Kant’s world
according to Jauernig
University
of Warsaw, Poland
Review of: Jauernig, Anja, The World According to Kant: Appearances and
Things in Themselves in Critical Idealism, Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2021, xiv +pp. 384 ISBN. 13:978-0-19-969538-6
The main aim
of the six chapters of the book is to provide an understanding of the ontological
implications of Kant’s theoretical philosophy, by clarifying the relation and
distinction between things in themselves and appearances. In contrast to
neo-Kantian interpreters, who considered Kant as the main opponent and
destroyer of metaphysics, Jauernig follows the path of Friedrich Paulsen, Max Wundt and Martin Heidegger, by regarding Kant as having
introduced a new kind of metaphysics. It is Kant himself, as the author
stresses, who declares that his efforts are not directed against the metaphysics
of Wolff and Leibniz, but rather they have the very same destination (see
Letter to Kästner, August [?] 5, 1790, 11:186).
The research
is led by six questions concerning the relation between things in themselves
and appearances and their classification. More specifically, the author
inquires: if things in themselves and appearances are numerical and ontological
identic; the status of the transcendental distinction and empirical objects; in
which sense Kant is an idealist and if things in themselves exist.
In the first chapter, the author
already reveals very clearly her position, which can be classified as a
two-world view, i.e. the realm of appearances and the realm of things in
themselves are two worlds which contain different kinds of entities. Besides, they
are organized according to different laws, and we have cognitive access to them
in different ways. For this, the author’s answers to the main questions
above-mentioned can be summarized as follows: 1) Appearances and things in
themselves are not numerically identical, but rather distinct existents. Also,
both things in themselves and appearances are things although not in the same
sense. 2) From an ontological point of view, appearances and things in
themselves are not the same things even if they are closely related insofar as
things in themselves ground appearances. 3) The transcendental distinction must
be considered an ontological distinction. 4) Empirical objects are appearances.
5) Kant’s position is idealist in the sense that appearances (empirical objects
included) are mind-dependent. 6) Things in themselves
are mind-independent and they actually exist.
In the
second chapter, which deals with the ontological nature of appearances,
Jauernig argues that, on the one hand, appearances are mind-dependent existents
and have specific features through which they can meet the requirements of
objectivity, on the other hand, things in themselves are mind-independent
existents. To defend the argument that there are no ontological common features
belonging to both of them, the author refers to passages in which Kant states
that appearances and things in themselves are distinct or ontologically
non-overlapping, e.g.: “these [appearances] really relate to something that is
distinct from them (and thus completely dissimilar), insofar as appearances
always presuppose a thing in itself and thus give an indication of it…” (Prol,
4:355); “one has to admit and assume behind the appearances still something
else that is not appearance, namely, things in themselves…” (GMS, 4:451);
“behind the appearances there must still be the things in themselves as grounds
(although hidden)” (GMS, 4:459).
In this
view, the transcendental distinction means that things in themselves and
appearances are numerically distinct existents and that the former are
independent from the mind, while the latter is dependent. The world, then,
intended as the sum of everything which is real, has different dimensions of
reality (es. mind-dependent or mind-independent level). Furthermore, the author
inquires about the nature of appearances and objectivity. More specifically,
appearances are regarded as a kind of intentional object, which are completely
mind-dependent: all their properties and their existence are dependent on the
mind (or, at least, on the possibility to be represented by the mind). In
contrast, things in themselves are mind-independent because their
determinations, ontological features and existence are independent from the
mind. Besides, the conditions to
represent objects are the conditions for the possibility of experience (time,
space, categories): Kant, namely, argues that to have representations of proper
objects, these must be presented with some specific properties, namely: to be
unified, outside us and included in a system of objects. After having specified
further the characteristics of the transcendental object (i.e., an X distinct
from the cognizer and the representation, which persists through time), the
author focuses on the stages of the construction of experience, which includes,
as a fundamental recurring step, the transition from intentional objects of
perception to those of experience and of the correspondent judgements (from
perception to experience). In this passage, one moves from mere subjective
representations to representations which hold objectivity, I.e., public objects
in their relations. This is possible by the application of concepts grounded in
Kant’s relational categories: for instance, the representation of a blue lily
as existing in the empirical world implies my assumption that the lily is the
cause of my sensations of the color and the shape of the flower.
Chapter 3
focuses on the main claims of transcendental idealism, namely that empirical
objects are not things in themselves and that space and time are forms of
sensibility. This leads to a revolution in the way of thinking, which is deeply
ontological: concepts, which are intentionally related to objects, are the
conditions of possibility of experience. The author compares Kant and Berkeley,
and comes to the conclusion that, unlike Berkeley, Kant is both a genuine
idealist and a genuine realist about empirical objects. More specifically, Kant
is relationalist about empirical space and time in assuming that empirical
space and time are constituted by the spatial and temporal determinations of
empirical objects. However, this relationalism is more refined than the
ordinary one, because Kant’s view of spatial and temporal determinations of
empirical objects is very rich, since it includes, for instance, pure intuitions
of space and time, which are prior to the empirical objects.
In chapter
4, the author considers Kant’s arguments for transcendental idealism and
empirical realism. She focuses on the argument from Transcendental Aesthetic concerning that we have a priori intuition
of pure space and time, which are then to be considered as transcendentally
ideal and as mere forms of sensibility. More specifically, space and time
cannot but be mind-dependent because of the three steps of the argument so
resumed by the author: 1) according to the metaphysical exposition any spatial
and temporal determination are contained respectively in pure space or pure
time, thus leading to 2) spacetime-containment, i.e. any time or space are
identical or contained in pure time or space and 3) if x is in space and time,
the ontological ingredients of x are the same of the mode of being of space and
time, i.e. mind-dependent. To Kant, anything that is regarded as a kind of time
or space is the same as or is contained in pure time and space.
Furthermore,
in chapter 5 Jauernig discusses Kant’s critical idealism, by arguing that
things in themselves, which exist, are the grounds for appearances and affect
sensibility. She wants to demonstrate that things in themselves and appearances
are not the same, but both exist: the former being the supersensible basis of
appearances. Besides, Jauernig delves into the distinction and relation between
the transcendental and the empirical self in a way which integrates the
two-world reading. Kant is described as assuming that everyone has a
transcendentally real part, the “I” in the formula “I think” or the
transcendental mind. This transcendental mind can affect the empirical self and
both, together with the body, come to compose human beings.
Chapter 6
delves into Kant’s fictionalism about things in themselves and its
reconciliation with his realism about things in themselves. The core point
seems to be that things in themselves are useful fictional objects, i.e., they
have the same status of ideas, namely they are heuristic tools (the reality of
which cannot be demonstrated), to provide a coherent and somehow meaningful
account of the world and ourselves. The author, then, asked herself if the
conditioning principle addressed by Kant in several passages (such as
B364/A307-308) is contained in Kant’s view on things in themselves. Among other
arguments to support this thesis, Jauernig focuses on passages where Kant seems
to suggest that the conditioning principle is a principle concerning a
connection of things in themselves, thought through pure reason (20:290).
This work
has the merit to provide in a very clear way a two-world interpretation of the
world according to Kant. The world, in Jauernig’s view, consists of different
ontological levels: while the empirical one is mind-dependent, the
transcendental (i.e. of things in themselves, according to the author) is
mind-independent. Besides, there might be a variety of appearances as
intentional objects intended (such as dreams and illusions) but just the ones
which conform to the formal conditions of objectivity are existing in a genuine
sense and they have as their grounds things in themselves, which provide the
matter for appearances. Now, the basis for this account of transcendental
idealism is provided by an account of the human mind as finite: it necessarily
includes a passive component which produces representations once it has been
affected. So, Kant is a realist about things in themselves as the ground of
appearances and, at the same time a fictionalist if things in themselves are
conceived as objects of pure understanding, i.e. a useful fiction that we need
for epistemic purposes.
Still, it
remains controversial the way in which the author describes things in
themselves as existing. It is true that Kant makes the example of an object as
a thing in itself (KrV A 29 / B 45), but he does not use here the notion of
things in themselves in a transcendental sense, but just in an empirical
commonsensical one. Kant seems to suggest, namely, that the perception of an
empirical object, such as a rose, depends on the differences concerning the
senses of the perceiving subjects, even if it can be recognized as such (as a
thing in itself) by every subject. But this is not the transcendental sense of
the term, but rather an empirical one, as Kant puts it:”For in this case that
which is originally itself only appearances, e.g. a rose, counts in an
empirical sense as a thing in itself, which can appear different to every eye
in regard to color”. (KrV A 30 / B 45).
Now, Kant is
not an absolute idealist, i.e. a priori functions do not create objects, but
define the limits of our possible experience. (KrV A 771 / B 799). For this, we
need to refer to something which is beyond those limits, it is a natural and
necessary movement of our reason. This, however, does not mean that one is
obliged to assume an ontological second realm. As Kant states it: "Das Ding an sich (ens per se) ist
nicht ein anderes Objekt sondern eine andere Beziehung (respectus) der
Vorstellung auf dasselbe Objekt" (22:26). Things in themselves are
then mere negative concepts used to set boundaries. (KrV A 255 / B 310).
Besides, I
am not sure how to understand that things in themselves can be used as
heuristic notions: ideas and principles, namely, are heuristic in the sense
that they help in finding unity in the empirical experience. But to do so, they
have specific content, for instance, the sameness of kind in the manifold under
a higher genus (A658/B686). If things in themselves are mind-independent, then
it is quite difficult to understand how they can do this job.
In
conclusion, these concerns demonstrate the fruitfulness of the book, which
regards one of the most controversial topics on which Kant scholars still have
a lot of space for debate.
