Towards a Holistic View of
Self-Deception
in Kant’s Moral Psychology
Maria Eugênia Zanchet ·
University of Bayreuth, Germany
Abstract
In his notable account of lying in
the Doctrine of Virtue, Kant draws a
parallel between self-deception and external lying, and argues that the agent
who lies throws away her personality and dignity. Challenged by many
commentators, this explanatory strategy may suggest that Kant's prohibition of
deception would be motivated by a contentious teleological principle. In my
account, I reject this suggestion and further show that this parallel can help
us better understand the nature of self-deception. By borrowing elements from
outside of Kant's treatment of self-deception in the Doctrine of Virtue, this paper aims to offer an account of Kant's
strong condemnation of self-deception, while showing that what is at stake in
cases of deception goes far beyond teleological principles. I contend that
taking seriously the parallel between lying and self-deception is crucial for
avoiding the trap of falling into teleological claims and that, in contrast to
what some commentators suggest, the parallel is key to understanding
self-deception.
Keywords
Kant's ethics; self-deception;
external lying; teleology; personality; dignity.
Introduction
In the
section on lying in the Doctrine of
Virtue, Kant presents what has traditionally been understood as his most
systematized account of self-deception. He defines self-deception as a form of lie one tells oneself. This
definition seems to imply a parallel and yet a mirroring[1] of self-deception on the external lie, since
both self-deception and external lying are expressions of the same phenomenon
(i.e., lying).
Yet, to mirror self-deception on
external lying imposes a difficulty regarding the nature of self-deception,
which is acknowledged by Kant. According to him:
"[i]t is easy to show that the human being is
actually guilty of many inner lies, but it seems more difficult to explain how they are possible; for a lie
requires a second person whom one intends to deceive, whereas to deceive
oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction" (MS 6:430).
Nevertheless,
although Kant makes explicit his awareness of the difficulties surrounding the
nature of self-deception, his account of it remains controversial, as for a
persistently challenging phenomenon such as self-deception,[2] one would expect a more explicitly
systematized account for his ethics, especially given the centrality of the
moral duty to know oneself (MS 2017:441) for his ethics.
But while
the very lack of a unified and structured account by Kant himself leads us to
wonder about the possible reasons for his laconic treatment of self-deception,[3] some of the controversies have been
challenged; and more recently, the overfocus on the parallel between
self-deception and external lying has been criticized in the literature.
Two
approaches are worth highlighting. Papish (2018)
suggests that mirroring self-deception from external lying is hardly helpful,
as assessing self-deception as a category of deception in general is "ill-conceived",
resulting in a view of self-deception that overlooks its epistemic aspects.
According to Papish, self-deception for Kant arises once agents infringe norms
of belief formation; because agents are unable to change or deny a certain
cognition, they might resort to rationalization mechanisms to deflect their own
attention, thus focusing on some other "minimally grounded cognition"
(Papish, 2018, p. 73), which flouts the rules that are normally observed during
evidence-gathering. She believes that "structural differences between
deception of oneself and deception of others" (p. 71) make internal lying
untenable for being a good interpretive key for self-deception.
Along
the same lines, Sticker (2021) criticizes Kant's explanatory strategy by
claiming that the distinction between homo
noumenon and homo phaenomenon
used by Kant to account for self-deception is troublesome. He suggests that in
acknowledging the need for a mental partitioning promoted by a phenomenon that
demands both a deceptive and a deceived self, Kant mistakenly uses the
distinction between the hominis to
account for self-deception. For Sticker, in approaching self-deception from
external lying, Kant "gets it almost completely the wrong way around"
(Sticker, 2021, p. 36) when he suggests that homo noumenon engages in self-deception by "communicating in a
deceptive way with other agents," thus using homo phaenomenon as a mere means. Sticker then moves on to the
distinction between sensuous and rational nature as a better path Kant could
have taken to explain self-deception within his own framework.
Thus,
although Papish and Sticker take different stances on Kant's position
concerning self-deception[4], they
both maintain that overemphasizing the parallel between self-deception and
external lying might be problematic.[5]
In
this paper, I argue that although the framework Kant draws in the Doctrine of Virtue is unable to provide
a sufficiently unambiguous account of self-deception, paying deep attention to
this parallel is central to understanding the place of self-deception in Kant's
moral psychology. In this sense, with
respect to Papish and Sticker's accounts, my analysis fulfills a complementary
role, since it analogously concentrates on the problems with entertaining a
reading that centers upon modeling self-deception on external lying. However,
my account advances further theoretical aspects, as it aims to explore this parallel, in particular,
through investigation of concepts such as personality, dignity and humanity,
which I believe are the reasons Kant forged such a parallel in the first place.
In
the first section, I reconstruct Kant's account of self-deception as a form of
lying to oneself in the Doctrine of
Virtue. In exploring an interpretive divergence, I hold with regard to
Sticker's reading (2021, pp. 24 - 25, 36), I devise a novel account according
to which Kant explicates self-deception from one's assessment
over one's own epistemic attitudes. Next, I point
to a possible tension arising out of the superfocus in the parallel; I discuss
how modeling self-deception on external lying adds up to the premises of what I
will describe as the teleological claim
about self-deception. This claim can be inferred from textual evidence
suggesting that external lying represents a violation of a natural teleological
principle, that is, a principle according to which everything in nature has its
own proper end, a natural purposiveness or telos.
This points to a reading according to which, by analogy, self-deception would
represent a violation of the same sort[6].
In
the second section, I look closely at this violation, which, along with Kant's
strong remarks against lying and self-deception, marks the need for the
discussion of the concepts Kant applies to the violation brought about by both
external lying and self-deception, namely, the concepts of personality,
dignity, and ultimately, humanity. My aim in this section is to explain to what
extent one can attribute a teleological appeal to Kant's ethics when it comes
to self-deception.
By
the end of this paper, it should be clear that despite the problems that may
arise from overfocusing on the parallel between self-deception and external
lying, understanding the role of self-deception in Kant's ethics requires a
sharp grasp of the violation involved in both
self-deception and external lying. While a treatment of self-deception that
focuses on its mere modulation on external lying might result in a teleological
misinterpretation, avoiding such misinterpretation requires precisely diving into
the parallel between these two phenomena.
Section 01.
The Parallel Between
External Lying and Self-Deception
The §9 of Doctrine
of Virtue (MS 2017:429 - 431) is concerned with the ethical duty not to lie
and the harms associated with the failure to carry out this duty. This
discussion opens with the strong position that lying in general is the "greatest violation of a human being's
duty to himself regarded merely as a moral being" (MS 6:429, my emphasis),
which amounts to a breach of the "humanity
in [one's] own person", a statement that is not exactly unexpected for
those familiar with Kant's traditional position on lying or his classic example
of the murderer at the door.
Alongside his account on lying, Kant discusses what he
refers to as internal lying [innere Lüge],
a phenomenon that falls under the scope of what we understand as self-deception
[Selbsttäuschung][7].
He explicates that we tell an external lie (mendacium
externum) when we make declarations [Erklärungen][8] contrary to our beliefs directed at other
persons, who in turn are led to believe the truth of those declarations;
internal lies, on the other hand, amount for "insincerity in [one's]
declarations, which a human being perpetuates upon [oneself]" (MS
2017:431).
Yet, in the the Doctrine of Virtue, more than a merely
different form of lie, internal lying (henceforth self-deception) seems to be modeled, i.e., mirrored from external lying, meaning that self-deception follows
the same schema as external lying. Just as external lying, self-deception
seemingly involves two persons: the deceiver and the deceived, and while it
amounts to an individual phenomenon, viz.,
something that happens within one's own self, the two "persons" Kant
requires to make sense of self-deception[9] must be within the same agent. This dual
psychological structure is briefly pointed out by Kant when he discusses the
ethical aspects of self-deception while acknowledging its paradoxical nature:
It is easy to show that the human being is actually
guilty of many inner lies, but it seems more difficult to explain how they are possible, for a lie
requires a second person whom one
intends to deceive, whereas to deceive
oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction. (MS:430, my emphasis)
This passage indicates that Kant is mindful that once
mirrored in external lying, self-deception results in a seeming contradiction.
Thus, although this passage seems to suggest that providing an argument to
account for the nature of self-deception is not within Kant's agenda, further
textual evidence suggests otherwise.
A key point Kant raises about the nature of lying and
self-deception lies on a metaphysical premise and concerns the interaction
between practical standpoints. He says:
The human being as a moral being (homo noumenon) cannot use himself as a natural being (homo phaenomenon) as a mere means (a
speaking machine), as if his natural being were not bound to the inner end (of communicating thoughts),
but is bound to the condition of using himself as a natural being in agreement
with the declaration (declaratio) of
his moral being and is under obligation to himself to truthfulness. (MS 2017: 430)
In this passage Kant holds that as a moral being (homo noumenon), the human being is not
capable of [kann (...) nicht] using
himself as a mere means[10]. In the
context of the duty not to lie, this amounts to claiming that the human being
is not capable of lying or deceiving oneself since in this respect (as homo noumenon) one is already bound not
to lie to oneself.
These remarks throw light on self-deception because
they seem to explain what is at stake from a metaphysical standpoint, meaning,
by engaging in self-deception a human being uses oneself as a mere means.
However, as noted by Sticker (2021), it is trivial to state that as homo noumenon, human beings are
incapable of using themselves as natural beings[11],
for "the homo noumenon cannot do
anything immoral anyway, since it is our legislating reason" (Sticker,
2021, p. 24).
However, beyond asserting a triviality, Kant is making
an important point here, namely, that moral transgression rather occurs with
regard to one's phenomenological aspect. This reading frames this passage as
containing a normative claim. This is better elucidated once we take into
account the distinction between homines
in light of the way one uses one's
rational capacities.
That an agent (as
homo noumenon) uses one's legislating reason for immoral purposes is, as a
matter of fact, beyond one's capacities - and thus beyond one's control. In
effect, anything outside the scope of human capacities and control cannot be
considered a duty (RGV 2019: 47; MS). This further reinforces that the passage
should not be read as a warning on how one is required to bring into balance
one's own metaphysical parts. However, there is something that is indeed within
one' s control, namely, to see oneself[12] as "subject of the moral lawgiving which
proceeds from the concept of freedom and in which he is subject to a law he
gives to himself," which in turn implies a certain use an agent makes of
one's own practical reason. This use, Kant explains, compels one to regard
oneself as well as other human beings as
ends in themselves. As he states in the Groundwork[13], "a
human being (...) exists as an end in itself (...) but must in all its actions, whether directed towards itself or also to
other rational beings, be considered
at the same time as an end" (GMS 2011: 428f, my emphasis).
Moreover, the normative claim Kant makes in this
passage can be better appreciated once we pay close attention to the
terminology. Notably, Kant refers to the idea of condition [Bedingung] in order to establish an
agreement [Übereinstimmung] between
the different aspects of one's being. Of course, the concept of condition is
not inherently normative; however, in this case, where the issue in play is
precisely the moral outcome resulting from lying,[14] Kant seems committed to the claim that
bringing the homines into agreement
is a condition that must be met if one is to make
appropriate use of one's moral capacities. Thus, to put it another way, that an
agent thinks of herself as a moral being, i.e., as freely legislating over the
principles of her actions, is a necessary condition so that she can treat
herself and others accordingly; this includes, in this context, avoiding lying
or engaging in self-deception. In contrast, once she fails to see herself as a
member of the intelligible world (meaning thereby, failing to see herself as homo noumenon) she will also fail to
make actual this aspect of herself as a person[15].
Thus, what Kant does in this passage is to stress, from a metaphysical point of
view, the existence of an agent's duty to oneself "in regard to its
substance" (VE 27: 601), namely, that an agent must see, regard, or think
about oneself as a moral being.
Yet, in attempting to clarify the nature of
self-deception Kant provides us with a few examples of a self-deceptive agent
regarding his beliefs about the existence of God:
Someone tells an inner lie, for example, if he
professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he really finds no
such belief within himself but persuades himself that it could do no harm and
might even be useful to profess in his thoughts to one who scrutinizes hearts a
belief in such a judge, in order to win his favor in case he should exist.
Someone also lies if, having no doubt about the existence of this future judge,
he still flatters himself that he inwardly reveres his law, though the only
incentive he feels is fear of punishment. (MS 6:430)
In the first case, the agent deceives himself by
believing in something which he initially does not believe, but which he thinks
is to some extent harmless and worthy of endorsement. In the second, the
self-deception results from the agent's misinterpretation about his own
incentives.
It is worth noting that in both examples, Kant refers
to epistemic strategies to account for the possibility of self-deception, that
is, to explicate how self-deception can occur from the assessment over one's
own epistemic attitudes. These epistemic strategies of insincerity amount to
one's impurity in the declarations one makes before one's own conscience, i.e.,
before one's "inner judge", being this, the second person Kant
requires to make sense of self-deception.
In Religion,
also in discussing one's belief in the existence of God, Kant challenges the
principle whereby "it's advisable to believe too much rather than too
little" (RGV 2019: 188). He elaborates a harsh critique of this principle
based on the same justification addressed in the Doctrine of Virtue. For him, to use such a "safety
maxim", that is, to force oneself to believe in something out of
convenience is a violation of conscience amounting to dishonesty in one's
pretense.
As such, from the epistemic strategies just mentioned,
both self-deception and external lying embody untruthfulness since by lying one
violates, to some extent, the beliefs one professes[16].
Analogously, failing to regard oneself as a moral
being seems to be based on an epistemic distortion, albeit not concerning
discrete epistemic attitudes, but rather one's assessment regarding one's
metaphysical standing. By virtue of their epistemic quality, these violations
are, in this sense, opposed to truthfulness (MS 6:429), which is why both forms
of lying are objects of the strictest censure (MS 6:430).
The Teleological Claim
about Self-Deception
Overfocusing on the parallel between
these two forms of lying may, however, lead to misconceptions of
self-deception. This is among the premises that result in what I discuss under
the name of the teleological claim about self-deception. The (henceforth) teleological
claim emerges from Kant's treatment of external lying (MS 6:429), which is
defined as "communication of one's thoughts to someone through words that
yet (intentionally) contain the contrary of what the speaker thinks on the
subject” and is qualified as violating "the natural purposiveness of the
speaker's capacity to communicate his thoughts."[17]
In this passage, Kant seems to claim that lying
violates the purpose in communicating one's thoughts to another. This violation
results from the conflict between two ends: the end of lying and the natural
end (natural purposiveness) of communication. It also reflects a limitation or
misuse of one's capacities. The terminology employed by Kant in this passage
reinforces the appeal to a teleological interpretation, since by putting
together the concepts of end, purposiveness, and nature, Kant seems to intend a
reference to the idea of telos or
final end.
Kant's supposedly naturalistic attitude emphasized by
such terminology is especially compelling for those familiar with his
considerations on the nature of the will in the Groundwork, according to which, if nature has endowed us with
practical reason, it follows that practical reason must have a final end. These
considerations encompass the idea that, "[i]n the natural predispositions
of an organized being, i.e., one arranged purposively for life, we assume as a
principle that no organ will be found in it for any end that is not also the
most fitting for it and the most suitable" (GMS 2011:395).
Furthermore, if one takes a closer inspection on
Kant's structure of duties, one can see that there is a parallel between
external lying and the violations related with the other duties, on which the
teleological reference is even stronger. According to Kant,
Just as love of life is destined by nature to preserve
the person, so sexual love is destined by it to preserve the species; in other
words, each of these is a natural end,
by which is understood that connection of a cause with an effect in which,
although no understanding is ascribed to the cause, it is still thought by
analogy with an intelligent cause, and so as if is produced human beings on
purpose. (MS 6:424)
Violations such as suicide or nonprocreative sex seem
to violate the same teleological principle, since the duties opposed to these
violations correspond to alleged natural ends. Therefore, there seems to be a
parallel between external lying and the other duties Kant discusses in the Doctrine of Virtue, as the violations
that arise from them seem to be equally bound to a teleological principle,
since they violate natural ends.
Along these lines, if self-deception mirrors external
lying, then analogously, we are left to situate the violation that results from
self-deception within the teleological field. This in turn makes room for the
idea that self-deception is wrong in virtue of violating the natural
purposiveness of truthfulness a human being has towards oneself.
Thus, the teleological claim can be described as
follows: Self-deception is a form of lying in the sense that it mirrors and
therefore follows the same structure as external lying; external lying, like
nonprocreative sex or suicide, seems to involve a violation of the proper use
of human capacities, that is, a teleological violation. Therefore,
self-deception represents a violation of the same nature.
While not elaborating or directly discussing the
problem involving the teleological claim of self-deception, some commentators
provide us with helpful elements for solving it. For example, while arguing
that there are four senses in which Kant's moral theory can indeed be
considered teleological, Guyer (2002) shows that the principle outlining the existence
of a proper use of human faculties does not offer in Kant any normative
function and therefore Kant's treatment of cases such as suicide and
nonprocreative sex must be considered merely heuristic rather than properly
teleological.[18] The latter premise that results in the
teleological claim about self-deception (namely, that external lying entails a
teleological violation) may be tackled from Guyer's remarks, which allow us to
argue that while Kant's moral theory may be considered teleological "virtually
from the outside," the discrete cases of such violations, insofar as they
are based on "the teleological assumption that everything in nature has a
purpose" (Guyer, 2002, p. 182) have a merely heuristic role.
The first premise (that self-deception mirrors
external lying) can in turn be countered by arguments from the commentators
already mentioned, who emphasize the problems in construing self-deception as a
form of external lying.
However, there are similarities between the two
phenomena that are vividly described by Kant in his treatment of lying in the Doctrine of Virtue. The strongest link
between the two lies in the violation they pose. Both forms of lying seem to be
regarded by Kant as leading to the relinquishment of one’s personality [1] and the
annihilation of the dignity [2] of the agent who now “has even less worth than
if he were a mere thing.” (MS 2017: 249)
The firm opposition with which Kant stands against
lying is as puzzling as its consequence: whoever lies loses their dignity and
personality. Yet it is precisely this attitude that typically strikes us as
odd. After all, how is it possible to cast doubt on a characteristic from which
we can derive our worth as persons merely as a result of an ordinary and
pervasive behavior such as lying?
It is specifically in trying to answer this question
in light of the considerations I have just raised[19] that the teleological claim appears
attractive; postulating a natural teleological principle would greatly
contribute to explain these violations' severity.
Following Papish and Sticker's claims, I also assume
that interpreting Kant's mirroring of self-deception from external lying might
be problematic. However, I believe that Kant has a point in tracing such a
parallel, and the centrality of the consequences Kant assigns to the violations
entailed by both phenomena support
this way to frame his account. In the
next lines, I thus explore the parallel between these two forms of lying. I aim
to devise a strategy that avoids a reading of the Doctrine of Virtue overly focused on this relationship that, by
extension, takes part in the teleological claim. To explain what Kant might
have in mind in that framework, I seek resources beyond the Doctrine of Virtue discussion of lying
that allow us to make sense of what is ultimately at stake when it comes to
lying and self-deception. I take the endeavor to explain the forcefulness in
which Kant stands against lying and self-deception as a guideline and look
closely at the concepts that are at play when Kant discusses these phenomena,
namely, (1) personality and (2) dignity. Discussing them at length will be
critical towards a better understanding of the place of self-deception in
Kant's moral psychology.
Section 02.
Personality, Dignity,
and Self-Deception
Kant is adamant when elaborating on the consequences
of violating one's duties to oneself and, in particular, of lying. In his
treatment of lying (MS 2017: 429) Kant refers to the renunciation [Verzichttuung] of one's personality that
accompanies the annihilation [Vernichtung]
of one's dignity as a human being. He also mentions the idea of annihilating [zernichten] the subject of morality in
one's own person (MS 2017: 423). Further on, he states that by using oneself
"merely as a means to satisfy [one's] animal impulse" (MS 2017: 425)
one surrenders [aufgeben] or throws
away [wegwerfen] one's personality.
Furthermore, that false humility amounts to the degradation [Abwürdigung] of one's personality (MS
2017: 436); in addition, in the context of what it means to be a useful member
of the world, Kant states that it encompasses a duty to not degrade [abwürdigen] humanity in one's own person
(MS 2017: 446).
But although he refers to the loss of personality as
one of the consequences of violating the duty to oneself not to lie, Kant
elaborates the classical definition of personality elsewhere. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant
states that personality means the “freedom
and independence from the mechanism of all nature yet regarded at the same
time as a power of a being subject to pure practical laws that are peculiar to
it.” (KpV 2002: 87) Personality, or independence from sensible impulses, is
bound up with a predisposition in us bearing the same name. This and two other
predispositions to the good in human nature[20] are listed and elaborated by Kant in the first
chapter of Religion (cf. RGV 2019: 26
– 28). For Kant, the predisposition to personality has its basis in practical
reason, thus delimiting our end as rational human beings insofar as we act
morally. Unlike the other predispositions which have vices associated with
them, the predisposition to personality allows respect for the moral law to
stand as a sufficient incentive for the power of choice[21].
Personality amounts to “the idea of the moral law alone, together with the
respect that is inseparable from it.” (RGV 2019: 28)
While it is not possible to get rid of our
predisposition to personality,[22] since it determines our nature as moral
beings,[23] Kant suggests in the Doctrine of Virtue that the same does not apply when it comes to
personality itself, for it can be renounced, annihilated, thrown away, or
degraded. The following lines are concerned with shedding light on this
possibility.
Renouncing One’s Personality and Violating One’s Dignity
To be a person is to be a living being endowed with a
moral personality.[24] Unlike a thing, a person is a subject “whose
actions can be imputed to him.” (MS 2017: 223) This ability for action, - and
the possibility of moral accountability, goes back to the duplicity of our
nature, which is sensible but at the same time intelligible, whose will needs
to be constrained by the law so that good deeds can result from it. According
to Kant:
We conceive of man first of all as an ideal, as he
ought to be and can be, merely according to reason, and call this Idea homo noumenon; this being is thought of
in relation to another, as though the latter were restrained by him; this is
man in the state of sensibility, who is called homo phenomenon. (VE, 1997: 593)
As homo noumenon,
we are only a “personified idea”,
namely, the idea of a subject under the moral law, whereas, as embodied
persons, we are “affected by the feelings of pleasure and pain” (VE, 1997: 593)[25]. Both of
these aspects belong together to the idea of personality, understood as
“freedom of a rational being under moral
laws” (MS 2017: 223, my emphasis), because acting morally depends on the
necessitation of our will by the moral law.
The morality (implied in the idea of personality) is,
“the condition under which alone a rational being can be an end in itself;
because it is possible only by this to be a legislating member in the kingdom
of ends”. (GMS 2014: 435) Kant concludes that the dignity of humanity lies in
the capacity for morality. To put it another way, personality, as the
characteristic of rational beings inasmuch as they are capable of being
affected by and adopting the moral law as their main incentive, gives human
beings their worth or dignity [Würde].
In sum, the moral capacity of rational beings is the basis of a person’s
dignity[26].
Yet, renouncing one’s own personality is not something
that occurs in isolation. When a person tells a lie, in addition to renouncing
her personality she also violates her dignity as a human person, for the root
of her dignity lies in the ability to provide for herself moral principles,
i.e., in her personality. That is, while a person who lies “has even less worth
as if he were a mere thing” (MS 2017: 429) he also “violates the dignity of
humanity of his own person,” (MS 2017: 429) degrading himself “far
below the animals.” (ANTH 2007: 489)
However, concluding that the renunciation of dignity
and personality take place simultaneously is still not the same as
demonstrating that such renunciations are possible. If they are connected to
our predispositions and thus to human nature, that a lying person gives up her
dignity and personality still seems to contradict some common intuitions
concerning our constitutive features.[27] In other words, if dignity and personality are
intrinsic features of human beings as we typically hold, it becomes difficult
to see how one can abdicate these properties. What makes it possible for an
agent to acquire the “mere appearance of a human being, not a human being
himself” (MS 2017: 429) remains therefore unclear.
It seems that if we are to make sense of this
renunciation, then dignity and therefore personality must be something other
than descriptive concepts, outlining qualities human beings do or do not inherently carry.
Oliver Sensen (2009) analyses Kant's use of the term
dignity in different contexts. Contrary to what has been argued by other Kant
scholars, Sensen contends that dignity corresponds to a relational property,
notably, a property that belongs to something in relation to something else. In
the case of human dignity, it can be assumed that by virtue of certain
capacities, human beings possess a prerogative or elevation over other beings
whose will is merely sensitively determined.[28] From this follows the idea that there are, in
Sensen’s words, “two stages” of the elevation of dignity. On his account, as
human beings, we have an initial dignity that can be enacted to the extent that
we make appropriate use of our moral capacities, but which can also, for that very
reason, be violated. Herein lies the relationship between dignity and
personality, to which I alluded earlier. The second stage would therefore be
this actualization. When we do not bring about our dignity, that is, when we
refuse to act according to moral principles and do not make appropriate use of
our freedom, we fail to elevate our moral capacity. To the extent to which she
“deprives [her]self of the prerogative of a moral being” (MS 2017: 420), the
person who tells a lie or engages in self-deception violates the duty against
herself along with the dignity of humanity in her personality.
The account drawn and advocated by Sensen makes it
clear that the predisposition to personality is woven together with moral
accountability. This predisposition functions as a subjective condition for the
moral law to be apprehended, and therefore, as a condition of the consciousness
of our freedom - namely, of the freedom of our will, or yet, of the
“independence of our power of choice from determination by all incentives.”
(RGV 2019: 26f) Consequently, when we tell (internal or external) lies, we
cease to make effective a central aspect of our rationality. In failing to
regard ourselves as moral beings (homo
noumenon), we also give up on that which engenders our moral
responsibility, that is, the freedom of our power of choice.
Another aspect that makes clear the moral and
epistemic strength of the violation posed by lying and self-deception is cast
by Kant in the opening sentence of his account of lying in the Doctrine of Virtue. Telling a lie or
engaging in self-deception amounts to a violation which is "contrary to truthfulness" (MS 2017: 429, my
emphasis).
The idea of truthfulness [Wahrhaftigkeit] underlies Kant's entire account of these
phenomena. According to Kant,
truthfulness in general (rectitude)
encompasses two further attitudes: honesty [Ehrlichkeit],
which is truthfulness in the statements we make; and sincerity [Redlichkeit] when the statements we make
are promises.
Such statements may embody truthfulness even though
they are not themselves true[29]. For
example, an agent who tells a lie and yet considers herself to have behaved
morally was typically not diligent enough in her self-reflection upon the
statement on her own action - that is, whether or not that statement embodies
truthfulness. It is precisely in this context that our inner judge comes into
play. It is our inner judge, i.e., our consciousness that assesses the
statements we make, whether or not they embody truthfulness (rather than
whether or not they are true). Truthfulness is therefore essential to the way
we assess the statements we make about the state of affairs in the world but
also, and most importantly, to the way we
see or regard our moral selves.
Therefore, in making false declarations that
additionally incorporate deception, we violate a duty which is intimately
connected to our self-cognition, thus compromising our ability to judge
ourselves responsible for our actions. An agent who deceives oneself and
rationalizes away her responsibility for her immoral deeds, evades the
accountability and moral obligation that are in turn directly engendered by the
fact that she is a person, i.e., that which allows one to regard oneself as homo noumenon. It becomes thereby clear
why truthfulness, i.e., the exact opposite of lying[30] also indicates an obligation one has to
oneself as a moral being.
There are, however, differences in terms of priority
of self-deception over external lying. While external lies may also harm others, internal untruthful declarations always violate our self-respect (MS
2017: 404), for they aim to deceive our inner judge, both resulting in the lie per se but also in the awareness of
that lie we have told to ourselves. In this sense, the respect a human being
has for oneself is firmly grounded on truthfulness[31].
As a result of this violation, the access we have to ourselves as moral beings
other than mere “speaking machines” (MS 2017: 430)[32] is thus jeopardized, from which it follows
that lying additionally entails the violation of our personality.
Self-deception is, therefore, equivalent to a
renunciation that is intimately intertwined with the proper use of our mental
faculties. These faculties are in turn the distinguishing feature between
persons and mere things. The renunciation of our personality, therefore, goes
back to the renunciation of a unique characteristic of human beings: the moral aspect of our dignity. Therefore,
when we make declarations that incorporate deception we compromise our function
as human beings, thus violating, “the highest principle of truthfulness” (MS
2017: 431), that on which one depends in order to be able to regard oneself a
moral being.
This is where the meaning of Kant's statements might
become misunderstood. As a matter of fact, modeling self-deception on external
lying renders this renunciation even clearer. Take for instance the passage
where Kant constructs a parallel between violating the perception of humanity
and violating the internal end of communication discussed earlier. In this passage,
Kant is adamant that the intention to deceive corrupts the proper function,
i.e., natural purposiveness of
communication between two persons. That self-deception violates self-respect is
a result of the same violation, albeit applied to the agent oneself. Thus, once
one assumes that Kant models self-deception on external lying, it seems
reasonable to infer that the reason for Kant's depreciation of deception is
that lying violates the proper function (telos)
of communicating our thoughts and, alongside the external lie that corrupts the
proper function of communicating our thoughts, self-deception corrupts truthfulness[33]. Because
every lie implies an initial self-deception, both phenomena are deeply
problematic for Kant. Thus, as a result of violating our freedom, we become “a
plaything of the mere inclinations and hence a thing.” (MS 2017: 420)
This conclusion sounds correct, and
Kant's discussion of truthfulness seems to stress it. The problem lies,
however, in holding that the severity of this violation arises from the idea
that by lying one violates a teleological principle. In other words, what is
problematic here is to assume that Kant condemns self-deception merely because,
just as lying violates the end communication to others, self-deception violates
the end of communication to oneself, i.e., truthfulness.
However, as I hope to have shown in my discussion of
the concepts of personality and dignity, when one engages in deception, what is
at stake is something much greater than the violation of the proper function of
telling the truth, taken in an essentially natural way. What is at stake is
instead the violation of our capacity for morality itself, which qualifies a
human being as a person, as opposed to a mere speaking machine. As Kant says,
"to annihilate the subject of morality in one's own person is to root out the existence of morality itself
from the world" (MS 2017: 423, my emphasis).
Some remarks on the interplay between humanity and
personality might help us better understand the violation of morality at hand
here. The concept of humanity is a key aspect in Kant's ethics, which is why it
features in the second formulation of the categorical imperative[34] presented by Kant in the Groundwork. Kant's definition of humanity, that is, as an
"objective end" that must be treated as an end rather than a mere
means, is consistent with Kant's use of this concept throughout the Metaphysics of Morals.
In the Doctrine
of Right, Kant defines humanity as grounding innate freedom, which in turn
is prerogative of any human being (MS 2017:238). Notably, humanity is a
property of one's capacity for freedom, and should therefore be understood as
one's "personality independent of physical attributes" (MS 2017:
239).
In the Doctrine
of Virtue the overlap between humanity and personality (through dignity) is
prominent. Not only does Kant discuss personality and dignity simultaneously
(as seen in his account of lying), but he also resorts to these concepts by
stating that "[h]umanity itself is a dignity." He explains:
for a man cannot be used merely as a means by any man
(either by others or even by himself) but must always be used at the same time
as an end. It is just in this that his dignity (personality) consists, by which
he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not men and yet
can be used, and so over all things. (MS 2017: 462)
The same relationship between humanity and personality
can be also appreciated in Religion.
As discussed, Kant claims that we hold a "susceptibility to respect for
the moral law" (RGV 2019: 27) by virtue of our predisposition to
personality. This suggests this predisposition has two aspects: the first,
"the subjective ground of our
incorporating this respect into our maxims," (RGV 2019: 27)[35]; and the
second, "the idea of moral law alone," that is, the objective aspect
of that very predisposition. This latter aspect accounts for what we may
properly call "personality," which, Kant explains, "is (...) the
idea of humanity considered wholly intellectually" (RGV 2019: 28).
Thus, to regard oneself or others as homo noumenon amounts, in that sense, to
regard oneself or others in terms of their humanity (MS 2017: 295), which in
turn is equivalent to regard oneself (or others) "as a person, that is, as
the subject of a morally practical reason" (MS 2017: 435). Therefore, what
Kant calls a person in a moral sense (homo
noumenon), which by virtue of being an end in itself, "is exalted
above any price," is analogous to the idea of humanity considered
intellectually.
Accordingly, to conceive of oneself objectively, that
is, to look at the objective aspect of one's own person, is a condition for
treating oneself and others as ends in themselves[36].
By self-deceiving and violating one's own personality, one additionally
violates one's humanity. In the opening sentence of the discussion of lying in
the Doctrine of Virtue Kant makes
this point clear by referring to lying as "the greatest violation
[against] the humanity in [one's own] person" (MS 2017:429).
Of course, from the foregoing, one might argue that
the insertion of the concept of humanity as an end in itself, and its
equivalence with personality, weaves a fundamentally teleological sense into
Kant's injunction against self-deception. As a matter of fact, some
interpreters[37] are sympathetic when it comes to drawing out
intersections between ethics and teleology in Kant. However, being careful on
this point is crucial, lest one incurs a purely natural teleology, which makes
a direct appeal to a naturalistic ethics where the violation of duties is
explained through the violation of teleological principles.
The sense in which the Doctrine of Virtue can actually be considered teleological is
instead a strictly moral sense, within a framework used by Kant to point to the
moral nature of agents as end in themselves. Their end is moral self-preservation, stressed in particular in Kant's
discussions of the duties to oneself as a merely
moral being, of which truthfulness is a crucial part.
Additionally, for discrete cases of self-deception it
is simply wrong to claim that the violation of truthfulness lies in a violation
of a teleological principle. Even duties to oneself as animals, i.e., those
that refer to essentially animal impulses, do not depend exclusively on a
purely naturalistic appeal. This is because even as animals, that is, as finite
and natural beings, we are also endowed with two other predispositions, namely
humanity and personality (RGV 2019: 26). For this reason, the distinction Kant
sets forth in the first book of the
Doctrine of Virtue is between one's duties to oneself as an animal being [als einem animalischen Wesen] and one's
duties to oneself merely as a moral being [bloß
als einem moralischen Wesen]. This distinction underlines the fact that
when discussing the duties one has to oneself as a moral being, Kant is
isolating this property, that is, letting animality out. Thus, whereas even in
addressing the duties to oneself as an
animal being, Kant uses the naturalistic principle "without harm"[38] only as methodological support for his claims
concerning these duties, and therefore it is even less likely that violations
of duties to oneself merely as a moral
being rely (in an essentially naturalistic way) on teleological principles.
This suggests that Kant's argument does not rely upon
teleological claims of any kind, which instead are merely meant to make explicit
the seriousness of the violations of the duties to oneself. Kant is rather
concerned that violations of such duties result in the loss of that which is a
condition for all moral action, namely, the loss of personality, i.e., the
(purely intellectually considered) humanity of the agent. He is therefore
concerned with violations, whether of formal or material duties, that result in
the agent being prevented from properly using her capacities with respect to
the exercise of morality. Even more specifically, both phenomena, external
lying and self-deception, preclude the possibility of setting maxims that
embody truthfulness, thereby jeopardizing the very chance of deeds out of duty,
a central element in Kant's ethics, which stands for the exercise of morality.
Conclusions
The growing interest of many Kant scholars in
self-deception has recently placed this phenomenon at the core of Kant's
ethical thought. Yet with regard to explaining Kant's views on self-deception,
things may become obscure, for the parallel he draws between self-deception and
external lying, traditionally regarded as his most systematized attempt to
explicate self-deception, is not without difficulties.
As a matter of fact, such a parallel is involved in a
number of explanatory quandaries. It may lead to problems concerning the very
nature of self-deception, but it can also importantly contribute to misreadings
of some of Kant's ambiguous assertions.
Out of the latter case might emerge the teleological
claim I have addressed here. This would be the claim that the prohibition of
lying and of self-deception is based on a teleological principle, meaning that
self-deception would violate the natural end of communication, and therefore
infringe the truthfulness that one must have towards oneself in order to
formulate maxims that would lead to actions out of duty. The parallel between
these two forms of lying would, according to this interpretation, reinforce the
teleological claim.
However, Kant does not rely on this claim to establish
what is wrong with self-deception. The passages in which he expresses his firm
rejection of lying provide textual evidence that the violation of the proper
function of telling the truth is not what is at issue in his account in the Doctrine of Virtue. For Kant, the
violation associated with self-deception is due to the fact that such a
phenomenon hinders the use of moral abilities. More specifically,
self-deception impedes the agents' capacity to see themselves as moral beings,
meaning to bring into effect what characterizes them as persons, rather than as
things, i.e., their personality. The teleological claim, so I argue, therefore
takes on a purely heuristic role.
Interpreting self-deception alongside external lying,
that is, adopting an explanatory strategy that, rather than being dismissive,
brings attention to this parallel, is precisely what gets us to understand the
crucial point Kant lays out in the Doctrine
of Virtue when he renders both phenomena so inextricably connected. His aim
is to stress that both external lying and self-deception impose an important
risk to the exercise of one's rational capacities insofar as both lies affect
how one regards oneself and how one sees one's own relation to pure practical
reason.
Once we realize that there is a point therein, we are
invited not only to acknowledge the limitations of the framework of
self-deception Kant devises in the Doctrine
of Virtue, but most importantly, to strive for connections between aspects
that Kant himself discusses outside of that framework.
More than drawing attention to the similarities
between self-deception and external lying, this paper contributes to the debate
on Kant's moral psychology by addressing both phenomena on the basis of the
violation both represent.
Furthermore, I have systematized and extended the application of the
teleological claim to the case of self-deception, arguing for the
complementarity of multiple passages when it comes to making sense of Kant's
claims about self-deception in the Doctrine
of Virtue, thus adding a new layer to the arguments for the centrality of
self-deception in Kant's ethics.
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