Obligation, Ability and the Deduction of Freedom
Konstantinos Sargentis·
University of Crete, Greece
Abstract
In this paper, I examine the place of the principles
“ought implies can” (OIC) and “you can because you ought” (CBO) in Kant’s moral
philosophy. Contrary to an often tacit assumption in the relevant literature,
according to which CBO is simply a version of OIC, I argue that it is a
separate principle, which has a central role in Kant’s attempt to justify
morality and freedom on the basis of the consciousness of the moral law as a
“fact of reason”. Crucial to my main argument is the somewhat neglected
distinction between actuality and reality of freedom, which leads me to a
differentiation within CBO itself. This differentiation is of particular
importance for understanding in what the deduction of freedom in the second Critique consists.
Keywords
Kant; “Ought implies can”; “You can because you
ought”; Fact of reason; Credential of the moral law; Freedom
The
principle[1]
“ought implies can” (OIC), which denotes a tight link[2]
between moral obligation and human ability, is very often attributed to Kant. However,
its place in Kantian ethics is anything but clear. Besides Kant, this principle
has been used in many debates in moral philosophy,[3]
which concern issues such as moral dilemmas, free will and determinism, moral
motivation, obligation and blame, but also issues regarding the foundation and
the principles of moral theories.[4]
In Kant, it is to be found in several parts of his work, but without being
explained or justified any further; thus, its relevance to the above-mentioned
debates remains obscure. This becomes even more perplexing considering that the
principle “you can because you ought” (CBO) also occurs in Kant. In the
relevant literature on Kant, CBO is not usually treated as a separate
principle, but rather as a version of OIC.[5]
In
the present paper, I will argue that CBO’s “absorption” into OIC is one way of considering the specific
Kantian relation between obligation and ability; and, to be sure, it is an
important one, insofar as one wishes to point to the difference between Kantian
and non-Kantian forms of OIC.[6]
However, so my argument goes, in Kant there is a version of CBO –let us call it
CBO*– that is entirely independent of OIC. This version occurs in the framework
of Kant’s attempt in the second Critique
to justify morality and freedom on the basis of the consciousness of the moral
law as a “fact of reason”. In this attempt, the crucial point about CBO* is
made prior to the “official”
deduction of freedom. More specifically, it occurs by means of an appeal to the
common use of reason and a related phenomenological account of both the moral
law and freedom. And although this point is made prior to the official
deduction of freedom, it constitutes an essential part of the latter. Kant
there derives freedom from the moral law in terms of consciousness of the moral law and awareness of freedom. I take “awareness” to denote the “actuality”
of freedom from where its “reality” can afterwards be inferred.[7]
CBO* is affirmed by the facticity of reason. Thus, the facticity of reason is
reflected not only in the giveness of the moral law,[8]
but also in the actuality of freedom, the latter being the “can” of CBO*.
By
contrast, the second Critique’s
“official” deduction of freedom[9]
is a form of CBO –let us call it CBO**– that (a) presupposes and affirms CBO* and,
additionally, (b) undertakes the task of deriving the reality of freedom (as
distinct from its actuality) from the moral law. Now, as I will argue, this
endeavour does need the assistance of
OIC, which is provided –in a Kantian manner– by the notion of autonomy as
self-legislation. Thus, while both forms of CBO are specifically Kantian, CBO*
essentially differs from CBO** due to the latter’s association with OIC, which
is also a specific Kantian principle that differs from contemporary forms of
OIC. In any case, my conclusion will be that CBO rather than OIC is the
prevailing principle which better describes the Kantian situation.
1. Moral Rightness and Moral Obligation
Stern
(2004) offers a helpful interpretation regarding the place of OIC in Kant’s
moral theory. He focuses first on the criteria for moral rightness and, more
specifically, on the way OIC has been used for the identification of these
criteria with respect to basic assumptions of moral theories. Stern examines a
set of examples and arguments, in which this principle is used,[10]
that come from ethics, epistemology and political philosophy: Griffin’s attempt
to support a greater degree of realism in ethics, P. F. Strawson’s naturalistic
response to skepticism, arguments regarding blame, moral obligation, moral motivation
and anti-utopianism as well as Nietzsche’s and Dewey’s naturalism. In all
cases, his conclusion is that although OIC is supposed to be used as a strong
principle that amounts to a determinant of what is right and wrong, in reality
only a weak use of it remains defensible. This weak use suffices only for the
support of a –weaker– position, such as “blame implies can”, and not of the
–stronger– position “right implies can”. Therefore, it cannot be used as an
argument against a moral theory (such as Utilitarianism), which assumes that
there are actions that are, on the one hand, right but, on the other, impossible
for human beings, given the limitations of human life; and, hence, it cannot
support moral theories[11]
that rely on the assumption that moral norms should be determined on the basis
of facts about human nature and society.
With
these in mind, Stern examines Kant’s case[12]
and argues that although at first glance Kant seems to use OIC in its strong
sense, in reality, he makes a weak use of this principle, according to which
the “can” in OIC is implied not by the moral law as such, but by the way the
moral law is related to us as agents, that is, by the specific human status of
moral obligation.[13]
The moral law is not constrained by the capacity of agents to act according to
it, as the strong reading of OIC would suggest. The Kantian, weak, use of OIC simply
claims that the moral law could not obligate
us were we not able to act in accordance with it, rather than that
something cannot be morally right
unless it concerns human beings and their capacities. Let us examine some
characteristic passages[14]
from Kant’s works, where OIC appears, and in which it seems that moral
rightness is actually being substituted with moral obligation:
(a) Pure reason thus contains –not in its speculative
use, to be sure, but yet in a certain practical use, namely the moral use–
principles of the possibility of
experience, namely of those actions in conformity with moral precepts which
could be encountered in the history of humankind. For since they
command that these actions ought to happen, they must also be able to happen.
(CR, A807/B835)
(b) Impulses of nature, accordingly, involve obstacles
within the human being’s mind to his fulfillment of duty and (sometimes
powerful) forces opposing it, which he must judge that he is capable of
resisting and conquering by reason not at some time in the future but at once
(the moment he thinks of duty): he must judge that he can do what the
law tells him unconditionally that he ought to do. (MM, VI:380)
(c) But if a human being is corrupt in the very ground
of his maxims, how can he possibly bring about this revolution by his own
forces and become a good human being on his own? Yet duty commands that he be
good, and duty commands nothing but what we can do. (Rel, VI:47)
(d) [T]he command that we ought to become
better human beings still resounds unabated in our souls; consequently, we must
also be capable of it. (Rel, VI:45)
(e) Morals is of itself practical in the objective
sense, as the sum of laws commanding unconditionally, in accordance with which
we ought to act, and it is patently absurd, having granted this concept
of duty its authority, to want to say that one nevertheless cannot do
it. For in that case this concept would of itself drop out of morals (ultra
posse nemo obligatur). (PP,
VIII:370)
If
we accept Stern’s interpretation, we should assume that in these passages the
conception of ought is viewed from the
perspective of the human being as far as the moral law refers to the latter and
not from the perspective of the moral law as such. Correspondingly, in the
Kantian passages, where OIC refers to the highest good and its conditions, we
should assume that Kant focuses on the content
of the moral law, insofar as it is addressed to us, commanding us to try with
all our powers to realise the highest good:
(f) [A] need of pure practical reason is based
on a duty, that of making something (the highest good) the object of my
will so as to promote it with all my powers; and thus I must suppose its
possibility and so too the conditions for this, namely God, freedom, and
immortality. (CP, V:142)
(g) It is a duty to realize the highest good to the
utmost of our capacity; therefore it must be possible. (CP, V:143 n.)
Especially
in these passages (f and g), it seems to be even clearer that for human beings
striving for the promotion of the highest good takes the form of duty, because
(or to the degree to which) they have the capacity to respond to it. However,
this does not mean that the aim of realising the highest good is not right “by
itself”, even if we assume that no human being has the capacity to promote this
aim.
I
believe that “implication” in OIC, as Stern generally understands it, has the
meaning of “presupposition” (as contrasted to “entailment”), both in the strong
sense of OIC, which he rejects, and in its weak sense, which he advocates. The
most general question is whether moral obligation does, or does not, presuppose
facts about the human condition (the human ability as determined by human limitations,
capacities etc.). Thus, there is an assumption that lies behind “implication”,
namely that in OIC there is a fixed direction between “ought” and “can” and
that, since “implication” is supposed to mean “presupposition”, this direction
is from “can” to “ought”.[15]
However, I believe that Stern’s support of the weak sense of OIC in Kant does
not in fact concern the OIC principle in this meaning; rather, it is about OIC
as concerning “merely” a tight link between ought and can without a fixed
indication of the direction between them. It is characteristic that almost all
of the above-cited passages do not express the principle that “ought” presupposes “can”, but, in contrast,
they begin from “ought” in order to arrive at “can”. It seems that the
principle being operative here is not OIC, but rather CBO. The only one of the
above passages where “ought” depends
on “can” is c. Thus, it seems as if “implication” in OIC can mean both
“presupposition” and “entailment”, thus
rendering CBO –the direction from ought
to can– a version of OIC. It will be shown in the next section of this
paper that, given the distinction between moral rightness and moral obligation
in Kant, this should not be considered a problem, since in this context moral
obligation is meant to be an application or an adjustment –the moral law’s
modus of appearance– to the human capacities; thus, the human capacities are
presupposed by this “adjustment” (the “ought”), but not by the moral law itself. This explains why in the examined
passages the direction in OIC can be two-way, thus making CBO simply a version
of OIC.
Nevertheless,
this should not be understood as threatening the “autonomy” of CBO as a
self-standing principle. It is my view that in Kant there is a genuine
distinction of CBO as a truly separate
principle, which occurs in the context of a specific doctrine of Kant’s
ethics, that is, the doctrine of the “fact of reason”. However, before turning
to this topic, we need to consider some consequences arising from Stern’s
interpretation.
2. Obligation and Human Receptivity
The
distinction between moral rightness and moral obligation –or so it might be
argued– reveals a gap between the moral law
as such and the moral law insofar as
it is addressed to the human being in the form of duty, imperative, command
or obligation. The question here is whether in Kant’s ethics the latter is constitutive
of the former: does the imperatival form of the (categorical commanding) moral
law not constitute the moral law?
Although Stern recognises this problem, his strategy consists in denying such a
strong reading of Kant; instead, he points out that “Kant certainly held that given what we are, the moral law is a
command to us: but that is (so to speak) a fact about us, rather than a fact
about the moral law, that it must be such that it can be commanded to human
agents” (Stern
2004, p. 57).
Although
this seems reasonable to me, it needs some clarification. To begin with, a first
reading of this view would be that it touches upon the well-known issue of the
possibility of the categorical imperative, when, for instance, in the GMM Kant
argues that “[t]he moral ‘ought’ is […] his [the human being’s] own necessary
‘will’ as a member of an intelligible world, and is thought by him as
‘ought’ only insofar as he regards himself at the same time as a member of the
world of sense” (IV:455). Thus, this reading would imply that the moral law is
related to us in its imperatival form, because we, as members of the sensible
world, are exposed to the influence of the inclinations of sensibility; and
these are obstacles that, along with the propensity to evil, we must overcome
in order to do what for us is our duty. Even more telling is a passage from the
MM:
The very concept
of duty is already the concept of a necessitation
(constraint) of free choice through the law. […] The moral imperative makes
this constraint known through the categorical nature of its pronouncement (the
unconditional ought). Such constraint, therefore, does not apply to rational
beings as such (there could also be holy ones) but rather to human
beings, rational natural beings, who are unholy enough that pleasure
can induce them to break the moral law, even though they recognize its
authority; and even when they do obey the law, they do it reluctantly (in
the face of opposition from their inclinations), and it is in this that such constraint
properly consists. (MM, VI:379)
However,
this reading focuses on human nature as a rival
of morality and fails to take into account the side of human nature that is
friendly and receptive to duty. Therefore, if we accepted solely this reading,
we would have to admit a shift to a principle that is entirely different from
OIC. This principle would state that “ought implies the hostility of human
nature”, but this would be an entirely different issue. And, indeed, with his
conclusion Stern does not touch upon this issue; as I understand him, he
actually examines and highlights the other side of the same issue: that of the
human agent as a rational being capable of being subjected to moral obligation,
where “capable” refers to specific predispositions (on the level of moral
anthropology).[16] In
the MM, Kant characteristically refers to “the mind’s receptivity to concepts
of duty as such” and he explains that:
[t]hey are moral feeling, conscience, love of
one’s neighbor, and respect for oneself (self-esteem). […] [T]hey
lie at the basis of morality, as subjective conditions of receptiveness
to the concept of duty, not as objective conditions of morality. All of them
are natural predispositions of the mind (praedispositio) for being
affected by concepts of duty, antecedent predispositions on the side of feeling. […] [E]very human being has them, and it
is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation. - Consciousness of
them is not of empirical origin; it
can, instead, only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the
effect this has on the mind. (MM, VI:399)
As
this important passage indicates, apart from their motivational role, these
predispositions also have an epistemic function with regard to moral
obligation.[17] Consequently,
the previous analysis should be complemented with the following: the “ought” in
OIC does not designate only the moral law in the form it takes as an
imperative, duty or moral obligation, but it goes even further to designate its
“touchpoint” with human predispositions and encompass the reason for which we
are receptive to its bindingness. It concerns the moment when the categorical
commanding moral law dovetails with the human mind and the form it takes from
the perspective of the supportive human predispositions. Thus, the “ought” in
OIC constitutes the “human” modus of the appearance of moral obligation. However,
as the final sentence[18]
of the above cited text indicates, it also goes the other way around: insofar
as the categorical commanding moral law is directed to the human agent, it
lights up and features specific capacities in her/him, which appear for the
first time precisely under the light of the commanding moral law.[19]
To put it differently: duty constitutes the ratio
cognoscendi of those capacities that are supportive of it. And this is
precisely a form of CBO. OIC subsequently suggests that if these capacities
could not prevail in the struggle with impediments (inclinations and propensity
to evil), the “ought” would be meaningless. In other words, it suggests that in
order for the moral law to bind/obligate the human agent, the latter’s
capacities must allow its compliance (and they do allow it), since otherwise concepts such as “ought”, “duty” and
“obligation” would not bear any meaning. Thus, in the determination of these
capacities Kant takes into account their relation to duty, not the converse:
Ethical duties must not be determined in accordance
with the capacity[-ies] to fulfill the law that is ascribed to human beings; on
the contrary, their moral capacity must be estimated by the law, which commands
categorically, and so in accordance with our rational knowledge of what they
ought to be in keeping with the idea of humanity, not in accordance with the
empirical knowledge we have of them as they are. (MM, VI:404 f.)
This
passage clarifies that moral capacities must be determined first on the basis
of their relation to duty (and not independently from it) –which is a form of
CBO– and that subsequently, given
this determination, OIC can be used for the determination (or limitation) of
the “ought” itself, namely that the latter cannot contain demands that
transcend the human moral capacities. While this may sound circular, its
meaning constitutes a primal compatibility between the unconditionally
commanding moral law and the human powers and capacities. What is important to
note here is that we can discern two particular moments in this weak sense of
OIC: (a) a form of CBO, where duty is the ratio
cognoscendi of the capacities that are friendly to it and (b) a specific
form of OIC: the principle that “ought”, as conceptually including these
capacities, presupposes their power
(within the use of human freedom) to prevail in the struggle with impediments
to morality.
Let
us now return to Stern. His general conclusion is that Kant does not begin “with an account of human
capacities to set the parameters of moral theorizing”, but the other way
around: “he first fixes his moral theory, in which what matters is not what we
are capable of qua human beings, but what obligations can be shown to apply to
rational agents capable of acting rightly; and then, once the moral law is
fixed, he uses ‘ought implies can’ to determine what we are capable of qua
human beings, in so far as we fall under this law” (Stern 2004, p. 60). In this sense, Stern argues that
in Kantian ethics OIC does not denote the movement from what we can do to what
we ought to do, but rather the movement from what we ought to do to what we can
do. Consequently, we could argue that this movement can be described as CBO rather
than OIC. In this respect, CBO is a more general principle, which according to
my previous analysis includes:
(1)
what Stern calls “fixing of the theory”; this amounts to a determination of the
obligations for all rational beings (which at this level can also be
prescriptive);
(2)
OIC, as Stern conceives it, which according to my view includes as its
sub-moments:
(2.1)
a further form of CBO, where “ought” can be thought of as the ratio cognoscendi of the supportive
human capacities, and
(2.2)
another form of OIC, that is, the principle that “ought” (conceived as in 2.1)
presupposes the power of these capacities to prevail in the struggle with
enemies.
This
is admittedly a very perplexing situation, since CBO cannot stand alone but rather
it is conceived in its association with OIC. Thus, it is my view that the
Sternian treatment of OIC in Kant should be better described by the
second-order principle “CBO implies OIC”. In this respect, the general
principle CBO (as implying OIC) could, in a more concise form, be translated as
“you have the capacities to respond because you are morally obligated”.
Consequently, from the perspective of the Sternian interpretation, the
prevailing principle in Kant seems to be CBO rather than OIC. This can also
explain why in passages a, b, d, e, f and g, in the previous section of this
paper, the direction is from “ought” to “can”. However, since the general
principle CBO includes OIC in the manner explained above, in Kant’s work there
are also passages, such as passage c, where the direction goes the other way
around. And, in any case, the two principles are interconnected in such a way
that CBO relies on OIC.
However,
this is not the whole story about CBO and OIC in Kant. It should be noted that
for the explanation of “can” the previous account focuses on human capacities
in terms of moral anthropology, leaving tacitly aside the issue of freedom in
its relation to the moral law. However, if we take the latter into account, we
will notice that in Kant there exist two further versions of CBO, that is, CBO*
and CBO** –as I called them at the beginning of the present paper–, both of
which, as I will argue later in this paper, concern a different meaning of
“can”, namely the meaning “you are aware of your freedom”. Thus, CBO* and CBO**
are versions of the principle “you are aware of your freedom because you (are
conscious that you) ought”. And, as it will be shown below, while CBO* is
entirely independent of OIC, CBO** relies on a specific Kantian version of OIC,[20]
which rests on the conception of autonomy. In what follows in the present
paper, I will be concerned with these two versions of CBO, regarding them both
as characteristic of the specific Kantian treatment of the relation between
moral obligation and human ability. Nonetheless, it might be constructive
beforehand to examine more closely the relation between the two basic
principles OIC and CBO in Kant’s ethics. Timmermann’s interpretation can help
us with this.
3. The Relation between the Two Principles
In
his initial examination of the two principles, OIC and CBO, in the context of
moral philosophy in general, and not specifically in Kant, Timmermann makes a
clear distinction between them. More specifically, he argues that: (a) they
have different meanings, since CBO presupposes “ought” as a given, while, by
contrast, the latter’s validity in OIC is to be examined; (b) they are not used
in the context of the same philosophical and practical issues; and (c) while
OIC is more widely accepted and agreed upon in the contemporary debate, CBO, at
least in its primal metaphysical meaning, remains an acceptable principle only
for Kant’s adherents.
However,
although CBO is a specifically Kantian principle, OIC is also of fundamental importance in Kant’s ethics.[21]
For instance, when in the GMM Kant defines duty as “the necessity of an action from respect for law” (IV:400), we must
assume that this “necessity” logically presupposes the possibility of action at
all levels: moral possibility, that is, permissiveness, the possibility of the
right decision at the level of the theory of action as well as the technical
possibility of execution of an action. Furthermore, this happens despite the
fact that the first two “analytic” sections of the GMS are occupied with the
metaphysical fear that the validity of moral commands could be undermined by
the human being’s impossibility to comply with them if s/he was taken to be
subjected to the compulsion of natural laws and, thus, to have no free will. To
be sure, this obstacle is overridden in the third, “synthetic” section of the GMS,
where the “transition from metaphysics of morals to the critique of pure
practical reason” (IV:446) dissolves the fear that morality could be a
“phantom” or a “chimerical idea without any truth” (IV:445) and, thereby, it
also provides support to the principle “ought implies can”.[22]
As far as
CBO is concerned, Timmermann firstly refers to the Common Saying, where
Kant emphasises that:
in a theory that is based on the concept of duty, concern
about the empty ideality of this concept quite disappears. For it would not be
a duty to aim at a certain effect of our will if this effect were not also
possible in experience. (CS, VIII:276-77)
Kant
supports this theory in the face of criticisms that argue,
to the scandal of philosophy, […] that what may be
correct in it is yet invalid in practice; and this is said in a lofty,
disdainful tone, full of the presumption of wanting to reform reason by
experience even in that in which reason puts its highest honor, and in a wisdom
that can see farther and more clearly with its dim moles’ eyes fixed on
experience than with the eyes belonging to a being that was made to stand erect
and look at the heavens. (CS, VIII:277)
Here,
it is made clear that the foundations of ethics should not be sought in experience.
Nevertheless, the fact that the principles of morality are not empirical does
not mean that they cannot also be manifested in experience. On the contrary,
standing before her/his action, the agent has a very clear consciousness of her/his
duty as a guide regarding what s/he should do;[23]
and, what is more, a consciousness that is even clearer compared with the
guidance provided by the empirical incentives of self-love and selfishness that
are “derived from happiness”[24],
which in other respects (given the propensity to evil) are stronger and usually
determine her/his agency. Therefore, for the being that has been made “to stand
erect and look at the heavens”, for the being whose consciousness of duty is
derived from non-empirical sources, there is no fear that the concept of duty
has an “empty ideality”.
In
this regard, and given Timmermann’s conclusion,[25]
the operative principle here is CBO, precisely because it expresses the
non-empirical derivation of the consciousness of duty. In other words, as I
understand it, Kant begins from a concept of duty that is founded independently
from experience in order to say that this concept becomes action-guiding in
experience, although it is not of
empirical origin. Thus, you “can” not
because you already can, but because you “ought”.
However,
I believe that this conclusion is restrictive, since Kant in these passages
from the Common Saying seems to
accept a combination of three claims: (a) duty is of non-empirical origin; (b)
despite its non-empirical origin, it demands its realisation in experience; (c)
it would not demand its empirical realisation if this were not possible.[26]
Hence, due to c, CBO seems to rely on OIC; yet, Kant does not provide any
further explanations. For instance, in challenging claim c one could ask: why
does (or how can) the –non-empirical– concept of duty imply the possibility of
its empirical realisation? An answer I have in mind starts from the concept of
the categorical imperative and goes
as follows.
When
Kant speaks of the “categorical imperative”,[27]
he could possibly refer to two things:[28]
first, the procedure of testing maxims of our actions in order to find out
which particular action for us is duty and, second, the definite result of this
testing procedure, namely that a particular action is categorically commanded,
that is, it is binding for us.
In
this second case, the concept of duty always concerns a particular empirical
action.[29]
In this sense, it already encompasses the possibility of its realisation in
experience, thus rendering it pointless to ask whether duty can be realised
(that is, whether it does or it does not have “empty ideality”). To put it
differently, a particular action is morally binding only if it can be realised,
that is, if it is empirically possible. Consequently, the question whether an
action is binding for someone also presupposes a diagnosis of the particular case
and its conditions, which can only be made with reference to empirical
circumstances.
Thus,
I believe that in these passages from the Common
Saying the prevailing principle is OIC and not CBO, which, if nonetheless is in effect, “merely” indicates
the non-empirical origin of the concept of duty: “that the human being is aware
that he can do this because he ought to discloses within him a depth of divine
predispositions and lets him feel, as it were, a holy awe at the greatness and
sublimity of his true vocation” (CS, VIII:287 f.). Nevertheless, the fact that
the human being –the most common human reason (CS, VIII:286)– clearly has
before her/his action the consciousness of duty thus conceived does not at the same time explain the reason
why duty can be realised: it is one thing for duty not to have an “empty
ideality” and another for duty to be realised. To be sure, it is possible for
the two cases to coincide, but for an explanation of this possibility we need
the analysis of “can” (which will be offered in the fifth section of this
paper). In the passages we are examining here, Kant seems to identify, as it
were, “can” with knowledge (“awareness”) of what
duty asks me to do in the case of a particular action,[30]
thus revealing to me the possibility of actions that experience could never
present to me. For this we need the analysis of the next section and Kant’s
doctrine of the fact of reason.
4. Fact of Reason and CBO
Until
now we have seen versions of CBO in Kant’s work that imply, or need the
assistance of, OIC. Timmermann argues that in CBO we presuppose (a) OIC and (b)
that “ought” really exists, and from these we conclude that (c) the agent can
in her/his agency comply with “ought”.[31]
According to him, this model also exists in Kant’s doctrine of the
consciousness of the moral law as a “fact of reason”.[32]
However, I believe that in the context of Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason
we also have a “pure” form of CBO that completely bypasses OIC and focuses on
the manner “can” is derived directly from
“ought”. More specifically, when Kant declares that “the moral law is the ratio
cognoscendi of freedom” (CP, V:4 n.), I believe that he means two things:
(a) what is included in the deduction of freedom in the corresponding chapter[33]
of the CP; (b) that consciousness of the moral law by the common human being
who is ready to act is at the same time awareness of her/his freedom. They both
constitute “moments” of the deduction of freedom in the CP. However, while the
first case is a form of CBO that seems to include OIC, the second one
constitutes a “pure” form of CBO. I will focus first on this second case, where
“can” refers specifically to the awareness of (transcendental) freedom.
I
will begin with a remark on Timmemann’s point that the opponent of CBO is the
moral skeptic, as far as s/he believes that natural laws undermine human
freedom and responsibility.[34]
According to the above distinction, I believe that while this is true in the
first case, it is not so in the second: if, in the second case, CBO were
threatened by something, then this could only be by an alleged inability
regarding knowledge of the good; for
instance, if we assume –Socratically as it were– that due to some “malfunction”,
we do not have real access to knowledge of the good.[35]
And this is so, because here the main question as well as the context are
different, since “can” identifies with awareness
of freedom as my possibility to do something which from an empirical
perspective would appear as impossibility: to sacrifice even my own life. The
human being’s highest empirical
determination, that is, the preservation of human life, is being deprived of
its axiological primacy when moral consciousness as the fact of reason raises the
human being on a higher level by changing the perspective from where values are viewed. From this perspective,
the empirical values are downgraded, while the values of pure practical reason
are put into the highest place. From the perspective of the empirical nature of
human beings, what appears as the highest and non-negotiable value is the
instinct for self-preservation, which is irresistible even in the face of the
most powerful inclination (in Kant’s example below: lust). However, under the
light of moral consciousness, it is weakened in terms of values and submitted
to moral duty that is commanded by reason. Kant illustrates this with the
famous example from the CP:
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful inclination
that, when the desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite
irresistible to him; ask him whether, if a gallows were erected in front of the
house where he finds this opportunity and he would be hanged on it immediately
after gratifying his lust, he would not then control his inclination. One need
not conjecture very long what he would reply. But ask him whether, if his
prince demanded, on pain of the same immediate execution, that he give false
testimony against an honorable man whom the prince would like to destroy under
a plausible pretext, he would consider it possible to overcome his love of
life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to assert whether
he would do it or not, but he must admit without hesitation that it would be
possible for him. He judges, therefore, that he can do something because he is
aware that he ought to do it and cognizes freedom within him, which, without
the moral law, would have remained unknown to him. (CP, V:30)[36]
I
believe that what is foregrounded here is not the “official” deduction of
freedom, which, as I noted above,[37]
is found in the corresponding chapter in the CP, but a first step to it - a
derivation of the awareness of
freedom as the modus by which the human being for the first time cognises
(judges, realises) that s/he is free and independent from the perspective of
her/his empirical nature, “from everything empirical and hence from nature
generally” (CP, V:97), namely that s/he is transcendentally free. I believe that
here “awareness of freedom” is analogous to the “idea of freedom” in the GMM,[38]
in the sense that both conceptions denote the self-consciousness of the moral
agent to the degree to which s/he is engaged in the process of deliberation
regarding what s/he ought to do; with the difference being that the awareness
of freedom here is derived from the consciousness of the moral law as the fact
of reason, while in the GMM the idea of freedom is merely “presupposed”[39]
(which subsequently leads to the known hidden circle that Kant there points out[40]).[41]
The fact that the derivation of the awareness
of freedom is only part of the overall deduction of freedom can be understood
on the basis of an often overlooked distinction between the concepts of
actuality (Wirklichkeit) and reality (Realität) of freedom. It is to this
distinction that I will focus on next.
4.1 Actuality versus Reality
As
far as I can discern, in the CP the deduction of freedom consists of two
“moments”: the derivation of the actuality
of freedom from the moral law and the move from the actuality of freedom to its
reality. Regarding the difference
between the two concepts, in the case of a contrast with mere “possibility”
Kant alludes to actuality, while in the context of freedom as a mode of
causality he refers to reality. More specifically, let us consider the
following passages:
(a) [Τ]he moral
law, which itself has no need of justifying grounds, proves not only the
possibility but the [actuality[42]
of freedom] in beings who cognize this law as binding upon them. (CP, V:47)
(b) [T]he moral law thus determines that which
speculative philosophy had to leave undetermined, namely the law for a
causality the concept of which was only negative in the latter, and thus for
the first time provides objective reality to this concept. (CP, V:47)
(c) [P]ractical
reason of itself, without any collusion with speculative reason, furnishes
reality to a supersensible object of the category of causality, namely to freedom
(although, as a practical concept, only for practical use), and hence
establishes by means of a fact what could there only be thought. (CP, V:6)
These
three passages are characteristic of the distinction between actuality (passage
a) and reality (passages b and c) of freedom. Regarding the difference between
actuality and reality in general, actuality is a modal concept that requires
giveness in the form of perception,[43]
and as such it is contrasted with (logical) possibility and mere
conceivability, while reality is a category of quality that points to the
“whatness” (quidditas or essentia) or to the “thinghood”
(Sachheit) (CR, B182) of a thing, to its positive nature.[44]Actuality
is derived from the assertoric form of judgment[45]
and determines that something exists, while reality is derived from the
affirmative form of judgment[46]
and qualitatively determines that something is what it is, even if that is only
possible and does not exist. In this respect, something that is actual is also real, but the opposite does not hold,
since something can be real without being actual – I will return to this
point in the next section. Finally, another difference between actuality and
reality is that the latter, in contrast to the former, has degrees.[47]
The question arising at this point concerns the way in which the distinction
between actuality and reality is applicable to the case of freedom.
To
be sure, freedom cannot be shown to be actual as an object of perception; rather,
its actuality is shown in both the judgment that I can resist inclinations when
I face a situation with moral traits, even at the cost of sacrificing my life, and
in the presence of the moral incentive of respect for the moral law, which is
inseparably connected with this judgment. This kind of giveness is due to the
giveness of the consciousness of the moral law as the fact of reason. On the
other hand, the “whatness” of freedom consists in being a causality, whose law
is the moral law. Now, regarding the fact that reality, contrary to actuality,
has degrees, it seems rather difficult to identify degrees of freedom here,
insofar as we have to do with transcendental freedom, which –it will be
recalled– requires independence “from everything empirical and hence from
nature generally” (CP, V:97).
Let
us summarise: while the giveness of freedom, and with it its actuality, result
from its identity with the moral law, which is given factually, its thinghood,
and thus its reality, consist in being a mode of causality under the moral law.
The first is shown in the gallows example,[48]
the second in the “official” deduction of freedom.[49] However, the second presupposes the first: apart from the giveness of freedom through
its identity with the moral law, it is impossible to prove its alleged
“independent” reality.[50]
This consideration points to a further issue that Kant touches upon in the
context of the deduction of freedom.
4.2 The “Credential” of the Moral Law
Essential to the deduction of the reality of
freedom (as contrasted to its actuality) is Kant’s demonstration of how the
moral law is related to “a kind of credential”, which consists in “that
it is itself laid down as a principle of the deduction of freedom as a
causality of pure reason” (CP, V:48). In the relevant literature, there is a
disagreement over whether this credential concerns the moral law or freedom,
that is, whether it is a credential for
the moral law or a credential for freedom.
What is actually at stake behind this disagreement is whether in the CP Kant holds
that beyond the fact of reason a further “credential” for the validity of the
moral law on the basis of an “independent
warrant” [51] of freedom as
causality and of the role of the moral law as the law of that causality is
necessary. And since Kant associates this independent warrant with “a need of
theoretical reason” (CP, V:48), the question turns out to be whether the
mentioned credential amounts to, on the one hand, a practical foundation of
freedom through the moral law as the fact of reason (which means that, apart
from being a factum, the moral law does not need a further credential for its
validity) or, on the other hand, a theoretical or a coherentist authentication
of the moral law through freedom (or, more accurately, through itself as the
causal law of freedom). Although prominent scholars, such as Beck and Rawls,
adopt the latter view,[52]
I agree with the opposite view, which is maintained by Bojanowski and Timmerman,
who argue that the credential can only refer to freedom and not to the moral
law.[53]
It is my view that an “independent warrant” for the moral law embedded in the process of the justification
of morality would run counter to the main idea of Kant’s doctrine of the
facticity of reason in the CP, especially when this doctrine is conceived in
its opposition to Kant’s account in GMM III.
However,
aside from this, I believe that there is a further reason why the credential
should be attributed to freedom and not to the moral law. And this rests on the
above-mentioned distinction between actuality and reality of freedom. I believe
that if the reality of freedom consists in being a mode of causality under the
moral law and if what can be deduced directly from the moral law as factum is the actuality of freedom, then its
reality is in need of a credential on the basis of its very actuality. We
have already seen that something can be real without being actual, but if
something is actual, then it is also real.[54] If we now take into account that the reality
of freedom as unconditioned causality cannot be theoretically proven –the first
Critique could merely defend it by
keeping open for the speculative reason “the place which for it is vacant,
namely the intelligible” (CP, V:49)–, it follows that the only way to fill this
“vacant place”, by providing “a positive determination” (CP, V:48) to the idea
of freedom, and thus to determine its quidditas,
is by means of its actuality that is given with the moral law (which is a “law
of causality in an intelligible world” (CP, V:49)). Freedom is hereby “afforded
objective and, though only practical, undoubted reality” (CP, V:49). Thus, freedom “reveals itself through the
moral law” (CP, V:4) both as actual and
real. In this sense, the “credential” is an essential part of the deduction
of freedom rather than an addendum to it.
After
these clarifications, I will now return to their importance for CBO. It should
be clear that the “can” in CBO* identifies with the awareness of the actuality of freedom, which is deduced
directly from the fact of reason, while the “can” in CBO** consists of both
that awareness and consciousness of the reality
of freedom, which is derived –on the basis of its very actuality– from the
moral law.
What
I want to emphasise with regard to CBO* is that in this context “awareness of
freedom” constitutes a phenomenological
moment, since it denotes the modus by which the moral law appears to the
common human being[55]
(who is philosophically uneducated and non-cognisant of Kant’s moral theory),
when s/he faces the case of an action with moral traits and must decide what to
do - as the man standing in front of the erected gallows in Kant’s example.
Consciousness of the moral law as a fact of reason means that the moral law (a)
appears to her/him in the form of particular commands adjusted to the concrete
case and its specific traits,[56]
which at the same time (b) make her/him realise (by means of a “paradigm
shift”, as it were) her/his ability to act in a way that s/he otherwise would
be unable even to think about if s/he remained restricted to the empirical
perspective; that is, to realise that s/he is free.[57]
My
conclusion is that in Kant’s ethics CBO* (the “pure” form of CBO) rests on a
specific meaning of the concept of “can”: in this context, “can” identifies
with the horizon of agency opened up by the awareness of transcendental
freedom, which is derived from the consciousness of the moral law as a fact of
reason. To put it another way: out of the sum of actions that can be realised
in experience, CBO* separates the subset that includes transcendentally free
actions and informs us that our moral consciousness (with its imperatival and
binding character) reveals the possibility to integrate such actions into our
intentional horizon. Thus, our moral consciousness is constitutive of our
awareness of freedom, which seems to be an expansion of our knowledge regarding
the scope of choices and actions that are possible for us. In this sense, CBO*
does not need the assistance of OIC.
Nevertheless,
there also exists the other version of CBO, namely CBO**, which, besides CBO*,
also presupposes the “official” deduction of freedom in the CP and relies on
OIC. How is this possible? How can the “ought” that provides the basis for the
deduction of “can” also imply the latter, as if it presupposed it? It is to
this issue that I will now turn.
5. Normativity and Ability
Transcendental
freedom consists in our ability to be determined by the moral “ought”
independently of natural determination –even contrary to it–, while our actions
are events in the natural world. A fundamental question here is how the notion
of “can” should be understood in this context and what kind of capacities Kant
takes to correspond to moral “ought”. Based on Stern’s interpretation, in the
first two sections of the present paper I referred to our capacities as agents
equipped with certain predispositions that are supportive of morality and to
their power to overcome obstacles. Another interpretation by Kohl[58]
can help us to complement this account by featuring the meaning of inner
volitional acts as expressions of the freedom of the power of choice (Willkür), given –we could say– those supportive predispositions.
Kohl
maintains that Kant endorses two versions of OIC, which concern two different
aspects that jointly constitute his conception of ourselves as fully rational
agents: a version that concerns the relation between “ought” and physical
capacity and a version that concerns moral obligation and volitional power (which
is distinct from physical capacity).[59]
This distinction is tied to the underlying distinction between “outer”
(physical) and “inner” (volitional) actions.[60]
In the following passage from the CR, which refers to ought-governed rational
agency in general, both of these action types in the context of OIC are
included:
Now of course the action must be possible under
natural conditions if the ought is directed to it; but these natural conditions
do not concern the determination of the power of choice itself, but only its
effect and result in appearance. (CR, A 548/B576)
As
mentioned above, this passage refers to ought-governed rational agency in
general (both moral and prudential),
but for our purposes we can focus on the moral context and on the version of
OIC that concerns the moral “ought” and its relation to both physical and
volitional capacities. According to the previous distinctions, the property of
being “possible under natural conditions” as well as that of being the “effect
and result in appearance” refer to “outer” actions, while the “determination of
the power of choice itself” concerns “inner” actions. Regarding inner actions,
the “determination of the power of choice” consists in the process of Willkür’s adoption of maxims and the
incorporation of incentives into these maxims. This process constitutes an
inner self-determination, which often manifests itself through the struggle
against inner impediments of the will. Such impediments are self-love in its
various forms as well as the propensity to evil.
Regarding
the physical capacity, the question is in what sense the action under the moral
“ought” must be “possible under natural conditions”. This amounts to the
question of how the “can” in this version of OIC should be understood. Does it
encompass general or specific physical capacities[61]
on the part of the agent? Although the moral “ought” does presuppose (“imply”) some causal[62]
capacities regarding the agent’s effectiveness in outer actions, these are general capacities as contrasted to specific capacities required for the
actual production of effects in specific circumstances of particular outer
actions. In this context, Kohl refers to Herman, who holds that the moral
“ought” in Kant requires the possibility of a certain type of physical action and not of a particular action token.[63]
Herman’s point is that if the moral “ought” also required the possibility of
particular action tokens, then in the case of an occasional impossibility of an
action token we could nullify our moral obligation.[64]
On the other hand, Kohl maintains that Kant does indeed connect the “can” with
types (and not with tokens) of actions, but not for the reason Herman invokes;[65]
Kant does not associate OIC with action tokens, because the successful
performance of particular physical actions (tokens) largely depends on
contingency or lack, which constitute characteristics that are ruled out by
Kant’s conception of compliance with morality and duty.[66]
Nonetheless,
it seems to me that, in contrast to outer/physical actions, the distinction
between action types and tokens does not play any role in the case of the
version of OIC that concerns inner/volitional actions. The ability for inner
determination of the power of choice that is linked to the moral “ought” also
concerns inner volitional action tokens,
since contingency and lack are ruled out as possible factors in the Willkür’s inner determination. Moreover,
as we saw above, the moral “ought” as the fact of reason appears to the common
human being in the form of particular moral “oughts” that are products of the
same power that also performs the inner volitional acts - I will return to this
point below. Given that Kant’s ethics could be characterised as an “ethics of
disposition” (Gesinnungsethik), in
which morality concerns the maxim of action and the inner determination of the
will, moral agency, which certainly needs action tokens for its actuality,
consists precisely in these inner volitional action tokens. As such, they are
not threatened by the agent’s possible physical inability to perform the outer
action tokens that correspond to them. And it is in such inner volitional acts
that the very goodness of good will consists:
Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the
niggardly provision of a stepmotherly nature, this will should wholly lack the
capacity to carry out its purpose - if with its greatest efforts it should yet
achieve nothing and only the good will were left (not, of course, as a mere
wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they are in our control) - then,
like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its full
worth in itself. (GMM, IV:394)[67]
Thus,
in contrast to opponents of OIC, whose starting point is a heterogeneity
between “ought” and “can”,[68]
a tight link emerges in Kant between moral “ought” and “can” in terms of inner
volitional acts precisely on the basis of
their homogeneity. It is this point that allows us to focus specifically on
Kant’s notion of autonomy[69]
as self-legislation, that is, “the will’s property of being a law to itself”
(GMM, IV:447). If the rational will lacked the ability to obey the law it makes
for itself, then this would ensue from a misconstruction of its capacities and
–first of all– of its identity, since in such a hypothetical case it would be
alienated from itself and through its very autonomy become heteronomous; and
this is certainly inconsistent, because, given the concept of autonomy, the
powers on the basis of which it obeys its own law are at the same time the
powers on the basis of which it makes this law.[70]
“Ought” and “can” have the same root and, thus, in the context of OIC, one
refers to the other. As I see it, Kant’s notorious “Reciprocity Thesis”[71]
has its deeper foundation here. In the Groundwork,
Kant maintains that “freedom and the will’s own lawgiving are both autonomy and
hence reciprocal concepts” (GMM, IV:450) insofar as freedom is conceived in its
positive sense, as “the will’s property of being a law to itself” (GMM,
IV:447); this thesis is also clearly formulated in the CP (V:29): “freedom and
unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other”.
According
to the above analysis, on the basis of the concept of autonomy we could argue
that Kant endorses OIC in a somewhat neutral form, in the sense that this
principle denotes a tight link between “ought” and “can”, without at the same
time containing an indication of a fixed direction from one to the other. If
“ought” and “can” have the same root, then one can refer to the other in such a
way that it does not make sense to say that one unidirectionally presupposes or
entails the other; rather, the relation between them holds for both directions.
Consider
now again the distinction between actuality and reality of freedom, which we
examined in section 4.1 of the present paper. The reality of freedom, its quidditas, consists in being a mode of
causality under the moral law and the moral law is the law of that causality: this
seems to be a reformulation of the Reciprocity Thesis. Thus, in its neutral
form, OIC is a valid principle in the context of the deduction of the reality
of freedom. However, since, as we saw, the deduction of the reality of freedom
already implies the deduction of its actuality from the consciousness of the
moral law as the fact of reason, even the principle CBO* is in place.
Consequently, both CBO* and OIC (in its neutral form) are valid and jointly
constitute what I have called CBO**. Thus, CBO (in the form of CBO**) is the
prevailing principle, and it can be argued again[72]
that the second-order principle “CBO implies OIC” more accurately explains the
Kantian situation.
6. Concluding Remark
In
the present paper I examined the place of moral obligation and human ability in
Kant’s ethics, starting from his moral anthropology and arriving at the
justification of morality and freedom in the second Critique, with a special focus on the issue of the deduction of
freedom from the moral law as a fact of reason. The latter issue, which is
divided into two parts, namely the deduction of the actuality of freedom and
the deduction of its reality, appeared as the culminating point in this
examination. It turned out that the principle “you can because you ought” (CBO)
rather than “ought implies can” (OIC) prevails in Kant’s endeavour in this
context. Why is this so?
To
be sure, freedom is the ratio essendi
of the moral law –it constitutes its essence–, and this is already contained in
the conception of the reality of freedom (as contrasted to its actuality),
which, as we saw, defines the latter’s quidditas
or essentia. In this respect, the
fact that freedom is the ratio essendi
of the moral law is already presupposed by
the Reciprocity Thesis. Yet, as Kant makes clear in a well-known passage
from the second Critique, his main question
does not concern the ontological basis of the Reciprocity Thesis insofar as the
latter refers to a conceptual relation between freedom and the moral law. His
main concern is rather epistemic in nature, as he wants to break the
circularity of the Reciprocity Thesis in order “to show that there is pure practical
reason” (CP, V:3). And to this
aim, he searches for a starting point regarding the “cognition of the
unconditionally practical”:
[F]reedom and unconditional practical law reciprocally
imply each other. Now I do not ask here whether they are in fact different or
whether it is not much rather the case that an unconditional law is merely the
self-consciousness of a pure practical reason, this being identical with the
positive concept of freedom; I ask instead from what our cognition of
the unconditionally practical starts, whether from freedom or from the
practical law. (CP, V:29)
Since
the answer to this question consists in the fact that the moral law is the ratio cognoscendi of freedom, CBO,
rather than OIC, is the prevailing Kantian principle.[73]
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