In the almost 250 years separating us from the publication of its
first edition, Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason has been
interpreted in several ways. Philosophers and scholars from different
periods and with different backgrounds (from Heidegger to neo-Kantians,
including more recent scholarly interpretations up to today) have read
it as a thorough criticism of previous special metaphysics, as a general
theory of knowledge or a particular theory of a priori
cognitions, as the philosophical foundation of natural science
(especially Newtonian physics), or as the starting point for a new
metaphysics, to name just some examples. All these readings are at least
partially grounded, and their plausibility shows the manifold of
concerns, and thereby the theoretical richness, of Kant’s first
Critique. However, none of them takes into account a further
possible interpretation which is striking because this interpretation is
explicitly suggested by Kant himself in the Preface to he
second edition of the work. There he writes that the Critique
is “not a system of the science itself” but, rather, “a treatise on the
method [ein Tractat von der Methode]” (B xxii). The same
qualification returns in a central section of the work, namely in the
metaphysical deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding, where
Kant claims that he will analyze such concepts “to the degree that is
sufficient in relation to the doctrine of method
[Methodenlehre] that I am working up” (A83 B109). Thus,
although secondary literature has surprisingly often neglected these
passages, it is Kant himself who claims that the Critique of Pure
Reason must be understood as a doctrine, or a treatise, on method.
However, if we take Kant’s claim seriously, several questions arise. How
can the Critique be a doctrine of method, if a doctrine of
method as such is supposed to elucidate the procedures of investigation
concerning a specific discipline, while the Critique does so
only in the Discipline of Pure Reason, and even there only
partially? Speaking of the Discipline, how can the
Critique as a whole be a doctrine of method, if Kant explicitly
qualifies only its second part (i.e. the Transcendental Doctrine of
Method) as such? Even admitting that the entire Critique
is such a doctrine, which discipline does it concern? And what must it
establish with regard to this discipline?
The aim of Gabriele Gava’s book is to answer precisely these
questions. More particularly, Gava’s aim is to show that the
Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of method of
metaphysics, with the latter understood as the discipline encompassing
valid a priori cognitions concerning objects of possible experience.
Accordingly, the task of the Critique is to show that
metaphysics “can be considered a science because it forms a ‘system’
with a certain unity, which Kant calls ‘architectonic’” (p. 2).
Moreover, Gava attaches central importance to a remark in the Wiener
Logik claiming that a doctrine of method “can come only at the end
of a science, because only then am I acquainted with the nature of the
science” (XXIV 795). Thus, his overall thesis is twofold: (i) the
Critique of Pure Reason is the doctrine of method of
metaphysics that must prove the possibility of metaphysics as a science
insofar as it is capable to achieve architectonic unity, and (ii) such a
doctrine comes only “at the end” of metaphysics, i.e. after metaphysical
cognitions (or at least the fundamental ones) have been established.
To prove both points, Gava draws a distinction between two
disciplines that, in his view, Kant presents in the Critique,
namely “transcendental philosophy” and the “critique of pure reason”. On
the one hand, and moving from Kant’s characterization of it as the first
part of metaphysics of nature in the Architectonic of Pure
Reason (A845 B873), Gava conceives of transcendental philosophy
as the discipline that must first identify a priori concepts and
principles for the cognitions of objects and then prove their validity.
The former task is performed by metaphysical deductions, the latter by
transcendental deductions (the plural is intentional, since one of
Gava’s main claims is that not only the Transcendental Analytic
but also the Aesthetic and the Dialectic include both
a metaphysical and a transcendental deduction). On the other hand, the
critique of pure reason is the discipline that, relying on the valid a
priori cognitions established by transcendental philosophy in the
Doctrine of Elements, must show that these cognitions and, by
extension, metaphysics as the discipline including them can be a science
insofar as it can achieve the specific kind of systematicity that is the
architectonic unity considered in the Doctrine of Method. This
clear distinction between transcendental philosophy and critique of pure
reason, whose relationship has traditionally been seen as problematic or
even neglected, constitutes the heart of Gava’s interpretation of the
Critique of Pure Reason, and consequently permeates all the
four parts of the book.
After the Introduction, in Part I (Metaphysics as a Science and
the Role of the Critique of Pure Reason) Gava presents in detail
his interpretation of the Critique as the doctrine of method
that must establish the possibility of metaphysics as a science by
showing that it can achieve architectonic unity.
Chapter 1 considers Kant’s account of architectonic unity in order to
show that this particular kind of unity is different from mere
systematicity. Architectonic unity certainly requires systematic
coherence, which means both that (i) its cognitions are interconnected
by means of logical implication, explanatory support or both, and that
(ii) the unity these cognitions form does not include contradictions.
However, systematic coherence is not sufficient to achieve architectonic
unity because the latter must also realize the “idea” of a science,
which idea both “defines the fundamental object of that science” and
“prescribes the ordering of the body of cognitions that form that
science” (p. 29). Thus, systematic coherence and the capacity to realize
the idea of a science constitute the two “minimal criteria” of
architectonic unity, which in turn constitutes the necessary but also
sufficient criterion of the scientificity of metaphysics. Moreover,
examining the distinction between the school and the worldly concept
[Schul- and Weltbegriff] of philosophy provided in the
Architectonic of Pure Reason, Gava shows that only the latter
allows metaphysics to become a science. By focusing merely on the
logical perfection of cognition “without having as its end anything more
than the systematic unity of this knowledge”, the school concept can
only provide metaphysics with a “technical unity” related to
arbitrary ends. On the contrary, the worldly concept relates “all
cognition to the essential ends of human reason” that are established a
priori through the idea of a science, thus being able to provide
metaphysics with “architectonic unity” (A838-839 B866-867).
In Chapter 2, Gava discusses his reading of the Critique of Pure
Reason as the doctrine of method of metaphysics by focusing on
Kant’s account of the function of a doctrine of method. Distinguishing
between that of general logic and that of particular sciences, he claims
that the task of the doctrine of method of a particular science is
two-fold: it must (i) “provide object- or cognition-dependent
methodological rules regarding how to proceed” (p. 42) in the science at
issue and (ii) show that this science possesses architectonic unity.
Accordingly, he shows in what sense the Transcendental Doctrine of
Method and the Critique as a whole can both be considered
doctrines of method of metaphysics: the Critique as a whole is
such a doctrine, but this doctrine includes both transcendental
philosophy and the critique of pure reason as two different disciplines
performing different tasks. Thus, the Doctrine of Method
carries out the critique of pure reason, which shows that metaphysics
can achieve architectonic unity; as such it relies on the valid a priori
cognitions established by transcendental philosophy in the Doctrine
of Elements. This last consideration leads to one of the main
results of Part I, namely the acknowledgment that, although it
constitutes a unitary doctrine of method of metaphysics, the
Critique of Pure Reason nevertheless includes transcendental
philosophy and the critique of pure reason as two different disciplines,
which therefore require two different methods.
In Part II (The Method of Transcendental Philosophy), Gava
considers the first of these disciplines, transcendental philosophy.
More precisely, he takes into account both the metaphysical and the
transcendental deductions provided in the Doctrine of Elements,
since they correspond to the two aims of transcendental philosophy,
namely to identify fundamental concepts and principles a priori for the
cognition of objects (metaphysical deduction) and to prove their
validity (transcendental deduction). In this regard, one of Gava’s main
theses is that each section of the Doctrine of Elements
includes both a metaphysical and a transcendental deduction, since each
section identifies and proves the objective validity of what he,
following Kant, calls “root concepts [Stammbegriffe]” (A13 B27)
for the cognition of objects. Being the fundamental a priori cognitions
that make synthetic a priori claims possible, they include not only the
pure concepts of the understanding but also the pure intuitions of
sensibility and the ideas of pure reason.
This is the reason why Chapter 3, which is devoted to metaphysical
deductions, begins by focusing on the Transcendental Aesthetic.
Gava shows that the metaphysical exposition of space and time actually
amounts to a metaphysical deduction, since it identifies space and time
as the root concepts of sensibility and shows their original intuitive
nature. His reconstruction of Kant’s argument in the Aesthetic
deserves particular attention insofar as Gava succeeds in achieving two
remarkable results. On the one hand, he preserves the terminological
coherence of the text by arguing, against traditional readings, that
Kant is not incoherent in talking about the “concepts” of space and
time. Gava convincingly shows both that Kant admits conceptual
representations of them and that the point of their metaphysical
expositions is nevertheless that these conceptual representations are
made possible by more fundamental ones, which are not conceptual but
intuitive. On the other hand, Gava shows that the theoretical legitimacy
of the concepts of space and time does not imply that their
metaphysical expositions end up being examples of mere conceptual
analysis that, as such, can only yield conceptual and therefore merely
analytic knowledge. On the contrary, in virtue of an accurate
reconstruction of Kant’s argument for the singularity of space and time,
Gava is able to show that this argument yields genuine synthetic
knowledge, since the singularity of space and time cannot be found by
means of mere analysis of their concepts. After the metaphysical
deduction of pure intuitions, he considers those of the pure concepts of
the understanding and of the ideas of pure reason, dealing in both cases
with several central issues debated by scholars. With regard to the
former, he discusses topics such as the completeness of the table of the
categories, the link between concepts and judgments, and the way in
which concepts are brought under other concepts in judgments; moreover,
he shows that Kant does not merely adopt the table of judgments from the
logicians of his time and that, on the contrary, the table of judgments
of general logic is not the same as that of transcendental logic. With
regard to the metaphysical deduction of ideas, the main issue considered
is how pure reason arrives at the idea of the unconditioned. Gava shows
that in the second section (On Transcendental Ideas) of Book I
of the Dialectic Kant provides two different (and contrasting)
accounts for it, grounded respectively on the universality with which a
property is predicated under a certain condition in the major premise of
a universal categorical syllogism (B379) and on the regress through
prosyllogisms in the series of premises (B386-389). This difference
leads to a further difference concerning the way in which the three
ideas of reason or, more precisely, their three classes are derived,
namely from the three logical forms of syllogisms (B379) and from the
possible relationship of a representation with the subject, with the
object as an appearance, and with all things in general (B391). Focusing
in particular on cosmological ideas, Gava claims that the second account
is more adequate and that Kant’s inconsistency in providing two
different accounts is explained by his attempt to fit psychological and
theological ideas into an overall framework that is first obtained
through cosmological ideas, since these play a primary role in his
account of reason and the unconditioned in general. In addition to its
careful textual analysis, Chapter 3 provides one of the most important
results of the book by proving that, contrary to what has often been
thought, Kant does not start by presupposing a distinction between
different cognitive faculties, which in this case could well be seen as
arbitrary. On the contrary, he distinguishes these faculties by
examining the nature and function of their root concepts (intuitions,
categories, ideas), and Gava’s accurate reconstruction of root concepts
of sensibility, understanding, and reason clearly shows how it happens.
In his words, and despite their obvious differences, all metaphysical
deductions have something in common, since “they all point to the origin
of root concepts for the cognition of objects, and they contribute to
offering a characterization of different faculties by emphasizing what
is specific to these origins” (p. 120).
Chapter 4 carries out the second task of transcendental philosophy,
namely to prove the validity of the root concepts presented in Chapter
3. Accordingly, it examines the transcendental deductions Kant provides
in all the three parts of the Doctrine of Elements. Starting
from the Aesthetic and focusing on space, Gava collocates its
transcendental deduction in its Transcendental Exposition and
divides Kant’s argument into two parts, reconstructing its several steps
and showing that Kant proves the objective validity of the intuition of
space but not of its concept, which is easily explained by noting that
the latter is “only an expression” (p. 133) of the former, on
which it is grounded. In the Analytic and the
Dialectic Gava follows the same pattern, thus identifying the
sections that include the transcendental deductions and dividing them
into clearly separated steps. In the Analytic, he focuses on
the B-version of the deduction, which he claims is preferable in virtue
of its clarity, and divides it into two parts (found at §20/B143 and
§26/B160-161), reconstructing their several steps. His main point is
that the two parts of the deduction prove different theses, and that the
first must be completed by the second. More particularly, the first part
proves that the categories are necessary for giving any unity to a
manifold of intuitions, which manifold can be either empirical or pure;
in this way, the first step establishes that the categories are
objectively valid. However, it does not establish how they are
objectively valid: indeed, by abstracting from the pure forms of
intuition, the first part leaves open the possibility that the
categories can provide unity to an empirical manifold without a
corresponding synthesis of a pure manifold. Only the second part of the
deduction proves that the categorial synthesis of an empirical manifold
must always be accompanied by a categorial synthesis of a pure one,
thereby explaining how the categories can have objective
validity, i.e. can provide a priori cognitions concerning objects of
possible experience. Finally, in the Dialectic Gava focuses on
the meaning of objective validity with regard to ideas. Identifying
their transcendental deduction in a specific paragraph of the
Appendix (B698-699), he reconstructs the steps of Kant’s
argument, showing not only that the function of ideas as heuristic tools
for empirical knowledge is sufficient to affirm their (indirect)
objective validity but also that they can be taken transcendentally as
referring to existing objects, but only in the sense that our “belief
[Glaube]” in them is rationally justified. Chapter 4 ends with
the acknowledgment that, since they are carried out in different ways
and concern different a priori cognitions, the three transcendental
deductions do not share the same structure; but they share the same aim,
namely to prove the validity of the root concepts of pure sensibility,
pure understanding, and pure reason, as requested by the second task of
transcendental philosophy.
Relying on the results established in Part II, Part III (The
Method of the Critique of Pure Reason) is devoted to the second
discipline Kant carries out, the critique of pure reason, which must
prove the possibility of metaphysics as a science by proving that it can
achieve architectonic unity. Gava claims that the critique of pure
reason includes both a positive and a negative task. The former consists
in limiting the validity of the root concepts for the cognition of
objects established by transcendental philosophy, the latter in showing
that metaphysics can achieve architectonic unity.
The negative task of the critique, and the way in which it is carried
out, is considered in Chapters 5 and 6. In this regard, Gava’s main
thesis is that each part of the Doctrine of Elements includes a
limitation of the validity of the root concepts established by
transcendental philosophy in that part. Accordingly, the
Aesthetic includes not only the identification and proof of the
validity of the pure intuitions of space and time (transcendental
philosophy) but also their limitation to the domain of appearances and
the consequent negation of their validity with regard to things in
themselves (critique of pure reason). Gava shows this by means of a
clear reconstruction that, moreover, explains the relationship between
Kant’s argument and the sections of the metaphysical and transcendental
expositions of space (and time) upon which it rests. In the
Analytic, the limitation of the objective validity of the
categories appears within the B-deduction, which therefore includes both
the positive argument of transcendental philosophy and the negative one
of the critique of pure reason. Focusing on §§22-23 and connecting it to
important remarks of the Metaphysical Principles of Natural
Science (1786), Gava reconstructs the negative argument and shows
how it rests on the first step of the transcendental deduction, thereby
showing not only that the limitation of the validity of the categories
is already contained in the deduction that proves it but also that there
is a clear continuity between the negative argument concerning pure
intuitions and that concerning the categories. Finally, in the section
concerning the Dialectic Gava pays special attention to the
cosmological ideas and the transcendental principle of reason affirming
the existence of the unconditioned for a given conditioned in order to
show that ideas are not fit for cognition of objects and, therefore,
that the (indirect) objective validity transcendental philosophy Kant
attaches to them is limited.
The positive task of the critique of pure reason is considered in
Chapter 7. Here Gava aims to show that metaphysics can achieve
architectonic unity without overstepping the limits of the validity of
root concepts established by the negative side of the critique. More
specifically, since God and the soul are an essential part of
metaphysics and therefore are required by the “idea” of this science,
the positive side of the critique of pure reason must provide an
adequate account of their systematic place within Kant’s metaphysics. To
show how the critique carries out this positive task, Gava takes into
account the Doctrine of Method and especially the Canon of
Pure Reason. Here he does not limit his reconstruction to the
long-acknowledged theoretical undecidability of freedom, immortality,
and God; rather, he provides a detailed analysis concerning, on the one
hand, Kant’s practical arguments in support of God’s existence and the
immortality of the soul and, on the other, his account of belief.
Accordingly, Gava shows the three results through which the possibility
of the architectonic unity of metaphysics (and therefore its
scientificity) is established: (i) Kant establishes the theoretical
undecidability of God and immortality as objects of pure reason, thereby
putting an end to the conflicts that have prevented metaphysics from
achieving systematic coherence; (ii) he provides practical arguments
supporting a grounded commitment to God and immortality, which allows to
include them within metaphysics as the idea of this science requires;
(iii) Kant provides an account of belief as a form of “taking-to-be-true
[Fürwahrhalten]” able to show that the commitment to
God and immortality motivated by his practical arguments is not grounded
on “objective grounds” and therefore does not provide actual theoretical
cognitions about God and the soul, which would have contradicted not
only Kant’s critique of rational psychology and theology but also the
limitations of the objective validity of ideas established by the
negative side of the critique. Thus, by showing that Kant’s account of
God and the soul not only avoids the contradictions that have prevented
metaphysics from achieving systematic coherence but also provides these
two ideas with a systematic place within metaphysics in virtue of
practical arguments explained by Kant’s account of belief, the positive
side of the critique of pure reason shows that metaphysics can achieve
architectonic unity, thereby establishing its possibility as a
science.
In the last part of the book, Part IV (Kant on Dogmatism and
Scepticism), Gava focuses on Kant’s interpretation of Wolff and
Hume and of how his own project in the Critique relates to
(Wolffian) dogmatism and (Humean) scepticism, which Kant conceived as
the paradigmatic representatives of the two other possible approaches to
metaphysics in addition to transcendental idealism.
Chapter8dealswithWolff.Gavaprovidesaninterestingdistinctionbetweenthreedifferentcharacterizations
of dogmatism, which conceive of it respectively as (i) the pursuit of
demonstrations from concepts alone, (ii) the absence of critique and the
unwarranted use of synthetic a priori principles, and (iii) the
affirmations of the theses in the Antinomy of Pure Reason.
Through a subtle analysis of these three meanings of dogmatism and their
mutual relationships, he shows that Kant relates his own account of the
“dogmatic procedure” of reason to a preliminary inquiry into the
validity and limits of certain synthetic a priori principles, which
conception is compatible with the previous distinction between
transcendental philosophy and critique of pure reason.
Chapter 9 deals with Hume. It starts from two issues that have
divided scholars, namely Kant’s interpretation of Hume’s doubt about
causality and his interpretation of the affinity of Hume’s philosophical
project with his own. Gava aims to show that apparently contrasting
readings of Kant’s interpretation of Hume can be reconciled through his
distinction between transcendental philosophy and critique of pure
reason. In order to do this, he again distinguishes between three
possible readings of Hume’s scepticism about causality, respectively
representing challenges (i) to natural science and ordinary knowledge,
(ii) to general metaphysics, and (iii) to special metaphysics. Rejecting
the first reading, Gava shows that the second and the third are
compatible because they represent Kant’s interpretation of Hume from the
standpoint of transcendental philosophy and of the critique of pure
reason, respectively. Thus, Kant’s account of Hume is two-fold: on the
one hand, Hume is an antagonist of Kant’s project insofar as he puts
into question the possibility of synthetic a priori judgments in general
metaphysics (transcendental philosophy); on the other, he is a “fellow
traveler” (p. 266) insofar as he wants to stop controversies in special
metaphysics (critique of pure reason). These considerations, followed by
a brief conclusion, close Part IV and, with it, the volume.
Gava’s book is excellent. Taking seriously Kant’s central yet often
neglected claim that the Critique of Pure Reason is a treatise
on method allows him to reaffirm its primarily methodological nature and
to interpret systematically its several sections and topics as belonging
to the unitary fundamental issue of method, thereby filling a
significant gap in secondary literature. Moreover, Gava’s achievements
concern not only Kant’s views on method but also his meta-philosophy
and, more precisely, his meta-metaphysics. As Gava convincingly shows,
the first Critique is a doctrine of method specifically devoted
to metaphysics, which means that Kant’s inquiry on the method of
metaphysics is at the same time an inquiry into its fundamental
cognitions, its aim, and, most importantly, its possibility to become a
science, which are all meta-metaphysical topics. Thus, the
acknowledgment and valorization of Kant’s methodological and
meta-metaphysical concerns is undoubtedly one of the main merits of the
book. But it is not the only one. A second merit is the rigorous
analytic approach to the text that Gava displays especially in Parts II
and III, which allows him to reconstruct accurately not only the
structure but also the single steps of notoriously difficult sections of
the Critique such as the metaphysical and transcendental
deductions. The exposition of interesting aspects of the book could
continue, including for example the characterization of Kant’s approach
to metaphysics in terms of “methodological” and “common sense
conservativism” (pp. 66-69) or Gava’s choice to present his theses in a
continuous comparison to those of other authoritative scholars. However,
let me conclude by briefly returning to the heart of his interpretation
of the Critique, namely his distinction between transcendental
philosophy and critique of pure reason. As the entire book shows, this
distinction is a powerful interpretative tool that, far from applying
only to specific sections of the Critique and not to others,
allows Gava to provide a comprehensive reading of the Critique of
Pure Reason as a whole, which is an impressive result.
Understanding the Critique as including two different
disciplines with different aims allows one to appreciate the complexity
but also the richness of Kant’s inquiry by showing that it keeps
together both the proof and the limitation of the validity of the
fundamental a priori cognitions of our pure faculties. Moreover,
conceiving these two disciplines as different parts of a unitary
doctrine of method of metaphysics clearly shows the unitary nature and
coherence of Kant’s philosophical project.
In short, Gava’s book is an impressive work and a great contribution
to the recent strand of Kantian scholarship that, including monographs
such as Marcus Willaschek’s Kant on the Sources of Metaphysics: The
Dialectic of Pure Reason (Cambridge University Press 2018) and
Karin De Boer’s Kant’s Reform of Metaphysics: The Critique of
Pure Reason Reconsidered (Cambridge University Press 2020), has
paid and continues to pay increasing attention to Kant’s metaphysical
concerns. A strand of which, in virtue of its several achievements,
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason and the Method of
Metaphysics is a perfect example.
