Kant´s Critique of Pure Reason
as a Reform of Metaphysics
Miguel Herszenbaun·
Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Review
of: de Boer, Karin, Kant’s
Reform of Metaphysics. The Critique of Pure Reason Reconsidered, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 2020, pp. 280, ISBN 978-1-108-84217-4
As its title clearly expresses, the main concern of Karin de Boer’s new
book is to provide a reading on Kant’s critical philosophy which proves that the
German philosopher did not intend to destroy metaphysics but to reform
metaphysics, namely, to turn it into a proper science and, thus, make it invulnerable
against attacks.
In order to prove this, de Boer starts by reconsidering
Wolff’s philosophy. According to de Boer, Wolff himself was a reformer of
metaphysics. His intentions were to reform seventeenth-century metaphysics and
provide this discipline with a solid systematic structure. Wolff’s intent was
to turn metaphysics into a science by adopting the mathematical method. Kant’s
position on this matter is not as clear as we might think. Yet as reformers of
metaphysics they both aimed to assure religious and moral goals and to recognize
severe errors in previous philosophical intents, but they also recognize an
intellectual core of metaphysics that must be preserved. As we see, Kant and
Wolff’s plans coincide in many aspects.
Wolffian metaphysics’
grounds are to be found in empirical psychology. Wolff starts the construction
of his system by reflecting on our mental content. As these elements are clear
and certain, they provide the starting point from which ontology, rational
psychology, cosmology, and theology develop. Ontology provides the general
predicates that can be predicated of all things as such. However, even though
Wolff believed that these intellectual concepts actually correspond
to things as such, he also conceived of ontology as a discipline involved with
the concepts that ground our objective cognition. According to de Boer, this is
an important element that shows Wolff’s influence on Kant and the continuities
between their works: Wolffian ontology can be taken as a precursor of Kant’s
transcendental analytic. This implies understanding Kant’s transcendental
analytic as a reformed ontology, insofar as it limits the use of pure
understanding to objects of possible experience.
As de Boer explains,
Crusius is another relevant influence on Kant. De Boer states that Crusius
seemed to have had a distorted picture of Wolffian metaphysics. He conceived of
Wolff as an ‘archi-rationalist’ who built his whole system based only on
dogmatic method. Against this, Crusius intended to build a metaphysical system
which its first grounds are basic elements presupposed and required in any
cognition of objects.
The influence of Wolff
and Crusius on Kant is to be found in their common mistakes too, mistakes that led
Kant to the Dissertation. According to de Boer, the Dissertation
is an intent to reform metaphysics by solving some of its main errors. Kant
tries to do so by separating purely intellectual concepts and pure intuitions.
This means attacking Wolff and Crusius’ assumptions regarding the continuity
between intellect and sensibility. Moreover, Kant rejected another common
mistake: the use of concepts proper to ontology in regard to
the soul, the world, and God.
De Boer explains that
Kant became aware of this issue by considering Crusius’ intent to predicate existence
of the soul and God. As Crusius understood ‘existence’ as ‘existence somewhere’,
by predicating existence of God and the soul he was led to several
incongruences. In order to solve them, Kant divorced continuism
and proposed a purely intellectual metaphysics. This was intended to save the purely
intellectual core of metaphysics, which would be assured as
long as we use purely intellectual concepts and protect the conceptual
realm of metaphysics against the invasion of sensibility. According to de Boer,
this aspect of Kant’s project still will be present in his Critique of Pure
Reason. Indeed, this explains very clearly why in the Critique (A294/B350-1)
Kant thinks that the origin of transcendental illusions rests on the influence
of sensibility over understanding.
After presenting a
thoughtful and detailed reconstruction of Kant’s predecessors and the development
of his own philosophy, de Boer turns to a thorough treatment of the Critique
of Pure Reason.
De Boer considers the
first Critique to continue the project planned in the Dissertation.
By studying the two prefaces and the introduction of the Critique, and
several letters and reflections of the period, de Boer shows that Kant’s work planned
to set metaphysics on the secure path of a science. Of course, there are
important differences between the Critique and the Dissertation.
Possibly, the most relevant difference is Kant’s abandonment of purely
intellectual cognition. However, even with this difference, there are several
aspects of the Critique that can be traced back to the Dissertation.
During the 70’s, Kant
was occupied with the question of how concepts a priori are related to objects.
This becomes a great concern and a main aspect of his reform of metaphysics. As we know, Kant intended the transcendental
analytic to replace traditional ontology. But this replacement is only done
after answering the abovementioned question. The key answer is Kant’s
transcendental deduction. De Boer proposes an innovative reading of the “A”
Deduction. According to her, the main goal of the Deduction is not to prove
that pure categories are capable of being applied to empirical objects
due to being their conditions of possibility. Rather, Kant’s main goal consists
in establishing the ground according to which a concept can be referred or
related to objects as such. Understood in this way, we see the relation between
Kant’s transcendental Deduction and Wolff and Crusius’ ontology. Kant’s concern
is metaphysical. Dealing with the conditions of possibility of experience is
only an indirect goal, a means to answer the more profound question: how purely
intellectual concepts may refer to things.
Kant’s answer does not lead
back to Wolffian metaphysics. Kant appeals to pure sensibility and proves that
pure categories are conditions of the possibility of objects, as long as the act of synthesis is carried out in pure time
and, thus, that they have objective validity in regard to such objects. This implies
positive and negative results: ontology is possible, but the valid use of pure
concepts is restricted to the realm of experience. In this regard, de Boer also
considers the “Schematism” chapter and shows that schemata and pure categories
are facets of the same intellectual activity.
In
regard to the second part of the Transcendental Logic, de Boer claims that Kant intended
the Transcendental Dialectic to restrain the tendency to objectify the
unconditioned. Here we find a discussion of the predication of concepts of the
soul and God. Kant’s critique of special metaphysics is concerned with pointing
out this putative misuse of categories, a topic that was already present in the
Dissertation. Overcoming this misuse of categories would leave room for
a purely intellectual metaphysics. In sum, de Boer shows that the Critique
does not exclude the possibility of metaphysics. As its propaedeutic, the Critique
is supposed to set the ground for the construction of a metaphysical system.
Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics presents an innovative reading
on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason that must be read by any scholar working
on Kant’s theoretical philosophy. Karin de Boer has found the right path that
emerges from Kant’s pre-critical writings and goes through the Critique toward
the planned metaphysical system. Her interpretation lets us understand Kant’s
philosophical evolution and provides an excellent explanation on how to place
the Critique in Kant’s cultural and philosophical context. The book
provides a comprehensive interpretation of the Critique, paying special
attention to various underinvestigated sections. Moreover, de Boer puts
together her analyses in a detailed and systematic reconstruction of Kant’s
theoretical thought that clarifies both the Critique’s main goal and
the way his arguments contribute toward reaching this goal.
