«Una fortaleza imbatida a espaldas del nuevo frente» Una nota sobre la doctrina de las facultades cognoscitivas, la crítica de Salomon Maimon y la réplica de Kant

Abstract

This paper addresses Kant's doctrine of the heterogeneity of cognitive faculties and distinct forms of representation and its critique by Solomon Maimon as presented in his Essay on Transcendental Philosophy, a work which acts as both a restoration of the pre-Kantian rationalist perspective of «German-School-Metaphysics» and a precursor to the post-Kantian speculative tendency of German Idealism. The paper emphasizes Kant's defence of his doctrine against Maimon's criticisms as a form of historical-philosophical self-demarcation by the philosopher of Königsberg, both in relation to the rationalist tradition against which his thought turns critically, as well as in connection to those attempts to reformulate and overcome his doctrine that culminated in the emergence of German Idealism. As the core reason for his resistance to both philosophical positions the present paper wants to identify Kant's philosophical commitment to the finitude of human knowledge, which inherently reflects the finitude of the knowing subject.