only from
natural inclination.
Let
us return and answer the question: does the morally worthy action require
acting only from moral duty? Kant explicitly objects to the view that for an
action to be morally worthy, the agent should act only from moral duty. Indeed,
Kant emphasizes that duty alone is insufficient, because
feelings of sympathy are “one of the impulses that nature has implanted in us
to do what the representation of duty alone would not accomplish” (MM 6:457).
Clearly, according to Kant, we need more than acting out of moral duty for an action
to be morally worthy.
We
still have one question to answer: Does the morally worthy action require
acting out of both inclination and duty? On the one hand, Kant’s example of
suicide and his critique for the kindhearted person suggests that Kantianism
condemns the view that the morally worthy action requires acting only out of
natural inclination. However, these examples do not necessitate that Kant only approves
actions when they “were manifestations of respect for the moral law”, as Wolf
argues. In fact, they suggest that our natural impulses can play a positive
role in morality. For instance, in Kant’s example of suicide, what prevents the
hopeless person from committing suicide is not the moral duty; rather, it is
the natural feeling of life. Moreover, according to Kant’s critique of the
kindhearted person, even if the agent does not perform the action out of moral
duty, his action is still worthy of honor, and deserves praise and
encouragement. In fact, Kant’s account of imperfect duty of helping others
entails that we should strengthen and encourage our natural inclinations and
feelings, as long as they do not violate any perfect
duty. Hence, Kant wants to illustrate the necessity of natural feelings and
inclinations in morality.
Additionally,
Kant’s critique of naturally kindhearted people in the Anthropology lectures
illustrates that acting both out of natural inclination and out of moral duty
are necessary for morality. After criticizing naturally kindhearted people,
Kant says that: admittedly both [strength of soul and kindness of soul] must be
found united in the same subject in order to bring out
what is more ideal than real, namely, the right to the title of magnanimity”
(AP 7:293). Hence, it seems that we have strong reason to argue that, for an
action to be a morally worthy one, in Kant’s moral theory, it should be performed
out of natural inclinations and moral duty.
According
to the discussion above, Kant’s moral theory does not necessitate that, for an
action to be morally worthy, it must only arise from duty or be dominated by
moral motivations. However, Kant approves feelings, inclinations, desires and duty; each is necessary in his moral theory, although
insufficient. Each of these motives is insufficient, because it can be strong
in one situation and weak in another. According to Kant, it is necessary to be
motivated by non-moral motives, such as desires, feelings
and inclinations. Kant’s moral theory entails that if these motives work with
each other in harmony, the agent will be motivated by more than one type of
motive to perform the morally right action. In this case, the action can be a
morally worthy one. For instance, Kant would not object to having a strong
desire to be an artist, as long as the agent does not
violate any perfect duty. However, desire alone will not motivate the agent to
work hard and achieve what he wants. He needs to transform this desire into a
duty by taking responsibility for developing his skill or talent, in order to achieve this stage of excellence in painting.
Moreover,
the response to Wolf’s first objection of the non-ideal Kantian saint
interpretation shows that, according to Kant, there is no problem if an agent
is motivated by a strong inclination, feeling, duty or desire for something, as long as this motive does not transform into passion,
because that will prevent him from recognizing other motives. Hence, all kinds
of motives are necessary in Kant’s moral theory; we should not allow any motive
to blind us from recognizing other ones.
4. Conclusion
Kant
has a complex theory in ethics. To defend Kantianism, we need to read Kant’s
moral theory as a system of ethics. In this system, each component is connected
to one another. In this paper, I have defended Kantianism against Wolf’s objections.
I have responded to Wolf’s objections of the non-ideal Kantian interpretation by
explaining some of the main principles in Kant’s moral theories. I challenged
Wolf’s objection that Kantianism does not explain supererogatory actions by explaining
Kant’s account of perfect and imperfect duties, and by arguing that Kant’s
moral theory leaves room for supererogatory actions under imperfect duties. And
I have responded to Wolf’s objection that Kantianism does not give an
unqualified seal of approval to non-morally directed ideals by explaining
Kant’s account of passion, and by showing that both Kant and Wolf are on the
same page. Both agree that we should not let any motive or interest swallow up
the agent’s personality.
On
the other hand, I have responded to Wolf’s objection of the ideal Kantian
interpretation – that Kantianism entails that the agent is dominated by the
motivation to be moral – by undermining her argument since she bases her
objection on a false premise. Finally, I have challenged Wolf’s objection that
Kantianism contains a “one thought too many” objection by arguing that Kant’s
moral theory does not necessitate that, for an action to be morally worthy, it
must only arise from duty or be dominated by moral motivations. Therefore,
Kantianism does not represent moral sainthood as a human ideal.
Bibliography
Adams,
Robert M. (1984), “Saints.” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 81, no. 7,
pp. 392-401.
Baron,
Mercia. (1987), “Kantian Ethics and Supererogation.” The Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 84, no. 5, pp. 237-262.
Carbonell, Vanessa. (2009) “What Moral Saints Look Like.” Canadian
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 371-398.
Formosa,
Paul. (2011), “A Life without Affects and Passions: Kant on the Duty of
Apathy.” Parrhesia, no. 13, pp. 96-111.
(AP)
Kant, Immanuel, Robert B. Louden and Manfred Kuehn.
(2006), Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View. Cambridge
University Press.
(CJ)
Kant, Immanuel and Paul Guyer. (2000), Critique of
the Power of Judgment. Cambridge University Press.
(G)
Kant, Immanuel, Allen W. Wood, and J. B. Schneewind.
(2002), Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. New Haven: Yale UP.
Print.
(LA)
Kant, Immanuel, et al. (2012),
Lectures on Anthropology. Cambridge University Press.
(LE)
Kant, Immanuel, and Louis Infield. (1980), Lectures on Ethics. Indianapolis:
Hackett. Print.
(MM)
Kant, Immanuel, and Mary J Gregor. (1996), The Metaphysics of Morals. Cambridge
University Press.
(R)
Kant, Immanuel, et al. (1966),
“Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason,” Religion and Rational
Theology. Cambridge University Press.
Moss,
Nicholas. (2015), “The Good Life: A Response To Susan Wolf’s ‘Moral Saint’
Argument.” The New Birmingham Review, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 29-42.
Wolf,
Susan. (1982), "Moral Saints." The Journal of Philosophy 79.8:
419-39. Web.
