

# CTK

Con-Textos **K**antianos  
*International Journal of Philosophy*



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## Editorial de CTK 2

El número 2 de *Con-Textos Kantianos* (*International Journal of Philosophy*) presenta varias novedades con respecto a los números 0 (Noviembre 2014) y 1 (Junio 2015). Por un lado, es la primera vez que se incorpora una sección monográfica, con el título de *Kant y las declinación de la armonía / Kant and the Meanings of Harmony*, cuyo editor invitado es el profesor de la Scuola Superiore di Sant'Anna, Alberto Pirni. Tenemos el placer de acoger en él artículos de Jeanine Grenberg, Jean-Christophe Merle, Ana M.<sup>a</sup> Andaluz Romanillos, Oscar Meo, Gerardo Cunico y Gualtiero Lorini, entre otros colegas. En los próximos números tenemos previsto dedicar secciones monográficas a temas tales como *Kant en la Europa del Este* y *El cosmopolitismo kantiano*, a cargo de Vadim Chaly (IKBFU, Rusia) y Pablo Muchnik (Emory College, USA), respectivamente, como editores invitados. Por otra parte, se inaugura una nueva sección, la destinada a *Dossiers*, donde recogeremos textos que mantengan alguna discusión sobre cuestiones de interés para el estudio y actualización del pensamiento de Kant, dedicada en esta ocasión a *Kant y la Ilustración* y protagonizada por los colegas de la Univ. de Illinois, Sam Fleischacker, de la Univ. de Montréal, Claude Piché, y de la Univ. Memorial de Canada, Joël Madore, Jay Foster y Sami Rajiva. El equipo editor se siente muy satisfecho con esta colaboración, que enriquece y amplía el alcance y proyección internacional de la revista.

Otra novedad es que la traducción del texto de Kant no lo es al español, sino al portugués, porque hemos advertido que sería interesante dar a conocer traducciones de textos kantianos en cualquiera de las seis lenguas admitidas por nuestra revista (español, inglés, francés, portugués, italiano, e incluso alemán, si se tratara de un original en latín), concediendo especial relevancia a las lenguas romances. Tampoco habíamos previsto publicar dos reseñas de un mismo libro, pero el interés concitado por alguno de los títulos reseñados así lo aconsejó. Ojalá esa situación se repita en ulteriores ocasiones. Los colaboradores de CTK nos van dictando todas estas novedades, que vienen a dinamizar nuestra estructura inicial. Siguen presentes las secciones dedicadas a *Entrevistas* —en esta ocasión realizada al prof. de la Univ. de Montréal, Claude Piché—; *Discusiones* —con motivo de un escrito de Anna Laura Macor, de la Universidad de Oxford, comentado y discutido por Lucía Bodas, de la Univ. Autónoma de Madrid—; *Documentos* —donde el

lector encontrará la traducción al español del primer artículo publicado por Howard Williams, de la Univ. de Aberystwyth— y *Crítica de Libros*, que pretende ofrecer una panorámica amplia de las novedades bibliográficas en el campo de los estudios kantianos, atendiendo a su variedad lingüística. Recordamos que el *Boletín de Noticias* se publicará únicamente en el primer número de cada año. Finalmente, hemos decidido abrir una sección compuesta por semblanzas vinculadas a obituarios, que inauguramos con la dedicada al profesor Massimo Barale, de la Univ. de Pisa, antiguo responsable de la revista *Studi Kantiani*, recientemente fallecido.

Nos planteamos ampliar las iniciativas de la revista con la publicación de una serie editorial inspirada en los *Sonderhefts* promovidos por algunas revistas prestigiosas, es decir, una colección de fascículos paralela a los números ordinarios semestrales, quizá con una periodicidad anual, en la que podrían tener cabida contenidos varios de investigación kantiana, manteniendo siempre la impronta internacional y multilingüe. Contendrían desde volúmenes colectivos al estilo de los *Companions* anglosajones, a tesis doctorales, escritas igualmente en cualquiera de los seis idiomas ya mencionados, seleccionadas mediante un concurso *ad hoc*, estudios monográficos en las modalidades de *senior* y *junior*, así como traducciones de Kant cuidadosamente introducidas y anotadas de textos cuya longitud desbordase la longitud que dedica a esta sección cada número ordinario.

Berlín, Noviembre de 2015  
Roberto R. Aramayo  
Editor Principal de *CTK*



### **CTK 2 Editorial Note**

*Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)* issue 2 contains some news compared to issue 0 (November 2014) and issue 1 (June 2015). For the first time one issue includes a monographic section, with the title *Kant and the Meanings of Harmony*, with Alberto Pirni as guest editor, professor at the Scuola Superiore di Sant'Anna (Pisa, Italy). It is our pleasure to gather in this section papers of colleagues as Jeanine Grenberg, Jean-Christophe Merle, Ana M.<sup>a</sup> Andaluz Romanillos, Oscar Meo, Gerardo Cunico and Gualtiero Lorini, among others. Next monographic sections are scheduled, devoted to subjects as *Kant in East Europe* and *Kant's Cosmopolitanism*, respectively edited by Vadim Chaly (IKBFU, Russia) and Pablo Muchnik (Emory College). Moreover, we launch a new section —*Dossiers*, which shall contain texts focusing on groundbreaking themes in international Kantian research— with the dossier *Kant's Enlightenment*, a group of articles written by the colleagues Sam Fleischaker (Univ. Illinois at Chicago), Claude Piché (Univ. of Montréal), Joël Madore, Jay Foster and Sami Rajiva (all three from Memorial University, Canada). CTK editorial team expresses his satisfaction with this enriching collaboration, which broadens the international scope of this journal.

Other new is that Kant's translation is not into Spanish this time, but into Portuguese, since CTK editorial team has considered interesting to encourage translations of Kant's texts into the six languages (Spanish, English, French, Portuguese, Italian, even German, if the original text were in Latin) used by CTK, especially in Romanic languages. We never expected to publish two reviews of the same book, but the value of some titles made it possible. We wish that this will be repeated in the future. CTK readers and authors helped us to improve our initial shape with this new structure. The journal maintains sections as the *Interviews* —with prof. Claude Piché (Univ. of Montréal, Canada) by Maria Hotes—; *Discussions* —moving from a text of Laura Anna Macor (Univ. of Oxford, UK), with a *responsio* by Lucía Bodas (UAM, Spain)—; *Documents* —with the translation into Spanish of Howard Williams' (Univ. of Aberystwyth) first published article— and *Books' Reviews*, aiming at displaying a wide view over new publications in international Kant Studies. I remind that the *Newsletter* will appear once a year, in the first issue of each year. Finally, we decided to open a section for obituaries with a text in memory of prof.

Massimo Barale (Univ. of Pisa, Italy), former main editor of the journal *Studi Kantiani*, who recently passed away. The international Kantian research will always have him in grateful remembrance.

We study to enlarge the agenda of the journal launching a new publishing action inspired in prestigious journals' *Sonderhefts*, i.e. a collection of materials to be published once per year, which will contain results of international and multilinguistical Kant's research. CTK *Sonderhefts* will accept collective volumes in the vein of Anglo-Saxon *Companions*, PhD essays, written in one of the six mentioned languages, selected by a call *ad hoc*, monographic studies in modalities *senior* and *junior* and finally Kant's translations accurately introduced and critical edited, whose length would discourage to include them in a CTK issue.

Berlin, November 2015  
Roberto R. Aramayo  
Editor-In-Chief of CTK



## Entretien avec Claude Piché

### *Interview with Claude Piché*

MARIA HOTES\*

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, Munich, Allemagne

Claude Piché est né à Salaberry-de-Valleyfield (Québec, Canada) en 1952. Il a fait ses études de baccalauréat (1971-1974) et de maîtrise (1974-1975) en philosophie à l'Université de Montréal. Après avoir complété sa maîtrise en déposant un mémoire sur Kant sous la direction de Garbis Kortian (1938-2009), il quitte le Canada afin de poursuivre ses études doctorales à l'Université de Heidelberg (1975-1979), sous la direction de Dieter Henrich (1927-...). Sa thèse de doctorat, intitulée *Das Ideal. Ein Problem der Kantischen Ideenlehre*, a été publiée chez Bouvier en 1984. Immédiatement après avoir complété sa thèse de doctorat, il est embauché à titre de professeur au Département de philosophie de l'Université de Montréal en 1980, où il a enseigné jusqu'au mois de juin 2015. À l'Université de Montréal, il a donné des cours et séminaires sur Kant (philosophie théorique et pratique), l'idéalisme allemand, le néo-kantisme et la phénoménologie. Au-delà de ses activités professorales, Claude Piché est un chercheur actif à la fois sur le continent américain et sur le continent européen. À ce dernier titre, il convient de souligner son rôle au sein de la *Société d'études kantiennes en langue française* (SEKLF), dont il est vice-président depuis 2001. Il fait également partie du comité de rédaction des *Kant-Studien*.

*(1) En considérant les nombreuses années que vous avez consacrées à l'enseignement et à la recherche fondamentale en philosophie, la première question qui se pose est sans doute celle de la motivation. Qu'est-ce qui vous a conduit à vous intéresser à la philosophie ?*

Il faut dire qu'au Québec, dans les collèges, c'est-à-dire au niveau pré-universitaire, il y avait quatre cours de philosophie obligatoires<sup>1</sup>. Or j'ai tout de suite été fasciné par ces enseignements. Sans doute, je ne connaissais rien à la philosophie jusqu'alors, mais la force d'attraction de cette discipline a opéré immédiatement. Et il y a de bonnes raisons pour

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cela : c'est que j'ai commencé à fréquenter le collège en 1969 et mon professeur de philosophie revenait tout juste d'un séjour d'études à Paris, donc au lendemain de ce qu'il est convenu d'appeler la « pensée 68 ». C'était une période d'effervescence incroyable. Il nous faisait découvrir Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Barthes, Ricoeur etc. Ainsi, par exemple, Foucault avait publié en 1966 *Les mots et les choses* et Derrida avait fait paraître l'année suivante, coup sur coup, *De la grammatologie*, *La voix et le phénomène* et *L'écriture et la différence*. C'était un temps béni pour la philosophie. Pour le jeune étudiant que j'étais et qui s'intéressait à la littérature et à la culture en général, c'était quelque chose de tout à fait extraordinaire comme découverte. Je peux me considérer privilégié d'avoir été le contemporain de ce mouvement philosophique.

—*Avant votre entrée à l'Université, vous aviez donc été en contact essentiellement avec la pensée française...*

Oui, mais en même temps aussi avec la pensée philosophique traduite en français : je me rappelle en l'occurrence que *La linguistique cartésienne* (1969) de Chomsky faisait partie de notre cursus philosophique. De même pour la pensée allemande, le tout passant par la tradition française. Et je pense que c'était une excellente chose.

*(2) On a souvent tendance à opposer, à tort ou à raison, l'histoire de la philosophie à « la » philosophie. Si l'on admet cette opposition, il ne semble pas abusif d'affirmer que votre démarche est avant tout celle d'un historien des idées. Comment en êtes-vous venu à privilégier cette façon de faire de la philosophie ?*

Avant d'entrer à l'université, j'avais étudié la littérature, dont j'étais passionné. Or, à cette époque, on privilégiait l'approche « structurale » des textes littéraires. On peut penser ce que l'on veut du courant structuraliste qui prévalait alors, mais je crois que ce qui doit retenir l'attention ici, c'est le fait qu'une œuvre, quelle qu'elle soit, possède une articulation et qu'il vaut la peine de s'intéresser à sa construction, à sa matérialité, à sa lettre. Ainsi, lorsque je me suis ensuite dirigé vers la philosophie, il me semblait que c'était une manière tout à fait naturelle d'aborder les textes : porter attention à sa textualité et de là à sa teneur même. On peut dire en conséquence que j'ai d'abord mis l'accent sur une approche de la philosophie que l'on pourrait qualifier de philologique. Quel meilleur accès à l'esprit d'un texte, en effet, que le passage par la lettre ? Sans en rester à une lecture servile, bien sûr.

*(3) La philosophie allemande a la réputation d'être particulièrement difficile d'accès, si bien qu'il semble pertinent de se questionner, non seulement sur l'intérêt que présente pour vous la philosophie en général, mais plus particulièrement la philosophie allemande, à laquelle vous consacrez vos recherches. Comment expliquez-vous cet attrait, à première*



*vue sans doute difficile à comprendre ? Et, dans ce contexte, pourquoi s'intéresser tout particulièrement à Kant ?*

Les défis que présente la lettre du kantisme prennent entre autres la forme d'ambiguïtés. Or on se rend compte qu'il s'agit d'ambiguïtés qui sont, le plus souvent, philosophiquement significatives, en ce sens qu'elles ne sont pas dues simplement à une insouciance quelconque de la part de Kant. Bien sûr, on sait que ce dernier ne possède pas une terminologie parfaitement stable et que, lorsqu'il formule des définitions, il prend parfois un malin plaisir à y déroger. Il n'en reste pas moins que la difficulté éprouvée par l'apprenti qui se confronte au texte a bien souvent à voir avec la chose même. C'est une difficulté qui est inhérente au thème lui-même et qui n'est pas imputable à une maladresse littéraire de la part de Kant. Bref, le kantisme présente un corpus qui est très riche, difficile, mais d'une difficulté à laquelle il vaut la peine de se frotter à mon avis.

Vous me demandez : pourquoi la philosophie de Kant en particulier ? La question s'impose parce que, évidemment, dans la tradition allemande il y a plusieurs oeuvres qui sont d'une difficulté redoutable : on pense à Fichte, à Hegel ou encore à Husserl et Heidegger. Pourquoi alors la philosophie de Kant ? Bien sûr, parce que c'est le philosophe de la raison. Mais, d'abord et avant tout, c'est un penseur qui, comme on sait, s'est appliqué à délimiter la raison, à en tracer les bornes. J'ai été d'emblée sensible à cette approche. On dit de lui, à juste titre, qu'il est un philosophe de la finitude. Donc un philosophe de la raison, oui, mais qui, avant toute chose, s'emploie à rabaisser les prétentions de cette raison et à mettre en veilleuse l'aspect conquérant de la philosophie moderne qui, se réclamant de cette raison, a pu prétendre à un certain moment être en mesure de résoudre tous les problèmes. Bref une raison revue à la baisse et réévaluée selon ses justes prétentions et son potentiel légitime, tant du point de vue de la philosophie théorique que du point de vue de la philosophie pratique.

S'il est un aspect qui m'interpelle tout particulièrement chez Kant, c'est la reconnaissance de la contingence. Kant est un philosophe qui maintient l'étonnement devant la contingence. Or l'étonnement, comme on le sait, c'est peut-être la vertu philosophique première. Pourquoi ? Parce que la contingence représente la part de ce qui est inattendu, ce qui n'était pas prévisible. C'est ce à quoi le philosophe est confronté. On pense en outre à la troisième *Critique* : la beauté naturelle, par exemple, provoque l'étonnement, tout comme la finalité des organismes. Kant est le philosophe qui prend acte de cette contingence et qui tente de l'expliquer, mais sans la réduire ou sans chercher à la déduire d'un principe premier qui éliminerait la dimension de surprise liée à la contingence. L'étonnement demeure chez lui parce que le principe explicatif, même s'il est transcendantal dans le cas de la beauté naturelle, renvoie ultimement à un substrat extérieur, à un vis-à-vis hors de portée. Si l'on se tourne par ailleurs vers la première *Critique*, on constate que la contingence y est également présente. Kant nous avoue très franchement que l'espace et le temps, comme formes de l'intuition, sont pour nous des

formes irréductibles et inexplicables. Les choses sont ainsi et pas autrement. De la même façon, les catégories sont au nombre de douze, ni plus ni moins. Il faut faire avec cette contingence, sans tenter de la résorber. Je dirais en somme que Kant accepte la pluralité des éléments, la pluralité des principes, ne serait-ce qu'au plan du partage entre théorie et pratique : il y a là des principes qui sont irréductibles les uns aux autres. Irréductibilité donc des éléments dans leur pluralité. On a le sentiment que chez lui c'est le point de départ dans la pluralité qui s'avère philosophiquement fructueux, dans la mesure où le philosophe a pour tâche de retracer les relations et l'interaction entre les éléments en vue de dégager, tout au plus, leur convergence et leur unité téléologique. Que l'on songe au refus de Kant de dériver les différentes races humaines d'une race unique, ou encore à ses réticences à déduire les facultés de l'âme d'une faculté fondamentale.

—*Il y a malgré tout une dimension systématique chez Kant, voire une prétention à fonder un système...*

C'est une exigence qu'il se pose comme philosophe au nom de la scientificité. Le philosophe doit prendre en compte le tout et tenter d'y voir clair. Le système est en revanche complexe chez lui et en attente constante de sa clôture. On le sait, les successeurs immédiats de Kant ont été déçus par la façon dont, dans la *Critique de la faculté de juger*, il a tenté de ficeler le système. Il faut en convenir, les traits d'union entre théorie et pratique tels qu'ils sont présentés dans la troisième *Critique*, à savoir le volet esthétique et le volet téléologique, sont plutôt modestes. Et c'est, je pense, tout à fait caractéristique de la philosophie de Kant. Le système demeure une exigence et Kant a tenté d'y répondre à l'aide des moyens à sa disposition. Il y a là une modestie qui n'est pas un trait de caractère mais qui vient de la confrontation à la chose même.

*(4) Lorsque l'on s'intéresse à vos recherches sur Kant, on constate un intérêt soutenu, tout au long de votre carrière, pour des enjeux d'ordre théorique (on peut penser notamment à la question du jugement, au problème de la chose en soi, de la déduction transcendantale, de l'auto-référentialité du discours kantien, etc.). Toutefois, ces dernières années, vous semblez vous intéresser de plus en plus à des enjeux relevant de la philosophie pratique, tels que le cosmopolitisme kantien par exemple. Comment expliquez-vous ce changement, à condition que vous admettiez qu'il y a un tel changement ?*

Oui, c'est tout à fait vrai. J'ai d'une certaine façon suivi l'itinéraire de Kant, qui a commencé aussi par des considérations très clairement théoriques. Ce sont les problèmes théoriques par lesquels je suis entré dans la philosophie de Kant : la *Critique de la raison pure* offre en effet des défis vraiment considérables pour l'apprenti-philosophe comme par exemple, vous l'avez dit, le thème de la chose en soi ou la théorie du discours philosophique. Ce sont des problèmes qui m'intéressent encore et j'y travaille toujours. Ainsi, il nous revient de reconstruire la méthodologie transcendantale de Kant parce que

les indications qu'il nous a laissées sont précieuses, mais certainement insuffisantes. Or vous avez raison d'insister sur le fait que je me suis orienté, ces dernières années, de plus en plus vers les préoccupations pratiques -- éthiques, juridiques, politiques -- notamment parce que cela révèle l'actualité et la pertinence de Kant. C'est de ce côté, évidemment, que Kant nous interpelle le plus. On pense tout de suite à son éthique universaliste, qui est encore pertinente pour nous. On songe aussi à son plaidoyer pour la paix internationale : Kant est un penseur qui a anticipé d'une certaine manière ce que l'on appelle la globalisation. Je dirais d'ailleurs que, dans son cas, le mot doit être compris dans son sens littéral parce que Kant a pris explicitement en compte, dans sa théorie du droit international, la forme sphérique de l'espace auquel les êtres humains sont confinés.

Mais Kant est aussi actuel par d'autres aspects. Ce qui m'intéresse en ce moment, c'est son jugement, et peut-être plus encore sa mise en garde, vis-à-vis de la culture. Dans l'un des derniers textes qu'il a publiés, le *Conflit des facultés*, il s'oppose non pas à la culture, mais à l'usage que l'on est susceptible d'en faire. Certes, il ne peut pas rejeter la culture puisque lui-même admet que le progrès du genre humain y est relié de façon très intime. Mais il y a un usage que l'on peut en faire et qui consiste à se servir de la culture pour se soustraire à ses responsabilités morales. Plus précisément, Kant se rend compte qu'il est possible pour le commun des mortels d'avoir recours aux diplômés des facultés universitaires supérieures à des fins pernicieuses. Dans le cas de la faculté de Droit, on peut recourir à l'avocat pour contourner son devoir de justice. On peut de plus se tourner, dans le cas de la faculté de Médecine, vers le médecin pour qu'il neutralise les conséquences néfastes de ses excès. Enfin, du côté de la faculté de Théologie, on peut demander au prêtre d'accomplir un rituel, lequel est toutefois susceptible de se substituer — ce jugement est constant chez Kant — à ce qui devrait être l'essentiel en religion : une conduite morale digne de ce nom. Il est quand même curieux de voir que Kant qualifie de « superstitieuse » cette attitude du commun des mortels face aux diplômés des trois facultés supérieures. Sachant que la superstition est la cible privilégiée des Lumières, ce que Kant nous dit par là, c'est que la lutte pour l'autonomie du penser et de l'agir n'est pas encore remportée ; il s'agit en fait d'un combat perpétuel. La tâche de l'*Aufklärung* est donc loin d'être complétée pour lui et je pense que ce jugement vaut à plus forte raison encore pour notre époque.

*(5) En plus de vos recherches, vous avez consacré les trente-cinq dernières années à l'enseignement de la philosophie. Vos cours à l'Université de Montréal, tout comme vos recherches, portaient sur la philosophie allemande (Kant et le post-kantisme, idéalisme allemand, néo-kantisme, phénoménologie, Heidegger, etc.). Que tirez-vous de la pratique de l'enseignement de l'histoire de la philosophie ? Dans quelle mesure l'enseignement de la philosophie a-t-il influencé vos recherches et vice-versa ?*

Je vais commencer par reprendre une idée qui est bien connue mais non moins juste : dans une relation d'enseignement, celui qui apprend le plus est sans conteste le professeur. Et il y a de bonnes raisons pour cela. L'enseignant est d'une certaine manière tenu de répondre du texte à l'étude. Il doit pouvoir en rendre compte avec la plus grande

honnêteté possible, en montrer la cohérence et la cohésion avant de songer à le critiquer. Il s'agit d'un défi constamment renouvelé pour un enseignant, surtout avec des auteurs complexes. Et ce défi est d'autant plus redoutable que, dans une situation pédagogique, on ne sait jamais d'où va venir la question ; c'est parfois l'interrogation naïve nous donne plus de difficulté, et non la question savante. Ceci est particulièrement vrai du premier cycle. Si l'on songe en revanche aux séminaires des cycles supérieurs, l'attitude à adopter est différente : le professeur a pour mission d'instaurer un climat de recherche, mais une recherche que l'on fait en commun avec les étudiants autour de textes déterminés à l'avance. Nous avons donc un objet en commun et nous tentons d'y voir clair. Je dois avouer que j'ai eu, dans ma carrière, des étudiants extrêmement brillants qui ont rendu ces séminaires d'autant plus riches et intéressants. J'éprouve d'ailleurs une très grande satisfaction à voir mes étudiants progresser et poursuivre leur cheminement de manière indépendante.

**(6)** *Revenons en arrière. Avant d'y être professeur, vous avez fréquenté l'Université de Montréal à titre d'étudiant de baccalauréat (B. A.) et de maîtrise (M. A.) entre 1971 et 1975. Vous avez alors décidé de rédiger votre mémoire de maîtrise sur Kant sous la direction de Garbis Kortian (1938-2009). Or, on sait que, avant 1970, la philosophie allemande était plutôt marginale au Québec<sup>2</sup>, si bien que le choix d'y faire carrière ne devait pas aller de soi. Que retirez-vous, en ce qui concerne particulièrement la situation de la recherche en philosophie allemande, de ces années de formation ?*

J'ai eu de la chance d'arriver à l'Université de Montréal quelques années à peine après l'embauche du Professeur Garbis Kortian. Il avait reçu sa formation à l'Université de Vienne et avait séjourné en Allemagne où il avait fréquenté les milieux philosophiques : il avait suivi les enseignements d'Adorno, de Habermas et de Gadamer. C'est donc quelqu'un qui possédait une connaissance de première main de la philosophie allemande contemporaine tout en étant un éminent spécialiste de Kant et de l'idéalisme allemand. Dans ses cours, nous étions d'entrée de jeu plongés dans cet univers passionnant ou dans ce que Hegel appelle l'« élément » de la philosophie. C'est aussi Garbis Kortian qui m'a incité à rédiger un mémoire de maîtrise sur Kant et qui m'a encouragé à poursuivre mes études doctorales en Allemagne.

—*Concernant vos études en Allemagne, justement : est-ce que votre formation doctorale à l'Université de Heidelberg, sous la direction de Dieter Henrich (1927-...), a modifié la manière dont vous conceviez à l'époque la recherche en philosophie allemande ?*

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. Jean Grondin, « Les débuts de la philosophie allemande au Canada français : Contexte et raisons », in: R. Klibansky et J. Boulab-Ayoub (dir.), *La pensée philosophique d'expression française au Canada. Le rayonnement du Québec*, Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1998, p. 211.

Je répondrais par l'affirmative. L'étudiant allemand est soumis à une pédagogie bien particulière. C'est que les enseignements à l'Université de Heidelberg, comme ailleurs en Allemagne du reste, prennent d'abord et avant tout la forme de séminaires, lesquels ne sont pas réservés aux seuls doctorants. Il s'agit d'une pédagogie qui a de quoi surprendre quelqu'un qui vient d'un milieu nord-américain où l'on est habitué à recevoir beaucoup de contenu. Dans le cas des séminaires à l'allemande, et tout particulièrement des séminaires de Dieter Henrich, on pouvait consacrer toute une séance à décortiquer et à sous-peser les interprétations possibles d'une phrase (de Fichte ou de Kant) inscrite au tableau. C'était pour moi une approche nouvelle dans la mesure où l'on ne ressortait pas nécessairement du séminaire avec un cahier de notes bien rempli. En revanche, on apprenait les rudiments du travail philosophique, surtout la confrontation avec les textes et avec les difficultés qu'ils peuvent offrir. Pour ne donner qu'un exemple, Dieter Henrich allait jusqu'à porter attention à la lettre majuscule employée par Kant avec l'article « *Eine* » en vue d'accentuer la dimension d'unité. Si j'avais d'emblée une propension pour l'analyse textuelle avant d'entamer mon cursus universitaire, je dois dire que la poursuite de mes études en Allemagne n'a fait que confirmer cette prédilection chez moi. Dieter Henrich était en l'occurrence un professeur absolument prodigieux sous ce rapport : disposant d'une compétence exceptionnelle pour Kant et l'idéalisme allemand, c'était un enseignant fascinant par la capacité qu'il avait à spéculer avec les idées, tout en conservant un contact très étroit avec les textes. En somme, le séminaire à l'allemande est une incitation à la patience et à la modestie dans le travail philosophique : il n'est pas rare que l'on sorte du séminaire sans avoir trouvé la solution aux problèmes posés.

*(7) Votre implication au sein de la Société d'études kantienne en langue française (SEKLF) semble témoigner de l'importance que vous accordez à ce que la langue française ait toujours sa place au sein des études kantienne. C'est-à-dire que, malgré — ou peut-être à cause de — l'importance de plus en plus marquée de l'anglais dans le milieu de la recherche universitaire, vous croyez qu'il est important de continuer à faire de la recherche sur Kant en français — ce qui peut sans doute s'étendre aussi à d'autres langues, comme l'italien, l'espagnol ou le portugais. Pourquoi ?*

C'est que chaque aire linguistique s'approprie à sa manière les grandes philosophies, en l'occurrence ici celle de Kant. En quoi consiste cette appropriation ? Évidemment, un très sérieux travail d'exégèse a été fait en langue française au cours des deux derniers siècles, tout comme en langue italienne, espagnole, portugaise, etc. Mais ce qu'il est important de souligner dans ce travail d'interprétation, c'est que la pensée kantienne acquiert des résonances particulières lorsqu'elle est reprise par d'autres traditions linguistiques et culturelles. Et il faut y voir un indice additionnel de la richesse et du rayonnement de cette oeuvre. Pour l'interprète de Kant, il y a donc une responsabilité qui consiste à rendre accessible le texte de Kant en langue française de façon à ce qu'il n'intéresse pas uniquement le spécialiste, mais qu'il puisse également entrer en dialogue avec d'autres courants philosophiques, voire interpeler le grand public en général. Ce

travail d'appropriation doit être fait par chacune des aires linguistiques et, en langue française, force nous est d'avouer que la chose est fort bien amorcée. Il ne tient qu'à nous de poursuivre cette tâche.

(8) La recherche en histoire de la philosophie, et à plus forte raison dans les études kantienne, est plus souvent qu'autrement une tâche très théorique, voire spéculative. Dans une perspective kantienne, il y a pourtant une préséance du pratique sur le théorique, si bien que l'on peut dire que le travail philosophique, même dans son volet théorico-spéculatif, doit, en dernière instance, conduire à l'agir moral. Dans ce contexte, comment concevez-vous le rôle de la philosophie et du philosophe ?

Kant écrit dans la *Critique de la raison pure*, à propos de la *République* de Platon, qu'il ne sied pas de se moquer de telles constructions idéales bien qu'elles soient à proprement parler sans doute irréalisables. En effet, si nous ne disposons pas de tels modèles qui prennent la forme d'une Idée, l'humanité ferait du sur place. Il faut qu'il y ait une orientation, quitte à ce que ce soit le philosophe qui en esquisse le fil conducteur. On se rappelle, par exemple, qu'en 1784, dans *l'Idée d'une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique*, Kant évoque une lecture de l'histoire qui, si l'on s'en tient strictement à l'enchaînement des faits, donne l'apparence d'un chaos. Il procède alors à une interprétation de l'histoire qui tente de lui conférer un sens, à savoir ici, comme on le sait, l'amélioration progressive des constitutions politiques. Il s'agit manifestement là, comme le titre de l'opuscule l'indique, d'une simple « Idée ». Mais il y a en vérité un devoir philosophique implicite de rechercher, dans le cours de l'histoire, les indices d'un progrès moral (au sens large). Et si ce n'est pas un progrès éthique, du moins peut-il s'agir d'un progrès au sens juridique, au sens politique. Voilà donc une manière de souligner le rôle crucial de l'Idée chez Kant, rôle qui était d'emblée mis en valeur dans la *Critique de la raison pure*. J'ai d'ailleurs consacré ma thèse de doctorat au thème de l'idéal. Il s'agit d'un thème qui fait de Kant sans contredit un penseur idéaliste, c'est-à-dire un idéaliste sans illusion mais qui insiste sur le caractère indispensable de l'Idée dans une perspective éthique. Nous ne sommes pas autorisés, selon lui, d'un point de vue moral, à désespérer du cours de l'histoire humaine.

La question qui se pose dès lors est la suivante : comment le philosophe peut-il intervenir de façon concrète, après avoir rappelé notre devoir de lire l'histoire ou d'interpréter le cours des actions humaines d'un point de vue éthique, même si les faits n'en témoignent pas de façon concluante ? Or le travail du philosophe, pour Kant, ne doit pas être sous-estimé ici : il s'agit en fait d'un travail théorique au plan des concepts. Mais cet éclaircissement conceptuel — qui est aussi l'une des connotations du mot *Aufklärung*, à savoir rendre l'Idée, comme dirait Descartes, claire et distincte — est un travail philosophique très spécifique, voire très technique. Cette élucidation des concepts a une portée que Kant n'a jamais négligée, à savoir ici présenter de façon conceptuellement juste le critère du Bien, y compris le souverain bien politique. Pour Kant, c'est l'un des éléments

importants — et il faut passer par la pédagogie pour y parvenir — susceptibles d'amener quelqu'un à agir moralement. Kant y croit profondément : à preuve les *Didactiques* qu'il a jointes à sa *Critique de la raison pratique* et à la *Métaphysique des mœurs*. Il y a une tâche de défense et d'illustration des Idées pratiques qui ressortit à la philosophie, bien qu'en dernière analyse l'adoption de tels critères relève d'une décision qui est entièrement libre de la part de l'agent moral. C'est le mieux que le philosophe, en tant que pédagogue de l'humanité, puisse faire. Mais, aux yeux de Kant, il s'agit là d'une prérogative cruciale

(9) *Pour clore cet entretien, pensons maintenant à l'avenir des études kantienne : quels sont, à votre avis, les nouveaux défis auxquels les études kantienne doivent faire face en ce XXIème siècle ?*

Je dirais que c'est sans doute Kant qui nous indique la marche à suivre au moment où il déclare qu'en philosophie, il n'y a pas d'auteurs classiques. Il n'y a pas non plus d'oeuvres classiques, au sens où par leurs seuls mérites intrinsèques elles demanderaient à être retransmises de génération en génération. Kant n'y croit pas. Il croit en sa philosophie, cela va de soi, mais le legs qu'il entend nous laisser consiste en un encouragement à faire nous-mêmes de la philosophie et à repenser les problèmes. Or s'il existe une chose telle que les études kantienne — *Kant-Studien*, *Kantian Studies*, *Studi Kantiani*, etc. —, c'est qu'il y a une tradition d'interprétation qui a inéluctablement tendance à faire de Kant un classique, ce à quoi il résisterait pourtant. En conséquence, nous pouvons bien sûr nous inscrire dans ce courant des études kantienne ; nous le faisons volontiers, parce que c'est à nous qu'il revient de scruter l'œuvre afin de savoir si cette pensée est encore pertinente de nos jours. Mais nous ne devons jamais oublier l'injonction de Kant selon laquelle nous sommes tenus de penser, à nouveaux frais, les problèmes, et non pas de nous en tenir à des solutions toutes faites.



## Hacia una *Crítica de la razón armónica*

## Towards a *Critique of harmonic reason*

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### Abstract

The essay focuses on the attempt of articulating the idea of a *critique of harmonic reason* understood as a comprehensive (and not explicitly expressed) project within the Kant's theoretical path. In the first paragraph, the attempt of elaborating a *critical* idea of harmony is addressed both biographically and theoretically by referring to the intense period 1783-1786. In the second paragraph, we introduce and discuss a methodical idea of *critic harmony*, whose roots are grounded within the framework of both pre-critical and critical period. Finally, as presented by the editor of the present monographic issue, the essay opens up to the dialogue with other interpretative paths about the topic, by offering a comprehensive view of all essays jointed in this issue and by presenting those stimulating materials along three concentric circles.

### Key words

Kant; harmony; harmonic reason, critique, community, public discussion

### Resumen

Este artículo intenta articular la idea de una *crítica de la razón armónica* como un proyecto comprensivo (no expresado explícitamente) dentro del camino teórico de Kant. En la primera sección se aborda el intento de elaborar una idea *crítica* de la armonía tanto biográfica como teóricamente, en referencia al intenso periodo de 1783-1786. En la segunda sección, presento y discuto una idea metódica de *armonía crítica*, cuyas raíces están basadas en el marco del periodo pre-crítico y crítico. Finalmente, como presentación del editor de este número monográfico, el trabajo inaugura el diálogo concerniente a la cuestión de la armonía con otros caminos

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interpretativos, ofreciendo una perspectiva comprehensiva de todos los trabajos reunidos en el número y organizando estos ricos materiales en torno a tres círculos concéntricos.

### Palabras clave

Kant; armonía; razón armónica, crítica, comunidad; discusión pública

### 1. Pensar en comunidad

«¿[H]asta qué punto y con qué corrección pensaríamos, si no pensáramos, por decirlo así, en comunidad [*Gemeinschaft*] con otros a los que comunicar [*mittheilen*] nosotros nuestros pensamientos, y ellos los suyos a nosotros?». <sup>1</sup>

Esta afirmación, que Kant incluye en las páginas finales de su importante escrito *¿Que significa orientarse en el pensamiento?*, quizá nos brinde la posibilidad de captar uno de los puntos de acceso más directos a nuestro tema. El pasaje y, más en general, el ensayo en el cual aparece, ha de verse previamente contextualizado como parte de la trayectoria intelectual del filósofo de Königsberg.

El ensayo aparece en la *Berlinische Monatsschrift* en octubre del 1786, insertándose así en un arco temporal comprendido entre 1783 y 1786, particularmente prolífico para Kant. Ciertamente, en este período, Kant publica muchos opúsculos que testimonian, junto a los cursos de las lecciones conservadas, una constelación de intereses particularmente fecundos para el tema que se intenta abordar aquí. Son estos los años en los que Kant vuelve al planteamiento metodológico de la nueva crítica, pero también puntualiza sus doctrinas de filosofía de la historia, filosofía del derecho y antropología, aparte de continuar, con gran éxito, las lecciones de ética y de filosofía de la religión.

Más específicamente, este es el trienio que comienza con la publicación de los *Prolegómenos para toda metafísica venidera*, la obra en la cual Kant comienza a trabajar inmediatamente después de la publicación de la primera *Crítica* —terminada al finalizar el verano de 1782 y publicada al comienzo de 1783— con la intención de ofrecer una especie de compendio, de guía para la lectura y, sobre todo, una aclaración general de la obra mayor, impulsado sobre todo por algunos comentarios iniciales que parecían desconocer la importancia de su propia propuesta, hasta tergiversar el intento general del criticismo. <sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> WhDO, AA 08: 144, 18, trad. por R. Rovira.

<sup>2</sup> Como es bien sabido por los estudiosos del tema, es emblemático el caso del comentario de Ch. Garve, reformulado por G. H. Feder, uno de los Directores del *Göttingische Gelehrte Azeigen*, revista en la que después aparecerá el texto de manera anónima, en enero del 1782. Han reconstruido con gran atención este intercambio de cfr. K. Vörländer (el primer editor de la obra para la Akademie Ausgabe, 1903-4), en la Introducción para la edición de la obra kantiana en la *Philosophische Bibliothek*, Meiner, Hamburg 1967, espec. pp. XI-XIV y la de P. Martinetti, en la traducción italiana, Paravia, Torino 1945<sup>2</sup>, pp. V-VIII (después Rusconi, Milano 1995, pp. 7-11), cfr. Además A. Guerra, *Introduzione a Kant*, Laterza, Roma - Bari, Laterza 2013<sup>18</sup>, espec. pp. 81-86.

Por otra parte, este es el trienio en que verán la luz algunos de los ensayos breves más célebres de Kant, desde la *Idea de una historia universal en sentido cosmopolita* a *Respuesta a la pregunta: ¿Qué es la Ilustración?*, ambos del 1784. No por eso se debe olvidar que en ese mismo período Kant plantea explícitamente el tema moral dentro del criticismo, o sea, que abre una importante (y para la época de la primera *Crítica* tal vez todavía inesperada) “ampliación” del criticismo hacia la «búsqueda y definición del supremo principio de la moralidad» [GMS, AA 04: 392, 3-4] que tendrá en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* (1784) una primera e importantísima síntesis, en vista de la “revolución copernicana” que se pretende realizar en el dominio de la moral, de la cual se hará cargo la *Crítica de la razón práctica* (1788).<sup>3</sup> Por último, para confirmar un conjunto de intereses verdaderamente relevantes y que solo su genio supo unir,<sup>4</sup> es necesario recordar dos aspectos, que ofrecen la fórmula interpretativa más próxima a la cuestión que se intenta tematizar aquí.

Por un lado, Kant prosigue en estos años con la articulación y desarrollo de la “obra” abierta con la primera *Crítica*. Este proceso consigue dos resultados relevantes. Ante todo, Kant continua desarrollando su prometida tarea en las partes finales de la primera *Crítica*, cuando publica los *Primeros principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza* (1786). Se trata de una obra que según el propósito del filósofo es de algún modo paralela a la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*, al pretender desplegar los dos dominios tradicionales de la metafísica, más precisamente “de las costumbres” y “de la naturaleza”, en la obra *Crítica*. De manera secundaria, Kant trabaja, durante todo 1786 – y por un período más largo de lo que había previsto – en una segunda edición de la obra mayor, o bien una “zweite, hin unde wieder verbesserte Auflage” [KRV, AA:3, 5], que como es sabido enriquecerá cabalmente esa obra.

Por otro lado — aquí está el segundo aspecto que deseaba subrayar —, a partir del 23 de abril de 1786, Kant es nombrado Rector de la Universidad de Königsberg. Este importante cargo — que además será una de las causas del retraso del trabajo de la segunda edición de la *Crítica* y tal vez de su abandono, antes de una primera revisión del texto completo— nos da la idea de un Kant inédito, empeñado en una responsabilidad institucional y pública de organización y transmisión del saber que afrontó con seriedad, aunque fuera por un breve período, a pesar de la gran cantidad de trabajo científico que todavía recaería sobre él para tratar de dar al sistema crítico una integridad, diremos, una cierta armonía.

Considerándolo íntegramente, en el trienio 1783-86 Kant se encuentra en uno de los momentos más importantes de su vida, caracterizado por una doble excepcionalidad. Por un lado, nos hallamos ante el lapso más complejo de su carrera intelectual, si se observa la

<sup>3</sup> He intentado reconstruir el tortuoso camino que, a partir del periodo pre-crítico conduce a Kant a la ampliación de ambos ensayos en este periodo de tiempo A. Pirni, *Kant filosofo della comunità*, Pisa, ETS 2006, cap. 1.

<sup>4</sup> No podemos ocuparnos aquí de los cursos impartidos por Kant en su intensa actividad didáctica, pero en las lecciones de metafísica, antropología, derecho natural, ética y doctrina de la religión se aprecian las semillas más importantes de posteriores obras fundamentales del filósofo de Königsberg.

variedad e importancia de los intereses teóricos que tenía ante sí en aquel tiempo. Por el otro, es este el período que culmina para el filósofo prestando la máxima atención al “frente público” y con el desempeño de responsabilidades públicas, ciertamente a partir del ejercicio del cargo de Rector, siendo esta función institucional inusitada en un camino biográfico que, como es sabido, encontró su sello característico en la sobriedad y la cautela, antes que en la búsqueda de visibilidad y poder.

Por tanto, este es un periodo en el que Kant, consciente de lo realizado y, al mismo tiempo, del todavía dilatado camino que le esperaba, no cesa en la compleja búsqueda de una armonía dentro del propio sistema, que tal vez nunca como en aquellos años aparecía a sus ojos necesitado de una orientación general (¿quizá las partes dedicadas a la Arquitectura y Disciplina de la Razón pura fueron acaso inspiradas también por esta urgencia de fondo, más amplia, de la misma exigencia de crítica de la razón?).

Y es en este contexto temporal donde madura también el ensayo *¿Que significa orientarse en el pensamiento?* Kant, al tomar partido dentro del intenso debate entre el racionalismo y el dogmatismo de Mendelssohn y el fideísmo intuicionista de Jacobi, propone fecundas reflexiones sobre la noción de límite y sobre la “necesidad subjetiva”, si bien, con una mayor relación respecto a nuestro tema, se detiene varias veces en el problema de cómo sobre cómo sea posible “orientarse” en la búsqueda de las condiciones que determinan los diversos campos, ámbitos y límites de posibilidad de una filosofía trascendental, o sea, en la búsqueda de una armonía entre las numerosas partes de un saber crítico limitado pero, por este mismo motivo, totalmente sólido y estable, con independencia del rumbo que se proponga tomar: he aquí lo que, en definitiva, se ha intentado calificar como una *crítica* de la razón armónica.

Para su elaboración, cabría subrayar al menos dos declinaciones del “pensar en comunidad” mencionado al principio. Una razón pura armónica, por un lado, se ve obligada a constituir una “comunidad”, una unión, una *systematische Verbindung* entre los diversos saberes, o bien entre las “necesidades de la razón”, para encontrar respuesta a exigencias diferentes, por ejemplo desde la historia a la moral, y desde ésta a la política y al derecho, solamente por citar uno de entre los múltiples caminos de armonización buscados.

Por otro lado, esta armonización se encuentra en el centro de una “comunidad de comunicaciones”, un nexo entre diversos sujetos que, solo compartiendo unos con otros los propios pensamientos, pueden cultivar la esperanza de armonizar los contenidos de estos últimos: «¿Hasta qué punto y con qué corrección pensaríamos?». En primer lugar, a nivel individual, en el plano de la coherencia subjetiva e interna y, con respecto al ámbito intersubjetivo, en el plano del consenso alcanzable y alcanzado solo por la armonía, aunque igualmente por la *concordia discordans*, de un debate auténtico y libre, un debate del que quepa esperar que represente un genuino avance en cada posible campo del saber.

## 2. La armonía como crítica y horizonte público del filosofar

Junto a las ya señaladas exigencias biográficas y teóricas de Kant, tendentes a “poner orden” en la propia agenda de investigación, se trata de descubrir, a partir del lapso temporal aludido, una declinación metódica y específica del concepto de armonía que aparece más pronto que tarde. Obviamente, las figuras y los significados de la armonía para Kant son muchos y específicos. Los ensayos recogidos en esta sección monográfica lo testimonian con la variedad de su análisis. Sin embargo, el sentido metódico que decíamos poseía una caracterización posterior, al tratarse de una declinación que, por un lado, devolvía la fórmula pre-ilustrada de Kant y, por el otro, confirmaba su peculiar interpretación de la Ilustración y de la pregunta acerca de su sentido, a la que el filósofo, en el fondo, sigue respondiendo a lo largo de toda su trayectoria intelectual.

Si se opta por una fórmula sintética, propondría conjugar armonía y crítica, en la forma precisa de una crítica *armónica*. Lo que pretendo afirmar es que, a partir de la “gran luz” de los años 60, es la institución lo que llevará a Kant a acuñar el concepto de *transcendental* y a concebir el esquema de lo que será más tarde la “*Crítica de la razón pura*”, que comporta la doble conciencia de tener el “*material*” para comenzar un nuevo decurso para la filosofía de su tiempo con vistas a los tiempos venideros y, simultáneamente, la conciencia de asumir la tarea de poder desarrollarlo, teniendo de ese modo que volver siempre como antecedente al camino recorrido por toda la filosofía hasta él mismo, para comprenderla mejor con arreglo a la inextirpable exigencia metafísica de la razón y sacarla así a la luz gracias a los precisos “tejidos” consolidados de la filosofía crítica.

En esto consiste el intento, diremos, “comprehensivo” y por ende intrínsecamente “armónico” de Kant, al no evitar la comparación y no dejar de lado ninguna teoría, sin antes haberla examinado bajo la luz de crítica, ejercitando esta última como muestra de armonía transcendental, es decir, de equilibrio entre como era antes y quizá pudiera al margen de la empresa crítica, y cuanto es posible ahora, en el espacio acaso más limitado, pero seguramente por ello mismos mejor fundamentado, según un interminable proceso de ida y vuelta, que parte de las tradiciones y las restituye al presente iluminado por la crítica.

En el interior de este cono de luces, tal vez están comprendidos o releídos aún los innumerables binomios conceptuales que Kant disemina a lo largo de toda su obra, desde el concepto escolar contrapuesto al concepto cósmico de la filosofía o la más célebre distinción entre *fenómeno* y *noúmeno*, solo por mencionar dos de los de mayor impacto, a binomios que consideramos más internos a su sistema: sensible / inteligible, espacio / tiempo, posibilidad / imposibilidad, sentidos / entendimiento, entendimiento / razón, razón / fe, analítica / dialéctica, limitado / ilimitado, naturaleza / libertad, libertad / ley, guerra / paz, metafísica / crítica, cuya enumeración exhaustiva resultaría excesivamente prolija. Partiendo de la comprensión conjunta de estos dos últimos binomios conceptuales acaso pueda emerger con mayor claridad el sentido comprehensivo y metódico de la idea kantiana de armonía. Luego se volverá sobre este punto.

Parece oportuno recordar que Kant reparó muy tempranamente en el tema de la armonía, quizá de forma todavía indirecta y no inmediatamente conectada con el sentido “crítico” que aquí se está tratando de articular, refiriéndose a la *Monadologia* de Leibniz en su *Monadologia physica* de 1756.<sup>5</sup> Sin embargo, Kant nunca simpatizó con la idea de *armonía preestablecida* leibniziana, con la que, como es sabido, ajustará cuentas de manera un poco lapidaria en las páginas finales de la *Crítica de la razón práctica*, atribuyendo a las mónadas la “libertad propia del asador” [KprV, AA 05: 97], incisivamente presentada como lo más distante de la idea de libertad, pensada a partir de la refinada dialéctica entre máxima e imperativo y desarrollada bajo la forma de un binomio armónico ulterior.

Además, si se quisiera encontrar en el período pre-crítico un referente más directo a la idea de armonía crítica que intentamos elaborar, este podría encontrarse más bien en la comparación con las reflexiones de Swedenborg, al cual Kant dedica una obra donde se prefiguran muchas de las intuiciones desarrolladas en la primera Crítica. En su texto de 1766 titulado *Sueños de un visionario explicados mediante los ensueños de la metafísica* Kant, tras reiteradas demandas de “amigos conocidos y desconocidos”, lleva a cabo un examen crítico de la obra *Arcana coelestia* de Emanuel Swedenborg. En el segundo capítulo de la Primera Parte, titulada “Fragmento de filosofía arcana para abrir la comunión con el mundo de los espíritus”, Kant habla de los “seres inmatriciales” que, como principales agentes para sí mismos se encuentran “inmediatamente unidos” en una “gran totalidad [*großes Ganze*], que cabe denominar mundo inmaterial (*mundus intelligibilis*)”.

«Este mundo inmaterial [*immaterielle Welt*] puede ser considerado, pues, como un todo existente por sí, cuyas partes están entre ellas en una mutua interrelación y en comunidad [*untereinander wechselseitiger Verknüpfung und Gemeinschaft*], incluso sin la mediación de las cosas materiales, por lo que esta última relación [...] no debe impedir que los seres inmatriciales, que actúan unos en otros por mediación de la materia, mantengan además entre ellos, independientemente, una relación particular y general y que, como seres inmatriciales, se ejerzan influjos mutuos, de modo que la relación de los mismos a través de la materia es solo contingente, y reposa sobre una disposición divina particular, siendo por el contrario la otra relación natural e indisoluble».<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> No es ahora posible detenerse analíticamente sobre esto, aún siendo un texto de interés, en el que Kant interpreta y revisa en manera muy interesante las tesis leibnizianas. Nos referimos aquí a los *Principes de la Nature et de la Grâce fondés en raison* (1714) y a los *Principes de la Philosophie* (obra redactada en francés en 1714, pero publicada en alemán en 1720, con el título de *Lehrsätze über die Monadologie*. Kant imagina y describe aquí una función más directa y “activa” de las mónadas, que quedan en equilibrio y armonía entre ellas, sobre todo por la originaria actividad de cada una, que necesita la ocupación de un *spatiolum* alrededor de sí misma y que, consiguientemente impide a cada mónada acercarse a las otras más allá de cierto límite. Esto sucede, según Kant, sobre la base del newtoniano principio de repulsión física entre los cuerpos y no, leibnizianamente, a partir de la intervención divina de “armonización” entre las mónadas, culminando la armonía preestablecida entre el *Reino de la Naturaleza* y el *Reino de la Gracia*. Entre los estudios más recientes sobre la confrontación crítica entre Kant y Leibniz véase S. Storrie, “Kant's 1768 attack on Leibniz' conception of space”, *Kant-Studien*, 104 (2013), no. 2, pp. 145-166.

<sup>6</sup> *Träume*, AA 02: 330, trad. por C. Canterla. Para un análisis exhaustivo de las numerosas referencias implicados en este pasaje y en todo el segundo capítulo sigue siendo en mi opinión un estudio de referencia la obra de A. Lamacchia, *La filosofia della religione in Kant. I Dal dogmatismo teologico al teismo morale (1755-1783)*, Lacaita, Bari 1969, spec. pp. 296-303 e pp. 523-534.

El mundo formado por los “seres inmateriales” se estructura como un enlace [*Verbindung*], o bien como una conexión [*Verknüpfung*], en una relación que implica reciprocidad y comunidad, que, sin obstáculos procedentes de las particularidades y obstáculos materiales, se presenta así de modo indisoluble como comunidad dinámica. El discurso protagonizado aquí por los “seres inmateriales” —los “espíritus”— se volverá a mencionar y a desarrollar denominándolos “seres razonables” o integrantes del reino de los fines, figura posterior que será paradigmática de la armonía crítica en su específica declinación moral, introducida en la *Fundamentación*, sobre la cual no es posible ahora detenerse analíticamente<sup>7</sup>; mientras “la totalidad por sí misma es independiente”, calificada ahora como “indisoluble”, será considerada en el contexto más maduro de la filosofía crítica, como una “unión sistemática”.

Ahora bien, como se ha mencionado con anterioridad, para captar quizá el núcleo más característico de una ideal crítica de la razón armónica, es necesario volver a dos de los binomio citados más arriba, más exactamente a aquel que reúne a la guerra y la paz, y aquel otro que hace lo mismo con la metafísica y la crítica. Naturalmente, todo intento de presentar con mayor detalle este conjunto conceptual superaría los límites de este texto. Con todo, en la amplia obra de Kant es posible descubrir un breve texto, diez años posterior respecto al citado anteriormente, que parece constituir un tornasol ideal de este plexo temático. Se trata del *Anuncio de la próxima conclusión de un tratado de paz perpetua en la filosofía*, publicado en diciembre de 1796 en la *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, que quizá pueda ser interpretado como la mayor expresión kantiana de la vocación auténticamente pública de la filosofía crítica, y al mismo tiempo, de toda filosofía que pretenda inspirarse en esa indicación metodológica.<sup>8</sup>

Como es sabido, es posible encontrar en Kant numerosas connotaciones, eminentemente jurídico-políticas y ético-religiosas, del concepto de paz perpetua. Sin embargo, parece poderse reconocer también perfilada en su obra una idea más comprensiva de paz, que incluye no solo estas facetas del saber filosófico, sino también una que posibilita estas últimas: la dimensión metafísico-gnoseológica.<sup>9</sup> A esta última parece dedicarse más plenamente Kant justo en el escrito de 1796, aun cuando en realidad no puede considerarse una novedad en términos absolutos. Desde el “Prefacio” a la primera edición hasta llegar a la “Doctrina del método” de la *Crítica de la razón pura* Kant había presentado el campo de la metafísica como un «lugar de combate» y, al mismo tiempo, la crítica como el «tribunal» resolutivo de toda controversia posible en semejante

<sup>7</sup> Para un análisis más amplio de este concepto me permito remitir a: A. Pirni, *Il ‘regno dei fini’ in Kant. Morale, religione e politica in collegamento sistematico*, il melangolo, Genova 2000.

<sup>8</sup> He presentado una interpretación de todo el ensayo, situándolo en relación con otros dos escritos menores significativos de aquellos años, *De un tono de gran señor recientemente adoptado en filosofía* y *Sobre un presunto derecho a mentir por filantropía* en: A. Pirni, «The Philosopher’s Public Calling: The Problems and Implications of Kant’s *Announcement of the Upcoming Conclusion of a Treatise of Perpetual Peace in Philosophy*», in R. Orden/ J. Rivera de Rosales /R. Hanna / R. Loudon/ N. Sanchez Madrid (ed.), *Critical Paths Outside the Critiques. Kant’s Shorter Writings*, Cambridge Scholar Publishing, Cambridge (forthcoming).

<sup>9</sup> Para amplio examen de este punto, véase: G. Cunico, «Pace, guerra e conflitto in Kant», in I. Kant, *Guerra e pace. Politica, religiosa, filosofica*, a cura di G. Cunico, Diabasis, Reggio Emilia 2004, pp. 9-32.

campo, gracias a su doble capacidad, por un lado, de limitar las pretensiones cognoscitivas de lo suprasensible y, por el otro, de dirigir fundadamente sus pretensiones legítimas articulando un camino que de la sensibilidad conducía al intelecto y de este a las tres ideas de la razón, entendidas como estructuras capaces de conferir unidad teleológica al conjunto de los conocimientos posibles.

El *Anuncio* puede situarse en esta última línea, pero contiene un tejido argumentativo diferente y original, de inicial matriz antropológica. Kant comienza considerando el carácter de la «vida» entendida como «acción inmanente de fuerzas estimulantes» que connota la naturaleza del hombre, pero entendido «antes de su universalidad», es decir antes de la obtención del carácter racional que lo distingue específicamente de cualquier otro animal. Este carácter le permite en efecto “sutilizar” [*vernünfteln*], filosofar, pero también disputar con un tono encendido, hasta «llevar a la guerra abierta, unidos en masa contra otros (escuela contra escuela, como ejército contra ejército)».<sup>10</sup>

No obstante, este es un carácter o un impulso sano, que permite al hombre mantenerse activo y «mantener lejos [...] la gran desgracia de descomponerse todavía viv[o]». Por este motivo hay que conservar este carácter pero, al mismo tiempo, incentivar su estabilización, de forma permanentemente dinámica, sobre todo gracias a y a través de la filosofía. Según Kant, la estabilización perpetuamente dinámica puede ser ofrecida sólo por la *filosofía crítica*. Esta es una filosofía que deja abierto el campo a la libre capacidad de la razón humana, pero tras haberlo encerrado establemente dentro de la más sólida legitimidad gnoseológica. Esta filosofía, dice significativamente Kant, «es un estado siempre armado» (AT, AA 8: 416, 23-25), contra los que, tratando de eliminar o discutir esos límites, no hacen más que confundir los fenómenos con las cosas en sí. Pero es también una filosofía que tiene la prerrogativa de «mantener siempre en activo las fuerzas del sujeto [...] para promover el propósito de la naturaleza de vivificar continuamente al sujeto y preservarlo del sueño de la muerte» (ibíd.).

Aquí reside el significado más profundo del ideal de paz perpetua aquí propugnado, junto al concepto de *armonía como crítica*, que constituye su *pendant* especulativo por el lado teórico: su carácter *perenne*, en un sentido, el punto de no retorno que el cambio trascendental ha impreso en el saber filosófico, su inagotable *dinamismo*, en el otro, por el cual la “paz perpetua en filosofía” (y la razón armónica) no es sinónimo de estaticidad, es decir, de “muerte en vida”, sino de solidez de la base crítica en la que solo puede desarrollarse de nuevo la discusión pública más viva, racionalmente fundada y, al mismo tiempo, a la altura de la tarea de “Ilustración” al que la razón ilustrada no puede renunciar.

### 3. Para una armonía crítica “polifónica”, en y más allá de Kant

En este horizonte global, de enfrentamiento crítico armónico, o sea dinámico, siempre reiterado y no simplemente ejercitado de manera constante, se inscribe así pues el itinerario

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<sup>10</sup> AT, AA 8: 414, 11-12, trad. por R. Rovira.

cumplido en primera persona por Kant, pero también lo preconiza para cada camino del pensar que esté a la altura de su propia tarea. Desde este punto de vista parecen confirmarse como un “bajo continuo” las palabras recordadas al comienzo de las consideraciones aquí propuestas. De acuerdo con ello, dando lugar a aquella misma indicación metódica, se han intentado recoger en esta sección monográfica “otros numerosos significados”, como diría George Herbert Mead, de la mano de contribuciones de prestigiosos intérpretes, no solo de la letra kantiana, sino también de la tarea de fondo que a ella subyace, en y más allá de Kant. Antes que nada, para intentar “pensar en comunidad” aquella tarea, tratando de aproximarse a la esperanza de no haberla desatendido del todo. Con el fin de entregar al lector una presentación, algo armónica de los textos presentados aquí, que proceden libremente del amplio “depósito semántico” de la armonía elaborado por Kant, se propone organizar el extenso material, de manera ideal, en *tres círculos concéntricos* que, conforme al orden general aquí articulado, encuentran su elemento distintivo en otras declinaciones la idea de diálogo.

El *primer círculo* se concentra en la comparación y *diálogo de Kant con pensadores contemporáneos suyos*, siempre en relación con el tema de la armonía. Se recorren así las páginas que el filósofo, en el período pre-crítico, dedica al tema de la *causalidad* en relación con algunos autores de referencia de su época, como Wolff y Baumgarten, Knutzen y Crusius. El tema es interpretado revisando el punto de vista del “influjo físico” elaborado por dichos autores, en una dirección que perfilará una redefinición de la idea de espacio, un contexto en el que encontrará su oportuna ubicación la noción de *interacción (commercium) entre sustancias*, teniendo ciertamente como base una relevante noción metafísica de armonía (Gualtiero Lorini). Se analiza y contextualiza asimismo una anotación escrita por Kant en los textos preparatorios del que más tarde será el texto contra Eberhard, *Sobre un descubrimiento, por el que toda nueva Crítica de la razón pura debería volverse prescindible*. El texto contiene una significativa anotación y metáfora musical, que ofrece la ocasión para una más amplia consideración sobre el uso del léxico musical en Kant y en Eberhard, un contexto semántico que ciertamente restituye la principal y más natural referencia del tema armónico en su conjunto, en comparación con aquellos con los que el filósofo de Königsberg demuestra competencia y familiaridad (Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques).

El *segundo círculo* de estudios se dirige en cambio al *diálogo de Kant consigo mismo*, o sea al “diálogo” entre diferentes partes y obras del “sistema”, que se evocan unas a las otras en una prolongada respuesta a varias, pero que en el fondo serían declinaciones convergentes del tema de la armonía. En este contexto se introduce en primer lugar una reflexión acerca del “principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones” el cual, en conexión con el concepto de *influjo físico* mencionado anteriormente y partiendo desde los *Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza*, enfoca algunos textos relevantes de la filosofía práctica kantiana, hasta culminar en la *Rechtslehre*, en dos diferentes significados (“dinámico” y “legal”) del mismo principio (Jean-Christophe Merle). Pero el camino que Kant articuló a través de las tres *Críticas* aparece también como el ensayo de



reconstruir una lógica armónica que esas mismas obras habían separado: de este modo, la armonía entre ser y pensar, “*separada*” de la primera *Crítica*, y aquella entre virtud y felicidad, dicotomizada por la segunda, encuentran en la tercera, a través de una re-semantización de la idea de naturaleza —ahora ya no objeto de conocimiento, pero sí “regla” para una empresa estética y artística— una posibilidad de recomposición armónica y comprensiva de las facultades de la razón (Francesco Valagussa).

Profundiza en este camino, o sea en el interior de la tercera *Crítica*, una reflexión en torno a la noción de “cognición en general”, destinada a resolver el problema de la comunicabilidad de los estados mentales relativos al juicio de gusto, así como el tema de la armonía entre comprensión e imaginación. Aquí la búsqueda armonía entre las facultades cognitivas permite pensar en el dinamismo de las formas expresivas a un nivel pre-teórico, hasta interesar la posibilidad de experiencia de lo bello (Oscar Meo). Disponiendo bajo otra luz este mismo tema, se profundiza también en un aspecto “sustantivo” de la misma experiencia de lo bello: la función de la literatura y, más específicamente, de la poesía, como punto de elaboración armónica entre el sentimiento de placer, típico del uso del bello, y las facultades cognoscitivas. La referencia a la literatura implica, en efecto, la mediación posible y necesaria entre sensibilidad y entendimiento, dando forma de este modo, en una progresión retrospectiva desde la tercera a la primera *Crítica*, a una interesante comparación entre la noción de correspondencia típica de la primera teoría estética con la de armonía introducida en la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar* (Germán Garrido Miñambres).

Cierra este segundo círculo concéntrico una reflexión completa sobre el sistema del pensamiento kantiano, dedicada al concepto de mundo. Se reconsidera, de este modo, la noción de armonía en su significado ontológico fundamental, o sea, en el interior de una concordancia teleológica que estaba en el centro de la metafísica dogmática y que, a través del criticismo, destruye y configura nuevamente ya no en su dimensión teórico-especulativa, sino en virtud de un renovado significado teleológico-moral que encuentra en la concordancia final de los entes terminados su perspectiva propia (Gerardo Cunico).

Para finalizar, el *tercer círculo* concéntrico que aquí se presenta intenta dar forma a la imagen de otros pensadores en diálogo diacrónico con Kant. Esta parte comienza con un ensayo dedicado a un capítulo importante del diálogo, más reciente, entre Habermas y Kant, con particular referencia a la dinámica armónica entre lo sensible y lo inteligible, resuelta por el primero, en el contexto del debate sobre determinismo y libertad, en el marco de un “naturalismo débil”. Tal solución, siguiendo con fidelidad el itinerario de Kant, podría enriquecerse posteriormente atendiendo al juicio reflexionante, que considera al hombre simplemente como ser biológico, natural y, al mismo tiempo, en armonía constituyente con su capacidad de libertad (Ana María Andaluz Romanillos). Prosigue este último círculo un ensayo que parte de la estética entendida como fundación de una filosofía del arte, del acto, o más bien del evento artístico, desde un significativo, aunque poco conocido diálogo mantenido en el siglo XIX con Kant por parte de tres autores eslovacos, Greguš, Vandrák y Kuzmány. De la mano de una interpretación dinámica de la idea de armonización kantiana, se propone una renovada “fundamentación” de la potencialidad

estética del arte (Jana Soškova).

Cierra para finalizar el círculo, como si se tratara de un significativo “contrapunto” musical, lo que en realidad aparece como un contrapunto moral y toda una lección de sabiduría. Se trata del indirecto diálogo entre el personaje de Emma, en el homónimo libro de Jean Austen y las páginas kantianas dedicadas al auto-engaño moral del sujeto racional. La enseñanza que este conversar consigo mismo nos proporciona remite a la misma perspectiva de la “dialéctica natural” reconocida sobre todo en la tendencia de la razón a ir más allá de los límites de lo conocido. Del mismo modo en que la *Crítica de la razón pura* pretendía enfrentarse a tal dialéctica, la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* ofrecerá en primer lugar la vía del autoconocimiento moral como primer deber de supresión del auto-engaño y el más sólido apoyo para la promoción de una sabiduría en el individuo que siga siendo “dinámicamente armónica” (Jeanine M. Grenberg).

Este camino, el marcado por el proyecto y la tarea de una crítica de la *razón armónica*, se encuentra orientado hacia sí mismo, hacia su origen. Pero este es un origen necesariamente doble. Por un lado, desde una perspectiva ontológica, comprendiendo en ella todo lo concerniente a la idea del orden del ser, a las fuerzas físicas que constituyen leyes, a la modalidad y límites de cada posible armonización, hasta llegar a la unidad teleológica del todo como mundo. Sin embargo, en su articularse aquella crítica descubre en sí misma también el origen y el conjunto de su obrar, el destino auténticamente moral de su propio realizarse, o sea el intento de elaborar y, si es posible, de imprimir al entero orden del ser, desde el todo hasta sus partes, una orientación metódica del equilibrio del conjunto, con un fin más exigente, dirigido a la justicia, si bien combatiendo siempre *críticamente* contra aquella “dialéctica natural” que no cesa de diferir el alcance de ese objetivo.

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*Harmonia in commercio vs Harmonia absque commercio.*

**Kant's eclectic dealing with causality**

**Harmonia in commercio vs Harmonia absque commercio.**

*El tratamiento ecléctico de la causalidad en Kant*

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**Abstract**

The present paper aims to provide an overview on Kant's dealing with the main theories of causality which were proposed and discussed in his time. The goal is to show that, since the pre-critical period, he has never simply accepted the theories of causality that he could find in second-scholastic sources, but has always tried to develop an original position. Starting from a general acceptance of the theory of the "physical influx", Kant tries to amend this theory, as it had been roughly provided by Knutzen and Crusius. This emendation is carried out through elements coming from the Leibnitian tradition. But neither in this field Kant totally embraces the Wolffian, as well as the Baumgartenian model. The paper tries also to shed light on the way in which the critical conception of space allows Kant to fulfill his original theory of causality as an amended version of the physical influx.

**Key words**

Physical Influx; Occasionalism; Pre-established Harmony; Causality; Space

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## Resumen

El presente artículo pretende ofrecer una perspectiva del tratamiento que Kant dedica a las principales teorías de la causalidad propuestas y discutidas en su tiempo. El objetivo es mostrar que Kant nunca aceptó, desde el periodo pre-crítico, las teorías de la causalidad que pudo encontrar en fuentes de la Segunda Escolástica, sino que intentó siempre desarrollar una posición original. Tomando como punto de partido la aceptación general de la teoría del “influjo físico”, Kant intenta corregir esta teoría, tal y como fue esbozada por Knutzen y Crusius. Esta corrección se lleva a cabo por medio de elementos procedentes de la tradición leibniziana. Pero ni siquiera en este campo Kant abraza totalmente el modelo de Wolff y Baumgarten. El artículo aspira a arrojar luz sobre la manera en que la concepción crítica del espacio permite a Kant completar su teoría original de la causalidad como una versión corregida del influjo físico.

## Palabras clave

Influjo físico; ocasionalismo; armonía pre-establecida; causalidad; espacio

### 1. Kant and his sources on *causality, force and change* in the pre-critical period

Kant’s approach to the different theories of causality that are at stake in the scientific and philosophical debate of his age is characterized, on the one hand, by the reference to his most direct sources, and, on the other hand, by the tendency to elaborate an original perspective that is not totally reducible to the sources. In this context, one of the first focal points is represented by a reference to Leibniz, which is often mediated by authors like Wolff and Baumgarten. This sometimes leads Kant to maintain he is positioning himself against Leibniz’s theories, whereas he is actually attacking e.g. Wolff’s thesis or the thesis of a Wolffian. It happens less frequently for Baumgarten, who is a more orthodox Leibnizian than Wolff.

A further line of interpretation consists in Kant’s employment of Crusius’ positions as a term of contrast to the Wolffian formalism. However, though Kant’s disagreement with Crusius is usually more hidden and implicit, it is nonetheless often sharp and also determines the rise of autonomous positions in Kant’s thought. The still point in the analysis of this panorama is what Kant himself (speaking of ontology) called the “vestibule of metaphysics” (See: *RPM*, AA 20: 260). In this case the vestibule is the text through which Kant faces the metaphysical tradition, namely Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*, which he employed throughout his entire academic career as a manual for his lectures on metaphysics. That is why we will start from this text.

For Baumgarten *ratio* [*Grund*] is meant as the “ground” of a thing [*ens*],<sup>1</sup> in the widest metaphysical meaning of *nexus*. The “principle” is what contains the ground of something else, and it can be “of being” [*essendi*], “of becoming” [*fiendi*] or “of knowing”

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<sup>1</sup> Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §14.

[*cognoscendi*],<sup>2</sup> while the “force” [*vis*] characterizes the internal nexus through which the accidents adhere to the essence of the substance insofar as it is their “sufficient ground”.<sup>3</sup> As regards the adherence to the essence of the “modes”, and even more of the “relations”, we need a further determination, that is a ground, which is a “cause” and not a “force”, and which coincides with the “principle of existence” (to be understood under the principle of becoming).<sup>4</sup> This principle is the ground of the “complement of essence or of internal possibility”<sup>5</sup> of a thing. Among the meanings of the concept of “cause” expressed by Baumgarten, Kant adopts since the *Thoughts on the true estimation of the living forces*, the “efficient cause” [*causa realitatis per actionem*].<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, while Kant adopts this concept in order to explain the “physical influx” among the substances, Baumgarten is a supporter of the “pre-established harmony”. Consequently, for Kant also the action of the force has a causal value, since it can be exerted by one substance on the other, whereas Baumgarten reduces the relationship among substances to a force that is internal to any substance.<sup>7</sup>

The pre-established harmony presupposes a monadist theory of substance, which is attacked by Kant in the third section of the *New elucidation* through the exposition of two principles that are supposed to be deduced from the principle of sufficient ground. The first is the “principle of succession”: “No change can happen to substances except insofar as they are connected with other substances; their reciprocal dependency on each other determines their reciprocal changes of state” (*NE*, AA 1: 410). Here Kant’s main polemical target is Wolff, according to whom “a simple substance is subject to constant change in virtue of an inner principle of activity” (*NE*, AA 1: 411).<sup>8</sup> Kant brands Wolff’s theory as untenable for several reasons. Firstly, a change requires new grounds that should necessarily come from outside, but it cannot be the case, since the internal determinations that already adhere to the substance are “posited in virtue of inner grounds which exclude the opposite” (*NE*, AA 1: 410). Furthermore, the changes of the internal determinations of the substance cannot derive from a change in their grounds because these grounds are by definition immutable, just as the determinations simultaneous to them. Thus, insofar as the essential determinations are immutable, they cannot be the source of the internal changes of the substance. The Wolffians—so Kant—“have constructed an arbitrary definition of force so that it means that which contains the ground of *changes*, when one ought to declare that it contains the ground of determinations” (*NE*, AA 1: 411). This refers to the *Thoughts*, where the force was defined as the most authentic expression of causality and its peculiar character was represented by “activity”, which characterizes the Wolffian

<sup>2</sup>*Ivi*, §311.

<sup>3</sup>*Ivi*, §197.

<sup>4</sup>*Ivi*, §307.

<sup>5</sup>*Ivi*, §55.

<sup>6</sup>*Ivi*, §319.

<sup>7</sup>*Ivi*, §§449ss. See: e.g. *TelF*, AA 1: 18.

<sup>8</sup> Anyway, in the *Cosmologia generalis* (§§209), Wolff admits that we can account for all the changes that occur in a single element through the changes that take place in another.

principle of change too. Thus, the next step is to understand towards what tends the activity of the force, and that requires further investigating the concept of causality.

Wolff, Baumgarten and Meier share a general concept of cause as a ground whose power is basically logical. Since this ground is an expression of the principle of sufficient ground, which in turn comes from the logical principle of non-contradiction, one can conclude that also this ground has a logical value<sup>9</sup> Therefore, even the necessity characterizing the derivation of the caused from the cause must be logical. Since the position of the cause is simultaneous to that of the consequence—a principle accepted even by Kant—the determinations deriving from the essential grounds of the substance are simultaneous to these essential grounds both on the logical and the ontological point of view, that is they are immutable as their grounds.<sup>10</sup>

The goal of Kant's remarks is to explain the transition from the logical to the ontological plane, but to this purpose the Wolffian theory of causality is clearly insufficient. Since for Kant Wolff's concept of substance lacks indeed intersubstantial relations, his concept of causality cannot be considered *real*. Rather, it is expressed by a mere logical and ideal correspondence between cause and caused. Therefore, the action of the force can only be exerted on the internal determinations of the substance, and the change is reduced to a succession of internal determinations that need another internal principle, in order to become actual. Such a model contradicts the concept of an essence grounded upon determinations whose contrary has been logically excluded. Thus, for Kant there is nothing inside the substance that can produce the change. It must necessarily come from outside, by means of a force expressed through a real causality.

In the third section of the *New elucidation* Kant adopts a complementary perspective as regards the first two sections. Where in the first two sections he aimed at analyzing the principle of sufficient ground and demonstrating its validity, here, by limiting this validity to the contingent reality, he can define the modality of determination of the contingent substances as a mutual causal interaction. In other words, the changes of the external relations of the substance are the cause of its internal changes, since the former contain the "ground of existence" [*ratio existentiae*] of the latter. Thus, the principle of succession explains how the *actual* removal of the predicate opposite to what pertains to the subject is possible in those cases, in which this removal goes beyond the limits of the formal logic. Since such a removal must be operated by an external cause, this requires the substances to be in a *real* mutual relation.<sup>11</sup> In this sense, Kant's adhesion to this form of physical influx answers the need of filling the lack of formal logic as it pretends to provide a complete account of contingent reality.

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<sup>9</sup> Wolff, *Ontologia*, §§866-881.

<sup>10</sup> Wolff, *Deutsche Metaphysik*, §§32, 42.

<sup>11</sup> On this point see: Reuscher (1977, p. 28).

On the basis of his principle of succession Kant claims indeed to be able to “utterly overthrow the Leibnizian pre-established harmony” (*NE*, AA 1: 412). But even as regards the relation between ground and determination, which Kant discusses in these lines, his criticisms do not actually affect the very Leibnizian conception. They are rather targeted against Wolff’s version of this relation.<sup>12</sup> Kant’s objection rests upon the fact that, once an essential ground internal to the substance is posed, a correspondent determination is in turn immediately and immutably posed. So, a pure internal change is not admitted. Nevertheless Leibniz, differently from both Wolff and Kant, rejects the contemporaneity between the position of the ground and that of the correspondent determination. This allows Leibniz to give reason of the change in terms of derivative rather than first causes.<sup>13</sup> However, the explanation of change in terms of first causes, or at least of essential grounds, is a goal pursued by both the Wolffians and Kant, though by different strategies. That is why the Leibnizian idealism is still unsatisfying for Kant’s purposes, even if the Kantian principle of succession does not substantially weaken Leibniz’s own position.

By the principle of succession Kant seems to claim that the sensible reality ultimately consists of primitive physical points endowed with physical forces that generate causal interactions. However, since these forces cannot be exposed to change, they cannot be identified with the particular forces that we can observe in our sensible experience. They seem rather to already coincide with the attractive and repulsive forces that Kant will treat in the *Physical monadology*.<sup>14</sup>

In this latter writing, differently from the Wolffian *atomi naturae* or the Leibnizian-Baumgartenian monads, the simplicity of Kant’s monads does not prevent them from consisting of parts. For Kant the simplicity of the physical monads consists rather in that even their eventual parts cannot be separated from one another, and such a definition of simplicity cannot be found in any other author of Kant’s time.<sup>15</sup> Nevertheless, once he poses this element of originality, at least programmatically, the development of the *Physical monadology* does not explain how the property of “consisting of parts, which cannot be separated from one another” actually characterizes the simple substance. Thus, in the end Kant’s definition of the simplicity of the physical monads still coincides with the Wolffian definition of simplicity as absence of parts.<sup>16</sup>

<sup>12</sup>See: Kaehler (1985, pp. 406-408).

<sup>13</sup>See in particular: Leibniz, *Système nouveau*. In: *Die philosophischen Schriften* 4: 477-487. On this point: Watkins (2005, p. 125).

<sup>14</sup> See: Watkins (2005, p. 129).

<sup>15</sup> See: Wolff (*Cosmologia generalis*, §§186-188), Baumgarten (*Metaphysica*, §§224, 230). On this point: Sarmiento (2005, p. 5).

<sup>16</sup> Pozzo-Oberhausen (2002, p. 354) argue Kant’s fundamental Wolffism in his early age on themes concerning the philosophy of nature not to be surprising, since both Leibniz and Newton are taught in this period in Königsberg through Wolffian manuals.



The second principle introduced by Kant in the third section of the *New elucidation*, namely the principle of co-existence, is actually presupposed by the principle of succession:

«Finite substances do not, in virtue of their existence alone, stand in a relationship with each other, nor are they linked together by any interaction at all, except in so far as the common principle of their existence, namely the divine understanding, maintains them in a state of harmony in their reciprocal relations». (*NE*, AA 1: 412-413)

Kant illustrates here the modalities of the causal nexus among the substances that is required in order for an internal change within any single substance to be possible. The limitation of this treatment to the contingent substances is expressed by the reference to the “finite” substances. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the insufficiency of the mere singular existence of substances for the determination of their mutual relations seems to put Kant’s position close to the doctrine of pre-established harmony. Indeed, if Kant would not maintain to have already ruled out this theory in the exposition of the principle of succession, passages like the following could be interpreted as totally consistent with Leibniz’s and Baumgarten’s position:

«Since, therefore, in so far as each individual substance has an existence which is independent of other substances, no reciprocal connection occurs between them; and since it certainly does not fall to finite beings to be the causes of other substances, and since, nonetheless, all the things in the universe are found to be reciprocally connected with each other - since all this is the case, it has to be admitted that this relation depends on a communality of cause, namely on God, the universal principle of beings». (*NE*, AA 1: 413)

The point on which Kant disagrees with Leibniz and Baumgarten is the real, and not merely ideal, nature of the relation among substances, a relation that is based upon their common dependence on the scheme of the divine understanding. However, the real nature of this relation was already stated in the treatment of the principle of succession, so Kant’s criticism is mainly focused on the insufficiency of the existence of substances in determining their mutual relations. For this reason, the target of Kant’s criticism should be identified with Crusius. Indeed, though Crusius admits the real nature of the relations among substances, he claims that God can only create substances, whose existence poses them *ipso facto* into a real relation.<sup>17</sup> On the contrary, Kant maintains that substances can also be created (with all their internal grounds) so that they have no mutual relations. In this case, the relations would be added later and independently from the internal grounds. Since the mere existence of substances does not necessarily imply their interaction [*commercium*], it can neither give reason of the determinations arising from this interaction, then “it is obvious that, if you posit a number of substances, you do not at the same time and as a result determine place, position, and space” (*NE*, AA 1: 414). Thus, the space occupied

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<sup>17</sup> See: C.A. Crusius, *Entwurf*, §327.

[*eingenommen*] or filled [*erfüllt*] by the substances now begins to play a significant role in the determination of the causal interaction among them.

## 2. The nature of space as a key-problem in the determination of the inter-substantial relations

As it is stated in the *New elucidation*, at point 5 of the *Application* of the principle of co-existence, the concept of space derives from the corporeal substances, and expresses their sensible relation, whose metaphysical ground is constituted by their dependence upon the divine causality. Here Kant mentions a “*notio spatii*”, which is reduced to the “interconnected actions of substances, reaction always being of necessity conjoined with such interconnected actions” (*NE*, AA 1: 415). Thus, though Kant assumes, with Leibniz, the derivative nature of space, he does not conclude, like Wolff, that space is merely subjective. Rather, following Newton, he attributes to the space a reality that makes it an essential element in the relations among the bodies. Indeed, Kant’s rejection of the ontological primacy of space on the physical substances stated by Newton does not prevent him from arguing that the external phenomenon of the universal relation among bodies “is called *attraction*. [...] Since it [the attraction] is brought about by co-presence alone, it reaches to all distances whatever, and is *Newtonian attraction* or universal gravity” (*NE*, AA 1: 415).

Here the force expresses the most authentic essence of causality once more. When Kant criticizes the theories of pre-established harmony and occasionalism, he turns back indeed on the value of the efficient causality, and explains that through the common dependence of substances upon God:

«One is equally justified both in saying that external changes may be produced in this way by means of efficient causes and also in saying that the changes which occur within the substance are ascribed to an internal force of the substance, although the natural power of this force to produce an effect rests, no less than the foundation of external relations just mentioned, on divine support». (*NE*, AA 1: 415).

However, it is surprising that in these last lines of the *New elucidation* Kant even seems to reject the theory of physical influx, which until this point had been defended both in its presuppositions and by the exclusion of the concurrent alternatives:

«[...] whatever determinations and changes are to be found in any of them [the substances], they always refer, indeed, to what is external. Physical influence, in the true sense of the term, however, is excluded. There exists a universal *harmony* of things». (*NE*, AA 1: 415)

But Kant is here simply rejecting a “rough” version of the physical influx, in which we can recognize Knutzen’s and Crusius’ versions. In the *Thoughts* Kant had indeed sarcastically mentioned an “acute author” (*Telf*, AA 1: 21), who was the main supporter of

the physical influx. In this metaphor, some scholars have with good reason recognized Knutzen.<sup>18</sup> His conception of the physical influx still consisted indeed in a mere action of one substance on the other, whose effect was the simple migration of an accident from one to the other, without the common dependence of the substances upon God to be required as presupposition and so without the “universal *harmony* of things”.<sup>19</sup>

As we have mentioned concerning the *Physical monadology*, the attempt to ground the physical influx in a new way is intrinsically linked to an innovative grounding of the theory of the simple substance. Despite Kant’s general adherence to a Wolffian theory of the simple substance in this period, some Leibnizian and Baumgartenian elements still remain. Indeed, when at the end of the *New elucidation* Kant tries to ground the relation among substances upon Newtonian concepts, he is nevertheless still refining a concept of “active force” that is basically Leibnizian. In order to overcome this position, which prevents him from embracing the Newtonian view, Kant has to scatter the theory according to which any activity of the substance can be reduced to one of its intrinsic properties. Starting from Kant’s version of the physical influx, a possible answer is in any case implicitly detectable at the end of proposition 7 of the *Physical monadology*. Here Kant maintains that the relational properties of the substance need the intrinsic properties to which they are referred in the same way the accidents need a substance (See: *PM*, AA 1: 482). At the same time, it is worth remembering what Kant has stated in the principle of succession of the *New elucidation*, namely that the changes inside the substance depend on the changes of its relations. Relations that, according to the principle of co-existence, embrace also “place, position and space” (*NE*, AA 1: 414). From these points we can argue that any contingent substance, which as such is exposed to changes, determines its own position in space by virtue of a plurality of relations that it establishes toward the other substances through the forces of impenetrability and attraction.

It is not coincidental that, since the lectures on metaphysics of the early 1760s, when enumerating the first concepts of metaphysics, Kant counts, next to the concepts that “cannot be reduced almost at all”—like “representation”, “contiguity” and “succession”—also space and time, which differently “can be only partially reduced” (See: *Met Herder*, AA 28: 155-158).<sup>20</sup> This testifies that, although Kant’s conception of space in this period is still relative, it is objective. That is Kant, like Baumgarten, counts the space among the first concepts of metaphysics. In the variety of the universe—states Kant—all the things have their own position [*Lage*] and the space seems to be divided by the things placed in it. Within space, it is possible to individuate places [*Orte*] coinciding with points, namely entities without parts. Therefore, no point within the space “occupies” a place. However, since we can state through direct experience that within space there are some positions, we must at the same time admit the existence of mutually external determinations [*äußere Bestimmungen*] corresponding to substances. Therefore, where there is no substance, there

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<sup>18</sup> See for instance: Kuehn (2001, 93).

<sup>19</sup> On the scheme of the divine understanding as the ground of the relations among substances a significant source of Kant is Ploucquet, *Principia de substantiis et phaenomenis*, §§200-202.

<sup>20</sup> See also: Ref 3716 (1762-1763), AA 17: 257.

is no space either. Thus, through the concepts of *Ort* and *Lage* Kant derives a *notio prima* of space as a relative concept that is required by the substances (See: *NDMR*, AA 2: 23-24 and *Met Herder*, AA 28: 29).

In the published writings of the late 1750s and the 1760s this conception of space is particularly relevant. In the *New doctrine of motion and rest* and the *Attempt to introduce the concept of negative magnitudes into philosophy*, for instance, it is placed in a wider discussion concerning the method of metaphysics. Even in the text in which such a discussion reaches its peak, namely the *Dreams of a spirit-seer*, the argumentative continuity with the problems treated in the *New elucidation* and *Physical monadology* is clearly detectable. In the *Dreams* Kant admits indeed the existence of simple material substances and tries to delineate by analogy with them the characteristics of eventual simple spiritual substances (See: *DSM*, AA 2: 323). By doing so, he is clearly integrating the perspective of the *Physical monadology*. In the *Dreams* he argues that, although even the presence in the space of the spiritual substances is mediated by the sphere of their activity, this presence is not a “filling”. Then Kant recalls some features linked to the relational conception of space that had been stated in the *Application* of the principle of co-existence and further developed in the lectures of the early 1760s (See: *DSM*, AA 2: 323-324).

Anyway, it is only two years later, in the writing on *The directions in space* (1768), that Kant marks a fundamental, though not definitive, progress in the elaboration of his peculiar version of physical influx. In this work Kant adheres indeed to Newton’s absolute conception of space, and acknowledges a particular reality to space, whose nature deserves to be further investigated (See: *DiS*, AA 2: 378).

### 3. *Influxus originarius and influxus derivativus*

Before considering the writing of 1768, we need to consider a *Reflexion* that comes soon after (between 1769 and 1770), in which Kant specifies that when speaking of “influx” we always need to admit the possibility of a direct influence of one substance on the other since “originally a substance cannot affect another substance, because substances do not suffer from one another, unless it is claimed that substances suffer from one another insofar as suffering is at the same time an action” (Ref 4217, 1769-1770, AA XVII 17: 461). Here Kant still adheres to the Baumgartenian thesis according to which even the suffering of one substance from another can only be represented by the suffering substance itself in the form of an action of its own, whose content expresses this suffering (See: *Met Herder*, AA 28: 51-53).<sup>21</sup> On the basis of this position Kant divides the physical influx into *original* [*originarius*] and *derivative* [*derivativus*], and states that “The former takes place if the formal ground [*ratio formalis*] is internal [*domestica*] to the substances; the latter if this ground is external [*peregrina*]”. The first case represents the influence that the substances could exert on one another only by virtue of their existence, and coincides with Knutzen’s and partially with Crusius’ models, both rejected by Kant. Insofar as this ground assumes

<sup>21</sup> See: Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, §§463.

instead a causal value, that is its effects go beyond the limits of the internal relations between the substance and its accidents<sup>22</sup>, it is a “cause external to the world” and coincides with an “extra-mundane being [*ens extramundanum*]”. Kant concludes that “The interaction [*commercium*] of the substances in the world is carried out through derivative influx, that is it is a natural interaction arising from a common dependence” (Ref 4217, 1769-1770, AA 17: 461). It is basically the principle already introduced in the *New elucidation*, according to which the interaction between the substances is based on their common dependence on the same creative cause. Here this principle explicitly alludes to the concept of “wholeness” [*universitas*], which will be thematised in the *Inaugural dissertation*. The *Reflexion* ends indeed with the statement: “The nature of the universe as such (since the whole nature is the nature of all the substances) consists in the conjunction and the completeness [*completudo*] (for this reason it is said wholeness [*universitas*] of the things)”. Thus, although the reality of a physical influx among substances, which is grounded on their dependence on a common cause, is for Kant here preferable to the ideal interaction proposed by pre-established harmony or occasionalism, nonetheless this solution still entirely depends on a fundamental supersensible assumption, like the divine causality.

Yet Kant had in 1768 already posed the key-concept for the foundation of his version of the physical influx, namely the absolute space as a condition of the sensible intuition. One may then ask what still retains Kant, almost two years after this text, from employing this concept of space in order to complete his version of the physical influx. With this concept he could indeed explain *how* the mutual interaction among substances is *concretely* realized. Nevertheless, there is a problem that affects the very concept of space, with respect to which, in the transition from the writing of 1768 to the *Inaugural dissertation*, Kant makes a decisive “correction”. If we indeed analyze the definition of the space provided in the *Inaugural dissertation*, we observe the disappearance of one of the predicates that characterized it in 1768: in 1770 there is no more reference to the “reality” of space (and time). Actually at the end of the writing of 1768 Kant had already admitted that this predicate of the space, though intuitive in the internal sense, created difficulties when one wanted to grasp it by “employing the ideas of reason” (*DiS*, AA 2: 383). In the *Inaugural dissertation* Kant speaks rather of “*conceptus spatii*” and “*idea temporis*” and associates them one another by the definition of the “*intuitus purus*” (*ID*, AA 2: 398-404). Compared to 1768, Kant seems to understand that, since space exists prior to the substances whose interaction is enabled by it, the “reality” of its function cannot be empirically established, but should rather lay in the understanding. Thus, between 1768 and 1770 the space keeps its absoluteness, in the context of a general adherence to the Newtonian model, but its peculiar reality is stated in the subjective and transcendently ideal sense that will also characterize it in the *CPR*. This transition is taking place exactly in the period of the *Reflexion* 4217, and it is therefore safe to assume that in that fragment Kant had not yet developed the concept of space as a form of the subjective intuition of the phenomena.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> See: *Ivi*, §§459ss.

<sup>23</sup> See: Ref 3950, AA 17: 362; 4077, AA 17: 405-406; 4078, AA 17: 406; 4086, AA 17: 409-410. All these *Reflexionen* date from 1769.

In the *Inaugural dissertation* this conception of space has immediate consequences on the emendation of the physical influx, which is one of Kant's goals. In §22 Kant claims indeed that the primitive interaction among substances, insofar as it rests upon "the subsistence founded on their common cause", gives room to a "*generally established*" harmony, whereas the harmony "which only occurs in virtue of the fact that each individual state of a substance is adapted to the state of another substance" is an "*individually established harmony*". The interaction arising from the first kind of harmony is "real and *physical*", while the second is "ideal and *sympathetic*" (*ID*, AA 2: 409). Kant adds that "physical influx (in its more correct form)" represents the most general form of the relations among substances in the world. He states that this interaction is always and unavoidably "*externally established*", even in the case in which it is "obtained individually for the states of each substance" (*ID*, AA 2: 409), which would be the case of pre-established harmony and occasionalism. Yet the fundamental distinction between the physical influx and the two alternative theories, that is what determines the reality of the first, again depends on the nexus that unites the mundane substances as all dependent on a single creative cause:

«Thus, if as a result of all substances being sustained by one being, the *conjunction of all substances*, in virtue of which they form a unity, were *necessary*, then there would be a universal interaction of substances by means of *physical influx*, and the world would be a real whole. But if not, the interaction would be sympathetic (that is to say harmony without true interaction), and the world would only be an ideal whole. For myself, indeed, although the former of these alternatives has not been demonstrated, it has nonetheless been rendered fully acceptable for other reasons». (*ID*, AA 2: 409)

Furthermore, although in the *Scholium* the space is defined as the "universal and necessary condition of the co-presence of all things", it can also be called "Phenomenal omnipresence [*Omnipraesentia phaenomenon*]". "For the cause of the universe"—Kant states indeed—"is not present to each and every thing simply in virtue of the fact that that cause is in places in which they are. It is rather the case that places exist, that is to say, that relations of substances are possible, because the cause of the universe is inwardly present to all things" (*ID*, AA 2: 410). Thus, we can maintain that the emendation of the physical influx that Kant mentions in §22 consists not only in the dependence of the substance on a common cause, but also in conceiving space as subjective form of intuition, an idea that in 1768 was not present yet.

On the one hand, the emendation of the theory of physical influx sketched in the *New elucidation* is here actually fulfilled, since Kant does not only avoid the mere migration of accidents from one substance to another, but he is also able to "think" the interaction among the substances through the conditions of their sensible relations. On the other hand, Kant still poses one of the principles of the sensible world, namely the space, as dependent on the formal principle of the intelligible world, namely the creative cause. Nonetheless, in 1770 this dichotomy is totally placed within the dimension of the knowing subject.

#### 4. Space as the form of God's omnipresence

From 1771 Kant deepens the model of 1770 as he recalls the juxtaposition between the terms “original” and “derivative”, and employs this set of terms not only for the concept on “influx”, but also for that of “interaction”. In a *Reflexion* of 1771 Kant specifies indeed that an original influx of one substance on the other can only be admitted without further “middle-substance”, so this original influx pertains “only the sustaining substance [*substantia sustentatrix*]”. Similarly, in case of an interaction, namely a “mutual influx”, no mundane substance could be supposed to have towards another substance such an original causal relation as the author of the whole world has towards the whole of the mundane substances. As a consequence “No interaction of substances [...] is original, each is derivative; insofar as it is sustained by something else” (Ref 4438, AA 17: 546). In a *Reflexion* of 1776-1778 Kant adds that “Physical influx is either naturally original or derivative, the latter is rational” (Ref 5422, AA 18: 178).

It is worth noting that here the derivative influx is defined as *rational* because Kant, close to the critical turn, feels the necessity of a comprehension of the totality that should be grounded on a conceptual representation of the subject, a representation that supposes the forms of the sensible intuition. Already in some *Reflexionen* of this age he had sketched the principle—then formalized in the *CPR*—according to which “the *a priori* conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience” (*CPR*, A111).<sup>24</sup> This principle well illustrates the new perspective from which Kant considers the problem. In the *CPR* he no longer speaks indeed of a *world*, but of *nature*, which could be either *materialiter spectata* as “lawfulness of appearances [*Erscheinungen*] in space and time”, or *formaliter spectata*, insofar as “all appearances [*Erscheinungen*] of nature, as far as their combination is concerned, stand under the categories”. Moreover he does not speak of “substances” anymore, but of “appearances” (that is phenomena), meant as “representations of things that exist without [we have] cognition of what they might be in themselves” (*CPR*, B163-166).<sup>25</sup> This overcoming of the dualism between sensible and intelligible world, as it was meant in the *Inaugural dissertation*, also enables Kant to overcome the classical objection against the physical influx of the soul on the body. He can indeed demonstrate that the pretended qualitative dualism between soul and body is actually fictive. Since we cannot know things as they are in themselves, it makes indeed no sense at all either pretending to know the essence of the simple substance, nor claiming about the heterogeneity between the material substance and the *res cogitans* (See: *CPR*, A389-396). Both the terms of this comparison should rather be brought on the same level, namely that of the representation of reality provided by the transcendental subject on the basis of his experience.

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<sup>24</sup> See also: Refl 4757 and 4758 (1775-1777), AA 27: 703-708.

<sup>25</sup> For the different senses in which Kant speaks of *world* and *nature*: see *CPR* A418-419/B446-447. See also: Afeissa (209, pp. 161-165).

This perspective is already recognizable both in the *Reflexionen* and the lectures on metaphysics of the end of the 1770s. Here Kant divides the derivative interaction in “hyperphysical influx”, which embraces pre-established harmony and occasionalism, and “physical influx”, which “refers to the laws of nature” (*Met L<sub>1</sub>* AA 28: 213).<sup>26</sup> These laws of nature correspond to the joint system of categories and pure intuitions that allows to conceive nature as a whole. Indeed, once Kant has established that the “connection” [*Verknüpfung*] between God and the world is a “connection of derivation” [*Verbindung der Ableitung*]<sup>27</sup>—which means that God is not entangled in the mutual determinations among the parts of the world (*Met L<sub>1</sub>*, AA 28: 212)—, he adds that space, as a phenomenon, “is the infinite connection of substances with each other” (*Met L<sub>1</sub>*, AA 28: 214). Of course the language in the lectures is more academic than in the printed works. This is the reason why Kant still talks about “substances”. Nevertheless, the critic approach is already clearly recognizable when Kant states that if we *sensibly* imagine the connection among substances—a connection that the purely intellectual approach limits to its divine foundation—then space is “the highest condition of the *possibility* of the connection” (*Met L<sub>1</sub>*, AA 28: 214). Therefore, space falls within the conditions of possibility that allow imagination to operate the transcendental synthesis by which a subject is able to represent nature as a whole “according to general laws” (See: *Met L<sub>1</sub>*, AA 28: 214 and *Met M<sub>rong</sub>*, AA 29: 868).

In his last course on metaphysics, in the mid-1790s, Kant maintains that Newton’s definition of space as the *organon* of God’s omnipresence is wrong, insofar as “space is nothing in itself; and cannot be thought as something in itself actually existent through the connection of things” (*Met Vig*, AA 29: 1007).<sup>27</sup> The harmony between substances, that is, the above mentioned relation “according to general laws” can be realized only as harmony *in commercio*, through the physical influx, and not as harmony *absque commercio*, that is, as one of the possible modes of the hyperphysical influx (*Met Vig*, 29: 1008).<sup>28</sup> The specific reality of space that Kant had already discerned between 1768 and 1770 can now be achieved through its integration with the general laws of the human understanding.

Since the *New elucidation* Kant had indeed meant to make use of Newton’s dynamics in order to account for the way in which the most original link between substances could be represented by the human understanding. In order to achieve this result, it was not enough for Kant to ascribe to space a reality which was ontologically prior to substances, since this would have put space at the noumenal level of that divine causality, of which it should be the intelligible expression. The specific relation between space and the divine omnipresence that Kant had discerned since his lectures of the early 1760s—when he had defined space as “the first act of the divine omnipresence” (*Met Herder*, AA 28: 103; *Nach. Met. Herder*, AA 28: 888)—is specified at the turn of the critical period, when he defines space as *one* phenomenon of the divine omnipresence (*Met L<sub>1</sub>*, AA 28: 347; *Met M<sub>ron</sub>*, AA 29: 866).

<sup>26</sup> See also: Ref 5428 (1776-1778): AA 18: 179.

<sup>27</sup> In this context Kant recalls a definition of space as “symbol” of this omnipresence. This definition was already present in Refl. 4208 (1769-1770), AA 17: 456.

<sup>28</sup> See also: *Met. Dohna*, 28: 665; *Met K<sub>2</sub>*, AA 28: 758.



Only in his last lectures, however, Kant deduces from the transcendental determination of space its definition as “*formal condition*” of the representation of nature as a *totum reale*. Here Kant achieves the passage that was foreshadowed in the *CPR*. Space is indeed no more conceived as a mere condition of the nature *materialiter spectata*, namely, as a condition of the mere simultaneous presence of all phenomena. It becomes “the *form* of the divine omnipresence”, insofar as this latter “is expressed *in the form* of a phenomenon, and *through* this omnipresence of God all substances are in harmony” (*Met Vig*, 29: 1008, emphasis added).<sup>29</sup>

Since space expresses in the phenomenal reality only the *form* of the divine omnipresence and it is not problematically defined as a phenomenon of this omnipresence *tout court*—that is, also of its *matter*—it is possible that all other phenomena are in harmony *through* space. One could ask how this can be concretely realized, insofar as this harmony should express the *real* totality of nature. But here, Kant concludes, our reason cannot see further.

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<sup>29</sup> See also: *Met K<sub>2</sub>*, AA 28: 732.

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**Os tons harmônicos e o “fundamento das representações”.**  
**Breve comentário a uma anotação de Kant sobre uma metáfora**  
**musical de Eberhard**

*Harmonics and the “ground of representations”.*  
*Kant on a musical metaphor from Eberhard. A brief commentary*

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**Resumo**

Nos *Vorarbeiten* para o *Streitschrift* contra Eberhard há uma anotação de Kant manuscrita com uma relativa abundância de vocábulos tomados à música. Estas quatro linhas são precedidas pela indicação um intervalo de páginas de texto não identificado. O presente artigo, revelando a fonte a que Kant indiretamente alude, comenta um “exemplo” musical de Eberhard contra a filosofia crítica, o mesmo que deu azo àquela anotação do filósofo. Após algumas considerações de ordem filológica atinentes ao vocabulário musical empregue por ambos os autores nos textos aqui em foco, seguir-se-á uma análise da metáfora em pauta e da sua eficácia argumentativa.

**Palavras-chave**

Kant; Eberhard; Metáfora musical; Harmônicos; Fundamento das representações

**Abstract**

In the *Vorarbeiten* to the *Streitschrift* against Eberhard there is a Kant's annotation with a relative abundance of vocables taken from the music. These four lines are preceded by mention of a page interval from an unidentified text. This paper, revealing the source to which Kant alludes indirectly, comments a musical “example” from Eberhard against critical philosophy, precisely the same that gave rise to this annotation of the philosopher. After some philological considerations on the musical vocabulary employed by both authors, I proceed to an analysis of the metaphor and their argumentative effectiveness.

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### Keywords

Kant; Eberhard; Musical metaphor; Harmonic; Ground of representations

### Introdução.

Soará porventura bizarro comentar uma anotação de Kant a uma metáfora<sup>1</sup> musical de Eberhard, quer em face da conhecida postura geral do filósofo associada à música – pouco elogiosa na economia das belas-artes<sup>2</sup> –, quer diante do substrato da não menos conhecida polêmica entre ambos,<sup>3</sup> na qual a “arte dos tons” não tem lugar. A despeito de tais fatos, é preciso notar que a metáfora proposta por Eberhard tem por objetivo uma questão nuclear de toda a filosofia transcendental, como também, por outro lado, que referências de natureza comparativa entre música e filosofia ou o emprego de metáforas musicais em contexto filosófico não representam, na época, uma estratégia retórico-argumentativa inusual, até para o próprio Kant (cf. Rancan de Azevedo Marques 2011). Neste mesmo sentido, já Lambert, no “Prefácio” ao seu *Novo Órganon*, (cf. Lambert 1764) introduz a música por meio do estudo geral dos “signos”, de vez que ela compõe “os modos restantes dos signos” relativamente aos quais, porém [para o caso da “música” como para o da “coreografia”, da “aritmética”, “álgebra” etc.], “a linguagem permanece sempre o repositório universal do nosso inteiro conhecimento”.<sup>4</sup> Em tal contexto,

«[o] primeiro modo de signos que podemos considerar – [...] – são as notas na música. Elas têm um considerável grau de perfeição, já que de pronto representam a altura do tom e a sua duração, e, por meio de alguns outros sinais, também o modo como ele deve ser

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<sup>1</sup> Embora Eberhard fale em “exemplo” [*Beyspiel*] [cf., aqui, n. 18], parece-me não haver incorreção nenhuma em tomar o mesmo como metáfora. A propósito, quando, no verbete “*Beyspiel*” da sua *Teoria Geral das Belas-Artes*, Sulzer conceitua tal expressão, “em sentido amplo” e “em sentido estrito”, sem nestes incluir “[die] *Metapher*”, creio, não obstante, esta possa ser tomada por um caso de “exemplo”, ao menos “*in weitläufigem Sinn*”; cf. Sulzer, Johann Georg. *Allgemeine Theorie der Schönen Künste*. Band 1. Leipzig, 1771; p. 165. Disponível em: <<http://www.zeno.org/Sulzer-1771/K/sulzer-1771-011-0165>> Acesso em: 26. set. 2015: «Toda representação do universal pelo particular pode, em sentido amplo, ser nomeada um exemplo, à medida que as fábulas de Esopo, as parábolas, as alegorias pertencem ao exemplo. Em sentido próprio, porém, o exemplo é um caso particular aduzido com a intenção que o universal do modo ou do gênero a que ele pertence seja convenientemente conhecido por este meio». [*Jede Vorstellung des Allgemeinen durch das Besondere, kann in weitläufigem Sinn ein Beyspiel genennet werden; in so fern gehören die aesopische Fabel, die Parabel, die Allegorie, zum Beyspiel. In der engeren Bedeutung aber ist es ein besonderer Fall, in der Absicht angeführt, dass das Allgemeinerer Art oder der Gattung, wozu er gehört, mit Vortheil daraus erkennt werde.*] Cf. *ibid.*: «*Metapher; Metaphorisch*». Disponível em: <<http://www.textlog.de/2787.html>> Acesso em: 06 out. 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Kant, KU, AA 05: 328: “[*“Die Tonkunst”*] hat, durch Vernunft beurtheilt, weniger Werth, als jede andere der schönen Künste”.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. *id.*, *Über eine Entdeckung, nach der alle neue Kritik der reinen Vernunft durch eine ältere entbehrlich gemacht werden soll*; cf. Kant, ÜE, AA 08: 187-251. Este opúsculo kantiano, o *Streitschrift* contra Eberhard, é conhecido em português como “Resposta a Eberhard”.

<sup>4</sup> Lambert 1764, “*Vorrede*” [as páginas do “Prefácio” não estão numeradas]: «*bleibt die Sprache immer das allgemeine Magazin unserer ganzen Erkenntniss*».

executado, assim como, no baixo contínuo, por meio de algumas cifras para tal finalidade, [elas representam] uma harmonia ou consonância de muitos tons». <sup>5</sup>

E, ainda:

«podemos observar – [...] – que esta possibilidade de comparar conceitos abstratos com sensações e, por meio disto, também com os seus objetos, mostra-nos de um modo mais próximo que é possível tornar figurável o nosso conhecimento, e particularmente os [conhecimentos] abstratos, representando-os por signos – [...] –. Mostramos na dianoilogia<sup>6</sup> – [...] – que a doutrina das inferências tornou-se figurada e as inferências podem ser designadas, e que *esta designação tem regras universais e rigorosas como as dos tons na música*». <sup>7</sup>

A passagem imediatamente acima, vê-se-o claramente, para além de revelar uma relação somente metafórica entre música e filosofia, toma a primeira como um certo padrão de “regras universais e rigorosas” para a segunda, facultando, assim, a hipótese de uma autêntica correlação funcional entre ambas, precisamente do ponto de vista semiótico.

Também Leibniz, nos “Princípios da Natureza e da Graça”, publicados em 1714, afirmava:

«A música encanta-nos, ainda que a sua beleza consista somente nas conformidades dos números e no cômputo, do qual não nos apercebemos, mas que a alma não deixa de fazer, dos batimentos ou vibrações dos corpos soantes, que ocorrem por meio de certos intervalos». <sup>8</sup>

Esta passagem, além de testemunhar a equivalência do seu conteúdo com a conhecida fórmula empregada pelo filósofo de Hannover em carta a Goldbach, de abril de 1712 [“A música é um exercício oculto de aritmética no qual a alma ignora que enumera”], <sup>9</sup> registra o tratamento metafórico da música no âmbito do conhecimento que nos é dado possuir de Deus, como um exemplo, entre outros, duma autêntica relação

<sup>5</sup>Lambert 1764, p. 16-17: «Die erste Art von Zeichen, die wir – [...] – betrachten können, sind die Noten in der Musik. Sie haben einen merklichen Grad der Vollkommenheit, weil sie mit einem male die Höhe des Tones und seine Dauer, und vermittelst einiger andern Zeichen auch die Art, wie er gespielt werden solle, desgleichen auch in dem Generalmaß vermittelst einiger darüber gesetzten Zählen, eine Harmonie oder Consonanz, mehrerer Töne vorstellen.»

<sup>6</sup>A “Dianoilogie” é a primeira parte do *Neues Organon* de Lambert, as demais sendo, respectivamente, a “Alethiologie”, a “Semiotik” e a “Phänomenologie”.

<sup>7</sup>Lambert 1764, p. 487; cf. *ibid.*, p. 73-74: «Wir können – [...] – anmerken, daß diese Möglichkeit, abstracte Begriffe mit Empfindungen, und dadurch auch mit ihren Objecten zu vergleichen, uns auf eine nähere Art anzeigt, daß es möglich ist, unsre Erkenntniß, und besonders die abstracte figürlich zu machen, und sie durch Zeichen vorzustellen [...] Wir haben in der Dianoilogie – [...] – gewiesen, daß die Lehre von den Schlüssen figürlich gemacht, und die Schlüsse gezeichnet werden können, und daß diese Zeichnung allgemeine und strengere Regeln habe, als die von den Tönen in der Musik.» [destaque meu]

<sup>8</sup>Leibniz 1714; p. 717-718: «La Musique nous charme, quoique sa beauté ne consiste que dans les convenances des nombres, et dans le compte, dont nous ne nous apercevons pas, et que l’âme ne laisse pas de faire, des battemens ou vibrations des corps sonnans, qui se rencontrent par certains intervalles.»

<sup>9</sup>Cf. Bailhache 1995: “*musica est exercitium arithmeticae occultum nescientis se numerare animi*”.

cognitiva, na qual, não obstante, o objeto conhecido não se encontra presente exteriormente:

«ainda que Deus não seja de modo nenhum sensível aos nossos sentidos externos, ele não deixa de ser muito amável e de dar um prazer muito grande. Vemos quanto as honras dão prazer aos homens, ainda que elas não consistam de modo nenhum nas qualidades dos sentidos externos. Os mártires e os fanáticos, ainda que a afecção destes últimos esteja mal-ordenada, mostram o que pode o prazer do espírito; e, ademais, os próprios prazeres dos sentidos reduzem-se a prazeres intelectuais confusamente conhecidos. A música encanta-nos *etc.*»<sup>10</sup>

Por fim, no conjunto de autores caros a Kant, às dimensões metafísica e semiótica nas quais a música é respectivamente considerada por Leibniz e por Lambert poder-se-á acrescentar ainda uma dimensão eminentemente técnico-estética na qual ela é abordada por Rousseau. (cf. Giordanetti 2001, p. 73; Rancan de Azevedo Marques 2014, pp. 39-50) Com isto, não se estranhará o filósofo tenha em conta a “arte dos tons” – inda que somente cá e lá –, e, para além de como elemento de consideração crítica na *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, também no âmbito do metaforismo musical, em particular o votado ao campo gnoseológico. Consoante tal fato, justificando-se a anotação do filósofo à metáfora musical de Eberhard pelo objetivo filosófico *anti-crítico* desta última, a especificidade que a distingue não poderia ser tomada por estranha ou mesmo excepcional, sendo, em verdade, inteiramente afim com a de não poucas passagens [musicais] do próprio *corpus* kantiano.

Com relação ao objeto propriamente dito do presente comentário, o objetivo deste não é a retomada da crítica de Eberhard à filosofia transcendental [nem a resposta dela a ele], tampouco as considerações de Kant sobre a estética musical. Trata-se aqui, em verdade, tão-só de explorar a metáfora apresentada por Eberhard contra Kant e a anotação do filósofo a ela. Consoante tal propósito, num primeiro momento farei algumas considerações de caráter filológico; em seguida, discutirei a metáfora proposta por Eberhard e a anotação de Kant a ela; por fim, por meio da *autodesconstrução* da metáfora musical eberhardiana, abordarei a sua eficácia filosófica propriamente dita.

### 1. A fonte da anotação de Kant e o vocabulário musical da metáfora de Eberhard

Nos “trabalhos-preparatórios”<sup>11</sup> para o então futuro texto da chamada “Resposta a Eberhard”, conforme a “Edição da Academia” dos “Escritos Reunidos” de Kant, há uma anotação do filósofo – a qual, depois, não estará neste mesmo escrito polêmico –

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<sup>10</sup> Leibniz 1840, p. 717: «quoique Dieu ne soit point sensible à nos sens externes, il ne laisse pas d'être très-aimable, et de donner un très-grand plaisir. Nous voyons combien les honneurs font plaisir aux hommes, quoiqu'ils ne consistent point dans les qualités des sens extérieurs. Les Martyres et les Fanatiques, quoique l'affection de ces derniers soit mal réglée, montrent ce que peut le plaisir de l'esprit: et, qui plus est, les plaisirs même des sens se réduisent à des plaisirs intellectuels confusément connus. La Musique nous charme etc.»

<sup>11</sup>Cf. Kant, “Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard”, AA 20: 355 e seguintes.

manuscrita com uma relativa abundância de vocábulos tomados à música.<sup>12</sup> Estas quatro linhas – e, nelas, as três ocorrências musicais que caracterizam tal anotação: “tons afins”; “tom-fundamental”; “tons-secundários” – são precedidas pela indicação de um intervalo de páginas [“p. 251-253”] de texto, ali, não identificado. Eis toda a passagem desta anotação de Kant:

«posto que os tons mais afins não são ouvidos junto com o tom-fundamental, os tons-secundários não têm, então, de estar na imaginação, mas fora de nós (portanto, o conhecimento musical não pertence à percepção)».<sup>13</sup>

Preliminarmente, uma observação com respeito à tradução de “*Schall*” e “*Ton*”. Em português, de modo geral, diz-se “som” para qualquer vibração, musical ou não. Em alemão, em contrapartida, utiliza-se “*Schall*” para “som” em geral, “*Ton*” para o som musical, donde, por exemplo, o subtítulo de uma “lição” de Kant: “Do som e dos tons”.<sup>14</sup> No presente texto, adotar-se-á “tom” para traduzir o alemão “*Ton*”.

Ao que parece, aquela nota de Kant não tem atraído a atenção dos comentadores [se é que o terá feito alguma vez], o que se pode explicar pelas características de forma e conteúdo que a envolvem: de modo especial, ela remete a texto cuja identidade não a acompanha – fazendo-o, ademais, por meio de considerações técnico-musicais um tanto breves –, e, de modo geral, no âmbito dos contra-ataques do filósofo aos seus primeiros detratores, ela não é exatamente relevante para a consolidação da filosofia transcendental.

Com respeito ao texto a que a anotação de Kant parece aludir, se se for ao *Magazine Filosófico* editado por Eberhard, e, então, ao terceiro fascículo do seu primeiro volume, publicado no mesmo ano [1789] deste fragmento do filósofo, encontrar-se-á nele um texto deste adversário da filosofia crítica, intitulado: “Aplicação Adicional da Teoria da Verdade Lógica ou da Validade Transcendental do Conhecimento Humano”.<sup>15</sup> Neste artigo,

<sup>12</sup>Na verdade, termos técnicos que a música compartilha com a física, especialmente com a acústica, ao menos no que tange a “*Nebentöne*” e a “*Grundton*”.

<sup>13</sup>Kant, “*Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard*”, AA 20: 358: «*weil die am meisten Verwandten [sic] töne [sic] nicht mit dem Grundton mitgehört werden so müssen die Nebentöne nicht in der Einbildungskraft sondern ausser uns seyn (also gehört musicalische Kenntniss nicht Wahrnehmung zu)*». Cf. *Deutsches Wörterbuch von Jacob Grimm und Wilhelm Grimm* [“*nebenton*”]: «*nebenton, m. gegensatz zu hauptton; grammatisch der tiefen, gegensatz zu hochton: der hochton der deutschen worte liegt auf der stammsilbe, der nebenton der affixe richtet sich nach der quantität des stammes. Weinh. mhd. gr. § 17; musikalisch der oberton, aliquotton Heyse fremdw. 32b.*» Por outro lado, se, no século XVIII, “*Oberton*” respondia pelo tom sustentado [elevado em meio tom] ou bemolizado [abaixado em meio tom] [cf., por exemplo: Hobert 1789, p. 54], no século XIX passaria a distinguir o tom harmônico; cf., por exemplo: Helmholtz 1863, p. 37.

<sup>14</sup>Cf. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Physik* [Mrongovius], AA 29: 146. Cf. id., KU, AA 05: 224: «*ein bloßer Ton (zum Unterschiede vom Schalle und Geräusch)*”; id., V-Lo/Philippi, AA 24: 342: “*Ich höre ein Geräusch, das ist gewiß eine zusammengesetzte Vorstellung, aber eine verworrene. Komme ich näher, und fange an die Stimmen in dem Lärm und zuletzt auch die Worte dieser Stimmen zu unterscheiden, so ist das eine deutliche Vorstellung.*» Cf. Sulzer 1771b[“*Klang*”]: «*Über die Bedeutung des Wortes Klang, merken wir noch an, dass der Schall, insofern er anhaltend und wohlklingend ist, mit dem Worte Klang, der Klang aber, insofern er hoch oder tief ist, mit dem Worte Ton bezeichnet wird. Man sagt nie, ein hoher oder tiefer Klang, sondern Ton. In Ansehung der Reinheit, sagt man zwar von einer einzelnen Saite, sie habe einen reinen Ton (besser Klang) aber von einem Instrument überhaupt, einer Violin oder einen Klavier, sie habe einen guten Klang.*»

<sup>15</sup>Eberhard 1789, pp. 243-262. Afora este artigo de Eberhard, dois outros textos publicados no “*Philosophisches Magazin*” estão na origem das demais anotações de Kant reunidas nos “*Vorarbeiten zur*



exatamente no intervalo entre as páginas “251” e “253” [as mesmas da anotação de Kant], Eberhard introduz um argumento em forma de “exemplo” musical, no qual se encontram os mesmos termos, o mesmo enredo e a mesma conclusão metafórica presentes naquela nota do filósofo. Na verdade, tendo-se em mente os vocábulos musicais empregados por um e por outro, os termos comuns a ambas as passagens reduzem-se a dois: “tom-fundamental” e “tons-secundários”.<sup>16</sup> Já com relação às respectivas conclusões, ver-se-á, elas equivalem-se à medida que se reportam ao exclusivo objeto do “exemplo” musical indicado por Eberhard, mas não, evidente, à medida que tal exemplo tem por objetivo último a própria filosofia crítica, alcance que, porém, não é, em tal anotação, tido em conta por Kant.

Com relação às expressões musicais utilizadas pelo filósofo neste seu apontamento, parece que “tons afins [*Verwandte töne* [*sic*]]” e “tons-secundários [*Nebentöne*]]” não foram mais empregues por ele. Com respeito a “tom-fundamental [*Grundton*]]”, parece haver somente sete outros registros de emprego dela por Kant,<sup>17</sup> sempre em contexto físico-musical. Por outro lado, os dois últimos daqueles termos [“tom-fundamental” e “tons-secundários”] aparecem, por exemplo, em tradução alemã – publicada em 1781 – do tratado “Do Sublime”, obra então ainda atribuída ao Pseudo-Longino. A passagem em questão, muito antes de Eberhard, de Kant e do inteiro século XVIII [estima-se hoje que o “Do Sublime” seja do século I d.C.] constitui um claro exemplo de metáfora musical, estabelecida, porém, neste caso, em proporção com a retórica.<sup>18</sup> Registre-se também que “tons afins” [“*verwandte Töne*”, bem como “*anverwandte Töne*”], “tom-fundamental” e “tons-secundários” são expressões razoavelmente contraditórias em obras escritas originalmente em alemão e publicadas no século XVIII, não só no âmbito da música.<sup>19</sup> Com respeito a “*Nebentöne*”, por fim, “tons-secundários” é expressão utilizada no vernáculo como referência aos sons harmônicos [tal como respectivamente ocorre, por exemplo, em espanhol, francês e italiano: “*sonidos secundarios*”; “*sons secondaires*”; “*suoni secondari*”<sup>20</sup>]. Nas passagens destacadas de Eberhard e de Kant, “tons afins” é

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*Schrift gegen Eberhard*: Anonym. 1788, pp. 150-174 [cf. Kant, “*Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard*”, AA 20: 357-359]; Anonym. 1789, pp. 263-289 [cf. Kant, “*Vorarbeiten zur Schrift gegen Eberhard*”, AA 20: 359].

<sup>16</sup>Conforme a ordem na qual no seu texto aparecem, Eberhard emprega os seguintes termos musicais: “*Grundton*”, “*Ton*”, “*Dreyklänge*”, “*Quinte*”, “*Nebenton*” / “*Nebentöne*”, “*Duodecima*”, “*Tertie*” e “*Decima septima*”. Kant, por sua vez: “*Verwandten* [*sic*] *töne* [*sic*]”, “*Grundton*”, “*Nebentöne*”.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Kant, Refl, AA 14: 394 [“*Grundton*” [uma ocorrência]; “*Grundthon*” [quatro ocorrências]]; id., AA 29: 149 [“*Grund Ton*” [duas ocorrências]].

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Longin 1781, pp. 181-182: «*Daß die Umschreibungen viel zum Erhabenen beitragen, wird niemand läugnen. Denn so wie in der Musik der Hauptton durch die Verbindung mit seinen Nebentönen lieblicher und harmonischer wird: so kann die Umschreibung den Hauptgedanken auch lieblicher und gefälliger machen, wenn sie anders nicht zu schreyend und unharmonisch, sondern gefällig und angenehm eingeflochten worden ist.*»

<sup>19</sup>Entre outras referências, cf. Meiner 1748, p. 6: «*Die Figuren der Nebentöne – [...] – nennt man Vocales, welche Benennung, ob sie gleich nicht die beste ist, wir deswegen behalten müssen, weil sie einmal eingeführet ist.*» Cf. Marpurg 1757, p. 8.

<sup>20</sup>Em espanhol, francês e italiano utilizam-se também, respectivamente: “*armónico*”; “*harmonique*”; “*armonico*” e “*ipertono*”. Em inglês, por outro lado, são empregados os vocábulos “*overtone*”, “*harmonic*” e “*partial tone*”. Em alemão, ao menos cinco outros termos ainda designam os sons harmônicos:

conceito empregado por este, mas não por aquele. Com isto, ver-se-á, interpretando “[os] tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica” como “tons mais afins”, Kant parece tomar uns e outros como “tons-secundários” ou tons harmônicos. De qualquer modo, “tons afins” e “tons-secundários” são mesmo expressões características dos tons harmônicos, o que, por sinal, comprova-se pela passagem seguinte, extraída da *História Geral da Música* do músico e musicólogo Johann Nikolaus Forkel, publicada em 1788:

«O benefício mais considerável que a música obteve por meio da acústica funda-se sobre a descoberta da simpatia dos tons. Posto que nenhum único som é completamente simples e sem uma certa sinfonia própria, interna; posto que cada tom, além do tom-fundamental, consoa também, ainda, tons que lhe são a princípio secundários, entre os quais os mais perceptíveis são as quintas, as oitavas e as terças maiores, a partir desta simpatia tomaram-se os fundamentos segundo os quais tons e acordes têm de desenvolver-se uns a partir dos outros».<sup>21</sup>

## 2. A estrutura da metáfora

O problema musicalmente exemplificado no escrito em pauta de Eberhard aponta para a suposta subjetividade psicológica – não, pois, transcendental, em sentido kantiano – das representações fenomênicas. Neste caso, a solução proposta por ele para a dificuldade contida no exemplo musical oferecido servirá para encarecer a sua postura acerca do problema de fundo que o preocupa; a saber:

«Nos objetos internos das representações há – [...] – algo de permanente que não é pensado como imaginário ou sensível. Mas alguns destes objetos são simultaneamente pensados como externos. Entre os objetos das nossas representações, portanto, há também alguns, de fato, externos? Podemos com alguma certeza atribuir-lhes uma realidade externa – uma possibilidade ou efetividade – para além da nossa capacidade de conhecimento?»<sup>22</sup>

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“Aliquottöne”; “Harmonische”; “Obertöne”, “Partialtöne”, “Teiltöne”. Por outro lado, creio muito provável que Kant tivesse conhecimento da teoria da vibração simpática, embora, assim parece, a ela não tenha feito referência em contexto musical. Cf. Kant, Anth, AA 07: 176: «*wir keine Kenntniß vom Gehirn und den Plätzen in demselben haben, worin die Spuren der Eindrücke aus Vorstellungen sympathetisch mit einander in Einklang kommen möchten, indem sie sich einander (wenigstens mittelbar) gleichsam berühren.*” “Einklang” é também “unísono».

<sup>21</sup>Forkel 1788, p. 30: «*Der beträchtlichste Vortheil, den die Musik durch die Akustik erhalten hat, gründet sich auf die Entdeckung der Sympathie der Thöne. Da kein einziger Klang ganz einfach, und ohne eine gewisse eigene innere Vollstimmigkeit ist; da jeder Ton ausser dem Haupttone auch noch die ihm zunächst verwandte Töne mittönt, worunter die Quinten, Octaven und grossen Terzen die merklichsten sind; so hat man aus dieser Sympathie die Gründe genommen, nach welchen sich Töne und Accorde aus einander entwickeln müssen.*»

<sup>22</sup>Cf. Eberhard, 1789, p. 244: «*In den innern Objekten der Vorstellungen ist also etwas Denkbare, das nicht als etwas Bildliches oder Sinnliches gedacht wird. Einige dieser Objekte werden aber zugleich als äussere gedacht: sind also unter den Gegenständen unserer Vorstellungen einige auch in der That äussere, können wir ihnen eine äussere Realität – eine Möglichkeit oder Wirklichkeit – ausser unserer Erkenntnisskraft mit einiger Gewissheit beilegen? Das ist die Frage, zu der wir nun vorrücken dürfen, ohne zu besorgen, dass wir im geringsten etwas übereilt haben.*»

Transposta a questão para o objeto do exemplo oferecido, trata-se de saber se o tom harmônico “é uma simples representação da imaginação ou uma sensação efetiva”;<sup>23</sup> se, representado pelo sujeito, a ele pode ser atribuída “uma realidade externa – [...] – para além da nossa capacidade de conhecimento”. Noutras palavras: trata-se de saber se o tom harmônico é obtido graças a um artifício da imaginação ou se é efetivamente percebido.

Colocação, desenvolvimento e solução do problema, tal como postas no “exemplo” musical de Eberhard, encontram-se assim expostas:

«Segundo a lei [da imaginação], uma sensação provoca outras [sensações] que são associadas com ela. Se, portanto, com a sensação do tom-fundamental, pode ser provocada a representação dos tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica, pode-se, então, perguntar: por que a quinta do tom-fundamental não é ouvida como tom-secundário junto dele, posto que, precisamente, a quinta é tão exatamente associada com o tom-fundamental quanto a duodécima, e inda mais exatamente associada com ele do que ela? [E, também, por que] não a terça, que, precisamente, é tão exatamente associada com o tom-fundamental quanto a décima-sétima, e inda mais exatamente associada com ele do que ela? O fundamento deste fenômeno, portanto, não é subjetivo, não estando em nenhuma lei do sujeito percipiente; ele, portanto, tem de ser objetivo. Ou seja: não temos de simplesmente imaginar os tons-secundários, [mas] temos de senti-los, temos de efetivamente ouvi-los. Temos, portanto, razão para concluir que o fundamento das representações não pode ser subjetivo, [mas] tem de ser um [fundamento] objetivo».<sup>24</sup>

Preliminarmente, observe-se que, reconstruída a argumentação por ele disposta, a conclusão inicial negativa apresentada por Eberhard no âmbito do exemplo musical proposto [“O fundamento deste fenômeno [a saber: a razão pela qual há tons-secundários ou harmônicos [U.R.]] – [...] – não é subjetivo, não estando em nenhuma lei do sujeito percipiente”] implicará um caso de falácia da negação da antecedente: se A [“com a sensação do tom-fundamental [pode] ser provocada a representação dos tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica”], então B [o “fenômeno” da série harmônica está assentado em “fundamento” subjetivo; a saber: na imaginação]; não-A [“com a sensação do tom-fundamental [não pode] ser provocada a representação dos tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica”], então não-B [o “fenômeno” da série harmônica não está assentado em “fundamento” subjetivo *etc.*] Mas, independente do raciocínio vicioso, a conclusão é

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<sup>23</sup>Eberhard 1789, p. 251: «*eine blosser Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, oder eine wirkliche Empfindung sey*».

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 252-253: «*Nach dem Gesetze der erstern [der Einbildungskraft] erregt eine Vorstellung andere, die mit ihr vergesellschaftet sind. Wenn also mit der Empfindung des Grundtones die Vorstellung der übrigen Töne, die zu dem harmonischen Dreyklange gehören, kann erregt werden: so kann man fragen, warum die Quinte des Grundtones nicht als Nebenton mit ihm gehört wird, da sie eben so genau und noch genauer mit ihm vergesellschaftet ist, als die Duodecima; nicht die Tertie, die eben so genau und noch genauer mit dem Grundtone vergesellschaftet ist, als die Decima septima? Der Grund von dieser Erscheinung ist also nicht subjektiv, er ist in keinem Gesetze des empfindenden Subjektes; er muss also objektiv seyn; das heisst: wir müssen uns die Nebentöne nicht bloss einbilden, wir müssen sie empfinden, wir müssen sie wirklich hören. Wir haben also Recht zu schliessen, der Grund der Vorstellungen, der kein subjektiver seyn kann, muss ein objektiver seyn.*»

verídica; pois, de fato, quer o fundamento da série harmônica, quer, de modo geral, o “fundamento das representações”, um e outro estão *objetivamente* assentados, a diferença entre Eberhard e Kant a propósito sendo a um tempo terminológica – pela equivocidade de “subjetivo” e “objetivo” – e filosófica – pelos pressupostos de cada qual.

Com relação ao “exemplo” musical apresentado por Eberhard, ele, noutras palavras, afirma que: se eu somente imaginasse as sensações secundárias, se, pela mera ocasião do “tom-fundamental”, elas fossem provocadas em mim, todas seriam subjetivamente fundadas. Em tal caso, os “tons-secundários” não seriam “efetivamente” ouvidos. Mas, se assim fosse, eu deveria poder ouvir a “quinta” e a “terça” do tom-fundamental – o que, porém, não ocorre. Tal não ocorrendo, este fato – sempre segundo Eberhard – evidencia a constituição não subjetiva dos “tons-secundários”, conduzindo indiretamente à certeza da sua constituição objetiva.

A base da argumentação assenta-se em que seria contraditório os tons *mais-próximos-do-tom-fundamental* [a saber: a terça e a quinta, conforme a passagem em causa] não serem também *mais-audíveis* frente aos *menos-próximos-do-tom-fundamental* [a saber: a décima-sétima e a duodécima, conforme a passagem em causa], e, pois, *menos-audíveis*.

Mas a hipótese, salvo engano, será falaciosamente construída, igualizando duas ordens entre si distintas: a espacial – com o *mais-próximo-do-tom-fundamental* e o *mais-distante-do-tom-fundamental* – e a auditiva – com o *mais-audível* e o *menos-audível* [ou, também: o *audível* e o *não-audível*]. Denunciando o aparente duplo contrassenso de o *mais-distante* ser *audível* e de o *mais-próximo* não o ser, Eberhard não terá feito conta do erro lógico cometido, tendo-lhe importado tão-só o *terminus ad quem*; ou seja: o estabelecimento da tese que “o fundamento das representações não pode ser subjetivo, [mas] tem de ser um [fundamento] objetivo”.

Do ponto de vista físico, a chamada série harmônica é a representação de frequências múltiplas inteiras, que, nelas próprias, relativamente a um tom para elas fundamental, são simultâneas ao infinito. Do ponto de vista musical, a mesma série harmônica é a representação de tais frequências sob a forma de notas musicais. Do ponto de vista filosófico, em atenção ao objetivo da metáfora musical proposta por Eberhard e tida em conta por Kant, a questão é mostrar que, tal como os harmônicos são *realmente reais*, assim também o fundamento dos fenômenos, que, como eles, não podem ser subjetivamente criados.

A ordem de tons e semitons das escalas é obtida a partir da seriação inscrita na representação musical da série harmônica, via reordenação aproximadora dos harmônicos. Assim, do ponto de vista da disposição dos tons na escala diatônica, tomada a tônica como “tom-fundamental”, a “terça” é indubitavelmente mais próxima dele – ou “inda mais exatamente associada” com ele, nas palavras de Eberhard – do que do mesmo o é a “décima-sétima”, o mesmo se dando com a “quinta” [mais próxima dele] e a “duodécima” [dele mais distante]. Com isto, do fato de, *do ponto de vista da notação musical e no âmbito da escala diatônica*, poder-se falar da terça e da quinta como mais-próximas-do-tom-fundamental do que dele o sejam a duodécima e a décima-sétima, Eberhard infere que

também do *ponto de vista físico* tal correlação igualmente se dê. Assumido este paralelismo indevido entre a *naturalidade* do ponto de vista físico e a *artificialidade* do ponto de vista musical, o passo seguinte, subentendido, reza que, fosse subjetiva, calcada na imaginação, a constituição da série harmônica decerto contemplaria a audição da terça e da quinta do tom-fundamental, por aquelas lhe serem *naturalmente* próximas. Tal não tendo lugar, contudo, provar-se-á com isto o não-subjetivismo da série, que, então, será objetivamente constituída, dependente dum acesso direto às próprias coisas; vale dizer: às *coisas em si mesmas* [*Dinge an sich selbst*].

De fato, no que se refere à sua constituição própria, não é devido à “sensação do tom-fundamental” que “pode ser provocada a representação dos tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica”, pois a formação de qualquer série harmônica, sempre dependente do tom que nela seja o “tom-fundamental”, independe da “sensação do tom-fundamental” [destaque meu], a qual diz respeito à *percepçionalidade* do sujeito, não à *constitutividade* do objeto. Noutras palavras: não é pelo fato de eu *ouvir* um determinado tom-fundamental que a ele seguir-se-á, subjetivamente provocada em mim pela minha imaginação, uma série de tons cujas frequências sejam múltiplos inteiros da frequência do tom-fundamental. Se assim fosse, a origem de tais tons seria subjetiva, não objetiva. Mas do fato de assim não ser, de modo nenhum se segue – do ponto de vista kantiano – uma objetividade empiricamente assentada, fundada na sensação direta das próprias coisas.

### 3. A anotação de Kant e a eficácia argumentativa da metáfora eberhardiana

Recordemos a anotação de Kant a propósito do “exemplo” musical de Eberhard: “posto que os tons mais afins não são ouvidos junto com o tom-fundamental, os tons-secundários não têm, então, de estar na imaginação, mas fora de nós (portanto, o conhecimento musical não pertence à percepção)”.

Menos do que uma reflexão autêntica acerca do “exemplo” de Eberhard ou uma análise própria da questão musical nele abordada, a anotação de Kant será uma sinopse do mesmo, tal como destacado na tabela seguinte:

[1] “por que a quinta do tom-fundamental não é ouvida como tom-secundário junto dele? – [...] – [E, também, por que] não a terça [...]?”

[2] “não temos de simplesmente imaginar os tons-secundários”

[3] “o fundamento das representações não pode ser subjetivo, [mas] tem de ser um [fundamento] objetivo.

[4] “O fundamento deste fenômeno, portanto, não é subjetivo, não estando em nenhuma lei do sujeito percipiente”

[1] “posto que os tons mais afins não são ouvidos junto com o tom-fundamental”.

[2] “os tons-secundários não têm – [...] – de estar na imaginação”.

[3] “[os tons-secundários têm de estar [U.R.]] fora de nós”.

[4] “(portanto, o conhecimento musical não pertence à percepção)”.

No último período do seu exemplo musical, Eberhard afirma: «Temos, portanto, razão para concluir que o fundamento das representações não pode ser subjetivo, [mas] tem de ser um [fundamento] objetivo».

Tal conclusão, que *desmetaforiza* o exemplo escolhido, remete à questão que levava a este; a saber:

«Entre os objetos das nossas representações, – [...] – há também alguns, de fato, externos? Podemos com alguma certeza atribuir-lhes uma realidade externa – uma possibilidade ou efetividade – para além da nossa capacidade de conhecimento?»

Na autoapreciação de Eberhard sobre o seu próprio exemplo, por sinal, confirma-se o objetivo nuclear do mesmo:

Desenvolvi propositadamente de modo tão extenso este exemplo, pois ele parece-me apresentar sob uma luz muito clara a racionalidade do procedimento segundo o qual a sã razão admite objetos externos como causa de algumas das nossas representações.<sup>25</sup>

Com respeito àquela mesma conclusão, ainda, o problema remeterá obliquamente a Hume e à conhecida questão da “tonalidade ausente de azul”,<sup>26</sup> à qual, parece, o próprio Eberhard terá aludido. Com efeito, não sendo devido à “sensação do tom-fundamental” que “pode ser provocada a representação dos tons restantes que pertencem à tríade harmônica” [diferentemente do que ocorre com a “tonalidade ausente de azul”, presentificada sem apelo à experiência, mas pelo simples recurso à imaginação], “a caracterização humeana das impressões ou sensações deixa-nos aqui completamente a nu”.<sup>27</sup> Pois, fossem os harmônicos tomados como as tonalidades de azul do exemplo de Hume, a ausência de um entre outros efetivamente ouvidos deveria ser logo compensada pela atividade imaginativa. A despeito de assim não ocorrer, a argumentação pelo grau de proximidade dos harmônicos para com o tom-fundamental, cujo propósito é recusar a composição subjetiva da série harmônica, opera no registro gnoseológico da “tonalidade ausente de azul”, como se, entre o primeiro harmônico ou tom-fundamental e o segundo [a primeira oitava dele], a

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<sup>25</sup>Cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 253: «*Ich habe dieses Beyspiel geflissentlich so weitläufig ausgeführt; weil es mir die Vernunftmässigkeit des Verfahrens, wonach die gesunde Vernunft zur Ursach einiger unserer Vorstellungen äussere Gegenstände annimmt, in einem sehr hellen Lichte darzustellen scheint.*»

<sup>26</sup>Cf. Hume 1902, p. 21: «*Suppose – [...] – a person to have enjoyed his sight for thirty years, and to have become perfectly well acquainted with colours of all kinds except one particular shade of blue, for instance, which it never has been his fortune to meet with. Let all the different shades of that colour, except that single one, be placed before him, descending gradually from the deepest to the lightest; it is plain that he will perceive a blank, where that shade is wanting, and will be sensible that there is a greater distance in that place between the contiguous colours than in any other. Now I ask, whether it be possible for him, from his own imagination, to supply this deficiency, and raise up to himself the idea of that particular shade, though it had never been conveyed to him by his senses?*»

<sup>27</sup>Cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 252: «*Das Humische Kennzeichen der Impressionen oder Empfindungen lässt uns hier – [...] – völlig im Blossen.*»

imaginação, fosse a série subjetivamente composta, devesse por si própria suprir a falta da terça e da quinta.

Por outro lado, na mesma conclusão *desmetaforizada* do exemplo de Eberhard, reencontramos o *Leitmotiv* de tanta crítica sua à filosofia transcendental, presente na própria sequência do seu mesmo artigo, e, obviamente, o mote que o anima.<sup>28</sup> Não é por outra razão que, na “Resposta a Eberhard”, referindo-se a este texto [mas nada ali dizendo a respeito da metáfora musical neste presente], Kant afirma:

«Na página 258 [nos números 3 e 4], o Senhor Eberhard diz: ‘Espaço e tempo, além dos fundamentos subjetivos, têm também fundamentos objetivos, e estes fundamentos objetivos não são nenhuns fenômenos, mas coisas verdadeiras, cognoscíveis’. Na página 259: Os seus fundamentos últimos são coisas em si’. Tudo o que a Crítica igualmente afirma, literal e repetidamente».<sup>29</sup>

Evidentemente, só se poderá anuir com que ali se encontre «[t]udo o que a Crítica igualmente afirma, literal e repetidamente», se se puser de lado a equivocidade filosófico-terminológica de “subjetivo” e “objetivo”. Noutras palavras: se os significados de um e outro valessem univocamente para os dois autores, se estes confluíssem com o novo conceito de experiência operado pela filosofia transcendental.

<sup>28</sup>Cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 254-259.

<sup>29</sup>Kant, ÜE, AA 08: 207: «S.258, No.3 und 4 sagt Herr Eberhard: »Raum und Zeit haben außer den subjectiven auch objective Gründe, und diese objective Gründe sind keine Erscheinungen, sondern wahre, erkennbare Dinge«; S.259: »Ihre letzten Gründe sind Dinge an sich«, welches alles die Kritik buchstäblich und wiederholentlich gleichfalls behauptet.» De fato, na página “258” do seu artigo, reportando-se em quatro pontos à “teoria leibniziana”, Eberhard assim dizia nos dois últimos: «3) além de fundamentos subjetivos, eles [espaço e tempo [U. R.]] têm também fundamentos objetivos; 4) e estes fundamentos objetivos não são nenhuns fenômenos, mas coisas verdadeiras cognoscíveis.» [Eberhard 1789, p. 258: «3) sie haben außer den subjektiven auch objektive Gründe; 4) und diese objektiven Gründe sind keine Erscheinungen, sondern wahre erkennbare Dinge.»] E, na página 259 do mesmo escrito, como título da sua última seção [“3”], lia-se: «Os objetos das percepções externas não são simplesmente objetos internos, mas também externos, e os seus fundamentos últimos são coisas em si.» [Eberhard 1789, p. 259: «Die Gegenstände der äußern Empfindungen sind nicht bloß innere Gegenstände, sondern auch äußere, und ihre letzten Gründe sind Dinge an sich.»] Na verdade, os quatro pontos definidos por Eberhard como decorrentes da “teoria leibniziana” sucedem, no seu texto, a quatro outros pontos que, segundo ele, correspondem à “teoria do Senhor Kant” [cf. Eberhard 1789, p. 257]: «1) Espaço e tempo são as formas da intuição sensível de todo o nosso conhecimento. Traduzimos isto [da seguinte forma]: eles são os conceitos mais simples da mesma, os elementos de que ela é composta; 2) eles são completamente indissolúveis em algo de conhecido; 3) estas formas da intuição sensível ou estes conceitos simples têm fundamentos simplesmente subjetivos; 4) eles, portanto, são simples fenômenos, sem nada que não [seja] fenômeno, ou, como o nomeia o Senhor Kant, [sem] uma coisa em si; isto é: uma coisa verdadeira, um *ovtwos ov* do qual nós nada conhecemos.» [Eberhard 1789, pp. 257-258: «1) Raum und Zeit sind die Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung aller unserer Erkenntniß; wir haben das übersetzt: sie sind die einfachsten Begriffe derselben, die Elemente, woraus sie zusammengesetzt ist; 2) sie sind in irgend etwas erkennbares völlig unauflöslich; 3) diese Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung, oder, diese einfachen Begriffe, haben bloß subjektive Gründe; 4) sie sind also bloße Erscheinungen, ohne irgend etwas, das nicht Erscheinung, oder, wie es Hr. Kant nennt, ein Ding an sich, d. i., ein wahres Ding, ein *ovtwos ov* ist, von dem wir irgend etwas erkennen.»]

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## The ‘principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions’ in Kant’s Practical Philosophy

### *El ‘principio de igualdad que gobierna las acciones y reacciones’ en la filosofía práctica de Kant*

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#### Abstract

Kant’s “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” (8:26) belongs not only to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences* (1786), but also to his practical philosophy. Kant’s *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784) and *On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice* (1793) may contribute to the understanding of the “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” in the latter writing, and vice-versa. Referring to all three, this paper tries to show that, in the context of his concept of right, Kant understands the principle of the equality of action and reaction in two different senses, which he combines: a *dynamic* one and a *legal* one.

#### Key words

Equality of action and counter-action; Nature; Rights; Natural Sciences

#### Resumen

El “principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones” (AA 08: 26) pertenece no solo a *Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza* (1786), sino también a su filosofía práctica. *Idea de una historia universal en clave cosmopolita* (1784) y *Acerca del dicho común: algo puede*

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*ser válido en teoría, pero no es válido para la práctica* (1793) de Kant pueden contribuir a la comprensión del “principio de igualdad que gobierna acciones y reacciones” en el último escrito, y viceversa. Teniendo en cuenta los tres, este artículo intenta mostrar que, en el contexto de su concepto de derecho, Kant entiende el principio de la igualdad de acción y reacción en dos sentidos distintos combinados: uno *dinámico* y otro *legal*.

### Palabras clave

Igualdad de acción y reacción; naturaleza; derechos; ciencias naturales

Kant’s “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” (IaG, AA 08: 26) belongs not only to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences* (1786), but also to his practical philosophy. One finds a practical version of this principle in his *Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose* (1784), in *On the Common Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, but it is of no Use in Practice* (1793) and in his *Doctrine of Right* (1796). The two former shorter writings of his practical philosophy may contribute to the understanding of the “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” in the latter longer writing, and vice-versa. Referring to all three, I would like to show that, in the context of his concept of right, Kant understands the principle of the equality of action and reaction in two different senses, which he combines: a *dynamic* one and a *legal* one.

In the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant defines the concept of right as “[...] the sum of the conditions under which the choice (*Willkür*) of one can be united with the choice of another *in accordance with a universal law of freedom.*” (RL, AA 06: 230) In the schematization that immediately follows the presentation of his concept of right, Kant offers two analogies which help considerably understanding what the “sum of the conditions” are in this formulation of his concept. One is a *physical* – and more precisely a dynamic – analogy, while the second is a *geometrical* one. Kant claims that the second one underlies the first.

### 1. The dynamic analogy

[*First analogy*] «The law of a reciprocal coercion necessarily in accord with the freedom of everyone under the principle of universal freedom is, as it were, the construction of that concept, that is, the presentation of it in pure intuition a priori, by analogy with presenting the possibility of bodies moving freely under the law of the equality of action and reaction». (RL, AA 06: 232)

This analogy is physical, because it combines elements of geometry that rely on space as a condition a priori of experience, as shown in the “Transcendental Aesthetics”, with a category, i.e., with a concept a priori, which is the category of reciprocal action.

[*Second analogy*] «A right line (*rectum*), one that is straight, is opposed to one that is curved on the one hand, and to one that is *oblique*, on the other hand. As opposed

to one that is curved, straightness is that position of a line toward another intersecting or touching it such that there can be only one line (the perpendicular), which does not incline more to one side than to the other and which divides the space on both sides equally. Analogous to this, the doctrine of right wants to be sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical exactitude)». (RL, AA 06:233)

Interestingly enough, at first sight, the geometrical analogy does not seem to coincide with the dynamic analogy. In fact, the geometrical representation of action and counter-action or power of resistance – if one puts aside any friction forces and any force of gravity – are segments located on the same line; action and counter-action are differentiated only by their opposite direction as well as by the length of the segments. In the dynamic analogy, there is no perpendicular line. Transcribed in legal concepts, the two analogies have different meanings.

The *physical* analogy takes as a starting point a certain distribution of “mine”, i.e., of the rights allocated to individual persons. This can be represented as one of the two end points of a line segment, on which the “possibility of body moving freely under the law of equality of action and reaction” (RL, AA 06: 222) is represented. One can interpret the analogy in at least two different ways. A *first* interpretation corresponds to the case of the “authorization to coerce who infringes upon” right (*Befugnis, den, der ihm Abbruch tut, zu zwingen*). In the *Doctrine of Right*, this case is mentioned in §D, that is, just before the two analogies. The legally wrong action violates this distribution, and its effect is represented by the second end point of the line segment. According to the §D of the *Doctrine of Right*, the reaction corrects the violation so that the *status quo ante* is restored and the cursor is brought back to the first end point.

Now, one should notice *two* aspects of the analogy.

The *first* one is that, in the *Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Sciences*, the “principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions” does not mean that any time a body A hits another body B located at a position  $x_1$  and moves it to the position  $x_2$ , a reaction will follow this action and relocate the body B at the position  $x_1$ . In fact, according to the *Metaphysical Foundation of Natural Sciences*, the final position after the reaction has occurred depends on the mass of the bodies. More precisely, the movement of the bodies after the choc stands in reverse proportion to the mass of the bodies (“in inverse ratio to their masses”, “*in umgekehrtem Verhältnis der Masse*”, MAN, AA 04: 545). Both aspects are absent from the dynamic analogy of the *Doctrine of Right*. Thus, one should adopt a *second* interpretation: According to the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences*, each immobile distribution is constantly the result of opposite forces exercised by bodies of unequal masses. Now, whether there is a hit or impact or not, that is, whether the *first* or the *second* interpretation is valid, neither in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences* nor in the first analogy does Kant assume in the merely dynamic

principle of equality of action and reaction the existence of an equality of the persons and of their physical and intellectual capacities to act. On the contrary, like non-human bodies, human beings do not have an equal mass, i.e., strength. Such an inequality exists also in the civil state, as is shown by Kant’s characterization of the “federation of peoples” which he considers as the “law-governed external relationship” (IaG, AA 08: 24) between states in the *Idea*:

«[...] a federation of peoples in which every state, *even the smallest* [my emphasis, JCM], could expect to derive its security and rights *not from its own power* [my emphasis, JCM], but solely [...] from a united power and the law-governed decisions of a united will.» (IaG, AA 08: 24)

The *second* remarkable aspect of the physical analogy is that the human persons are presented as “bodies moving freely” (DR, AA 06: 232). This contrasts with the presentation of the way “unsocial sociability” exercises its action. In the state of nature, unsocial sociability inspires the “desire for honor, power or property” (IaG, AA 08: 21) (*Ehrsucht, Herrschsucht oder Habsucht*), and leads the human being to expect “resistance all around, just as he knows of himself that he is in turn inclined to offer resistance to others.” (IaG, AA 08: 21) However, unsocial sociability results in what the *Common Saying* calls the “will to subjugate one another or to diminish what belongs to another”, i.e., to destroy another. Now, when either subjugation or destruction occurs between two persons, there are no longer two “bodies moving freely” (DR, AA 06: 232) in their relationship to one another, and there is no longer any impact nor any touch. This situation is incompatible with the analogy of the ‘principle of equality governing the actions and counter-actions’. In fact, in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences*, Kant develops a concept in which each body has a force of extension, so that body B hit by body A is not inert, but resists body A:

«[In an impact,] it is clear that the resting body does not, merely as resting, acquire motion lost by the impacting body, but that, in the collision, it exerts actual forces on the latter in the opposite direction, so as to compress, as it were, a *spring* between the two, which requires just as much actual motion on its part (but in the opposite direction) as the moving body itself has need of for this purpose». (MAN, AA 04: 549)

In the concept of right, the force of the individuals is moved by freedom, but this freedom acts on other free individuals in the same way as any body acting freely. On the contrary, if the individual is subjugated, she no longer moves freely, but only as dependent on another body, on which she cannot not longer hit or impact. The same applies in the case of the destruction of other individuals, for instance in war. Now, both subjugation and war are opposed to the concept of right in the *Idea of a Universal History* because they contradict the free coexistence of individuals:

«All wars are accordingly so many attempts [...] to bring about new relations between states, and, by the destruction or at least the dismemberment of old entities, to create new ones». (IaG, AA 08: 24f.)

Also the “prerogative of the rank” contradicts the concept of right and the principle of equality between action and reaction, as Kant explains in the *Common Saying*:

«[A member of the commonwealth] may bequeath anything else, whatever is a thing (not pertaining to personality) and can be acquired as property and also alienated by him, and so in a series of generations produce a considerable inequality of financial circumstances among the members of a commonwealth (of hireling and hirer, landowners and agricultural laborers, and so forth); but he may not prevent their being authorized to raise themselves to like circumstances if their talent, their industry, and their luck make this possible for them. For otherwise he could coerce without others in turn being able to coerce him by their reaction, and would rise above the level of a fellow subject. Again, no one living in a rightful condition of a commonwealth can fall from this equality otherwise than by his own crime». (VATP, AA 08: 293)

If we summarize the two aforementioned points, the elements of the analogy are (1) that the concept of right guarantees the conservation of the bodies against mutual danger, and (2) that the danger that equality of action and reaction may lead to situations contrary to the return to the *status quo ante* after the impact because of the difference of forces between the individuals, is overcome by legal constraint exercised by a “universal law of freedom” into a restoration of the *status quo ante*, so that the only possible movements are free movements in the sense in which they are freely intended or accepted by all agents involved. The only way to reconcile the dynamic principle of the equality of action and reaction with the legal equality of action and reaction is the following: Through the constraint (*Zwang*) exercised by the state, the stronger individual diminishes his freedom of action to the extent needed for the weaker individual to enjoy the same freedom of action. In other words, the dynamic analogy has to be backed by an analogy expressing the legal equality of action and reaction. The latter is the geometrical analogy. Three years before the *Doctrine of Right*, the *Common Saying* expresses this in a more concise form:

«For all right consists merely in the limitation of the freedom of every other to the condition that it can coexist with my freedom in accordance with a universal law, and public right (within a commonwealth) is merely the condition of an actual legislation in conformity with this principle and joined with power, by virtue of which all those belonging to a people as subjects are in a rightful condition (*status iuridicus*) as such, namely a condition of equality of action and reaction of a choice limiting one another in conformity with a universal law of freedom (which is called the civil condition)». (VATP, 08: 293)

## 2. The geometrical analogy

Let us now inquire into the *geometrical* analogy. It does not take a certain distribution as a starting point. Instead, the geometrical analogy determines the distribution between two choices, that is, external freedoms: “[...] to be sure that what belongs to each has been determined (with mathematical exactitude).” (RL, AA 06: 233). The choice’s common realm of action is represented by one unique segment on which both choices may collide, which is expressed by Kant as the “position of two lines cutting or hitting another” (“die Lage zweier einander durchschneidender oder zusammenstoßenden Linien”, AA 06: 233; or to clarify the English translation: It is “that position of a line toward another intersecting or touching it”). One of the end points represents the full implementation of the choice of one individual against the choice of another, whereas the other end point represents the reverse situation. The mathematical analogy determines the distribution by a line perpendicular to the segment, cutting it into two equal segments. Two aspects of the geometrical analogy are noticeable.

*First*, the equality of the two resulting segments shows the legal equality of the choices despite them being different regarding physical and intellectual strength. This infringes the merely dynamic principle of equality between action and reaction. In other words, any time person A collides with person B, the concept of right will result in the restoration of the initial location, i.e., in distribution being restored, no matter how different the respective mass of persons A and B may be. *Second*, there is not only a point cutting the segment into two equal segments, but a full line, which is more than a unique point. This is confirmed by the fact that the perpendicular line divides not only the segment, but it “also [...] divides the space” (RL, AA 06: 233)

In order to explain the *first* remark, I suggest interpreting in a literal and strong way the fact that the perpendicular line intersects with the initial segments, in which it operates as a strict separation between two segments and between two spaces. And, in fact, law exercises the force needed for all individuals to be equality limited in their freedom in spite of their different respective strength, which implies that law exercises a coercion proportionate to the strength of the actual or potential perpetrator. In this regard, the law behaves in another way than a spring C being interposed between a spring A and a spring B, because such a spring does not modify the relationship of strength between the springs A and B, as is explained in the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences* (see 4:549, footnote \*\*). In other words, unlike the spring C, the legal order backed by its power of coercion exercises an “irresistible force”.

Now, what does the fact that the perpendicular line separates not only two lines, but also two spaces mean? Here, I suggest referring to the famous metaphor of the forest apparently used for explaining the just civil constitution in the *Idea of a Universal History*:

«The highest task which nature has set for mankind must therefore be that of establishing a society in which *freedom under external laws* would be combined to the greatest possible extent with irresistible force, in other words of establishing a perfectly *just civil constitution*. [...] there inclinations make it impossible for them to exist side by side for long in a state of wild freedom. But once enclosed within a precinct like that of civil union, the same inclinations have the most beneficial effect. In the same way, trees in a forest, by seeking to deprive each other of air and sunlight, compel each other to find these by upward growth, so that they grow beautiful and straight – whereas those who put branches at will, in freedom and isolation of others, grow stunted, bent and twisted». (IaG, 08: 22)

In this quotation, Kant opposes natural isolation, characterized by laziness, to a state of cooperation and competition, characterized by the development of one's capacities and talents. Both the just civil constitution and the forest provide the conditions for such a cooperation and competition. In such a closed environment as either a just civil society or a forest, the individual choices collide with one another like the trees in the forest collide with one another, so that the *dynamic* principle of equality of action and reaction applies.

However, in a forest, the weaker trees decay and eventually die. In fact, competition and collision between the stronger ones do not imply that all remain alive and interacting. Thus, the *legal* principle of equality of action and reaction is what differentiates the just civil constitution from the forest. Unlike in the case of the forest, in the just civil society there is not only a precinct enclosing the totality of all trees or citizens, but there is also a precinct limiting the sphere of each individual with an “irresistible force”, so that, unlike in the case of weak trees that decay and die, no citizen is subjugated or destroyed by fellow citizens.

This major difference said, the common aspects pointed out by the analogy remain: mutual limitation lead the trees or the citizens to “grow upward”. This means that the “desire for honor, power or property” cannot strive any longer for subjugating or destroying others, but instead it can only do two things: *First*, the individual can develop his or her capacities and talents. *Second*, he or she can interact with others through free contracts, which, because they are voluntary on all sides, are supposed to stand under both the *dynamic* and the legal principles of equality of action and reaction. Through developing their capacities and talents and through contracting with another, citizens increasingly occupy their space, as limited by the perpendicular line.



In the following, I would like to sketch the potential progress regarding the dynamic *and* legal equality between action and reaction, as opposed to a merely dynamic equality. This potential progress consists in developing an established civil constitution into a *fully* just civil constitution. By the potential progress of a civil constitution, I understand more precisely that not only freedom of contract is respected, but also that the legal order may remedy circumstances that modify the outcome of the fulfillment of the contract in a way that diverges from the one intended at the time at which the contract has been concluded. In other words, an improved rule of law can prevent contingency to collide with the legal equality between action and reaction. I see this potential progress in the concept of equity exposed in the *Doctrine of Right* that is absent from the *Idea of a Universal History* and from the *Common Saying*, but that, as an at first sight ambiguous right, immediately follows the dynamic and geometrical analogies in the *Doctrine of Right*. Before doing this, I would like to emphasize that the *Idea of a Universal History* handles civil constitution in reference to the issue of the historical process of the establishment of a just historical constitution, whereas the *Doctrine of Right* also (although not only) considers an ideal, and metaphysical framework, independent of any legal act. Kant’s concept of equity is in accord with his examination of this “ambiguous right”, eventually a “true” right, although a “right without coercion.” (RL, AA 06: 234).

Here is an example of equity given by Kant:

«[...] suppose that a domestic servant is paid his wages at the end of a year in money that has depreciated in the interval, so that he cannot buy with it what he could have bought with it when he concluded the contract. The servant cannot appeal to his right to be compensated when he gets the same amount of money, but it is of unequal value. He can appeal only on grounds of equity (a mute divinity who cannot be heard); for nothing was specified about this in the contract, and a judge cannot pronounce in accordance with indefinite conditions». (RL, AA 06: 235)

Unlike what most of the commentators assume, the reason why the judge cannot decide in accordance with equity is not because equity did not provide any exact criterion for deciding the case. In fact, statistical means make it quite possible to calculate the exact depreciation of money as compared to other goods, and such a calculation is actually often used in tort law for calculating compensations for damages. The only obstacle for applying equity is the absence of an adequate proviso in the contract, and – more generally – of any legal proviso, whether of contractual origin or of another origin like statute law. Now, why does Kant choose as an exact criterion for equity as a “right without coercion” “what [the servant] could have bought [with the amount of money set in the contract] when he concluded the contract”? This criterion (1) clearly refers to the purposive use of the amount of money, and (2) it does not determine this use, which the mention of the real purpose of the servant at the time of the conclusion of the contract would do, that is, that this criterion leaves the servant’s choice (*Willkür*) fully open. Unfortunately, Kant does not mention

whether the same criterion applies in the case of the appreciation of the money as compared to other goods – i.e., the case of deflation. The likely reason for not mentioning this is that deflation seldom happens, while inflation is the most frequent price evolution. Yet, in the case of deflation, the same criterion should apply. In my view, equity is represented by the aforementioned perpendicular. In fact, the perpendicular line that cuts the segment into two equal segments takes into consideration the open choice of both contracting parties, whereas deciding for not compensating inflation would incline the intersecting line more in one direction – that of the employer – than in the other.

One may object that Kant stipulates only the enforcement of the *real* contract, and *not of the equitable* contract that should have been put in writing instead of the *real* contract. Yet, Kant explicitly mentions in the first paragraph of the “Introduction to the *Doctrine of Right*” that the “doctrine of natural rights”, as opposed to positive law, “must supply the immutable principles for any giving of positive law.” (RL, AA 06: 229)

Admittedly, Kant assumes that, since the innate rights to freedom and equality imply the freedom of contract, the provisos adopted in free contracts are valid. A free action also leads to liability for its consequences. The validity of free contracts is expressed by the famous legal principle *volenti non fit iniuria*. Since the labor contract between a server and his or her employer, for instance, is a free contract, and does *not definitively* suppress the former’s freedom – unlike free enslavement, which Kant prohibits –, this contract is valid, and it is handled as such in the body of the *Doctrine of Right*. (cf. RL, AA 06: 282f.)

Thereby, Kant considers *neither* any possible depreciation of the amount of money regularly paid by the employer to the servant *nor* such empirical circumstances as poverty or weakness that may constrain the person to accept the contract even on unequal or unbalanced terms that do not fulfill the criterion for equity. This leads to the frequent critique against Kant that he accepts the existence of a status, such as that of a servant, of which he himself admits that it creates *dependence*, which apparently contradicts the innate right to freedom and the legal equality of action and reaction. If one considers only enforceable law, one can say that, if Kant did take into consideration the aforementioned circumstances that lead to unequal terms of free contracts, he would have defined legal provisos that are much more adequate for protecting each person’s choice (*Willkür*), since equity is predominantly favorable to the expectations of the weak who is endangered to become dependent or to die. Now, if one considers that the concepts of law and equity should guide positive legislation, one can see in equity a clear direction for a progress of the positive rule of law. And, in fact, Kant repeatedly stresses the requirement that reason makes positive law progress.

To conclude, the dynamic analogy of the *Doctrine of Right* must be distinguished from the merely dynamic analogy of the trees in the *Idea of a Universal History*. In fact,

only the former entails both the dynamic principle of the equality of action and reaction and the legal principle of equality of action and reaction, the latter being emphasized in the *Common Saying*. The dynamic analogy of the *Doctrine of Right* entails an equality between persons that is missing in the analogy of the forest in the *Idea of a Universal History*. This equality is backed by the geometrical analogy of the perpendicular and one can see in equity a potential progress in regard to this legal equality. In the comparison of these analogies and metaphors to another, one can see how Kant gradually combines and differentiates – although not with full clarity – different conceptual elements and the way these elements build upon another.

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## **Kant. Il trascendentale e l'armonia delle facoltà**

### ***Kant. The Transcendental and the Harmony of Faculties***

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#### **Riassunto**

Partendo dall'analisi del criticismo proposta da Simmel, si può dire che Kant abbia infranto l'armonia tra essere e pensare sul piano metafisico e quella tra virtù e felicità sul piano morale. Ciò non significa abbandonare definitivamente la teoria di un sistema delle nostre facoltà, ma piuttosto porre questo tema al centro pensandolo come compito. Sotto questo aspetto la *Critica del Giudizio* può essere letta come il tentativo di riannodare i fili spezzati: da questo testo emerge in modo peculiare il problema della natura. La natura non è più intesa come oggetto sottoposto alla legislazione dell'intelletto, bensì come elemento chiave che dà la regola all'arte.

#### **Parole chiavi**

Sistema; Critica del giudizio; Simmel; trascendentale; natura

#### **Abstract**

Starting from Simmel's analysis of the criticism, we can say that Kant has broken the harmony between being and thinking from a metaphysical point of view and the harmony between happiness and virtue concerning the moral point of view. It does not mean that Kant left definitely a theory of the system of our faculties, rather he focuses on this problem, thinking about it as a task. In this sense the *Critique of Judgement* could be read as the attempt to knot again these broken wires: in

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this context the nature plays a leading role. The nature is no more an object subjected to the legislation of our intellect, rather the nature gives the rule to the art.

### Key words

System; Critique of Judgement; Simmel; transcendental; Nature

### 1. Armonie infrante

Nella terza delle sue *Lezioni berlinesi* dedicate alla filosofia kantiana Simmel parla della “fede appassionata” nell’armonia naturale di tutto l’essente quale carattere chiave dell’epoca illuminista. Il clima culturale all’interno del quale Kant trascorre i propri “anni di apprendistato” considerava ancora pienamente lecito «gettare questo ponte tra l’obiettivamente valido e lo psicologico: verità fondamentali erano disposte in modo tale che ogni spirito dovesse esserne consapevole» (Simmel 1918, 27).<sup>1</sup> Da questo punto di vista l’impostazione costitutiva del criticismo kantiano segna una discontinuità radicale e ineludibile rispetto al proprio tempo:

«Questo ponte fu spezzato da Kant, senonché le verità, anziché sprofondare nell’abisso sottostante, come sarebbe stata conseguenza di quel presupposto, egli le dotò – nel loro significato di a priori – di una solida dimora, e ciò proprio delimitandole rispetto a qualsiasi elemento di natura psicologica» (Simmel 1918, 27).

Simmel si era espresso in maniera ancora più incisiva nel primo di una serie di articoli apparsi verso la fine del XIX secolo come supplemento domenicale sul *Vossische Zeitung*, dal titolo piuttosto significativo – *Was ist uns Kant?* – e che rappresentano di fatto un primo abbozzo delle sue ricerche attorno al pensiero del filosofo di Königsberg. Nell’articolo apparso il 2 agosto 1896, per sottolineare come nella *Critica della ragione pura* il mero pensiero non produca per noi alcuna conoscenza, Simmel ascrive a Kant una vera e propria soluzione di continuità sul piano metafisico rispetto alla tradizione precedente:

«Viene reciso ogni filo mediante cui i metafisici hanno creduto di legare insieme in un’armonia arcana il pensiero e l’essere» (Simmel 2008, 787).

Se volessimo individuare una conferma testuale, l’impostazione generale del criticismo trova la sua prima formulazione non nel celebre paragone con la rivoluzione copernicana<sup>2</sup> – che appartiene alla seconda edizione della *Critica della ragione pura* – ma già nell’ultimo paragrafo dell’estetica trascendentale, presente nell’edizione del 1781:

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<sup>1</sup> Sul rapporto tra Kant e Simmel si vedano in particolare due contributi (Marini, 1986, 7-43 e Vigorelli 1986, 45-60).

<sup>2</sup> Cfr. KrV, AA 03: B XVI-XVII.

«tutte queste cose, in quanto apparenze, non possono esistere in se stesse, ma esistono soltanto in noi. Di che cosa possa trattarsi, riguardo agli oggetti in se stessi, separati da tutta questa recettività della nostra sensibilità, ci rimane perfettamente ignoto» (KrV, AA 03: B60 / A43). In tal senso, ogni tentativo di costruire un ponte capace di collegare le due opposte sponde – il pensare e l'essere – viene dichiarato sostanzialmente vano e illusorio. All'interno delle lezioni berlinesi, Simmel esprime l'esito di questa frattura con un'immagine particolarmente efficace: «Il mondo è la mia rappresentazione – la sua realtà effettuale, la nuda verità delle cose è per me eternamente irraggiungibile, sono confinato nell'angustia del mio rappresentare, davanti allo spirito, che si protende verso l'essere, questo si ritrae come i frutti davanti alla mano di Tantalò» (Simmel 1918, 59-60).

Tale operazione riguarda l'ambito prettamente metafisico, ma comporta profonde ricadute sul piano ontologico ed epistemologico, che si possono riassumere facendo appello, di nuovo, a un passo della prima Critica: «Le proposizioni fondamentali dell'intelletto sono semplicemente principi dell'esposizione delle apparenze, e il nome orgoglioso di una ontologia, la quale presume di fornire in una dottrina sistematica conoscenze sintetiche in generale [...] deve fare posto al nome modesto di una semplice analitica dell'intelletto puro» (KrV, AA 03: B304 / A247).

Restando ancorati all'analisi di Simmel, peraltro, quest'armonia arcana tra essere e pensiero non è la sola ad essere infranta nel corso dell'indagine kantiana. In ambito morale assistiamo a un'analogia frattura, dagli esiti certamente non inferiori alla prima:

«Kant ha rivelato in tutta la sua insostenibilità la vecchia credenza secondo cui una necessità psichica, oppure l'ordine stesso degli esterni destini, fornirebbero inevitabilmente alla bontà morale una gratifica di felicità» (Simmel 1918, 148).

Ad essere infranto, questa volta, è il ponte mediante cui, da sempre, la tradizione aveva cercato di congiungere virtù e felicità. Nell'ultimo supplemento al *Vossische Zeitung*, datato 16 agosto 1896, il medesimo tema viene espresso in questi termini: «Alla morale viene tolto il supporto, che essa possedeva, della speranza di una ricompensa che verrà conseguita presto o tardi; alla tensione verso la felicità è stata tolta la giustificazione che essa si traesse dal suo legame con la morale» (Simmel 2008, 802). Benché l'idea di un destinale accordo tra virtù e felicità appaia nella *Critica della ragione pratica* nella forma di un postulato della ragione – in particolare attraverso l'idea di Dio – rimane assolutamente chiaro come nessun nesso possa essere istituito tra i due ambiti sul piano della conoscenza razionale.

«Così noi siamo costretti a rassegnarci a una doppiezza impietosa, e a incamminarci lungo due strade di cui noi però nutriamo la segreta speranza che la prima sia tuttavia soltanto una deviazione e conduca poi alla seconda» (Simmel 2008, 802).

Più che di “segreta speranza” – espressione che sarebbe più adatta a qualificare l'atmosfera presente nella terza Critica – forse si dovrebbe parlare di un'autentica esigenza, o addirittura di “pretesa della ragione”. Come appare anche nella tavola delle facoltà superiori, a conclusione dell'Introduzione alla *Critica del giudizio* (KrV, AA 05: BLVIII / ALVI), la ragione si presenta come facoltà appetitiva, ossia come capacità di desiderare. Alla luce della *Critica della ragione pura*, si deve dire che il vero e proprio “oggetto del desiderio”<sup>3</sup> da parte della ragione è l'incondizionato, vale a dire la cosiddetta totalità delle condizioni (KrV, AA 03: B380 / A323) – quell'oggetto letteralmente *impossibile* che l'esperienza non sarà mai in grado di esibire e che pertanto rimane escluso dalle possibilità inerenti alla nostra facoltà conoscitiva.

L'idea di una “archittonica”<sup>4</sup> delle facoltà dell'animo umano”, e dunque l'esigenza di sistematicità espressa a più riprese e sotto diverse angolazioni da parte di Kant, dev'essere intesa proprio alla luce di una preliminare e radicale incrinatura delle varie “armonie prestabilite” che la tradizione si era sforzata di elaborare sino ad allora.

### 2. L'istanza sistematica

Nel pensiero di Kant il sistema assume il carattere di una necessità, non però nel senso di un ineludibile “sillogismo della conciliazione”, come accadrà nel caso della dialettica hegeliana, bensì nell'accezione peculiare di una istanza della ragione. «La ragione – così si leggerà poi nella *Critica del giudizio* – esige (*fordert*) la totalità» (KU, AA 05: B92 / A91).

Avendo letteralmente tagliato i ponti con le varie ipotesi di armonie precostituite, alimentate per millenni dalla metafisica occidentale, l'impulso verso il sistema non concerne più il rapporto tra anima e mondo, piuttosto converge e si concentra interamente sul rapporto interno tra le facoltà dell'animo. *L'archittonica delle facoltà*<sup>5</sup> costituisce quasi la traccia di un'armonia perduta. Tale esigenza si esprime nella ricerca quasi ossessiva di momenti di connessione tra le facoltà e nella presenza di continui e capillari rimandi interni che coinvolgono non soltanto le tre critiche, ma anche diversi saggi coevi – basti pensare al modo in cui la quadripartizione presente nella tavola delle categorie (quantità, qualità, relazione, modalità) si ripercuota sui paralogismi, e poi sulle antinomie, e infine sui quattro momenti in cui è suddivisa l'analitica del bello.

Sulla stessa linea si potrebbe rilevare come la distinzione tra matematico e dinamico, che già coinvolge le categorie (cfr. KrV, AA 03: B110), si ritrovi poi nelle proposizioni fondamentali sintetiche dell'intelletto puro (cfr. KrV, AA 03: B199 / A160) e da ultimo persino nell'articolazione dell'analitica del sublime.

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<sup>3</sup> Cfr. KpV AA 05: B 8-9, 20 e 22.

<sup>4</sup> Su questo punto cfr. Pierobon 1990. Inoltre si vedano i saggi presenti nel più recente AA.VV. 2001, testo che non concerne specificamente la *Critica del giudizio*, ma l'ottica sistematica alla luce delle prime due critiche e della produzione kantiana coeva.

<sup>5</sup> Su questo tema si veda in particolare Garelli 1999, e inoltre Hohenegger 2004.

Volendo rintracciare altri percorsi connessi all'architettonica delle facoltà, si potrebbero individuare correlazioni molto precise tra le tre massime del *sensus communis* presenti nella *Critica del giudizio* (pensare da sé, pensare nella posizione di ogni altro e pensare sempre in accordo con se stessi)<sup>6</sup> e le partizioni presenti in alcuni scritti coevi – per esempio in rapporto ai principi a priori di “libertà” come uomo, eguaglianza come “suddito” e indipendenza come “cittadino” (cfr. UdG, AA 08: A 236), presenti nel saggio *Sul detto comune: questo può essere giusto in teoria, ma non vale per la prassi*, edito nel 1793; la medesima struttura si ripresenterà poi nella tripartizione dei diritti presente nello scritto, ben più celebre, dal titolo *Per la pace perpetua*, pubblicato nel 1795, ossia il diritto statale-civile degli uomini in un popolo, il diritto delle genti negli Stati nei loro reciproci rapporti e il diritto cosmopolitico in quanto uomini e Stati che stiano in rapporti di reciproco influsso come cittadini di un universale Stato di uomini (cfr. ZeF, BA19). Le esemplificazioni potrebbero continuare, ma otterrebbero soltanto l'effetto di una mera “casistica” in cui vengono affastellati una serie di correlazioni: quanto di più contrario si possa immaginare rispetto allo spirito kantiano (cfr. Centi 1999).

Rimane da precisare, dunque, quali siano i termini in cui si configura l'istanza sistematica: «ogni nostra conoscenza – possiamo leggere nella Dialettica trascendentale – prende inizio dai sensi, di qui procede verso l'intelletto e finisce nella ragione» (KrV, AA 04: B355 / A298). Se i sensi forniscono intuizioni e l'intelletto si occupa di concetti, il “prodotto” peculiare della ragione viene indicato con il nome di *Schluss* (cfr. KrV, AA 03: B360-361 / A303-304) in quanto la ragione letteralmente *tira le conclusioni* di un ragionamento e lo riconduce ai minimi principi possibili.

La ragione lavora in vista dell'unità, alla luce della quale si può appunto “concludere” un ragionamento. Di regola Giorgio Colli non traduce “*Schluss*” con “sillogismo”, bensì assai più spesso – e giustamente – con “inferenza”:<sup>7</sup> ciò consente, in effetti, di rendere sul piano di una sfumatura terminologica la differenza che passa tra Kant ed Hegel.

Se per il filosofo di Stoccarda la dialettica è direttamente la forma in cui trova espressione il vero, non dunque come sostanza bensì come movimento del soggetto (Hegel 1970, III, 23), agli occhi di Kant la dialettica viene definita esplicitamente come «logica dell'illusione» (KrV, AA 03: B86 / A61) e più precisamente come «un'arte sofistica che cerca di fornire il colorito della verità alla propria ignoranza, anzi persino alle proprie intenzionali costruzioni illusorie» (KrV, AA 03: B86 / A61). La ragione kantiana non *sillogizza* nel senso dello *Schluss* hegeliano che svuota ogni morto Aldilà e dunque si riflette in se stessa costituendo l'identità compiuta (*Vollendung*) di razionalità e realtà,<sup>8</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Cfr. KU, AA 05: B185 / A156.

<sup>7</sup> Ciò accade già nell'Analitica delle proposizioni trascendentali, cfr. *ivi*, B169 / A130.

<sup>8</sup> Certamente mai definitiva, ma sempre di volta in volta rinnovantesi secondo il ritmo incessante del divenire, ma capace di realizzare ad ogni istante ciò che è il “vero”. A questo proposito cfr. Hegel 1970, 23: «c'è un falso tanto poco quanto c'è qualcosa di cattivo. [...] Si può ben sapere falsamente. Alcunché saputo falsamente significa: il sapere è in ineguaglianza con la sua sostanza. Ma proprio tale ineguaglianza è il distinguere in generale, che è momento essenziale». Questo accenno dovrà essere sufficiente per evitare di semplificare eccessivamente la posizione hegeliana, che qui non è possibile ripercorrere. Per quanto riguarda



bensi *inferisce*, pretendendo di concludere la serie dei condizionati, illudendosi di poter conseguire l'incondizionato.

L'illusione che – nel linguaggio kantiano – prende il nome di dialettica e coincide con il *Vernunftschluß* non può assolutamente essere evitata: «l'illusione trascendentale non scompare quand'anche sia già stata svelata e si sia scorta chiaramente la sua nullità mediante la critica trascendentale» (*KrV*, AA 04: B353/ A297). Ciò significa che il desiderio di sistematicità in qualche senso sopravvive malgrado si sia svelata la sua inconsistenza sul piano logico e conoscitivo. L'architettura delle facoltà può essere intesa proprio come residuo, come “l'ultimo quasi rifugio”(Leopardi 1956, 788) dinnanzi al crollo di qualsiasi possibilità di concepire una “visione sistematica” del mondo o comunque un'armonia tra le “cose” e l'attività dell'intelletto.

In questa prospettiva si comprende bene come l'interrogativo “che cosa posso sperare?” costituisca la domanda centrale attorno a cui ruota la *Critica del giudizio*, intesa non più soltanto come ricognizione sulla dimensione estetica e teleologica del sapere, ma alla luce dell'istanza sistematica<sup>9</sup>: la speranza rimane l'unica cinghia di trasmissione tra l'intelletto come facoltà conoscitiva e la ragione come facoltà desiderativa. Esattamente in relazione a questo punto Simmel dichiara in modo esplicito quale distanza intercorra tra la visione kantiana e l'orizzonte contemporaneo:

«In breve, lo spirito umano gli appare come una costruzione simmetrica in se stessa, che non può avere né più né meno membri di quanto richiede la logica conformità a regole. Questo è il punto in cui la concezione del mondo contemporanea si distingue da quella kantiana nella maniera più decisiva. Lo spirito umano ci sembra, al pari di ogni altra costituzione organica, una stazione di uno sviluppo che procede all'infinito» (Simmel 1918, 791).

Per esprimere il problema restando su un terreno particolarmente familiare alle indagini simmeliane, l'architettura kantiana dell'animo umano ricorda molto i progetti urbanistici delle città ideali, mentre la contemporaneità si vede costretta a scorgere nella mente umana una *metropoli caotica di facoltà* per nulla sincronizzate tra loro, ma spesso costituita per via di agglomerati giustapposti. Più che all'organicità, alla coesione e alla continuità, come fattori che assicurano un passaggio da una facoltà all'altra, oggi siamo molto più interessati a notare le faglie, le soglie, i punti di rottura.

Sul piano artistico tale tendenza è stata espressa perfettamente da Benjamin: dall'aura allo choc; dallo sforzo di armonizzare le facoltà dell'animo all'insegna dell'unità si passa al tentativo di colpirle nella loro attività, di bloccare il loro coordinamento, di sconvolgere le strutture della loro sincronizzazione.

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la *Wissenschaft der Logik* si rinvia a Lugarini 1998, 277-323. Cfr. inoltre Chiareghin 1998, 170-171, in particolare la nota 15 in cui si esemplifica l'andamento speculativo con la curva periodica che descrive la cicloide.

<sup>9</sup> Su questa problematica appare ancora centrale il contributo presente in Scaravelli 1980. Di fondamentale importanza rimane E. Garroni 1976.

Per restare all'esempio di Benjamin, l'affresco contemplato dal monaco all'interno della propria cella lungo l'arco di un'intera vita si trasforma nel cartellone pubblicitario che in un istante fa colpo sul passante (Benjamin 1991, I,2, 500-501).

### 3. L'armonia come problema

Proprio nella sua radicale smentita dell'armonia delle facoltà, l'evoluzione contemporanea, tuttavia, consente anche di scorgere nel criticismo kantiano una straordinaria anticipazione del problema. L'assillo kantiano per l'architettura e l'armonizzazione dipende proprio dalla consapevolezza della fragilità che caratterizza il passaggio tra le facoltà, l'unico ponte che all'epoca pareva ancora reggere. Per dirla con Simmel, tolta l'impalcatura su cui si reggeva l'edificio del mondo (Simmel 1918, 64), tutto si risolve nella prestazione e nella funzione dell'io: «l'io è la vitalità del processo del mondo, che consiste nel collegare quegli elementi in modo comprensibile, costruttivo di oggetti, e capace di *dar forma* al caos della sensibilità» (ivi, 124).

Questa stessa attività dell'io, nondimeno, si rivela ben diversa da quella stabilità e permanenza che si è soliti attribuirgli. Simmel intravede «il suo inquieto procedere per salti» (ivi, 55), ma certamente il problema non era sfuggito all'ideatore dello *Ich denke*. Al contrario, sin dalla tormentata stesura della *Critica della ragione pura* è possibile scorgere il dramma di Kant, ossessionato dalla tenuta complessiva del sistema: in seguito al totale rovesciamento della prospettiva metafisica per cui non saranno più le facoltà a doversi accordare all'oggetto, ma saranno gli oggetti a doversi accordare al nostro modo di conoscere (KrV, AA 03: B166-167), la natura come complesso regolato di leggi cessa di avere un'esistenza autonoma e l'intelletto diventa condizione di possibilità della natura stessa (KrV, AA 03: A126-127).<sup>10</sup> Dopo aver operato questo strategico arretramento di posizione, o forse si dovrebbe dire un rovesciamento di posizioni, Kant si preoccupa di sondare continuamente la tenuta del nuovo fronte.

L'armonia corre il pericolo di infrangersi a vari livelli: partendo per così dire dal limite superiore, certamente il problema investe il rapporto tra le diverse facoltà, ma appare senz'altro più interessante intraprendere la strada opposta e risalire a partire dal limite inferiore. Qui è possibile esporre soltanto in estrema sintesi quali siano i rischi maggiori d'incrinatura:<sup>11</sup>

- 1) Il problema dell'omogeneità tra la cosiddetta materia greggia e la nostra capacità di conoscere in generale determina appunto quel rovesciamento di fronte appena menzionato.

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<sup>10</sup> L'intelletto viene considerato condizione di possibilità della natura stessa, intesa come sistema regolato di apparenze. Non si tratta certo di un *hapax*, bensì piuttosto di un *Leit Motiv* del criticismo. Il medesimo ragionamento si trova in KrV, AA 03: B263 / A216.

<sup>11</sup> Per un'analisi delle strutture e delle implicazioni presenti nella Deduzione in particolare con riferimento alla facoltà del giudizio qui si può soltanto rimandare a R. Brand 1991. Qui si offrirà solo una tripartizione schematica.

- 2) Proprio tale “rovesciamento” comporta, tuttavia, il problema di una possibile eterogeneità tra la facoltà ricettiva e quella della spontaneità, affrontato nella deduzione trascendentale che si concentra prima sulla capacità d’immaginazione, nella versione del 1781, e che in seguito subisce una radicale revisione nell’edizione del 1787<sup>12</sup>, dove si assegna maggiore rilievo alla facoltà dell’intelletto.
- 3) La deduzione spalanca tuttavia la vista su un ulteriore problema relativo alla compatibilità tra intuizioni e categorie: la loro eterogeneità potrebbe rendere impossibile la sintesi da parte dell’intelletto e a tale problematica è dedicato l’intero schematismo trascendentale.

Nei diversi gradi di sviluppo del problema Kant si preoccupa di assicurare omogeneità, di individuare momenti di mediazione che possano tenere insieme intuizioni e concetti: la celebre espressione «lo “io penso” deve potere accompagnare tutte le mie rappresentazioni» (KrV, AA 03: B131) rivela – come del resto si sarebbe intuito già con Schopenhauer<sup>13</sup> – il carattere problematico e non certo apodittico del “grande mediatore” cui venne affidata l’intera impalcatura del mondo, per adoperare la terminologia cara a Simmel.

In effetti l’io penso emerge proprio come momento risolutivo che garantisce la connessione delle rappresentazioni nella forma dell’autocoscienza: grazie per così dire all’apporto fornito dalla “dimensione coscienziale” quella che era una pura e semplice intuizione si trasforma in percezione e dunque s’inserisce in quella connessione stabile e permanente che è l’esperienza in quanto costruzione dell’intelletto. A prescindere da quella grande funzione accompagnatrice svolta dall’io penso «o la rappresentazione risulterebbe impossibile, oppure, almeno per me, essa non sarebbe niente» (KrV, AA 03, B132).

In tal modo il problema della connessione trova una sua “risoluzione” soltanto sul piano trascendentale: non si esclude la possibilità che vi siano intuizioni costrette a rimanere al di sotto del livello di coscienza, ma proprio perciò tali intuizioni non raggiungerebbero mai lo statuto di rappresentazioni e dunque non entrerebbero mai a far parte della concatenazione esperienziale.

Affidarsi allo “io penso” è la strategia mediante cui nella seconda edizione della *Critica della ragione pura*, Kant cerca di risolvere il problema incontrato nella prima stesura, ossia l’abisso in cui consiste la capacità d’immaginazione trascendentale, che si trova esattamente a metà strada tra l’essere meramente determinabile (*bloß bestimmbar*) come il senso e l’essere già determinante (*bestimmend*) come sarà poi peculiarità specifica dell’intelletto, anche nella seconda edizione dell’opera (cfr. KrV, 03: B151-152).

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<sup>12</sup> Sulla differenza tra le due edizioni con specifico riferimento alla deduzione trascendentale il contributo fondamentale rimane quello di Heidegger 1973, 123-124.

<sup>13</sup> Cfr. Schopenhauer 1988, I, 575-576: «Deve – potere: è questa un’enunciazione problematico-apodittica; per esser chiari, una frase che prende con una mano ciò che dà con l’altra».

Del “fiume carsico” mediante cui opera la capacità di immaginazione nulla conosciamo se non l’effetto (*Wirkung*)<sup>14</sup>, ossia il risultato di quel lavoro sotterraneo che associa tra loro le intuizioni, trasformandole in rappresentazioni, avendole già concatenate: tale risultato si presenta dunque nei termini di un flusso esperienziale già configurato, costante e continuo.

#### **4. La Critica del giudizio: per riannodare i fili spezzati**

Abbiamo visto come la *Critica della ragion pura* si costituisca a partire dalla rottura dell’armonia tra essere e pensiero, così come la *Critica della ragione pratica* prende avvio dall’infrangersi di ogni nesso capace di legare virtù e felicità. Di fronte al crollo di tale “impalcatura”, lo “io penso” si vede destinato a farsi carico di un ruolo decisivo nell’economia del criticismo. Nella terza Critica Kant prova a recuperare i fili spezzati, tessendoli nuovamente secondo un ordito trascendentale e una trama che viene affidata interamente allo statuto del giudizio riflettente (cfr. Garroni, 1990, 7-19).

L’Analitica del bello per un verso e l’Analitica del sublime per l’altro svolgono un ruolo decisivo in rapporto alle “disarmonie” emerse a partire dalle prime due critiche.

Kant sottolinea come il secondo momento dell’Analitica del bello costituisca la chiave per risolvere l’intera critica del gusto (KU, AA 05, B27 / A27). Nel § 9 si discute il ruolo del “piacere” in rapporto alla valutazione dell’oggetto: soltanto facendo precedere la valutazione dell’oggetto rispetto all’insorgere del sentimento di piacere si può assicurare al giudizio riflettente una caratura trascendentale. Il problema riguarda lo statuto soggettivo e insieme oggettivo del giudizio: Kant è costretto a elaborare una strategia che consenta di assegnare a un giudizio apparentemente del tutto soggettivo un certo profilo di “oggettività”. Si tratta di trovare un “criterio d’oggettività”, ossia un orizzonte di condivisibilità, senza che ciò si trasformi in un contenuto universalizzabile e necessario (che risulterebbe appannaggio del giudizio determinante).<sup>15</sup>

Tale contenuto, a un tempo *condiviso* senza essere universale, in un certo senso *accomunante* senza essere riconducibile a un concetto determinato, coincide unicamente con la situazione in cui le facoltà si trovano reciprocamente disposte nella maniera migliore in vista di una conoscenza in generale. Si noti che un simile contesto comporta esattamente una *condizione di armonia* tra la facoltà dell’intelletto e la facoltà dell’immaginazione.

In queste pagine l’*armonia* ritorna potentemente come fondamento trascendentale dell’intera dinamica di funzionamento delle facoltà. Il rapporto che si instaura tra immaginazione e intelletto viene descritto icasticamente come un “libero gioco” (*ein freies*

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<sup>14</sup> Cfr. KrV, AA 03: B152: «la sua sintesi dev’essere la sintesi trascendentale della *capacità di immaginazione*: cioè un effetto (*Wirkung*) che l’intelletto produce sulla sensibilità (e al tempo stesso fondamento di tutte le altre)».

<sup>15</sup> Sul rapporto tra giudizio determinante e giudizio riflettente, e in particolare sui loro rapporti all’interno della terza Critica, possiamo soltanto rinviare a Deleuze 1963, 109-111. Sullo stesso problema si veda Desideri 2003.

*Spiel*) (KU, AA 05: B28 / A28): la celebre espressione era già stata adoperata da Lessing nel suo *Laocoonte* (Lessing 1961, 179), dove si afferma già a chiare lettere che «fruttuoso è solo ciò che dà libero gioco all'immaginazione. Quanto più vediamo, tanto più dobbiamo rifletterci». Tale formula viene ripresa nella *Critica del Giudizio* nell'obiettivo, però, di conferire al giudizio riflettente un sostrato trascendentale.

L'incapacità da parte dell'intelletto di recuperare un concetto sotto il quale sussumere l'intuizione apre il campo a una sorta di "vuoto legislativo", che viene riempito dall'immaginazione, la quale si scopre non soltanto ricettiva, ma anche spontanea, assumendo un ruolo per così dire "creativo": di fronte all'*impasse* in cui si trova l'intelletto nel fornire la regola determinata, l'immaginazione scopre non un nuovo territorio cui imporre la propria legislazione<sup>16</sup>, bensì la propria autonomia (di giudizio).

La possibilità di un'armonia tra le due facoltà per un verso viene avvertita soggettivamente, per l'altro verso accomuna su un piano "oggettivo" e si pone quale condizione per il funzionamento stesso dell'io penso come attività che accompagna ogni rappresentazione. L'armonia tra facoltà costituisce una sorta di margine che Kant residua dall'illusione di un'armonia tra "le cose del mondo" e l'intelletto conoscente.

Analogamente, nell'analitica del sublime si tenta di ricomporre i cocci prodotti dalla *Critica della ragione pratica*: l'operazione kantiana risulta uguale e contraria rispetto a quella messa in campo nell'analitica del bello. Invece di sottolineare l'armonia delle facoltà, coinvolgendo *intelletto* e *immaginazione*, il sublime si caratterizza come momento in cui l'animo avverte una profonda e irrimediabile disarmonia, che concerne il rapporto tra *ragione* e *immaginazione*. Se l'immaginazione era riuscita a coinvolgere l'intelletto in un libero gioco, ora si trova invece a patire un'incolmabile distanza rispetto al desiderio dell'incondizionato che caratterizza la ragione. Nessuna immagine può essere adeguata a rappresentare la totalità della serie:

«il compiacimento per il sublime della natura non è che negativo, cioè un sentimento del privarsi, da parte dell'immaginazione, della sua propria libertà, in quanto essa viene determinata finalisticamente secondo una legge diversa da quella dell'uso empirico. Con ciò essa acquista una potenza che è più grande di quella che sacrifica, ma il cui fondamento è nascosto a lei stessa, che invece *sente* il sacrificio o la privazione cui è sottoposta» (KU, AA 05: B 117 / A115-116).

La percezione di una distanza irrecuperabile e dunque di una profonda inadeguatezza dell'immaginazione instilla nell'animo il sentimento del rispetto:<sup>17</sup> già qui si spalanca la porta che può introdurre direttamente al regno dei fini. L'inadeguatezza apre la strada al sacrificio, ma il sacrificio a sua volta risveglia l'autonomia e dunque la libertà dell'animo. L'iniziale controfinalismo si trasforma così in un compiacimento negativo (*ein*

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<sup>16</sup> Fondamentale a proposito dell'assenza di un "territorio dell'immaginazione" il rilievo presente in Deleuze 1963, 111.

<sup>17</sup> Cfr. KrV AA 03: B96 / A95: «il sentimento dell'inadeguatezza della nostra facoltà a raggiungere un'idea che per noi è legge è il rispetto».

*negatives Wohlgefallen*):<sup>18</sup> la stessa espressione si trova nella *Critica della ragione pratica* (KpV, AA 05: A 212) in riferimento alla *Selbstzufriedenheit* come “consapevolezza di non aver bisogno di nulla”.

Se per un verso il sentimento suscitato dal dovere – «nome grande e sublime» (KpV, AA 05: A 154), come si legge nella seconda Critica – si alimenta dell’incomparabilità che sussiste tra sensibile e sovrasensibile, per un altro verso la pura e semplice possibilità di avvertire tale distanza risveglia l’idea di una superiorità rispetto alla natura. La distanza che contrassegna il dovere rispetto all’empirico si trasforma in sentimento d’indipendenza e di autonomia: la disarmonia è per così dire l’effetto provocato dall’insufficienza dell’empirico rispetto all’incondizionato. Tramite il sentimento del sublime si ridesta la destinazione sovrasensibile dell’animo umano: l’intero ambito fenomenico si raccoglie e si annoda attorno a un punto più alto.

L’armonia, nel caso dell’analitica del bello, e la disarmonia, nel caso dell’analitica del sublime, devono essere intese come “occasioni di collaborazione” tra le facoltà: per un verso rivelando momenti di coerenza tra immaginazione e intelletto nel libero gioco, per l’altro verso mostrando il sacrificio dell’immaginazione dinnanzi alla ragione, la *Critica del giudizio* rappresenta un luogo di dialogo tra le facoltà dell’animo (cfr. Hohenegger 2004, 166-177). Anche l’inadeguatezza percepita nel sentimento del sublime si rivela funzionale alla cooperazione: l’armonia perduta sul piano del rapporto tra oggetto e facoltà viene dunque riconquistata all’interno di un margine trascendentale.

## 5. “Dare la regola”: arte e natura

La lettura della *Critica del giudizio* – con particolare riferimento ai paragrafi dedicati all’arte del genio – costringe ad assistere a un’ultima inversione di marcia, che prende in contropiede l’intero sistema del criticismo e pone nuovamente in discussione lo statuto dell’armonia tra le facoltà.

Si è visto come nell’ottica kantiana si debba rinunciare alle “armonie prestabilite”. La radicalità della cosiddetta rivoluzione copernicana conduce Kant a una sorta di “trasvalutazione” delle leggi dell’intelletto,<sup>19</sup> sino al punto di affermare che «l’intelletto dunque non è semplicemente una facoltà per costruire regole con il raffronto delle apparenze; esso stesso è il legislatore della natura, ossia, senza intelletto non vi sarebbe assolutamente una natura, cioè un’unità sintetica del molteplice delle apparenze secondo regole» (KrV, AA 03: A 126-127).

Nella *Critica della ragione pura* l’intelletto assegna regole alle apparenze e così si costituisce come legislatore e condizione di possibilità della natura stessa. Analogamente nella *Critica della ragione pratica*, la celebre massima «Agisci in modo che la massima della tua volontà possa sempre valere, insieme, come principio di una legislazione universale» (KpV, AA 05: A 54) dipende da una *costruzione* tutta interna alle facoltà

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<sup>18</sup> Cfr. KU, AA 05: B117 / A115.

<sup>19</sup> Per un’analisi dell’evoluzione del pensiero kantiano circa il ruolo dell’intelletto cfr. Hinske 1970, 109-112.

dell'animo: per non inquinare l'incondizionatezza del dovere tramite il riferimento a un contenuto empirico – e dunque dovendo mantenere un carattere puramente formale<sup>20</sup> – l'imperativo categorico si trova costretto a ricalcare quel principio di una legislazione universale che contraddistingue in realtà il regno della natura.

L'analogia permette di constatare come nelle prime due Critiche le regole siano imposte dall'attività delle facoltà – ora secondo leggi di natura, ora secondo massime della volontà, ma sempre in quanto costruzione interna che assegna un ordinamento all'esterno in mancanza di un'armonia precostituita e precedente rispetto all'attività del soggetto.

Tale prospettiva, massimamente consolidata tramite l'analitica del bello e del sublime, viene rovesciata nuovamente nel caso del genio, inteso come «disposizione d'animo innata (*ingenium*) mediante la quale la natura dà la regola all'arte» (KU, AA 05: B181 / A178). Se l'intero criticismo è concepito come attiva imposizione di regole al regno della natura e al regno dei fini da parte delle facoltà, nella *Critica del giudizio* si assiste a una natura che torna a “dettare la regola” all'arte. Kant concepisce l'arte come il nucleo più intimo in cui il soggetto sperimenta la propria autonomia, come luogo di autentica formazione del giudizio, facoltà capace di “sentire” da un lato il libero gioco delle facoltà e dall'altro il rispetto.

Qui sembra affiorare l'idea di una più originaria consonanza: pur avendo dovuto presupporre la totale eterogeneità e dunque la più completa estraneità tra la materia greggia e le facoltà dell'animo, tuttavia l'esperienza accade e dunque una qualche forma di accordo dev'essere per lo meno possibile.

Senza dubbio il trascendentale provvede a rintuzzare ogni illusione di dialogo con l'oggetto fuori di noi, anzi il trascendentale potrebbe addirittura essere inteso come strategia generale di tale disincantamento. Il progetto di rifondazione trascendentale dell'idea di armonia (ora intesa come costruzione tutta interna alle facoltà) non pregiudica però la possibilità di pensare<sup>21</sup> a una affinità più originaria, certamente ormai dimenticata e inattuabile, ma che torna prepotentemente a *farsi-sentire* tramite l'evento dell'arte.

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<sup>20</sup> Sull'autentico significato del formalismo kantiano all'interno dell'imperativo categorico si veda Heidegger 1982, 279.

<sup>21</sup> Pensare in senso tecnico, ossia riflettere senza l'apporto di concetti e dunque senza comportare conoscenza.

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## **Die Übereinstimmung zwischen Einbildungskraft und Verstand und die „Erkenntnis überhaupt“**

### *The Harmony between Understanding and Imagination, and the “Cognition in General”*

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#### **Abstract**

Im ersten Teil des Aufsatzes diskutiere ich die Bedeutung des Syntagmas „Erkenntnis überhaupt“, das Kant im § 9 der *KU* einführt, um sowohl das Problem der allgemeinen Mitteilbarkeit des dem Geschmacksurteil zugrundeliegenden „Gemütszustandes“, als auch das Problem der Natur der ästhetischen Übereinstimmung zwischen Verstand und Einbildungskraft aufzulösen: Während der ästhetischen Erfahrung ist es zwar notwendig, dass sie sich miteinander verbinden, als ob sie auf die Gegenstandserkenntnis ausgerichtet wären, aber ihre Beziehung besteht in einem freien Spiel auf dem vortheoretischen Niveau der reinen Erkenntnisform. Ich erforsche auch eine interessante, wenn auch zu wenig studierte, Folge der Vermögensharmonie: das Entstehen eines besonderen Zeitbewusstseins im Betrachtungsobjekt. Im zweiten Teil, auf der Basis von einigen Textstellen bewerte ich die möglichen Antworten auf einen von einigen Auslegern erhobenen Einwand, nämlich dass aus Kants Lösung des Problems der Vermögensharmonie die Notwendigkeit folgt, alle Erfahrungsobjekte als schön zu definieren.

#### **Schlüsselwörter**

Kant; Vermögensharmonie; Erkenntnis überhaupt; Geschmacksurteil

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### Abstract

In the first part of this paper I discuss the meaning of the syntagm “cognition in general”, introduced by Kant in the § 9 of the *KU* to solve the problem both of the communicability of the “mental state” underlying the judgment of taste and of the aesthetic harmony between understanding and imagination: during the aesthetic experience it is necessary that they join as if they aim at object knowledge, but their relationship consists in a free play at the pre-theoretical level of the pure cognitive form. I also investigate an interesting, but too little studied, consequence of the harmony between the cognitive powers: the emergence of a specific time-consciousness in the observer. In the second part I examine, on the basis of some text passages, the possible answers to an objection made by some scholars, i.e. that from Kant’s solution of the problem of the harmony between the cognitive powers arises the necessity to define all objects of experience as beautiful.

### Key words

Understanding; Imagination; Harmony; Cognition in general; Judgment of taste

Eine der größten Schwierigkeiten in der Auslegung des letzten Teils vom zweiten Moment des Geschmacksurteils ergibt sich aus dem Verhältnis, das Kant zwischen der Mitteilbarkeit und der Verallgemeinbarkeit des individuellen Geschmacksurteils einerseits, und dem Thema der Erkenntnis andererseits herstellt.<sup>1</sup> Im § 9 erklärt er, dass die Lust der „Beurteilung des Gegenstandes“ nicht vorhergehen kann, weil die unauflösbare Verbindung zwischen Lust und „Sinnenempfindung“ das Verbleiben am Niveau der „Privatgültigkeit“ nach sich ziehen und das Erreichen der gesuchten Allgemeingültigkeit verbieten würde.<sup>2</sup> Es gibt aber ein großes Hindernis, das der allgemeinen Mitteilung des dem Geschmacksurteil zugrundeliegenden „Gemütszustandes“ im Wege steht: »Es kann [...] nichts allgemein mitgeteilt werden als Erkenntniß und Vorstellung, sofern sie zum Erkenntniß gehört.«<sup>3</sup> Kant schließt seinen komplizierten Gedankengang in einer ziemlich kryptischen Weise:

»Soll nun der Bestimmungsgrund des Urtheils über diese allgemeine Mittheilbarkeit der Vorstellung bloß subjectiv, nämlich ohne einen Begriff vom Gegenstande, gedacht werden, so kann er kein anderer als der Gemütszustand sein, der im Verhältnisse der Vorstellungskräfte zu einander angetroffen wird, sofern sie eine gegebene Vorstellung auf Erkenntniß überhaupt beziehen.«<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Zu einer kürzeren Behandlung des fraglichen Themas s. Meo (2013, S. 147-151).

<sup>2</sup> Wie bekannt, ist das Geschmacksurteil kein eigentliches Urteil, weil es nicht objektiv ist und „schön“ kein Begriff ist (und also kein Prädikat vom Gegenstand sein kann). Daher widerspricht es der allgemeinen Definition von § 19 der *KrV B*, nach der das Urteil ein „objektiv gültiges“ Verhältnis (oder „die objektive Einheit gegebener Vorstellungen“) ist. S. Kulenkampff (1994, S. 118-119) u. Meo (2011, S. 26-34).

<sup>3</sup> *KU* 217.

<sup>4</sup> Ebd. Vgl. *EEKU*, § VIII, 224.

Der logisch-theoretischen Bedeutung von „überhaupt,, in der Philosophie Kants gemäß,<sup>5</sup> abstrahiert die „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ von jeglicher Bestimmung: Sie ist die reine Erkenntnisform, ohne einen besonderen Inhalt und ohne Bezug auf *besondere* Begriffe.<sup>6</sup> Es gibt also eine gewisse (wenn auch schwache) Ähnlichkeit mit der logischen Struktur des Geschmacksurteils, das von *jedem* Begriff absieht. Das Problem wird klar genug an der folgenden Stelle aus der R 988 (1783-84) erörtert:

»Wenn sich das Urtheil aufs obiect bezieht, gleichwohl aber kein bestimmter Begriff von irgend einem obiect, noch auch von irgend einer nach Regeln bestimmbaren Beziehung aufs Subiect das Urtheil desselben nothwendig macht: so muß es sich auf obiect überhaupt durch Gemüthskräfte der Erkenntnis überhaupt beziehen. Denn da ist kein bestimmter Begriff, sondern blos das Gefühl der durch Begriffe überhaupt einer Mittheilung fähigen Bewegung der Erkenntniskräfte das, was den Grund des Urtheils enthält.«<sup>7</sup>

Die Einführung des Begriffs „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ scheint eine innere Notwendigkeit der Erkenntnistheorie Kants zu sein. Das menschliche Gemüt ist so strukturiert, dass die Erkenntnisvermögen allein weder stehen noch funktionieren können: Der Verstand braucht die Synthesis der Einbildungskraft (sonst wäre er ein *intellectus archetypus*); die Einbildungskraft braucht die Kontrolle des Verstandes, ohne die sie auf die „Schwärmerei“, auf das wilde Herausbrechen der Phantasie hinauslaufen würde.<sup>8</sup> Also, wenn auch ein bestimmter Erkenntniszweck fehlt, muss es einen Faden (eine sozusagen instabile chemische Verbindung) geben, der Einbildungskraft und Verstand zueinander in eine Beziehung setzt, die nicht identisch mit der eine bestimmte Erkenntnis bewirkenden Verknüpfung sein kann. In *Analogie* zu dieser letzten, auch im Fall der Lust ist es notwendig, dass die Vermögen sich miteinander verbinden, *als ob* sie auf die Erkenntnis eines Gegenstands ausgerichtet wären.<sup>9</sup> Was die Anordnung und die Tätigkeit der Vermögen betrifft, ist also der kognitive Bezug auf den Gegenstand das *Vorbild* der ästhetischen Übereinstimmung, insofern er als Vorbild einer gelungenen Übereinstimmung überhaupt gilt; aber im Fall des Geschmacksurteils halten Verstand und Einbildungskraft

<sup>5</sup>Zur Erklärung vom semantischen Feld des Adverbs vgl. De Vleeschauwer (1976, Bd. 2, S. 464-465).

<sup>6</sup>Die Rätselhaftigkeit vom Syntagma, das in der *Vernunftlehre* von Georg Friedrich Meyer (d.h. im Handbuch, das Kant zu seinen Logikvorlesungen verwendete) auftritt, wurde schon von Basch (1896, 237) hervorgehoben. Es erscheint in vielen Stellen der Werke Kants. Was betrifft die KU, s.§ 12, 222 u. § 21, AA 05: 238. Mit Bezug auf den alten Begriff von der ästhetischen Vollkommenheit, s. R 1800 u. 1894. Zu einem außerästhetischen Kontext s. R 2162 u. 4934, die den formalen Charakter der logischen Wahrheitskriterien behandeln u. also in Verhältnis zu einem Thema der *Einl.* in die *Transz. Logik der KrV* sind). Auf die Vermögensharmonie zu einer Erkenntnis überhaupt weisen die R 1931 u. 1935 hin.

<sup>7</sup>AA 15: 432. Zur Wichtigkeit der *Refl* vgl. Dumouchel (1994, S. 429-430).

<sup>8</sup>Vgl. das harte Urteil über die Genieästhetik Herders und der Vorromantik überhaupt in den §§ 47 u. 57 der *KU*.

<sup>9</sup>Das bestätigt, dass die Rolle der Analogie zentral in der Ästhetik Kants ist, wie übrigens die *Einl.* zeigt. Vgl. dazu Meo (2004, S. 120-143). Nach Bartuschat (1972, S. 24), insofern die Erkenntnis überhaupt unbestimmt ist, transzendiert sie die besonderen Erkenntnisse, sieht von irgendeinem Objekt ab und wendet sich nur an sich selbst. Diese letzte Behauptung ist zwar kompatibel mit der „Heautonomie“ der reflektierenden Urteilskraft (und also mit der ästhetischen Haltung), sondern nicht mit Kants Erkenntnistheorie.

auf einer Ebene an, die nicht die der kognitiven Harmonie (genauer: der Subsumtion der Anschauungen unter Begriffe) ist, und bleiben frei zu spielen: Wenn „die Einbildungskraft ohne Begriff schematisirt“,<sup>10</sup> versetzt der Verstand „ohne Begriffe die Einbildungskraft in ein regelmäßiges Spiel“.<sup>11</sup>

Kant fixiert den Unterschied, indem er eine „mindere Frage“ im § 9 erörtert:

»Auf welche Art wir uns einer wechselseitigen subjectiven Übereinstimmung der Erkenntnißkräfte unter einander im Geschmacksurtheile bewußt werden, ob ästhetisch durch den bloßen innern Sinn und Empfindung, oder intellectuell durch das Bewußtsein unserer absichtlichen Thätigkeit, womit wir jene ins Spiel setzen.

Wäre die gegebene Vorstellung, welche das Geschmacksurtheil veranlaßt, ein Begriff, welcher Verstand und Einbildungskraft in der Beurtheilung des Gegenstandes zu einem Erkenntnisse des Objects vereinigte, so wäre das Bewußtsein dieses Verhältnisses intellectuell (wie im objectiven Schematism der Urtheilskraft, wovon die Kritik handelt). Aber das Urtheil wäre auch alsdann nicht in Beziehung auf Lust und Unlust gefällt, mithin kein Geschmacksurtheil. Nun bestimmt aber das Geschmacksurtheil unabhängig von Begriffen das Object in Ansehung des Wohlgefallens und des Prädicats der Schönheit. Also kann jene subjective Einheit des Verhältnisses sich nur durch Empfindung kenntlich machen«.<sup>12</sup>

Kant weist auch terminologisch auf den Unterschied zwischen der Situation des uninteressierten Wohlgefallens und der der Strukturierung der Erfahrungsmannigfaltigkeit zum Erkenntniszweck hin: Während der ästhetischen Betrachtung bleibt der *Gegenstand* unabhängig vom Subjekt; dagegen erscheint dem Erkenntnissubjekt ein *Objekt*, das kraft seiner Tätigkeit ist, was es ist. Aber das Element, das diesen Gegensatz eigentlich charakterisiert, ist die verschiedene Funktion der Erkenntnisstrukturen: Einerseits aktiviert sich ein „ästhetischer“ (diesmal im etymologischen Sinne, in dem das Wort in der *KrV* verwendet wird: „zur *aisthesis* gehöriger“) Prozess, der den inneren Sinn und die Empfindung betrifft; andererseits betrifft der kognitive Prozess Einbildungskraft, Verstand und bestimmende Urtheilskraft.<sup>13</sup> In diesem Kontext, der reich an expliziten und impliziten Hinweisen auf die *KrV* ist, zeigt Kant die Entgegensetzung zwischen dem Prozess des „inneren Sinnes“ einerseits und dem der Einbildungskraft und des Verstandes andererseits, wenn sie verknüpft sind und der Schematismus sich verwirklicht.

Diese ist eine der wenigen Stellen der *Kritik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft*, an der es einen, wenn auch elliptischen und marginalen, Bezug auf die Zeit gibt, d.h. auf die Form des inneren Sinnes, die in der *KrV* die Prozessstruktur der Schemen charakterisiert. Ohne Zweifel tritt die Zeit auch im ersten Moment des Geschmacksurteils auf, wie Kants kurze

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<sup>10</sup>KU, § 35, AA 05: 287.

<sup>11</sup>KU, § 40, AA 05: 296.

<sup>12</sup>KU, § 9, AA 05: 218-219.

<sup>13</sup>Diese Unterscheidung, die der Definition des Geschmacksurteils in KU, §15 zugrunde liegt (s. auch EEKU, § VIII, AA 20: 222), steht in Zusammenhang mit der berühmten Anmerkung der *KrV* A 21/B 35 zur Bedeutung vom Wort „Ästhetik“.

Diskussion der sukzessiven Auffassung und der Synthesis (oder der Zusammenfassung) des Mannigfaltigen in einer Gestalt zeigt<sup>14</sup>; aber im zweiten Moment, wo das Thema von der Vermögensharmonie zum kognitivem Zeck oder zum zweckfreiem Spiel zentral ist, ist die Funktion der Zeit noch wirkungsvoll. Das Problem ist nicht, die Weise des Übergangs von einem Begriff zu einem Bild und umgekehrt (nach der bidirektionalen Bewegung *top down* und *bottom up*, die das Schematismuskapitel beschreibt) zu bestimmen, sondern zu verstehen, wie Verstand und Einbildungskraft sich in ihrem Spiel einer Zeitlichkeit gemäß harmonisieren, die die der Schemen nicht sein kann,<sup>15</sup> weil keine objektive Erkenntnis und kein Unterordnen vom Gestaltungs- und Vorstellungsprozess der Objekte nach bestimmten, von Verstand und Einbildungskraft gegebenen Regeln stattfindet. Hier handelt es sich um die Zeitlichkeit des inneren Sinnes, d.h. die Subjektstruktur, die wesentlich auch zum Bewusstsein der eigenen Identität (oder auch: des „empirischen Ichs“) beiträgt<sup>16</sup> und zu der Kant in der *KrV* sagt, dass sie die Art ist, „wie das Gemüt durch eigene Thätigkeit, nämlich dieses Setzen seiner Vorstellung, mithin durch sich selbst afficirt wird“.<sup>17</sup>

Zwar ist das psychologische Erlebnis leicht zu beschreiben: Ich kann nicht bewusst sein, bei der Betrachtung vom ästhetischen Gegenstand zu „weilen“ (wie Kant im § 12 sagen wird), und kann nicht wünschen, in meinem gegenwärtigen „Gemütszustand“ zu bleiben, ohne ein paralleles Bewusstsein der Zeitlichkeit von meinem Akt zu haben; der Gegenstand kann meine „Aufmerksamkeit“ nicht erwecken, ohne dass sozusagen eine „Selbstaffektion“, eine Modifikation meines inneren Sinnes auftritt;<sup>18</sup> meine Vermögen können nicht frei spielen und miteinander übereinstimmen, ohne dass ich ein paralleles Bewusstsein der Zeitlichkeit meiner ästhetischen Haltung habe. Nicht nur auf Grund der Definition von „innerem Sinn“ in der *KrV*, aber auch der in der *KU* verwendeten Terminologie ist es notwendig, von einer „Gemütsätigkeit“ zu sprechen: Kant selbst behauptet im schon zitierten § 12, dass die Betrachtung sich selbst während der Verweilung bei dem Gegenstand „stärkt und reproducirt“, wenn auch das Gemüt „passiv“ in dieser Situation ist.<sup>19</sup> Und, wenn auch die starren Regeln und die auf die Erkenntnis ausgerichtete Vermögensharmonie den Prozesscharakter meines ästhetischen Gefühls (das

<sup>14</sup> Vgl. *KU*, § 1, AA 05: 204.

<sup>15</sup> Zu einer weiteren Untersuchung über die Vermittlungsfunktion der Schemen zwischen sinnlichen Begriffen und Bildern vgl. Meo (2004, S. 90-117).

<sup>16</sup> In *KrV*, § 24, B 153 betont Kant die Notwendigkeit einer sorgfältigen Unterscheidung zwischen innerem Sinn und transzendentaler Apperzeption, die in der „Systemen der Psychologie“ für einerlei ausgegeben werden.

<sup>17</sup> *KrV*, § 8, B 67-68. Vgl. auch ebd. A 22/B 37 u. B 139.

<sup>18</sup> Vgl. *KrV*, § 24, B 156, Anm.: »Ich sehe nicht, wie man so viel Schwierigkeit darin finden könne, daß der innere Sinn von uns selbst afficirt werde. Jeder Actus der Aufmerksamkeit kann uns ein Beispiel davon geben... Wie sehr das Gemüth gemeinlich hiedurch afficirt werde, wird ein jeder in sich wahrnehmen können«. Vgl. auch *KrV*, A 98-99: Die Vorstellungen gehören »zum innern Sinn, und als solche sind alle unsere Erkenntnisse zuletzt doch der formalen Bedingung des innern Sinnes, nämlich der Zeit, unterworfen, als in welcher sie insgesamt geordnet, verknüpft und in Verhältnisse gebracht werden müssen«. Abgesehen davon, dass die *KrV* A u. B voneinander abweichen, was die Theorie vom inneren Sinn angeht, ist das Wichtigste, dass die fragliche Stelle der *KU* das Gefühl betrifft, das unzweifelhaft etwas *Inneres* ist.

<sup>19</sup> Nach Bartuschat (1972, S. 95) ist die Subjektätigkeit die Voraussetzung des Geschmacksurteils.

auch ein „Lebensgefühl“ ist) nicht modellieren können, wird der innere Sinn eine solche Wirkung erreichen.<sup>20</sup> Vom Standpunkt der kognitiv orientierten Vermögen sind Art und Weise vom Prozess unbestimmt (weil die Synthesis ihm fremd ist), aber vom Standpunkt des Subjekts der ästhetischen Erfahrung ist er reich an Lebendigkeit und semantisch voll.

Die Betrachtungen vom § 9 zeigen darum interessante, wenn auch unentwickelte Verhältnisse mit einem Problem, dem Kant eine große Aufmerksamkeit nach der *KrV* widmete: das „zweifache“ („transzendente“ und „psychologische“) Ich.<sup>21</sup> Wie bereits aufgetaucht, ist das psychologische Ich als Subjekt von Erlebnissen ein empirisches und zeitlich bedingtes Bewusstsein, das entweder als den „Gefühlzustand“ begleitender Gemütsakt oder als Erkenntnisbewusstsein gedeutet werden kann.<sup>22</sup>

Man könnte sogar vermuten, dass Kant das ästhetische Erlebnis als einen Zustand betrachtet, der vor der „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ anhält und eine ihrer subjektiven Bedingungen ist, eben darum, weil man sich noch auf dem kognitiv unvollkommenen Niveau der äußeren (der Empfindung) und inneren (des inneren Sinnes) *aisthesis* findet. Daher wäre die Vermögensharmonie nur vorkognitiv. Weil man es nur mit einer Vorprogrammierung in einem kognitiven Sinn zu tun hätte, würde man sich nur im Vorhalle der phänomenalen Erfahrung finden und könnte man nur von einer Prädisposition und einer Vorbereitung im Hinblick auf die „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ sprechen.

Nun entspringt jedoch eine Schwierigkeit. Es ist unmöglich, dass die ästhetische Reflexion über einen Gegenstand von seiner Wiedererkennung absieht: Man kann keines Geschmacksurteil aussprechen, das immer die Form „dieses *x* ist schön“ hat, ohne einen Begriff von *x* zu haben. Daher findet auch in diesem Fall jene „figürliche Synthesis“ statt, die im § 24 der *KrV* B eine wichtige Rolle innerhalb des Vereinigungsprozesses vom Mannigfaltigen der Sinnenanschauung hat; und sofern diese Synthesis ein Ergebnis der produktiven Einbildungskraft ist und *a priori* verfährt, erklärt sie den transzendentalen Charakter vom Aufbauprozess eines Objekts besser als die „Synthesis der Reproduktion“

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<sup>20</sup> Makkreel (1994, S. 93) betont den Unterschied zwischen „kognitiver“ und „ästhetischer“ Zeit: Der Fluss der Zeit „verlangsamt sich“ während der Verweilung beim Schönen. S. auch Kaulbach (1984, S. 113-114). „Kontemplation“ (der Latinismus, der als Synonym von „Betrachtung“ im § 2 auftritt) ist nicht identisch mit Aufhebung der Zeit: Wenn auch Kant einer alten und reichen Überlieferung im ersten Moment folgt, indem seine Deutung vom Verhältnis zum ästhetischen Gegenstand als „uninteressiert“ nicht nur dem *delectare* des Horaz, sondern auch dem *frui* Augustins als freiem geistigem Genuss von einem geistigen Gute nahesteht, haltet er die ästhetische Erfahrung nicht für ein ekstatisches Erlebnis, ein mystisches „Außer-Sich-Sein“.

<sup>21</sup> Das Thema tritt schon in der *KrV* A auf: vgl. die Unterscheidung zwischen empirischem Bewusstsein der eigenen Identität in der Zeit und „stehendem oder bleibendem Selbst“ während der Behandlung der „Synthesis der Rekognition im Begriffe“. Es wird jedoch explizit behandelt in FM, AA 20: 270 u. ApH, § 4, AA 07: 134, Anm. Zur Beziehung zwischen Psychologie und Transzendentalphilosophie in Kants Ästhetik vgl. die wirkungsvollen Überlegungen Brandts (1994, S. 37-40) zur Zeitlichkeit des freien Spiels.

<sup>22</sup> Soweit ich weiß, fehlt noch ein Gesamtstudium zum Raum- und Zeitproblem in der *KU*. In ihm sollte man Kants Beobachtungen nicht nur zur ästhetischen Überlegenheit der Form (und also zum Moment der Qualität des Geschmacksurteils – vgl. dazu Meo (2011, S. 34-43) und zum „inneren Sinn“, sondern auch zu den der Einbildungskraft gesetzten Grenzen in der *Analytik des Erhabenen* (§§ 26-27) untersuchen: Während die Auffassung „ins Unendliche“ gehen kann, wird die Zusammenfassung „immer schwerer“ und „gelangt bald zu ihrem Maximum“ (*KU*, AA 05: 251-252).

der subjektiven Deduktion der *KrV* A.<sup>23</sup> Dagegen, scheint von der fraglichen Stelle der *KU* eine Abzweigung der Anordnung der Vermögen (ihrer „subjektiven Einheit“) stattzufinden: Indem sie sich zu einer der zwei Richtungen wenden, rufen sie ein ästhetisches zweckfreies Spiel ins Leben; indem sie sich zur anderen Richtung wenden, verwirklichen sie ein von starren Gesetzen geregeltes Unterordnungsverhältnis zum Erkenntniszweck.

Man kann sich von dieser vermutlichen Aporie befreien, wenn man, abgesehen von den Betrachtungen Kants und von seinem elliptischen und verschlungenen Gedankengang, eine Trennung zwischen einer Synthesis, die zum Vorteil der Konstruktion des phänomenalen Objekts, aber nicht in einer bestimmten Weise, wirkt, und einer Erkenntnissynthesis, die der Orientierung des Subjekts in der Erscheinungswelt dienlich ist. In der Diskussion des § 9 findet man einen Beleg dafür, dass die Ebene sozusagen noch „roh“ ist: Kant wählt das Wort „Vorstellungskräfte“, dessen semantisches Feld unbestimmt ist, um die Gesamtheit von Einbildungskraft und Verstand zu bezeichnen. Nicht nur gilt dieses Wort sowohl für die kognitive als auch für die ästhetische Vorstellung (deren Unterscheidung bei Kant jedoch sehr klar ist), sondern vor allem bezeichnet es die subjektive Seite des Erkenntnisvermögens überhaupt<sup>24</sup>.

Also meint Kant die Einbildungskraft und den Verstand sowohl in ihrer spielerischen als auch in ihrer nach der Erkenntnis ausgerichteten Tätigkeit, aber vor ihrer Spezialisierung in einem dieser Sinnen. Damit sich ein ästhetischer Bezug auf den Gegenstand verwirklicht, genügt es, dass diese noch kognitiv unvollkommene Übereinstimmung erreicht wird, in der die Vorstellung sich zur „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ bezieht.

Eine fragwürdige Deutung behauptet, dass es möglich ist, das Syntagma „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ durch einen Vergleich mit dem § 12 von der *KrV* B zu erklären.<sup>25</sup> An dieser Stelle kritisiert Kant die „vermeintlich transscendentalen Prädicate der

<sup>23</sup> Zur Rolle der figürlichen Synthesis innerhalb des Erkenntnisprozesses s. Meo (2004, S. 78-90).

<sup>24</sup> Kant verwendet „Vorstellungskraft“ (die *vis repraesentativa* Baumgartens) gelegentlich in seinen vorkritischen Schriften und öfter von der *KrV* A aus. Unter Berücksichtigung des semantisch weiten Feldes des Wortes „Vorstellung“, das die Gemütstätigkeiten überhaupt (Wahrnehmungen, Empfindungen, Phantasien, Begriffe, usw.) bezeichnet, nimmt „Vorstellungskraft“ nie eine „technische“ Bedeutung an. Wichtiger aus einem theoretischen Standpunkt ist das semantisch verwandte Wort „Vorstellungsvermögen“, das die subjektive Voraussetzung der Erkenntnis bezeichnet. Die Vermehrung seiner Verwendung und die Präzisierung von seinem subjektiven Charakter stehen im Zusammenhang mit der Verteidigung vom Kritizismus gegen Reinhold, der das Vorstellungsvermögen für den Grund der Erkenntnisvermögen hielt und daher Kants Dualismus, d.h. die Notwendigkeit der Verbindung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand und die Unterscheidung zwischen Erscheinung und Ding an sich, bekämpfte.

<sup>25</sup> Vgl. Fricke (1990, S. 58-64) u. Ameriks (1998, S. 438). Auch in der Vergangenheit wichen einige Deutungen von jener der meisten Forscher ab. Nach Cohen (2007, S. 175), beträfe die „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ einen bestimmten Gegenstand. Dieser aber wäre nicht der Gegenstand selbst, sondern nur ein „Vertretungsgegenstand“ oder eine „Vertretungsvorstellung“: Er verträte ein nicht genauer dargestelltes „Allgemeines“, dessen er – als Zeichen oder Spur – nur der „Schatten“ wäre. Diese Deutung der Beziehung zwischen Allgemeinem und Einzelem hat eine vage metaphysische (oder quasi-metaphysische) *allure*, die jedoch in Kants Text nicht auftritt. Was die Deutung des Gegenstands als ein Zeichen des „Allgemeinen“



Dinge“ der Scholastiker (d.h. *unum, verum* und *bonum*), die „nichts anders als logische Erfordernisse und Kriterien aller Erkenntnis der Dinge überhaupt“ wären.<sup>26</sup> Weil die Unbestimmtheit der „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ mit dem freien Spiel und der Vermögensharmonie eng verbunden ist, gibt es keinen Raum für die vermeintliche metaphysische Rolle von den drei *praedicata generaliora*.<sup>27</sup> Außerdem kann man nicht vergessen, dass Kant eben diese Rolle bestreitet, indem er sie als Elemente einer „allgemeinen Logik“ betrachtet. Eben weil sie unbestimmt für irgendeines Seiendes gelten und bloße logisch-analytische Vorbedingungen sind,<sup>28</sup> sind sie sowohl für die wirklich-synthetischen Erkenntnis, als auch für das ästhetische Wohlgefallen oder Missfallen nutzlos. Es ist darum seltsam, Kant die Idee zuzuschreiben, dass Verstand und Einbildungskraft für eine Erkenntnis überhaupt nur miteinander übereinstimmen, wenn sie sich an die Transzendentalien anpassen.<sup>29</sup> Sie haben mit dem subjektiven Gemütszustand, der Geschmacks- und Erkenntnisurteilen vorangeht, nichts zu tun.

Eine interessante Deutung dieses Problems wurde schon von Cassirer formuliert:

»Das ästhetische Verhalten heißt ‚zweckmäßig für die Erkenntnis der Objekte überhaupt‘; aber es verzichtet eben damit darauf, die Objekte in Sonderklassen aufzuteilen und sie „durch besondere Unterscheidungsmerkmale [...] zu bezeichnen und zu bestimmen«. <sup>30</sup>

Sowohl zur ästhetischen als auch zur theoretischen Vorstellung fordert man eine Erkenntniseinheit; aber, während man vom theoretischen Standpunkt den Akzent auf das Erkenntnismoment legt, so ist vom ästhetischen Standpunkt das Einheitsmoment zentral. Drei unter den vielen theoretischen und philologischen von dieser Deutung gelegten Probleme sind hier hervorzuheben. Erstens tritt die Formulierung „Erkenntnis der Objekte überhaupt“ nie an der fraglichen Stelle auf: Kant spricht immer nur von „Erkenntnis überhaupt“ (wie gesehen, nur im § 12 von der *KrV* spricht er von einer „Erkenntnis der Dinge überhaupt“); nie tritt darum die Idee einer allgemeinen, von einer bestimmten oder individuell unterschiedenen Erkenntnis auf. Zweitens führt die These von einem Verzicht auf die Klassenaufteilung und auf die Bestimmung der Objekte durch ihre Unterscheidung

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betrifft, die die Beziehung Erscheinung-Noumenon widerspiegelt, gelten dieselben Einwände, die man gegen die modernen einseitig semiotisierenden Lektüre Kants erheben kann (vgl. z.B. Schönrich 1981, S. 122-126.). Zur Thesen, dass die Erscheinung, als objektiv ausgemacht, das semantische Korrelat vom Erkenntnisakt ist, vgl. meine Diskussion der Standpunkte Schönrichs und Hogrebes (1974) (Meo 2004, S. 69).

<sup>26</sup>KrV B 97-98.

<sup>27</sup> Der sowohl logisch als auch chronologisch vorbereitende Charakter des freien Spiels im Vergleich mit der bestimmten Erkenntnis wird von Brandt kraftvoll hervorgehoben: Es ist „in der Tiefensphäre des Noch-Nicht-Bestimmten“ und in der „Primärzone der Tätigkeit des Vernunftwesens“ anzusiedeln (1994, S. 46).

<sup>28</sup> Vgl. auch KU, § 73, 394, wo die Aussage, durch die die *bonitas* von einem Ding behauptet wird, als ein Kinderspiel bezeichnet wird. Zur Rolle der Seinsprädikate bei Kant, s. Meo 2001.

<sup>29</sup> Vgl. Fricke (1990, S. 61). Jedenfalls muss man einräumen, dass Kant immer schwankend war, was den Begriff Vollkommenheit betrifft, die untrennbar verbunden mit der Transzendentalientheorie ist und eine wichtige Rolle im dritten Moment des Geschmacksurteils spielt (vgl. dazu Meo 2011, S. 121-132). Ein Zeichen hierfür ist die häufige terminologische Veränderung der Bezeichnung der Vollkommenheitsarten (vgl. Marc-Wogau 1938, S. 170): Das könnte Hinweis auf eine gewisse Schwierigkeit Kants sein, sich von dem zu befreien, was er als nutzlosen Kram in der *KrV* betrachtet hatte.

<sup>30</sup> Cassirer (2001, S. 303).

wieder zur Unbestimmtheit der von Kant abgewiesenen Seinsprädikate: Nach der Abschaffung der bestimmenden Prädikate der Dinge bleiben noch die allgemeinsten, von denen er sich befreit hatte, insofern er sie als bloße „logische Erfordernisse“ (d.h. als nicht zureichende, vor allem von ihrem tautologischen Charakter angefochtene Erkenntnisbedingungen) betrachtet hatte. Es hätte darum keinen Sinn gehabt, sie unverändert in der *KU* wieder aufzugreifen. Drittens ist die ästhetische Vorstellung weder auf die allgemeine noch auf die besondere oder einzelne Erkenntnis ausgerichtet. Die eigentümliche Vermögensharmonie in der ästhetischen Erfahrung, als *subjektiv* angemessene Bedingung im Hinblick auf die Erkenntnis,<sup>31</sup> kann also nicht als ein Beleg ihrer Anordnung zum kognitiven Zweck betrachtet werden. Andererseits wird Kant später erklären, dass der „Gemüthszustand, d.i. die Stimmung der Erkenntnißkräfte zu einer Erkenntniß überhaupt“, sich auch im Geschmacksurteil „allgemein mittheilen lassen“ muss.<sup>32</sup>

Jedenfalls ist es unbestreitbar, dass die drei Prädikate (mit einem vierten, das mit ihnen in der Geschichte der Metaphysik eng verbunden ist: dem *pulchrum*) in der *KU* vorkommen und auch eine bedeutende Rolle haben, insofern sie die Einteilung der zusammenfassenden Tafel der *Einl.* aus einem metaphysischen Standpunkt ergänzen: Das Wahre entspricht der Erkenntnis im Naturgebiet, das Gute der Handlung im Freiheitsgebiet, das Schöne der Betrachtung im ästhetischen Feld, die Einheit dem Ganzen der Natur als System in der Mannigfaltigkeit seiner Erscheinungen, das uns erscheint, als ob es auf unser subjektives Ordnungs- und Harmoniebedürfnis ausgerichtet wäre. Die subjektive Harmonie und die Freiheit der Vermögen während der ästhetischen Tätigkeit scheinen also ein Mikrokosmos zu sein, der der ebenso vielen subjektiven (d.h. von uns zugeschriebenen) Harmonie und Freiheit der Natur in der Hervorbringung ihrer Formen entspricht.

Gegen die im § 9 vorgebrachte These ist ein tückischer Einwand erhoben worden: Wenn eine Vorstellung Verstand und Einbildungskraft in ein „freies Spiel“ versetzt und dieses in eine Übereinstimmung mündet, die 1. zur Lust führt und sich im Geschmacksurteil ausdrückt, 2. die Bedingung von jeder bestimmten Erkenntnis ist, können wir nicht vermeiden, alle Erfahrungsobjekte als „schön“ zu definieren.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Vgl. *KU*, §9, AA 05: 218.

<sup>32</sup> Ebd., § 21, AA 05: 238.

<sup>33</sup> Der Einwand hat verschiedene Formulierungen gehabt. Schon Basch (1896, S. 215 u. S. 245) hob hervor, dass jedes Erkenntnisurteil ein Geschmacksurteil sein müsste, wenn die für den Geschmack erforderliche Stimmung der Vermögen auch für den gesunden und gemeinen Verstand notwendig ist. In neuerer Zeit: Elliott (1968, S. 255); Bernstein (1992); Crawford (1974, S. 145); Meerbote (1982, S. 81-84; Savile (1987); Ginsborg (1990, S. 65); Guyer (1997, S. 263-264 u. S. 286-287); Budd (2001); Rind (2002), pp. 20-30. Zu einer Antwort, die wesentlich auf die Postulation der Existenz von verschiedenen Proportionen der Übereinstimmung (s. bes. *KU*, §§ 21 u. 39) gegründet ist, vgl.: Marc-Wogau (1938, S. 133); Ameriks (1982, S. 298-300) u. (1998, S. 439 u. S. 442); Allison (1998, S. 478); Iber (2006, S. 117). Artikulierter und geneigt, einen Naturunterschied zwischen der auf die Erkenntnis und der auf das Geschmacksurteil ausgerichteten Harmonie zu sehen, sind die Auflösungen von Fricke (1990, S. 52-57) u. Longuenesse (2000, S. 300-301) u.

Zumindest teilweise antwortet Kant selbst auf den Einwand im § 6 der *Einl.*: Er erklärt, dass

»wir von dem Zusammentreffen der Wahrnehmungen mit den Gesetzen nach allgemeinen Naturbegriffen (den Kategorieen) nicht die mindeste Wirkung auf das Gefühl der Lust in uns antreffen, auch nicht antreffen können, weil der Verstand damit unabsichtlich nach seiner Natur nothwendig verfährt.«<sup>34</sup>

Darum handelt es sich nicht um einen Gemütszustand, in dem das freie Spiel sich verwirklicht. Einige Forscher wundern sich jedoch darüber, dass der Einwand eine Unterstützung in einigen älteren *Refl.*, wie z.B. in der 672 (vielleicht 1769-70), wo der implizite Bezug auf die Einheit in der Mannigfaltigkeit und auf die *perfectio naturae* eine Reminiszenz an der alten Theorie der Vollkommenheit einer geordneten Welt ist:

»Nun Gelten die Verhältnisse des Raumes und der Zeit vor iederman, welche Empfindungen man auch haben mag. Demnach ist in allen Erscheinungen die Form allgemein gültig; diese Form wird auch nach gemeinschaftlichen Regeln der coordination erkannt; was also der Regel der Coordination in Raum und Zeit gemäß ist, daß gefällt nothwendig iederman und ist schön. Das Angenehme in dem Anschauen der Schönheit kommt an auf die Faslichkeit eines Gantzen, allein die Schönheit auf die allgemeine Gültigkeit dieser schicklichen Verhältnisse.«<sup>35</sup>

Es ist unleugbar, dass die Überlieferung eine wichtige Rolle an dieser und anderen Stellen auch der „kritischen Periode“ spielt,<sup>36</sup> aber es ist notwendig, den Kontext der Beobachtungen zu der Erkenntnis überhaupt in Betracht zu ziehen. Im § 9 besteht Kant darauf, dass die Einbildungskraft (das Vermögen, das die Synthesis des Mannigfaltigen der Anschauung bewirkt) und der Verstand (das Vermögen, das die Synthesis der Vorstellungen im Begriff bewirkt) nicht zugunsten einer bestimmten Erkenntnis, sondern zugunsten der Subjekt-Lust miteinander übereinstimmen. Die Erkenntnis kommt ins Spiel, insofern es notwendig ist, eine Rechtfertigung für die Mitteilung vom Gefühl zu finden,

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(2006, S. 205-206). Bemerkenswert ist der von Allison vorgeschlagene Ausweg (2001, S. 116-117). Er unterscheidet zwischen Harmonie und freiem Spiel der Vermögen: Während dieses sich auf ihre Verbindung im Akt der reinen Reflexion bezieht, so ist jene ein Produkt der Reflexion. Seine Deutung rechtfertigt auch die Möglichkeit vom Scheitern der Reflexion, d.h. von einer „Disharmonie“ und einem negativen Geschmacksurteil. Also: So wie ein freies Spiel ohne Harmonie stattfinden kann, so spricht nichts dagegen, dass eine Harmonie ohne ein freies Spiel stattfindet; und eben dieser wäre der Fall der Erkenntnis.

<sup>34</sup>KU 187. Vgl. auch die *Allg. Anm. zum ersten Abschn. der Analytik*, ebd. 242.

<sup>35</sup>AA 15: 298. (Kulenkampff 1994, S. 207, Anm. 4) behauptet plausiblerweise, dass Kant diese Stellung aufgab, weil sie ungeeignet war, das Problem der Rechtfertigung der Forderung des Geschmacksurteils nach der Allgemeingültigkeit aufzulösen. Er fügt hinzu, dass sich hieraus die Unzufriedenheit über den empirischen Ursprung dieser Forderung ergibt. Vgl. auch die zeitgenössischen R 639, 646, 648, 683, 702, 711, 715, 743 e 764 u. die späteren 1895 u. 1907. Was die Vorlesungen betrifft, s. V-Met-L1/Pölitiz (AA 28: 252-253). Das Thema der Vermögensharmonie tritt ausdrücklich in der V-Anth/Pillau (1777-78) AA 25: 759-760) u. in der V-Anth/Mensch (1781-82 – ebd. 997) auf. Im ersten Text ist das noch nicht reife Denken Kants schon nach der endgültigen Auflösung der *KU* ausgerichtet.

<sup>36</sup> Was die objektivistische Deutung des Schönen in der vorkritischen Zeit betrifft, zitiert Brandt (1994, S. 22-23) eine Stelle aus dem Aufsatz BDG, in dem das Thema der kosmischen Ordnung und der „Übereinstimmung und schöner Verknüpfung“ der Naturdinge auftritt (AA 02: 110). Vgl. auch NTH (z.B. AA 01: 222 u. 306).

das in das Geschmacksurteil mündet. Zwar ist jede bestimmte Erkenntnis mitteilbar, aber sie hat ihren Grund eben in jenem Verhältnis zwischen den Vermögen, das der subjektive Gemütszustand ist, in dem ihr freies Spiel sich entwickelt. Also hat die Absicht, keinen Bezug auf einen bestimmten Erkenntniszweck zu nehmen, Kant erst zur Einführung jener Erkenntnis überhaupt gebracht, die so viele Zweifel geweckt hat. Um diese Deutung zu bestärken, kann man sich auf eine im § 39 gegebenen Präzisierung berufen: Die Übereinstimmung zwischen den Vermögen ist die (subjektive, aber nichtsdestoweniger logisch-transzendente) Bedingung der Möglichkeit sowohl der ästhetischen Lust als auch der Erkenntnis überhaupt.<sup>37</sup>

Im § 9 kommt eben diese „subjektive Bedingung“ ins Spiel<sup>38</sup>, die den Vermögen eine kognitive (objektiv-intersubjektive) und eine ästhetische (subjektive-intersubjektive) Richtung zugesteht, wenn auch die Unterscheidung zwischen bestimmender und reflektierender Urteilskraft (derer sich Kant hingegen im § 39 bewusst ist) noch nicht aufgetreten ist.<sup>39</sup> Wir sind uns darüber bewusst,

»daß dieses zum Erkenntniß überhaupt schickliche subjective Verhältniß eben so wohl für jedermann gelten und folglich allgemein mittheilbar sein müsse, als es eine jede bestimmte Erkenntniß ist, die doch immer auf jenem Verhältniß als subjectiver Bedingung beruht.«<sup>40</sup>

Wenn ein der möglichen Ergebnisse (das kognitive) mitteilbar ist, wird das auch das andere sein, weil die Bedingung dieselbe ist.

Eine Betrachtung, die der zuvor zitierten Stelle aus der § VI der *Einl.* folgt, scheint diese Deutung zu bestärken:

»Zwar spüren wir an der Faßlichkeit der Natur und ihrer Einheit der Abtheilung in Gattungen und Arten, wodurch allein empirische Begriffe möglich sind, durch welche wir sie nach ihren besonderen Gesetzen erkennen, keine merkliche Lust mehr: aber sie ist gewiß zu ihrer Zeit gewesen, und nur weil die gemeinste Erfahrung ohne sie nicht möglich sein würde, ist sie allmählig mit dem bloßen Erkenntnisse vermischt und nicht mehr besonders bemerkt worden.«<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> Vgl. KU, AA 05: 292-293.

<sup>38</sup> Selbstverständlich ist die „subjektive Bedingung“ notwendig, jedoch nicht ausreichend, nicht nur – wie Allison (2001, S. 187) aufweist – damit etwas schön beurteilt wird, sondern bezüglich jeden Urteils. Es ist sehr wichtig, auf den Unterschied zwischen dem freien Spiel der Vermögen und ihrem auf die Erkenntnis ausgerichteten Verhältnis zu bestehen, weil man sonst denken könnte, dass das erste die Voraussetzung der zweiten ist.

<sup>39</sup> Eine anfängliche Unterscheidung findet man nur in der *Deduktion* (bes. §§ 31-38). In den §§ 6-9, wenn auch Kant die Funktion der Urteilskraft noch nicht klar ist (aufgrund der bekannten Geschichte der Textentstehung), ist er also schon dazu gelangt, die im Fall des Erkenntnisurteils notwendige und in dem des Geschmacksurteils freie Harmonie zu verbinden. Zum „Parallelismus“ zwischen der *Deduktion* u. dem § 9 s. Dumouchel (1994, S. 431-432) u. (1998, S. 27).

<sup>40</sup> KU, AA 05: 218.

<sup>41</sup> Ebd. 187.

In einer ziemlich archaischen Phase der Kulturgeschichte gab es noch keine solche Spezialisierung der Vermögensharmonie, dass man die kognitive und die ästhetische Richtung schon gänzlich voneinander hätte unterscheiden können: Die Erkenntnis konnte eine Lust hervorbringen dank der Verschmelzung der Strukturen in einem noch primitiven Gemüt, das erst begann, jene Unterscheidungs- und Vergleichungsfunktion auszuüben, auf der der Wissenschafts- und Erfahrungsfortschritt sich gründet. In einem noch sehr magmatischen Zustand brachte die embryonale Ausübung dieser Funktionen eine psychologische Antwort hervor, die eine reifere Kultur als „ästhetisch“ bezeichnet und an die bekannte Betrachtung Aristoteles' zum Ursprung der Philosophie aus der Verwunderung vor *tà prókheira* erinnert.

Diese Stelle hilft vielleicht zu verstehen, warum Kant fest auf jenem subjektiven Verhältnis zwischen den „Vorstellungskräften“ besteht, das sowohl auf das freie Spiel als auch auf die Erkenntnis überhaupt ausgerichtet ist.

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## Correspondencia o armonía

### La literatura en la distinción kantiana de las bellas artes

#### *Correspondence or harmony*

#### *Literature within Kantian distinction of fine arts*

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#### Resumen

La *Crítica del Juicio* concede a la poesía una distinción entre las bellas artes que no encuentra fundamento en la crítica del juicio estético: si la *Analítica* vincula el sentimiento de placer propio de lo bello al reconocimiento de una relación armónica entre las facultades del conocimiento, la literatura se distingue por la afinidad que mantiene su medio representativo con la facultad del entendimiento. El primado de la poesía en la CJ obedece pues necesariamente a una teoría estética previa que equiparaba el gusto a la correspondencia entre sensibilidad y razón consustancial a todo juicio de conocimiento. El presente trabajo destaca la continuidad de la poética clasicista en la obra kantiana confrontando la noción de correspondencia (*Übereinstimmung*) asumida por su primera teoría estética con la delimitación respecto al concepto de armonía que introduce la tercera crítica.

#### Palabras Clave

Estética; poética; racionalismo; clasicismo; correspondencia

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### Abstract

The *Critique of Judgment* provides poetry with a distinction within fine arts that finds no basis in the critique of aesthetic judgment: if the *Analytic* relates the feeling of pleasure, typical of the beautiful, to the harmonic relationship among the faculties of knowledge, the very thing that distinguishes literature is the affinity that its representative medium holds with the faculty of understanding. The primacy of poetry in the CJ needs to obey a prior aesthetic theory that equates the taste with the correspondence between sensitivity and reason consubstantial to any judgment of knowledge. This work outlines the continuity of the classicist poetics in Kant's work confronting the notion of correspondence (*Übereinstimmung*) adopted by his first aesthetic theory with its delimitation in regards to the notion of harmony introduced by the third critique.

### Key words

Aesthetics ; Poetics ; Rationalism ; Classicism ; Correspondence

## 1. Las complicaciones de una innecesaria digresión

Considerando el lugar accesorio que ocupan las preocupaciones artísticas en la *Crítica del Juicio*, no deja de sorprender que Kant se detuviera en el § 51 a proponer una clasificación de las bellas artes más propia de lo que convencionalmente se considera una teoría estética que del fin último perseguido por la tercera crítica. Igual de sorprendente resulta el criterio esgrimido para establecer una jerarquía que sitúa la poesía al frente de los lenguajes artísticos. Pues si ya el tercer momento de la *Analítica* se había encargado de definir el juicio de gusto como correlato del sentimiento suscitado por una específica relación armónica entre las facultades del conocimiento, y el examen del genio lo había caracterizado por su capacidad para intuir la proporción de imaginación y entendimiento que propicia esa armonía, Kant distingue ahora las bellas artes en función de la proximidad que mantiene su medio representativo respecto a una u otra facultad del conocimiento. Partiendo sobre todo del testimonio ofrecido por las *Reflexiones*, comprobaremos que esta contradicción responde a la misma que se da entre los referentes de la incipiente disciplina estética manejados por Kant antes de 1781 y los presupuestos de su filosofía crítica, al tiempo que señala una coincidencia indirecta con el legado transmitido a sus primeros destinatarios. La poesía permite poner así al descubierto tanto los restos de la concepción estética adheridos a la tercera crítica como la revolución poética que esta alentó apuntando desde el gusto a la raíz oculta del juicio reflexionante. Del cruce entre la línea retrospectiva y la prospectiva da cuenta la función que desempeñan los conceptos de correspondencia y armonía en la teoría del gusto.

La distinción entre medios artísticos que introduce el § 51 se fundamenta en la analogía con los códigos comunicativos: «die Analogie der Kunst mit der Art des Ausdrucks, dessen sich Menschen im Sprechen bedienen, um sich so vollkommen, als möglich ist, einander, d. i. nicht bloß ihren Begriffen, sondern auch Empfindungen nach, mitzuteilen» AA 5 320). Una vez que esos modos han sido identificados con los de

palabra, gesto y sonido, las artes se diferenciarán en función de si utilizan un lenguaje verbal, figurativo o sonoro. Kant parece restar valor a esta clasificación advirtiéndolo en una nota a pie de página que solo responde a una posible clase organizativa. Más adelante volveremos sobre los antecedentes de su elección, por el momento baste constatar que, lejos de obedecer a un recurso improvisado, el criterio semiótico que subyace a la consideración de las bellas artes descubre sus implicaciones en el § 53, cuando su distinción se pliega explícitamente a una comparación valorativa. La primacía que detenta de entrada la literatura solo puede obedecer a lo que constituye su elemento diferencial, esto es, al hecho de que los signos verbales representen ideas para dar cuenta de impresiones sensibles en lugar de remitir directamente a ellas (la *Antropología Collins* se refiere a la poesía como una pintura de ideas, AA 25 95). Naturalmente, el Kant de la CJ no puede ignorar la libertad imaginativa en el juego de facultades impulsado por el juicio de gusto. Nada sirve mejor a ese propósito que la demarcación respecto al otro gran arte de palabra, la retórica, pues si esta promete una engañosa ocupación al entendimiento valiéndose de la imaginación, la poesía se sirve sin tapujos de los recursos imaginativos para terminar proporcionando ocupación al entendimiento (AA 5 327). La elevada consideración que merece la poesía en la tercera crítica parte pues de que su medio expresivo mantiene una especial intimidad con los conceptos del entendimiento sin determinar por ello falazmente su sentido.

No hace falta aventurar las causas que apartan este punto del hilo expositivo dictado por la crítica del juicio estético proponiendo una jerarquía de los lenguajes artísticos, para apreciar su difícil engarce en el camino desbrozado por la *Analítica* y la *Deducción*. Kant identifica el sentimiento de placer suscitado por la apreciación de belleza formal en un objeto con el reconocimiento de una correspondencia armónica entre imaginación y entendimiento (AA 5 218). Concede luego que ese juicio difiere en sus implicaciones si lo origina un objeto de la naturaleza o un producto del arte, pues la capacidad del genio para dotar a su obra de apariencia natural no disipa la conciencia de que fue concebida con el fin último de procurar placer (AA 5 307). En cambio, que la naturaleza parezca esmerarse en complacer la coincidencia entre entendimiento e imaginación revela su disposición favorable a corresponder la necesidad humana de subsumir las intuiciones imaginativas a los conceptos de la razón y, en consecuencia, de comprender el mundo como un todo organizado. La superioridad del juicio de gusto sobre la belleza natural frente al que proporciona el objeto artístico es entonces consecuente con lo que para uno y otro supone el concepto de conformidad a fin como principio a priori del juicio reflexionante. Por el contrario, una segunda segregación en función de las condiciones impuestas por el medio representativo obedece a un presupuesto que no solo dista de responder a la dimensión trascendental abierta por el juicio de gusto, sino que cuestiona sus mismos presupuestos.

Así lo evidencia ya el que, lejos de acotar un ámbito específico de la creación artística, las razones esgrimidas en el § 53 para destacar la poesía resulten válidas para

cualquier juicio de gusto, al menos para cualquiera inspirado por un producto de las bellas artes. Quiere respaldar Kant la supremacía de la literatura afirmando que:

«Sie erweitert das Gemüt dadurch, daß sie die Einbildungskraft in Freiheit setzt und innerhalb den Schranken eines gegebenen Begriffs unter der unbegrenzten Mannigfaltigkeit möglicher damit zusammenstimmender Formen diejenige verknüpft, der kein Sprachausdruck völlig adäquat ist, und sich also ästhetisch zu Ideen erhebt» (AA 5 326).

La asociación de la libertad imaginativa a una actividad del pensamiento renuente a la determinación conceptual dista de ser una cualidad exclusivamente poética, como constata la comparación con las artes plásticas y las musicales que se ofrece a continuación: las relaciones entre sensaciones sonoras que establece el lenguaje musical persiguen la expresión de ideas estéticas, como lo hace el vehículo figurativo que procuran las artes plásticas a la imaginación. El lugar jerárquico ocupado por estas modalidades artísticas responde a un signo ambivalente: la música sigue inmediatamente a la poesía en lo que a «encanto y movimiento de espíritu» se refiere (la precede incluso si nos ceñimos al agrado causado por el mero juego de sensaciones), pero claudica ante las artes de forma atendiendo al valor cultural transmitido al espíritu. La poesía mantiene en cambio una incuestionable posición de privilegio aunque los méritos aducidos para ello no se distinguen de los concedidos al juicio de cualquier forma artísticamente bella.

Otro tanto cabe decir del pasaje que define a continuación la poesía como «esquema de lo suprasensible», controvertida fórmula tradicionalmente interpretada conforme a dos sentidos al menos.<sup>1</sup> En primer lugar, el juicio de gusto atañe indirectamente a lo suprasensible porque utiliza la representación sensible de un concepto empírico para trasladar un concepto de la razón inasequible a toda representación imaginativa. Lo hace en segunda instancia porque el tránsito entre imaginación y entendimiento facultado por el juicio de gusto muestra la disposición de la naturaleza a ser subsumida como un todo unitario conforme a los conceptos de la razón. De la segunda acepción se deducirá el fin último del juicio estético que cierra la primera parte de la obra tendiendo el puente hacia la *Crítica del juicio teleológico*. Pero tanto una como otra fundamentación de lo bello resultan ajenas a si la representación del objeto responde a un soporte verbal, sonoro o iconográfico: el arte bello aspira siempre a representar indirectamente los conceptos de la razón como lo hacen los objetos de la naturaleza, aunque se sitúe a su zaga desde el momento en que la voluntad del autor tiñe el ideal de una conformidad a fin sin fin. Si bien la contemplación ociosa de la belleza natural promueve mejor la transición a las ideas de la razón que el juicio de la artística, nada invita a discriminar esta última en función de su canal expresivo, menos aún de su afinidad con una u otra facultad del conocimiento.

Que los motivos para un ensalzamiento de la poesía terminen recayendo sobre los principios generales del gusto confirma su problemática inclusión en una crítica del juicio

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<sup>1</sup> Sobre la controvertida cuestión de la relación simbólica entre gusto y moral ver entre otros Paul Guyer (1998, pp. 338-35), Gundula Felten (200, p. 4 200 y ss) o Birgit Recki (2001).

reflexionante, esto es, en el hilo discursivo que enlaza el juicio estético con el teleológico. Al describir lo bello como aquello que, sin concepto, es definido como objeto de una satisfacción universal, el primer momento de la *Analítica* anticipa los interrogantes que plantea una crítica del juicio estético: cómo puede este basarse en un sentimiento antes que en un concepto, o qué fundamenta entonces su demanda de universal acatamiento. Para despejar estas y otras incógnitas, Kant necesitaba empezar concretando la disposición adoptada por las facultades del entendimiento cuando un objeto es juzgado únicamente conforme a la ley del gusto. Si esta constituye su elemento diferencial es porque de ella se derivan sus demás atributos: la autonomía respecto a las legislaciones del entendimiento y la imaginación, o la universalidad de un juicio no sujeto ni a la coerción de los afectos sensoriales ni a la determinación conceptual. La *Crítica de la razón pura* había esclarecido la síntesis imaginativa que sigue a la aplicación de los conceptos puros del entendimiento, pero ya la *Deducción* reconocía que nada garantiza la concordancia del orden acotado por las leyes empíricas con el que demandan los conceptos de la razón. La *Crítica del Juicio* nace con el propósito de resolver ese interrogante tras haber constatado que la necesidad de subsumir los objetos de la naturaleza al principio de conformidad a fin sobrepasa las atribuciones del juicio determinante. El enlace entre entendimiento y razón presume pues una tercera facultad que carece de ámbito legislativo propio. Probarlo exige que el Juicio pueda escapar a la contingencia de los afectos sensitivos sin que su objeto sea conceptualmente determinado. Solo el juicio de lo bello acredita la existencia de esa instancia regida por el libre juego entre facultades sin sujetarse a la legislación decretada por una u otra.

Lejos pues de obedecer (solo) a un capricho clasicista, la relación armónica entre imaginación y entendimiento adoptada por el juicio de gusto descubre la raíz común del conocimiento teórico y el práctico, proporcionando así la tabla de salvación al entero sistema de la filosofía crítica. La insistencia con que Kant regresa al conflicto entre belleza natural y artística abunda en el estatus particular que otorga a la segunda. Pero incluso circunscrito a la órbita de la producción artística, lo bello solo se atiene a la ley del gusto desde la específica relación entre libertad imaginativa e indeterminación conceptual que Kant designa como armonía. Esté o no mediatizado por el artificio, el juicio de gusto encuentra su elemento distintivo en el equilibrio y armónica relación que adoptan las facultades del conocimiento en la apreciación de un objeto, independientemente del soporte expresivo empleado para su representación. Si algún arte pudiera merecer mejor consideración serían en todo caso las de forma (pintura, escultura, arquitectura,...), pues solo esta suscita una libre y armónica correspondencia de las facultades no supeditada ni al dictado del entendimiento ni al de los sentidos. Asumida la incongruencia entre una crítica del juicio estético y el encumbramiento de la literatura como modalidad artística, el lugar privilegiado que ocupa esta en la *Crítica del Juicio* solo puede obedecer a huella de una antigua concepción poética que Kant no sometió al método probatorio de la filosofía crítica. Atendiendo al escaso interés que dedicó a esta materia, la cuestión podría parecer baladí u objeto de una ociosa erudición, si los primeros lectores de la obra kantiana no

hubieran convenido en extraer de ella una inaudita revaloración filosófica de la poesía. Más atento a la clausura de su sistema que a las inquietudes artísticas, Kant no reparó en que asumía una concepción de la literatura difícilmente conciliable con su teoría crítica del gusto, pero también con la dimensión demiúrgica que encontraría en el romanticismo. Entre un corte y otro de la historia poética, la *Crítica del Juicio* nos ofrece el mudo testimonio de la revolución que estaba propiciando.

## 2. La sombra de una antigua inclinación

Contra el prejuicio filosófico que desprecia el oficio de los poetas, Kant da muestras de una temprana estima por la literatura que no le abandonará en los escritos de madurez: Tan evidente resulta en efecto que las *Observaciones sobre lo bello y lo sublime* parten de su experiencia lectora, como que la definición de genio propuesta en la tercera crítica se inspira en la figura del poeta. Si en el primer caso la preferencia responde a una confesa afinidad que no requiere mayor justificación, en el segundo asoma solo la cabeza desde el margen al que se ve relegada, pero no lo hace por ello con menor énfasis y convicción. El desplazamiento de las cuestiones artístico-poéticas no obedece pues tanto a una mengua de la inclinación kantiana hacia las bellas letras, como al orden de prioridades impuesto por el giro copernicano de la filosofía crítica. Así lo atestiguan los escritos póstumos pertenecientes a los años setenta, la década del gran silencio que separa los escritos de juventud de la *Crítica de la razón pura*. Manfred Frank extrajo del corpus acumulado por las anotaciones de este periodo buena parte de las *Reflexiones estéticas*.<sup>2</sup> Las *Reflexiones* constatan el reconocimiento que Kant concedió desde un principio a la literatura: «Poesie ist der schönste aller Spiele, indem wir alle Gemütskräfte darin versetzen» (AA 15 Refl 618 266). Aunque una elemental cautela impide identificar estos asertos con la postura personal de Kant (Sánchez Rodríguez 2015 XVIII), el cotejo con sus escritos previos o contemporáneos permite formarse una idea aproximada de cual fue su contribución a la primera teoría del gusto. Durante los años setenta Meier y Baumgarten funcionan para Kant simultáneamente como guías y antagonistas de su propia indagación estética, delimitando el terreno donde se libra la contienda entre el conocimiento transmitido y el que pugna subterráneamente por hacerse oír. En lo que atañe a la poesía y sus implicaciones para la teoría del gusto, la función rectora de ambos autores acusa la influencia tanto de la tradición racionalista como de la doctrina poética a la que esta dio soporte.

En primer lugar, la consideración que presta Kant a la literatura revela efectivamente la deuda contraída por su inicial teoría del gusto con la estética de Baumgarten. Así como

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<sup>2</sup> Compilación que Frank incorporó a una edición de la tercera crítica donde con atinado criterio reunía los textos kantianos dedicados a la teoría del gusto y a la filosofía de la naturaleza (1996). Recientemente ha aparecido una edición traducida de los escritos estéticos dispersos en las *Reflexiones* y las *Lecciones de Antropología* (Sánchez Rodríguez 2015).

la *Crítica del juicio estético* subraya la independencia del gusto respecto a todo concepto de perfección, entendiendo que el sentimiento suscitado por el juicio de lo bello ignora la adecuación a un principio de fin (§ 15), la teoría precrítica liga aún el gusto al modelo de perfección que Baumgarten y Meier atribuyen al conocimiento sensible (AA 24.1 346). En la estela de Leibniz y Wolff, Baumgarten contrapone una facultad superior del conocimiento acorde a la claridad conceptual a una inferior sumida en la confusión de los sentidos. Sostiene en cambio que lo confuso (*verworren*) del conocimiento sensible no le priva necesariamente de claridad (fundamental distinción entre *klar* y *deutlich*) cuando, aun siendo incapaz de discernir todos y cada uno de los elementos que integran del objeto, alcanza a distinguirlo desde su totalidad constitutiva. Baumgarten separa así la verdad estética de la lógica como aspectos autónomos pero complementarios de una verdad subjetiva contrapuesta a la objetividad de la verdad metafísica (*Estética* § 429). Va incluso más allá concediendo a la verdad estética mayor afinidad con la metafísica que a la lógica (*Estética* § 558): mientras la segunda procede elevándose desde los elementos que el objeto comparte con otros similares hasta dar con el concepto categorial que lo identifica, la verdad estética desciende hasta la concatenación aleatoria de elementos que conforman el objeto en su particularidad. Constatada la incapacidad de la verdad lógica para aprehender el objeto en lo que tiene de único e insustituible, solo el conocimiento sensible ofrece la posibilidad de vincular la manifestación individual a una verdad absoluta. Baumgarten introduce el concepto de verdad esteticológica para dar cuenta del alcance específico que de este modo detenta el conocimiento sensible en la apreciación de la claridad extensiva (*Estética* § 427),

Pero la verdad esteticológica permite poner al mismo tiempo de manifiesto que si la perfección sensible se acerca más a la metafísica es ante todo porque la estética de Baumgarten entiende lo bello como representación de una verdad inteligible. De ello se deduce que aunque la perfección estética obedece a criterios distintos que la lógica, encuentra su fin último en la adecuación o correspondencia entre la verdad subjetiva de la experiencia humana y la objetiva de un entendimiento superior, entre un conocimiento limitado y uno absoluto. El concepto de correspondencia o *Übereinstimmung*<sup>3</sup> desempeña en efecto un papel central en la definición que ofrece Baumgarten de lo bello como perfección del conocimiento sensible. Son tres las formas de correspondencia que atribuye a la perfección estética (§ 18): entre las cosas y su pensamiento, entre la diversidad de elementos que lo componen y su unidad y, finalmente, entre la cosa pensada y los signos de su lenguaje representativo. Cada uno de los tres aspectos redundan en una misma idea: que la verdad sensitiva tiende a la perfección cuando procura la correspondencia entre la representación del objeto y la aprehensión de su completo sentido: supeditando la teoría del conocimiento sensible a la gnosología, Baumgarten revela la herencia racionalista de su

<sup>3</sup> Adoptamos esta acepción de *Übereinstimmung* por ser la que mejor permite establecer un paralelismo con la terminología kantiana divulgada por la traducción de Manuel García Morente, sin dejar por ello de reparar en lo que tiene de provisional y hasta cuestionable (basta reparar en que el propio Baumgarten emplea el término *consensus* con idéntica finalidad en las *Meditationes*).

estética, donde lo bello funciona siempre a modo de representación. La *Estética* confirma de este modo lo que ya adelantaban tanto las *Meditationes* como los pasajes de la *Metafísica* comentados en las *Reflexiones*: el ideal de perfección por el que se rige el conocimiento sensible no es finalmente otro que su grado de disposición a la intelección racional.

En conformidad con la doctrina artística mayoritaria del siglo XVIII, lo bello se ajusta a la perfección estética propiciando la adecuación de una materia sensible a su abstracción conceptual. Si el arte cobra especial protagonismo para Baumgarten es porque proporciona la representación más acorde a dicha perfección. La doble premisa de que el conocimiento sensible obedece a un concepto específico de perfección, pero que este se ajusta indirectamente a la intelección racional, condicionará la estimación kantiana de la literatura como había secundado la discusión poética de la época. Así lo atestigua el uso que recibe un concepto tan caro a la estética de Baumgarten como el de correspondencia en las *Reflexiones*. Las anotaciones a la *Lógica* de Meier de los años setenta insisten en trazar una nítida separación entre una perfección lógica acorde a las leyes de la razón y una estética acorde a las de la sensibilidad (AA 16 Refl. 1812 a 125); entre una perfección lógica entendida como correspondencia con las leyes objetivas del conocimiento y una estética como correspondencia con las leyes subjetivas (AA 16 Refl. 1845 135). Al mismo tiempo, las reflexiones destacan tres formas de correspondencia (con las reglas de unidad, forma y sensibilidad) que la perfección estética comparte con la lógica, (AA 16 Refl. 1793 117 – Refl. 1801 121). Dando continuidad a la senda marcada por Baumgarten, Kant no se limita a identificar la belleza formal (frente a la material) con el ideal de perfección estética, sino que va un paso más allá superponiendo ese ideal a las condiciones que posibilitan una correspondencia entre la experiencia sensible y el conocimiento racional: «Schönheit der Erkenntnis ist die Übereinstimmung der Freiheit der Einbildungskraft mit der Gesetzmäßigkeit des Verstandes in Darstellung der Begriffe». (AA 16 Refl. 1923 158). Durante este periodo Kant entendió en efecto el sentimiento de placer propio de lo bello como indicio del enlace entre imaginación y entendimiento que faculta todo juicio de conocimiento. Más allá del testimonio aproximativo que aportan sus anotaciones a Meier y Baumgarten, las lecciones sobre lógica de 1772 arrojan una evidencia concluyente del parecer inicial adoptado por Kant respecto a la perfección que orienta al juicio de gusto. Tras referirse sintomáticamente a la perfección estética como vehículo de la lógica (AA 24.1 361) Kant evidencia hasta qué punto la autonomía de la primera no descarta una supeditación a los primados de la segunda:

«Wenn indessen die logische Vollkommenheit mit derjenigen der Ästhetik übereinstimmend vergesellschaftet ist; so erhebt diese jene ansehnlich, indem sie die Verstandesbegriffe anschauend macht und erleichtert. Im Sinnlichen wird große Mannigfaltigkeit angetroffen, durch diese wird die Anschauung ausgebreitet und daraus entsteht Verwirrung. Räumen wir also der ästhetischen Vollkommenheit zuviel ein, so werden wir, da wir angenehm sein wollen, seichte» (AA 24.1 364).

Si la perfección lógica implica un ajuste a las leyes objetivas del conocimiento, la estética contiene la adecuada disposición de las condiciones subjetivas que dan lugar a un juicio de experiencia. Lejos de barruntar la relevancia que alcanzaría el juicio de gusto en el cierre sistemático de la filosofía crítica, Kant no dispone aún de medios suficientes para distinguir los fundamentos que subyacen al juicio de gusto de los que sustentan todo juicio de conocimiento.

Las *Reflexiones* posteriores a 1790 imprimen un sesgo muy distinto al concepto de correspondencia desde el momento que la belleza queda vinculada al libre juego entre la facultad imaginativa y el entendimiento: «Schön ist eine Vorstellungsart, in der die Übereinstimmung des freien Spiels der Einbildungskraft mit der Gesetzmäßigkeit des Verstandes empfunden wird» (AA 16 Refl. 1935 161). La misma tesis se repite en una reflexión anterior para concluir con una significativa mención al concepto de armonía:

«Die Übereinstimmung der Sinnlichkeit mit dem Verstande in einer Erkenntnis ist Schönheit. Schönheit beruht nicht auf Empfindung, Reiz und Rührung, denn die tragen nichts zum Erkenntnis bei.

(Empfindung gehört nicht zum Erkenntnis.)

Das Gefühl dieser Harmonie beider Erkenntniskräfte macht das Wohlgefallen am Schönen» (AA 16 Refl. 1932 160).

La armonía pasa a designar la específica caracterización del vínculo entre imaginación y entendimiento adoptado por el juicio de lo bello, atestiguando así el vuelco que provoca el giro de la filosofía en la teoría del gusto. Una vez el conocimiento ha dejado de supeditarse exclusivamente a las condiciones subjetivas de la experiencia, presumiendo una síntesis conceptual de intuiciones imaginativas, el placer de lo bello no puede seguir fundamentándose en la mera concordancia entre facultades. Alguna instancia debe mediar el tránsito del juicio de gusto al de conocimiento para no caer en el absurdo de que cualquier juicio empírico es susceptible de producir el sentimiento de placer propio de lo bello. La *Crítica del Juicio* encuentra esa instancia en una tercera facultad del conocimiento, atribuyendo al juicio de gusto las condiciones necesarias, pero no las suficientes para dar lugar a un juicio de conocimiento. El sentimiento de placer suscitado por lo bello revelaría la existencia de un nivel previo a la determinación conceptual de la intuición imaginativa donde esta se ofrece a la comprensión racional sin ver por ello comprometido su sentido. El juicio de gusto no llega a constituir un juicio de conocimiento, circunscribiendo su objeto al principio que presume una potencial adecuación de la materia sensible a los conceptos de la razón. Es esa misma limitación sin embargo lo que legitima su autonomía y el papel protagonista que recibe en la tercera crítica: precisamente por no predicar ningún atributo determinado del objeto, el juicio de gusto es el único capaz de descubrir la raíz última del juicio reflexionante, el misterioso origen del nexo trascendental entre las facultades del conocimiento. La relación que adoptan ambas facultades desde la perspectiva asumida por ese punto cero del



conocimiento solo puede ser una mutua suspensión de la actividad judicativa que Kant califica como armonía. Se evidencia así la ruptura con una teoría del gusto que pretendía reservarse un ámbito legislativo propio entre los objetos de la naturaleza cifrando implícitamente su fin último en la adecuación de una representación imaginativa a los conceptos del entendimiento.<sup>4</sup>

Fundamental para lo que aquí nos ocupa es que una concepción del conocimiento sensible regida por un principio de perfección que persigue la adecuada correspondencia con el conocimiento racional ofrece motivos suficientes para promover el lenguaje representativo más afín al entendimiento. Recuperando la tercera forma de correspondencia que Baumgarten asigna a la perfección sensible, los signos representativos se ajustan mejor a la cosa pensada si señalan directamente conceptos del pensamiento, como sucede con el lenguaje verbal, en lugar de remitir a impresiones sensibles, como ocurre con los lenguajes visuales o sonoros. De este modo, las *Reflexiones* conceden al término *Übereinstimmung* un sentido distinto del que recibirá en la *Crítica del Juicio*, como ratifica el § 9 cuando aborda la cuestión de si el sentimiento placentero propio de lo bello mantiene una relación de continuidad o simultaneidad con el juicio de gusto. Kant habla ahora de correspondencia (*Übereinstimmung* o *Zustimmung*) para referirse al acuerdo entre imaginación y entendimiento que da lugar a un juicio de conocimiento. Pero en lugar de identificar dicho acuerdo con el sentimiento consustancial al juicio de gusto, reserva este al reconocimiento de la armonía (*Harmonie*) que resulta de una relación específica. La dimensión trascendental del Juicio introduce así una cesura en el alcance e implicaciones de *Übereinstimmung* como sucede con otras muchas entradas del léxico kantiano. Mientras el sistema de la filosofía crítica proporciona el marco en el que contraponer la correspondencia genérica de imaginación y entendimiento al libre juego armónico entre las facultades del conocimiento, su presencia en los escritos previos exige una interpelación a los autores que mayor impronta dejaron en el primer Kant.

La discrepancia entre la teoría estética heredada por Kant y su crítica del gusto se deja resumir pues en las acepciones acumuladas por el término *Übereinstimmung* desde que designa la posibilidad de correspondencia entre representación sensible y comprensión racional descubierta por el gusto, hasta que la tercera crítica circunscribe el juicio de la belleza formal a la correspondencia armónica de imaginación y entendimiento. El primado de la poesía entre las bellas letras encaja obviamente antes en la primera variante, el grado en que una representación sensible se pliega al conocimiento racional, que en la segunda, el espacio de libertad inaugurado por la *Crítica del Juicio* con el juego entre facultades, donde la equilibrada participación de ambas descarta de antemano que un lenguaje representativo destaque por su mayor proximidad respecto a cualquiera de ellas: si la asociación entre poesía y entendimiento cuestiona la armonía del libre juego entre facultades suscitado por el juicio de gusto en la tercera crítica, enlaza en cambio con la

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<sup>4</sup> Mientras el Kant de las primeras *Reflexiones* asume de este modo la existencia de una belleza objetiva y del procedimiento que presume su representación artística, la tercera crítica limita el placer de lo bello a una subjetiva apreciación formal del objeto, deslegitimando cualquier doctrina normativa de las bellas artes.

triple correspondencia heurística, metodológica y semiótica<sup>5</sup> que Kant adopta de Baumgarten en su primitiva teoría del gusto. Del mismo modo, las concesiones a la poética normativa de un Gottsched que evidencia la *Estética*, se perpetuarán en la postura de Kant incluso después de que este formulara una teoría del gusto que cuestionaba sus fundamentos.

### 3. La huella de una inevitable herencia.

Con razón puede calificarse la temprana disquisición poética de Baumgarten de auténtico regalo para el estudio de las relaciones entre filosofía y literaria. Aunque limite su alcance el preceder a la plena formulación de una doctrina estética por parte del autor, las *Meditationes* constituyen un documento excepcional del intenso diálogo que mantiene la filosofía ilustrada con la teoría y reflexión poéticas del clasicismo. El texto de Baumgarten anticipa para la praxis y recepción literarias buena parte de las ideas que solo posteriormente encontrarían su formulación definitiva, desde la tajante distinción entre una perfección lógica y una estética, hasta el subterfugio que termina orientando la perfección por la que se rige la segunda hacia su confluencia con el que conduce a la primera. Así, leemos en las *Meditationes* que la poesía pertenece a la clase de los discursos confusos desde el momento en que permanece ligado a la representación sensible (§ IX), pero que ello no le priva forzosamente de claridad si acierta a representar la totalidad unitaria que distingue un objeto de otros semejantes (§ XII). Del mismo modo se constata que la poesía tiende a la perfección cuando proporciona tantos elementos como sea posible del objeto representado sin necesidad de especificar todos y cada uno de ellos (claridad extensiva frente a intensiva). Ahora bien, Baumgarten deja claro desde un principio que el discurso sensible perfecto es aquel «cuyas varias partes tienden al conocimiento de representaciones sensibles» (§ VII), y concluye sus *Meditationes* reafirmando que mientras la filosofía persigue la perfección propia del conocimiento lógico, la poesía se ocupa de la que corresponde al conocimiento sensible (§ CXV): refiriéndose a ambas dimensiones como la facultad superior y la inferior del conocimiento, Baumgarten clarifica que la segunda se circunscribe al ámbito perceptivo de la *aesthesis*; cifrando la perfección de esta en la claridad evidencia su correspondencia con la aprehensión conceptual del objeto sensible. Por perfección sensible se entiende pues la representación de la materia sensitiva más acorde a los principios del conocimiento. Si la poesía obtiene galones en este entorno discursivo es porque proporciona la representación del objeto sensible que mejor se ajusta a ese ideal.<sup>6</sup> Ninguna de las posteriores aportaciones a la teoría estética de Baumgarten contravendrá el principio que aquí se da ya por sentado: la perfección de la belleza artística obedece a su capacidad para proporcionar una idónea conjunción de la representación

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<sup>5</sup> Como las denomina Dagmar Mirbach en el estudio introductorio a su edición crítica (2007 LVI).

<sup>6</sup> Baumgarten no llega con todo a establecer una comparación valorativa entre las bellas artes. La deuda con el *ut pictoris* horaciano que acusa su defensa de la mimesis simultánea frente a la secuencial asumiría de hecho una implícita distinción de las artes plásticas.

sensible a un orden intelectual que se sustrae a la verificación empírica. La poesía legitima de este modo la perfección estética como la más acabada manifestación de lo inteligible, y es en el orden representativo de la manifestación donde Baumgarten fundamenta en efecto su poética primero y su *Estética* más adelante.

Entendiendo la representación artística como manifestación del principio perfectivo que rige al conocimiento sensible, Baumgarten descubre su deuda con la poética clasicista. Como Boileu y Gottsched, su principal divulgador en la cultura alemana, asume el credo horaciano que legitima la literatura en última instancia como representación de las ideas y verdades generales atesoradas por razón. Coincide también con ellos en la defensa de una concepción poética sujeta a las reglas de sencillez, claridad y buen gusto que garanticen la más acabada y completa representación del objeto y con ello la plena manifestación del concepto al que este se asocia. Así, vemos que aunque Baumgarten no solo admite, sino que recomienda el libre ejercicio de la fantasía y el consiguiente efecto de admiración (§ XLIII), rechaza la recreación de mundos quiméricos o utópicos con el mismo énfasis que desaconseja un registro expresivo oscuro y rebuscado (§ LV). Las coincidencias con el credo clasicista continúan sucediéndose hasta encontrar su razón de ser en la confrontación final entre una facultad superior y una inferior del conocimiento. Baumgarten no necesita adivinar las implicaciones que extraerá su *Estética* de esta dicotomía para entender aquí ya la perfección de la poesía como variante discursiva que dispone plenamente una materia empírica a su aprehensión cognitiva proporcionando sus ejemplos más ilustrativos (§ LVIII). Sin dejar de defender un criterio propio en la perfección del conocimiento sensible, Baumgarten no puede ocultar que los fundamentos del discurso poético revelan una adecuación parcial de su principio perfectivo al conocimiento lógico. Así lo entiende también el Kant de las primeras *Reflexiones* cuando el sentimiento de placer propio del gusto una manifestación de la perfecta correspondencia entre entendimiento e imaginación que posibilita nuestro conocimiento del mundo. Conviene resaltar en todo caso la coherencia de esta postura con el gusto artístico (habitualmente tildado de clásico y formalista) que acusan tanto las primeras aseveraciones de la obra kantiana como las valoraciones dispersas en la tercera crítica.

El magisterio de Horacio en la doctrina poética del siglo XVIII corre parejo a una determinada recepción de la mimesis aristotélica que encuentra en Averroes su principal valedor. Su *Paráfrasis* (1993) proporcionará a los portavoces del clasicismo una interpretación ético-moral de la Poética que supedita el concepto de mimesis a un enfoque ético-moral. Averroes legitima una reedición ilustrada del *exemplum* retórico relegando la vertiente compositiva de la mimesis aristotélica a un segundo plano. Su lectura determinará la discusión poética de la época desde la posición privilegiada que encuentra en la *Poetische Dichtkunst* de Gottsched, que subordina también la mimesis a los fines marcados por un normativismo instructivo. El oficio poético buscará pues la traslación ejemplar de los conceptos que la razón tiene por adecuados, y a la consecución de ese objetivo respondería el rigorismo prescriptivo de la poética. Menos dogmático de lo que juzgaron muchos de sus contemporáneos, Gottsched revela en todo caso una clara sujeción al

dualismo metafísico que asume toda poética clasicista: el arte se justifica como manifestación del sentido sustraído a una dimensión ulterior del conocimiento, mientras la literatura queda entronizada entre las bellas artes una vez asumido que el lenguaje verbal es el más acorde a los propósitos de la razón. Lejos pues de abordar su proyecto reformista en clave de ruptura, el clasicismo encuentra pleno respaldo filosófico en el racionalismo. Pero entonces cabe afirmar también a la inversa que la estela marcada por los herederos de Leibniz sustenta el ideario clasicista incluso después de haber asentado los fundamentos de un pensamiento estético autónomo orientado a su propia idea de perfección.

La impronta de Aristóteles en la discusión poética del momento desborda sin embargo el clasicismo más ortodoxo. Un texto fundacional para la nueva sensibilidad literaria, *Las bellas artes reducidas a un mismo principio* de Batteaux, encuentra también en la mimesis ese principio común a todas las modalidades artísticas sin dejar de resaltar las particularidades que adopta en cada medio expresivo. Batteux supera la lectura doctrinal de Aristóteles explorando las opciones que ofrece la mimesis de la naturaleza a los distintos lenguajes artísticos. Como Baumgarten, segrega cuidadosamente la meta perseguida por la belleza artística de los objetivos que se marca el conocimiento racional. Como él deslinda los criterios que condicionan la apreciación sensible de los que se imponen a la verificación lógica, incorporando además una novedosa dimensión semiótica en el estudio de las representaciones artísticas. Con todo lo que esta comparación entre códigos comunicativos tiene de innovadora, Batteaux no abandona en ningún momento el procedimiento analógico que trata la valoración de la belleza artística como correlato de la certeza demandada por el conocimiento lógico. Aunque el arte se sabe deudor de un modelo evaluativo distinto al del método racional, acaba tomando este como referente para dar cuenta de su comportamiento:

«La verdad es el objeto de las ciencias, y el bien y lo bello el del arte. La inteligencia considera lo que los objetos son en ellos mismo, su esencia, sin relacionarlos con nosotros. El gusto se ocupa de esos mismos objetos con relación a nosotros. Una inteligencia es perfecta cuando ve claramente (*sans nuages*) y distingue sin error lo verdadero de lo falso, la probabilidad de la evidencia. El gusto es perfecto cuando, con una impresión distinta, siente lo bueno y lo malo, lo excelente de lo mediocre si (sic) confundir jamás» (2010, p. 7).

Batteux reconoce con Baumgarten un dominio específico del gusto y la apreciación de lo bello pero, lejos de excluir su concomitancia con la intelección racional, destaca sus múltiples paralelismos. El juego de afinidades culmina con la confluencia entre los objetivos que persigue una adecuada educación del gusto y aquellos que son conformes a la razón (Batteaux 2010, p. 15).

Kant parte directa o indirectamente del trasfondo poético conformado por estos referentes cuando formula una primera teoría del gusto que prioriza el concepto de correspondencia entre imaginación y entendimiento. Y del mismo modo que el

pensamiento ilustrado había dado su visto bueno a la promoción del medio literario como el más afín a los propósitos instrumentales de la razón y, por tanto, el más acorde a sus aspiraciones formativas, Kant adopta de entrada una teoría estética que encuentra la perfección del discurso sensible en la poesía. Solo su limitado interés por las cuestiones artísticas explica que no llegara a revisar posteriormente ese privilegio desde la instancia judicial inaugurada por la filosofía crítica. Serán sus primeros lectores románticos quienes pretendan ver superada esta contradicción conciliando la preeminencia de la poesía entre las bellas artes con la dimensión trascendental inaugurada por la facultad del Juicio (Kuypers 1972, p. 152 y ss.). Schelling entenderá la poesía como culmen de la libertad imaginativa alumbrada por la belleza artística, cancelando de ese modo la teórica incompatibilidad entre la preeminencia de un lenguaje artístico y las condiciones impuestas por una relación armónica entre las facultades del conocimiento (Biemel 1959, pp. 147-165). La armonía pasa así a respaldar aquello que en un principio sustentaba la correspondencia al precio de que el Juicio vea enteramente trastocados su alcance y principios constitutivos para ponerse al servicio de una filosofía del arte. Ajeno al vuelco que estaba provocando en la historia de las ideas artístico-literarias, Kant nos remite en la *Crítica del Juicio* al momento inaugural que engendró una específica concepción literaria como podía haber dado lugar a otras.

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## **Unità e concordanza teleologica del mondo in Kant**

### *Teleological World Unity and Harmony in Kant*

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#### **Riassunto**

L'articolo tratta la concezione dell'armonia di Kant nel suo significato ontologico fondamentale, ossia nel senso di quella concordanza teleologica che era al centro della metafisica dogmatica e che Kant intende decostruire criticamente e ricostruire su un piano non più teoretico-speculativo, ma teleologico-morale. Gli argomenti fondamentali di questa ricostruzione vengono presentati e discussi esaminando il modo in cui Kant rielabora il concetto di mondo come unità degli enti finiti concepibile solo come concordanza finalistica.

#### **Parole chiavi**

Kant; cosmologia; concordanza; teleologia morale

#### **Abstract**

The paper deals with Kant's conception of harmony in its fundamental ontological meaning, i.e. in terms of that teleological harmony which was central for the dogmatic metaphysics and Kant will critically deconstruct and reconstruct not in a speculative-theoretical, but in a moral-teleological way. The basic arguments of this reconstruction are presented and discussed by examining the manner in which Kant re-elaborates the notion of the world as the unity of finite beings, conceivable only as a purposive harmony.

#### **Key words**

Kant; Cosmology; Harmony; Moral Teleology

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## 1. L'unità del mondo come idea e come precomprensione

In questo contributo vorrei trattare il tema dell'armonia in Kant nel suo significato ontologico fondamentale, ossia nel senso di quella concordanza teleologica<sup>1</sup> che era al centro della tesi leibniziana dell'armonia prestabilita e quindi della metafisica dogmatica che Kant intende demolire criticamente e ricostruire su un piano non più puramente teoretico. Per mettere a fuoco l'idea portante di questa ricostruzione, che è quella della teleologia morale, prenderò in esame il modo in cui Kant rielabora il concetto di mondo come unità degli enti finiti concepibile appunto solo come concordanza finalistica.

Eugen Fink ha segnalato che in Kant “si compie per la prima volta [...] la fondazione dell'idea che il mondo *non è un ente, una cosa*”.<sup>2</sup> Diversi decenni prima, già Georg Simmel aveva osservato che il termine “mondo” non indica semplicemente “la totalità di tutte le cose e di tutti gli accadimenti in generale”, bensì il fatto che tutti i contenuti dell'esperienza passata, attuale e possibile vengano a costituire un tutto unitario in virtù di una “forma” ovvero di una connessione che può essere stabilita solo dallo spirito, capace di “catturare” il molteplice dei dati “in una rete che esso ha intessuto”, al contempo “liberandoli dalla loro esistenza isolata”.<sup>3</sup>

Indicazioni come queste ci suggeriscono di riconoscere, per prima cosa, che il mondo è un'idea, e precisamente un'idea che guida ed esprime al contempo un'interpretazione unitaria dell'insieme delle esperienze (delle cose e dei fenomeni, degli eventi naturali e morali) come un sistema di rapporti.

Questo vale in particolare, e a maggior ragione, per Kant, perché per lui il mondo nella sua interezza non può essere oggetto di conoscenza, né di esperienza né di speculazione metafisica né di pura riflessione teleologica teoretica. Il mondo può essere pensato e considerato come unità, come un tutto dotato di senso, oltre che di ordine garantito da leggi naturali, solo se è possibile e legittimo mettere gli eventi e i nessi della natura in rapporto a un ordine finalistico congruente con la legge e la destinazione morale della creatura razionale, solo cioè se il regno della natura può essere raccordato e accordato teleologicamente col regno della libertà e col suo principio finale che è il sommo bene.

Questa è la posizione su cui Kant si attesta al culmine del periodo delle tre *Critiche*. In precedenza certo la visione del mondo come un “sistema” era intesa diversamente; non è detto che non possa risultare almeno in parte diversa nella fase dell'*Opus postumum*.

Nella *Teoria del cielo* Kant si limita a rivendicare la necessità di leggi meccaniche universali della natura come base per poter interpretare unitariamente il mondo, in forza del suo

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<sup>1</sup> Si veda la dissertazione di Triebener (1999).

<sup>2</sup> (Fink 1986, p. 81): “ogni tentativo di pensare il mondo in modo cosale impiglia la ragione umana in un'insolubile contraddizione”; cfr. (La Rocca 1999, p. 230).

<sup>3</sup> (Simmel [1918] 1997, p. 23).



ordine regolare e della sua armonica bellezza, come teleologicamente orientato e come prodotto di una intelligenza creatrice.<sup>4</sup>

È nella *Dissertazione* del 1770 che il concetto di mondo, diviso in due ambiti irriducibili (sensibile e intelligibile), comincia a diventare problematico. Riecheggiando la formula scolastico-leibniziana<sup>5</sup>, Kant definisce il mondo come il “totum quod non est pars”, pensato come composto onnicomprensivo (§ 1), la cui “forma” è la “coordinazione reale e oggettiva” delle sostanze che lo compongono, mentre la “forma essenziale” è il nesso che sta a fondamento degli influssi reciproci degli enti (§ 2). Il fondamento dell’unità della sua composizione è da una parte (quanto alla semplice coesistenza delle cose nel mondo sensibile) la necessaria struttura soggettiva delle condizioni spazio-temporali dell’intuizione sensibile, dall’altra (quanto all’interrelazione o *commercium* delle sostanze nel mondo intelligibile) l’unità del suo fondamento necessario trascendente (Dio).<sup>6</sup>

Questa impostazione, che critica la visione leibniziana, senza ancora distaccarsene del tutto, è sviluppata in modo didatticamente chiaro nelle *Lezioni di metafisica* degli anni 1778-1780: la “forma” del mondo come un tutto assoluto (cioè il modo della sua composizione, del *nexus substantiarum* nel loro *commercium* reciproco) va pensata come un *influxus physicus derivativus*, ossia sì reciproco, reale e conforme a leggi universali (non dunque “iperfisico” come nell’armonia prestabilita o nell’occasionalismo), ma neppure puramente immanente (“originario”), bensì derivante il suo sussistere e il suo ordine da un ente originario extramondano che è autore delle sostanze e loro legislatore.<sup>7</sup>

Nella *Critica della ragion pura* Kant mette in piena evidenza tutta la problematicità del concetto di mondo: in quanto indica la totalità degli enti fenomenici, non può essere come tale attestato dall’esperienza, né può designare una totalità assoluta; in quanto sia assunto come nozione di una totalità reale in sé stessa, non può avere un contenuto determinato. Il concetto di mondo risulta così ambiguo e come tale dà luogo alla parvenza dialettica: l’uso dogmatico del termine mondo confonde la totalità assoluta della serie dei fenomeni con la totalità assoluta degli enti pensabili (ossia delle cose in sé).<sup>8</sup>

Le antinomie cosmologiche evidenziano la non oggettività o costitutività della nozione di mondo, la sua inapplicabilità al tentativo (proprio della metafisica) di rispondere all’esigenza della ragione di trovare una totalità assoluta delle condizioni per ogni condizionato dato nell’esperienza.

La critica toglie l’ambiguità fissando la “distinzione trascendentale” tra mondo fenomenico (sensibile) e mondo noumenico (intelligibile), corrispondente a quella tra cosa apparente (il dato, la rappresentazione) e cosa in sé (ciò che può essere solo pensato, ma non conosciuto).

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<sup>4</sup> I. Kant, NTH, AA 01: 310 ss. [trad. it., pp. 120 ss.]. Le opere di Kant vengono citate, per lo più con l’ausilio delle sigle dei KS, secondo l’indicazione di volume e pagina dell’Akademie-Ausgabe: I. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin, Reimer (poi: de Gruyter), 1900 ss., là dove questa non riporta la paginazione originale. Gli altri scritti (gli abbozzi e gli appunti tratti dalle lezioni) vengono citati con il riferimento all’Akademie-Ausgabe. Le indicazioni relative alle traduzioni italiane compaiono tra parentesi quadre.

<sup>5</sup> Così nella formulazione di Baumgarten, *Metaphysica*, 1757<sup>4</sup>, 1779<sup>7</sup> [reprint: 1982], § 354: « MUNDUS ([...] Universum, πᾶν) est series (multitudo, totum) actualium finitorum, quae non est pars alterius ».

<sup>6</sup> I. Kant, MSI, AA 02: 385-419 [ pp. 419-461], §§ 13, 16, 20, 22.

<sup>7</sup> V-Met/Heinze, AA 28: 195 s., 211 ss. Cfr. anche *Refl.* 6210, AA 18: 496 s.

<sup>8</sup> *KrV* B 391, 434 s., 447 s., 532 s., 724.

Il concetto di mondo (la categoria di totalità applicata alla sintesi dei fenomeni o di tutti gli enti possibili) viene perciò risolto in un'idea trascendentale della ragione, che ha una funzione puramente regolativa, quella di unificare il molteplice delle conoscenze empiriche secondo la massima unità sistematica possibile e di orientare a tale unità tutte le ricerche scientifiche.<sup>9</sup>

Come schema di un principio regolativo, l'idea di mondo ha una valenza teleologica, perché ogni unità sistematica è retta da uno scopo ultimo a cui è subordinata ogni conoscenza particolare; implica cioè una connessione finalistica delle singole cose e dei loro influssi reciproci, anche se questa è solo una presupposizione soggettiva che risponde al bisogno di ordine e sistematicità della nostra ragione (teoretica).<sup>10</sup>

Ciò significa che l'idea razionale di mondo non può mostrare la propria realtà oggettiva (cioè la sua pensabilità concreta) neppure come concetto critico-trascendentale. Ciò è connesso proprio col fatto che la ragione teoretica stessa non può andare oltre la richiesta di un fondamento incondizionato della sintesi del condizionato *dato*, ossia di un'analisi *regressiva*, che prospetta la totalità assoluta dei fenomeni soltanto dal lato delle condizioni (degli antecedenti).<sup>11</sup> Il concetto di totalità come unità *sistematica* regolativa richiede invece, per il suo carattere teleologico, anche una sintesi *progressiva*, un'anticipazione del condizionato conseguente, ossia dell'esito risultante dall'applicazione delle condizioni; il tutto delle conseguenze andrebbe pensato allora a sua volta come incondizionato, come condizione assoluta, come compimento che presiede idealmente a tutto il processo del divenire fenomenico.

Ma se è irrilevante (oltre che arbitrario e inattuabile) per la ragione teoretica, il compimento di questa sintesi progressiva è richiesto necessariamente dalla ragione pratica, che attraverso la legge morale prescrive uno scopo assoluto come esito dell'agire. Ed è su questa logica progressiva che può innestarsi la riflessione teleologica (come si vedrà nel prossimo paragrafo). Nell'uso pratico della ragione, infatti, l'idea di mondo intelligibile diventa un correlato indispensabile della legge morale, lo schema della sua possibile attuazione (praticamente necessaria) come mondo morale e il presupposto della sua possibilità (come insieme e come rapporto reciproco degli esseri razionali dotati di libertà). Anzi proprio tale applicazione pratica dell'idea di mondo è quella che procura realtà oggettiva a tale concetto (e quindi all'idea di assoluta unità/totalità e connessione teleologica sistematica) e che riempie di contenuto razionale lo schema vuoto del principio regolativo.

Le analisi kantiane del Giudizio teleologico nella seconda parte della *Critica del Giudizio* mirano a valutare, in ultima istanza, la possibile validità di asserzioni sul mondo come totalità teleologica, cioè come oggetto (o prodotto finale) non come preconditione (o prodotto originario) del Giudizio; asserzioni che nella *Critica della ragion pura* erano state definitivamente escluse come proposizioni teoreticamente oggettive, e che nella terza *Critica* vengono ammesse soltanto sul piano dell'applicazione riflessiva del principio di finalità, sì, ma neppure qui direttamente, sul piano del Giudizio teleologico-teoretico (teleologia fisica), bensì solo indirettamente, attraverso l'implicazione teoretica (ultima) del Giudizio teleologico-pratico (teleologia morale).

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<sup>9</sup> *KrV* B 379 s., 434 s., 446, 647, 699 ss., 712 ss.

<sup>10</sup> *KrV* B 714 ss., 719 ss., 724-729.

<sup>11</sup> *KrV* B 435-437.; cfr. B 393-394).

Il principio trascendentale (sia come appercezione spazializzante sia come presupposizione finalistica) fonda l'*interpretabilità* del mondo come totalità di interrelazioni ordinate e sistematiche; ma è solo l'esercizio del Giudizio teleologico, nell'intreccio tra Giudizio pratico e Giudizio teoretico (in cui la riflessione teoretica risulta alla fine subordinata a quella pratica), che consente concretamente l'*interpretazione* del mondo come totalità sistematica in senso pieno e globale, includente cioè una conformità a scopi che non risponde più solo all'interesse conoscitivo, ma anche e soprattutto (anzi primariamente) all'interesse pratico della ragione, che si rivela qui però al contempo come l'interesse anche conoscitivo fondante, quello che corrisponde più intimamente al bisogno metafisico: l'interesse a una possibilità di senso che non annulli o renda del tutto inintelligibile la nostra originaria autocomprensione come esistenze finite ma dotate di libera autodeterminazione del volere.

### 2. L'unità finalistica del mondo in base alla teleologia morale

Nella dottrina del Giudizio teleologico la legittimazione del concetto di mondo come totalità sistematica dipende dalla distinzione e connessione tra la teleologia fisica e la teleologia morale,<sup>12</sup> termini che, nell'opera edita di Kant, compaiono solo nella *Critica del Giudizio*.<sup>13</sup>

“Teleologia fisica” è un'espressione che riassume l'insieme della dottrina critica del Giudizio riflettente teoretico, che parte dal “principio trascendentale” della “finalità soggettiva della natura nelle sue leggi particolari”<sup>14</sup> e ne trova un'applicazione oggettivo-materiale nella considerazione della “finalità interna” riscontrabile negli organismi viventi (*KU* §§ 63-66). Questi “scopi della natura” autorizzano a interpretare l'intera natura come “sistema di scopi”, nel quale inserire anche quella “finalità esterna” (o relativa) che altrimenti deve sempre rimanere ipotetica (*KU* §§ 63, 67, 82-83). Tuttavia non è possibile a legittimare fino in fondo questa necessaria idea di un “sistema teleologico della natura”, perché per questo occorre individuare uno “scopo ultimo”, mentre nessun ente naturale può essere come tale uno scopo incondizionato, ossia uno “scopo finale”.<sup>15</sup>

La teleologia fisica ha buone ragioni per assumere l'uomo come scopo ultimo della natura (in quanto l'uomo è l'unico ente naturale capace di porsi e attuare scopi), ma questa assunzione non è confermata dall'esperienza (che trova l'uomo sottoposto alle stesse leggi di ogni altro ente naturale), bensì solo da una diversa considerazione teleologica, entro la quale si mostra che l'uomo va necessariamente giudicato come un essere che oltrepassa la natura in quanto è un essere morale, ossia in quanto è sottoposto alle leggi morali della libertà e destinato a dar loro attuazione (*KU*, AA 05: 430-431, 435).

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<sup>12</sup> Per un approfondimento devo rimandare al mio testo: G. Cunico (2001, parte II (§ 3) e parte III).

<sup>13</sup> “Physische Teleologie” a partire dal § 85 (*KU*, AA 05: 437) fino alla fine, “moralische Teleologie” a partire dal § 86 (*KU*, AA 05: 444). La problematica era stata toccata già nel corso di *Teologia razionale* del 1783/84, in cui compaiono i due concetti *teleologia practica* e *teleologia physica* (V-Th/Pöhlitz, AA 28: 1201-1205, 1302-1307 1099-1103 [trad. it. (sigla: *LFR*), pp. 246-251]). In altre lezioni e riflessioni Kant usa il termine “teleologia pratica”, come fa anche nel saggio ÜGTP, in “Teutscher Merkur”, 1788, AA 08: 182 s. [trad. it., p. 58].

<sup>14</sup> *KU*, AA 05: 181-186.

<sup>15</sup> *KU*, AA 05: 426, 431, 434-435, 443.

È a questo punto che interviene la “teleologia morale”, definita come “la relazione della nostra propria causalità a scopi e addirittura ad uno scopo finale a cui dobbiamo mirare nel mondo” (KU § 87, AA 05: 447). Questo scopo finale della ragione pratica (al pari del dovere morale in generale) deve ricevere attuazione “nella natura”, e cioè non solo in un soggetto (l’uomo) che è anche un “essere sensibile”, ma anche in un ambito più vasto di cose, rapporti e circostanze, cioè in un mondo, che deve inoltre essere necessariamente pensato come cooperante a tale attuazione, sebbene il corso naturale delle cose e l’insieme delle leggi della natura non consentano né di prevedere né di concepire questo concorso.<sup>16</sup>

La necessità di questa cooperazione risulta dal fatto che lo scopo finale dell’uomo, inteso come sommo bene completo, deve includere non solo l’insieme delle intenzioni, degli atti interiori e degli effetti immediati della moralità, ma anche l’insieme dei suoi effetti mediati, riassumibili nel concetto di felicità che è il sommo bene fisico possibile nel mondo e quindi rientra di diritto sotto la legislazione della natura, sebbene debba essere pensato come subordinato (mediatamente) anche alla legislazione della libertà e sebbene questa concordanza con la moralità non sia concepibile in base alle leggi naturali (KU, AA 05: 449-450).

Solo alla luce della teleologia morale (KU, AA 05: 444, 447) l’uomo può essere considerato allora come “scopo finale della creazione”, ossia dell’esistenza della natura e di tutto l’universo, giacché solo un tale essere morale è incondizionatamente degno di esistere e può costituire la ragione sufficiente per la creazione del mondo.<sup>17</sup>

Il concetto di scopo finale ha però un legame ancora più stretto e diretto con quello di mondo, un legame che lo rende decisivo per la comprensione riflessiva dell’unità sistematica integrale di quest’ultimo. Lo scopo finale dell’uomo è quello che Kant nella *Critica della ragion pratica* designa come “il sommo bene di un mondo possibile”, intendendolo come la sintesi (proporzionata) di moralità e felicità dell’essere razionale finito (KpV, AA 05: 110).

Già nella prima *Critica*, nel “Canone della ragion pura”, il concetto di sommo bene era stato introdotto a partire da quello di “mondo morale”, che indica una “unità sistematica” ovvero “teleologica”, identificata con l’“idea pratica” di un mondo che sia “conforme a tutte le leggi morali”, idea che acquista “realità oggettiva” in quanto congiunta con le condizioni di un “sistema della felicità connessa e proporzionata alla moralità” (KrV B 835-845). Un concetto corrispondente è quello del “regno dei fini”, introdotto nella *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi* per designare il “tutto” sistematico degli enti razionali reso possibile dalla legge morale, che viene pensato “in analogia con un regno della natura”, inteso come sistema di cause finali reali, subordinate agli scopi degli esseri razionali (GMS, AA 04: 433-438). Ai concetti di “mondo morale” e “regno dei fini” corrisponde nella *Critica della ragion pratica* quello del “regno dei costumi” (KpV, AA 05: 262) che potrebbe essere realizzato mediante un’osservanza universale delle leggi morali, ossia procurando “al mondo sensibile, in quanto *natura sensibile* (per quanto riguarda gli esseri razionali), la forma di un mondo intelligibile, ossia di una *natura soprasensibile*” (KpV, AA 05: 43), e cioè proprio quel nesso “comunitario” sistematico che può fare del rapporto interattivo tra gli uomini un “insieme di tutti gli scopi” (KpV, AA 05: 87), vale a dire un vero e proprio sistema teleologico.

<sup>16</sup> KU, AA 05: 447, 471, 455.

<sup>17</sup> KU, AA 05: 433-435, 442-445, 447-450.

Il “sommo bene” in senso completo non si identifica però con questo “mondo intelligibile” coincidente con l’ordine etico universale, ma piuttosto con quel “massimo bene del mondo” che “consiste nella congiunzione del massimo benessere degli esseri razionali mondani con la suprema condizione del bene in essi, ossia della felicità universale con la moralità più conforme alla legge” (KU § 88, AA 05: 453). Questo bene totale allora non è più soltanto lo scopo finale dell’uomo (ossia “della nostra ragione pratica”), bensì al contempo il fine dell’esistenza del mondo in generale (RGV, AA 06: 6). Lo “scopo finale della creazione” è infatti, secondo la nuova formulazione (ulteriore) della terza *Critica*, “quella costituzione del mondo” che “si accorda con lo scopo finale della nostra ragione pratica” (KU, AA 05: 455) e quindi non è altro che l’idea del “mondo migliore”, della “perfezione del mondo”, che consiste nella congiunzione di “perfezione morale” e “perfezione fisica”.<sup>18</sup>

Nella seconda *Critica*, nella “Dialettica della ragion pratica”, Kant argomenta che, come la ragione pura in generale esige la totalità assoluta delle condizioni per un dato condizionato, così anche la ragione pratica cerca la “totalità incondizionata” del suo oggetto, che è “l’incondizionato per ciò che è praticamente condizionato”, e lo trova nell’idea del sommo bene che scaturisce dalla coscienza della legge morale (KpV, AA 05: 108).

Nella terza *Critica* si vede che questa operazione della ragione costituisce un’applicazione del Giudizio riflettente (pratico) che *interpreta* la legge morale come regola del “sistema degli scopi secondo la libertà”, il quale, per l’esigenza di “totalizzazione” intrinseca alla ragione come tale, richiede di essere esteso a “sistema di tutti gli scopi” in generale e in senso assoluto, e quindi a “scopo finale” della ragione pratica (KU § 87), che include l’idea dell’attuazione dell’insieme degli scopi condizionati al rispetto della legge.

Lo scopo finale inclusivo discende dalla legge pratica perché, a livello meta-morale, la ragione pratica comanda non solo di perseguire lo scopo della perfezione morale, ma anche di prendersi cura del fatto che esso abbia effetti nel mondo,<sup>19</sup> ossia di sviluppare strategie efficaci per attuare o almeno per promuovere effettivamente un concordare del mondo con la destinazione morale dell’umanità.

La ragione cerca l’incondizionato come totalità, come unità sistematica completa, che può essere solo teleologica (non causale) e consiste nella perfezione (dell’uomo e del mondo). Questo è il suo “scopo supremo” che fonda o anzi costituisce un “sistema di tutti gli scopi”.<sup>20</sup> Ma il “sistema di tutti gli scopi” è anzitutto il “sistema morale” o “pratico”, basato sulla libertà, perché solo questo mostra da sé la propria incondizionatezza e necessità. Questo “scopo finale morale” (ossia l’idea della perfezione morale e del “regno dei fini”) non è ancora però il sistema *completo* di tutti gli scopi, perché ne rimane fuori l’ambito degli scopi possibili solo mediante il concorso della natura, ambito che diventa un “sistema di scopi” solo se subordinato al “sistema morale” e al suo scopo finale.

La ragione pratica stessa “estende” il proprio concetto di “scopo finale” al di là del concetto formale della “concordanza di tutti gli scopi” della volontà libera, fino ad inglobare, nel

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<sup>18</sup> AA 28: 1099 s. [LFR 246 s.], 1201 s.

<sup>19</sup> I. Kant, RGV, AA 06: 7 [ed. it., pp. 317-534].

<sup>20</sup> Quest’ultima asserzione si trova in I. Kant, Prol, § 56, A 162, AA 04: 350 [trad. it., p.156].

concetto di *scopo finale inclusivo* (o “sommo bene completo”), anche la “somma del raggiungimento di tutti gli scopi”, che dipende anche da condizioni “fisiche” e che coincide con il concetto complessivo di “felicità” (AA 27: 1324), comprendendo anche l’*attuazione* o il conseguimento dell’insieme degli scopi perseguiti in concomitanza con l’adempimento della condizione della moralità, e quindi implicando anche il concorso teleologico della natura.

Solo la ragione pratica è sede legittima del concetto di scopo finale (KU, AA 05: 455), perché solo la morale determina ciò che rende possibile il “sistema di tutti gli scopi”, la condizione incondizionata della possibilità degli scopi di essere concordanti in assoluto. Così la morale termina nella “teleologia morale”, che va oltre il piano dei doveri in senso stretto prescrivendo uno scopo finale inclusivo e prospettando la sua attuazione. La teleologia (in generale) ricava il suo principio necessario (il concetto di scopo finale) dalla morale, che sola può determinarlo e legittimarlo, mostrandone la realtà oggettiva (pratica); ma a sua volta la teleologia morale implica anche una “teleologia fisica”, che per parte sua trova anche attestazioni indipendenti, per quanto insufficienti a costituirla come un sistema autonomo.

Il giudizio riflettente pratico fornisce anzitutto una interpretazione teleologica<sup>21</sup> della legge morale: esso considera la legge come orientata verso uno scopo finale inclusivo (eccedente, per quanto conforme allo scopo morale) che la ragione pratica prescrive all’uomo di perseguire e promuovere (KU §§ ix, AA 05: 251-252). Il secondo passo di tale giudizio è l’interpretazione teleologica della natura e del mondo intero, ossia quella che Kant designa come “inferenza” (sintetica) dallo scopo finale dell’uomo allo “scopo finale della creazione” (KU § 88), che unifica il “sistema di tutti gli scopi mediante libertà” col “sistema di tutti gli scopi mediante natura”, fondando il sistema globale di tutti i fini in assoluto, la concordanza finale della natura con la moralità, ossia la teleologia globale della ragione.<sup>22</sup>

### **3. L’unità del mondo è concepibile come quella di un organismo?**

Fin qui abbiamo indicato una via per la legittimazione critica del concetto di scopo finale, che fonda la teleologia morale e quindi anche la possibilità-necessità di concepire il mondo come un tutto unitario, sistematico e anche armonico, nell’unica connessione criticamente sostenibile tra piano empirico e piano metaempirico, che è quella scaturente dalla riflessione sulla destinazione morale dell’uomo. Adesso conviene tornare a riflettere sul perché non sia possibile giudicare il mondo come un tutto sotto il profilo della teleologia fisica, vale a dire perché il Giudizio riflettente teoretico non sia in grado di autorizzare una comprensione del mondo né come finalizzato internamente a se stesso, né come finalizzato a uno scopo ultimo.

In un suo studio ormai non più recente, ma sempre importante, Klaus Düsing ha sostenuto la tesi che il mondo è concepito da Kant non solo come sistema teleologico, ma più precisamente come un tutto organizzato.<sup>23</sup> Kant, prendendo le mosse dalla “particolare ed eminente forma di

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<sup>21</sup> Sul giudizio teleologico come “interpretazione” rinvio al mio lavoro (Cunico 2007, pp. 359-371).

<sup>22</sup> AA 28: 1099 s., 1102 [LFR 246 s., 250], 1201 s., 1204 s.

<sup>23</sup> (Düsing 1968, pp. 121-124).

finalità che vediamo negli organismi”, giunge ad “estendere il principio teleologico al tutto cosmico”,<sup>24</sup> intendendolo come un sistema basato su un nesso finalistico interno corrispondente (se non identico) a quello dei corpi organici.<sup>25</sup> È vero che poi Düsing, nel prosieguo del suo studio, analizzando in dettaglio i testi dell’*Opus postumum*, indebolisce sostanzialmente tale tesi, fino a ridurre la concezione del mondo come un tutto organico a quella di una “analogia”.<sup>26</sup> Tuttavia la questione così sollevata offre l’opportunità di riverificare l’impostazione data nelle pagine precedenti.

In primo luogo è chiaro che il mondo non può essere neppure pensato come un organismo in senso stretto. Infatti, un corpo organico, secondo la *Critica del Giudizio*, è definito dalla congiunzione di due distinte condizioni: da un lato, una condizione più ampia e generica: “*un prodotto organizzato della natura è quello nel quale tutto è scopo e reciprocamente anche mezzo*” (KU § 66, AA 05: 376); dall’altro, una condizione più restrittiva e specifica: “*un tale prodotto potrà essere chiamato uno scopo naturale, in quanto ente organizzato e organizzante se stesso*” (KU § 65, AA 05: 372). La prima condizione significa che l’organismo è un “sistema”, un insieme di componenti interconnesse finalisticamente, nel quale “le parti [...] siano possibili soltanto mediante la loro relazione con il tutto”; la seconda specifica che l’organismo, per distinguersi da altri sistemi, e in particolare dalle macchine (naturali e artificiali), deve anche essere tale che “le sue parti si congiungano nell’unità di un tutto essendo reciprocamente causa ed effetto della loro forma rispettiva” (KU § 65, AA 05: 372-374).

L’organismo si distingue dal semplice sistema perché produce movimento, come la macchina, ma si distingue dalla macchina proprio perché non è solo “articolato” (nei suoi organi), bensì è dotato di una interna “forza plasmatrice” (organizzante), che non è soltanto “motrice”, ma è capace di mettere in movimento se stessa e di riprodursi (KU § 65, AA 05: 374).

Ora, è vero che, secondo Kant, il concetto della “materia organizzata” “conduce necessariamente all’idea dell’intera natura come un sistema secondo la regola degli scopi” (KU § 67, AA 05: 379). Ma poco oltre egli precisa che “la natura nel suo insieme non è data come organizzata”, se questo termine viene inteso nel suo senso più ristretto (KU § 75, AA 05: 398s.). Rimane certo possibile *pensare* la natura come un tutto *finalistico*, e anzi perfino come un tutto *organizzato*, ma solo in quel senso più lato in cui un tutto finalistico può anche esser detto “organico”.<sup>27</sup> Tuttavia non è necessario *giudicarla* così, se si rimane sul piano della teleologia fisica, ossia sul piano della conoscenza oggettiva e del giudizio riflettente teoretico.

Nel § 82 della terza *Critica* leggiamo però che, nel “rapporto esterno” degli enti organizzati, “è conforme alla ragione pensare una certa organizzazione”, anche se l’esperienza sembra non confermare affatto tale supposizione (KU, AA 05: 427). Qui si tratta evidentemente di organizzazione solo nel senso di un “sistema di scopi” (KU, AA 05: 427, 428, 430) inteso genericamente (non nel senso di un “ente organizzato” propriamente detto), che riguarda solo le “creature terrestri” in quanto enti organizzati e il loro rapporto esterno, non la loro forma o

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<sup>24</sup> *Ivi*, p. 121.

<sup>25</sup> *Ivi*, p. 124.

<sup>26</sup> *Ivi*, pp. 129, 142, 161-171.

<sup>27</sup> Secondo il modo in cui il corpo organizzato è definito nel § 66 della *Critica del Giudizio* e in cui la *Critica della ragion pura* caratterizza il “sistema” in analogia con un corpo animale (KrV, B 860 s.) e l’*Opus postumum* addirittura la macchina (OP, AA 21: 185, 547 ss., OP, AA 22: 568 ss.).

costituzione interna e neppure la loro esistenza in assoluto, ma semmai solo la loro esistenza in quanto utile (degli uni per gli altri).

Questo rapporto esterno, nel contesto di tutto il paragrafo, indica la relazione funzionale di un ente organizzato (singolo o classe) con altri, ma non necessariamente una relazione rigorosamente e propriamente reciproca (bidirezionale), per cui l'uno sia mezzo per l'altro e viceversa, bensì di regola e primariamente una relazione unidirezionale, in cui l'uno è mezzo per un altro e questo per un altro ancora e così via, fino a un (ipotetico) scopo ultimo. Qui dunque la domanda (finalistica) "per che cosa?" (*wozu*) non significa "in funzione di che" qualcosa si trova internamente connesso con altro in un composto sostanziale che si dà a riconoscere come sistema, ma "a vantaggio di chi (o che cosa)" qualcosa si trova interconnesso con altro in un composto di sostanze che si presenta anzitutto come "aggregato" e non è evidente che costituisca un "sistema" (KU, AA 05: 427-428).

Senza uno scopo ultimo non si può affermare che sussista un sistema teleologico nel rapporto esterno tra gli enti organizzati, secondo Kant. Ma perché non basta la reciprocità relativa della funzionalità dell'esistenza di un ente per l'altro, quella che resta da ammettere dopo aver riconosciuto che nessun ente organizzato (neppure l'uomo che a noi appare il più titolato o l'unico titolato) può essere attestato dall'esperienza come scopo ultimo della natura?

Introducendo il concetto di finalità relativa o esterna (KU § 63, AA 05: 368-369), Kant dice che non siamo autorizzati a giudicare come finalità reale (e cioè come "scopo della natura") la relazione funzionale che possiamo ipotizzare tra qualche ente naturale e qualche altro, a meno che non si possa asserire che l'esistenza di ciò "a vantaggio di cui" ipotizziamo il rapporto funzionale sia fine a se stessa, e quindi "per se stessa scopo della natura", ovvero che tale esistenza sia necessaria in assoluto e quindi per la natura stessa (che è l'insieme di ciò che esiste di fatto); ma questo equivarrebbe ad asserire che quell'esistenza sia "scopo finale", non più condizionato e subordinato ad altri scopi (naturali) (cfr. KU § 84, AA 05: 435). Ora una simile asserzione è impossibile sul piano della conoscenza teoretica della natura (e anche della riflessione teleologico-teoretica).

Parafrasando il passo del § 63 in parallelo a passi dei §§ 82 e 83, si potrebbe dire, in sintesi, che per Kant, nella *Critica del Giudizio*, la finalità esterna potrebbe configurarsi come un sistema teleologico solo se l'ipotetico scopo ultimo potesse convalidarsi come scopo finale (ossia come un ente che ha in se stesso lo scopo della sua esistenza), perché solo allora saremmo autorizzati a giudicarlo come uno scopo (ultimo) della natura nel rapporto esterno tra enti naturali.<sup>28</sup>

Possiamo pensare un organismo come fine in se stesso, e perciò giudicarlo come un sistema teleologico (tra altri analoghi), in virtù della sua forma che ci è data (ossia di cui possiamo comprendere la possibilità) solo come organizzata, cioè come articolazione di parti funzionale al suo tutto, e quindi a lei stessa; ma non è possibile giudicarlo un fine in senso assoluto (e quindi uno scopo finale), perché si può sempre domandare: "a che scopo esiste?" e non si è legittimati (non si hanno motivi sufficienti) a rispondere: "per se stesso" ovvero "in vista di se stesso" (§ 67). La natura nel suo insieme (considerata come un tutto), invece, non ha una forma che ci sia data come

<sup>28</sup> O meglio tra enti organizzati, come precisa il § 82 (KU, AA 05: 425), argomentando che degli altri, degli enti inorganici, è escluso *a priori* che possano essere giudicabili come "scopi naturali".



organizzata (§ 75), e soprattutto anche di essa si può domandare lo scopo della sua esistenza, che di nuovo non può essere riposto in lei (§ 67); perciò non può essere *giudicata* legittimamente un sistema teleologico globale, sebbene sia lecito, e anzi inevitabile, *pensarla* (ossia supporla) come tale (§ 75).

#### 4. Il mondo come domanda e orizzonte del senso

Sul piano teoretico, per Kant, il mondo diventa problema come tale: nel suo concetto formale di unità-totalità e soprattutto nel suo carattere di esistenza fattuale che richiede una giustificazione del suo essere-così e del suo essere in generale. Il concetto di mondo viene rilegittimato proprio attraverso la domanda della “ragione interrogante” che ne mette in questione il suo diritto di esistere puramente di fatto come semplice naturalità e lo ricollega all’interrogativo sulla destinazione e prospettiva finale dell’uomo. La domanda radicale della ragione investe l’esistenza del mondo come esigenza e richiesta di uno scopo finale: “Per che cosa esiste l’uomo?”, “Per che cosa esiste l’intera natura?” (KU, AA 05: 477).

Il concetto di mondo diventa dunque un’idea legittima solo nell’ottica della domanda pratica dell’uomo quando si estende alla domanda meta-pratica e meta-critica: “Che cosa mi è lecito sperare?” (KrV, B 833). Questo interrogativo, che costituisce la terza delle domande capitali della ragione e che investe l’orizzonte ultimo dell’interrogare e dell’agire, e quindi dell’esistere stesso dell’uomo, è decisivo per la sua autocomprensione, per la sua domanda su se stesso, che nella *Logica* viene formulata come la quarta domanda, conclusiva e inclusiva, della ragione: “Che cos’è l’uomo?”.<sup>29</sup>

Qui diventa necessario non solo pensare o ipotizzare, ma postulare un mondo che nel suo essere (idealmente anticipato) attui il suo dover-essere (indicato dal suo scopo finale); un tutto sistematico in cui la stessa naturalità possa essere riflessivamente giudicata come ordinata alla moralità, ossia concordante con la legge morale e la sua esigenza di giustizia da un lato e di attuazione dell’insieme degli scopi (soggettivi) congruenti, dall’altro.

In forza della sua problematizzazione radicale e antisostanzialistica, Kant appare la fonte primaria di Heidegger e del suo concetto del mondo come struttura esistenziale dell’uomo.<sup>30</sup> Anche per Kant all’uomo appartiene originariamente l’“essere nel mondo”: questo però per lui non è solo una struttura formale, una condizione di possibilità: non basta la prefigurazione spaziale, ma è necessaria l’anticipazione determinata di un “essere un tutto”, che a sua volta non è assicurato (come in Heidegger) dal “precorrimento” della morte, ovvero dall’assunzione preliminare dell’orizzonte della finitezza dell’esistere,<sup>31</sup> bensì dall’anticipazione di un possibile compimento adempiente. In Kant il “poter essere un tutto” del mondo in cui l’uomo esiste è aperto dal “poter essere un tutto” dell’uomo stesso come essere morale finito, che è sottoposto a un’esigenza irremissibile oltrepassante la sua singolarità (la legge morale universale, ma autonoma, che gli pone uno scopo finale come compito supremo), ma che proprio per questo avanza, in virtù della sua stessa ragione, l’esigenza di un soddisfacimento (finale) anche dei suoi bisogni legittimi (cioè dei suoi scopi in quanto resi concordanti tra loro e con lo scopo finale comune) tramite un accordo della natura con l’ordine della libertà.

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<sup>29</sup> I. Kant, Lo, AA 09: 25 [trad. it. p. 19].

<sup>30</sup> M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, Niemeyer, Halle S. 1927, §§ 11-27.

<sup>31</sup> *Ivi*, §§ 46-53.

Il mondo come un tutto sistematico è l'orizzonte di senso che si apre nella riflessione sulla destinazione etica dell'uomo. La "teleologia morale" offre infatti, come Kant si esprime nel saggio del 1791, *Sull'insuccesso di ogni saggio filosofico di teodicea*, l'"interpretazione autentica" della creazione, ossia quell'unico "senso" che la nostra ragione (pratica) può attribuire al "libro" del mondo, che altrimenti rimarrebbe per sempre sigillato e inintelligibile.<sup>32</sup>

In quanto idea teoretica di totalità assoluta dell'ente, il mondo è preformazione di un orizzonte formale di conoscibilità e intelligibilità. Ma solo in quanto idea teleologica "riempita" di valenza e protensione "pratico-morale" il mondo diventa orizzonte "pieno", come progetto e anticipazione "materiale" di "senso", ossia di un'intelligibilità che insieme (sia pure su un piano di postulazione anziché di certezza assertoria) appaga tutti gli interessi della ragione umana: come autorizzazione a interpretare i rapporti e gli eventi in un arco teso da ultimo al bene anziché al nulla.

Il tutto del mondo è fondato sullo scopo finale che è il sommo bene finito, "il sommo bene possibile nel mondo": questo "mondo" non è soltanto il mondo sensibile o fenomenico (come si è talora equivocato)<sup>33</sup>, ma la totalità della realtà finita, nel senso indicato: l'insieme degli enti dotati di esistenza derivata, non autosufficiente, in quanto costituiscono un sistema connesso da una articolazione di senso che è la concordanza con l'orizzonte del bene. Ed è precisamente questa concordanza, a cui il mondo deve essere giudicato destinato solo in base al legame della nostra autocomprensione umana con il dover essere morale, che costituisce l'armonia del tutto nell'unico senso ammissibile dalla riflessione critica.

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<sup>32</sup> I. Kant, MpVT, AA 08: 253-272, qui 264 [trad. it. qui p. 59 s.].

<sup>33</sup> Cfr. G.B. Sala (1993, spec. 378-384).

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## **Armonía en la dualidad frente a monismo naturalista:**

### **Kant y Habermas**

#### *Harmony in Duality versus Naturalist Monism:*

#### *Kant and Habermas*

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#### **Resumen**

Este trabajo intenta articular la *Crítica del Juicio* en el debate contemporáneo sobre el determinismo y la libertad. En esta perspectiva, defiende, frente a Habermas, que la dualidad entre los dos mundos no impidió a Kant fundamentar una idea coherente del mundo, que incluya al hombre como ser natural. Se estructura en dos partes. En la primera parte estudia la propuesta de Habermas, de combinar un dualismo epistemológico con un monismo naturalista no científicista (naturalismo débil), como vía adecuada para una imagen coherente del mundo. La segunda parte, dedicada a Kant, pone de relieve que la *Crítica del Juicio*, mediante una lectura de la naturaleza y del lugar del hombre en la misma desde el concepto de organismo, propio de la biología, consigue justificar, desde el Juicio reflexionante, una imagen del hombre como un ser natural en armonía con la libertad. Caracterizamos la propuesta kantiana como una armonía en la dualidad.

#### **Palabras clave**

Habermas; Kant; armonía; dualismo; libertad; naturalismo

#### **Abstract**

This paper tries to articulate the *Critique of Judgement* within the contemporary debate on the issues of determinism and freedom. From this perspective, it sustains, against Habermas's ideas, that the duality between the two worlds did not prevent Kant to lay the foundations of a coherent vision of the world which included man as a natural being. The paper is structured in two parts. The first is dedicated to the study of Habermas's proposal of combining an epistemological dualism

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with a non-scientific naturalist monism (weak naturalism), as a suitable channel for a coherent picture of the world. The second part is dedicated to Kant. It emphasises that the *Critique of Judgement*, through a perception of nature and the place of man in it, ensued as a biological organism, achieves, from a thoughtful judgement, an image of man as a natural being in harmony with freedom. We, therefore, may characterize Kant's proposal as a harmony in duality.

### Key words

Habermas; Kant; Dualism; Freedom; Harmony; Naturalism

## 1. DUALISMO EPISTEMOLÓGICO Y MONISMO NATURALISTA EN HABERMAS

En el debate actual sobre el determinismo y la libertad, Habermas defiende un dualismo como presupuesto necesario para afirmar la existencia de la libertad. En “Libertad y determinismo” apoya su defensa del papel causal de nuestra voluntad libre en un dualismo entre causas y razones o motivos racionales, que se corresponde con un dualismo entre “la perspectiva del observador” y “la perspectiva del partícipe”.<sup>1</sup> Pero se opone expresamente al dualismo kantiano entre el mundo sensible y el mundo inteligible,<sup>2</sup> con vistas a “satisfacer también la necesidad de una imagen coherente del universo, que incluya al hombre como ser natural”.<sup>3</sup> En este sentido, intenta combinar su dualismo, de perspectivas epistemológicas, con un monismo naturalista no científicista, que recoge en la expresión “naturalismo blando”<sup>4</sup> o “naturalismo débil”<sup>5</sup>. En esta primera parte nos referiremos, en primer lugar, a su dualismo, mediante el cual fundamenta el concepto de libertad de acción [1]; y en segundo lugar, a su monismo naturalista [2].

[1] Para Habermas, lo que hace que nuestras acciones se conviertan en acciones libres es su conexión interna con *razones*, que son las que pueden motivar que obremos así y no de otro modo. La libertad de acción supone un proceso previo de deliberación en el que el agente sopesa argumentos.

En primer lugar, este concepto de libertad es compatible con el carácter condicionado de la misma, pues las aptitudes del agente, su carácter, sus circunstancias, no son más que otras tantas razones a sopesar. Pero, por otro lado, Habermas distingue entre condicionalidad y determinación causal. Precisamente, el dualismo de perspectivas epistemológicas que defiende Habermas tiene como base fundamental la irreductibilidad de los motivos racionales a causas; esto es, la tesis de que “el papel motivador de la acción

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<sup>1</sup>El contexto en el que Habermas defiende un dualismo en este escrito es el de las actuales tentativas de aplicar al problema de la libertad los resultados de la investigación sobre el cerebro (concretamente, en los experimentos de Libet). Nosotros vamos a prescindir de ese contexto para centrarnos en las cuestiones de la libertad, el dualismo y una imagen coherente del mundo.

<sup>2</sup>“Kant pudo conciliar la causalidad dimanante de la libertad con la causalidad de la naturaleza únicamente a costa de un dualismo entre el mundo de lo inteligible y el mundo de los fenómenos. Hoy día nos gustaría arreglarnos sin tales suposiciones metafísicas de fondo” (Habermas 2006, pp. 160-161).

<sup>3</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 160.

<sup>4</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 174.

<sup>5</sup>Habermas 2011, pp. 32 ss.

que tienen las razones no puede ser comprendido según el modelo de causalidad de un suceso observable”.<sup>6</sup> Una acción motivada por razones no debe ser interpretada en el sentido de un proceso causal determinista.

Según una interpretación determinista, las razones, lo que juzgamos como bueno o como correcto, determinan necesariamente la aparición de la acción, del mismo modo que de una causa natural se sigue necesariamente un determinado efecto.<sup>7</sup> Pero, de acuerdo con Habermas, una acción motivada por razones se distingue de un proceso natural determinista por la *participación* del sujeto<sup>8</sup> en el acontecer de la acción. En la motivación racional de la acción no cuentan sólo las razones, sino que, además, es necesario que el agente se deje determinar por ellas.

Por eso, de una motivación por razones no se sigue necesariamente una acción; la aparición de ésta depende de la decisión del *sujeto*, el cual puede actuar incluso en contra de lo que tiene por correcto:

«A causa de esta referencia a un sujeto –que puede actuar incluso en contra de un saber mejor–, el enunciado de que un sujeto S ha ejecutado la acción H (*Handlung* en alemán) por una razón G (*Grund*) no es, evidentemente, equivalente a ese otro que dice que G ha causado la acción H. A diferencia de lo que ocurre en una explicación causal habitual, la explicación racional de la acción no permite sacar la conclusión de que personas cualesquiera llegarían, con idénticas premisas, a una misma decisión [...].

El que “dependa de él” obrar así y no de otro modo requiere estas dos cosas: tiene que estar convencido de hacer lo correcto, pero tiene que hacerlo *él mismo*. La espontaneidad de la acción, presente en la autoexperiencia, no es una fuente anónima, sino un sujeto que se atribuye a sí mismo el “poder” obrar». <sup>9</sup>

La libertad de acción no radica sólo en la vinculación de la voluntad a razones, sino también en ese *poder*, el cual es “específicamente suyo”.<sup>10</sup>

Desde este poder del sujeto, condicionamientos como los procesos cerebrales se transforman “de determinantes causales en condiciones *posibilitadoras*”.<sup>11</sup> Y factores como el carácter, las aptitudes, la historia vital, las circunstancias, dejan de ejercer su influjo como causas externas; el sujeto “hace suyos”<sup>12</sup> los distintos condicionamientos y los incluye en su propio proceso de deliberación; incluso nuestros deseos y preferencias pueden contar “como buenas razones para obrar”.<sup>13</sup>

Ciertamente, estas razones pueden ser rebasadas por razones de carácter moral; pero el concepto de libertad de acción no se limita a éstas. En este punto Habermas

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<sup>6</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 165.

<sup>7</sup>En este aspecto, Habermas tiene como interlocutor a P. Bieri. Cf. Habermas 2006, pp. 164-166.

<sup>8</sup>Por eso, Habermas conceptúa también el dualismo entre razones y causas como un dualismo entre “la perspectiva de los partícipes y la de los observadores” (Habermas 2006, p. 169).

<sup>9</sup>Habermas 2006, pp. 167-168.

<sup>10</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 165.

<sup>11</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 168.

<sup>12</sup>Habermas 2006, p.169.

<sup>13</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 168.

reprocha a Kant haber restringido el concepto de la libertad a la vinculación de la voluntad a razones *éticas*:

«La marca de actuación moral y deber categórico ha propiciado un concepto inflacionario de libertad inteligible y sin origen y que, separado de todas las conexiones empíricas, es, en este sentido, “absoluta”.

La fenomenología de la autoría responsable nos ha conducido, respecto a esto, a un concepto de libertad enraizada en el organismo y en la historia vital, el cual no casa ni con la doctrina de Descartes sobre las dos sustancias ni con la doctrina kantiana de los dos mundos. El dualismo metodológico de las dos perspectivas explicativas —la de los partícipes y la de los observadores— no debe ser ontologizado en un dualismo de espíritu y naturaleza».<sup>14</sup>

Así pues, Habermas no da a su dualismo un carácter ontológico (como separación entre naturaleza y espíritu), sino epistemológico; entiende la diferencia entre determinación causal y motivación racional de la acción como una “escisión epistémica entre perspectivas explicativas y formas de saber complementarias”.<sup>15</sup> El sentido de este dualismo tiene que ver con el siguiente paso de la propuesta de Habermas.

[2] En un segundo paso quiere hacer concordar ese dualismo metodológico con “una concepción monista del universo que se ajuste a nuestra necesidad de tener una imagen coherente del mundo”.<sup>16</sup> Para ello, va a intentar combinar el dualismo de las dos perspectivas epistémicas, entendido como irreductibilidad de una a otra, con un monismo *naturalista*.

Una posible vía la ofrece una teoría evolucionista del conocimiento. Frente a las estrategias de investigación reduccionistas, que asignan a la deliberación de razones la categoría de epifenómenos, una teoría evolucionista puede reivindicar el papel causal de las razones como un producto adaptativo:

«Si tanto las razones como la elaboración lógica de las razones no desempeñan, desde un punto de vista neurológico, ningún papel causal, sigue siendo chocante, en la perspectiva de la teoría evolucionista, por qué la naturaleza se permite en absoluto, el lujo de todo un “ámbito de razones” [...] Si se ha de tildar de epifenómeno a ese “dar y recibir motivos racionales”, no quedaría ya gran cosa de las funciones biológicas de autocomprensión de los sujetos capaces de lenguaje y acción. ¿Por qué deberíamos ponernos unos a otros exigencias de legitimación? ¿Qué funciones cumpliría toda esa superestructura de diligencias de socialización encaminadas a infundir en los niños la necesidad de algo que, respecto a la causalidad, marcha en vacío?».<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>14</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 169. Sobre su oposición a un dualismo de carácter ontológico *vid.* también *ibid.*, pp. 161, 170.

<sup>15</sup> Habermas 2006, 161. Es un dualismo de “perspectivas explicativas y juegos del lenguaje” (*ibid.* p. 170).

<sup>16</sup>Habermas 2006, p. 170.

<sup>17</sup>Habermas 2006, pp. 171-172.

Causas observables y motivos racionales serían, de acuerdo con una teoría evolutiva, el resultado de “una adaptación funcional de nuestra especie a dos entornos distintos, el natural y el social”.<sup>18</sup>

Sin embargo, Habermas tampoco está dispuesto a reducir la verdad de nuestras teorías a “su éxito para la adaptación”.<sup>19</sup>

Es en una teoría pragmatista del conocimiento, con su transformación del trascendentalismo kantiano en un sentido no idealista,<sup>20</sup> donde Habermas ve la vía adecuada para “encontrar en el propio mundo un lugar para un dualismo epistémico”,<sup>21</sup> en vez de tener que remitirlo al mundo nouménico kantiano.

El giro pragmático de la teoría del conocimiento conserva la problemática trascendental, pero evita el carácter idealista o el *status* inteligible que Kant asigna a las condiciones de posibilidad y la hace compatible con un punto de vista naturalista.<sup>22</sup> “Las condiciones transcendentales para el acceso epistémico al mundo deben ser, ellas mismas, concebidas como algo *en* el mundo”.<sup>23</sup>

Una concepción pragmatista del conocimiento presupone renunciar al modelo representacionalista del conocimiento para poner en su lugar conceptos como un “trato activo con la realidad”, “la ‘superación’ de problemas” y “el éxito de los procesos de aprendizaje”.<sup>24</sup>

«Desde un punto de vista pragmatista, el proceso del conocimiento se presenta como una conducta inteligente que soluciona problemas, posibilita procesos de aprendizaje, corrige errores e invalida objeciones. [...] la realidad no es nada a reproducir o representar; únicamente se hace notar —realizativamente, como el conjunto de las resistencias procesadas y de las previsibles— en las limitaciones y restricciones a las que están sometidas nuestras soluciones a los problemas y nuestros procesos de aprendizaje».<sup>25</sup>

Por otro lado, nuestros procesos de aprendizaje se desenvuelven en un trasfondo comunicativo intersubjetivamente compartido, “el mundo de la vida”, un concepto que Habermas toma de la fenomenología de Husserl y con el que se opone explícitamente a la conciencia trascendental y nouménica de Kant.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Habermas 2006, p. 173.

<sup>19</sup> Habermas 2006, p. 173. Ya en *Conocimiento e interés*, donde Habermas combinaba el papel constitutivo —y, en este sentido, trascendental— de los intereses rectores del conocimiento con su origen en contextos vitales, se había opuesto a considerarlos como meras respuestas instintivas a necesidades biológicas. A lo que apuntan es al éxito en la resolución de problemas (Cf. Habermas 1986, p. 143).

<sup>20</sup> En el marco de esta problemática Habermas asume la transformación de la problemática trascendental de Kant por el giro pragmático de la teoría del conocimiento, por parte de Rorty. *Vid.* sobre ello la Introducción de Habermas 2011.

<sup>21</sup> Habermas 2006, 173.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Habermas 2011, pp. 18-19.

<sup>23</sup> Habermas 2011, p. 27; cf. también, *ibid.*, p. 30.

<sup>24</sup> Habermas 2011, p. 37.

<sup>25</sup> Habermas 2011, pp. 36-37.

<sup>26</sup> “La conciencia trascendental pierde las connotaciones de una dimensión establecida en el ‘más allá’, en el ámbito de lo inteligible; ha bajado a la tierra en la forma desublimada de la práctica comunicativa cotidiana.



Pues bien, a este pragmatismo asocia Habermas, como supuesto metateórico, un “naturalismo débil”.<sup>27</sup> Dicho naturalismo, inspirado en la teoría de la evolución, consiste en afirmar que los procesos de aprendizaje, que tienen lugar en el marco de nuestras formas socioculturales de vida, sólo continúan procesos evolutivos naturales, que son los que han posibilitado dichas formas socioculturales de vida. Lo que Habermas afirma con su naturalismo débil es una continuidad entre la *cultura* y la *naturaleza*, poniendo del lado de ésta una teoría de la evolución entendida como secuencia de “soluciones de problemas”.<sup>28</sup>

Nuestros procesos de aprendizaje serían procesos de “aprendizaje *evolutivo*”<sup>29</sup> y la evolución natural se interpreta como un “proceso análogo al aprendizaje”.<sup>30</sup> En dicho proceso irían emergiendo tanto las estructuras que hacen posible nuestro conocimiento objetivo del mundo como las estructuras que caracterizan nuestras formas socioculturales de vida.<sup>31</sup>

Con estos presupuestos, Habermas cree posible inscribir el dualismo epistémico de causas y razones o motivos racionales en una imagen coherente del universo:

«El dualismo epistémico no debe haber caído de un cielo transcendental. Tiene que haber *surgido* de un proceso de aprendizaje evolutivo y haberse acreditado en la confrontación cognitiva del *homo sapiens* con las exigencias de un mundo ambiental lleno de riesgos. La continuidad de una historia natural, sobre la que nosotros podemos tener, al menos, una representación *análoga* a la de la evolución natural de Darwin, si bien no una concepción teórica satisfactoria, nos asegura —salvando el abismo epistémico entre la naturaleza objetivable en las ciencias naturales y una cultura que se sigue entendiendo intuitivamente, al estar compartida intersubjetivamente— la unidad de un universo al que los humanos pertenecemos como seres naturales».<sup>32</sup>

De este modo, Habermas intenta unir a Kant con Darwin<sup>33</sup>. De Kant toma, frente a un planteamiento empirista, la idea de condicionamientos trascendentales del conocimiento; como se ha visto, un trascendentalismo no idealista, según el cual nuestro conocimiento objetivo sobre el mundo (causas observables) y nuestras formas socioculturales de vida, en las que se inscriben nuestros procesos deliberativos, surgirían de procesos de aprendizaje en nuestro trato con la realidad.

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El profano mundo de la vida ha venido a ocupar el lugar transmudano de lo nouménico” (Habermas 2011, p. 27). “En lugar de la subjetividad transcendental de la consciencia aparece la intersubjetividad detranscendentalizada del mundo de la vida” (*ibid.*, 40).

<sup>27</sup> Un concepto que Habermas contraponen al naturalismo “estricto”, “riguroso” o científico de Quine, según el cual: “Todo conocimiento debe poder remitirse, en última instancia, a procesos científico-experimentales” (Habermas 2011, p. 33).

<sup>28</sup> Habermas 2011, p. 38.

<sup>29</sup> Habermas 2011, p. 38.

<sup>30</sup> Habermas 2011, p. 39.

<sup>31</sup> Cf. Habermas, 2011, p. 39.

<sup>32</sup> Habermas 2006, p. 174.

<sup>33</sup> Cf. Habermas 2006, pp. 161, 178.

Por otro lado, apoyándose en hallazgos antropológicos, Habermas aboga por el surgimiento simultáneo de las dos perspectivas, la de las causas observables (perspectiva del observador) y la de los motivos racionales (perspectiva del partícipe): nuestra mirada objetivante sobre el mundo no se constituye independientemente de los procesos de socialización, en los cuales tiene lugar el dar y recibir argumentos, que es el espacio de la *libertad*. Con ello, Habermas cree poder abordar uno de los grandes problemas que plantea todo dualismo: el problema de la interacción.<sup>34</sup>

Sin duda, y haciendo una valoración de la posición de Habermas aquí expuesta, su análisis de la libertad de acción, en el que concilia dicha libertad con condicionamientos empíricos, propios de una voluntad que obra en el mundo, es convincente: los condicionamientos de nuestra libertad son otros tantos argumentos o razones a sopesar en la deliberación, la cual dependerá en última instancia del sujeto. Otra cosa es que la libertad, así entendida, no pase de un nivel meramente prudencial; es decir, lo que para Kant serían los imperativos hipotéticos, frente a lo que es bueno en sí mismo, que es el nivel genuino de la filosofía kantiana de la libertad. Compartimos también la posición de que no es posible afirmar la existencia de la libertad sin tener que admitir algún tipo de dualismo. Y desde luego, el problema de cómo armonizar un dualismo, como presupuesto de la libertad, con una imagen coherente del universo es un problema relevante en el debate contemporáneo sobre el determinismo y la libertad.

Sin embargo, quisiéramos oponer a Habermas, desde Kant, que un monismo naturalista no es la única opción posible para una imagen coherente del mundo, que incluya al hombre como ser natural. También es discutible que los fundamentos de la libertad deban ser remitidos únicamente a procesos socio-culturales.

## **2. JUICIO REFLEXIONANTE Y ARMONÍA EN LA DUALIDAD EN KANT: ORGANIZACIÓN DE LA NATURALEZA, CULTURA, MORALIDAD**

Veremos en esta segunda parte que el dualismo entre los dos mundos no impidió a Kant fundamentar una imagen coherente del mundo.

Después de recordar esquemáticamente el dualismo kantiano, como fundamento del concepto de una voluntad libre, y poner de relieve que dicho dualismo se convierte en un problema cuando se pasa del plano de la fundamentación al de la realización de la libertad en el mundo [3], mostraremos que la segunda parte de la *Crítica del Juicio* aporta una lectura de la naturaleza y del lugar del hombre en la naturaleza desde el concepto de organismo, propio de la biología; y que por este camino se llega a la cultura como el medio señalado por Kant para la realización de la libertad[4]. Sin embargo, ello no significa remitir el origen de la libertad a la naturaleza; la dualidad entre la naturaleza sensible y la libertad, como lo suprasensible, persiste; pero, al mismo tiempo, la nueva visión del hombre como ser natural se integra *armónicamente* con la posibilidad de la libertad en el mundo [5].

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<sup>34</sup>Cf sobre ello Habermas 2006, pp. 174ss.

[3] En su discusión sobre el conflicto entre determinismo y libertad, dentro del contexto cosmológico de la tercera antinomia, Kant apela también a la distinción entre “causas naturales determinantes” y “la decisión y el acto”. En un acto voluntario, si éste es *libre*, la decisión es irreductible a causas naturales. Ciertamente, en tanto que acontece en el tiempo, el acto “sigue a estas causas”; pero, desde el punto de vista causal, “no se sigue de ellas”.<sup>35</sup>

Sin embargo, en el concepto kantiano de libertad, la distinción entre causas observables y deliberación según motivos no es suficiente. La libertad de acción no se juega meramente en la vinculación de la acción a razones, sino en el tipo de razones; o en términos más kantianos, en el tipo de legalidad con el que se vincula la decisión de la voluntad. Para que pueda hablarse de libertad, no basta con la participación del sujeto o de su voluntad en la decisión.<sup>36</sup> Sólo la vinculación de la voluntad a fundamentos de determinación absolutamente independientes de la legalidad de la naturaleza hace de ella una voluntad libre. Libertad es en Kant causalidad incondicionada. Ya en el mismo contexto cosmológico de la tercera antinomia Kant encuentra este tipo de causalidad en la razón (*Vernunft*).<sup>37</sup> Por otro lado, solo hay un hecho que pone de relieve un tipo de causalidad tal:

«Que esta razón posee causalidad, o que al menos nos representamos que la posee, es algo que queda claro en virtud de los *imperativos* que en todo lo práctico proponemos como reglas a las facultades activas. El *deber* expresa un tipo de necesidad y de relación con fundamentos que no aparece en ninguna otra parte de la naturaleza».<sup>38</sup>

Por eso, Kant escribe en un momento ulterior de su obra crítica, en la *Crítica de la razón práctica*, que “(la) libertad y la ley práctica incondicionada remiten [...] recíprocamente una a la otra”.<sup>39</sup> Pues la representación de la forma de la ley, como fundamento de determinación de la voluntad, “se distingue de todos los fundamentos determinantes de los eventos en la naturaleza según la ley de causalidad, porque en estos los fundamentos determinantes también tienen que ser fenómenos”.<sup>40</sup>

En este aspecto, lleva razón Habermas cuando dice que Kant restringe el concepto de libertad a la vinculación de la voluntad a motivos éticos<sup>41</sup>. La afirmación kantiana de la

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<sup>35</sup> KrV, A 451 / B 479.

<sup>36</sup> “[...] la posibilidad de las cosas según leyes naturales se distingue esencialmente de la posibilidad de las cosas según leyes de la libertad con arreglo a sus respectivos principios. Pero esta diferencia no estriba en que en las últimas la causa se ponga en una voluntad, mientras que en las primeras se sitúe fuera de ésta, en las cosas mismas” (EEKU, AA 20: 197).

<sup>37</sup> Cf. KrV, A 547 / B 575, KrV A 551 / B 552, KrV 553 / B 581.

<sup>38</sup> KrV, A 547 / B 575.

<sup>39</sup> KpV, AA 05: 29.

<sup>40</sup> KpV, AA 05: 28-29.

<sup>41</sup> De todos modos, Allison ha advertido que en la *Crítica de la razón pura*, tanto en la “Dialéctica”, como el “El Canon”, *deber e imperativo* no siempre se toman en sentido estrictamente moral, sino que incluirían también reglas prudenciales, o lo que luego quedará definitivamente como imperativos hipotéticos, frente a los categóricos (Cf. Allison 1992, p. 478). Reconoce, no obstante, que ello no se reconcilia con algunos pasajes añadidos en la segunda edición; y, por supuesto, no se reconcilia con la segunda *Crítica*, “la cual vincula directamente la conciencia de la libertad con la ley moral” (*ibid.*, p. 496).

libertad no se funda meramente en un dualismo entre causas y motivos, sino en un dualismo entre mundo fenoménico y mundo nouménico. Ciertamente, en el texto de la antinomia encontramos, frente al determinismo, la distinción entre “causas empíricas” (*empirische Ursachen*) y “motivos de la razón” (*Grunde der Vernunft*).<sup>42</sup> Pero aquí motivos racionales hacen referencia, no a cualquier tipo de motivos, que sería el caso de Habermas, sino a la razón en el sentido que acabamos de expresar.

Ahora bien, frente a Habermas, quisiéramos mostrar que este dualismo no impidió a Kant ofrecer una imagen del mundo sensible coherente con el orden de la libertad.

La dualidad entre los dos mundos, siendo esencial e ineliminable en el planteamiento kantiano, no constituye la respuesta *completa* al problema de la libertad. En la *Crítica del Juicio* Kant formula explícitamente la exigencia de un *acuerdo* de la naturaleza sensible con la libertad. Dicha exigencia la plantea justamente cuando pasa a tematizar el problema de la realización de la libertad en el mundo de los sentidos, tal como se pone de relieve en el conocido pasaje de la *Einleitung*: “el concepto de libertad debe realizar en el mundo sensible el fin propuesto por sus leyes<sup>43</sup>, y la naturaleza, por tanto, debe poder pensarse de tal modo que [...] concuerde con la posibilidad de los fines, según leyes de libertad, que se han de realizar en ella.”<sup>44</sup>

Y de acuerdo con un pasaje de la sección novena de la *Einleitung*, lo que se persigue en la *Crítica del Juicio* es la posibilidad de pensar el “fin final” como fenómeno en el mundo sensible<sup>45</sup>.

Por eso, no puede decirse, sin más y en todos los sentidos, que Kant separe el problema de la libertad de toda conexión empírica<sup>46</sup>. Ello sucede en el plano de la fundamentación pero no en el de su realización en el mundo.

Desde este segundo plano, la dualidad entre los dos mundos topa, como puede apreciarse en el texto recién citado, con el problema característico de un dualismo, el de la interacción: el abismo establecido entre la naturaleza sensible y el orden de la libertad torna incomprensible un “influjo” del segundo sobre la primera; no nos resulta

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<sup>42</sup>KrV A 550 / B 578.

<sup>43</sup>Idea que conecta con este otro texto: “Encontramos [...] en nosotros mismos, y, más aún, en el concepto, en general de un ser racional, dotado de libertad (de su causalidad), una *teleología moral*, la cual, empero, como la relación final en nosotros mismos puede ser determinada *a priori* con la ley misma, y, por consiguiente, puede ser conocida como necesaria [...] pero esa teleología moral se aplica, sin embargo, a nosotros como seres del mundo y, por lo tanto, como seres relacionados con otras cosas en el mundo” (KU, AA 05: 447).

<sup>44</sup>KU, AA 05: 176.

<sup>45</sup>“El efecto, según el concepto de la libertad, es el fin final (*Endzweck*); éste (o su fenómeno en el mundo sensible) debe existir, para lo cual la condición de la posibilidad del mismo en la naturaleza (del sujeto, como ser sensible, a saber, como hombre) es presupuesta. (KU, AA 05: 195-196).

<sup>46</sup>Incluso puede afirmarse que la preocupación por la conexión de la libertad con las condiciones empíricas de su realización está ya presente en la misma tercera antinomia, como lo prueba este pequeño extracto: “El acto al que se aplica el deber tiene que ser realmente posible bajo condiciones naturales. Pero éstas no afectan a la determinación de la voluntad misma, sino a su efecto y resultado en la esfera del fenómeno. Por muchos que sean los motivos naturales y los estímulos sensitivos que me impulsen a *querer*, son incapaces de producir el *deber* [...] A pesar de ello, la razón parte del supuesto de que puede ejercer causalidad sobre todas esas acciones, ya que, en caso contrario, no esperarí de sus ideas efecto empírico alguno” (KrV, A 548 / B 576).

comprensible la posibilidad de efectos de la libertad “como fenómenos en el mundo sensible”.<sup>47</sup>

Atendiendo a ese segundo plano y a la mencionada problemática, Kant va a intentar un concepto de naturaleza que sea *coherente* con la posibilidad de la libertad en el mundo. Pero no lo intenta por la vía de un monismo naturalista, sino por la vía de una ampliación del concepto de naturaleza desde la *libertad* del Juicio reflexionante.

El Juicio reflexionante permite una ampliación del concepto de naturaleza más allá de lo que es *explicable* desde las ciencias; es decir, más allá de lo que permiten los conceptos y principios constitutivos del entendimiento. El Juicio reflexionante representa, en efecto, un *espacio de libertad* dentro del uso teórico de la razón.<sup>48</sup>

[4] Pero que el Juicio reflexionante permita una ampliación del concepto de naturaleza no restringido a lo que es *explicable* desde las ciencias y represente, en este sentido, un espacio de libertad dentro del uso teórico de la razón, no significa que no tenga nada que ver con la actividad científica. Al contrario, es en los *presupuestos* mismos de la investigación de la naturaleza donde Kant encuentra justificación para una ampliación del concepto de la misma. Dicho de otro modo, el Juicio reflexionante es libre respecto a los conceptos y principios constitutivos del entendimiento, pero su libertad no es una libertad arbitraria sino fundada en *razones*.

Una primera razón procede de la problemática de la aplicación de la lógica a la naturaleza o problemas de la conceptualización y sistematización de la naturaleza en la diversidad de sus formas particulares y sus leyes empíricas, que Kant desarrolla en cada una de las dos Introducciones a la *Crítica del Juicio*.<sup>49</sup> Una segunda razón procede de la reflexión sobre el hecho de la organización interna de los fenómenos biológicos, que Kant plantea igualmente en las dos Introducciones y desarrolla en la segunda parte de la *Crítica del Juicio*, la “Crítica del Juicio teleológico”.<sup>50</sup> Por uno y por otro camino, y a partir de la insuficiencia de las leyes trascendentales del entendimiento, el Juicio reflexionante tiene que poner a la base de su reflexión sobre la naturaleza el concepto de *finalidad* (*Zweckmäßigkeit*)<sup>51</sup>.

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<sup>47</sup>KU, AA 05: 196, nota de Kant.

<sup>48</sup> Kant había anticipado ya esta libertad en el uso regulativo de las ideas de la razón, en la *Crítica de la razón pura*. Comparto el juicio de L. Flamarique sobre los conceptos y principios regulativos: frente a los constitutivos, los conceptos y principios regulativos “están del lado de la autonomía y libertad de la razón” (Flamarique 2013, p. 48), “Configuran el espacio de la libertad también en la dimensión especulativa de la razón” (*ibid.*, p. 56).

<sup>49</sup> En ellas tiene lugar una “*catábasis* o descenso” de la Lógica trascendental a la pluralidad empírica (Sánchez Madrid 2011, p. 50).

<sup>50</sup> Para un desarrollo de esa problemática, *vid.* Andaluz 2011, pp. 93-107; Andaluz 1990, pp. 53-98; Andaluz 1990, pp. 23-98, 131-158.

<sup>51</sup> En el caso de la problemática de la conceptualización y sistematización empíricas de la naturaleza en sus formas particulares, la finalidad se refiere a la adecuación de la naturaleza a nuestro Juicio (finalidad formal y subjetiva); en el caso de la experiencia científica de los seres organizados de la naturaleza, se trata, en cambio, de un “principio de la posibilidad de las cosas de la naturaleza” (finalidad objetiva y real) (Cf. KU, AA 05: 359-360). Además, Kant encuentra también el principio del Juicio de una finalidad de la naturaleza (entendida, igual que en el primer caso, como adecuación de la naturaleza al Juicio) en su reflexión trascendental sobre la experiencia de lo bello (Cf. KU, AA 05: 245).

Como es bien sabido, la finalidad de la naturaleza es solo un principio que el Juicio se da “a sí mismo (como heautonomía)”<sup>52</sup> en su reflexión sobre la naturaleza; no tiene un valor explicativo sino sólo heurístico o metodológico, si bien es un principio de naturaleza transcendental; entendiendo por “principio transcendental [...] aquel por el cual se representa la condición universal a priori bajo la cual solamente cosas pueden venir a ser objeto de nuestro conocimiento en general”.<sup>53</sup>

Por otro lado, Kant no entiende la finalidad en el sentido de un fin o propósito al cual esté destinado algo, sino en el sentido de unidad, ajuste u organización sistemática de lo diverso, una organización tal que parece depender de la idea o representación previa del todo.<sup>54</sup>

Pues bien, en el ámbito de la biología, la insuficiencia del enlace causal mecánico para comprender, desde él, la forma interna de los organismos naturales justifica la aplicación a los mismos del enlace de los fines; pues, de otro modo, no sería posible una experiencia científica en el campo de lo orgánico. Según el enlace causal mecánico, son las partes las que hacen posible el todo. Pero, desde el punto de vista de la organización interna de las partes o de la materia, los seres naturales vivos sólo nos resultan inteligibles poniendo a la base de su posibilidad una idea, la idea del todo, que fundamente el modo de asociación de las partes; es decir, sólo nos resultan inteligibles en cuanto fines.<sup>55</sup> En este sentido, el concepto central de la “Analítica del Juicio teleológico” es el concepto de los seres organizados como “fines naturales” (*Naturzwecke*),<sup>56</sup> una noción que, como decimos, no pretende ser explicativa sino metodológica, aunque necesaria; es decir, no pertenece al Juicio determinante sino al reflexionante.<sup>57</sup>

La configuración interna de los seres orgánicos conlleva un doble aspecto. Uno de ellos concierne al *fundamento* de la misma; el otro hace referencia a la *relación* de las partes entre sí.

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<sup>52</sup>KU, AA 05: 185. En la heautonomía de la facultad de juzgar insiste especialmente Cubo 2012.

<sup>53</sup>KU, AA 05: 181.

<sup>54</sup> Cf. sobre ello McFarland 1970, p. 78. Cassirer, por su parte, remite este concepto de finalidad o “adecuación a fin” al concepto de armonía de Leibniz (Cassirer 1978, p. 337).

<sup>55</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 235-236.

<sup>56</sup> A esta clase de finalidad, referente a la forma interna de un ser organizado, la denomina Kant finalidad interna, distinguiéndola de la finalidad relativa o externa, que se refiere a las relaciones de medios y fines entre los seres de la naturaleza: “La experiencia no conduce nuestro Juicio al concepto de una finalidad objetiva y material, es decir, al concepto de un fin de la naturaleza, más que cuando se ha de juzgar la relación de causa a efecto, que solo nos encontramos capacitados para considerar como legal porque ponemos la idea del efecto de la causalidad de la causa, como la condición de la posibilidad del efecto mismo, contenida a la base de la causa misma. Esto, empero, puede ocurrir de dos maneras: o considerando el efecto inmediatamente como producto del arte, o considerándolo sólo como material para el arte de otros seres posibles de la naturaleza, es decir, o como fin o como medio para el uso, conforme a fin, de otras causa. La última finalidad se llama utilizabilidad (para los hombres), o también la aprovechabilidad (para cualquier otra criatura), y es meramente relativa; en cambio, la primera es una finalidad interna del ser natural” (KU, AA 05: 366-367). En el párrafo 63 Kant niega que las relaciones de utilizabilidad entre los seres de la naturaleza justifique un juicio teleológico sobre la naturaleza; sin embargo, ello no significa que la rechace definitivamente. Veremos más adelante que Kant recupera la finalidad relativa o externa del el concepto de fin natural y que dicha recuperación es muy importante de cara al objetivo sistemático de la tercera *Crítica*.

<sup>57</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 360.

Según el primero, el fundamento de la producción de un ser organizado hay que situarlo fuera de la materia, en una idea. Ello implica una *ampliación* del concepto de naturaleza más allá del mecanismo natural. La naturaleza organizada es interpretada por analogía a la técnica o arte humanos.<sup>58</sup> La relación de la naturaleza a un entendimiento suprasensible<sup>59</sup> es uno de los resultados principales de la reflexión sobre la naturaleza organizada. Entre la naturaleza como mero mecanismo natural y el mundo suprasensible de razón práctico-moral señala la tercera *Crítica* el concepto de la naturaleza como técnica. Pero, por otro lado, a Kant no se le escapa que la analogía con la técnica no es adecuada para dar cuenta de otro aspecto esencial de los seres orgánicos: el fenómeno de la autoorganización. Volveremos sobre ello en el último punto; pero veremos que, incluso tomando en consideración ese fenómeno, Kant sigue afirmando la relación de la naturaleza sensible a una causa no sensible, que no podemos pensar más que como un entendimiento.

Según el segundo aspecto, la relación entre las partes que componen el organismo hay que enjuiciarla, no según el esquema determinista de la causalidad mecánica, sino según el esquema teleológico de la relación de *medios y fines*.<sup>60</sup> Dicha relación es la que recoge Kant en su formulación del principio del Juicio para la investigación de los productos organizados, y que constituye al mismo tiempo la definición de los mismos: “*un producto organizado de la naturaleza es aquel en el cual todo es fin, y, recíprocamente, también medio*. Nada en él es gratuito, sin fin o debido a un ciego mecanismo natural”.<sup>61</sup>

En el planteamiento kantiano sobre los organismos, ambos aspectos –el de la causa intencional y el de la relación entre las partes como medios y fines– están relacionados entre sí; más concretamente, el segundo, debido a su incomprendibilidad desde el enlace causal mecánico, se funda en el primero.<sup>62</sup> Como ha observado McFarland, a diferencia de lo que sucede en la biología contemporánea, *función* significa en Kant *función proyectada*.<sup>63</sup>

Pero, además, en virtud del argumento de la unidad del fundamento, Kant extiende el concepto de organismo u organización interna, en cada uno de los dos aspectos señalados, a la naturaleza *en su conjunto*.<sup>64</sup> Por supuesto, el enjuiciamiento de la naturaleza como un sistema de fines sigue siendo un principio regulativo del Juicio reflexionante.<sup>65</sup>

Por el primer aspecto, la naturaleza en su conjunto es puesta en conexión con una causa intencional, es decir, que obra según fines. Y por el segundo aspecto, se obtiene una imagen de la naturaleza que tiene como forma de categorización la relación *medios-fines* en las relaciones externas entre las distintas clases de seres naturales.

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<sup>58</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 360.

<sup>59</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 377, 380-381.

<sup>60</sup> Comparto la opinión de Philonenko, según la cual la finalidad relativa, como finalidad de medio a fin, está ya contenida en el concepto mismo de organismo; referida en este caso, naturalmente, a la relación entre las partes de éste (Cf. Philonenko 1982, pp. 120-121).

<sup>61</sup> KU, AA 05: 376.

<sup>62</sup> Sobre la conexión entre ambos aspectos, es decir, que la relación recíproca de fines y medios entre las partes de un ser organizado exige poner a la base de dicha relación una causalidad final *vid.* también ÜGTP, AA 08: 178.

<sup>63</sup> Cf. McFarland 1970, pp. 110-111. Cf., por ejemplo, KU, AA 05: 360.

<sup>64</sup> Cf. sobre ello KU, AA 05: 378-379, 380-381.

<sup>65</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 379.

Dicha extensión a la naturaleza en su conjunto representa un momento clave para el objetivo sistemático central de la *Crítica del Juicio*, de vincular la naturaleza con la posibilidad de la libertad en el mundo. De los dos aspectos señalados, aunque inseparables en el planteamiento kantiano sobre la organización de la naturaleza, destacaremos aquí sólo el segundo.

Como decimos, la aplicación del concepto de organismo a la naturaleza en su conjunto, en ese segundo aspecto, aporta una imagen de la naturaleza que tiene como categorización básica la relación *medios-fines* en las relaciones externas entre los seres naturales entre sí. Y dicha categorización tiene como consecuencia, según veremos, un nuevo planteamiento de la condición del *hombre* como ser *natural*.

La conceptualización de las relaciones entre los seres naturales según la relación de medios-fines constituye, tal como anticipamos más atrás, lo que Kant llama *finalidad relativa* o *externa*.<sup>66</sup> Rechazada en los párrafos 63 y 67, Kant la recupera, en cambio, en el párrafo 82, desde el concepto de fin natural o finalidad interna.<sup>67</sup>

En el párrafo 63 Kant se opuso a la idea de que la utilidad de cosas en la naturaleza para el hombre o la aprovechabilidad de unos seres para otros en la naturaleza justifique un juicio teleológico sobre la misma; es decir, que la *existencia* de una cosa, por razón de su utilidad o de su aprovechabilidad, pueda ser considerada como “un fin de la naturaleza” (*Zweck der Natur*).<sup>68</sup>

Al comienzo del párrafo 67, en el cual tiene lugar el paso del concepto de fin natural al concepto de la naturaleza en su conjunto como un sistema de fines, Kant se reafirma en ello. Pero subraya el carácter *hipotético* de la finalidad externa, ya indicado también en el párrafo 63: sólo estaría justificado admitir la existencia de algo como fin de la naturaleza (*Zweck der Natur*) si conociéramos el fin (el objetivo) por el cual existe la naturaleza, esto es, el “fin final (*Endzweck*) (*scopus*)” de la existencia de ésta. Ahora bien, ello sobrepasa todo posible conocimiento de la naturaleza, pues un fin semejante “requiere una relación de ésta con algo suprasensible”; “el fin de la existencia de la naturaleza debe ser buscado por encima de la naturaleza”.<sup>69</sup>

Pero en el párrafo 82 Kant justifica la finalidad externa desde el concepto de un ser organizado como fin natural. Sólo en relación con seres organizados pueden otros seres de la naturaleza ser juzgados como medios.<sup>70</sup> La finalidad externa comporta el concepto de la existencia de algo como fin. Pero ello sólo es posible plantearlo en relación con un ser

<sup>66</sup>“Por finalidad externa entiendo aquella en que una cosa en la naturaleza sirve a otra de medio para un fin” (KU, AA 05: 425); se llama “utilizabilidad (para los hombres), o también la aprovechabilidad (para cualquier otra criatura)” (KU, AA 05: 367).

<sup>67</sup>[...] la noción de fin natural entraña no tanto un rechazo, cuanto un reexamen de la noción de finalidad externa” (Lebrun 2008, p. 473).

<sup>68</sup>KU, AA 05: 367. Nótese la diferencia entre las expresiones *Naturzweck* y *Zweck der Natur*. En la primera expresión se trata del concepto de fin natural y se refiere a su *forma interna*, en el segundo caso se trata de la *existencia* de un ser como fin de la naturaleza. “La finalidad externa es un concepto totalmente distinto del concepto de la interna, que está enlazado con la posibilidad de un objeto, prescindiendo de si su realidad (*Wirklichkeit*) misma es un fin o no” (KU, AA 05: 425).

<sup>69</sup>KU, AA 05: 378.

<sup>70</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 425.



organizado, pues ya su posibilidad descansa en una causa que obra según fines.<sup>71</sup> La pregunta por el fin de la existencia de algo sólo tiene sentido en una representación teleológica de la naturaleza; no, en cambio, en una concepción mecánica de la misma.<sup>72</sup>

En relación con este punto, referente a la justificación de la finalidad externa desde el concepto de un ser organizado, G. Lebrun (interpretando a Kant desde Hegel) aporta argumentos de interés, centrados en la originalidad de los seres vivos frente a los inorgánicos. Tomar en consideración la diferencia entre lo orgánico y lo inorgánico introduce un cambio respecto a una interpretación de las relaciones medio-fines como meras relaciones contingentes de utilidad; pues la relación de la vida con el “medio-entorno” es de *asimilación* o *apropiación*. Frente a la relación mecánica “*stimulus-reacción*”, la relación característica de la vida es la de “necesidad-asimilación”. “En la asimilación el medio se comporta como medio”. Por eso, sólo en relación con lo orgánico, los medios son propiamente medios. La vida representa un cambio respecto a la relación con el medio-entorno: es capacidad de “transformar las condiciones de existencia en un medio-entorno dado, en lugar de ser determinado por ellas”. Y en este entorno de lo orgánico hay seres, los hombres, capaces de transfigurar la naturaleza y no meramente “de alojarse en ella”.<sup>73</sup>

La interpretación, aunque libre, aporta luz a los textos kantianos; pues, en efecto, la nueva categorización de la naturaleza en fines y medios introduce aspectos nuevos respecto a la categorización de la misma desde una perspectiva no orgánica.

En primer lugar, la finalidad externa, como también señala Lebrun, queda ante todo como *jerarquía* entre los distintos seres orgánicos.<sup>74</sup> Por otro lado, y relacionado con lo primero, cambia la visión del modo de *estar el hombre en el mundo*, que en los textos de la fundamentación de la ética parecía responder única y necesariamente al esquema de la relación estímulo-respuesta.<sup>75</sup>

Lo que se recupera del concepto de finalidad externa no son tanto relaciones más o menos contingentes de utilidad cuanto la idea de una jerarquía u “organización” entre los distintos seres orgánicos:

«Cuando una finalidad objetiva, en la diversidad de las especies de las criaturas terrestres y su relación recíproca exterior, como seres construidos conforme a fin, se la convierte en principio, es conforme a la razón pensar, en esa relación, a su vez, una cierta organización y un sistema de todos los reinos de la naturaleza según causas finales».<sup>76</sup>

La jerarquía se establece entre estas tres clases de fines naturales: fines naturales que existen sólo como medios, fin final y fin último.

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<sup>71</sup>Cf. KU, AA 05: 425.

<sup>72</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 425- 426.

<sup>73</sup>Lebrun 2008, p. 474 - 477.

<sup>74</sup>Lebrun 2008, p. 476.

<sup>75</sup> Según la *Grundlegung*, las acciones, en tanto que pertenecientes al mundo sensible, no pueden ser comprendidas más que “como determinadas por otros fenómenos, a saber: apetitos e inclinaciones” (GMS, AA 04: 453).

<sup>76</sup> KU, AA 05: 427..

En primer lugar, cabe pensar la siguiente jerarquía: fines naturales que existen sólo como medios y un *fin final*, esto es, un fin natural que tuviera en él mismo y no en otros seres naturales el fin de su existencia. En efecto, dado que la existencia de un ser organizado es pensada como un fin cabe preguntarse si:

«el fin de la existencia de un ser semejante de la naturaleza está en sí mismo, es decir, no es sólo fin, sino *fin final* (*Endzweck*), o bien está fuera de él en otros seres de la naturaleza, es decir, no existe, en modo final, como fin final, sino, en modo necesario, al mismo tiempo como medio».<sup>77</sup>

Con ello, la *Crítica del Juicio* parece retomar el motivo que la desencadenó: fundar la posibilidad del fin final como fenómeno en el mundo sensible.<sup>78</sup> Pero, al mismo tiempo, también parece que vuelve a hacer acto de presencia el *dualismo* entre los dos mundos, pues el fin final, por su carácter incondicionado, no es algo que podamos conocer en la naturaleza:

«[...] cuando repasamos la naturaleza entera no encontramos en ella, como naturaleza, ningún ser que pueda tener pretensiones al privilegio de ser fin final de la creación, y hasta se puede demostrar *a priori* que lo que quizá aun para la naturaleza pudiera ser *último fin* (*letzter Zweck*) con todas las determinaciones y propiedades imaginables con que se le pueda proveer, no puede ser nunca un *fin final* (*Endzweck*)».<sup>79</sup>

Por supuesto, no es poco que la reflexión sobre la naturaleza desde los organismos dé pie a la pregunta por el fin final.<sup>80</sup> Pero es verdad que la dualidad entre los dos mundos persiste.

En segundo lugar, dentro de la naturaleza, la jerarquía se establece entre: los fines naturales y un *fin último* de la naturaleza, esto es, un ser natural para el cual existen todos los demás o en relación con el cual todos los demás son medios.

¿Es el *hombre* el fin último de la naturaleza? Pues el hombre, por su entendimiento, es el único ser en la tierra capaz de “hacerse un concepto de fines y, mediante su razón, un sistema de fines de un agregado de cosas formadas en modo final”.<sup>81</sup> Pero si nos atenemos a una concepción meramente mecanicista de la naturaleza, la respuesta también podría ser que el hombre es un mero medio para el mantenimiento del “equilibrio”<sup>82</sup> de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, este segundo argumento supone aceptar que los seres organizados no tienen más origen que el mecanismo de la naturaleza; en cambio, una de las grandes posiciones de

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<sup>77</sup> KU, AA 05: 426.

<sup>78</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 195-196.

<sup>79</sup> KU, AA 05: 426.

<sup>80</sup> Cf. KU, AA 05: 485.

<sup>81</sup> KU, AA 05: 427.

<sup>82</sup> KU, AA 05: 427.

la *Crítica del Juicio* es que mecanismo y teleología son compatibles como principios del Juicio reflexionante<sup>83</sup>.

Por tanto, desde una visión de la naturaleza no limitada al mecanismo natural:

«[...] tenemos motivo suficiente, según principios de la razón, para juzgar al hombre, no sólo, igual que los seres organizados todos, como fin natural (*Naturzweck*), sino también aquí, en la tierra, como el *último fin* (*letzten Zweck*) de la naturaleza, en relación con el cual todas las demás cosas naturales constituyen un sistema de fines, y ese juicio, no, desde luego, para el Juicio determinante, pero sí para el reflexionante».<sup>84</sup>

Ahora bien, conceptualizar al hombre como el fin último de la naturaleza representa un cambio (respecto a las *Críticas* anteriores) en la visión kantiana sobre el modo de *estar el hombre en el mundo*.

Como veremos más abajo, la noción del hombre como fin último de la naturaleza conlleva la idea de que puede ser *libre* en el entorno natural.

Kant sitúa la dimensión por la que el hombre puede ser el fin último de la naturaleza en “la aptitud y en la habilidad para toda clase de fines, para los cuales pueda la naturaleza (interior y exteriormente) ser utilizada por el hombre”.<sup>85</sup> A mi modo de ver, la expresión *utilizar*, debe entenderse en el sentido de *conformar* la naturaleza a sus fines. Por eso, esa dimensión por la que el hombre puede ser enjuiciado como el fin último de la naturaleza se concreta en la *cultura*, como “producción” de su aptitud para fines, en general.<sup>86</sup>

Esto quiere decir que el hombre, en tanto que ser en el mundo, deja de ser visto como fenómeno necesariamente determinado por otros fenómenos, para ser considerado como causa *determinante* en la naturaleza, una afirmación que, por cierto, concuerda con la conocida distinción, en el *Prólogo* de la *Antropología*, entre “lo que la *naturaleza* hace del hombre” y “lo que *él mismo*, como ser que obra libremente, hace o puede y debe hacer, de sí mismo”.<sup>87</sup>

Pero, con ello, parece que hemos llegado, desde la naturaleza, al ámbito que Habermas señala como el ámbito de la libertad, entendida ésta como la vinculación de la voluntad a motivos racionales; dicho ámbito es para Habermas, como veíamos, el de lo sociocultural.

Sin embargo, en el caso de Kant, la relación entre la cultura y la libertad / moralidad exige algunas precisiones. Retomaremos esta cuestión en el último apartado, después de plantear un aspecto que podría dar pie a una interpretación en el sentido de un naturalismo.

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<sup>83</sup> Kant establece esta posición en la solución a la “Antinomia del Juicio teleológico” (Cf. KU, AA 05: 387-388).

<sup>84</sup> KU, AA 05: 429.

<sup>85</sup> KU, AA 05: 430.

<sup>86</sup> KU, AA 05: 431.

<sup>87</sup> Anth, AA 07: 119.

[5] Dado que en su discurso sobre el hombre como fin último, Kant sitúa al hombre, con su capacidad racional, entre otros seres *organizados* en la naturaleza, es decir, como perteneciente a una de las especies animales, ¿podría deducirse, a partir de ello, que su voluntad *libre* es una cualidad que le pertenece en tanto que ser natural *organizado*? Por otro lado, Kant remite la libertad, como pusimos de relieve más arriba, a la causalidad de la razón. En este sentido, cabe traer aquí un problema al que aludimos más atrás pero que dejamos para este momento.

Decíamos que la analogía de la técnica, si bien constituye el único modo como nosotros podemos hacernos comprensible la posibilidad de la forma interna de los seres organizados de la naturaleza, en cambio, dicha analogía no es adecuada para dar cuenta de un fenómeno característico de los mismos, que es su capacidad productiva y autoorganizativa.<sup>88</sup> En la analogía de la técnica situamos el fundamento de la organización interna en una causa racional exterior. Pero en un fin *natural*, en la medida en que es un producto natural y no un producto del arte, la organización debe ser producida por las partes, por la materia. De manera que habría que atribuir a la materia organizada una capacidad organizativa intrínseca.

A mi modo de ver, la posición de Kant en este punto podría sintetizarse aludiendo a dos pasos de la “Crítica del Juicio teleológico”, pertenecientes a la “Metodología del Juicio teleológico”.

Por un lado, en el párrafo 80, Kant expresa su simpatía por el intento de los arqueólogos de la naturaleza, de indagar las causas mecánicas que podrían conducir a un sistema de las naturalezas organizadas.<sup>89</sup> Sin embargo, Kant se opone a conceder que la materia organizada pueda proceder de la materia bruta, a partir de leyes meramente mecánicas. La tesis de Kant es que el arqueólogo de la naturaleza tiene que “atribuir a esa madre universal una organización, puesta, en modo final, en todas esas criaturas”.<sup>90</sup> Y, según Kant, esta organización originaria no podemos pensarla más que como procedente de un “entendimiento arquitectónico”.<sup>91</sup>

Pero, por otro lado, en el párrafo 81, dentro de las teorías *teleológicas* (ocasionalismo y pre-estabilismo, en la que distingue entre la teoría de la preformación individual y la teoría de la preformación genérica), Kant se inclina hacia aquella que concede un mayor protagonismo a la naturaleza: el sistema de la epigénesis o sistema de la

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<sup>88</sup> Vid sobre ello los párrafos 64 y 65 de la “Analítica del Juicio teleológico”.

<sup>89</sup> “Esa analogía de las formas, en cuanto, a pesar de toda la diversidad, parecen ser producidas por un prototipo común, fortalece la sospecha de una verdadera afinidad en la producción de una madre común primitiva, por medio de la aproximación gradual de una especie animal a otra, desde aquella en que *el principio de los fines parece más guardado, a saber, en el hombre* hasta el pólipo, y de éste, incluso, hasta los musgos y los líquenes, y, finalmente, hasta la escala inferior que podemos observar de la naturaleza, la materia bruta, de la cual y de cuyas fuerzas, según leyes mecánicas (iguales que las que siguen la producción de los cristales), parece provenir toda la técnica de la naturaleza, que en los seres organizados nos es tan incomprensible que nos creemos obligados a pensar para ellos otro principio” (KU, AA 05: 418-419). La cursiva es nuestra.

<sup>90</sup> KU, AA 05: 419.

<sup>91</sup> KU, AA 05: 420.

preformación genérica de Blumenbach. Según el pre-estabilismo, “la causa suprema del mundo” “habría puesto en los productos primeros [...] los gérmenes (*Anlage*) sólo mediante los cuales un ser orgánico produce su semejante”.<sup>92</sup> Pero, a diferencia del sistema de la preformación individual, el sistema de la epigénesis sostiene que esas predisposiciones o gérmenes habrían sido puestos no en los individuos, sino en la especie. De este modo, el sistema de la preformación genérica “considera a la naturaleza como productora de suyo y no sólo como capaz de desarrollo, y así confía a la naturaleza, con el gasto más pequeño posible de sobrenatural, todo lo que sigue desde el primer comienzo”.<sup>93</sup>

Esto quiere decir que todo intento de interpretación naturalista de la facultad racional en Kant<sup>94</sup> ha de tener en cuenta que cuando habla de predisposiciones o gérmenes lo hace a partir de la aceptación de una organización teleológica originaria, la cual remite a un entendimiento como causa de la naturaleza.

La posición de Kant en la *Crítica del Juicio* no es ni la de la “autocracia de la materia”<sup>95</sup> ni la de una eliminación de la naturaleza, sino la de una compatibilidad de mecanismo y teleología, tal como se pone de relieve en la solución de la antinomia del Juicio teleológico. Mecanismo y teleología son contradictorios y se excluyen mutuamente si se adoptan como principios constitutivos del Juicio determinante; pero la contradicción desaparece si se adoptan como máximas del Juicio reflexionante.<sup>96</sup> Dicha compatibilidad tiene su fundamento en el hecho de que la contingencia de las formas organizadas según el nexo causal mecánico y la necesidad de enjuiciarlas como fines es algo que hay que imputar a la peculiar constitución de la facultad humana de conocer y “no a la posibilidad de las cosas mismas”<sup>97</sup>; pero como nuestro conocimiento se refiere sólo a las cosas como fenómenos, es posible pensar que mecanismo y finalidad se hallen en unidad en un “*intellectus archetypus*”, como sustrato suprasensible de la naturaleza, que podemos poner frente a nuestro “*intellectus ectypus*”.<sup>98</sup>

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<sup>92</sup>KU, AA 05: 422.

<sup>93</sup> “[...] (pero sin determinar nada sobre este primer comienzo, en el cual la física, en general, naufraga, por más que intente explicarlo con la encadenación de causas que quiera)” (KU, AA 05: 424).

<sup>94</sup>Entre los elementos que han dado pie a interpretaciones del idealismo trascendental kantiano en el sentido de un naturalismo, cabe destacar, precisamente, los siguientes: la presencia de la noción de disposiciones o gérmenes (*Anlage*) (KU, AA 05: 422); “disposiciones naturales en la especie humana” (KU, AA 05: 432); “disposiciones originarias” (*ursprünglichen Anlagen*), “disposiciones naturales” (*Naturanlagen*) (IaG, AA 08, 17-18); la simpatía que manifiesta Kant por las investigaciones de los arqueólogos de la naturaleza sobre un “prototipo común” (KU AA 05: 418-419), su adhesión a la teoría epigenética de Blumenbach (cf. KU, AA 05: 424); y también la idea de una “epigénesis de la razón” (KrV, B 167). Una interpretación proclive a una interpretación naturalista, e incluso darwinista, se puede ver en Moya 2011, pp. 220-224. Para algunas objeciones a esta línea interpretativa y una lectura no naturalista de la idea kantiana de epigénesis de la razón, *vid.* García Norro 2011, 180, 183-184. Un proyecto de armonizar a Kant con Lorenz puede verse en Teruel 2015, pp. 23-29.

<sup>95</sup> KU, AA 05: 421.

<sup>96</sup> Cf. KU, AA 005: 385-389.

<sup>97</sup> KU, AA 005: 408.

<sup>98</sup> KU, AA 005: 408. “[...] el principio del mecanismo de la naturaleza y el de la causalidad de la misma según fines, en uno y el mismo producto natural, deben reunirse ambos en la dependencia de un principio superior, y brotar juntamente de él, porque si no, en la consideración de la naturaleza, no podrían coexistir uno junto al otro” (KU, AA 05: 412). En la *Crítica del Juicio* la relación del mecanismo con la teleología es de *subordinación* del primero a la segunda (Cf. KU, AA 05: 414-415).

A partir de estas premisas, es decir, a partir de la oposición de Kant a la autosuficiencia de la materia y, por tanto, la necesidad de admitir una organización teleológica originaria (puesta en la especie), por un lado, y a partir de su tesis de la compatibilidad de mecanismo y teleología, por el otro, quizás no haya problema en aceptar que la razón como causa es algo que pertenece al hombre, en tanto que un ser *natural organizado*. De hecho, Kant mismo lo afirma en la “Doctrina de la virtud” de la *Metafísica de las costumbres*:

«En la conciencia de un deber hacia sí mismo el hombre se considera, como sujeto de tal deber, en una doble calidad: primero como *ser sensible*, es decir, como hombre (como perteneciente a una de las especies animales); pero luego también como *ser racional* (*Vernunftwesen*) (no simplemente como un ser dotado de razón (*vernünftiges Wesen*), porque la razón en su facultad teórica bien podría ser también la cualidad de un ser corporal viviente), al que ningún sentido alcanza, y que sólo se puede reconocer en las relaciones práctico-morales, en las que se hace patente la propiedad inconcebible de la *libertad* por el influjo de la razón sobre la voluntad internamente legisladora».<sup>99</sup>

Ahora bien, lo que estaría en un nivel diferente a su condición de ser natural organizado (“ser corporal viviente”), tal como evidencia también ese texto, con la distinción entre *Vernunftwesen* y *vernünftiges Wesen*<sup>100</sup>, es la libertad de su voluntad o dimensión de la moralidad. Veamos qué aporta en este sentido el discurso kantiano del hombre como fin último de la naturaleza.

Decíamos al final del punto [4] que Kant sitúa la dimensión por la que el hombre puede ser el fin último de la naturaleza en su aptitud para conformar la naturaleza a sus fines y en la producción de dicha aptitud, esto es, en la cultura. Pero nos preguntábamos si con ello (que vendría a corresponderse con el concepto habermasiano de la libertad como motivación racional de la acción) estamos ya en el ámbito de la libertad.

Pues bien, la respuesta es: sí, pero con condiciones. Veámoslo.

Según el discurso de la tercera *Crítica* sobre el fin último, el hombre no es fin último de la naturaleza meramente por su capacidad de proponerse fines y someter a ellos a la naturaleza, sino que Kant introduce, como *condición* para ser el fin último, la voluntad de ser fin final:

«Como único ser en la tierra que tiene entendimiento (*Verstand*), y, por tanto, facultad de proponerse arbitrariamente fines, es él, ciertamente, señor, en título, de la naturaleza, y si se considera ésta como un sistema teleológico, el hombre es, según su determinación, el último fin de la naturaleza (*letzte Zweck der Natur*), pero siempre sólo con la condición de que lo comprenda y tenga la voluntad de dar a ella y a sí mismo una relación de fin tal que pueda, independientemente de la naturaleza, bastarse a sí mismo, y ser, por tanto, fin final (*Endzweck*); éste, empero, no debe ser, de ningún modo, buscado en la naturaleza».<sup>101</sup>

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<sup>99</sup> MS, AA 06: 418.

<sup>100</sup> Sobre esta distinción *vid.* Lebrun 2008, p. 487.

<sup>101</sup> KU, AA 05: 431.

Fin último significa el concepto de un ser respecto al cual todos los demás seres pueden ser considerados como medios. Y fin final significa en este contexto de las relaciones externas entre los seres organizados de la naturaleza el concepto de un ser que tiene en él mismo y no en otros seres naturales el fin de su existencia.<sup>102</sup> Pero se nos dice (justamente en el texto recién citado) que el fin final “no debe ser, de ningún modo, buscado en la naturaleza”.<sup>103</sup>

De acuerdo con el párrafo 84, fin final es el hombre, pero en cuanto “sujeto de moralidad” y, por tanto, “como noumeno”<sup>104</sup>. Por tanto, en la *Crítica del Juicio* persiste la *dualidad* entre la naturaleza y la libertad como lo práctico-moral.

Ahora bien, que persista la dualidad no significa que no sea posible la *armonía* entre la condición natural del hombre y su dimensión práctico-moral. Destacar dicha armonía constituye, a mi juicio, el objetivo central de la doctrina kantiana sobre el hombre como fin último de la naturaleza; y se pone de relieve en dos aspectos.

Por un lado, porque el hombre tiene una constitución natural, su aptitud para proponerse fines y conformar la naturaleza a ellos, que concuerda con la posibilidad de ser fin final. En este sentido, la naturaleza *ha preparado* al hombre para poder ser fin final.<sup>105</sup>

Por otro lado, porque dicha armonía constituye el sentido de la cultura. En la medida en que consista en la armonía de la naturaleza con la moralidad, la cultura es el aspecto por el que el hombre puede ser el fin último de la naturaleza.<sup>106</sup> Precisamente por eso introduce Kant, en el concepto del hombre como fin último de la naturaleza, la condición de ser fin final: el hombre podrá ser el fin último de la naturaleza en la medida en que la conforme a sus fines; pero no a cualquier clase de fines, que podrían hacer de él un medio más, sino a sus fines *morales*, los únicos respecto a los cuales no depende de la naturaleza.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>102</sup>Cf. KU, AA 05: 426.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. también KU, AA 05: 426, 431. “Fin final es el fin que no necesita ningún otro como condición de su posibilidad” (KU, AA 05: 434. El fin final “es incondicionado” (KU, AA 05: 435).

<sup>104</sup>Cf. KU, AA 05: 435. En este párrafo 84, en el que se enfoca la representación teleológica de la naturaleza en el aspecto de la relación de la naturaleza sensible con un entendimiento suprasensible como causa intencional del mundo, se llega a la conclusión de que el *fin final de la existencia del mundo* es el hombre (aunque sólo en tanto que *sujeto de la moralidad*, pues ésta es lo único *incondicionado*). Fin final significa aquí el fundamento de determinación de la causa inteligente del mundo. Dicho fin final, como decimos, es el hombre en cuanto ser moral. Pero, además, de acuerdo con este párrafo 84, esta dimensión moral, aunque nouménica, aparece como encajada en la causalidad teleológica natural del hombre. Cabe añadir que, según el modo de razonar de este párrafo, el fin final existe en el mundo como efecto (Cf. KU, AA 05: 434-436); por tanto, el hombre es ser natural y, al mismo tiempo, fin final.

<sup>105</sup>“[...] para encontrar en dónde en el hombre al menos, hemos de poner aquel último fin de la naturaleza, debemos buscar lo que la naturaleza puede llevar a cabo para *preparar al hombre* a lo que él mismo ha de hacer para ser fin final y separarlo de todos los fines, cuya posibilidad descansa en cosas que no se pueden esperar más que de la naturaleza” (KU, AA 05: 431). La cursiva es nuestra.

<sup>106</sup>“[...] sólo la cultura puede ser el último fin que hay motivo para atribuir a la naturaleza, en consideración de la especie humana (no la propia felicidad en la tierra, ni tampoco ser sólo el principal instrumento para establecer fuera del hombre, en la naturaleza irracional, orden y armonía” (KU, AA 05: 431).

<sup>107</sup> De ahí que Kant no sitúe la dimensión por la que el hombre puede ser el fin último de la naturaleza en la felicidad. Pues para la consecución de ésta, incluso aunque no sea entendida como mera satisfacción de la

Así pues, de acuerdo con el discurso sobre el hombre como fin último, en Kant la cultura no se identifica sin más con la libertad. La *cultura*, como producción de la aptitud del hombre para proponerse fines y conformar la naturaleza a ellos, pertenece a la dimensión *natural* del hombre. En cambio, la libertad, como lo práctico-moral, tiene su origen en el nivel de los fundamentos incondicionados de determinación de la voluntad, es decir, en la ley moral.

En la perspectiva kantiana, la libertad no procede de la confrontación del hombre con el medio. De lo contrario, estaríamos ante un monismo naturalista respecto a la libertad. Eso sí, la libertad está llamada a *realizarse en el medio*. Y en el párrafo 83 de la *Crítica del Juicio* Kant señala como medio el de “las relaciones de los hombres unos con otros”<sup>108</sup>. La cultura puede y debe ser *realización* de la *libertad*, tal como se pone de relieve en el pensamiento histórico y jurídico-político de Kant.<sup>109</sup>

Para Habermas, tener una imagen coherente del mundo significa poder justificar la libertad desde el hombre como ser natural. Para ello se inspira, como corresponde a un naturalismo, en una determinada teoría científica; en este caso, la teoría de la evolución. Para Kant, en cambio, tener una imagen coherente del mundo significa sólo que el hombre, en tanto que ser natural situado entre otros seres naturales, posea las condiciones de posibilidad necesarias para ser libre en el mundo. En este sentido, su capacidad de obrar según fines o causalidad teleológica natural se integra *armónicamente* con la posibilidad de *realizar* la libertad en la naturaleza, conformando ésta a sus fines *libres*, que es para Kant el verdadero sentido de la cultura.<sup>110</sup>

Por eso, frente a un enfoque naturalista, la posición kantiana en el debate contemporáneo sobre el determinismo y la libertad, con la exigencia de una imagen coherente del mundo, que incluya al hombre como ser natural, puede ser caracterizada como una *armonía en la dualidad*.

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animalidad, el hombre depende en buena medida de la naturaleza. En lo que concierne al fin natural de la felicidad, el hombre es “siempre sólo un anillo en la cadena de los fines naturales” (KU, AA 05: 430).

<sup>108</sup> KU, AA 05: 432.

<sup>109</sup> Cf., por ejemplo, IaG, aa 08: 17, 21. Sobre la armonía de la política con la moral en Kant, *vid.*, Andaluz 1998.

<sup>110</sup> Estoy de acuerdo con Lebrun cuando subraya la diferencia de origen entre cultura y moralidad: Kant “instituye la diferencia esencial entre fin último (*letzter Zweck*) y fin supremo (*Edzweck*) para subrayar mejor esta diferencia de origen” (Lebrun 2008, pp. 486-487). Pero no comparto el juicio de que en la tercera *Crítica* no haya reconciliación (Cf. *ibid.*, p. 486). La cultura no lleva necesariamente a la moralidad; pero, de acuerdo con Delbos, prepara al hombre para el ejercicio del gobierno de la razón; si bien la cultura no constituye el fin supremo, ella le proporciona, al menos en el orden del mundo sensible, una imagen de lo que es este fin, y le invita por ello a tender a él (Cf. Delbos 1969, p. 467). Conciliación no significa, a mi juicio, un origen común; en tal caso, estaríamos en un monismo; conciliación significa más bien una predisposición y orientación de la constitución natural del hombre hacia la moralidad y, con ello, la posibilidad de llevar a la naturaleza su armonía con la moralidad.



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**Concepts of “Aesthetics of Arts” in Slovak Aesthetics of the 19<sup>th</sup>  
Century and Kant’s Conception of “Harmonization”**

*Conceptos de la “estética artística” en la estética eslovaca del siglo  
XIX y la concepción kantiana de la “armonización”*

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**Abstract**

The paper analyses three concepts of aesthetics of arts in Slovak aesthetics in the first third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century based on the ideas of three Slovak authors (Michal Greguš, Andrej Vandrák and Karol Kuzmány) who all shared creative reading of Kant and transformation of the process of “harmonization” as a foundation of defining possible aesthetic potentiality of art.

**Key words**

Kant; Aesthetics; Harmonization; Michal Greguš; Andrej Vandrák; Karol Kuzmány

**Resumen**

Este artículo analiza tres conceptos de la estética artística en la estética eslovaca del primer tercio del siglo XIX, a partir del pensamiento de tres autores eslovacos (Michal Greguš, Andrej Vandrák and Karol Kuzmány), que comparten una lectura creativa de Kant y la transformación del proceso de “armonización” como fundación para definir la potencialidad estética del arte.

**Palabras clave**

Kant; estética; armonización; Michal Greguš; Andrej Vandrák; Karol Kuzmány

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The tradition of aesthetic thinking in Slovakia has not been long. In theory, it has been developing from about the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Its specific feature is that from its outset it has been linked with the European theoretical thinking and that it has responded to the state of the art in the world as well as in Slovakia. In the first third of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, three forms of designing the aesthetics accommodated in Prešov, incurred by the different reading of I. Kant and his followers (F. Bouterweck, W. Krug, and F. Fries). They were M. Greguš in his work *Compendium Aestheticae*<sup>1</sup> (1826, the first guide to aesthetics in Slovakia written in Latin) and A. Vandrák in the work *Elements of Philosophical Ethics*<sup>2</sup> (1842) and Karol Kuzmány in his work *On Beauty*<sup>3</sup>. Both of them differently perceived the possibilities of aesthetics to give an account on art and perceived differently even the sense of art itself.

M. Greguš accepts Kant's understanding of the aesthetics as "a transcendental science of all a-priori principles of sensuality [...] and [...] propedeutics of each philosophy"<sup>4</sup> as an inter-world between the theoretical and the practical, that is, between knowledge and acting. M. Greguš explains aesthetics as science, whereas, unlike Kant, he

<sup>1</sup> Greguš, M. (1793-1838), after studying at the Bratislava Lutheran Lyceum, he completed his university education at the universities of Göttingen and Tübingen. He also visited the famous educational centres in Jena, Halle, Leipzig, Berlin, and Dresden. From the year 1817, he took over the post of Professor at the Prešov Lutheran College after Ž. Carlowszky. He lectured in philosophy, history, mathematics, physics, philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. In the years 1831-32 he was the Director of the Prešov Lutheran College. From 1832 he served on the Lutheran Lyceum in Bratislava, lecturing on philosophy, history, and aesthetics. At the time of his establishment in Bratislava in the same Lyceum, there studied prominent Slovak thinkers such as L. Štúr and J. M. Hurban, who considered him "the most philosophical head among their professors", praising his philosophical and aesthetic competence, his freedom of thought, and tolerance as a representative of the Hungarian nationality. He wrote in Latin (*Logic* 1833, *Metaphysics* 1834, *Practical Philosophy* 1835) and in Hungarian (*Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 1835, *Philosophy of History* 1836). All of his works remained in manuscript. The only released work is the book written in Latin in Prešov, *Compendium Aestheticae* in the year 1817 and published in the year 1826. (Cf.: Červenka, J.: *Prešovské evanjelické kolégium v dejinách filozofie*. In: Zborník prác profesorov evanjelického kolegiálneho gymnázia v Prešove. Prešov 1940, pp. 125-126)

<sup>2</sup> Vandrák, A. (1807-1884), graduated from the Prešov Lutheran College, continued in Jena and also visited other university centres in Germany. After returning to Prešov, he worked at the Lutheran College and together with Greguš they created a liberal, free-thinking spirit there. After Greguš had left for Bratislava, he assumed his post of Professor, later became the Rector of the College of Prešov, where he remained for the rest of his life despite various other offers. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences appointed him a member-correspondent for his scientific merit in the year 1847, in the year 1858 he was granted honorary doctorate from the University of Jena, he was honoured for lifetime achievement in the year 1882 by having been awarded the Small Cross of the Order of Francis Joseph I. He published a wide variety of works in the Hungarian language: *Enchiridion Antropologiae Psychicae; Philosophiae elementae ethicae; Tiszta Logika, Lélektan, Bölcséleti Jogtan*. (Cf.: Kónya, P.: *Andrej Vandrák*. In: *Antológia z diel profesorov prešovského evanjelického kolégia*. Eds. R. Dupkala-P. Kónya, pp. 168-169)

<sup>3</sup> Kuzmány, K. (1806-1866): *On Beauty*, 1836: In: *Estetika*. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. XLVII (New Series: III), 2010, Issue 2, pp. 226-237; See: Sošková, J.: *Karol Kuzmány's Philosophy of Art*. In: *Estetika*. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. XLVII (New Series: III), 2010, Issue 2, pp. 215-225)

<sup>4</sup> Greguš, M.: *Compendium Aestheticae*. In: *Studia Aesthetica I. Kapitoly k dejinám estetiky na Slovensku*. FF PU Prešov 1998, pp.155-157

perceives aesthetics (*Schönheitslehre*) not only as a “critique”, but as a systematic knowledge, “which is united by an idea and basic elements.”<sup>5</sup>

Criticism could not be based on a single source, according to Greguš; therefore it could not be science. In his opinion, what counts in science is systematic knowledge, which is based on a unifying basis. According to Greguš, the unifying idea in aesthetics is *the idea of beauty*. While Kant prefers aesthetics as *Geschmackskritik* or *Geschmackslehre*, Greguš talks about the *Schönheitslehre*. And since, in accordance with Greguš, we understand philosophy as a science of the basic laws of human spirit, then aesthetics (*Schönheitslehre*) is part of philosophy or philosophical science. Greguš distinguishes between *general aesthetics* and *special aesthetics*. It is that very specification and the naming of *special aesthetics* that can be regarded as an interesting shift and the contribution of M. Greguš. While the *general aesthetics* is actually a philosophy of aesthetics (according to Greguš, it talks about what the unifying idea of aesthetics is, it explains the nature of absolute beauty and relative beauty, all of the forms of both of the beauties, the principles of aesthetic perception, assessment, acceptance of both absolute and relative beauty), *special aesthetics* is in fact the aesthetics of individual types of art. Special aesthetics explains manifestations of aesthetic regularities in specific art genres. In our view, Greguš’ approach is an interesting attempt to investigate the arts from the aesthetic viewpoint. In the second and third parts of his *Compendium*, Greguš showed under what conditions it is possible to make the aesthetic analysis of individual works of art; he distinguished the aesthetic analysis of art from the history and theory of art and from art criticism. He didn’t perceive aesthetics as “*Kritik*”, but as “*Lehre*”, i.e. the doctrine leading to objective knowledge. Such knowledge is also possible in relation to art. In addition to the usual terms of aesthetics (beautiful, ugly, sublime, tragic, comic, aesthetic idea), Greguš also explains the general concept of “*aesthetic*” which would include all the possible forms of “*aesthetic*”. Applying the lessons learned from I. Kant, he departs from the assumption that “*the aesthetic*” is based either on a free play (imagery, imagination, thinking and feeling), or on the feeling of harmonisation, or on the feeling of heading towards infinity and perfection. These three characteristics of the peculiarity of the “*aesthetic*” are also an explanation of a kind of “*involvement*” of the aesthetic, which Greguš explains. As it is commonly known, I. Kant explained the characteristics of the “*aesthetic*” in his *Critique of Judgement* as a question of “non-involvement of aesthetic judgements”, while Kant explained “non-involvement” as non-involvement in the realistic existence of objects and their practical usefulness, because, according to Kant, what assesses the aesthetic judgement is not an object in itself, but the idea about the object. The idea of the object encourages further imagination, feelings, but is also engages the mind. The ideas and feelings thus released are seen as likeable or unlikeable, not the object itself, whose existence is unimportant in the assessment of its perception. By thinking over Kant’s explanation of the emergence of aesthetic judgements, their nature, validity, and orientation, Greguš named what actually the “*aesthetic involvement*” is. Briefly and

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<sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 158

simply, *aesthetic involvement* is an endeavour of man to remain in the aesthetic condition and in the condition of assessing the freed needs, thinking, and feeling. Greguš reasons that such an assessment is also possible in relation to artistic works, because not only nature, but also works of art are capable of releasing ideas and feelings, therefore the way of exerting their effect on man can be aesthetically assessed.

According to Greguš, what is specific for the “*aesthetic*” are three symptoms justified in Kant’s *Critique of Judgement: the feeling of harmonisation, the feeling of heading toward the infinity and perfection, and the feeling of free play of fantasy, thinking, and feeling*. If we identify three of these symptoms in the perception and evaluation of works of art, then the aesthetic analysis of art becomes possible. In Greguš’ *Guide to Aesthetics* we find parts which are directly devoted to and named by the term *Aesthetics of Art*. Greguš differentiates the three aesthetic principles from moral, practical, psychological, art-scholarly and art-critical assessment of the art. *Aesthetic* exploration of the art should, according to Greguš, explain not only the division of fine arts, clarification of the concept and the essence of art (which, in essence, is made by the history and theory of art and art criticism), but, in particular, to explore, to show, and to explain *aesthetic perfection* as such. The aesthetics of art, by Greguš, is to explore how we achieve aesthetic perfection in specific kinds of art, how it is possible to achieve aesthetic perfection in the method of artistic creation. In his *Special Aesthetics*, Greguš defines the aesthetic principles, for which he considers the following: *the principle of harmonisation, the principle of idealness and transcendence, and the principle of compliance*. In order to clarify how the co-operation of the aesthetic principles, the content, and the artistic expression works, Greguš uses the concept of *sign (Zeichen)*. The principle of *compliance* and the one of *sign* are those factors which, according to Greguš, allow one to “aesthetically” explore the art. The explanation of the ideational content of art, its moral implications, or social functions is not principal in it, but how in the particular artistic work (its type and genre) all of these aesthetic principles are carried out. He considers the principle of *compliance* and the principle of *sign* the most important. The principle of *compliance* relates, according to Greguš, to an integral human nature, which, according to him, lies in the basis of the feeling of the beautiful. Greguš says:

«The feeling of the beautiful comes from the indivisible human nature, thus it manifests the idea of **compliance**; it is, however, not less focused on the idea of perfection and is related to the feelings of truth, goodness, and divinity. Therefore, the objects in which we effortlessly find compliance or harmony, and which, as completed, give impetus to the realization of infinity, operate on a spirit in such a way as to lead the state of his nature to the absolute and forward-oriented, thus they invoke a feeling of pleasure» (§11 *Compendium Aestheticae*).<sup>6</sup>

The term of **compliance** is therefore related to the integral human nature, with recognition of harmony in perceived objects, but also to the state of spiritual forces, which is called for

<sup>6</sup> Ibid., p. 161

by the perception of objects. **Compliance** relates to the ability of the integral human nature to get into a state of “*concentration*” on knowing perfection, the infinity, forward-looking, into overlapping the borders of man... The principle of compliance, according to Greguš, manifests itself as an *aesthetic principle in creating the idea of the beautiful* in the consciousness of the perceiving subject. Perception depends on the sensory abilities of man, but Greguš speaks of the outer and the inner senses, by which we perceive beauty, and which have to be in compliance. Therefore, it’s not just about watching, looking at, physical listening to, and the mechanical response to the same in perception. It is not only about the perception of the form by external senses.

As one of the few readers, interpreters, and followers of Kant, Greguš does not derive “formalism” from Kant’s aesthetics as the main principle of aesthetics, nor external sensuousness as the main principle of aesthetics. Greguš recognizes the difference between internal and external senses, but also their possible unification. In the external senses, he sees the focus of man on external objects. By perceiving the external senses we recognize the quality of objects. Mental states, released by perception through the external senses, are considered *internal senses* by Greguš. He also applies this division in relation to the concept of *Stoff (substance)* and *Inhalt*, i.e. the *content*. The concept of form (in the interpretation of Greguš this is the German notion of Gestalt, not Form!) is referred to by Greguš to the mode of perception, i.e. to the manner in which it is perceived as a whole and the unity. He includes the notion of “*expression*” (*Ausdruck*) within the outer sense, and he includes the notion of “*sign*” (*Zeichen*) within the form of the internal sense. We need to achieve “*aesthetic compliance*” in perceiving, according to Greguš. In §14 he explains that aesthetic compliance should be distinguished from logical compliance. He understands aesthetic compliance<sup>7</sup> as compliance in diversity, and this is manifested in three components: (a) compliance of the signs of the object, i.e. the harmony of its internal form; (b) compliance of the object with the status of our spirit – its forces are brought into harmonious activity – it is a harmony of the external form, i.e. that of relationship; (c) compliance of ideas and feelings during perception – this belongs in the *content (Inhalt)* or *expression (Ausdruck)*. It’s actually the unity of expression. Greguš adds one more note on the interpretation, which explains the whole process of the aesthetic operation of the art. He says: *because a particular expression (signing) is connected with certain shapes (as signs), experience is necessary, which teaches that mental states are linked to certain statements*. Greguš further makes a distinction between *absolute aesthetic perfection (the idea of absolute beauty)* and *the relative aesthetic perfection (relative beauty)*. The ideals of absolute beauty may not be found, in his opinion, in the nature or in the arts, but only in the mind. In the artist’s mind, these ideals form a kind of a *protomodel (Urbild)*, which the artist then reflects in a specific work of art.<sup>8</sup> The art by Greguš embodies the aesthetic principles in different ways and by different means.

Greguš reacts, among other things, on § 8 and § 9 of Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* in which Kant explains how and why the harmonization of the states of mind is possible and

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<sup>7</sup> Ibid., p. 163

<sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 165

what its consequences for the feeling of pleasure and aesthetical judgement are. I would claim that Greguš grasped the implications of Kant's reasoning very well. Going back to Kant's *Critique of Judgement* and the abovementioned paragraphs, Kant deals there with the "universability of pleasure" and its subjectivity, and investigates the question whether the feeling of pleasure precedes the judgement of taste or is its consequence. In § 8 he explains that the judgement of taste, by which we describe anything *as beautiful*, has a claim to the universal validity and without this claim it would fail, nevertheless it is subjective. According to Kant, aesthetic judgements of objects rest upon concepts of the object and the validity of the reference of a representation is connected to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Universality of this type of judgement is then not logical, but aesthetic, i.e. it does not involve any objective quality of the judgement, but only one that is subjective – as Kant calls it – *universal validity*. This validity does not denote the validity of the reference of a representation to the cognitive faculties, but to the feeling of pleasure or displeasure for every subject. Judgements are, according to Kant, subjective, but with the **possibility** of universal agreement. In the following § 9, Kant more closely specifies what the key to the critique of taste is and emphasises that it is the universal communicability of the state of mind in the given representation, which as the subjective condition of the judgement of taste, must be the basis, with the pleasure in the object as its consequence. Kant emphasises that what is communicated is only the representation that pertains to cognition. This representation brings into a free play the cognitive powers, and hence, the state of the mind in this representation must be one of a feeling of the free play of the cognitive powers, and, it must be universally communicable. This state of mind is not based on cognition, however, it is involved in the free play of imagination and understanding. According to Kant, only this purely subjective (aesthetic) judging of the object, or of the representation through which it is given, is antecedent to the pleasure in it, and is the basis of this pleasure in the harmony of the cognitive faculties. Kant warns that the natural propensity of mankind to "sociability," which is given empirically or psychologically, is not sufficient for explaining the harmony of the cognitive faculties. How is it then possible that the man is conscious of mutual accord of the powers of cognition in a judgement of taste? In the next part of § 9 Kant points out the more lightened play of both mental powers (imagination and understanding) enlivened by their mutual accord and says that a representation which is singular and independent of comparison with other representations, and, being such, yet accords with the conditions of the universality that is the general concern of understanding, is one that brings the cognitive faculties into that "harmonic accord" which we require for all cognition and which we therefore deem valid for everyone. In this connection Kant uses the terms accord and concord. Greguš' understanding of Kant was mainly aimed at emphasising harmonization, concord, accord among cognitive faculties, consideration, conditions of universability and subjective judgements of the way of imagination and harmonization of the spirit and mind. It is exactly the realization of harmonization of cognitive powers that liberates the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, followed by the feeling of accord and



concord between the object being judged and our state of mind. Here is the source of all subjective validity of pleasure which is attributed to the representation of an object which we later call beautiful. What is beautiful is not the object itself, but our representations of the object. That is why Greguš talks about “accord”, “compliance” (of our representation of the object with a universally possible representation of the object), and that is why he talks about “harmonization” of all spiritual powers.

A. Vandrák offers another explanation of aesthetics. In his work *Elements of Philosophical Ethics* (1842) he includes aesthetics in the philosophy of objectives. Vandrák says:

«In respect of the objectives lurking in the concept of philosophy, the wise life is the philosophy: with regard to its mission and function, it is a guideline for this wise life; due to the way of its functioning, it is then philosophizing, i.e. rational examination of the being and its final objectives (Analysis); with regard to its results and content, it is by pure reason looked for and set up system of the main truths (principles and ideas), thus the science (Synthesis)».<sup>9</sup>

Vandrák emphasizes such an understanding of philosophy and the inner classification of its disciplines, which would not be made problematic by the dichotomy between the theoretical and the practical, knowledge and action. The traditional division of philosophy in theoretical and practical (what I. Kant observed as well) is made problematic by the psychological impact (the influence of F. Fries). Vandrák reasons that even the knowing reason is already acting, active; on the other hand, the acting cannot exist without the possibilities of knowledge.<sup>10</sup> Therefore, he divides philosophy in the philosophy of causes and the philosophy of objectives.

The philosophy of causes deals with exploring causal connections, and the philosophy of objectives deals with purpose contexts. Beliefs play a role in both of these, values and goals of human life, the objectives (*Zwecke*) of the world. This knowledge exerts impact on our soul by giving orientation to our daily lives. The philosophy of objectives then, according to Vandrák, brings together theoretical and practical dimensions into a single meaningful whole. The philosophy of science is divided by Vandrák in two sciences: “the science of the actual value and objectives of deeds, the science of life wisdom, under the notion of ethics, a science of morality” and the “science revealing the objectives of life, the sacred origin of beings and their eternal order named dogmatics, aesthetics”. Both ethics and aesthetics are part of the philosophy of objectives, even though they have different subjects, „the truths of the two are united in the belief of man”.<sup>11</sup>

Vandrák’s structure of ethics also includes aesthetic themes, and his aesthetics contains ethical topics. In the science of morality, there are inherent aspects and knowledge of the science of the beauty, the dogmatics. Within the framework of ethics, special ethics

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<sup>9</sup> Vandrák, A.: *Prvky filozofickej etiky*. In: Antológia z diel profesorov Prešovského evanjelického kolégia. I. Filozofia. Eds. R. Dupkala, P. Kónya. Prešov 1999, ISBN 80-85668-89-0, p. 178

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 175

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., pp. 174-175

is delimited – the theory of State and law, politics, philosophy of law as the application of the general ethics on the external conditions of life, and doctrine of virtues, focused on the inner virtues of man, i.e. the sentiments, feelings, desires, aspirations, will, and virtues. In the doctrine of virtues, aesthetic themes are also contained. Vandrák says that what is required by wisdom is in part duty or moral, i.e. “it is necessary this way” and *partly the unforced spiritual beauty*. The aesthetic theme is subordinate to the ethical base, its meaning and results in the consequences. Without aesthetics (spiritual beauty), *the science of the dignity and beauty of the soul* would not be fulfilled; dogmatics is learning about the value of the real objectives of human life.<sup>12</sup> Aesthetics and dogmatics is part of ethics, according to Vandrák.

Vandrák did not understand the beauty either sensually or hedonistically. He perceived it as a selfless sentiment creating a humanistic dimension of man. Even his definition of beauty is in a similar vein: “We call beautiful what is pleasing in itself from the very self and for itself.”<sup>13</sup> Only selfless beauty, unrelated to selfish individual interests, may be liked. But it rises in the soul of man, is predominantly a mental beauty, which is dependent on the dignity and virtues of the soul. Vandrák wants to reconnect what Kant separated and distinguished (sensuousness, customs, and common sense). Spiritual beauty is characterized by the idea of honour, mental charm, mental health, mental emotion, and obedience to God. All of the above ultimately result in the moral and beautiful life. Intellectual, aesthetic and moral abilities are associated in the soul of man as the basis of moral action. The task of the virtue is, according to Vandrák, “to form life ... in such a way that it be beautiful, i.e. spiritually healthy.”<sup>14</sup> It is the selfless and from egoism delivered dimension of the aesthetic (beauty) that can cause that moral duty will not become a command by compulsion (which I. Kant favoured), but from the free inner willpower. According to him, the aesthetic fundamentals also embrace such moral values as love, friendship, “dignity of the human being, that is, his true honour”. It is right here where, according to Vandrák, not only the duty has to function (compulsion), but “the virtue of the intellectual beauty, the nature of the personality.”<sup>15</sup>

Vandrák follows and quotes Fries’ work *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung*<sup>16</sup> (Jena 1805), in which Fries explains that he wants to link being and thinking, that does not want to depart solely from one or the other, because being has the superiority, and anything thought is already being. Fries’ *Wissen* (knowledge) applies to matter, spirit, and belief (*Glauben*) that relates to the purpose, eternal good, intelligible world, eternity, human sojourn (*Dasein*) and freedom of will. By clarifying the concept of retribution (*Ahndung*) relating to the secrets of the teleology of nature and the possibility of its assessment under the laws of beauty and sublime, Fries offered to Vandrák the opportunity to overcome Kant’s understanding of the aesthetic world as the possible, the probable, and anchor it in

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., p. 176

<sup>13</sup> Ibid., p. 179

<sup>14</sup> Ibid.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid., p. 183

<sup>16</sup> Fries, J. F.: *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung*. Jena 1805.

piety (*Andacht*), which through subsequent enthusiasm allows one to imagine the secret of being as the path to divinity. Aesthetics becomes part of ethics as the philosophy of objectives. What is then at stake in the aesthetics is not merely simple assessment, sensuousness, but for the mental beauty as a virtue it's an overlap of the terrestrial to the extraterrestrial. Neither aesthetics nor art as creation that embodies the creative power of the spirit have any purpose in themselves, it is rather in practical humanity.

Different readings of Kant's critique by Greguš are also apparent in relation to the understanding of aesthetics and the meaning of art. Greguš tends more to the understanding of aesthetics as a descriptive science, which arrives at the knowledge of what is going on in the aesthetic assessment with the subject of assessment, and what the object of assessment is, i.e. art and the relaxed state of feeling and thinking of the person appreciating the art. Greguš names the object of aesthetics and the way this should be done. I have already pointed out that his contribution is conceptualizing the “*aesthetics of art*”. According to Greguš, the sense of art lies in the fact that it creates images, artworks, in which *Stoff*, *Inhalt*, *Gestalt*, and *Ausdruck* are manifested. On the basis of the above, the “*aesthetic compliance of the object and the state of the spirit*” manifests itself. Works of art are signs and notices of these aesthetic compliances. Therein lies the ethos of art by Greguš. Vandrák subsumes aesthetics under ethics and his exploration of art leads toward the definition of *the purposes of art* – it is a mental beauty as the quality of goodness and piety, it is a cultivating and moral consequence of the works of art, it is attaining the eternal through the final.<sup>17</sup> Vandrák pushes the understanding of the aesthetics (and of the art) towards pragmatic outlet of the moral-religious-aesthetic disposition of man, which is reflected both in assessment and in making of art. The meaning of art is identifiable through pragmatic and practical goals which the art has to perform.<sup>18</sup>

In Slovak Kantian tradition, K. Kuzmány<sup>19</sup> continues in Fries' and Fichte's modification of Kant's explanation of harmonization and its influence on a perception of art and a beingness of art.<sup>20</sup> He differs from Kant in his attempt to achieve a synthesis of cognition, aesthetic judgement, and moral action in the form of the unification of thinking, feeling and the will, and also a great acceptance of mystically conceived final sense of art. Art and beauty are, for him, the knowledge, moral action and judgement. In Kuzmány's conception, the unity of all faculties of man (feeling, thinking and will) does not have such a radically mystical outcome as the one we find in Fries.<sup>21</sup> Kuzmány is inspired by Fries in

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<sup>17</sup> Although both of these works were written in Prešov, their impact soared across Slovakia, since M. Greguš was a lecturer in aesthetics from 1832 until the end of his life and A. Vandrák's disciple's works, although having stayed in Prešov, were mainly known in the Lutheran milieu at colleges all over Slovakia, more precisely, the former “Upper Hungary”.

<sup>18</sup> In addition to the aesthetics following the line of I. Kant, the aesthetic thought in that time in Slovakia developed in the line of Hegel's and Schelling's ideas. Particularly attractive is Hegel's idea of the art, whose purpose is to elucidate sensually the idea of beauty, identical with the idea of goodness and truth, as well by Hegel defined limits of art.

<sup>19</sup> Kuzmány, K.: *On Beauty*. In: *Estetika*. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. 47 (2010), Issue 2.

<sup>20</sup> Sošková, J.: *Karol Kuzmány's Philosophy of Art*. In: *Estetika*. The Central European Journal of Aesthetics. 47 (2010), Issue 2.

<sup>21</sup> Jacob Friedrich Fries: *Wissen, Glaube und Ahndung*. Jena: Gopferdt, 1805. Also in idem: *Sämtliche Schriften*, vol. 3; pp. 413-755 (Aalen: Scientia, 1968)

that he considers feeling to be a cognitive faculty. But whereas Fries considers feeling to be the equal of intuitive awareness, Kuzmány sees it as something distinct and puts it into a hierarchy. There is, according to Kuzmány, only one essence, but it exists in three forms, as truth, beauty, and moral good. It is known, felt, desired, and ultimately intuited by the mind and internally observed as “stripped bare”, that is, beyond time and space. The connection between truth, beauty, and moral good is, according to Kuzmány, in the one essence, in the indivisibility of the human spirit, in three forms of idea, which is created by the unmediated consciousness of man’s mind and intuitive awareness. Kuzmány points out that: a) science investigates, and makes known the truthfulness of truth, beauty, and moral good; b) art represents, and makes one feel the beauty of truth and moral good; c) religion leads to consciousness of the moral good, truth, and beauty. Kuzmány’s feeling by the mind is an intuitive awareness, which, in seeing beauty, surmounts the limits of reason, and, in the form beauty, sees essence revealed, not veiled by time and space. Feeling by the mind is not a sensory phenomenon; it is the world of beauty rooted in art, which provides the first possibility of seeing the essence of the object in front of it. The second act of the workings of the spirit is observing that the aesthetic world is present, that we “catch ourselves” seeing the essence of the object by means of beauty, that is, we have an intuitive awareness. Only in that culmination, that is, by means of sublime, which is fully dependent on stripping away time and space, which veiled the essence of the object, we do have “naked” essence, that is, revealed, unveiled essence before our minds. We cannot understand this essence by reason, but we can feel it with our minds in intuitive awareness. This essence – felt by the mind in intuitive awareness – cannot even be explained by reason, nor can it be ascribed meaning that has been justified by reason.

Kuzmány’s philosophical and aesthetic position is consistently projected into his conception of art. This conception often makes his conception of aesthetics more precise and more comprehensible. According to him, “the aim of all arts is the creation and representation of the beautiful, or creation and representation of certain objects in a way that makes it possible to feel their essence, that is to say, that which is a value in and of itself and is the supreme aim of all endeavours of the soul.”<sup>22</sup> Art is therefore not an imitation; it is creating and presenting something beautiful so that by means of beautiful it is possible to feel, and then have an intuitive awareness of essence itself, that is, the truth and the value of the object created and presented by the artist. In this way the aesthetic, the artistic, and, ultimately, also the philosophical come into harmony in Kuzmány’s conception. With art we create the Being itself, we reveal its truth by means of the beautiful, and by its increase into a form of the sublime we cross the boundary of our own subjective existence.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>22</sup> Kuzmány, K.: *On Beauty*, p. 230

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 232

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**Self-deception and self-knowledge: Jane Austen's *Emma* as an  
Example of Kant's Notion of Self-Deception**

***Autodecepción y autoconocimiento: "Emma" de Jane Austen  
como ejemplo de la noción kantiana de autodecepción***

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**Abstract**

In this paper, I address the theme of harmony by investigating that harmony of person necessary for obtaining wisdom. Central to achievement of that harmony is the removal of the unstable, unharmonious presence of self-deception within one's moral character.

**Keywords**

Kant; Harmony; Self-deception; Self-knowledge; Wisdom

**Resumen**

Este artículo plantea la cuestión de la armonía de la mano de la investigación de la armonía que la persona precisa para obtener sabiduría. Sostengo que la supresión de la presencia inestable y no armónica del autoengaño en el marco del carácter moral de cada cual es central para alcanzar tal armonía.

**Palabras clave**

Kant; armonía; autoengaño; autoconocimiento; sabiduría

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I have, in the past, argued versus Onora O'Neill that knowledge of oneself (and not just right action) is a central moral concern for Kant, suggesting that a balanced amount of introspection was not only permissible but obligatory even to hope to fulfill one's duties to others.<sup>1</sup> In this paper, I further my thoughts on this topic by considering what one might take to be the direct opposite of self-knowledge: self-deception. To deceive oneself is not only to fail in self-knowledge, but also to seek actively to avoid it. I have come to believe that Kant not only believes self-deception is possible but also that it is the most *characteristic* obstacle to successful expression of finite practical reasoning. If this is true, the obvious conclusion that follows is that the *removal* of self-deception, that is, self-knowledge is, in Kant's words, "the **First Command** of All Duties to Oneself." (6:441/191)<sup>2</sup> Indeed, if we accept Kant's related point that duties to *self* are previous to all duties to *others*, then we arrive at the interesting conclusion that self-knowledge is the first of all duties *simpliciter*. I accept these strong claims, and seek here to defend them.

### 1. *Self-Deception in the Metaphysics of Morals*

Kant investigates self-deception in his discussion of lying in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. There, he seems perplexed by the phenomenon. On the one hand, "[i]t is easy to show that man is actually guilty of many inner lies." (6:430/183) Kant accepts as obvious that lying to oneself is prevalent in humanity, and that such a tendency is easily observable. He quickly raises a problem, though: "it seems more difficult to explain *how* [inner lies] are possible; for a lie requires a second person whom one intends to deceive, whereas to deceive oneself on purpose seems to contain a contradiction." (6:430/183). The implicit "contradiction" is that I need at once to know my intention to lie (as the "liar") but also *not* to know my intention to lie (as the "lied-to"). So the perplexing thing about self-deception is that inner lies occur, but the very notion of an inner lie involves a contradiction which seems to make it impossible for them to occur.

Although Kant lays out this difficult question, he does nothing—at least in the *Metaphysics of Morals*—to resolve it. Instead, he dwells on the unquestionable phenomenon of self-deception in several examples. I'm not certain whether all his examples really are examples that fit the model he gives, viz., that each of these persons both knows and does not know his intention to lie. For example, he suggests that one who "professes belief in a future judge of the world, although he really finds no such belief

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<sup>1</sup> See: Grenberg, Jeanine. *Kant and the Ethics of Humility: A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

<sup>2</sup> All reference to Kant will first reference the Akademie edition page numbers, followed by the page numbers of the following Cambridge translation of Kant's works:

*Critique of Pure Reason*, Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
*Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Mary Gregor, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

*The Metaphysics of Morals*. Mary Gregor, trs. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

within himself” is someone who is deceiving himself. But this person seems more of a straight-forward prudential reasoner than a self-deceiver. He “persuade[s] himself that it could do no harm [to profess a belief in God]” and that it “might even be *useful* to profess in his thoughts...a belief in such a judge, in order to win his favor in case he should exist.” (6:430/183, emphasis added) This describes someone who knows very well that he does not believe in God, but who is going to pretend to believe in God just in case God does exist. This is just prudential reasoning (and outright deception of *others*), not self-deception. Mind you, it is *bad* prudential reasoning, since if God really were to exist, He would be the first one to see through this little charade. Nonetheless, this is not a good example.

Kant’s second example is better: “Someone also lies if, having no doubt about the existence of this future judge [i.e., God], he still flatters *himself* that he inwardly *reveres* his law, though the only incentive he *feels* is fear of punishment.” (6:430/183, emphases added) Here, the lie to oneself is that one feels reverence toward God when in fact one only feels ‘fear of punishment’, not ‘reverence.’

Let’s speculate now on the *motives* for this self-lie. Why would one want to believe that one is a reverent and religious person when in fact one is only a fearful, sycophantic panderer to a powerful being? Put that way, the motive for self-deception is screamingly obvious: one simply does not want to believe that one is as horrible a person as one has turned out to be. In Kant’s words, this person wants to avoid the “descent into the hell of self-cognition.” (6:441/191) (He also calls this “the abyss” of self-knowledge – 6:441/191) None of us likes admitting parts of ourselves that are less-than-good. So, instead of admitting we are less-than-good and then working at making ourselves better, we hide from ourselves that we are less-than-good and then present ourselves as even better than we are! This tendency toward false, arrogant self-presentation is one of the most frequent fruits of self-deception. Self-deception becomes a tool whereby we construct an image of ourselves more pleasing to ourselves. We then go out into the world with that constructed image, building an entire reality around us that supports the original self-lie. I may really not have reverence toward God, but I ostentatiously present myself to everyone as though I do; I even come to believe that I am *truly* reverent toward God. If I’m lucky, people start saying of me that I am an exceedingly reverent person. More likely, people will think I am a very hypocritical person. But the hypocrisy at the basis of my character is exactly what I am preventing myself from knowing about myself.

This tendency to “live the lie” is one reason Kant thinks self-deception is such a bad thing. He states:

«[S]uch insincerity in his declarations, which a human being perpetuates upon himself...deserves the strongest censure, since it is from such a rotten spot (falsity, which



seems to be rooted in human nature itself) that the ill of untruthfulness spreads into his relations with other human beings as well» (6:430-431/182)

Once we lie to ourselves we cannot help but to lie to others (in the sense of falsely presenting ourselves to them), and what started as one wrong perpetuates a whole series of wrongs, indeed, for some, a whole lifetime of wrongs towards oneself and others.

An excellent example of Kant's point about how self-deception perpetuates wrongs can be found in Jane Austen's novel, *Emma*.<sup>3</sup> Emma is in a good situation at her family estate, Hartfield. Her mother's early death assured that she became lady of the manor early on. She is "handsome, clever and rich," and lives comfortably with her "affectionate, indulgent" father. (Austen, 5) Mr. Knightley is a frequent visitor and close friend of the family, so Emma has everything she needs.

All this inspires Emma's main motive for self-deception: because she is frightened to lose her happy situation at Hartfield, she constructs a belief that she never wants to marry. Marrying would, after all, require her to leave Hartfield, her father and visits from Mr. Knightley. She thus deceives herself into believing both that she is not in love with Mr. Knightley, and that she does not want to marry. Emma also falsely believes, and takes great pride in the belief, that she is an accomplished match-maker, a false belief rooted in her unwillingness to admit to herself that she is a rather lazy person, and isn't good at the sort of things—like painting or music-making—which actually *do* take time, hard work and discipline. Emma thus constructs a world around her which supports all these false beliefs.

Emma's self-deception on these points leads her utterly to misunderstand expressions of affection toward her from men. One of my favorite passages for appreciating this point is when Emma, in matchmaking mode, is trying to convince her friend Harriet that a riddle written by Mr. Elton is in fact about his love for Harriet:

«She cast her eye over it, pondered, caught the meaning, read it through again to be quite certain...and then passing it to Harriet, sat happily smiling... 'May its approval beam in that soft eye!' Harriet exactly. Soft, is the very word for her eye—of all epithets, the justest that could be given. 'Thy ready wit the word will soon supply.' Humph— Harriet's ready wit! All the better. A man must be very much in love indeed, to describe her so» (Austen, 58).

The reader is clearly meant to realize this poem about a woman with a "soft eye" and "ready wit" is Emma. But Emma's self-deception about her own interest in love leads her to misinterpret it as being about Harriet, one more with dull eyes than soft ones and a dull wit (rather than a 'ready' one) to match them.

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<sup>3</sup> All references to *Emma* come from: Austen, Jane. *Emma* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

Emma's self-deceptions have exactly the results Kant suggests: they are a 'falsity...that...spreads into [one's] relations with other human beings,' (6:430-431/182) which guarantees that wrongs are brought upon others. Not only does Emma inadvertently present a mistruth to Harriet about Mr. Elton's affections. Beyond that, Emma's encouragements raise Harriet's hopes. So, when the truth of his affections is revealed, Harriet's pain is intense, and Emma has been the cause of that pain.

So, if self-deception is 'rooted in human nature itself' and has this huge moral consequence of grounding a false life, injurious to ourselves and others, we can see why getting to *know* oneself—and especially uncovering deceptions at the basis of one's self-presentation—is a central moral task. In a section titled "the **First Command** of All Duties to Oneself," (6:441/191) Kant affirms:

«Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one's heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For in the case of a human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a human being's will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present in him) and then to develop the original predisposition to a good will within him, which can never be lost. (Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness.)» (6:441/191)

If we were not the sort of persons to deceive ourselves, then self-knowledge might not be so important. Getting to know ourselves would be like getting to know anything we have not yet understood, like calculus or flute-playing. But the duty to self-knowledge is a duty to know 'evil' things about you which you have actively sought to avoid knowing, things which require moral *attention*, not avoidance. Acquisition of self-knowledge puts us on the road to 'wisdom' (and not just 'knowledge') because it removes that internal obstacle which prevents us from developing the goal of a wise, moral person: a will in 'harmony' with a good will (instead of one actively opposed to that end). Self-deception is a tool for false character building. But self-knowledge is an act of wisdom because, through it, we uncover that false character. It brings out into the open our self-incurred obstacles to morality, our efforts to *hide* from ourselves what really needs to be *worked* on to become a moral person.

Scrutinizing our motives and character is not, however, an end in itself. The whole point of admitting who one has *been* is to become who one was *meant* to be. All those lies to oneself turned back on the world as arrogant self-assertions must be undermined so that new, self-aware motives can provide the basis for a new character in 'harmony' with a good will. The 'wisdom' here is of one who *knows* that the unexamined self is the first and worst obstacle to becoming moral. Indeed, Kant would, with Socrates, not only agree that

the unexamined life is not worth living, but also add that the *unexamined* life is *guaranteed* to be an *immoral* life.

## 2. Explaining How We Deceive Ourselves

### 2.1 Step One: Groundwork I

Yet, even as we draw this picture of self-deception, we still don't know how it is possible. There remains this apparent "contradiction" that the same person is both liar (and thus aware of her intention to deceive) and lied-to (and thus unaware of her intention to deceive).

Although we get no resolution of this contradiction in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, one brief hint in his discussion there points us forward. After raising the problem of contradiction, Kant distinguishes between "[m]an as a moral being" and man "as a natural being", suggesting that, like all persons, "[m]an as a moral being...cannot use *himself* as a natural being...as a mere means (a speaking machine)...but is bound to the condition of using himself as a natural being in agreement with the declaration...of his moral being and is under obligation to *himself* to truthfulness." (6:430/183) The implied thought here is that self-deception somehow involves one person having two selves: the "moral being" and the "natural being," with the former admonished not to treat the latter as a mere means toward the end of his lying.

Kant gives no further hints of how to make sense of the interaction between these two beings within one person. But, if we turn to *Groundwork I*, we find a story of attentiveness, and failure thereof, which constructs a clearer picture of the interaction of two internal selves. Along the way, we'll find that self-deception is deeply embedded in the nature of human practical reasoning itself and is thus *the* defining, characteristic challenge to becoming a moral person.

At the very end of *Groundwork I*, Kant provides an account not only of *why* we deceive ourselves about moral obligations, but also hints of *how* we do so:

«The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the highest respect – the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name happiness. Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly, without thereby promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and contempt for those claims, which are so impetuous and besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by any command). But from this there arises a *natural dialectic*, that is a propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and where possible, to make them better

suiting to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and to destroy all their dignity» (4:405/17-18).

This person is in the process of deceiving himself about the authority of moral demands. The truth of the matter is that moral demands are categorical. But, here, he begins to turn them into something else—laws that are perceived *not* to hold with categorical ‘purity’ or ‘strictness’—via self-deception.

First, let’s think about *why* the person engaged in this ‘natural dialectic’ wants to deceive himself. He wants to place happiness *above* morality when the two conflict; so deceiving himself about the strictness of the moral law becomes an attractive option. This prioritizing of happiness over morality is just the most general characterization we can give of the motives of *any* case of self-deception. The man who wants to believe himself reverent toward God even though he’s not wants to avoid the injury to his happiness that admitting his baser motives would involve. All Emma’s self-deceptions are pointed toward retaining her happiness at Hartfield. Now, we see the same desire for happiness encouraging this man to deceive himself about the strictness of moral demands.

*How* though does this man deceive himself? The crucial moment for understanding the mechanics of self-deception is when this man ‘cast[s] doubt upon [moral laws]’ validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and where possible...make[s] them better suited to [his] wishes and inclinations.’ To make sense of this move, let’s go back just a page earlier in *Groundwork I* to remind ourselves that Kant first *affirms* the capacity of “common human understanding” to get things *right* here, that is, to see *clearly* the ‘strict’, categorical nature of moral laws:

«[C]ommon human reason...knows very well how to distinguish in every case that comes up what is good and what is evil, what is in conformity with duty or contrary to duty, *if*, without in the least teaching it anything new, we only, as did Socrates, *make it attentive to its own principle*; and that there is accordingly, no need of science and philosophy to know what one has to do in order to be honest and good, and even wise and virtuous» (4:404/16, emphases added).

*As long as* one pays attention to the presence of moral demands within one’s moral consciousness, their strictness is very clear. In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant confirms this import of attentiveness. There he notes: “[w]e can become aware of pure practical laws...by *attending* to the necessity with which reason prescribes them to us and to the setting aside of all empirical conditions.” (5:30/27, emphasis added) Here, not only do we appreciate *that* the person of common reason attends to the moral law; we also learn more about *how* he does it: by ‘setting aside...all empirical conditions,’ that is, by not letting desire-based or happiness-focused interests interfere with one’s perception of the moral law.

Now, back in the *Groundwork*, the person of “common human reason” (Kant now simply calls him “the human being” – 4:405/17) starts to “attend” rather differently to things. If he looks clearly at the moral law, setting aside all concerns about happiness, he knows it for exactly what it is. But our ‘human being’ is now engaged in a conflict between happiness and morality, and he wishes happiness could win. Well, then, let’s not look at morality so clearly. Let’s “attend” to something else so that the law looks differently to us. That “something else”, of course, is our own happiness and whatever oddly colored lens it provides through which to see the moral law. “Of *course* one shouldn’t lie, but maybe just this one time for the sake of paying my debt off (which will make me happy). I’ll even make other people happy because I’ll stop pestering them with further requests for loans. Yeah, that’s it: I’m really *helping* other people if I lie now. It really is the right thing to do.” If I attend to my happiness as primary instead of attending to the strict demand of the law, the law starts looking, well, less strict. I may still (in some sense to be considered later) “know” that the moral law holds strictly, but I no longer *believe* that. I no longer *attend* to that knowledge, so it recedes quietly into the back of my mind and a new belief emerges: the moral law *isn’t* totally strict; it admits of exceptions in the name of my happiness. Kant had told us the attentive human being needed only to ‘set aside...all empirical conditions’ to see the moral law clearly. But this person does exactly the opposite: he *welcomes* ‘empirical conditions’ into his perception of the law, and thus deceives himself about it.

To summarize: our person reflecting on the moral law does not stop knowing that it holds categorically; but he develops techniques to stop *looking* attentively at that knowledge. He looks elsewhere—to his own hopes for happiness—to gain a new, and corrupting, perspective on the moral law. Doing so allows him, eventually, perhaps over a long period of time, to begin *believing* the precise *opposite* of what he already *knows* to be true (*viz.*, the categorical authority of the moral law). So, this person *believes* both *a* and  $\sim a$ : the moral law holds categorically, and the moral law does not hold categorically. But he develops a disposition, or way of being, in which he *attends* only to ‘ $\sim a$ ’ (the moral law does not hold categorically). And he attends to that so regularly over time that he begins to *lose* his *conscious* memory of ‘*a*’ (the categorical authority of the moral law).

## 2.2 Step Two: Analyzing Two Selves via Emma and Groundwork I

Can we, then, appeal to these shifting objects of attentiveness to explain how the same person is both the liar (who knows the intention to deceive) and the lied-to (who doesn’t know that intention)? Well, in fact, we’ve uncovered in this belief of ‘*a*’ and ‘ $\sim a$ ’ story a slightly different “contradiction” within self-deception than the original one Kant had suggested. Nonetheless, investigating further how the construction and management of this contradiction in knowledge claims occurs *will* allow us to affirm, to a certain extent, the other “two selves” story Kant suggested in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. We need, then,

to investigate further this person contradictions in beliefs and with that, construct a clearer account of the two selves involved in self-deception.

First, the knowledge we attribute to this person of ‘a’ (the moral law holds categorically) is only implicit. He doesn’t *claim* the moral law holds categorically; indeed, he might become a defender of the idea that one *must adjust* the strictness of moral laws in light of happiness. But he can hold this claim implicitly only within a carefully constructed world maintained by a careful segmenting of himself into two. We had been saying these two selves are the liar (who knows the intention to lie) and the lied-to (who does not). But the self does not segment *exactly* along these lines. Rather, there is, first, the self able to look at truths directly and know the strictness of the moral law; let’s call him the Honest Self. Then there is the self who wants to satisfy the demands of happiness over those of morality. This is the Devious Self. The interesting thing, though, is that the Honest Self doesn’t become “the lied to” and the Devious Self doesn’t know himself constantly as the liar. Something different occurs. Let’s investigate each of these points in turn.

First, the Honest Self is not told a lie by the Devious Self. Rather, the Honest Self just gets ignored, sort of lost in this person’s overall consciousness: he has his knowledge, but he has a curtain placed over him by the Devious Self, who won’t pay attention to him. He is no longer involved in the choice process of the self, at least not directly.

On the flip side, the Devious Self, who *puts* the curtain over the Honest Self, cannot be said to be continually aware of the intention to deceive. That’s why I call him the Devious Self instead of the Lying Self. If we think of self-deception as a *process* through which one eventually comes to believe the opposite of what one knows, then the Devious Self, instead of maintaining a continual awareness of his intention to deceive, looks more like this: initially, he has an intention to lie (i.e., to claim ‘~a’ instead of ‘a’). But stated so baldly, this is too much: make moral laws bend to the demands of *my* happiness?? That would be wrong!! So, the Devious Self starts to build a world within which that obviously wrong thing no longer *looks* so obviously wrong. Now, ‘~a’ doesn’t look so bad. It doesn’t even look like a “lie” anymore. So the Devious Self *claims* ‘~a’, but he doesn’t claim it (even to himself) *as* a “lie”; it is just his way of seeing the world. So, he does *not* maintain a conscious *intention* throughout this process to lie to the Honest Self, or to anyone else. It might have begun like that, but by the time the deception is complete, it no longer looks like that.

And yet the Devious Self *does* “attend”—and attend very *carefully*—to the beliefs of the Honest Self, i.e., to ‘a’ (‘the moral law holds categorically’). How? Only in the back-handed sense of assuring vigorously that the truth of the Honest Self *not* be revealed,

especially in those circumstances in which such outing appears immanent. Let's look again at *Emma* to appreciate this point.

A dangerous possibility of outing Emma's false beliefs occurs when Mr. Knightly tries to call out the Honest Emma, insisting that she is in fact not a 'successful' matchmaker at all:

«I do not understand what you mean by "success;"... 'Success supposes endeavor. But if, which I rather imagine, your making the match, as you call it, means only your planning it, your saying to yourself one idle day, "I think it would be a very good thing for Miss Taylor if Mr. Weston were to marry her," and saying it again to yourself every now and then afterwards, --why do you talk of success? Where is your merit? --what are you proud of? --you made a lucky guess; and *that* is all that can be said» (Austen, 11).

Here is an excellent opportunity for the Honest Emma to come out: "oh, alright, Mr. Knightly, my matchmaking is all just a front for my failure to admit that I am lazy." Well, she doesn't say *that* in response to Mr. Knightley. Instead, when Mr. Knightley concludes "you made a lucky guess; and that is all that can be said," Emma responds:

«And have you never known the pleasure and triumph of a lucky guess?—I pity you.—I thought you cleverer—for depend upon it, a lucky guess is never merely luck. There is always some talent in it. And as to my poor word 'success,' which you quarrel with, I do not know that I am so entirely without any claim to it. You have drawn two pretty Opictures—but I think there may be a third—a something between the do-nothing and the do-all. If I had not promoted Mr. Weston's visits here, and given many little encouragements, and smoothed many little matters, it might not have come to anything after all» (Austen, 11).

This is Emma's Devious Self attending to her Honest Self's knowledge, and coming to protect it from being revealed. To admit to Mr. Knightley that she is lazy and unaccomplished would be too much. But her Devious Self is well-trained in such matters, and gets right to work. First, she speaks in an arrogant, almost insulting, tone ('I pity you' and 'I thought you were cleverer'), hinting at some defensiveness underneath her words. She tries, furthermore, to claim there was hard *work* behind her match-making success, thereby affirming the world the Devious Self has constructed.

This arrogant assertion of the world of the Devious Self confirms, then, one sense of the self-deceived person's "knowledge" of the denied fact: Emma knows that she is lazy and unaccomplished in the sense that she assiduously prevents this fact from coming to light, either to herself or others. When circumstances threaten to 'out' that fact, her Devious Self is immediately aware of the threat and fiercely protects that fact, keeping it in its safe hiding place deep within her curtained Honest Self. The denial of the guarded fact finds its strength in the intense desire to keep hidden what one wants to hide. As such,

“knowledge” of the denied thing must be admitted as a condition for the very need for, and the resulting strength of, the denial.

This “knowledge” of the underlying truth when it presents itself thusly is, however, a complex state psychologically. Long ago, Emma just knew that she was lazy and unaccomplished. But now, at the same time, she holds all the following:

- 1) She unconsciously, but accessibly, *knows* that she is lazy and unaccomplished.
- 2) She *believes* she is *not* lazy and unaccomplished.
- 3) She *fears* she *is* lazy and unaccomplished.
- 4) She does not *want* to believe she is lazy and unaccomplished.
- 5) She fiercely *denies* any claims that she is lazy and unaccomplished.

Emma holds all these states, but *attends* differently to each, depending upon circumstances. When Mr. Knightly suggests she is not accomplished in matchmaking, she most likely starts, internally, to attend to #3 (her *fear* that she *is* lazy and unaccomplished), leading to conscious assertion of #5 (her denial that she is lazy). In this state, her knowledge of #1 (that she is lazy and unaccomplished) remains unconscious.

Ironically, though, the knowledge of the Honest Self, despite being unconscious, is at the very *basis* of the plotting of the Devious Self, acting as that part of the self which must never be explicitly revealed. That truth is “known” in the sense of being that which must always be denied. The man of *Groundwork I* thus “knows” in his Honest Self that the moral law holds strictly, but it is too painful a fact to admit to himself or others. His Devious Self’s way of “knowing” this fact is to fiercely protect it, keeping it in its safe hiding place deep within his curtained Honest Self. The contradiction here is not that he both knows and does not know the intention to lie. The contradiction is that, in different ways, he believes both *a* (the moral law holds strictly) and  $\sim a$  (the moral law does not hold strictly); it is not the contradiction that he both knows and does not know the intention to lie.

But, although we thus reject the contradiction within the self-deceived person Kant had originally suggested, we *affirm* Kant’s other *Metaphysics of Morals* distinction between a moral self and a natural self. More precisely, the Devious Self fails to attend to the moral admonition the “moral self” was given. Kant had said the moral being must not use the natural being as a mere means. I’m not sure my Devious Self and Honest Self are perfectly parallel to his moral being and natural being. Nonetheless, the Devious Self is *using* the knowledge of the Honest Self as a mere means to his end of securing his happiness. Whether he *intends* to lie or not, the Devious Self is *using* another part of himself as a mere means instead of accepting that part of himself—the part that knows the truth of things—on its own terms, or as possessing its own “end” of truth-telling.



It is, of course, at least theoretically possible that, instead of continuing to conceal the Honest Self, the Devious Self will just give up and admit what had been hidden. But, such direct attentiveness to the fact to be denied would make the entire structure of self-deception collapse into the simple state of direct knowledge of the previously denied fact. Such reactions are thus rare, since they indicate the barest beginnings of that road to self-knowledge of which Kant spoke. They are, however, possible. The most likely scenario within which honest admission of the previously denied truth would emerge is one in which the original intentions of the Devious Self are thwarted. Let's turn again to *Emma* to appreciate the point.

First, some background: the unfortunate target of Emma's matchmaking attention is Harriet Smith, a woman younger than Emma, a little inept, and with lower social standing. Emma engages in two spectacular failures of matchmaking when she tries to connect Harriet with two different men who in fact are attracted to Emma, not Harriet. But the beautiful, bitter irony of Austen's narrative is that the person Harriet eventually does fall in love with is...Mr. Knightley, *Emma's* Mr. Knightley!!

When faced with the real possibility that someone else could be attracted to *him* and that (gasp!) *he* might be attracted to someone other than herself, Emma is finally forced to admit that she *does* love Mr. Knightley. Emma is *not* welcoming that path to wisdom which is self-knowledge; she is, rather, being untimely forced to admit things about herself as she watches the hope of her undisturbed life at Hartfield being challenged by little Harriet, whom she thought to be her toy, her protégé, and who now is revealing herself more as a monster in the Frankenstein sense, whose capacities exceed those of her creator's!! This is a perfect example of how changes in circumstances thwart the plotting and planning of the Devious Self; for, surely, Mr. Knightley marrying someone else would destroy Harriet's happy world at Hartfield, and it is the protection of that world which inspired Emma's self-deception in the first place.

Here, then, is the moment when she gives up what she had previously vociferously denied, viz., that she loves Mr. Knightley:

«To understand, thoroughly understand her own heart, was the first endeavor...How long had Mr. Knightley been so dear to her, as every feeling declared him now to be? When had his influence, such influence begun?—When had he succeeded to that place in her affection...?...—She saw that there never had been a time when she did not consider Mr. Knightley as infinitely the superior, or when his regard for her had not been infinitely the most dear. She saw, that in persuading herself, in fancying, in acting to the contrary, *she had been entirely under a delusion, totally ignorant of her own heart* (Austen, 324, emphasis added)».

We see here the other sense in which we can say the self-deceived person “knows” the denied truth: given the right circumstances—and especially given circumstances in which the efforts of the Devious Self are foiled—the truth that has been denied by the self-deceiving person comes naturally to light. Of course she has always “known” that she loved Mr. Knightley; she just couldn’t admit it to herself. Her knowledge of the previously hidden fact is now clear: she simply has conscious knowledge of it.

I suspect that if our *Groundwork I* man rejecting the strictness of moral laws for the sake of his own happiness were, ironically, presented with a similar sort of situation—one within which holding that claim (that moral laws are *not* strict) were to *undermine* his happiness, then he’d abandon his constructed world and admit that moral laws *do* hold strictly. Suppose, for example, that someone else uses a non-strict reading of moral laws to cheat him. Our man would vociferously object that moral laws *do* hold strictly! I do not mean to suggest this man will become moral (certainly not for the right reasons), but he does see his original project of self-deception failing; there is a collapse of the structure of the world he had created for himself because he now has to admit, *for* the sake of his own happiness, that moral laws *do* hold strictly!

So, we have two examples of the senses in which we can say that the self-deceived person “knows” the truth of the thing about which he’s been deceiving himself, either indirectly through vigorous denial of the truth, or directly, leading to the collapse of self-deception. And what we have accomplished in analysis of Emma’s self-deception, instead of a resolution of the original contradiction at the basis of self-deception, is an *affirmation* of the *existence* of a slightly *different* sort of contradiction hiding underneath an unstable state of self-deception. The self-deceiving person is not both a liar who knows the intention to lie and a lied-to who does not know that intention. Rather, the same person believes ‘a’ & ‘~a’, but *manages* those contradictory beliefs so as to efface the power of the contradiction. This management is accomplished by segmenting the self into the Devious Self and the Honest Self, where the Honest Self becomes used as a mere means by the Devious Self.

In this management of selves, we also see the management of various knowledge claims and beliefs. Some beliefs (as, e.g., the belief that Emma is *not* lazy and unaccomplished) are conscious; other beliefs (as, e.g., the underlying belief that Emma *is* lazy and unaccomplished) are normally unconscious, but accessible, depending upon circumstances. Usually, though, this underlying knowledge/belief is relegated to the realm of the “forbidden,” that of which one does not speak and does not even consciously know. As long as the Honest Self enters into the Devious Self’s projects only in the way the Devious Self wants, management of one’s contradictions succeeds: the same person can indeed successfully believe both a & ~a! There *is* a contradiction at the basis of self-deception.

But this need for complex management of one's contradictions is also what makes self-deception such an unstable state. Once one has to deny the '¬a' claim of the Devious Self (as Emma is forced to do when she is forced to admit her love for Mr. Knightley), the whole managed structure of self-deception comes crashing down: *without* a contradiction carefully held and managed, there *is* no self-deception.

We thus do not so much *resolve* the contradiction inherent to self-deception, as instead *affirm* it. The difficult work of the self-deceived person is to manage her holding of contradictions in belief in a way that makes them less obviously contradictions. It is too simple merely to say that one part of the person is the liar who knows the deception, and the other part is the lied-to who is deceived. The liar turns out to know her intention to lie only before she turns that intention into something else; and the lied-to is never really the lied-to but only the ignored, yet protected and used.

### 3. Conclusion

There is, however, a final point to make about self-deception, and ultimately, self-knowledge, for Kant. When discussing self-deception in *Groundwork I*, Kant spoke of it as a “natural dialectic,” a phrase that should prick the attuned ears of a Kant scholar. Recall that a “natural dialectic” is exactly the phrase Kant used in the *Critique of Pure Reason* when speaking of the unavoidable tendency of theoretical pure reason to fall into illusions about things beyond its limits. Even after one learns the lessons of Transcendental Idealism, we still cannot help but to fall into this “natural dialectic” which pushes us toward illusions about metaphysics:

«[T]here is a natural and unavoidable dialect of pure reason, not one in which a bungler might be entangled through lack of acquaintance, or one that some sophist has artfully invented in order to confuse rational people, but *one that irremediably attaches to human reason, so that even after we have exposed the mirage it will still not cease to lead our reason on with false hopes, continually propelling it into momentary aberrations that always need to be removed*» (A298/B354, emphasis added).

A “natural dialectic” is, then, a sort of disease to which reason is prone, one that cannot so much be cured as managed via constant vigilance. I apply all of this to Kant's discussion of the “natural dialectic” of *practical* reason as well. We will never *not be* tempted to self-deception about the strictness of moral laws. Rather, we must maintain a vigilance which assures we will recognize when this natural tendency kicks in. This pervasiveness of the possibility of self-deception reaffirms again Kant's original point, viz., that *knowledge* of

oneself is the *first* command of all duties to oneself. This duty is as central as it is because of the nature of finite practical reason itself.<sup>4</sup>

Self-deception is *the* human failure with which one needs to come to terms in order to become moral. And self-knowledge is the first of all duties to oneself overall: if it is in “human nature” to engage in the sorts of deception we have analyzed here, then it is impossible to be a moral person (or even to understand the nature of the duties to which one is held) without removing that obstacle to morality that is the Dear, Deceiving, Devious Self.

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<sup>4</sup> It is this inextirpable tendency toward self-deception that inspires my phenomenological reading of Kant (see: Grenberg, Jeanine, *Kant’s Defense of Common Moral Experience: A Phenomenological Account* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013]). Attentive phenomenological reflection is the antidote to this inextirpable tendency toward self-deception. Seeing well how moral reasons press themselves on us is the first step in becoming a moral agent. Choice is a second step that is accomplished most successfully by prefacing choice with this moral attentiveness.

## Kant's Enlightenment<sup>1</sup>

### *La Ilustración de Kant*

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#### Abstract

I urge here that Kant's essay "What is Enlightenment?" be read in the context of debates at the time over the public critique of religion, and together with elements of his other writings, especially a short piece on orientation in thinking that he wrote two years later. After laying out the main themes of the essay in some detail, I argue that, read in context, Kant's call to "think for ourselves" is not meant to rule out a legitimate role for relying on the testimony of others, that it is directed instead against a kind of blind religious faith, in which one either refuses to question one's clerical authorities or relies on a mystical intuition that cannot be assessed by reason. Both of these ways of abandoning reason can be fended off if we always submit our private thoughts to the test of public scrutiny: which is why enlightenment, for Kant, requires *both* free thinking, by each individual for him or herself, *and* a realm of free public expression in which individuals can discuss the results of their thinking.

#### Key words

Enlightenment; Testimony; Public/Private distinction; Public Reason; Enthusiasm

#### Resumen

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<sup>1</sup> This piece is adapted from Fleischacker, S. (2013), *What is Enlightenment? Kant's Questions*, London: Routledge, New York. Chapter 1.

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Propongo en este artículo leer el ensayo de Kant “¿Qué es la Ilustración?” en el contexto de los debates de su tiempo sobre la crítica pública de la religión, junto con elementos de otros escritos de Kant, especialmente un opúsculo sobre la orientación en el pensamiento que escribió dos años antes. Tras desplegar los temas principales del ensayo con algún detalle, argumento que, leída en su contexto, la exhortación de Kant a “pensar por nosotros mismos” no debe entenderse llamada a descartar la función legítima de confiar en el testimonio de los otros, sino que está dirigida más bien contra un tipo de fe religiosa ciega, en la que o bien rechaza cuestionar las propias autoridades clericales, o bien descansa sobre una intuición mística que no puede ser evaluada por la razón. Ambas maneras de abandonar la razón pueden esquivarse si sometemos en todo momento nuestros pensamientos privados a la prueba del escrutinio público. Por ello, la Ilustración para Kant requiere *tanto* el libre pensamiento, de cada individuo por sí mismo, *cuanto* un espacio de expresión pública libre, en el que los individuos puedan discutir los resultados de su pensamiento.

### Palabras clave

Ilustración; testimonio; distinción público/privado; razón pública; entusiasmo

1. In 1712, Joseph Addison described the world as “enlightened by Learning and Philosophy.” Bishop Berkeley called his era an “enlightened age” in 1732, and David Hume contrasted barbarous” with “enlightened ages” when he discussed reports of miracles in 1748. Hume also contrasted those who “enlighten” the world with religious figures like Thomas à Becket in his *History of England*, lamenting that “pretended saints” receive so much popular attention while enlighteners do not (Addison 1837, p. 31, 419; Berkeley 1803, p. 97; Hume 1975, p. 119; Hume 1983, p. 337).

In all these cases, the words “enlighten” and “enlightened” are used to signify something that comes with learning, and contrasts with dogmatic religious belief. But these words appear rarely in 18<sup>th</sup>-century Britain— I’ve given their only appearance in Hume’s *Enquiries* and they don’t appear at all in his *Treatise* or *Dialogues* on religion — and there is no extended discussion in the Anglophone world of what “enlightenment” might entail.<sup>2</sup> Nor did the French *lumières* or the Italian *lumi* engage in any real debate over what mental processes or political conditions made their learning possible.

That debate was left to German-speaking lands, where, from 1783 onwards, a large number of articles appeared under titles like “What is Enlightenment?” One of these — by Kant — has become an icon, a piece by which students are introduced to the intellectual world of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and that is supposed to represent an ethos running through it. But we should bear in mind that Kant was writing in a very specific corner of the historical

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<sup>2</sup>And it names just a process, not a historical period, until quite late in the 19<sup>th</sup> century. Hegel seems to have been the first to use *Aufklärung* to designate the 18<sup>th</sup> century as a stage in intellectual history, and it was by way of translations of his works that the term came into English use. But *Aufklärung* was generally translated as “Illumination” (and sometimes as “Clearing Up”!) until the end of the nineteenth century. See Schmidt, J, “Inventing the Enlightenment: Anti-Jacobins, Hegelians, and the *Oxford English Dictionary*,” pp.421-443.

phenomenon we call today “*the Enlightenment*,” and responding to its specific challenges, not necessarily representing what characterized that period in, say, Edinburgh or Paris.<sup>3</sup>

What specific challenges did Kant face? Kant really wrote *two* pieces in defense of enlightenment, the famous one of 1784, and “What is Orientation in Thinking?,” in 1786. At that time, the long reign of Frederick the Great was drawing to a close and the intellectual circles to which Kant belonged were worried about what might happen next. Frederick was beloved by intellectuals for the free rein he gave to scholarly discussion, but there was reason to fear that his successor would not follow him in that respect. The future Frederick William II had joined a series of secret societies and was purported to believe that he had mystical visions; he was also close with a certain Johann Christof Wöllner, who harbored hopes of suppressing the open discussion of religion and “bringing back the ... country to the faith of Jesus Christ” (Frederick William II 1910, p. 64).<sup>4</sup> And indeed, immediately after coming to the throne, Frederick William would appoint Wöllner to high position, Wöllner would attempt to shut down the public expression of heretical views, and Frederick William would use his personal conversations with Jesus as a basis for further restrictive policies.<sup>5</sup> When Kant calls for the supreme importance of freedom of the pen, then, even in 1784 and especially in 1786, and when in 1786 he adds that being guided by personal religious experience can lead to the greatest of despotisms, we need to hear him as in part making a case for the policies of Frederick the Great, and warning his fellow intellectuals against giving aid to the repressive tendencies in Frederick William. Kant was reluctant to write the 1786 piece on orientation, which required him to intervene in a dispute among friends, but was eventually convinced that he had to do it in order to help fend off the political threat looming on the horizon (Beiser 1992, p. 52).

2. So much for historical background; let's turn now to the texts. What was “enlightenment,” for Kant? Kant's piece on the topic is extremely short, but it contains a number of different elements and it is worth making sure we are clear about them. I'd like

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<sup>3</sup>Intellectual historians today tend to be leery of the very idea that there is a single period or movement properly called “*the Enlightenment*.” “There is no single or unifiable phenomenon describable as ‘the Enlightenment,’” says John Pocock, although he adds that “it is the definite article rather than the noun which is to be avoided. In studying the intellectual history of the late seventeenth century and the eighteenth, we encounter a variety of statements made, and assumptions proposed, to which the term ‘Enlightenment’ may usefully be applied, but the means of the term shift as we apply it.” (Pocock, J, “Historiography and Enlightenment: A View of their History,” p.83). See also the thoughtful discussion in Oz-Salzberger, F, “New Approaches towards a History of the Enlightenment”: in place of Gay's monolithic anti-religious Enlightenment, she says, contemporary intellectual historians have given us “a moderate Presbyterian Enlightenment in Scotland, a Latitudinarian Enlightenment in England, a radical Enlightenment of Spinozists and freemasons, a conservative Enlightenment which was largely Socinian, [and] a Jesuit Enlightenment,” among others (p.175).

<sup>4</sup> See also Schmidt, “Introduction”, *What is Enlightenment? Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions*, pp. 6-7.

<sup>5</sup> “In June 1791 Kieseewetter wrote Kant to inform him that attempts were being made in the Wöllner ministry to prevent him from publishing. Kieseewetter explained that the king, who was prone to mystical visions, had seen Jesus again, so that even more edicts could be expected.” Frederick C. Beiser, *Enlightenment, Revolution and Romanticism*, p.50.

to lay out five major themes of his famous essay, and then elaborate and defend two of them.

“Enlightenment,” Kant tells us in the opening line of his famous piece, “is the exit of human beings from their self-incurred immaturity.” And at the end of the first paragraph, Kant says that “Dare to know!,” or “Have the courage to use your own reason!,” is the watchword of enlightenment. So we have two themes right off the bat. First, the opposite of enlightenment is not a state of *ignorance* — a mere lack of information — but an emotional weakness, a state of immaturity; we cure this immaturity by taking responsibility for our own knowing, not by simply acquiring information. And second, our immaturity is self-incurred, and the way out of it is an act we must perform ourselves. Other people cannot enlighten us; we must enlighten ourselves. And we do that by “using our own reason” — whatever exactly that means.

We should pause to note that this is not the most obvious view of enlightenment. Many other thinkers in Kant’s time saw enlightenment as coming about when scientific knowledge, is cultivated and used to solve chronic human problems, or when the baleful rule of priests, enslaving the population by way of superstition, is brought to an end.<sup>6</sup> For Moses Mendelssohn, enlightenment consisted in theoretical knowledge, especially about religion (Mendelssohn in Schmidt 1996, pp. 54-55). For Karl Reinhold, it lay in the clarification of concepts, especially “those concepts which have a considerable influence on human happiness.” Mendelssohn, in Schmidt 1996, pp. 65-6). Christian Daniel Erhard, writing a few years after Kant, held that enlightenment consists in “the abolition of prevailing prejudices and errors among individuals and... peoples” (Knudsen in Schmidt 1996, p. 270). Kant too thought that enlightenment will improve science and lead us away from prejudice and superstition, but it was the courage to use our own reason, and not the improvement of science or the overcoming of prejudice and superstition, that he *identified* with enlightenment. It follows that he did not think people need the help of others, even scientific experts, to enter enlightenment — he regarded our reliance on others, including scientific experts, as precisely what keeps us *from* enlightenment — and he didn’t blame others, even clerics, for our lack of enlightenment. People with a great deal of theoretical knowledge, or skill in clarifying concepts, or understanding of what makes for human happiness or underpins prejudice, might be the source of enlightenment for Mendelssohn and Reinhold and Erhard, but not for Kant. The source of enlightenment lies within each of us, for him, not in any set of scholars. He puts the onus on each of us for achieving enlightenment, and he blames us for the immaturity that blocks us from doing so. He implies, thereby, that enlightenment is within reach of everybody.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> For a modern account of the Enlightenment that sees it as primarily concerned to solve long-standing social, political, and economic problems, see Robertson, *The Case for Enlightenment*. For a modern account that sees the Enlightenment as primarily concerned to challenge traditional religious beliefs, see Israel, *Radical Enlightenment*.

<sup>7</sup> I believe that Kant’s enlightenment, for all that he talks at one point about a public realm in which “scholars” (*Gelehrten*) have the freedom to write what they will, is meant to be a very egalitarian affair — something that everyone, whether well-educated or not, can carry out for him or herself. This is, after all, what the admonition, “Think for yourself!” would seem to imply, and Kant condemns unquestioning reliance



3. What, now, is the immaturity that blocks our enlightenment? Kant describes it as “the inability to use one’s understanding without the direction of another.” He attributes this condition to everyone who thinks “I have a book which understands for me, a pastor who has a conscience for me, a doctor who decides on my diet.” We should stop and wonder at this. Does Kant mean to say we should never rely on authority? Am I to figure out everything on my own, ignoring even my doctor’s advice about diet? Surely not. But then what *does* Kant mean? Perhaps just that I must always stand *ready to question* my authorities, if what they say seems to me ill-considered or ill-informed. I need to have enough understanding of my own, and trust my understanding enough, that I can say, “This doctor seems to me a charlatan” in certain cases, and blame myself, rather than just the doctor, if I continue nevertheless to rely on him. Moreover, Kant’s main point doesn’t have to do with our attitude towards medical experts, or other experts on scientific matters. The pastor, not the doctor, is the main character in his list of examples. As we’ll see, Kant is concerned above all with the way we rely on authorities in matters of religion — an arena

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on any authority: it’s hard to imagine that why he wouldn’t include scholarly authority in this polemic. Kant also himself contrasts his notion of enlightenment with one on which it would consist in acquiring information, in the footnote from WDO AA 08. He says there that “there is less to” his notion of enlightenment than to one that identifies it with the acquisition of information, that *everyone* can carry it out for himself, and that a good educational system will ensure that everyone is trained in it from a young age.

There is other textual evidence that Kant sees enlightenment as something everyone, not just scholars, can and should accomplish. First, Kant’s rule for enlightenment is one of three maxims that he identifies with the “common understanding”— a mode of thought that all human beings share. Second, in his *Reflexionen* Kant says that while it can be good for people to be trained, for a while, by way of “coercion, authority or prejudice,” eventually “all these evils must have an end” (RGV 528 AA 15:229-30); he also says, in the same place, that philosophy, “if it shall have a use” at all, must “give the principles” by which immaturity can be ended everywhere. Moreover, he bitterly condemns the infantilization of the populace by kings and clerics, making no distinction between scholars and other members of the populace: “One first renders the people unable to govern themselves, and then excuses one’s despotism on the grounds that they cannot govern themselves.” (RGV 532 AA 15:231) And he compares academics to despotic rulers, saying that they make the people immature (RGV 1508-9 AA 15:820-26).

So I think there is good reason to say that for Kant enlightenment is something that all human beings can and should carry out, regardless of their scholarly training. Indeed, throughout most of WA Kant talks about how anyone can and should enlighten him or herself; he uses the term “scholar” quite rarely, although those occurrences are located, unfortunately for my purposes, in the midst of his central discussion of the right to a public use of reason. But I think we can make good sense of this fact: the occasional references to the right of “scholars” to address one another freely in WA have to do with the context in which it was written, in which there was considerable danger that scholarship was about to be put back under censorship. So in context Kant may either be saying that the writings of scholars *at least*, or *especially*, should be wholly free. He may also regard be using the word “scholar” in a loose, broad way by which anyone speaking or writing for the purpose of inquiry alone counts as a “scholar.” In any case, there is no reason to suppose that Kant thinks free speech should be *limited* to scholars, or that he regards enlightenment as something that flows from scholars to the people at large. Indeed, on his conception of enlightenment, that would be impossible.

Several commentators on Kant’s notion of enlightenment accept this egalitarian view of WA, but argue that Kant moves to a more elitist model in RGV and SF: see, especially, Laursen, “The Subversive Kant”, Lestition, “Kant and the End of the Enlightenment in Prussia,” and Deligiorgi, pp.76-7. I am not convinced that Kant drops his egalitarianism as much as these writers suggest, but I do think his RGV and SF offer a somewhat different model of enlightenment (see my *What is Enlightenment?* chapter 2).

where, he thinks, scientific knowledge is not available and relying on someone else's words is morally inappropriate.<sup>8</sup>

And what about the second idea, that our immaturity is “self-incurred”? We are responsible, according to Kant, for the very unwillingness to question that makes us vulnerable to manipulation by authorities. Many other people, in Kant's own time and since, would rather blame those *authorities* for the threats and manipulative ways of teaching that make it difficult for people to think for themselves. Kant blames us for our own mental slavery. Why? Well, Kant's fundamental principle of morality is based on the idea that we are all free: we have the ability, at all times, to follow a law we lay down for ourselves, and not to be led around by outside pressures. It follows that we bear responsibility even for the occasions on which we *renounce* our own responsibility, that we can be regarded as having in some sense freely taken on even conditions by which we are mentally enslaved. We are *wrong* to do this, of course, but it is nevertheless something we *do*, and not something that just happens to us. As applied to our failure to think for ourselves, the idea is that we ourselves attribute the aura of authority to others that enables them to shape our beliefs. Kant says in a later text that the public “surreptitiously attributes” a “magic power” to experts in medicine, law, and theology, regarding them as “miracle-workers” who will help them get what they want (SF AA 49-50). So *we* are the true source of the authority that others wield over us. If we but question that authority, it will disappear: we will see that there is nothing magical about experts, and that we have reason to rely on their authority only insofar as it is based on grounds we can accept. We will realize that we can and should see authority only in those to whom we are freely willing to grant it, that we never have reason to accept their word blindly.<sup>9</sup>

4. The third major point in the essay is a political one. Kant tells us that it is difficult for an individual to pull himself out of immaturity on his own — it is all too comfortable to recite “statutes and formulas” instead of thinking for ourselves — but that an entire society

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<sup>8</sup> Kant's essay, throughout, is about pushing off responsibility for decisions about how to guide my own life and the warning not to rely unthinkingly on the doctor has to be understood in that context. It is not that I should think that I *know* as much as the doctor, but that I have to take responsibility for the way the doctor's advice affects my own life, for the *actions* I take on the basis of what he or she says. This is not a matter simply of knowledge but of values: the value I place on having certain pleasures at the cost of shortening my life, for instance, or, by contrast, on *extending* my life at the cost of financial and emotional burdens I place on others, or of my own dignity or mental health. It is a shirking of responsibility, a mark of immaturity, to blame my doctor for these *uses* of the information she offers me.

<sup>9</sup>It is also a source for some important later ideas. Marx will try to show us how oppressed classes are themselves the source of the power that the ideology of the ruling class has over them. Nietzsche will say that our belief in God, and in traditional forms of morality (including Kantian morality) is a projection of our own fears and hatreds, and that these beliefs will fall away as soon as we have the courage to get rid of our childish feelings about them. Freud will locate the source of what he calls the “illusion” of religion in a projection of our relationship to our fathers. For all of these figures, and their many followers, enlightenment will involve something more than Kant's mere willingness to question — radical social change, for Marx; radical psychological change, for Freud and Nietzsche — but the core idea that we have enslaved ourselves, and can consequently redeem ourselves *from* our own slavery, remains the same.

can move towards enlightenment if only it allows freedom of expression.<sup>10</sup> Then the freedom of thought shown by some may inspire others to “throw... off the yoke of immaturity.”

And now, as Kant clarifies what he means by freedom of expression, he introduces what is probably the best-known element of the essay: a distinction between the private and the public use of reason. Everywhere we hear “Don’t argue!,” he says. Officers in the military tell their soldiers not to argue with their orders; tax collectors say, “Don’t argue; just pay!” Kant thinks that some sort of argument should be permissible in all these realms: even soldiers in the army should be allowed to raise doubts about the orders they receive. But they need not be permitted to raise those doubts *when and where* they receive these orders. We need to obey superiors in various spheres, even if we should also be allowed to dispute their orders in the public realm. The realm of argument, of free debate, must be separated from the realm of obedience. Making use of a slightly odd understanding of the words “private” and “public,” Kant says that in one’s private capacity — one’s role in a specific job or other limited aspect of society — one may not always have a right to speak freely, but that one should always be allowed to do this when addressing the public: when writing or speaking as a “scholar.” Those who have an official role are required to carry out the duties assigned to them in that role, Kant thinks, but he also calls for a realm of free public discussion in which everyone can criticize the duties assigned to them.

There is a great deal more to be said about this version of the public/private distinction, but before we get there, I want to add points 4 and 5 to the summary I have been giving of Kant’s essay. The fourth point is that no church may fix its doctrines forever, binding future generations to accept without question the views it proclaims at one particular time. “One age cannot bind itself, and thus conspire to place the succeeding age in a situation in which it becomes impossible to broaden its knowledge.” Even the *unanimous* consent of a church’s members to such an arrangement would not make it legitimate: “[T]o renounce [enlightenment,” says Kant – to renounce the free questioning of dogmas — “is to wound and trample underfoot the holy rights of humanity.” Again we see that enlightenment is a moral act, for Kant — even a moral obligation. We also see that voluntary groups as well as the government can offend against this obligation, and that it should not be overridden even by communal consensus. It is, rather, a condition *for* any acceptable social contract, a condition without which no society can be seen as reflecting its members’ choices.

Which brings us to the fifth and final main thesis of the essay: the priority of intellectual over civic freedom. Governments should never forbid the free discussion of politics, says Kant. Such discussions are helpful to the government itself, as well as a condition for policies to be legitimate. Kant indicates that nothing *more* than public discussion is necessary, in the long run, to effect political change. Absolute rulers, he thinks, will eventually reform everything in a constitution that needs reforming — even

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<sup>10</sup> Whether freedom of expression was necessary for enlightenment was a recurring topic in the German literature on this subject. See the contributions of Möhsen, Klein, Bahrtdt, Moser and Fichte, in Schmidt (ed.), *What is Enlightenment?*

their own absolute powers — in the face of public criticism. Indeed, Kant suggests that it may be helpful to intellectual freedom if civic freedom is restrained for a while. Then ideas can be played out without leading to rash political changes, and the people can come to mental maturity before they rule themselves.

I think there is a nugget of truth to Kant's separation of public discussion from practical politics, but on the whole I don't want to defend Kant's political views here. What I do want to defend is 1) the idea that every human being everywhere has a duty to think for him or herself and not merely accept doctrines on authority, and 2) Kant's intriguing, complex picture of how this individual duty is interwoven with a realm of public debate. These theses do not constitute all that people have meant by "enlightenment," but they are central aspects of it, and aspects that have been central to the opposition that the term has aroused, in conservative circles and non-Western cultures. I am myself sympathetic to the religious and cultural groups who feel threatened by Western secularism. But I think the enlightenment Kant defined and urged in his famous essay is something more minimal than that. Kantian enlightenment, I want to say, is something we all can and should accept — even if some of us continue to resist what else and what more marches under the banner of "secularism" and "modernity."

5. Half the battle in defending something is explaining clearly what it means. Let's begin by trying to make clearer sense of the distinction Kant draws between the private and the public realms. That distinction is less puzzling if we look at the way Kant uses the word "private" in other contexts. "Private" derives from a Latin word meaning "set apart," "lacking," or "deprived": the "private" person was deprived of public office. Kant takes the term out of this political context and uses it to describe individuals insofar as they are "deprived of" their common humanity — insofar as they are *limited to* some specific aspect of themselves, which links them to just one community among others, rather than to humanity at large. Thus he distinguishes in his *Logic* between an absolute or universal and a private horizon of thought, identifying the latter with what we think as "particular and conditioned" beings and the former with what we think as, simply, *human* beings. "The determination of the private horizon," he tells us, "depends on various empirical conditions and special considerations, e.g., age, sex, position, way of life and the like" (46) — features of what today we might call our "identity," which can limit our thought or guide it towards limited aims.<sup>11</sup> From the absolute or universal horizon, by contrast — the public horizon — we are concerned with the question, "What can the human being, *as* a human being, ... know?" (41). And this question is not limited by any aim. It is the response of a shallow mind, says Kant, to ask of this kind of knowledge, "What is that good for?" (47). Elsewhere, in his lectures on *Anthropology* (AA 07: 219), Kant contrasts a "private sense" (*sensus privatus*) with a "communal sense" (*sensus communis*). We have "a sense for ideas peculiar to ourselves" as well as "a sense for ideas that are common to all," he says, and we

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<sup>11</sup>Onora O'Neill also stresses the connection between "private" and "deprived," for Kant, but understands a bit differently than I do: O'Neill, *Constructions of Reason*, pp. 17, 50.

correct the former by the latter; it is indeed insanity to rely on our private sense when it is contradicted by the communal one. The person who does that is the person who sees things “in broad daylight” that people next to him do not see, or hears voices that no-one else hears (§ 53; AA 07: 219). Relating our understanding to the understanding of others is “a subjectively necessary touchstone” of the correctness of our judgments, and we are on our way to madness if we “merely isolate ourselves within our own experiences.” Moreover, our private sense or understanding gets better the more we are able to test it against the judgments of others. For that reason, censoring books is not merely bad politics, but a serious obstacle to the growth of knowledge: “In this way we are deprived of ... the greatest and most useful means of correcting our own thoughts.”

If we plug all this back into the enlightenment essay, we see that the public realm is not a *political* realm for Kant, but a realm in which all our specific, historically located projects and identities — including our political projects and identities — are suspended and we are therefore able to think generally about them. And he wants to suggest that it is important even for our private identities themselves — our identities as lawyers or doctors, or representatives of a specific religious group — that we *have* a public realm in which we can suspend those identities and scrutinize them: in which we can check the judgments we make in our private capacities against the touchstone of a more broadly human kind of judgment, a *sensus communis*. In the public realm, Kant tells us, we write for “a society of world citizens,” for human beings in general. As scholars, as people interested in knowledge for its own sake, we are not bound by any specific role or limited community: and we all need to see ourselves this way some of the time.

Now Kant is not out to deny that scholarly writings, like other writings, always respond to the questions and pre-suppositions of a specific historical context. Kant's own essay was written for a Berlin journal read by a limited set of scholars, and he filled the piece with allusions to local concerns and events of which only that community was likely to be aware. Kant could also not have expected, at this point in his life, that any literal society of world citizens would read his work. His reputation had begun to grow in Germany since the publication of his *Critique of Pure Reason*, three years earlier, but he was still fairly obscure, and he could not have expected his writings to reach an international audience. So by saying that the scholar writes for a society of world citizens, Kant does not mean to deny that the scholar *also* writes for a more local community: of Germans or Frenchmen, Christians or Jews, professors or clerics. The point is that anything written *as* a piece of scholarship<sup>12</sup> is implicitly opened up by that fact to the judgments of all humanity, even if it is also directed to the judgments of a particular group. When considering a piece in our capacity just as beings who pursue knowledge, we implicitly regard our local norms of judgment as open to correction by the *sensus communis* of all human beings. *As* pure inquirers — members of the “public,” in Kant's sense — we recognize that the standards of argument that our intellectual community employs, to be standards of argument at all, must be capable of being corrected by more general tests of

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<sup>12</sup> Which here means anything written as a contribution to human knowledge at large, rather than to meet the needs of a specific institution.

epistemic adequacy. As Germans or Christians or lawyers, we may place limitations on what our fellow group members may *say*. But we cannot limit what they, or we, will count as *true*. To do that is to act like the person who sees things that no-one else sees — to drift towards a kind of group madness.

We can make ready sense of these points. As the contemporary Kantian, Christine Korsgaard, has stressed, we need to be able to ask, from a place beyond each of our specific identities, why we are committed to each one, what its limits are, and which of the demands it makes on us are legitimate. If I occupy a specific “civil post or office,” to take one of Kant’s examples, I need to be able to ask myself why I have been willing to accept that post — what purposes I think it serves and why I support those purposes — and in what circumstances I might feel obliged to renounce it, or to challenge the requirements that go with it. And this is good *for* my specific identity itself. It is good *for* the civil service — it makes the civil service less prey to corruption — if its employees think independently about its rules and practices, if they can evaluate those rules and practices from an independent perspective.

Similarly, if I adhere to a specific “way of life,” to take another of Kant’s examples — the way of life of a specific culture or religion, say — I need to be able to ask myself, from a position beyond that *of* the way of life, why I find it worthwhile or in line with my moral duties. Again, it will be good *for* my culture or religion if its members can think out of the box like this — it is most likely to live up to its own ideals if its members can think about what they are doing on their own. And the position making such assessment possible is that of a human being in general, in which neither the questions we ask nor their answers are limited by any “private” — specific — ends.

More broadly, Kant thinks that the public or general point of view can serve as a test for the correctness of our beliefs even on ordinary empirical matters. It can of course happen that everyone’s views on a certain subject are mistaken or corrupt, and we shouldn’t overlook the importance of individuals like Copernicus, who defy common sense correctly on some issue. But for the most part Kant is surely right that the understanding of those around us is a healthy corrective for our private judgments, and that one who refuses to check in with the judgments of others, when he thinks he sees or hears something, is on the way to madness.

6. How does all this go with Kant’s demand that we think for ourselves? In the first place, as I’ve already noted, by “think for yourself,” Kant cannot and does not mean that we are to figure everything out on our own. The subject of testimony has become a philosophical topic of great importance, in recent years; philosophers have become very interested in the fact that much of what we know comes from other people’s testimony. That’s the source of your beliefs about your name and birthplace, as well as the vast majority of your other common-sense and scientific views. If belief based on testimony had to be excluded from knowledge, we would know hardly anything: we would not even have the premises from which we could readily *find out* anything. Consequently, we must regard

the word of others as an independent source of knowledge, right up there with perception and our various modes of reasoning.<sup>13</sup>

Now, partly because of what he says in “What is Enlightenment?,” Kant is often represented as a philosopher who didn’t grasp this point. But that turns out to be false. In a brilliant essay called “Kant on Testimony,” Axel Gelfert has shown that Kant put testimony on a level with perception as a source of knowledge. Drawing on texts from Kant’s logic lectures that are rarely read even by Kant scholars, Gelfert brings to light passages like the following: “[W]e can just as well accept something on the testimony of others as on our own experience. For there is just as much that is deceptive in our experience as in the testimony of others. ... To be sure, the testimony that we accept from others is subject to just as many hazards as our own experience is subject to errors. But we can just as well have certainty through the testimony of others as through our own experience.”(V-Lo/Weiner AA 24.2 895-6 in Gelfert 2006, p. 633).<sup>14</sup> Testimony is subject to “hazards”: the people giving it to us may be lying or misinformed. But what we see and hear is also subject to error. So in both cases, we need to use our cognitive faculties critically. Kant says that “[h]istorical belief is reasonable if it is critical,” in this sense (Gelfert 2006, p. 641).

But Kant limits the appropriate epistemic place for testimony to empirical matters. Truths of reason are a different matter. “[S]omething [may] be considered historically true,” he says, “purely on the strength of testimonies, as in the belief that there is a city called Rome.” By contrast, “a *purely rational belief* can never be transformed into *knowledge* by any natural data of reason and experience” and hence cannot rightly be held on the basis of testimony (WDO AA 8: 141).<sup>15</sup> When it comes to truths of reason, Kant thinks, there is something deficient in our understanding if we merely accept what others tell us (Gelfert 2006, pp. 627, 637, 641). The person who doesn’t work out claims of logic or mathematics for him or herself doesn’t properly grasp them, and can’t be said to know them in the way that someone who has worked through the proofs does. “If a cognition is constituted in such a way that it can ... be made out by one’s understanding,” says Kant, “then the authority of others is no genuine ground of holding [it to be true]” (Gelfert 2006, p. 641).

<sup>13</sup> See Coady, *Testimony* for an excellent overview of this subject.

<sup>14</sup> As quoted in Gelfert, “Kant on Testimony,” p.633.Indeed, Kant thinks we have an *obligation* to trust others — prima facie, at least: “It ... indicates a very bad mode of thought if one never trusts anyone in anything, but instead ... wants to see everything that is promised and pledged to him present and fulfilled.” And again: “[w]ithout fidelity and belief no *republique*, no public affairs would be able to exist.” (in Gelfert, “Kant on Testimony,” pp. 634-5).

<sup>15</sup> See also Gelfert, “Kant on Testimony” p.637. There may be an echo in this last passage of a distinction Lessing drew between truths of history and truths of reason. Lessing argued that the historical claims of traditional religions under-determine their doctrines about God and the nature of the soul — “[I]f I have no historical objection to the fact that Christ raised someone from the dead, must I therefore regard it as true that God has a Son who is of the same essence as himself? What connection is there between my inability to raise any substantial objection to the evidence for the former, and my obligation to believe something which my reason refuses to accept?” (Lessing, “On the proof of the spirit and of power,” p.86) — and Kant is concerned with much the same issues in WDO. The inappropriateness of reliance on testimony in religious matters is a central theme in 18<sup>th</sup>-century writings on testimony (in, for instance, Hume’s much-quoted chapter on miracles in the *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*). This context tends to be overlooked by 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup>-century philosophers when they look back at the 18<sup>th</sup>-century discussions. Coady, for instance, entirely leaves out this context: see Coady, *Testimony*, pp.179-82; 186-8.

This point takes a yet sharper form when it comes to moral issues. Not only are moral claims matters of reason, for Kant, but they are the direct expression of our autonomy. It follows that accepting moral claims merely on authority is not just a cognitive failing but a moral one as well: we betray our autonomy when we do that.

This brings us back to “What is Enlightenment?” When Kant admonishes us to think for ourselves, he has in mind moral issues in particular: the examples he gives are almost entirely political or religious ones, and religion, for Kant, is at bottom a form of morality.<sup>16</sup> That is why reliance on testimony, here, is inappropriate.

We may still think Kant has gone too far, however, and forgotten his own wise comments on testimony in the logic lectures. One of his examples, remember, is that of relying on doctors when it comes to diet, yet medicine is surely an empirical science to which testimony is appropriate. He also urges soldiers to scrutinize military discipline, and all of us to take a critical stance towards the system of taxation under which we live — but many of the questions that arise about taxation and military discipline are empirical ones. And even as regards religion, surely there is a place for expertise, hence testimony, when it comes to, say, the historical claims that various religions make; surely religion is not *only* a moral matter.

Kant’s point, I believe, is that even as regards empirical facts, we must at some point think hard about which authorities we can reasonably rely on and which we should suspect or reject. As we’ll see in a bit, Kant eventually translates “think for yourself” into a principle to seek grounds we can uphold universally for each source of belief we accept. That means we need to think through the sorts of reasons we have for relying on perception *or* testimony, or for rejecting both in favor of a priori argument. It also means, as regards testimony in particular, that we need to figure out the features that make one source of testimony more reliable than another. Modern philosophy begins with Descartes’s doubts about the church authorities from whom he learned astrophysics, and Descartes was right to harbor such doubts. More generally, we all must choose *among* authorities, and assess them, accordingly, for trustworthiness. Some authorities are more reliable than others, and there are at least some general guidelines we can use to sift out the former from the latter. But that means that we can “think for ourselves” about the grounds on which we accept authoritative claims, and how those grounds favor some authorities over others. This is already not to rely on authorities in virtue of an instinctive or socially-inculcated fear or awe of them: it is already to rely on them *in an enlightened way*. And I think that that is all Kant wants, when he calls on us to think for ourselves. We should not be cowed by the aura of superiority with which certain people or institutions appear to us. We should realize instead that we are responsible for the power that that aura has over us, and have the courage to resist that power.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Compare *Anthropology* § 43 (Anth AA 7:200): “[T]o require that a so-called layman ... should not use his own reason in religious matters, particularly since religion is to be appreciated as moral ... is an unjust demand because as to morals every man must account for all his doings.”

<sup>17</sup>We do *have* such good reason, of course: indeed, for me to rely on my own individual experience over that of scientific experts when it comes to matters of, say, astrophysics or ancient history would be for me *not* to



There is a further point that could be made. Kant's main concern in his enlightenment essay, as I've noted, is with religious questions: with the views we hold about what, overall, we should be doing with our lives. It is *here*, above all, that Kant thinks each of us needs to think for him or herself, and here he is surely right. It is one thing to rely on experts for factual information, but quite another to borrow one's fundamental values from other people.<sup>18</sup> There are at least three deep problems with relying on testimony for our beliefs about our ultimate goals and orientation in life. One is that there is very limited expertise to be had in such matters: the questions about them are unlikely to be settled by empirical facts, or by the sorts of abstract reasoning in which some people excel over others. A second is that the reasons by which we differentiate between where we will and where we will not rely on authorities, and determine what sorts of authorities to accept, are very likely to depend significantly *on* our ultimate values, on the over-arching goals by which we orient our lives. A person with a religious orientation may treat scientific authorities far more skeptically than a person of secular orientation would, at least when they issue proclamations on religious subjects. And a person with one kind of religious orientation may accept very different authorities from a person with a different religious orientation. So authority cannot reasonably settle the question of which authorities on value to accept, or whether one should rely on authorities, here, at all.

Finally, when it comes to truths on which the shape of my entire life may depend, I am responsible for the answer I give myself in a way I am not for many of my other beliefs. I can decide to delegate responsibility for determining the right answer to many factual questions, and even some moral ones, after I determine how on the whole I will orient my life. But I can't (responsibly) *delegate* responsibility until I first *take* responsibility for the decisions by which I figure out what to delegate and to whom. I can't *decide* to trust authorities, as opposed to trusting them blindly, until I first figure out what, for me, will count as good reason to trust someone. At some point, as Wittgenstein might have said, trusting must come to an end.

7. I hope it is beginning to become clear that "think for yourself," for Kant, can go along with a great deal of respect for the thought of other people. This is even clearer if we look at Kant's use of that phrase outside of the enlightenment essay. Kant describes "think for yourself" as the motto of enlightenment in several places, but elsewhere it goes along with two other maxims: "Think in the position of everyone else" and "Think in accord with

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have good (universalizable) grounds for these beliefs: *not* to think for myself, as Kant understands that idea. We'll see later that Kant regards "think for yourself" as a motto that should keep us *from* relying unduly on our own private feelings and experience: "*think for yourself*" is meant as an antonym to, among other things, "rely on your personal *feelings*." Often, thinking for myself not only allows me but requires me to rely on the thoughts of others.

<sup>18</sup>In the words of Carl Friedrich Bahrdt, a contemporary of Kant's, "If ... I tried to verify every report of a flotilla, ... I would act absurdly, wasting too much time and effort on things that are unimportant for me. But when we are talking about truths that ... [affect my civil welfare or] decide the salvation of my soul, that is quite a different case. There I must examine the truth with the greatest obstinacy if I do not wish to gamble foolishly with my well-being." — "On the Freedom of the Press and its Limits ...," in Schmidt, *What is Enlightenment?*, p. 103.

yourself.” Collectively, Kant calls these three the maxims of the “common human understanding” (KU AA 05: 294-5).<sup>19</sup> He also has specific names for each maxim. The first is the “maxim of enlightenment,” although he also calls it “the maxim of a reason that is never passive,” “the maxim of unprejudiced thought,” the maxim that opposes “the heteronomy of reason,” and the maxim that liberates us from “superstition.” He equates enlightenment, that is, with active thought or autonomy, and contrasts it with prejudice and superstition.

The other two he calls the maxim of “broad-minded” thought and the maxim of consistency. The maxim of broad-minded thought, says Kant, requires us to “put [ourselves] into the standpoint of others” (CJ § 40). This echoes Adam Smith, who held that moral judgment requires us to project ourselves into other people’s situations. For Kant, such projection enables us to attain the universal or “public” horizon described earlier, and to communicate with others.<sup>20</sup>

Finally, the third maxim — don’t contradict yourself — which seems the most obvious of the maxims, is in fact the hardest, Kant says, and can be achieved only if we develop long habits of thinking in accordance with the first two.<sup>21</sup> The idea seems to be that a motley of prejudices can easily contain all sorts of contradictions, so if we simply mouth what we hear from others we will contradict ourselves without knowing it, while a merely private kind of thought — “isolated within our own experience” — will also lead us to think now one thing, now another, depending on our moods and the different things we seem to see or hear at different times. So only an active attempt to adjust the opinions we receive from others to our own experience, and vice versa, will keep us from inconsistency.

We should now see more clearly how Kant means to bring “private” and “public” thought together. I am to think for myself — I am never to allow my reason to be merely “passive,” always actively to apply my own conception of good argument to any claim proposed to me — but I am also always to *aim* this thinking towards standards I can share with all other human beings. I am to take the modes of reasoning that I share with other human beings — *as* human beings, not as fellow Germans or Christians or lawyers — to be a “touchstone” for my own thought, even while never allowing what other people tell me to become my own beliefs just on their say-so. This double-sided guide for thinking directs us to respect general modes of reasoning we share with other people without necessarily respecting any *particular* shared belief: the fine line between taking on a belief as a “prejudice,” and failing to respect the common understanding of the world, can be found by focusing on *methods* of justification rather than particular claims that purport to be justified by those methods.

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<sup>19</sup> See also Anth AA 7:57, Introduction § VII; Anth AA 7:200 § 43; and R AA 15: 715,1486 and R AA 15: 820-22, 1508.

<sup>20</sup> To “set [ourselves] apart from the subjective private conditions [*Privatbedingungen*] of the judgment” — KU AA 5:295. On the importance of communication, see Anth AA 7: 200, 219, § 43, 53.

<sup>21</sup> “The third maxim, namely that of the **consistent** way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can only be achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic.” (KU AA 5:295)

Which is pretty much what Kant himself says, when, at the end of his essay on “orientation,” he translates “think for oneself” into a concrete guide for thought:

«*Thinking for oneself* means seeking the highest touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e., in one's own reason), and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is **enlightenment**. Moreover, there is less to this maxim than those who locate enlightenment in information imagine, since it is instead a negative principle in the use of one's capacity for knowledge, and often a person rich in information is the least enlightened in his use of it. Employing one's own reason means nothing more than always asking oneself, about everything one is supposed to accept, whether one finds it possible to make the ground on which one accepts it, or the rule that follows from accepting it, into a universal principle for one's use of reason. Everyone can apply this test for himself, and he will see superstition and enthusiasm immediately disappear with this examination, even if he is far from having the information with which to refute them on objective grounds. For he is simply using the maxim of the *self-preservation* of reason» (WhDO? AA 08: 146-7n).

It's worth noting that Kant here explicitly rejects the notion of enlightenment as a mere spread of information, as if it could be showered down on an unthinking populace by brilliant and well-educated experts; he even says that one can be well-informed and still not enlightened. Kantian enlightenment is egalitarian, focused on *how* we know rather than *what* we know.<sup>22</sup> But the main point of interest in this passage is that it gives us a sort of cognitive equivalent to Kant's famous basic moral rule, the Categorical Imperative: accept only claims whose grounds you could use universally as a basis of belief.

What might this mean? Well, to begin with, it *doesn't* mean, “accept only those specific claims that everyone else might accept.” Kant's basic rule is not aimed at the *content* of what we believe, but at its *form*: the *grounds* on which we believe it. We are supposed to ask whether the grounds on which we accept something as true are the sort of grounds we would use for any other belief; this is the maxim of reason's “self-preservation” presumably because it fends off contradiction, the greatest threat to reasoning. In practice, what Kant seems to have in mind are two sorts of cases: first, cases in which you are inclined to believe something just because some strong emotion inclines you to believe it, or on the basis of a set of sensations — a dream or mystical vision, perhaps — that no-one else shares. And second, cases in which you are inclined to believe something because you have heard it from a religious teacher or read it in a supposedly sacred text. These are what Kant, earlier in the orientation essay, calls “enthusiasm” and “superstition.” Enlightenment views of religion were resisted on the one hand by people committed to a personal, mystical faith, in which direct experience of God rather than reason is supposed to let one know what God wants, and on the other hand by people committed to a traditional religion, in which sacred texts and creeds rather than reason were supposed to represent the will of God. Kant finds

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<sup>22</sup>The charge of elitism often brought against Kant's notion of enlightenment seems to me misplaced: see above, note 9.

both these sorts of religious commitment a threat to reason, and therefore to true freedom, and the paragraph to which the note above is appended appeals to all “friends of the human race and what is holiest to it” — for Kant, of course, freedom is what is holiest to human beings — to “accept what appears worthy of belief after careful and sincere examination of facts or rational grounds,” rather than rejecting reason as the test of truth.<sup>23</sup> Given this context, it seems clear that Kant expects his cognitive universalization test to rule out claims to knowledge that depend either on unshareable personal experience or on authoritative texts. We will recognize that we could not make such grounds of belief into “a universal principle for [our] use of reason.” I couldn’t generally get around the world by accepting my private experiences as true even when everyone around me thinks I am wrong. That way lies seeing lamps in broad daylight that nobody else sees, and hearing voices that nobody else hears. Nor could I get around the world in general by accepting without question everything I read or hear from others: that way lies buying the Brooklyn bridge from friendly strangers.<sup>24</sup> So both the maxim for grounding a belief that runs, “This is the way things look to me; hence it must be correct” and the maxim for grounding belief that runs, “This is what an impressive person said to me; hence it must be correct” cannot be universalized.

Now it is not clear from all this whether Kant believes we will necessarily give up on the *content* of a religious claim that we had hitherto held on enthusiastic or superstitious grounds, once we apply his cognitive universalization test. Kant says a person can apply the test who “is far from having the information” to refute superstition and enthusiasm objectively, but this leaves open whether such a person, after applying the test, will reject everything that a superstitious or enthusiastic religion claims as *false*, or merely cease to believe in that religion *superstitiously* or *enthusiastically*. Suppose I am a lapsed or half-hearted Lutheran and you, a fervent Lutheran who thinks you have experienced God’s presence, try to bolster my faith by appealing to your mystical experiences or inducing experiences of that sort in me. I respond, much to your dismay, by applying Kant’s cognitive universalization test — even to rhapsodies I myself experience. Now what happens? Do I *give up* on Lutheranism, or do I simply refuse to come to the faith *on an enthusiastic basis*? I think the casual quality of Kant’s treatment of this issue, and the assumption that we will see his test as something obvious, indicates strongly that he did not regard it as a means of *refuting* traditional religious faiths, just of dismissing a certain way of holding them. I think it is clear, that is, that in the scenario just sketched, I could remain

<sup>23</sup> The context here is a debate over the nature of freedom: Kant is arguing against those who think freedom requires a willingness to suspend reason itself — that we need freedom, among other things, *from* reason itself, and can find that in the fancies of a poetic or religious “genius.”

<sup>24</sup> These quick pragmatic arguments are of course not all that Kant would say in defense of the claim that private experience and authority can’t be universalized as grounds for belief. The first *Critique* shows, rather, that we cannot so much as distinguish between the subjective and the objective unless we bring our private sensations in line with rules for organizing experience that others can share as well. There is also a social analogue to this claim: we cannot, as a society, regard propositions as true simply because they are upheld by people invested with authority without losing all grip on the distinction between what we *hold* true and what really *is* true.

a Lutheran, even become a more believing one, and still be quite enlightened, for Kant: as long as I did not *rest* my religious beliefs on enthusiastic or superstitious grounds. Perhaps I have other grounds for my belief — rational ones that I can easily universalize. Perhaps I even believe that “private” experience of some sort has a legitimate role to play in the religious life: but my grounds for *that* belief, for my very view of private experience, are ones I regard as shareable with others, and try in fact to share with others, in order to be corrected if I am mistaken or confused. In that case, I would still count as “enlightened” for Kant.

These points get at the core of what Kant means by “think for yourself.” Thinking for yourself is not for Kant the adoption of any specific mode of argument — it does not, in particular, require one to adopt Kant’s own critical theory. It is just a refusal to accept any mode of argument, in one case, that one would reject elsewhere. The enlightenment Kant describes in his journal pieces of 1784 and 1786 is a broad and a thin one — an attitude towards knowledge that practically anyone could accept — and not, like his full critical theory, a method thick enough to rule out many specific beliefs.<sup>25</sup> The rule of Kantian enlightenment is that one must always pull one’s private thoughts toward a publically-shareable touchstone, not that one has to have any particular set of such thoughts or endorse any particular public standard.

8. To sum up. Kant’s notion of enlightenment has two central components. On the one hand, it requires of each of us that we seek reasons for what we believe that we can expect everyone else to share — that we never accept beliefs blindly, or on a basis, like our private sensations, which we could not regard generally as a reason for believing. On the other hand, it requires of the society in which we live that it permit, and to the extent necessary foster, a public realm of debate to which people can bring anything they are inclined to believe for examination. We each have a duty to our societies and our societies have a duty to each of us. We must aim to be publically reasonable regardless of what we privately feel; our society must allow us to say what we want, regardless of whether it is based on public reason. And a public realm structured by these reciprocal duties, Kant thinks, will eventually be free of fanaticism and dogmatism. If society keeps its part of the bargain, no powerful institution or elite will be able to block good new ideas from coming forward, or preserve bad old ones, and if each of us keeps our part of the bargain, mass hysteria will be unable to squelch new ideas, and the popular hold of bad ones will wither away. Taken together, the two sides of this vision of enlightenment should ensure that the public realm remains both lively and thoughtful.

This vision of enlightenment — the two complementary sets of responsibilities, on each of us to our societies and on our societies to us — is something that can I think be

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<sup>25</sup>Many other commentators, including Michel Foucault, draw a distinction between “enlightenment” and “critique” in Kant’s writings: see, for instance, Foucault, “What is Critique?”.

defended as a good for all human beings in all cultures. It is a minimal conception of enlightenment, one that doesn't require us to accept Kant's critical system, or purely moral reading of religion, or rationalistic understanding of morality. There are more maximal notions of enlightenment, to which Kant himself was tempted in some moods, and on which later figures insisted — notions on which nobody can count as enlightened unless they give up traditional religion, for instance, or rise beyond merely conventional morality, or live in a radically egalitarian society. But these ideas are far more problematic than the minimal notion of enlightenment to be found in Kant's journal pieces of 1784 and 1786. Kant was quite right, I think, to present "enlightenment," there, as something that people could endorse despite deep differences over the overall human good. The freedom that comes of thinking for oneself in Kant's sense simply insures that all our views, including the ones on which we most profoundly differ, are accepted freely, and kept open to further discussion. Any community with a view of the human good can gain by endorsing such freedom, and will flourish only in a world where that freedom is secured. Far from offending against them, Kantian enlightenment is the precondition for a healthy proliferation of cultures, political movements, and religious faiths.

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## **Kantian Enlightenment as a critique of culture**

### ***La Ilustración kantiana como una crítica de la cultura***

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«The scholarly estate [is] the most superfluous of all for mankind living in a state of simplicity, but the most indispensable in the condition of oppression by superstition and violence» (AA 20:10).

#### **Abstract**

It is puzzling to notice that in his 1784 essay on Enlightenment, Kant addresses every human being with his watchword « Have the courage to use your *own* understanding! », while at the same time he seems to restrict the access to the public discussion of matters of common interest to the learned persons (*Gelehrte*). This begs the question: Is the participation in the public debate part and parcel of Kant's conception of *Aufklärung*? A positive answer to this question is given by Katerina Deligiorgi in her *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*. A critical assessment of this book will lead us however to consider that Kant has a differentiated approach to enlightenment depending on whether someone is educated or uneducated. Following Rousseau, Kant has come to recognize as a matter of fact this inequality toward the products of culture. Now the two-level conception of enlightenment entailed by this inequality becomes explicit in the 1790s, especially in the very last work Kant has published: *The Conflict of the Faculties* (1798).

#### **Key words**

Kant; Enlightenment; Culture; Scholars; Common Understanding

## Resumen

Es sorprendente advertir que en su ensayo de 1784 sobre la Ilustración, Kant se dirige a todo ser humano con la consigna «¡Ten el coraje de usar tu *propio* entendimiento!», mientras que al mismo tiempo parece restringir el acceso a la discusión pública de cuestiones de interés común a los doctos (*Gelehrte*). Esto propicia la pregunta siguiente: ¿La participación en el espacio público forma parte de la concepción kantiana de la *Aufklärung*? Una respuesta positiva a esta pregunta es ofrecida por Katerina Deligiorgi en su *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*. Un comentario crítico de este libro nos conducirá, sin embargo, a considerar que Kant muestra un acercamiento diferenciado a la Ilustración dependiendo de si la persona en cuestión cuenta con educación o no. Siguiendo a Rousseau, Kant llega a reconocer como un hecho esta desigualdad en relación con los productos de la cultura. La concepción en dos niveles de la Ilustración que comporta esta desigualdad se vuelve explícita en los años 90, especialmente en la última obra publicada por Kant, *El conflicto de las Facultades* (1798).

## Palabras clave

Kant; Ilustración; cultura; doctos; entendimiento común

In her fascinating book *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*, Katerina Deligiorgi seeks to demonstrate the intrinsic interest and continuing relevance of Kant's concept of enlightenment. As was to be expected, she begins her investigation with the famous essay of 1784 *An Answer to the Question : What is Enlightenment?* and subsequently draws from many other sources from across the Kantian corpus in order to provide a full picture and a "cohesive account" (Deligiorgi 2005, p. 1) of Kant's appropriation of this well-known theme. We all remember the definition Kant gives of Enlightenment, in a wording that has almost become a commonplace: "Enlightenment is mankind's exit from its self-incurred immaturity." And the path to follow in order to leave this condition of immaturity is indicated in the watchword: "*Sapere aude!* Have the courage to use your *own* understanding!"<sup>1</sup>

One of the most important aspects to stress in this motto is, according to Deligiorgi, the fact that it excludes no one. It makes no restrictions. In effect, everyone is invited to heed the call to think for oneself, to reject while thinking any form of tutelage. This leads however Deligiorgi to claim that Kantian enlightenment must be conceived as essentially "egalitarian" (p. 76) in the sense that everyone is equally invited to take part in the public discussion. To this statement we might reply that enlightenment certainly calls upon everyone, upon every human as a rational being, but does this mean that everyone is involved in the process at the same level? I would like to argue that Deligiorgi's egalitarian approach is sound, but that in order to be maintained it needs to be qualified. In

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<sup>1</sup> Kant, *Beantwortung der Frage : Was ist Aufklärung ?*, 8:35 ; trans. J. Schmidt, p. 58.

fact, the critical examination of her approach will lead us to realize that Kant has a differentiated concept of enlightenment. In order to address the questions left open by her exposition, the following thesis will be defended: for Kant, the real target of the enlightenment is *culture*. The word culture is understood here in the sense that J.-J. Rousseau gave it in his first *Discourse* (1750), namely as the sciences and the arts. Once we recall the decisive lessons that Kant learned from the citizen of Geneva, we will be in a better position, leaving Deligiorgi aside, to assess the precise tasks awaiting the enlightened person, tasks which are specified in much more detail in Kant's works of the 1790s.

In what follows, we will first examine some aspects of Deligiorgi's interpretation pertaining to the egalitarian character of Kantian enlightenment. In addition to *What is Enlightenment?* we will focus on two other sources also analysed by her: *What does it mean to orient oneself in thinking?* (1786) and section 40 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790). Both are considered standard sources by commentators,<sup>2</sup> since each one contains an explicit definition and concise explanation of enlightenment. Secondly, we will measure the impact on Kant of Rousseau's severe criticism of the culture of his time in his two *Discourses*, the first on the progress of the sciences and the arts and the second on inequality. This influence led Kant to undertake an enlightenment of the enlightenment,<sup>3</sup> so to speak, forcing him to reconsider the role of knowledge in the moral progress of humankind and to present a twofold conception of enlightenment that took into consideration both the educated as well as the uneducated. Thirdly, with the help of the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* (1793) and especially the *Conflict of the Faculties* (1798), we will find concrete examples of the manner in which the educated and the uneducated, in their own specific ways, have to behave towards the products of culture. In the final analysis, we will see that culture is the real issue of enlightenment for Kant, as it represents both the problem as well as part of the solution.

### 1 . Deligiorgi's Reconstruction of the Kantian model of Enlightenment

Although the three texts under scrutiny here (*What is Enlightenment?*, the essay on the *Orientation*, and section 40 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*) are the privileged sources for characterizing Kantian enlightenment, they are not as explicit as one would wish, the last two being even rather sketchy. As for the first text, Kant's fellow citizen in Königsberg, Hamann, remarks that *What is Enlightenment?* does not contain an "explanation" of enlightenment so much as an "aesthetic" presentation of it.<sup>4</sup> This is why Katerina Deligiorgi is motivated to reconstruct Kant's argument. With regard to these texts, I will take Deligiorgi as a guide, without hesitating to draw attention to elements

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<sup>2</sup> Let us mention for instance Allison 2012 (228-235), and Ferrari 2001 (252).

<sup>3</sup> I borrow the expression "*Aufklärung de l'Aufklärung*" from my colleague Luc Langlois 2009 (56).

<sup>4</sup> J. G. Hamann, Letter to C. J. Kraus, 18 December 1784, in Hamann, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 5. A. Henkel (ed.) (Frankfurt-am-Main: Insel, 1965), pp. 289-292. Quoted in Deligiorgi 2005, p. 93.

which she left aside but which I deem important. I will single them out, since they call for the further developments that are to be found in the writings of the 1790s to which we will turn in the last part of this presentation.

Deligiorgi stresses two main features of the Kantian conception of Enlightenment: the use of one's own reason and the use of this reason in public. Both aspects are brought together in the formula that describes the gist of her reconstruction: Enlightenment places people in a position "in which [they] are free to make public use of their reason" (p. 71). Deligiorgi gives importance especially to the second aspect of the definition, i.e., that enlightenment involves access to public discussion. To be sure, the individual must always think for herself, but she is also invited to think with others and to submit her opinion to a public forum. Enlightenment entails a constant process of criticizing and revising opinions. This process can be characterized as "agonistic and dynamic" (p. 8). On Deligiorgi's account, two formal requirements are set at the basis of this public discussion: inclusion and publicity. As we have seen, enlightenment is inclusive in the sense that everyone is enjoined to think for oneself and is therefore, according to Deligiorgi, entitled on that very basis to have access to the public forum. This is a very important point in her reconstruction: the public sphere is in principle accessible to the "common mass of people." (p. 56) Enlightenment involves a communicative dimension that makes it possible to test the universalizability of the arguments that have been aired. This public aspect of the process of enlightenment is most explicit in *What is Enlightenment?* but, as we will soon see, it is not without certain difficulties. Let us start with the two other sources, i.e., the *Orientation* essay and the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. In these texts, the reference to the public sphere may not be as explicit as Deligiorgi might wish, but she manages anyhow to locate it in order to maintain the coherence of her reconstruction.

Enlightenment is treated in the last footnote of the *Orientation* essay. This note is often quoted because it contains the passage in which Kant contends – contrary to a widespread opinion at the time – that enlightenment does *not* consist in the possession of a great amount of information (*Kenntnisse*), nor in the "acquisition of knowledge."<sup>5</sup> Deligiorgi takes this denial of the contemporary conception as a confirmation of the egalitarian character of enlightenment. And she is right. One does not need to know much to be enlightened. The motto of the enlightenment in the footnote simply takes the form of the maxim: "always think for yourself," and this accords well with *What is Enlightenment?* But here Kant gives a reason for his reservations about knowledge. He argues, albeit elliptically, that the people who possess a great deal of knowledge are very often those who use it in the least enlightened manner. He does not give any further details; consequently we may leave this question open and come back to it at a later stage. At any rate, Deligiorgi does not attend to it. On the other hand, with respect to the second feature of her model, i.e., access to the public sphere, we must admit that the only evidence that she finds in the footnote is a reference to the "universality" of the principle a person should adopt in

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<sup>5</sup>Deligiorgi 2005, p. 56, 64; Kant, *Was heisst : Sich im Denken orientieren ?*, 8:146 n.

order to be enlightened. Kant's maxim is the following: when one is about to accept something as true, one has to ask oneself if the rule on the basis of which one makes this admission could become a "universal principle of the use of *one's* reason." As we can see, the universality of the principle concerns only my whole personal attitude when it comes to admitting something as true. It does not yet appeal to a universal consensus involving all rational beings, as Deligiorgi would like to see it.<sup>6</sup> The fact is that here Kant remains "monological," as Habermas would say. So in order to maintain her thesis, she is forced to refer to the main text of the essay, which unequivocally states that it is impossible to think exclusively on one's own. To think involves confronting our opinions with those of others, it implies thinking with others. Deligiorgi thereby succeeds in making her point, albeit indirectly.

Again, her case regarding the public dimension of enlightenment is no easier to state when she turns to section 40 of the third *Critique* in which Kant enumerates the three maxims of the common understanding. They read as follows (5:294): "1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; and 3. Always to think in accord with oneself." The first maxim, it goes without saying, explicitly pertains to "enlightenment," which is not the case for the two others. The maxim of enlightenment is about a reason that is "never *passive*" (5:294). Now if Deligiorgi is to maintain her reconstruction of Kant's conception, she must find a reference to the second feature of her model, the public sphere. Yet no trace of it is to be found in Kant's short description of the first maxim.<sup>7</sup> But this does not seem to be a problem, since she moves to the second maxim, which urges one to think while placing oneself in the position of someone else. This is a fair solution for getting at something like a public discussion, even though the second maxim does not deal with enlightenment *per se*. Indeed this strategy of linking the second maxim with the first has been adopted lately by Otfried Höffe, and it seems to be a legitimate way to complete the picture (Höffe 2012, p. 23). To think while adopting the position of someone else implies that one takes a certain distance from one's private opinion, and it at least suggests the readiness to submit oneself to the test of universalizability through a confrontation with others. The full concept of the enlightenment is reached, on this interpretation, once we read the first maxim together with the second. But what remains puzzling is that Kant does not in fact include the public dimension in the first maxim – the only one dealing explicitly with enlightenment – which leads us to suspect that this dimension does not belong to the core of his conception of enlightenment.

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<sup>6</sup>Although he usually provides a careful and nuanced reading of Kant's texts, Henry Allison defends here a position very close to Deligiorgi's. See his "Kant's Conception of *Aufklärung*," p. 233. In my opinion, the text of the footnote does not support this reading. In order to maintain it one has to extrapolate from a principle adopted for my personal use and transform it into the principle of every other rational being. Here is what the footnote stipulates: "To make use of one's *own* reason means no more than to ask oneself, for whatever one is supposed to assume, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground of the assumption, or also the rule following from the assumption, into a universal principle for the use of *one's* reason. This test is one that everyone can apply *for oneself* [...]" *Was heisst :Sich im Denken orientieren ?*, 8:146-147 n. (my italics); trans. A. Westra.

<sup>7</sup>In the footnote related to the first maxim (5:294) there is in fact a furtive allusion to the "public" dimension of *Aufklärung*, but it is a mere parenthesis, and Deligiorgi does not pay attention to it.

Before leaving the *Critique of the Power of Judgement* and returning to *What is Enlightenment?* I would like to focus on a point raised in the short description of the first maxim. What I have in mind is the definition of superstition. Deligiorgi mentions the word in passing but does not pay attention to it. She sees that the maxim of enlightenment is characterized by Kant as the maxim of the “absence of prejudice” and that the greatest prejudice of all is “superstition.” In Deligiorgi’s defense, it must be said that the definition of superstition offered by Kant immediately afterwards is quite compressed and convoluted: superstition means: “to represent nature to oneself as not being submitted to the rules that the understanding puts at its basis through its essential law.”<sup>8</sup> To be sure, this is quite abstract, but the basic meaning of the formula might be reformulated in the following way: never accept to interpret phenomena of nature as if they escaped the laws of the understanding. In other words, I am not allowed to bypass the formal laws of nature prescribed by my mind. Any and every natural phenomenon must comply with them. This is an implicit prohibition against introducing the supernatural into nature. One must not allow the presence of mystery in nature – and if I may complement this observation with the footnote of the essay on *Orientation*: I am not obliged to oppose an objectively grounded refutation to someone who tries to make me accept something like a mysterious phenomenon; I merely have to rely on my understanding, on my sound understanding. It is the guarantor of my intellectual autonomy. And in this sense the maxim of enlightenment is no more than a negative principle in the use of one’s faculty of cognition.

At first sight, this description of enlightenment contained in section 40, i.e., resisting superstition, may seem quite standard. Yet it must be recalled that this formulation of the maxim of enlightenment especially concerns the *common* understanding, an attribute of ordinary people. Earlier in the same section, Kant claims that this common human understanding, also designated as a sound understanding, is the least that we can expect of someone who lays claim to the name of a human being. Nevertheless, such an understanding, while not scientifically trained, is not deprived of implicit knowledge of the main laws of nature since, for instance, the principle of causality in its most basic form, according to the first *Critique*, is already present and operative in the most common understanding.<sup>9</sup> Therefore, the depiction of the task of enlightenment

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<sup>8</sup> Kant, *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, 5:294, mytranslation. Guyer’s and Matthews’ translation is not accurate here.

<sup>9</sup> Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, B3; see also the following passage on the “Typik” in the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 5:69-70, trans. M. J. Gregor and A. Wood: “If the maxim of the action is not so constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it is morally impossible. This is how even the most common understanding judges; for the law of nature always lies at the basis of its most ordinary judgments, even those of experience. Thus it has the law of nature always at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised it makes that *law of nature* merely the type of a *law of freedom*, because without having at hand something which it could make an example in a case of experience, it could not provide use in application for the law of a pure practical reason.”

contained in section 40 is not intended for the learned, but rather for the uneducated. The description remains cryptic but, as we will see, it will be fleshed out in Kant's later works.

What can we conclude from the two short passages of 1786 and 1790 on Enlightenment? We have noticed that Deligiorgi was forced to refer to other parts of these texts in order to maintain her interpretation, in particular the second feature of her model (access to a public forum). Once again, could it be that this component does not belong to the core of Kantian enlightenment? I am afraid that we will have to come to this conclusion. But for now, let us consider *What is Enlightenment?* in which this feature is prominent.

From the outset, the essay *What is Enlightenment?* emphasizes the inclusive character of enlightenment. No one is left aside when it comes to autonomous thinking; and the same goes, according to Deligiorgi, for access to public discussion. She makes her point in the following way:

«Kant defines the public use of reason as “that use which anyone may make of [reason] as a man of learning addressing the entire reading public” (AA 08: 37, *What is Enlightenment?* 55). It possesses two key features: it is public and it is inclusive. Irrespective of rank or occupation, all are equally invited to participate». (Deligiorgi 2005, p. 62)

It is interesting to notice that in the explanations she gives following this quote, Deligiorgi does not pause on the persons “of learning” who are, according to Kant, the only ones who seem allowed to take part. Hence the three examples of enlightened people mentioned in the essay, namely the army officer, the tax inspector and the priest. If the three of them are authorised, when they are not on duty, to play a part on the public stage in order to express their thoughts on military command, tax legislation and religious dogmas, it is in virtue of their status as “scholars.” Kant uses the word *Gelehrter* here in order to indicate that these men have received an education (a *higher* education, in fact) and can therefore be considered to be erudite persons, men of learning, or in a word, scholars. Tellingly, the term *Gelehrter* occurs no less than seven times in this short essay.

Deligiorgi may thus have overlooked the reference to *scholars* in the quoted passage, but she comes back to this problem in the following section of her chapter when she raises the question of “who” takes part in the public discussion. On her account, the requirement to be a “learned” person in order to participate in the public debate is, despite first appearances, no real obstacle to the inclusive character of enlightenment:

«Those who express their thoughts in public are invited to speak as men of ‘learning’ or as ‘learned’ individuals who address the ‘reading’ public. These qualifications appear to restrict the public use of reason to a small circle of educated individuals and thus to revise downward, so to speak, the real reach of the domain of application of the requirement of inclusion». (Deligiorgi 2005, p. 71-72)

To be frank, it seems to me that this restriction on the participation in Enlightenment does not only ‘appear’ to narrow the access to public discussion, but that it actually does just that. If Kant indeed reserves the public forum for the scholars, then participation definitely concerns “a small circle of educated individuals.” And the defense that Deligiorgi goes on to provide just after this passage is not entirely convincing. She argues that we must interpret this qualification as “inclusive” since nothing more is expected of the participants than being educated. This minimal requirement would then contribute, according to her, to overcoming “the traditional barriers of birth, wealth, standing, or professional specialisation” (p. 72). This might be true; and if it were, it would show the modernity of Kant’s approach to society. However, this requirement nonetheless excludes the masses. Discussion in journals of matters of public interest is clearly reserved to the educated classes. Kant seems to think that the citizens as scholars are the best suited to express their thoughts, especially in their respective fields of competence.

At any rate, Deligiorgi maintains her position on inclusion by reading Kant’s essay in ways that are sometimes questionable. Let me give two examples. First, she writes that “soldiers” (p. 71; see also p. 97) could publicly voice their thoughts concerning the military command. But the fact is that Kant does not speak of the ordinary *soldier*, but of an army *officer* – who has received an education. We know, for instance, that early in his career Kant himself had occasion to teach Russian as well as Prussian officers.<sup>10</sup> Second, Deligiorgi rightly notes that it is not the tax inspector who expresses his thoughts on tax legislation, but the “citizen,” the “overtaxed citizen,” (p. 71) as she says. Again, a few remarks are in order here. The overtaxed individual cannot be just any citizen since, as Deligiorgi knows (p. 73), a citizen who pays taxes is likely to be what Kant calls in his philosophy of right an “active” citizen, that is : a citizen with the right to vote. To be entitled to this status, one has to be one’s own master – a criterion that excludes for instance the children, the housewives and the private tutors, who are all dependent on someone else for their subsistence and, on that account, are considered “passive” citizens. Furthermore, the citizen who complains about the level of taxation cannot be any independent citizen: the requirement of being a “scholar” (8:37) applies here as well. So even here, we remain within the higher classes of society, and it seems that Kant takes this state of affairs for granted.

What is fruitful about Deligiorgi’s discussion of the three sources we have examined along with her is that she puts her finger on issues which are crucial for Kant but which are nevertheless not systematically developed by him. For instance, she is right to complain that in *What is Enlightenment?* Kant “only cursorily” touches the question of “who” can intervene on the public scene. Whence her praise worthy efforts to reconstruct a

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<sup>10</sup>Kuehn 2001, p. 114: “He [Kant] not only taught many officers in his lectures, especially in mathematics, but also gave them private instructions (or *privatissima*), which were, as he himself points out, very well paid.” See also Gouliga 1985, p. 44, 65. Samuel Fleischacker, who is sympathetic to Deligiorgi’s egalitarian approach, also trusts “*soldiers* to scrutinize military discipline.” See his otherwise excellent book *What is Enlightenment?* 2013, p. 20.



coherent argument. Yet in the end we are left with an important question: If access to public discussion is reserved for a small circle of educated persons, to the people of culture, does that mean that the person of mere common understanding is excluded from enlightenment altogether? We have seen in section 40 that this is not the case, since the maxim of enlightenment also concerns the person of common understanding. So we are compelled to conclude that participation in public discussion is only one element of a differentiated concept of enlightenment. In sum, we are left with one model of enlightenment in the third *Critique* aimed at a common understanding prone to superstition, and another model, promoted by Deligiorgi, centered on the requirement of public discussion, but with limited accessibility.

### 2. Enlightenment in a Rousseauian situation of inequality

In order to develop this differentiated concept, we have to face the facts and admit that such a conception must take due account of social inequality. This was the concrete situation Kant was facing in his country and in Europe in general: a civilization of high culture produces inequalities. This he learned from Rousseau, who had such a tremendous impact on him as a young philosopher. In fact, for Rousseau, the dichotomy we have encountered between the educated and the uneducated, between the scholar and the person of common understanding, is precisely a factor that characterizes inequality, as we can read in the *Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality among Men*: “education introduces a difference between the minds that are cultivated and those that are not.” (Rousseau 1755, p. 160). Culture becomes a crucial issue here, indeed a divisive one. Incidentally, one finds in section 40 of the third *Critique* that the “sound” common human understanding is precisely the one that is “*not yet cultivated*.” (5:293) Thus we are left with two main social classes – the educated and the uneducated – separated in addition by economic, political and juridical inequality.

In a way, Kant is prepared to admit this fact and to take the situation diagnosed by Rousseau as his starting point. He is ready to take it for granted because he realizes that such a condition renders the development of culture possible and that it is the price to be paid if humanity is to fulfil its ultimate vocation. In section 83, especially devoted to the concept of culture, Kant will make the following admission:

«Skill cannot very well be developed in the human race except by means of inequality among people; for the majority provides the necessities of life as it were mechanically, without requiring any special art for that, for the comfort and ease of others, who cultivate the less necessary elements of culture, science and art, and are maintained by the latter in a state of oppression, bitter work and little enjoyment [...]. (5:293)

Although this inequality is an unavoidable condition for the development of culture, it must be recalled that culture as such does not constitute the ultimate end of humankind. Culture consists merely in the development of all human capacities, enabling the individual

to attain any goal whatsoever – good, bad, or morally neutral. It becomes evident that the full vocation of humanity is defined only in the following section (§84), in which noumenal freedom and the specifically moral vocation of humankind are introduced. And in this regard, the theoretical autonomy vindicated by enlightenment can be interpreted as a kind of mediation between the two sections, between culture and morality.

It goes without saying that Kant was very receptive to Rousseau’s first *Discourse*, in which the progress of the sciences and the arts is associated with the growth of evils, vices and ills of all kinds. In the following passage Rousseau establishes a link between his two *Discourses*:

«It follows from this exposition that inequality, being almost non-existent in the state of nature, owes its strength and its growth to the development of our faculties and to the progress of the human mind, becoming stable and legitimate with the establishment of property and laws». (Rousseau 1755, p. 193)

It is in statements such as this one that the young Kant began to distance himself from the value of science; until then, he had thought that the development of science was the sole source of the highest dignity of humanity.<sup>11</sup> No wonder, then, that the *Orientation* essay claims that real enlightenment does not have to do with the acquisition of knowledge. Knowledge for its own sake belongs precisely to the “Lumières” legitimately fought by Rousseau (1755, p.170). If Kant is to maintain a conception of enlightenment, it will have to include a flexible stance toward science and culture. It will have to be an enlightenment of the enlightenment. Cultural progress does not necessarily go hand in hand with moral progress, as the seventh Proposition of the essay on *Universal history* (1784) reminds us: “We are *cultivated* in a high degree by art and science. [...] But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already *moralized*.” (8:26) Culture remains the main concern here, and anyone transitioning from the state of bare common understanding to culture is then exposed to the danger of using the products of civilisation as a smokescreen to hide moral misconduct and to produce the illusion of virtue.<sup>12</sup>

This means that Kant was led to distinguish two strands in the process of enlightenment: 1) an enlightenment for the learned designed to critically assess knowledge and culture in general, and 2) an enlightenment for the underprivileged class, fighting superstition. In the first case, we can think of *What is Enlightenment?* Where the priest, the army officer and the taxpaying citizen adopt a critical stance toward church dogmas, military orders, and fiscal legislation. Kant does not, however, give a clear view of the orientation their critique must take. In the second case, there would be an enlightenment for the lower class, for the common people. And in the latter case Kant would reiterate the

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<sup>11</sup> See the famous passage on Rousseau in the *Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*, 20:44.

<sup>12</sup> Such a dialectic is likely to arise in an age of culture. See the following passage from the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (4:405, trans. A. Westra): “So there develops unnoticed in common practical reason as well, when it cultivates itself, a *dialectic* [...]”.

conventional concept of enlightenment directed specifically at the people living in a dark age, or, if one prefers, in an “enchanted world,”<sup>13</sup> filled with good and bad spirits. It is a world of magic and mystery in which individuals can shift the responsibility for their misdeeds onto the witch of the village who had ostensibly put a curse on them, or onto the Devil who had ostensibly possessed them and incited them to commit a crime.<sup>14</sup> This would be the meaning of the injunction addressed to them: Abjure superstitious beliefs and instead become autonomous! Stop shirking your own moral responsibility by foisting it onto mysterious forces.

However, Kant’s recognition of social inequality as a concrete state of affairs seems to jeopardize my thesis that the common concern of Kantian enlightenment as a whole is culture. At first sight, it looks as though only the educated were concerned by culture’s shortcomings and were thus led to criticize it.

### 3. Kant’s twofold concept of Enlightenment

In order to show that the masses are also concerned by culture in their own particular way, we must turn to the works of the 1790s, starting with the *Conflict of the Faculties*. This book is a privileged source for our purpose since it gives a concrete form to Kant’s plea in favour of enlightenment and helps to answer the questions left open in the texts of the critical decade. The topic of the *Conflict*, it might be recalled, is the learned world of the German university and it exposes the dynamic interaction that should ideally prevail between the lower faculty, philosophy, and the three higher faculties, namely theology, law and medicine. As an institution sponsored by the state, the university has specific duties to fulfil, and the government has a specific interest in promoting its superior faculties since they have important functions in society by respectively managing a number of portfolios (so to speak): the citizens’ souls and their hope for a life after death; private property in civil society; and the physical health of the population. In order to accomplish this, the higher faculties provide training to the clergymen, the jurists, and the doctors according to definite programmes established by the professors within each faculty and sanctioned by the government.

On the other hand, the lower faculty is presented as the “free” faculty, devoted exclusively to the advancement of science and to the “public” (7:20) search for truth in collaboration with the other faculties. Now, according to Kant, the faculty of philosophy has, in comparison, very simple teachings to impart to the layman regarding the three spheres to which the higher faculties are dedicated. These teachings originate from practical reason, and they amount to nothing more than the imperative: lead a moral life

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<sup>13</sup> Kant, *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft*, 6:88 n.

<sup>14</sup> See Kittsteiner 1995, pp. 22, 51, 55, 303-312. It is interesting to notice that in his investigation of the Modern Times, Kittsteiner comes to establish a distinction between the “Gelehrtenkultur” and the “Masse der Bevölkerung,” p. 17.

and be an autonomous agent in each of these realms. That is to say, first, that if someone wants to be pleasing to God, nothing more is expected from her than to scrupulously perform all of her moral duties; second, if someone desires to be a decent member of civil society, she simply has to abide by the law; and third, if someone wants to live a long and healthy life, she must take personal responsibility for her health and show due moderation in everything.

These preliminary considerations set the stage for a very interesting discussion of the attitudes of the masses toward religion, law and medicine. Surprisingly, it is *superstition* that comes to the fore here, although it is not the kind of superstition that brings us back to the dark ages. On the contrary, Kant envisages another form of superstition, turned this time not toward the occult powers present in nature but toward culture, toward the sciences, and more precisely toward the specific disciplines of the higher faculties. It must be remembered that Kant wrote the *Conflict* at the very end of the eighteenth century, i.e., the century of the *Encyclopédie* whose goal was to diffuse knowledge on a large scale in order to promote the extensive application of recent scientific breakthroughs. Kant himself writes in the third *Critique*, just after having taken notice of the unavoidable fact of social inequality, that the benefits of these advances “gradually spread” to the lower classes – again, the classes that provide the higher ones with the leisure to develop the arts and sciences, i.e., the products of high culture (5:432). To be sure, in Kant’s times, there were certainly some people still prone to interpret thunder and lightning as an expression of the divine wrath. But, after the invention of the lightning conductor by Benjamin Franklin in the middle of the century, for instance, people were gradually led to consider that those phenomena might very well be natural after all. The lightning conductor is in reality a fairly simple device which, together with other experiments on electricity, proves that lightning is ultimately nothing more than a natural phenomenon. As we can see, this is the classic theme of the disenchantment of the world: there seems to be no more place within nature for the supernatural.

According to Kant, however, the supernatural and the magical that constitute the essence of superstition are likely to take on new forms. There are other ways of short-circuiting the laws of nature even *within* the phenomenal world, and this is precisely what the common understanding does when it transfers the supernatural from the physical world to the domain of culture, or more precisely, when it attributes magical virtues to religion, law and medicine. This is the most important point in the *Conflict of the Faculties* for our understanding of Kantian enlightenment. If, as we have seen, superstition used to allow the common person to dodge her guilt and shirk her moral responsibility, the same pattern might very well reoccur when this person comes into contact with the professionals educated in the higher faculties, that is, with the priest, the lawyer and the doctor. There is a great temptation to confer magical powers on them and to expect them to perform miracles of sorts. In the eyes of the common person, these professionals very often appear, as Kant writes, like “*Wundermänner*”, miracle-men, if I may use this term. Now that

nature is increasingly disenchanting, it is culture that becomes enchanted. Phenomena taking place in the sensible world, such as a church ritual, a trial in court, or medical surgery are in fact likely to be interpreted by the common person as having supersensible effects: each can be seen as a substitute, as an ersatz, for my failing moral conduct. For example if, according to practical reason, salvation can only be hoped for through scrupulous moral behaviour, why wouldn't the performance of a simple religious ritual in the sensible world (like confession) produce the same result, and thus be equivalent to exercising my freedom at the level of my intelligible character?<sup>15</sup> The following passage, certainly worth being quoted *in extenso*, is highly revealing of the manner in which superstition re-emerges in the realm of culture. One has to pay attention to the fact that it is the people (*Volk*) who exert pressure on the graduates of the higher faculties to perform these miracles. The *Volk* rejects the lessons of the philosophical faculty, which imposes a burden seemingly much too heavy to bear: the exhortation to lead one's life morally.

«So the people [...] invite the higher faculties to make them more acceptable proposals. And the demands they make on these scholars [*Gelehrte*] run like this. 'As for the philosophers' twaddle, I've known that all along. What I want you, as scholars, to tell me is this: if I've been a scoundrel all my life, how can I get an eleventh-hour ticket to heaven? If I've broken the law, how can I still win my case? And even if I've abused my physical powers as I've pleased, how can I stay healthy and live a long time? Surely this is why you have studied – so that you would know more than someone like ourselves (you call us idiots), who can claim nothing more than sound understanding».

As we can see, the professionals to whom the people turn are asked to neutralize, or better, to erase the consequences of their misconduct and to discharge them of their moral responsibility of leading a virtuous life. But if the people are deaf to the summons of philosophy, then the higher faculties on the other hand should be open to the remarks of the philosopher, because otherwise they run the risk of encouraging superstition, the greatest prejudice, as we know, that enlightenment must combat. Here the superstitious character of the people's demands could not be more explicit. Let us read Kant's comments:

«But now the people are approaching these scholars as if they were soothsayers and magicians, with knowledge of supernatural things; for if an unlearned person expects something from a scholar, he readily forms exaggerated notions of him. But we can naturally expect that if someone has the effrontery to give himself out as a such a miracle-worker, the people will flock to him and contemptuously desert the philosophy faculty. But the business people [*Geschäftsleute*] of the three higher faculties will always be such miracle-workers, unless the philosophy faculty is allowed to counteract them publicly – not in order to overthrow their teachings but only to deny the magic power that the public superstitiously [*abergläubisch*] attributes to these teachings and the rites connected with them – as if, by passively surrendering themselves to such skilful guides, the people would

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<sup>15</sup> In the *Religion*, Kant describes this “sorcery [*Zauber*]” as an art “of achieving a supernatural effect through entirely natural means,” 6:177. See also on superstition, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:64, 65 n. For the intelligible character of the human being, see *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, A 538/B 567.

be excused from any activity of their own and led, in ease and comfort, to achieve the ends they desire». <sup>16</sup>

Here superstition takes on a very definite shape, that nevertheless reminds us of the formal definition that we read earlier in the third *Critique*. The phenomena in the sensible world are all subject, without exception, to the laws of nature, and it is not permitted to attribute them supernatural properties. The laws of nature are basically the laws of the understanding common to all individuals, and hence we can appreciate why the maxim of the enlightenment in the *Orientation* essay is characterized as the maxim of the “self-preservation” (8:147n.) of reason. Invoking the miraculous is not permissible because one thereby “forfeits” one’s own reason. As we can see, the sound common understanding is clearly concerned by the call to enlightenment in that it must resist overestimating and overburdening the products of culture and their repositories.

But we must admit that the professionals, the “business people” as Kant calls them, are also intimately concerned by enlightenment since they are themselves often at fault by accepting to play the role the people urge them to play. There is indeed a strong temptation on their side, too. Through their very functions they exercise a certain authority over the people, and so they must be careful. If we turn for instance to Kant’s book on *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, we discover that there is room for what Kant calls a “true enlightenment” in religious matters. It consists in considering things in their proper order: what the priest has primarily to teach are the fundamentals of the religion of reason, which simply amount to the fulfilment of all moral duties (as if they were commands originating from God). And then there is the part that Kant calls church belief. It consists of statutes and observances which were revealed in ancient times and have been transmitted to further generations through historical documents. Now what matters here is that the simple precepts of the religion of reason must maintain precedence over the statutes and the rituals, because the authentic manner to be pleasing to God lies exclusively in the first part of the teachings, the purely rational part to which everyone has access. However, if the priest gives precedence to the second part as the means for salvation, he becomes the proponent of a false cult (*Afterdienst*). <sup>17</sup> This reversal of the

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<sup>16</sup> Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:30-31. On this topic, see Norbert Hinske 1980, p. 78-80.

<sup>17</sup> Kant, *Religion*, 6:153, 165, 170. J. B. Schneewind (2006, p. 345-347) explains Kant’s conception of enlightenment with the help of the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, which is in itself perfectly legitimate. He interprets the reversal of the order between the moral effort and the ritualized service leading to fetishism in terms of “radical evil,” according to which the egoistic motives are taking precedence over the moral ones. Now he transposes to religion the *perversitas* (7:30) proper to radical evil in such a strict manner that he considers that the religious practices (observances and rituals) that gain precedence over the ethical conduct have to be in themselves immoral, if the parallel is to be maintained. And this would also apply to three of the examples of *What is Enlightenment?*: “Perhaps our pastor directs us to prosecute members of a group he thinks ungodly and despicable ; perhaps our commanding officer tells us to kill the wives and daughters of the enemy as well as their soldiers ; perhaps our physician urges us to bribe the pharmacist to give us priority for some important medicine in very short supply... Enlightened agents can, however, accept church ceremonies or political directives or medical advice as long as these do not require overruling morality. The agent is free to decide by using prudential reason whether to accept or reject

order of priority is very tempting for the clergyman because in this way he gains a form of control and “domination”<sup>18</sup> over his parishioners, a dominion that may easily become “despotic.”<sup>19</sup> In principle, the priest is a “servant [*Diener*],” (6:152-153) but this is an empty word if he claims to be the exclusive depository of rites and statutes that lead to salvation. Kant notes for instance that Protestantism as a historical religion is based on an impressive amount of “erudition (*Gelehrsamkeit*)” in order to maintain access to the historical sources of revelation, i.e., extensive knowledge of ancient languages, of geography and history. So this means that historical religions are viewed as sophisticated objects of positive knowledge, of erudition – in a word: of *culture*. And because this specialized knowledge is accessible only to the learned priests, the risk of responding to the superstitious demands of the people, fascinated by this esoteric knowledge, by this erudition to which they do not have access, is all the greater.

We are now in a position to re-examine some aspects of the texts of the critical decade that appeared somewhat elliptical in the first part of this paper. By considering what we have just learned from the temptation facing the clergyman, it becomes easier to understand why Kant could argue in *What is Enlightenment?* that the guardians are always prone to accept the authority conferred on them by the people. The erudition possessed by the priest, a knowledge that ought to be put in the service of the faithful for the accomplishment of their moral duties, is instead turned into an instrument of domination, provided that the learned person consents to play this role. This is surely what Kant meant in the *Orientation* essay when he argued that enlightenment does not have to do with the acquisition of information and that the people who possess a great wealth of knowledge are often the ones who make the least “enlightened” usage of it. In this regard, the person of learning has to answer the call to *sapere aude!* as much as the uneducated person. The latter was characterized in *What is Enlightenment?* by his laziness and cowardice. We can now interpret this to mean that the sound human understanding should not abandon its intellectual autonomy, nor its ethical responsibilities. Reason must “never be passive,” as we have learned from the third *Critique*, in the sense that it must never sink into magical thought. The simple laws of the understanding apply without exception everywhere in nature. They are the safeguard against superstition – whose specific form we came to know – and the basis of one’s autonomy: a theoretical autonomy that is closely linked to practical autonomy.<sup>20</sup> Finally, we can answer a very relevant question raised by Deligiorgi concerning the refusal to listen to the advice of the doctor mentioned at the very beginning

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directions from any authority, insofar as their directives concern the use of means that lie within the bounds of morality. And he can decide simply to take the authority’s advice without trying to think for himself about it any further than to see that it is morally permissible.” According to Kant however, in religion church ceremonies can be good in themselves if they come in the second place, and even when they gain precedence over the exercise of virtue, they can remain *per se* morally perfectly neutral (see *Religion*, AA 06, 169, 172). It is not because they overrule morality that they have to be rejected. The rituals and observances become condemnable by the mere fact they are used as substitutes that replace the moral conduct by taking precedence over virtue.

<sup>18</sup> Kant, *Religion*, 6:165; *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:33.

<sup>19</sup> Kant, *Religion*, 6:180; *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:28.

<sup>20</sup> On this difficult question, see Kubsda 2014, p. 35, 155; and Zöller 2009, p. 90.

of *What is Enlightenment?* In this particular passage, the individual who is enjoined by Kant to disregard the advice is not characterized as learned, but simply as someone who has to resist the authority of the spiritual advisor, of the doctor and of the book. Here an ordinary individual is faced with what we have characterized as persons or products of culture. And these people and products of learning have an authority that one is warned to approach with caution. In the case of the doctor, Kant's demand certainly seems to "border on the foolhardy," as Deligiorgi concedes (p. 61). Why resist the advice of such a learned person? But it must first be reminded that, for Kant, taking care of one's own health is an ethical duty. The *Metaphysics of Morals*, under the heading "Man's duty to himself as an animal being", mentions only three prohibitions (committing suicide, mutilating one's body and immoderately consuming food and alcohol), yet taken together, these prohibitions conversely entail an implicit command to take responsibility for one's own health.<sup>21</sup> This is the sense in which we must interpret the example of the doctor in *What is Enlightenment?* When it comes to choosing my diet or lifestyle, I should be my own best judge as well as my own best doctor. Or at least so claims Kant in the *Conflict of the Faculties*, in which he presents a "philosophical," albeit idiosyncratic, approach to health that mobilises the power of reason in order to "become master of one's sensible feelings with the help of a principle determined by oneself."<sup>22</sup> This proactive attitude toward the care of his own health was already present in Kant's correspondence with his friend Markus Herz in the 1770s and 1780s.<sup>23</sup>

What should we conclude from all this about Katerina Deligiorgi's account according to which Kant is the proponent of an "egalitarian" conception of enlightenment? On the one hand, we can easily subscribe to this reading to the extent that it pertains to the core of Kant's conception: Have the courage to think for yourself in all circumstances! It is obvious that this call does not exclude any human being. Everyone is equally concerned. On the other hand, through our critical assessment of the sources to which Deligiorgi refers, we have been led to consider that the concept of enlightenment in Kant has two branches, or two different ways of making use of one's understanding. This is incidentally confirmed by the *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, where we learn that both the common person and the learned person need enlightenment (6:181), although in a differentiated manner. In both cases, however, the central concern or target is, as I have tried to demonstrate, *culture*. For the sound common understanding, the injunction means to refrain from magical thinking. The individual of common understanding is urged to decide once and for all to cease seeing in the products of culture physical means to exempt

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<sup>21</sup>Kant, *Metaphysik der Sitten*, 6:421. See for the interpretation of prohibitions as implicit prescriptions: Höffe 1993, p. 106.

<sup>22</sup> Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:100-101; see also *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, Section 54, 5:332 where the soul is said to be the doctor of the body. For a critique of Kant's idiosyncratic approach to medicine, see Unna 2012.

<sup>23</sup>See for example Kant's letters to M. Herz of June 7, 1771, of the end of 1773, of August 20, 1777, of the beginning of April 1778, of August 28, 1778 and of May 11, 1781, in *Briefwechsel*, 10:123, 143, 212-213, 231, 241, 270.



herself from fulfilling her ethical duties. Physical means like religious rituals are no substitutes because they cannot produce effects in the supersensible realm of morality and freedom. To be sure, the decision to elevate oneself to intellectual autonomy can only be taken by the individual. In fact Kant envisages this decision as a real personal “revolution.”<sup>24</sup> In this regard, Kant could definitely not agree with Hamann, who strongly criticised the main thesis of *What is Enlightenment?* According to Hamann, it is not permissible to accuse the masses of being responsible for their immaturity.<sup>25</sup> They are literally held in a state of submission by an absolutist regime and they cannot be accused of not breaking the chains in which the guardians hold them. Immaturity cannot be said to be self-incurred; it is imposed from the outside. But Kant cannot agree. If enlightenment in the end amounts to intellectual autonomy, one cannot emancipate an individual without her participation or against her will. Enlightenment is precisely a matter of courage and personal decision, and therefore it cannot be understood as a top-down process for Kant. As for the learned, on the other hand, enlightenment means adopting a critical attitude toward the products of culture and especially toward the sciences taught in the higher faculties in order to prevent this knowledge from being fetishized by the people.

That being said, the following question comes to mind: why did Deligiorgi not exploit the important passages of the *Conflict of the Faculties* concerning enlightenment? To be sure, this is not an oversight on her part. Leaving this later work aside is a deliberate and understandable choice. In fact, the developments of the *Conflict* do not fit well with the image of enlightenment that she tries to extract from the texts of the critical decade, according to which *Aufklärung* should entail a free and open access to public discussion for everyone and without censorship. Her project of showing the present-day relevance of this approach to enlightenment is certainly legitimate, especially in view of the new channels that have recently opened up, if only for what Kant calls the “world of readers” (*Leserwelt*). The public sphere has expanded to proportions that were totally unimaginable for Kant. And in this regard Deligiorgi is right when she sees in Kant’s last published work a “narrowing down of the scope of public argument” (p. 77). In 1798 Kant was in fact led to revise<sup>26</sup> his position of 1784 in that, from then on, he confers the status of men of learning (*Gelehrte*) exclusively upon the university teachers, not anymore upon the professionals who come out of their faculties. This means that the priests, lawyers and doctors are no doubt learned persons, but they now deserve the title of mere “literate.”<sup>27</sup> Because they are appointed by the government to apply a definite corpus of religious dogmas, laws or medical prescriptions, they do not, in Kant’s view, enjoy the freedom to adopt a reflexive critical stance vis-à-vis these doctrines – a marked demotion, so to speak, compared to the priest, the army officer, and the tax inspector in *What is Enlightenment?* whom Kant did deem capable of stepping outside of their civic functions

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<sup>24</sup> Kant, *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*, 7:228-229.

<sup>25</sup> Hamann, Letter to C. J. Kraus, December 18, 1784, *Briefwechsel*, vol. 5, p. 289-292.

<sup>26</sup> This revision had already been adumbrated in the Foreword to the first edition of the *Religion* (1793), 6:8-9.

<sup>27</sup> Kant, *Der Streit der Fakultäten*, 7:18. See also Braeckmann 2008, p. 296.

and making a public use of their reason. This change is perhaps related to the limited scope of the *Conflict of the Faculties*, as Deligiorgi thinks, but it becomes clear that the public discussion from then on takes place between the faculty of philosophy and the teachers of the higher faculties, in order to incite the latter to continually question their scientific knowledge for the benefit of truth – and for Kant, that means for the benefit of the citizens’ freedom.

While we are accustomed to understanding enlightenment as a struggle against obscurantism, we have discovered that with Kant it is rather turned against the “Lumières” themselves. This, Kant has retained from Rousseau. But he feels the need to go beyond the two *Discourses*, in which culture is severely criticized against the background of the state of nature. For Kant, culture is here to stay and is in reality a crucial condition for the attainment of the moral vocation of the humanity. Yet he knows that culture is still at an early stage, that is, in a phase involving its lot of hardships for individuals. In an essay published the same year as the *Orientation* article, the *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*, he even writes that culture “has not yet really begun,” even though he remains confident that it will one day come to its “full completion” (8:116,121). Meanwhile enlightenment has to play a role of supervision toward culture. Enlightenment must bring about what Gerhard Krämling calls a “critical concept of culture” (Krämling 1985, p. 294; see also 135,141, 163, 296). Or if I may allow myself to invert the title of Deligiorgi’s book, rather than speaking of “Kant and the culture of enlightenment,” we should say “Kant and the enlightenment of culture.”

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## **When Reason Began to Stir... –Kantian Courage and the Enlightenment**

### *Quando la razón comenzó a moverse... — El coraje kantiano y la Ilustración*

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#### **Abstract**

In his answer to the question “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant argues that we must have the courage to use our own reason and imputes failure to do so on laziness and cowardice. Why exactly does the call for emancipation require resolve? This paper follows Foucault in defining Enlightenment as a modern ethos that adopts the ephemeral as a way of being. Contrary to the French philosopher, however, we argue that this permanent critique of oneself and of the world creates a void that leaves us trembling before nothingness. If Enlightenment requires courage, then, it is precisely to urge us to remain steadfast in the practice of freedom and to not shy away from the dangers it imposes. Courage, in short, is resolve before the abyss of freedom. Too long have we confined Kant to an ossified, rationalistic framework, thankfully impervious to human anguish for some, regrettably incapable of it for others. If anything, this paper wants to uncover the deep, existential tones of his conclusions on modernity, and it will do so through an examination of his account of courage.

#### **Key words**

Kant; Enlightenment; Courage; Foucault; Baudelaire; Despair; Freedom; Modernity.

#### **Resumen**

En su respuesta a la pregunta *¿Qué es la Ilustración?*, Kant argumenta que tenemos que tener coraje para usar nuestra propia razón e imputa la incapacidad para ello a la pereza y cobardía. ¿Por qué exactamente la apelación a la emancipación requiere esta resolución? Este artículo sigue la

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definición de Foucault de la Ilustración como un *ethos* moderno que adopta lo efímero como modo de ser. Contrariamente al filósofo francés, sin embargo, argumentamos que esta crítica permanente de uno mismo y del mundo crea un vacío que nos deja inermes ante la nada. Si la Ilustración requiere coraje, ello equivale a aconsejarnos ejercitar con entereza la libertad y no amilanarse ante los peligros que esta impone. El coraje, dicho brevemente, resuelve ante el abismo de la libertad. Hemos confinado durante demasiado tiempo a Kant a patrones osificados, racionalistas, considerándolo afortunadamente impermeable a la angustia humana para algunos, desgraciadamente incapaz de ello para otros. Este artículo pretende de manera principal descubrir los tonos profundos y existenciales de sus conclusiones sobre la Modernidad, de la mano de un examen de su abordaje del coraje.

### Palabras clave

Kant; Ilustración; coraje; Foucault; Baudelaire; desesperación; libertad; Modernidad

### INTRODUCTION

As the duty of distancing ourselves from experience in order to formulate and abide by a law that is by definition a priori and unconditionally binding, Kantian ethics is often portrayed as obdurate and inflexible, if not altogether impracticable. It has all the makings of a scene from *Babette's Feast*, where the austerity of life and the characters' exertions to repress their most basic desires is so absurd it appears comical to the viewer. In other words, Kant's morality is universal and rigorist to the extent that he seems to be asking us to abstract not only from our inclinations, but from our humanity as well, almost as if he articulated its *formal* conditions outside of the *human* condition.

Widespread, this view is nevertheless inaccurate as it fails to account for Kant's sustained meditation on what it is to be a human being, which we know from his *Logic* to be the underlying query of his critical philosophy. One of the various tangible manifestations of this concern in his works may be found in his essay: "What is Enlightenment?"<sup>1</sup> Kant's characterization of both the process and the period in this piece is well-known: enlightenment is the release from our "self-incurred tutelage", that is, from our inability to use our reason without the guidance of an external authority (8:35). What remains obscure is the cause he gives for this self-inflicted servitude: a lack of *courage*. At first sight, this only serves to confirm the above impression of intransigence, if not to portray Kant as downright abrasive in his call for emancipation, as he brusquely imputes failure to "cowardice" and "laziness".

These remarks, however, deserve much more scrutiny. Why is it, precisely, that enlightenment requires courage? It cannot be for the sake of freedom itself, for Kant has made abundantly clear in his writings that it is "self-sufficient", in that no incentive or any other device is necessary "to recognize what our duty is or to impel its performance" (RGV, 6:3-4). It is not freedom that requires resolve, then, but the subject exercising it. Of

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<sup>1</sup> Henceforth in the text: *WE*.

course, this could very well be for the simple fact that moral obligation is demanding, at times even daunting, and so requires strength of will for its performance, an observation that is in itself quite unoriginal in the history of philosophy. Yet Kant places this discussion in a very specific context. We are living in an “*enlightened age*”, he says, where we have “clear indications” of an increased public freedom and where the obstacles towards emancipation “are gradually being reduced” (5:40). As such, the call for courage is not made in a vacuum: it is addressed *specifically* to the *modern* subject who is asked to break the bonds of “external direction” and “finally learn to walk *alone*” (5:36, my italics). Held to be “dangerous” and “arduous” to the “far greater portion of humankind” (5:35), this undertaking is a daunting one indeed. In sum, when Kant compels us to “have the courage to use (our) own reason” (5:35), he is in fact articulating a new way of being. Courage, as he redefines it in the Enlightenment essay and throughout his writings, represents the particular disposition of the modern human being, his *solitude* and distress before the adversity of autonomy. Too long have we confined Kant to an ossified, rationalistic framework, thankfully impervious to human anguish for some, regrettably incapable of it for others. If anything, this paper wants to uncover the deep, existential tones of his conclusions on modernity, and it will do so through an examination of his account of courage.

Foucault was perhaps the first to understand that the Enlightenment essay was a reflection on what it is to *be* modern, that instead of describing a period in history, it was in fact fleshing out a new “attitude” or “mode of relating to contemporary reality” (Foucault 1984, p. 39). The first section of this paper will examine this ontological dimension, explaining how exactly *WE* articulates a new way of being. The second section demonstrates why adopting this new attitude requires courage, for Kant. Comparing his writings on freedom with some of Baudelaire’s poetry exposes the abyss that opens before us when we embrace freedom as a way of being. Defined as a permanent critique of oneself and of one’s world, the modern ethos reveals existence as groundless and in constant need of retransfiguration. No doubt this is exhilarating, but there is something daunting – perhaps even frightening – in this undertaking as well, as is convincingly illustrated in the Book of Job. The last section will address contemporary readings of *WE* and Kantian courage. Rigorous and instructive, they have nevertheless confined enlightenment to an egalitarian and inclusive liberal framework that provides us with the means to manage the growing diversity of contemporary society. As such, they completely overlook the veritable threat again stone’s independence: despair, generated in Kant’s writings by solitude, distress, and radical evil. Courage, in sum, is the resolve to continue embracing freedom in the face of these dangers, and so it does not merely supplement the modern attitude, it *defines* it.

## 1. THE MODERN ETHOS

Foucault has continually engaged with Kant’s philosophy, beginning with his *these complémentaire* on the *Anthropology*, a text he himself introduced, translated and

eventually published with Vrin in 1964. He was equally absorbed with the essay on the Enlightenment, dedicating a paper on the subject in 1978 at the Société française de philosophie<sup>2</sup> as well as part of his 1983 seminar at the Collège de France. We also find a more detailed study of the piece in *The Foucault Reader*, which he wrote just before his death. Foucault has of course been a fierce critique of the German philosopher, accusing him of having provided the tools of oppression with his all-encompassing reason and separated history from philosophical investigations or truth claims. Still, as Fleischacker suggests, the sincerity of his admiration for Kant should not be doubted, and his treatment of the *Aufklärung* is nothing short of an example in “hermeneutical brilliance” (Fleischacker 2013, p. 108).

An intriguing remark made by Foucault in his 1983 seminar hints at the novelty of the Enlightenment: it is noteworthy, he says, that the *Aufklärung* was self-identified, that it became conscious of itself by naming itself (Foucault 1994, p. 679). It is this same type of reflexivity that we find at work in Kant’s essay, where the originality of his thought lies not so much in *what* he says about his own epoch as in *how* he decides to treat it, that is, the manner by which he weaves a new rapport to the immediate. Obviously, other philosophers have sought to reflect on their own present, but their point of view remained *situated* or connected to a specific age and concrete society they attempted to understand. Such reflections were often meant to uncover the uniqueness of a particular community, anticipate its impending doom or predict its forthcoming glory (Foucault 1984, p. 33). Kant’s project in *WE* is different: he is not looking to understand the present for the sake of some other end, but on its own behalf. “He is looking for a difference, says Foucault. What difference does today introduce with respect to yesterday?” (*Ibid.*)

Foucault does little to unpack this rather sibylline formula, although a clue as to what he means can be found in his working hypothesis: “This little text [i.e. *WE*] is located in a sense at the crossroads of critical reflection and reflection on history. It is a reflection by Kant on the contemporary status of his own enterprise” (p. 38). We know that the said enterprise – critical philosophy – is supported by three pillars that have taken the form of the following questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What can I hope for? In each case, Kant sets out to explore the potentialities of reason as well as its limits, for instance what it can and cannot know, what it can and cannot hope for, among other inquiries. The innovation of critical philosophy, then, consists not so much in using reason to decipher the mysteries of the universe, but to meditate upon the use of reason itself; it is not just reason that reflects, but reason that reflects on the conditions of its own possibility. In this way, Kant provides us with the most achieved form of modernity: what persists in human existence, its *Grund* as it were, is neither provided by history in the form of tradition, nor revealed by nature as a divinely orchestrated cosmos. This ground is not even the *product* of reason. Indeed, if Descartes’ method uses doubt as a magnifier in his

<sup>2</sup> The conference was later published in the *Bulletin de la Société française de philosophie*, t. LXXXIV, 1990, 84, 2.



investigation to uncover the *res cogitans*, Kant refuses to close the case and turns the search itself into the object. In other words, instead of a means to discover an answer, critical inquiry becomes a *way of being*, it turns into a “critical ontology”.

For Foucault, this type of reflexivity is especially resonant of Baudelaire, whose “consciousness of modernity is widely recognized as one of the most acute of the nineteenth century” (p. 39). A few decades earlier, Sartre had already insisted on the latter’s efforts towards self-awareness. “Baudelaire was the man who never forgot himself. He watched himself see; he watched in order to see himself watch” (Sartre 1950, p. 22). This said, if the poet can see his arms and hands, he could never catch a glimpse of his own eye, lest he duplicate himself (pp. 25-26). Consequently, concludes Sartre, Baudelaire “was the man who chose to look upon himself as if he were another person; his life is simply the story of the failure of this attempt” (pp. 27-28). Such an interpretation may be representative of other art works, such as Escher’s *Drawing Hands*, for instance. Following Foucault’s reading, however, it completely misses the point regarding Baudelaire’s poetry. Granted, the latter does depict modernity as “the ephemeral, the fleeting, the contingent” (quoted in: Foucault 1984, p. 39). Yet his uncommon flair lies not in this diagnosis, but in elevating transience into a “heroization of the present” (p. 41). Simply put, a passing moment is also an *unfettered* moment, free from any tradition or institution – metaphysically speaking – that pre-colors or taints our life perspective. As such, the ephemeral is not a flaw, but the uninhibited opportunity to continually transfigure the world and oneself in the process. Baudelaire, then, does not deplore the contingent as superficial, he *wills* it, or as Foucault claims, he adopts an *attitude* towards it, a “deliberate, difficult attitude (that) consists in recapturing something eternal that is not beyond the present instant, nor behind it, but within it” (p. 39). “*Hélas! La musique se ride!*”, lamented Victor Hugo about Mozart’s *Requiem*. There are many spectators, many *flâneurs*, capable of sharp, sardonic remarks on flitting fashions and passing fads. Few become actors who transform the waning moment into a practice of freedom where one constantly reinvents oneself. As a response to Sartre, we could argue that Baudelaire, in the end, was not so much trying to surprise himself in the act of creating, as define creation as his very mode of existence.

It is at this point that Baudelaire’s poetry and Kant’s critical philosophy come together. Their respective work is not simply another commentary on our times, but itself the expression of a different relationship to the present and to oneself altogether (p. 41). Foucault’s exceptional lucidity is to have realized that both authors were not so much articulating a relevant opinion on modernity as a specific disposition towards it, a philosophical *ethos* earlier referred to as critical ontology, which we can now understand to be “work carried on by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings” (p. 47). Looking to define more precisely what he means by attitude, Foucault declares it to be “avoluntary choice made by certain people; (...) a way of thinking and feeling; a way, too, of acting and behaving that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and presents itself as a task” (p. 39). The idea that there should be any form of “belonging” associated with a

modern ethos seems to be at odds with what has just been said. Yet in his seminar of 1983, we learn that it is not at all linked to a particular doctrine or tradition, nor is it a question of belonging to a human community in general (Foucault 1994, pp. 680-681). What we have here, instead, is an attachment to detachment, to the practice of liberty that consists in “the permanent critique of ourselves”.<sup>3</sup> Hence, with both Baudelaire and Kant, we witness the emergence of a modern ethos that does not merely “accept oneself as one is in the flux of the passing moments”, but takes “oneself as object of a complex and difficult elaboration” (Foucault 1984, p. 41).

## 2. THE ABYSS OF FREEDOM

The *Aufklärung* text is a compelling invitation to use our own reason and free ourselves from the shackles of external direction. From the preceding section, we now know that through this call, Kant is actually framing the attitude of modernity as the permanent critique of ourselves. This ethos adopts the ephemeral as its way of being, implying that: i- modern existence is no longer predicated upon an immemorial tradition or natural principle it looks to reenact or imitate; ii- this groundlessness or, at the very least, absence of *arkhé*, is in fact an opening to continually re-transfigure reality and reinvent ourselves in the process. In a word, the modern attitude is the posture that continually seeks to unmask imposture. So why should this require courage, to recall the initial query of this paper? At this point, Foucault is of little help to continue with our investigation. Is it his apprehension towards humanism? This amorphous “set of themes” “has always been obliged to lean on certain conceptions of man borrowed from religion, science, or politics”, he claims, and as such seems to preclude the “mode of reflective relation to the present” he is trying to establish as the basis of Enlightenment (p. 44). Is it his archeological method, which seeks “to treat the instances of discourse that articulate what we think, say, and do as so many historical events” (p. 46)? This would indeed be at odds with a transcendental approach, which emphasizes subjectivity and, as such, connects moral integrity to the incessant practice of self-introspection. Whatever the reasons, he appears to completely overlook the conditions in which the modern attitude is effectively adopted, almost as if he had emptied critical ontology of its... ontology, or at least of the particular manner in which it is *experienced* by the human being.<sup>4</sup>

The possibility of a “permanent creation of ourselves” is so emphasized in Foucault, so inebriating perhaps, it has shrouded the context in which this ethos is effectively embraced, an experience that is the condition of both its adoption and its re-

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<sup>3</sup>Foucault 1984, p. 43. On page p. 44, Foucault insists that “at the heart of the historical consciousness that the Enlightenment has of itself” is the “principle of a critique and a permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy.”

<sup>4</sup>In the above definition, he does speak of a “difficult attitude”, but adds very little – if anything at all – to explain why this should be the case.

actualization: the kind of solitary distress that beckons courage. This oversight is particularly striking in his commentary of Baudelaire. The modern man for the latter, sustains Foucault, is not the one “who goes off to discover himself, his secrets and his hidden truth; he is the man who tries to invent himself” (p. 42). After having carefully and meticulously fleshed out the new creative attitude articulated in the poet’s work, this characterization suddenly seems anticlimactic, if not summary. It seems as though Foucault creates a fracture between a certain experience of nothingness and the act of writing, or to use another reference, as if a life-affirming will to power should dispense with an earlier agonistic struggle with life. Yet the poet’s writings do not appear to confirm this caesura, quite to the contrary. Baudelairean *Spleen* – how could one neglect it in the context of this discussion? – laments the defeat of Hope who weeps before Anguish, atrocious and despotic as she plants her black flag on the poet’s bowed skull.<sup>5</sup> We also feel his sense of void when we read, in *Recueillement*: “Be quiet and more discrete, O my Grief. You cried out for Evening; even now it falls: a gloomy atmosphere envelops the city, bringing peace to some, anxiety to others” (XIII).

What is more significant is the recurrence in his works of the figure of the abyss. *L’homme et la mer*, for instance, evokes a *free* man who will always cherish the sea as the mirror of his soul, the two “tenebrous and discrete”, one and the other a “bitter abyss” (XIV). “Both of you are gloomy and reticent; Man, no one has sounded the depths of your being; O Sea, no person knows your most hidden riches, so zealously do you keep your secrets!” (*Ibid.*). Elsewhere, he wonders whether beauty, with its infernal and divine gaze, comes down to us from the heavens or rises out of the abyss (*Hymne à la beauté*, XXI). We could also remark that Baudelaire went through the trouble of translating Edgar Allan Poe’s *Arthur Gordon Pym*, whose hero is irresistibly attracted to the abyss.<sup>6</sup> Even more notable, however, is his poem *Le gouffre*, where Baudelaire engages with the deeper and darker Pascalian themes. The philosopher has his “gulf” that moves with him, he says, before exclaiming: “Alas! all is abyss, – action, desire, dream (...) Above, below, on every side, the depth, the strand, the silence, space, hideous and fascinating...” (XI). Echoing Pascal’s infinite silence of the eternal spaces, these lines speak of the poet’s spirit, “haunted by vertigo” and envying the insensibility of nothingness (*ibid.*).

What to make of this? Modernity is no doubt the opportunity to continually produce the world and our own selves. It would not be misleading to see this act of creation as an opening, a breach that continually exposes the groundlessness of our preconceptions and, as such, opens the possibility of transfiguration. Baudelaire clearly understood that this space of emptiness, this abyss, was the condition of the “permanent creation of ourselves in our autonomy”, as Foucault uncovered, thus transforming the ephemeral into his *façon*

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<sup>5</sup>Baudelaire, *Spleen*, LXXVIII. All translations are from William Aggeler (1954), which I have found to be the most accurate and poetic: *The Flowers of Evil* (Fresno, CA: Academy Library Guild). I have occasionally modified the translation, indicating such instances. The poems will be quoted by their title followed by their number as established by Claude Pichois, Paris, Gallimard, 1964.

<sup>6</sup> See in particular Chapter XXIV of Poe’s *Les aventures d’Arthur Gordon Pym*, translated by Charles Baudelaire, Roger Asselineau (ed.), Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1973.

*d'être*. Yet he also measured with disquieting lucidity this immense gulf, which appears before us as soon as we embrace this posture. We have another illustration of this nothingness in his draft for a preface to the *Flowers of Evil* where, looking back on his poems, his creation, he writes: "I aspire to an absolute rest and to a *never-ending night*. (...) To know *nothing*, to teach *nothing*, to will *nothing*, to feel *nothing*, to sleep and sleep again, such is today my only wish. A vile and disgusting wish, but sincere".<sup>7</sup> To be clear, modern attitude not only presupposes emptiness, it *creates* the void itself by accepting as sole foundation the continual exercise of critical reflection. This permanent creation of ourselves, this *freedom* as practice and as way of being, is now part of the modern landscape. Vertiginous, it takes the shape of an abyss that appears as stirring as it is frightening.

Does Kant's tableau of modernity also depict the act of emancipation as a deep precipice, an open space of transfiguration experienced simultaneously as exhilarating and forbidding? Imputing the persistence of tutelage on laziness and cowardice, it seems at first sight that his sketch of freedom has emphasized the details of the act at the expense of the individual performing it. Yet a careful examination of his writings might suggest otherwise. A first hint is uncovered in the celebrated formula, *Sapere aude!* Quoted from Horace's *Epistles*, the full passage reads as follows:

«For why do you seek to remove with such haste that which hurts your eyes, when you defer from year to year from curing that which gnaws your soul? He has the deed half done, who has begun. Dare to know: begin. He who postpones the time for righteousness, is like the peasant who waits for the river to flow by: yet runs and will continue to run, flowing forever». (Epistles, I, 2, 37-43)<sup>8</sup>

If anything, these lines highlight the adversity that is inherent to rectitude, hence the spur to overcome one's hesitation, which in Horace takes the form of the following imperative: *Begin!* Were it a walk in the park, the first step would not necessitate such impellent encouragement. Kant, then, does not quote this motto randomly: "It is so easy not to be of age", he admits, concomitantly (8:35). For anyone "to work himself out of the life under tutelage which has become almost his nature is very difficult". It is as if making "only an uncertain leap over the narrowest ditch because he is not accustomed to that kind of free motion" (8:36), he continues, in what is most probably an explicit reference to the above verses.

<sup>7</sup>This draft for a preface is found in Baudelaire (1964), *Les Fleurs du mal*, "Projet de préface pour *Les Fleurs du mal*", texte établi et annoté par Claude Pichois, (Paris: Gallimard), p. 222. I have translated the passage myself. The italics are also mine.

<sup>8</sup>I have translated this passage myself. The original reads as follows: *Nam cur quae laedunt oculum festinas demere; si quid est animum, differs curandi tempus in annum? Dimidium facti qui coepit habet: sapere aude: incipe. Qui recte vivendi prorogathoram, rusticus expectat dum defluatamnis; at ille labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.*

Our release from servitude in Kant suddenly appears much more arduous and demanding. Still, one would be hard pressed to distil from these lines the same type of acrid anxiety that simmered in Baudelaire's poetry. Other works, however, engage more profoundly with freedom as it is experienced by the human being, notably in *Conjectural Beginning of Human History*,<sup>9</sup> which proposes a philosophical exegesis of the first two chapters of Genesis. This short piece discusses the end of *innocence* and our passage – for better or for worse – towards independence. Its initial claim is rather standard: at first, we were guided by instinct alone, “that voice of God which is obeyed by all animals” (8:111). Soon, however, “*reason began to stir*”, adds Kant, almost ominously (*ibid.*, my italics). This is nothing short of a moment of consciousness, the “eye-opener” whereby we realize that we have the power of choosing. We now recognize that we can adopt a different “*way of life*, of not being bound without alternative to a single way, like the animals” (8:112). The human being can think and choose *otherwise*; he can always question, judge and appraise his decisions or his acts. His life is the story of an alternative he is continually forced to address, and this permanent critique becomes the very mode of his existence.

What is especially noteworthy in *CB* is how the discovery of such reflexive freedom is framed. Initially, perhaps, it creates a “moment of delight”, “but of necessity, anxiety and alarm as to how he was to deal with this newly discovered power quickly followed” (8:112). The first exercise of freedom, then, is “an alteration of condition which is honorable, to be sure, but also *fraught with danger*”, for we are suddenly thrown into “the wide world, where so many cares, troubles and unforeseen ills” await us (8:114). In *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, his other existential text, Kant articulates the initiation to autonomy in similar fashion: “To be sure, the first attempts will be crude, and in general also bound to greater hardships and dangers than when still under the command but also the care of others (...)” (6:188n). There is no denying the forceful appeal of Kant's call for moral and political emancipation. This promising awakening, however, has its shadow. Freedom is not merely programmatic, as if limited to the initial excitement of transgression or the youthful enthusiasm of one's rebellion against the establishment. As liberating as it may be, the absence of external direction is also felt as a deep “distress which threatens our moral fiber” before a newfound, and exponential, responsibility only the “thoughtless” can ignore (8:120-121). The guardians did present, after all, the advantage of supplying us with the framework to structure our conduct, now left groundless. As such, if Baudelaire and Kant can be brought together in a discussion on freedom, it is not only because they both see it as a critical ontology, but also because they portray the human being engaged in this practice as daunted before the scale of the undertaking. “He stood as it were, at the brink of an *abyss*.<sup>10</sup> Until that moment instinct had directed him toward specific objects of desire. But from these there now *opened up an infinity* of such objects, and he did not yet know how to choose between them” (8:112, my italics). These are the

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<sup>9</sup> Henceforth in the text: *CB*.

<sup>10</sup> *Abgrund* in the text, that is to say, without ground.

words of the philosopher, though they resonate of the poet's angst. Their modernity has been to uncover the abyss behind the ephemeral, and to measure themselves against it.

In light of this, we can better appreciate why human beings “apparently foreswore and decried as a crime the use of reason, which had been the cause of all these ills” (8:113), and would consequently wish for a return into permanent immaturity. In fact, the discovery of reason may very well generate, concurrently, its hatred –what Kant has called *misology* –, for we immediately realize it brings more trouble than it does happiness (GMS, 4:395). It is the concern for such an outcome that explains why the philosopher holds the figure of Job in such high esteem, praising him as a moral exemplar. He is, of course, a model of unqualified resilience in the face of utter affliction. For all his miseries and torments, remarks Kant admiringly, he remains unwavering: “Till I die, I will not remove mine integrity from me. My righteousness I hold fast, and will not let it go: my heart shall not reproach me so long as I live”.<sup>11</sup> The Book of Job, however, not only relates the story of a just man who suffers; it also narrates an experience of nothingness. As Philippe Nemo suggests, Job's afflictions reveal more than the undeserved suffering of the righteous; they also disclose his powerlessness before a situation he does not control. He finds himself completely helpless before the hardships, the deaths, the betrayals, and the sickness that suddenly plague his life. He represents neither their cause – indeed, it is *God himself* who wagers with Satan! –nor their solution. Behind this impotence, argues Nemo, lies an excess of evil [*mal*] that “unhinges all human know-how and hurls it into the abyss, precipitating the appearance – a veritable apparition – of the abyss in which the whole world sinks” (Nemo 1998, p. 86).

There is something acutely modern – indeed contemporary –about Job's story, as testify the numerous artistic, cinematic and philosophical works inspired by his plight. If his experience is significant for Kant, it is because the Biblical hero epitomizes the agonistic struggle against nothingness. “What is most important”, claims the philosopher, is that Job is at first portrayed as a being “at peace with himself in a good conscience” (8:265). What follows, however, is nothing less than the breakdown of order, that is to say, the collapse of the logic that made sense of his world and, with it, of his life. Job discovers, dramatically enough, that both the just and the wicked “shall lie down alike in the dust, and the worms shall cover them” (Job, 21:26). His ontological markers fall to ruin, leaving him “trembling” in his flesh (Job, 21:6) and unsettled before the meaninglessness of his afflictions. Yet “in the midst of his strongest doubts”, praises Kant, he remains sincere and resolute (8:267). In a peculiar passage, he adds:

«There is little worthy of note in the subtle or hypersubtle reasonings of the two sides; but the spirit in which they carry them out merits all the more attention. Job speaks as he thinks, and with the courage with which he, as well as every human being in his position,

<sup>11</sup>Job, 27: 5-6, quoted in MpVT, 8:267. In the text, Kant cites only the first part of this passage followed by an ellipsis. I have simply added the last verse.

can well afford; his friends, on the contrary, speak as if they were being secretly listened to by the mighty one (...).» (8:265)

What both parties are saying is irrelevant. In the end, it is the fact that Job continues to reason despite his distress that characterizes his heroism. Facing his torments, he has two choices: he can disavow reason through misology or superstition (i.e. the belief by which he thinks he can seduce God through rites and rituals into favouring him); or he can embrace reason regardless of his sufferings, remain composed in the midst of his afflictions. Job chooses the latter, as if his ultimate consolation was not an illusory theodicy that would conveniently justify his misfortunes, but the critical ethos that refused them the last word by getting the better of him. Herein lies his courage.

The reader will recall that in the very first paragraph of *WE*, Kant does not merely suggest we should use our own understanding, he compels us to have the courage to do so and frames this as the rallying call of the Enlightenment. Why such emphasis on resolution? This was our initial question and we are now in a better position to articulate an answer. On the first hand, with Foucault we have outlined enlightenment as a modern attitude consisting in the perpetual transfiguration of the world and of oneself, an ethos we adopt as a way of being. On the second hand, we have equally insisted that this critical ontology reveals the void of existence. A permanent critique consistently exposes the contingency of moral principles or the transience of traditions, in short, it reveals groundlessness. It is true that it opens for the human being a space of creation; in doing so, however, it confronts him with nothingness. As such, the practice of freedom is as stirring as it is daunting. Courage, then, is the “moral strength of the will”, but of the *human being's* will more specifically (MS, 6:405), confronted as he is with the fright of emptiness. “Anxiety, anguish, horror, and terror are degrees of fear, that is, degrees of aversion to danger”, says Kant. Courage, he continues, is precisely “the composure of the mind to take on fear with reflection” (Anth., 7:256); it “has he who in reflecting on danger does not yield; brave is he whose courage is *constant* in danger” (*ibid.*). In a word, courage is rational resolve before the vertigo of the abyss; it is “relief from preceding anxiety” (MS, 6:440), as for Job who stands upright despite the weight of his afflictions, weary though never trodden. In this sense, courage is the indispensable virtue of the being who wishes to embrace freedom, and so it does not merely qualify the modern attitude, it *defines* it.

### 3. DESPAIR PRECEDES EQUALITY

A number of thought-provoking studies have recently proposed scrupulous and particularly useful examinations of Kant's notion of Enlightenment. Despite the many exegetical differences of their respective works, there is an underlying consensus in their analysis that is rather striking: the *Aufklärung* is what provides some sort of liberal framework to help us respond to the growing pluralism of contemporary society. In *Kantian Courage*, for instance, Nicholas Tampio reminds us that the intention of the

Enlightenment, generally speaking, was to propose a solution to the brutal and murderous violence that devastated Europe during the wars of religion. Now for all the considerable differences between the Thirty Years War and current fundamentalism, religious militancy today equally poses an urgent problem that begs immediate attention (Tampio 2012, p. 7). Enlightenment considered as an ethos is precisely what “empowers us to construct theories to envision a way out of the looming religious wars of the twenty-first century” (p. 15). This is made possible by the kind of courage advocated by Kant in *WE*, which “demands that we reconceptualize political discourse to reflect the new religious diversity on the ground” (p. 29). In short, Kantian courage provides us with the kind of political and moral elasticity to face and address the particular problems of our historical context, much in the same way the European philosophers of the historical Enlightenment displayed the necessary open-mindedness to overcome the religious violence of their own epoch (p. 40).

Despite obvious philosophical differences, Samuel Fleischacker’s *What is Enlightenment?*, continues in a similar vein. He claims in his work that the “thinking for oneself” articulated in *WE* “simply ensures that all our views, including the ones on which we most profoundly differ, are accepted freely, and kept open to further discussion” (Fleischacker 2013, p. 30). He acknowledges the strong Rawlsian and Habermasian undertones behind this perspective, declaring that these schools of thought “take up the minimalist version of Kantian enlightenment, trying to find appropriate rules to foster a free and responsible public discussion among people with very different religious and philosophical doctrines” (p. 39). Proposing a periodization of enlightenment, he sustains that if for Plato the process involved an ascent towards a better way of leading one’s life, modern enlightenment came “to be used for what happens once one replaces a trust in religious leaders with a commitment to the science”. Kant’s essay, however, is distinctive “for the strong freedom of the press that it advocates (...), for its individualism, and for the fact that it identifies enlightenment with a kind of act, rather than a kind of theory” (p. 12).

At first sight, one of the most obvious points of discord between these two readings would be the apparent Foucauldian position of the former, which connects enlightenment to an attitude rather than an act. Yet by characterizing courage as tolerance before difference, or the ethos that allows us to “confront the singular problems of our day and then construct new solutions” (Tampio 2012, p. 31)<sup>12</sup>, Tampio’s interpretation seems as minimalist – in the same Rawlsian sense – as Fleischacker’s. In both cases, the basic political imperative extracted from *WE* is to adjust political discourse in order to address diversity, religious or otherwise, so as to ensure civic harmony. This reading not only predicates social order upon the neutrality of the state, it also defends the universal recognition and accommodation of the entities that compose the community, each dissolved into equal groups contributing their own opinion to public debate. This may outline the basis of a liberal model of political integration, if not constitute an upfront apology of multiculturalism, but does it succeed in highlighting the *originality* of Kant’s answer to the

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<sup>12</sup>See also p. 23.



question of the Enlightenment? Although we may discern in it a political program that calls for religious and cultural acceptance – such as is also advocated *at least* as cogently in John Locke or John Stuart Mill, among others –,it leaves little room to a practice of freedom that adopts the ephemeral as way of being. What is more, with its usual recourse to inherent dignity and inalienable human rights, this liberal view – whether conservative or (slightly) more inclined to the left – presupposes a recourse to naturalism that critical ontology precludes. Finally, it is somewhat difficult to see in what way courage is necessary to defend one of the most widespread, run-of-the-mill philosophical doctrine of the twenty-first century. One defended freedom of thought during the period of the Enlightenment at the peril of his life, and although similar risks are incurred elsewhere in the world, Western democracies simply do not pose the same threat. Disputing the ecclesiastical authorities of his time brought Giordano Bruno the death penalty; when academics challenge the establishment today, it brings them tenure. In what way is Kantian courage *still* relevant to us?

In her captivating book, *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment*, Katerina Deligiorgi approaches *WE* from a different historical angle: instead of reading it on the background of the religious violence that scarred the Enlightenment, she proposes to examine it from the emerging cultural relativism that equally marked it. We know the movement did not remain indifferent to the spectacular discoveries of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which suddenly exposed European society to other customs, new religious practices and different sets of beliefs. Facing breaches within the ethical values that structured their own understanding of the world, authors such as Diderot and Rousseau took to uncover a normative ground of objectivity capable of resisting the growing relativism of the period. We have here the first attempts towards establishing a conception of reason “whose authority is not natural but established through discursive practice” (Deligiorgi 2005, p. 10). As we have seen earlier in this paper, Kant goes a step further, arguing that reason is not so much a faculty that allows us to test the validity of a norm, but the norm itself. In other words, it is not that a more acute exercise of reflexivity will cement with greater solidity the rules upon which society is edified; rather, the exercise of reflexivity itself constitutes the foundational principle. As such, “the strength of Kant’s proposal is that he acknowledges precisely this – namely, that to confront a situation where alternatives are possible and the right thing is neither obvious nor natural is a condition for the exercise of our freedom and not an impediment to it” (p. 156). Deligiorgi therefore makes a case for an “agonistic model of social interaction” where in debating the matter at hand, one is also simultaneously critically addressing the norms that ground the (potential) decision (pp. 90-91).

Despite the undeniable rigor of her argument, there is something in Deligiorgi’s treatment of Kantian enlightenment that also seems to overlook its novelty. To begin with, she shifts the emphasis of the practice of freedom from a subjective experience to a public exercise: “enlightenment amounts to a test of one’s capacity to acknowledge others as having an equal claim to intellectual independence. This is the deepest transformation that

the concept of enlightenment undergoes in Kant's interpretation, *for it no longer means the solitary struggle against error and superstition*, but rather the effort to think with others" (p. 58, my italics). Having done so, she subsequently moves away from the Baudelairian undertones of the modern ethos and intersects with the more pluralist – one is tempted to say Anglo-American – position defended by the aforementioned commentators, depicting enlightenment as a culture indeed, though one that describes "a sphere of social interaction that is not hierarchically structured in the manner of guardianship, but inclusive and egalitarian because what vouchsafes this sphere are the freedoms of participation and of communication" (p. 76). Enlightenment is once more reduced to a mere space of free speech based on the abstract equality of its members, thus overlooking the angst connected with one's *own* use of his understanding. Of course, there is no denying the public ramifications of Kant's call for emancipation. Autonomy is not exercised in a vacuum, but continually measured against the rationality of my peers I am consequently and simultaneously asked to recognize as free and equal. Nevertheless, amplifying the otherwise undeniable political dimension of the *Aufklärung* at the expense of its ethical ground runs the risk of confusing the enemy at hand, the true foe that beckons our courage in order to be defied and overcome.

To that effect, *WE* is unequivocally limpid – in its very first paragraph – as to the immediate threat of enlightenment: not institutional repression such as censorship, but the lack of resolution to use our own reason without direction from another (8:35). *Cowardice* is the cause of our self-incurred minority and the reason "so great a portion of mankind, after nature has long since discharged them from external direction, nevertheless remains under lifelong tutelage" (8:35). Now to impute servitude on pusillanimity is a trenchant if not obdurate verdict, and one is tempted here to remind Kant that other external factors can stand in the way of one's emancipation. This being said, what exactly does he understand by cowardice? It is none other than "*dishonorable despair*" (Anth., 7:256), he contends, an aversion to fear we already know to be of anxiety, anguish, horror and terror. The opposite of courage, then, is not merely a "lack of discipline", as if the veritable trial merely consisted in taming our natural inclinations through force of will (RGV, 6:57). It is, rather, dejection before freedom, to shudder and vacillate before the "irresistible constraints" of duty (MS, 6:405). If Kantian enlightenment is agonistic, then, it is because of an initial struggle – one might say institutive – against "the vices and the brood of dispositions opposing the law". These are the "monsters" we have to fight, illustrates Kant (6:405). As such, virtue does not speak of power against an unconcealed enemy, as the Stoics mistakenly thought (RGV, 6:57); it is what galvanizes our spirits in our confrontation with the holiness of the law and what strengthens the "resolution to bring ourselves ever nearer to conformity to that law according to this noble predisposition in us" (6:184n-185n). Still calibrating his position against the Stoics, Kant does concede that there is indeed courage in taking one's life, such as they display when they choose to free themselves "with peace of soul" from "the pressure of present or anticipated ills" (MS, 6:422). "But there should have been in this very courage, this strength of soul not to fear death and to know of

something that a human being can value even more highly than his life, a still stronger motive for him not to destroy himself” (6:422). This motive, Kant continues, is morality, the capacity for self-legislation or to break with empirical determinism and spark a new beginning. Greater than honor, greater even than life, is freedom. Courage consists in measuring oneself against its majesty, that is, of remaining faithful to its promise and not shying away from its demands.

Far from the nauseating pop-psychology that lures us into thinking excellence simply requires belief in oneself, courage is the resolution of mind that keeps us steady in the torment of our passage to majority. It will come as no surprise, then, that Kant weaves an intimate relation between courage and hope, both sparking our leap over the aforementioned ditch. We find at least three different examples of this connection. Firstly, the postulate of immortality presses us forward in our exertions to attain moral perfection, instead of forsaking our course when we realize that this goal is unattainable (RGV, 6:68-69). Secondly, piety may “crown” virtue “with the hope of the final success of all our good ends” (6:185). Granted, the latter is an ambiguous concept in Kant, at times containing the concept of an object which we represent to ourselves as “a cause supplementing our incapacity with respect to the final moral end” (6:183), elsewhere defined as belief in the supreme being’s ability to reconcile our virtue with our worthiness to be happy. In any case, it can minimally be taken as that which both helps us stand on our own feet and “opens up for us the path to a new conduct of life” (6:183-184). Finally, in a similar vein though different enough to warrant its own mention, Kant sustains that the historical representation of the Kingdom of Heaven may also be seen in this light, that is, “interpreted as a symbolic representation aimed merely at stimulating greater hope and courage and effort in achieving it” (6:134). Nature and history do contain for the philosopher elements that provide us, as a species, with support in our moral advances, but this is often achieved in absence of the individual or quite simply at his expense.<sup>13</sup> If the story of Job reminds us of anything, it is that this is of very little consolation in the face of our afflictions, no matter how useful they may turn out to be for subsequent generations. Courage and hope, then, are what spur us forward in the adversity of our ethical exertions and prevent us from collapsing into despondency.

Let us use these last paragraphs to examine more specifically the causes behind such despair, so as to further accentuate the existential tones we are looking to bring out in Kant’s modernity. We know it comes from the practice of freedom as critical ontology, but why is this so distressing, in the end? One of the chief reasons can be attributed to solitude. It is striking that most, if not all of Kant’s texts we have quoted in this paper call for *severance*: *WE* from guardians, *CB* from the womb of nature and Providence, *Religion* from the vicarious effects of grace, and *Theodicy* from soothing illusions. We could of course add the *Groundwork*, which asks us to legislate our conduct by abstracting from the

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<sup>13</sup>See MAM, 8:115: “For the individual, who in the use of his freedom is concerned only with himself, this whole change was a loss; for nature, whose purpose with man concerns the species, it was a gain.”

empirical factors that might distort the universality of the moral law, that is, from whatever precedes the subject, be it tradition, culture or revealed religion. Make no mistake: the enlightened individual in Kant takes his *first* steps alone, even if this can imply eventually walking towards a community of equals and social interaction, so to speak. Solitude, in this case, should not be conflated with Capitalism's mythical self-made man, deluded into thinking he is the sole author of his happiness or success. It echoes, rather, Zarathustra's loneliness, who exclaims as he returns to the mountains: "But one day solitude will make you weary, one day your pride will cringe and your courage will gnash its teeth. One day you will cry 'I am alone!'" (Nietzsche 2006, p. 47). There has been considerable work done as of late to highlight the role and place of the social in Kant's writings, not only within the *Aufklärung* text but also concerning radical evil, among other themes in his philosophy. Again, the intention here is neither to belittle his anthropological and political concerns nor the commentaries that investigate them. However, it seems irrefutable that constituting a Kingdom of ends, resisting self-deception, or moving from innocence to majority initially presupposes the subjective experience of freedom, i.e. reason that stirs the subject from his slumber and opens before him the path of autonomy. To let the voice of reason silence the tumult of experience, the call of instinct and the insinuations of the guardians... This is the sound of freedom, and it resonates of solitude before the unknown.

Severance from heteronomy, that is, emancipation from the external sources of authority that legislated in our stead, is thus very unsettling. There is something reassuring in being guided by someone else: not only does he set the itinerary, he can also be held imputable should we err along the way. Hence, to be called to freely engage upon our own path disturbs our peace and comfort. Herein lies a second cause of despair, one that leaves us so "discontented" that we begin longing for a "golden age" where "there is to be contentment with the mere satisfaction of natural needs, universal human equality and perpetual peace: in a word, unalloyed enjoyment of a carefree life, dreamt away idly, or trifled away in childish play" (MAM, 6:122). Freedom, the reader will recall, is the eye opener that interrupts innocence and casts the human being into the wide world. As a result, predicts Kant, "the wretchedness of his condition would often arouse in him the wish for a paradise, the creation of his imagination, where he could dream or while away his existence in quiet inactivity and permanent peace" (6:114-115). More than two centuries before *WE*, Étienne de la Boétie wrote that servitude was not so much attributable to the might of the tyrant as to our own free will. We *like* our chains and often prefer them to an independence that brings with it toils and tribulations. This was also Dostoyevsky's Grand Inquisitor's formidable insight, more appears more perceptive than his prisoner – none other than Christ himself – when he asks:

«Or did you forget that a tranquil mind and even death is dearer to man than the free choice in the knowledge of good and evil? There is nothing more alluring to man than this freedom of conscience, but there is nothing more tormenting, either. (...) Did it never occur to you that he would at last reject and call in question even your image and your truth, if he

were weighed down by so fearful a burden as freedom of choice?» (Dostoyevsky 1998, pp. 298-299).

Kant had foreseen this outcome, and suspected that human reason, in its weariness, would rather rest on the soft “pillow” of empirical satisfaction and in “a dream of sweet illusions (which allow it to embrace a cloud instead of Juno)”, than commit “to virtue in her true form” (GMS, 4:426). Tampio is thus right to see self-love as the enemy of courage (Tampio 2012, p. 38), though only to the extent it is equivalent to the selfish preference for one’s comfort over the exerting demands of freedom.<sup>14</sup>

We may identify a third and final reason behind despair in Kant’s writings: radical evil. This is a particularly intricate problem for the philosopher and one that we have examined at length elsewhere (2011). The underlying claim is that there is in “even the best” of us a natural propensity to evil (6:30,32). Kant’s verdict there stands in stark contrast with his defence of autonomy whereby the subject can abstract from empirical determinism and choose his own principle of action. In the latter context, evil seems to be nothing more than the mere subordination of duty to inclination, a sporadic mistake the rational subject can keep from repeating. Kant’s contention however is that this lapse in judgment is not as random as it seems, that it presupposes an initial accord with egoism through which the subject constitutively favours his personal desires to the detriment of duty. In other words, to prefer my needs to the law is itself conditional upon the operation by which I belittle the impact of the former, and relativize the importance of the latter, that is, upon dishonesty. As such, though the resulting action may appear innocuous, the hypocrisy behind it is utterly deleterious, slowly turning into a habit that contaminates my whole being. Propensity, in short, is a predisposition for self-deception, not only an inherent vulnerability to temptation (weakness), but a penchant for seduction whereby we convince ourselves of the virtue of vice. In very evocative terms, Kant thus depicts radical evil as “an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason” and “secretly undermines the disposition with soul-corrupting principles” (6:57). In sum, evil is *radical* because it gnaws the very root (‘radix’, in Latin) of our disposition; it is *universal* because it corrupts even the best of us; and it is *inextirpable* because its very ruse is to outplay the tool – free will or *Willkür* – that could otherwise be used to deracinate it. Framed in these terms, wickedness drives a wedge between what is and what should be. In Kant’s words, “the distance between the goodness which we ought to effect in ourselves and the evil from which we start” seems “infinite” (6:66), and the subject begins to suspect he may “never be able to become quite fully what he has in mind” (6:68n). Dispirited before an “immeasurable gap” he cannot bridge by his own means, he is left hoping for an external succor bestowed according to his efforts to remain steadfast in his ethical strivings. Kant’s account of radical evil is not always coherent and leaves open a number of questions that deserve further scrutiny, in particular the issue of divine grace. It is remarkable, however, for its

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<sup>14</sup> As suggests a footnote in *Religion*: “Those for whom the merely formal determining ground as such (lawfulness) will not suffice as the determining ground in the concept of duty, nonetheless admit that this ground is not to be found in self-love directed to one’s own comfort” (6:3n).

dramatic portrayal of human finitude, highlighting the potential despair that threatens us all, and the necessary courage to not succumb to it.

Faced with solitude, distress and his “permanent deficiency”, one can understand why the human being might be tempted to alleviate the burden that comes with the practice of freedom, to falter in his resolution and surrender to laziness and cowardice. For Kant, this capitulation has quite often taken the form of superstition, that is, the illusory belief of fooling ourselves into thinking we can inflect God’s will or the course of Providence through rites and rituals, thus blurring the lucid sobriety of reason with misleading sophistry, such as is displayed in the rhetoric of Job’s companions. Once more, Kant’s treatment of religious themes is somewhat narrow, yet the underlying intuition that we should use such stratagems to remain under self-tutelage and postpone majority is most pertinent. It is especially useful in understanding the following definition of *Aufklärung*, which has puzzled a number of commentators: “Liberation from superstition is called enlightenment. (...) The blindness that superstition creates in a person, which indeed it even seems to demand as an obligation, reveals especially well the person’s need to be guided by others, and hence his state of passive reason” (KU, 5:294). To ward against such blindness and keep our eyes open as we come of age, no matter how desolate this itinerary appears before us, is one of the key imperatives of Kant’s ethics. Indeed, “moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom”, he declares (MS, 6:441).<sup>15</sup>

In other words, the officer, the tax collector and the cleric can only exercise decisive influence over our conduct to the extent we have internalized their command as the rightful authority, to the detriment of the voice of our own reason we alienate in the process. Introspection is therefore instrumental in determining not only the integrity of the legislation, but its origin as well. Its purpose is to continually validate the universality of the law and authenticate its author. As such, it is intimately connected to the process of enlightenment: “*Thinking for oneself* means seeking the supreme touchstone of truth in oneself (i.e. in one’s own reason); and the maxim of always thinking for oneself is *enlightenment*” (WDO, 8: 146). When we take the time to measure the abyss that opens before the practice of freedom, and the temptation that follows to turn our back on it, we come to realize that *Aufklärung* does preclude the “solitary struggle against superstition” as Deligiorgi and Foucault both hold; it is rather its condition, as Kant so acutely observes. The culture of enlightenment may very well describe a sphere of social interaction, and perhaps this space is more inclusive and egalitarian than the Athenian agora, the early Christian ecclesiae, or even the early indigenous communities so beautifully described by Claude Lévi-Strauss in *Tristes tropiques*, despite the complete absence of embodied, institutional power that characterized them. Still, it seems that the modernity of Kantian

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<sup>15</sup>And as if to further tie introspection and enlightenment together, Kant explicitly associates wisdom with moral strength and courage:MS, 6:405.

enlightenment lies elsewhere, that it is found, rather, in the particular attitude of the *emancipated* subject, severed from any form of external direction. *Aufklärung* is an *Ausgang* for Kant because the human being begins to walk *outside* the comfort of the beaten path, to legislate *outside* any reference to natural harmony, and if God may still exist in such a world, then the human being is sure to exist *outside* of him. Freedom is an ethos only the brave can embrace; it is a commitment only the courageous can make.

#### CONCLUSION

This paper followed Foucault in defining enlightenment as an attitude, a modern ethos that adopts the ephemeral as way of being. Contrary to the French philosopher, however, we have argued that this permanent critique of oneself and of the world creates a void that leaves us trembling before nothingness. If enlightenment requires courage, it is precisely to urge us to persist in our moral exertions, to remain steadfast in the practice of freedom and not retreat into immaturity from the fright it may incur, as did Job, righteous despite his afflictions and the apparent groundlessness of his existence. Courage, it is worth repeating, is resolve before the abyss of freedom. Notwithstanding their respective and indisputable strengths, recent commentaries have almost completely overshadowed this deep existential element of Kantian enlightenment, often reducing it to a liberal space of discursive practice that allows for equal participation in the free exchange of ideas, useful notably to address the challenges posed by the growing diversity of Western societies. This is to neglect the despair behind the practice of freedom, an experience of solitude that leaves us weary and dejected before the difficulty of its demands. Enlightenment is a daunting undertaking indeed, for which all have the means, though few have the courage.

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## Kant's Machiavellian Moment

### *El momento maquiaveliano de Kant*

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#### Abstract

At least two recent collections of essays – *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment* (2001) and *What's Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question* (2001) – have responded to postmodern critiques of Enlightenment by arguing that Enlightenment *philosophes* themselves embraced a number of post-modern themes. This essay situates Kant's essay *Was ist Aufklärung* (1784) in the context of this recent literature about the appropriate characterization of modernity and the Enlightenment. Adopting an internalist reading of Kant's *Aufklärung* essay, this paper observes that Kant is surprisingly ambivalent about who might be Enlightened and unspecific about when Enlightenment might be achieved. The paper argues that this is because Kant is concerned less with elucidating his concept of Enlightenment and more with characterizing a political condition that might provide the conditions for the possibility of Enlightenment. This paper calls this political condition *modernity* and it is achieved when civil order can be maintained alongside fractious and possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience, including the nature and possibility of Enlightenment. Thus, the audience for the *Aufklärung* essay is not the tax collector, soldier or clergyman, but rather the sovereign. Kant enjoins and advises the prince that discord and debate about matters of conscience need not entail any political unrest or upheaval. It is in this restricted (Pocockian) sense that the Enlightenment essay is Kant's Machiavellian moment.

#### Key words

Kant; Enlightenment; *Aufklärung*; post-modernism; modernism; modernity; Machiavelli; Pocock; Foucault; Lyotard

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### Resumen

Al menos dos recientes colecciones de ensayos, *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment* (2001) y *What's Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question* (2001), han respondido a las críticas posmodernas de la Ilustración aduciendo que los *philosophes* de la Ilustración abrazaron una serie de temas posmodernos. Este artículo sitúa el ensayo de Kant, *¿Qué es la Ilustración?* (1784) en el contexto de esta reciente literatura acerca de la caracterización apropiada de la Modernidad y la Ilustración. Adoptando una lectura inmanente del ensayo de Kant sobre la *Aufklärung*, señalo que Kant es sorprendentemente ambivalente con respecto a quién podría ser ilustrado y no especifica cuándo podrá alcanzarse la Ilustración. Este artículo argumenta que esto se debe a que Kant está menos preocupado por elucidar este concepto de Ilustración que por caracterizar una condición política que podría suministrar las condiciones para posibilitar la Ilustración. Así, pues, la audiencia del ensayo sobre la *Aufklärung* no es el recaudador de impuestos, el soldado o el sacerdote, sino más bien el soberano. Kant ordena y aconseja al príncipe que la discordia y el debate sobre cuestiones de conciencia no comportan necesariamente inseguridad o conmoción social alguna. Es en este sentido (Pocockiano) restringido que el ensayo sobre la Ilustración actúa como el momento maquiaveliano de Kant.

### Palabras clave

Kant; Ilustración; *Aufklärung*; Posmodernidad; Modernismo; Modernidad; Machiavelli; Pocock; Foucault; Lyotard

## 1. Enlightenment and Critique

Everyone, it seems, should want to be enlightened. Perhaps that's just because the alternative – being unenlightened – seems so ignominious. Shall you be daring and engage in the autonomous use of reason? Or, shall you be cowardly and dwell in nonage and tutelage? Put in just these terms *Was is Aufklärung?* seems to be a loaded question. We'll take Enlightenment, of course. There isn't much choice in the matter.

Even Enlightenment's detractors – among them Hamann, Herder, Heidegger and Adorno and Horkheimer – acknowledge that we always choose Enlightenment. As Enlightenment's critics, their concern is to anticipate, redirect or diagnose enlightenment and its consequences. Whatever the specifics of their criticism, as critics they must minimally take some position on what *Aufklärung* might or might not be, and perhaps also some stance on its attainability. And, in turn, taking, holding, asserting and defending a stance on Enlightenment can be (and has been) interpreted as itself being an enlightenment commitment. That is, the willingness and capability to engage in processes of giving and accepting reasons for some position or another is, if not a key tenet of enlightened, well down the path toward Enlightenment. Grappling with the question *Was is Aufklärung?*, would then imply not only a disposition towards Enlightenment but also an enlightened disposition.

From this vantage point, Enlightenment seems as ineluctable as Descartes' *cogito*. Positing the *cogito* implies a thinking thing that does the positing, and so doubting that there are thinking things leads to self-contradiction. Likewise, if the willingness to engage in critical discussion of Enlightenment is always already evidence of an enlightened critical disposition, then Enlightenment cannot be rejected on pain of self-contradiction. To what extent may Enlightenment values, procedures or aims themselves be subject to question by Enlightenment precepts? To express the same question in loosely Nietzschean terms: is a complete transvaluation of all values possible, or does such a transvaluation itself depend on some enduring underlying values? Considered from this vantage point, the question *Was is Aufklärung?* need not be about Enlightenment *per se*, but is instead much more a question about the limits of analytical reflexivity.

A recent example of this form of argument is Jürgen Habermas' famous question posed to Michel Foucault. "How can Foucault's self-understanding as a thinker in the tradition of Enlightenment be compatible with his unmistakable critique of precisely this form of knowledge, which is that of modernity?" Foucault had just died so he could not answer the question. Yet Habermas kept alive the reply that Foucault was embroiled in a hopeless contradiction, albeit a "productive contradiction" and an "instructive contradiction."<sup>1</sup> An accusation of contradiction is attention grabbing – as Habermas' continues to be. Anything, true or false, can follow from a contradiction, so it is a potentially devastating objection to an argument. But, usually it's quite hard to make such an accusation stick. The easy cure for a contradiction is a distinction. If it really is the case that attempting to put together a reasonable, well-argued and (therefore) convincing critique of Enlightenment immediately implicates you in some tragic, misguided contradiction, then something seems to be very much awry in our intellectual machinery. We should be leery of arguments that suggest otherwise. Surely I can have my Enlightenment and eat it too.

The question is not whether a distinction can be made but where to make the distinction. As Richard Bernstein points out there are many ways to save Foucault and others from accusations of self-contradiction.<sup>2</sup> Enlightenment is a philosophical and historiographical concept that is both elastic and piecemeal. Elastic in the sense that the scope of the concept shifts over time, and piecemeal in the sense that the relevant histories that constitute it continue to shift over the course of inquiry. And so decisions, cuts, must be made. The cut this paper makes, or begins to make, is between modernity and Enlightenment. Modernity, I suggest, is a political condition that opens a possibility for the pursuit of enlightenment; it is not the process or product of Enlightenment itself. (Thus, contra Habermas, Foucault could work within the Enlightenment tradition and offer

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<sup>1</sup>See Jürgen Habermas, "Taking Aim at the Heart of the Present: On Foucault's Lecture on Kant's What is Enlightenment?" in S.W. Nicholson, ed. and trans., *The New Conservatism: Cultural Criticism and the Historians Debate* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1989), 173-179 at 176 and 178.

<sup>2</sup>See Richard J. Bernstein, "Foucault: Critique as a Philosophical Ethos" in Michael Kelly, ed., *Critique and Power: Recasting the Foucault/Habermas Debate* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1994), 283-314.

a critique of modernity without any risk of contradiction.) I argue here that modernity is a political condition which is achieved when there can be civil order alongside fractious and possibly insoluble public disagreement about matters of conscience.

By contrast, enlightenment is a different creature. Enlightenment may be (and has been) variously formulated. Sometimes Enlightenment is portrayed as an ongoing process, as Adorno and Horkheimer famously suggested in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (1944). At other times, Enlightenment is presented as a past achievement or future goal, and sometimes even both. For instance, in the Preface to *The Philosophy of Enlightenment* (1932), Ernst Cassirer reflected, “the time is again ripe for applying ... self-criticism to the present age, for holding up to it that bright clear mirror fashioned by the Enlightenment.” Cassirer wrote this at the Warburg Institute in Hamburg as the Nazi Party machinated to achieve power. He went on to suggest that Enlightenment might be regained: “the age which venerated reason and science as man’s highest faculty cannot and must not be lost even for us.”<sup>3</sup> As a product or outcome, Enlightenment may represent some achieved consensus — some universal agreement — about the character of the good, the true or the beautiful. So, for example, for a stereotypical (and inexistent) eighteenth-century *philosophe* the enlightened consensus was that the rational is the good, the good is the natural, and the natural is the rational. That is, of course, circular but, even today, many take the circle to be virtuous rather than vicious. The very ability to debate these and other conceptions of enlightenment, without any threat to civic order marks the achievement of modernity.

This distinction between modernity and enlightenment was articulated, I suggest, in Immanuel Kant’s *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* (1784). The final section of this paper argues that the *Aufklärung* essay was Kant’s “Machiavellian moment” in which he argues for the indifference of princes to the free and public use of reason in matters of conscience. In so doing, I shall suggest, Kant simultaneously makes an implicit distinction between modernity and enlightenment. Of course, some Kant scholars read the *Aufklärung* piece as anticipating positions articulated in the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) and his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).<sup>4</sup> In the second section of this essay, I point to several ambivalences in Kant’s *Aufklärung* essay. I think these are unexpected if Kant was simply articulating positions developed in greater detail elsewhere. I take these ambivalences to be part of Kant’s rhetorical strategy, signaling that the essay is offering a distinct argument. Of course, the very attempt to distinguish enlightenment and modernity may seem misguided, and perhaps even counter-intuitive. Are not the terms synonymous? And so, I shall begin by suggesting that this synonymy is only a feature of a very recent intellectual history.

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<sup>3</sup>See Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C.A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Boston: Beacon Press), xi.

<sup>4</sup>For example, see Henry E. Allison, *Essays on Kant* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 229-235.

## 2. A Postmodern Enlightenment?

In *The Postmodern Condition* (1979/1984), Jean-François Lyotard offered the best known definition of the postmodern as “incredulity towards metanarratives.” That’s probably as good a simple definition of postmodernism as one can hope for. Lyotard himself rejected two specific metanarratives as unsustainable myths: the myth of the progress of knowledge and the myth of the progress of liberation. Other avowed postmodernists called for the rejection of various other metanarratives — the myth of objectivity, the myth of the public sphere, the myth of universal reason — the list goes on. For his part, Lyotard was largely indifferent to the ultimate origin of such myths. The proclivity for metanarrative is, “noticeable in Renaissance Humanism and variously present in the Enlightenment, the *Sturm und Drang*, German idealist philosophy and the historical school in France.”<sup>5</sup> Many other postmodernists, however, identified the eighteenth-century Enlightenment — mainly as it occurred in France, Scotland and Germany — as the primary source of the many dubious metanarratives that informed and guided subsequent modernity. If indeed the fact or concept of modernity was prototyped by Enlightenment *philosophes*, then the historical Enlightenment is always implicated in debates about modernism. To be postmodern is to be post-Enlightenment, and in some extreme cases, even anti-Enlightenment.

In 2001, two collections of philosophical and historical essays were published that assessed some of the claims made by postmodernists about the Enlightenment. Daniel Gordon edited *Postmodernism and the Enlightenment*, while Keith Baker and Peter Reill edited *What’s Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question*. Both volumes were clearly in the same key, but they also opened on precisely the same note. Baker and Reill wrote: “the many varieties of thinking grouped under the rubric of ‘postmodernism’ share at least one salient character: they all depend on a stereotyped, even caricatural, account of the Enlightenment.”<sup>6</sup> Gordon meanwhile cautioned against “postmodernist academics whose knowledge of the Enlightenment is limited to a series of derogatory clichés: the Enlightenment glorified ‘instrumental’ reason; the Enlightenment set out to eliminate cultural diversity; the Enlightenment naively idealized history as infinite progress.”<sup>7</sup> Interestingly, perhaps in the spirit of settling conflict, neither book attempts to reject or refute postmodernism. Instead, the various essays in both volumes contribute to a slightly new and different project: reconstructing Enlightenment so that in most relevant respects it is continuous with postmodernism.

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<sup>5</sup> See Jean-François Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), 30.

<sup>6</sup> See Keith M. Baker and Peter H. Reill, *What’s Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), 1.

<sup>7</sup> See Daniel Gordon, ed. *Postmodernism and Enlightenment: New Perspectives in Eighteenth-Century French Intellectual History* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 1.

As might be expected, the “postmodern Enlightenment” makes no mention of universality, reason, nature, essentialism or secularism. It is, instead, envisioned as an ongoing conversation of humanity about potential solutions to two very general concerns, one epistemological and the other political. The epistemological concern is about the well-foundedness of knowledge claims. The political concern is about the means to build an inclusive politics of diversity and difference amongst classes, cultures and genders. Richard Rorty speaks for this well-tempered Enlightenment when he argues for the continuity of Enlightenment and postmodernism by claiming that, “there were two Enlightenment projects,” one political and the other philosophical. The political project was “to create heaven on earth” while the philosophical project was, “to find a new comprehensive, world-view which would replace God with Nature and Reason.”<sup>8</sup> Rorty then maintained that the political Enlightenment project continues, while postmodernism has shown that the epistemological project of philosophy has failed. An inclusive politics may still be possible, but there is no salve for epistemological anxiety.

This new-fangled postmodern Enlightenment might well be regarded with suspicion, perhaps with good cause but not for the reason that the Enlightenment did not express postmodern themes. Historically speaking, it's just good sense to remind ourselves that eighteenth-century *literati* argued for a variety of philosophical positions and agitated for a number of different objectives. The Enlightenment was an intellectually, geographically, culturally and temporally dispersed movement. This point had been raised two decades before a “postmodern Enlightenment” had even been suggested, by Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich in the collection of essays *The Enlightenment in National Context* (1981). Teich concluded that volume by noting that the *Aufklärungs* were “socially a heterogeneous group” drawn from “aristocratic-bourgeois” classes.<sup>9</sup> Enlightenment interlocutors were certainly not a representative sample of eighteenth-century humanity, but nevertheless, Enlightenment was variously expressed by different genders and classes and cultures. Given this diversity of Enlightenments, it would be surprising if at least some postmodern concerns hadn't been voiced.

The reason, then, to be cautious interpreting the Enlightenment as presaging postmodernity is that taking this stance might capitulate far too much to the particular strand of recent French philosophy articulated by Foucault and Lyotard, among others. Consider for a moment an alternative, now largely forgotten, historiography of modernism that does not identify either modernity or postmodernity with Enlightenment. This other history was articulated by a generation of Anglo-American intellectual historians who produced a bevy of books in the 1980s. These books pointed out that there was a sustained critique of established ideals and standards in art and literature long before 1960s French philosophers arrived on the scene. Taking H. Stuart-Hughes' *Consciousness and Society*

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<sup>8</sup>See Richard Rorty, “The Continuity Between the Enlightenment and ‘Postmodernism’,” in Baker and Reill, eds. *What's Left of Enlightenment?*, 19,

<sup>9</sup>See Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich, eds., *The Enlightenment in National Context* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 217.

(1958) as a model, Carl E. Schorske, T.J. Jackson Lears, Marshall Berman and Modris Eksteins all offered book-length discussion of “modernist” movements in the period between 1880 and 1930.<sup>10</sup>

Lears expressed the modernist sensibility as a rejection of “a docile mass society — glutted by sensate gratification, ordered by benevolent governors, populated by creatures who have exchanged spiritual freedom and moral responsibility for economic and psychic security.”<sup>11</sup> In this sense, neither modernism nor modernity involves the expression or realization of some identifiable body of eighteenth-century values or ideals. On the contrary, modernism was an expression of an ongoing avant-garde reworking of established artistic styles, musical forms and literary strategies. Various avant-gardists — Dostoevsky, Klimt, Schoenberg, Stravinsky, Cubists, Dadaists, Joyce, Miller and the Bloomsburies — subverted and rejected bourgeois values and traditions in art, literature, music and life.

From this historiographic perspective, it is patently absurd to suggest that Foucault, Lyotard and other French philosophers had just recently discovered a rejection of Enlightenment values. Quietly ignoring the intellectual history of the modernist movement of 1880-1930 serves the interest of contemporary French philosophy very well. As David Hollinger puts it:

«All those folks who thought everything had changed on or about December 1910 were kidding themselves. There was a big break, all right, but it did not take place in Bloomsbury on the eve of World War I. It took place in Paris 1968».<sup>12</sup>

The upshot is that when Foucault situates the emergence of modernity in the eighteenth-century Enlightenment — as he does in his College lectures as much as in *Discipline and Punish* (1975)<sup>13</sup> — the effect is to consolidate the intellectual history of period from (say) 1750 to 1968 into a sufficiently uniform lump that it can be an object of a unified philosophical critique. Lyotard polarizes intellectual history still more sharply. He is not exhibiting greater historical sensitivity when he suggests (as we saw above) that the metanarratives that inform modernity emerge piecemeal from the Renaissance, the Enlightenment, and Romanticism, as well as from among the Annalists. In fact, he is

<sup>10</sup> H. Stuart Hughes, *Consciousness and Society: The Reorientation of European Social Thought, 1890-1930* (New York: Vintage Books, 1977 [1958]). Carl E. Schorske, *Fin-de-Siecle Vienna: Politics and Culture* (New York: Vintage Books, 1981 [1961]). T.J. Jackson Lears, *No Place of Grace: Modernism and Antimodernism and the Transformation of American Culture* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1981). Marshall Berman, *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1988 [1982]). Modris Eksteins, *Rites of Spring: The Great War and the Birth of the Modern Age* (Toronto: Lester and Orpen Dennys, 1989).

<sup>11</sup> See Lears, *No Place of Grace*, 300.

<sup>12</sup> See David A. Hollinger, “The Enlightenment and the Genealogy of Cultural Conflict in the United States,” in Baker and Reill, eds. *What’s Left of Enlightenment?*, 12. Harold Mah argued a very similar point in his graduate seminar on Modernism at Queen’s University in 1992.

<sup>13</sup> To be more specific, a sagittal or vertical (rather than longitudinal) modernity. See Michel Foucault, *The Government of the Self and Others: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1982-1982* (), 12-15.



showing *less*. All of history is suddenly divided into that time before 1968 when the gullible credulously accepted metanarratives, and the time after 1968 when French philosophers showed us the way of appropriate incredulity.

To be clear, none of this should be taken to suggest that either Foucault or Lyotard maintain that nothing of significance happened after (say) 1789 and before 1968. The much more restricted point on offer here is that taking a stand for “postmodernism” and then identifying modernism with the Enlightenment is to draw lines in the sand. You either fall into line behind those who wish to complete “the unfinished project of Enlightenment” or you join ranks with those who declare “the failure of the Enlightenment project.” Once the lines between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente were just this sharp, wars — the Culture Wars, the Science Wars and the Freud Wars — were inevitable.

The kinds of conflicts exhibited in the humanities in the 1980s and 1990s might have been more subdued and more subtle if more attention had been paid to the fact that categories of modernity and modernism might not be that tightly bound up with Enlightenment. Modernist art, music and literature have exhibited a remarkable and delightful iconoclastic propensity to break the rules and go about doing things the wrong way. Mondrian's sudden break with landscape art, Schoenberg's dodecaphony and Joyce's Bloom-ing confusion of literary convention are all paradigms of modernism. These iconoclasts have no obvious debts to Enlightenment ideals and values, nor are they merely a vanguard for postmodernism. They are simply avant-garde modernists, mostly dissatisfied with entrenched or bourgeois standards of taste. Likewise, arguments for the social construction of science, or about the scientific and therapeutic benefits of psychoanalysis, may be considered forms of avant-gardism. Given that modernism has been identified with an avant-garde rejection of accepted standards of rightness, there is little reason to closely identify modernity and Enlightenment. Moreover, given the piecemeal character of Enlightenment and the differing accounts of modernity, we need never have fever-pitched engagements with anything so grandiose and singular as either “the Enlightenment project” or “the modern project,” whatever either of those might be.

### 3. What is Enlightenment?

Since 2000, at least three substantial book-length studies on Kant and *Aufklärung* have been published along with a handful of journal articles. Now, Kant scholarship is something of a briar patch, more suited to hedgehogs than foxes. From outside the briar patch, it simply isn't clear how these new books fit within debates among Kant scholars. That said, from the outside, these new contributions are obviously all timely meditations on the postmodern critique of enlightenment. Given the tendentiousness of the concept of Enlightenment in the 1980s and 1990s, it is perhaps not surprising that critical attention has now turned to Kant's famous essay. Kant scholars like to emphasize that when Kant talks

about enlightenment in his essay he doesn't mean any kind of historical Enlightenment but rather a *process* of enlightening. An answer to "what is enlightening?" is divorced from eighteenth-century history and the history of knowledge in general (or, so it is argued).

The new literature on Kant's *Aufklärung* essay tends to adopt a common opening move: enlightenment (the process with a lowercase "e") embraced "otherness" in ways that belie stereotypes that portray it as being repressive, dominating, architectonic and demanding the subordination of sensibility to universal reason. The work here is to find a softer side of Kant, and in so doing, a kinder, gentler Kantian enlightenment. So, for example, Diane Morgan casts her work as explicitly rejecting the "institutionalised orthodoxy" that sees enlightenment reason as "the product of censorship, resulting in the repression of anything that is unpredictable and contingent, of anything that resists totalitarian order."<sup>14</sup> Katerina Deligiorgi tells us that, "a proper understanding of the historical context and the real scope of Kant's conception of enlightenment should help us to resist the deflationary conclusions arising from one-sided accounts of the Enlightenment."<sup>15</sup> Sam Fleischacker opens his study with the expansive observation that the Enlightenment is "a more diverse period than one might suppose from the way its opponents describe it, comprising advocates of sentiment as well as advocates of reason, champions of community as well as individualists, critics as well as defenders of empire, and a wide variety of other tendencies and views."<sup>16</sup> Each of these authors opens their argument by emphasizing that the concept of enlightenment can embrace sensitivities to differences among opinions, cultural diversity and different ways of knowing. This opening move prompts, in one way or another, a return to Kant's original text in order to inspect his specific conception of enlightening.

The trouble with returning to Kant's original text, as it appeared in the pages of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* in 1784, is that it is exceedingly sparse in the sense of being very short. This brevity invites a question that is at once textual and methodological: what texts, if any, are to be read as supporting or elaborating Kant's 1784 essay? There is no consensus on this matter. Morgan and Deligiorgi both take a very expansive approach. Kant's essay should be considered as coextensive with much of his *oeuvre* as well as much subsequent discussion of enlightenment. In contrast, James Schmidt situates Kant's essay mainly among the texts of other responses to the question of Enlightenment offered by Mendelssohn, Möhsen, Reinhold and others.<sup>17</sup> Sam Fleischacker and Claude Piché offer

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<sup>14</sup>See Diane Morgan, *Kant Trouble: The Obscurities of the Enlightened* (New York: Routledge, 2000), 1-2.

<sup>15</sup> See Katerina Deligiorgi, *Kant and the Culture of Enlightenment* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 2005), 185.

<sup>16</sup>See Samuel Fleischacker, *What is Enlightenment?* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 1.

<sup>17</sup>See James Schmidt, ed., *What is Enlightenment?: Eighteenth-Century Answers and Twentieth-Century Questions* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

largely internalist readings of the essay, demanding that the essay be interpreted largely analytically.<sup>18</sup>

There is almost certainly no single right answer to the issue of interpretive approach. Differences about the scope of appropriate evidence will undoubtedly produce different characterisations of the main question, what is enlightening? That admitted, the following takes an entirely internalist approach in order to highlight some of the deep ambivalences in the *Aufklärung* essay, and to use those ambivalences to rethink the orientation of the essay's overall argument. Other than mere usefulness, this narrow approach is motivated by two contextual considerations.

First and very simply, if we accept, as Henry Allison, Schmidt and Piché all agree, that Kant is offering a *new* view of enlightenment, then this enjoins close attention to the details of the text.<sup>19</sup> The other reason for an internalist reading is that it allows for the (admittedly controversial) possibility that the essay argues for a somewhat different position than Kant's other writings. After all, the *Aufklärung* essay was published in a monthly magazine oriented towards the intellectual interests and concerns of the *Berliner Mittwochsgesellschaft*. The question "What is Enlightenment?" had been posed by Johann Friedrich Zöllner in a footnote to another paper published in December 1783. As Schmidt points out, that the question was posed by Zöllner is likely "a sign of the intense interest in the question within the influential group of civil servants, clergy, and men of letters who made up the Wednesday Society."<sup>20</sup>

Zöllner's question prompted at least two lectures in the Wednesday Society in late 1783 and early 1784, one by Johann Karl Wilhelm Möhsen (a personal physician to Frederick the Great and scholar of the history of science) and another by Moses Mendelssohn. Presumably, Mendelssohn's lecture was the basis for his essay "On the Question: What is Enlightenment" (1784) which appeared in September. When Kant's answer to Zöllner's question was published in December 1784, it appeared without Kant having read Mendelssohn's piece and likely without Kant having attended Society lectures. Given this immediate context, Kant would not necessarily have any expectation that his readers would be familiar with (much less convinced by) his previous philosophical writings, like the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781). As Schmidt further observes, Kant's essay "could be readily understood by readers who knew little about Kant's system as a whole" and "it is unlikely that anyone at the time or that many in the decades that followed would have pursued these links."<sup>21</sup> For this reason too, there is little reason to think that the *Aufklärung* essay must or ought to be considered "against the backdrop" of his future

<sup>18</sup>See Claude Piché, "Kant's Conception of Enlightenment: Aristocratic or Democratic," above.

<sup>19</sup>Allison, *Essays on Kant*, 229-235. Schmidt, "What is Enlightenment? A Question, Its Context, and Some Consequences" in Schmidt, ed., *What is Enlightenment?*, 1-2. Piché, above.

<sup>20</sup>See James Schmidt, "Misunderstanding the Question: 'What is Enlightenment?': Venturi, Habermas, and Foucault" in *History of European Ideas* 37 (2011), 43-52 at 44.

<sup>21</sup>See Schmidt, "Misunderstanding the Question," 45.

work, like the *Critique of Judgement* (1790) or his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (1798).<sup>22</sup>

*Was is Aufklärung?* begins on a stirring, almost heroic, note with its demand and challenge: *Sapere aude!* For me, the famous passage that follows still prompts a *frisson* even after many readings. “Enlightenment is man’s release from self-incurred tutelage. Tutelage is man’s inability to make use of his understanding without direction from another.”<sup>23</sup> Enlightenment is the courage to use your own understanding, and in so doing, shuck off self-incurred tutelage and achieve the adult autonomy that befits a mature human intellect.

The original passage in Horace, which is alluded to when *sapere aude* is invoked, may signal a second, different feature of enlightenment. Horace writes:

«Why indeed are you in a hurry to remove things which hurt the eye, while if aught is eating into your soul, you put off the time for cure till next year? Well begun is half done; dare to be wise; begin! He who puts off the hour of right living is like the bumpkin waiting for the river to run out: yet on it glides, and on it will glide, rolling its flood forever».<sup>24</sup>

Being wise or enlightened is not about possessing any particular knowledge, as Kant scholars like to point out. But, for Horace, it isn’t clear if being wise even involves the possession of any particular skills or capacities either. Wisdom simply lies in undertaking the journey or process of enlightenment, rather than deferring the decision to set out by waiting for just the right moment. Simply to start is to be half-finished!

If *sapere aude* is just a prompt to start the process of enlightening, then it isn’t altogether clear what Kant means when he declares that the motto of enlightenment is, “Have courage to use your own reason!”<sup>25</sup> Does he mean that enlightenment is the simple willingness to undertake using your own reason, for better or worse regardless of outcome? Or, does he mean that enlightenment is, to borrow from Descartes, not just to use your reason but to learn to use your reason *rightly*?<sup>26</sup> This need not deny Kant’s precept that enlightening demands no particular knowledge. The skill, capacity or wherewithal to reason rightly would itself not be knowledge, if knowledge were construed simply as propositional knowledge. In other words, there are two possible accounts of enlightened

<sup>22</sup> Allison makes this very odd claim. It isn’t at all clear why Kant’s *future work* would be a “backdrop” for the Enlightenment essay. See Allison, 229.

<sup>23</sup> Immanuel Kant, “What is Enlightenment?” in Sylvere Lotringer, *The Politics of Truth: Michel Foucault* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1997), 7. Henceforth, referred to as WA.

<sup>24</sup> Horace, *Satires. Epistles. The Art of Poetry*, trans. H. Rushton Fairclough (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb Classical Library, 1978), 1.2.32-43,

<sup>25</sup> WA 7.

<sup>26</sup> Consider here Descartes’ *Meditation IV* at AT 55-57.

reason, one permissive and the other restrictive. On the restrictive account, enlightened reason is the use of reason to reach right or true conclusions. On the permissive account, so long as I use my reason “without direction from another” then I am engaged in enlightening.<sup>27</sup>

The *Aufklärung* essay also expresses a related ambivalence about the extent to which the enlightening process itself is emancipatory. At the beginning of the essay, Kant explicitly links the process of enlightening with freedom and the public use of reason. In the essay's middle, the free, public use of reason is then connected very briefly with progress. There Kant tells us that “the proper destination” of “human nature” is “the progress in general enlightenment.”<sup>28</sup> Yet, the essay ends on a note that seems more restrictive than emancipatory: debate all you want, but obey! And moments later, Kant continues: “A greater degree of civil freedom appears advantageous to the freedom of mind of the people, and yet it places inescapable limitations upon it; a lower degree of civil freedom on the contrary, provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity.” We are told that as people become “capable of managing freedom” this will affect “the principles of government,” eventually at some undisclosed future point.<sup>29</sup>

A third ambivalence arises from the question: who might be enlightened? The common answer to this question is: everyone who dares to use their reason. Allison, Deligiorgi, Fleischacker are very much agreed about this point. They do not hold that everyone is actually caught up in the process of enlightenment, but they agree that it is possible that everyone has the capacity to engage in the enlightening process, at least in principle. All three frame this inclusivity in terms of universalisability, though they don't agree about what is universal.

Fleischacker tells us that it is the potential to *self-legislate*: “we are all free: we have the ability to follow a law we lay down for ourselves, and not be led around by outside pressures.”<sup>30</sup> Allison describes it similarly in terms of *reflexivity*: “to ask oneself whether the ground of one's assumption can be regarded as suitable for all cognizers ... which amounts to a cognitive version of the principle of the universality of reasons...”<sup>31</sup> This criterion by itself is almost certainly inadequate. It is all too open to the problem of self-deception in which being acceptable to a specific group is confused with universal validity. Recognizing this, Deligiorgi casts the universal *communicatively*: “the freedom to communicate with real interlocutors is essential, for without it we lose our capacity to even *think* freely.”<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>27</sup>WA 7.

<sup>28</sup>WA 14.

<sup>29</sup>WA 18-19.

<sup>30</sup>See Fleischacker, 14.

<sup>31</sup>See Allison, 233.

<sup>32</sup>See Deligiorgi, 66.

Yet, as Claude Piché suggests in his contribution to this volume, there is a note of ambivalence in Kant's attitude towards universality. Piché writes: "enlightenment is potentially open to everyone" but at the same time "there is a modulation in the degree to which one has access to it."<sup>33</sup> It is certainly true that eighteenth-century Europe saw a rapid growth of literacy rates, particularly in cities and towns. But, Kant's insistence that ideas are communicated "through writing" suggests that more than rudimentary literacy is required to undertake enlightenment.<sup>34</sup> For that matter, Frederick II's 1763 *General-landschul-reglement* was arguably more a means of instilling social discipline and political authority than enlightened free-thinking.<sup>35</sup>

Piché draws specific attention to Kant's hints that the pursuit of enlightenment is not open to just anyone. Early in the essay, Kant explicitly states that, "there are few who have succeeded by their own exercise of mind both in freeing themselves from incompetence and in achieving a steady pace." Thus, enlightening will depend on "some independent thinkers" who shall "disseminate the spirit ... of rational appreciation."<sup>36</sup> Traces of the "modulation" highlighted by Piché may be evident even in Horace. There the bumpkins or rustics (what Scottish *virtuosi* would have called "the rude" sort and Kant might have called "the great unthinking masses") are forever waiting for the right time and so never get to the work of enlightening.

The *Aufklärung* essay can be read as resonating with these uncertainties about education and literacy. Those to whom enlightenment is available are not even *Bürgers* or town-dwelling citizens but very specifically *Gelehrten* or scholars. This, Piché suggests, means that enlightenment may be more aristocratic than democratic. I think this suggestion is right in spirit but wrong in detail. As we have seen above, enlightenment is almost certainly unavailable to the illiterate, and it may not extend to farmers or labourers. But, this does not mean that Kant is arguing for a literal aristocratic enlightenment. As the next section of the paper will argue, Kant is arguing for an enlightening of what Daniel Defoe called "the middling sort" — he is calling for bourgeois enlightenment.

#### 4. A Machiavellian Moment

Kant's three examples — the military officer, the tax collector, the clergyman — all occupy *bürgerlichen Posten* or civic offices. The duty of any *Bürger* while at their civil post is to perform their official duties: to pass on the lawful orders of superior officers, to collect the prescribed taxes and to convey church doctrine. A *Bürger* without a civil post

<sup>33</sup> See Piché, above.

<sup>34</sup> WA 14.

<sup>35</sup> For discussion, see James Van Horn Melton, *Absolutism and the Eighteenth-Century Origins of Compulsory Schooling in Prussia and Austria* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).

<sup>36</sup> WA 9.

had the duty to pay his taxes. Holding a civil post has the benefit of being paid, in one way or another, by the prince. The *Bürger* engaged in commerce is also provided for by the prince, since it is the prince's army that ensures the safety and stability that makes trade possible. Everyone has their civic duty.<sup>37</sup> Civic duty demands no more and no less than the efficient performance of the requirements of office, no criticisms and no complaints. Pay taxes, collect taxes, follow orders, preach doctrine. "Here argument is certainly not allowed — one must obey." Obedience may be demanded, Kant says, "without particularly hindering the progress of enlightenment." Perhaps more ominously he adds: "impudent complaints" about duties can, "be punished as a scandal (as it could occasion general refractoriness.)"<sup>38</sup>

The requirement for obedience that comes with the performance of civic duty, however, involves a privation — that is, having something taken away, being deprived of something properly possessed. It is in this sense that civil posts are for Kant "private offices," not public offices as we might say. The conduct of a civil office requires the "the private use of reason." This privated form of reason is required "in the interest of the community" so government may direct people to public ends, or "at least prevent them from destroying those ends."<sup>39</sup> The point here is that while a modicum of reason may be required for civic duty, fulfillment of those duties may be incompatible with expressions of personal conscience. The officer, taxman or clergyman cannot simultaneously perform their duties and argue about what those duties are. And so, the deprivation involved in private reason is the suspension of "the free use of reason in matters of conscience."

Fully-fledged reason without privation — what Kant calls "the public use of reason" — is the activity of *Gelehrten* or scholars. Scholars are entitled to publically express disagreements about taxes and how they are collected, appropriate military service and religious orthodoxies. Scholarly activity and the public use of reason are very much the same thing. It is the scholar who "publicly expresses his thoughts" and the scholar's writings "speak to his public, the world."<sup>40</sup> The free or public use of reason is "the use which a person makes of it as a scholar before the reading public," and "the public use of reason enjoys an unlimited freedom to use his own reason and to speak in his own person."<sup>41</sup> Scholars are engaged in the public use of reason when they "communicate to the public ... carefully tested and well-meaning thoughts on that which is erroneous."<sup>42</sup>

This is all stirring stuff but we should be extraordinarily careful how we construe Kant's statements about scholarly activity. There is a temptation to read what Kant says

<sup>37</sup> This is indebted to John Christian Laursen, "The Subversive Kant: The Vocabulary of 'Public' and 'Publicity'" in Schmidt, ed., *What is Enlightenment?*, 253-270.

<sup>38</sup> WA 10-11.

<sup>39</sup> WA 11.

<sup>40</sup> WA 11 and 13.

<sup>41</sup> WA 10 and 13.

<sup>42</sup> WA 12.

about scholarship as implying any number of liberal-democratic values. For example, it is tempting to suggest something like: the public use of reason implies communicating with a public so this, in turn, implies an absence of censorship, which, in turn, implies freedom of the press. This is an enticing chain of reasoning as it would align Kant with our contemporary political beliefs and sensibilities. But, notice that the use of “implies” here suggests a deep logical connection where there simply is none. There is no modern logical proof to show that freedom of the press may be derived from the public use of reason. To suggest otherwise is to take a moral from logic, and since that doughty neo-Kantian Rudolph Carnap, logicians have been agreed that in logic there are no morals (or politics for that matter). The sense of ‘implies’ involved in claims connecting the public use of reason with freedom of the press is semantic not logical. This is the sense of ‘implies’ that one finds in an assertion like: that the house is red all over implies that the house is not black all over.

So consider, for example, Kant’s claim that, “One might let every citizen ... in the role of scholar, make his comments freely and publicly, through writing, on the erroneous aspect of the present institution.”<sup>43</sup> This particular passage might be read as implying the broad claim that the status of scholar could be extended to every citizen. It might also be read narrowly as implying merely that every citizen *qua* scholar can voice their public opinion. Either or both of these readings might be correct. But, all of us who have children also understand that the “might” can be used as a proxy for “no.” Even children recognize that we mean “no” when we say: we won’t order pizza today but we might later in the week. The semantic problem is compounded once we acknowledge that the meaning of many key philosophical concepts have shifted over time, even basic terms like “experience” and “objectivity.”<sup>44</sup> Given the shifting sands of concept-meanings, there is just no certainty about what expressions like “public use of reason” and “communicating with a public” may have entailed for Kant.

If, for a moment, we resist the temptation to reconstruct the semantic implications of Kant’s concepts, then another and quite different reading of *Was ist Aufklärung?* might be discerned. As has been shown, Kant is ambivalent about the universality of enlightening as well as the sanctity of enlightening. That is, he doesn’t make clear whether everyone can become scholars, and he leaves open the possibility that some public uses of reason might be quashed as inimical to civic order. Finally, he is silent about when enlightenment will be achieved, as he reminds us that we live in an age of Enlightenment but not an enlightened age. Given these and the other ambivalences noted above, it seems unlikely that the main point of the *Aufklärung* essay is that: “The public use of one’s reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”<sup>45</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> WA 14.

<sup>44</sup>Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison, *Objectivity* (New York: Zone Books, 2007). Alan W. Richardson, “Conceiving, Experiencing, and Conceiving Experiencing: Neo-Kantianism and the History of the Concept of Experience,” *Topoi* 22 (1) (2003), 55-67.

<sup>45</sup> WA 10.



Kant is clearly advancing this claim but he does so in a register that is strikingly ambivalent about what this means, who is involved and its future prospect, as we have already seen.

Note that there are just a few actors in the *Aufklärung* essay: the officer, the tax collector, the clergyman, the scholar and prince. In our commentaries, we all too often focus on the first four actors at the expense of the prince. Perhaps Kant's intended audience for the essay was not the world-community of scholars, or even the readership of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. Perhaps the intended audience was aristocratic, namely the prince. "This," declares Kant, "is the age of enlightenment, or the century of Friedrich."<sup>46</sup> If Kant is trying to say something to the prince, then what is he trying to say? The point is not to argue for greater civil freedom since Kant maintains without any hint of irony that, "a lower degree of civil freedom ... provides the mind with room for each man to extend himself to his full capacity."<sup>47</sup> Nor is the point to argue that a prince ought to respect the capacity of all persons to become scholars and engage in "the public use of reason." If this point had to be argued for, then the argument would be futile! Why would a prince give up any power whatsoever to the weak on the basis of anything so flimsy as an argument, a mere collection of words? Assuming that power responds to reason is not merely naive, it is question-begging. Thus, the essential point that Kant wishes to convey to the prince is this: it is *unbefitting the office of a prince* to be concerned with the petty squabbles of scholars.

If Kant can sustain this critical point, then the free public use of reason is immediately assured. Towards the end of the essay, the focus of the argument shifts to the prince and reaches its culmination. There we are told:

«A prince who does not find it unworthy of himself to say that he holds it to be his duty to prescribe nothing to men in religious matters but give them complete freedom while renouncing the haughty name of *tolerance*, is himself enlightened».<sup>48</sup>

The enlightened prince — the prince who will be honoured and glorified — understands that it is a duty of his office as prince not to legislate matters of religion, or the arts and sciences. The reason for this, however, is not any specific kind of commitment to the form of tolerance found in, for example, Locke's *Letter Concerning Toleration* (1689). Lockean tolerance is inappropriate because the prince simply has no duty or requirement to maintain toleration. If the prince did have such a duty, then this would demand a princely concern about matters of religious conscience and proper care of the soul. In contrast with Locke's

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<sup>46</sup> WA 16.

<sup>47</sup> WA 18.

<sup>48</sup> WA 16.

magistrate who has a deep interest in maintaining religious tolerance, Kant's prince is comparatively indifferent to such matters.

Princely indifference is also a benign indifference, since it leaves "each man free to make use of his reason in matters of conscience."<sup>49</sup> The only concern the prince has with matters of conscience is the prevention of civil strife, "to prevent one of them from violently hindering another in determining and promoting this welfare."<sup>50</sup> Any further involvement in matters of conscience "injures" the prince's majesty by supporting the, "despotism of some tyrants in his state over his other subjects." In general, "to meddle in these matters lowers his own majesty."<sup>51</sup> This does not, of course, prevent the prince from considering the "general and widely approved" conclusions of scholarship that have been brought forward as "a proposal to the throne." The prince may even enact such proposals if the suggested "improvement stands together with civil order."<sup>52</sup> The prince insists only on civil order in the form of obedience to the prescribed duties of private office. Not only is it unbecoming of a prince to worry about scholarly squabbles, Kant suggests, it is a rare and worthy prince indeed who will permit the scholars to debate as much as they please, so long as they obey. In a thinly veiled allusion to Friedrich II, Kant adds, "Of this we have a shining example wherein no monarch is superior to him who we honor."<sup>53</sup>

Kant's crucial point in the *Aufklärung* essay is not that the aim of the process of enlightening is to make every person a scholar, no matter how attractive and flattering twenty-first-century academics might find this idea. Reading *Was ist Aufklärung?* through the lens of Machiavelli's *The Prince* (1532) shows how Kant thinks of the prince as his principal audience.<sup>54</sup> This approach also makes sense of the early part of the essay. There Kant shows that there is no threat to civic order if a person who holds a civic office also engages in public expressions of conscience "without infringing on their official duties."<sup>55</sup> Having a *bürgerlichen Posten* is not incompatible with being *Gelehrten*. The officer, tax collector, clergyman and others who hold civic office can be free to pursue matters of personal conscience when they are not discharging their duties. The precise demarcation being drawn out by Kant is not between the *oikos* and the *polis*, or between the private and the political. The demarcation being drawn is between the personal and the occupational. We are all familiar with a more recent, and very bourgeois, form of just this distinction: from 9A-5P on weekdays, I go to work and do my job and discharge my duties to the state as an employee and taxpayer, but outside of those hours, what I say and do is my own personal business.

<sup>49</sup> WA 17.

<sup>50</sup> WA 15.

<sup>51</sup> WA 16.

<sup>52</sup> WA 14-15.

<sup>53</sup> WA 18.

<sup>54</sup> And, of course, also through the lens of J.G.A. Pocock, *The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

<sup>55</sup> WA 17.

## 5. Pulling Modernity and Enlightenment Apart

In the *Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard asks: “Who has the right to decide for society? Who is the subject whose prescriptions are norms for those they obligate?” The modern (rather than postmodern) way to answer these questions, he says, is to use the model of scientific rationality:

«The people debate among themselves about what is just or unjust in the same way that the scientific community debates about what is true or false; they accumulate civil laws just as scientists accumulate scientific laws; they perfect their rules of consensus just as the scientists produce new “paradigms” to revise their rules in light of what they have learned».<sup>56</sup>

On this account, progress in politics is achieved in much the same way as progress in science, and both enterprises are conceived as a process of collective deliberation, universal legislation and progressive accumulation. As we have already seen, Lyotard's strong suit is not historical nuance. All that is offered is a generic claim about the character of scientific rationality and its homology with some account of political decision-making. It isn't evident that scientific rationality ever conformed to the pattern Lyotard suggests, or if those rules have ever been deployed in politics. Even if Lyotard has offered a description of what Kant and other *philosophes* aspired to as an ideal of enlightened politics, it isn't clear that this is also a description of modernity.

In recent philosophical literature, modernity and modernism has been equated with Enlightenment so that modernity and Enlightenment can be substituted *salva veritate*. The historical moment of modernity was the Scientific Revolution and the subsequent Age of Enlightenment. This is, so the usual story goes, when we became modern. The philosophical movement called the “Enlightenment project” and the “modern project” is the realisation of the ideals, values and ambitions given expression in this historical period. The bringing together of the concepts of modernity and Enlightenment so that they are now almost synonymous is the outcome of a quite recent turn in philosophy effected by the work of Foucault, Lyotard, Habermas and others. This rethinking of the philosophical project of Enlightenment and modernity invites reinterpretation of the history, just as historiographic reimaginings of the Enlightenment period tend to adjust the aims of the philosophical project. The recent philosophical shift now reverberates in the

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<sup>56</sup>See Lyotard, 30.

historiography of the Enlightenment in the form of a new historiographic emphasis on the so-called “postmodern enlightenment.”

There are, however, other historiographic resources that might help us doubt the collapse of Enlightenment and modernity into each other. A slightly older and now obscured historiography traces the ideas of modernism and modernity not to the Enlightenment but to the avant-garde movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These movements in art, literature and music push the boundaries of what is established and accepted as appropriate conventions, ideals and values. As Clement Greenberg wrote in the *Partisan Review* in 1939, a society, “as it becomes less and less able... to justify the inevitability of its particular forms, breaks up the accepted notions upon which artists and writers must depend in large part for communication with their audiences.” The work of avant-gardists is to depart from “a motionless Alexandrianism” and “academicism” — to dissolve “the precedent of the old masters.”<sup>57</sup>

*Pace* Greenberg, we tend to identify avant-gardism with the achievements of new paradigms in literature, art and music, and specifically, the historical moments of Eliot, Joyce, Picasso, Braque, Schoenberg, Duchamp and Pollock. But, we could also argue that the avant-garde sensibility has been at work in science and philosophy as well. Albert Einstein, Niels Bohr and recently Ilya Prigogine are arguably avant-garde scientists, and Thomas Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend, Bruno Latour and Isabelle Stengers their philosophical exegetes. From this point of view, avant-garde modernity is a movement of movements. As a movement, it is iconoclastic, irreverent and a little seditious. In its specific movements, it variously resists the reification of norms, and even their sedimentation. In so doing, it (by definition) opposes entrenched, bourgeois sensibilities and resists *any* fixed conception of Enlightened values. The avant-garde rejection of enlightenment values should not, however, be confused with a rejection of modernity. Avant-gardes embrace modernity! They are modernists! How then should we explain how modernity and enlightenment come apart? This becomes clearer in the analysis of Kant’s *Aufklärung* essay.

On the close reading of *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?* offered here, it is possible to discern an implicit Kantian schism between modernity and enlightenment. If we look beyond the *Aufklärung* essay, as many Kant scholars recommend and insist, we perhaps see Kant’s particular anticipation of what the process of enlightenment could achieve. Allison takes Kant’s vision to be a “principle of the universality of reasons” which is the idea that, “if something justifies my belief, it must also justify the belief of any other rational being under similar conditions.”<sup>58</sup> Fleischacker argues for what he calls a “minimal Enlightenment” which is a condition where, “One is enlightened if one holds one’s beliefs as a result of thinking responsibly for oneself, rather

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<sup>57</sup>Clement Greenberg, “Avante-Garde and Kitsch,” *Partisan Review* 6:5 (1939), 34-49.

<sup>58</sup>Allison, 233.

than as dogma. Roughly, this means that one seeks reasons for beliefs, opens them to correction by others ...”<sup>59</sup>

These are both compelling descriptions of Kant's vision of Enlightenment, though Kant's articulation of it offered in the *Aufklärung* essay is noticeably equivocal. Whatever he says elsewhere, in that essay Kant is strikingly ambivalent. While he clearly thinks that the process of enlightening is underway in Friedrich's Prussia, the realization of enlightenment is ongoingly thrust into a millennialist future. He also isn't clear to whom it applies. At times, he says everyone, eventually, at some undisclosed future time. In the meantime, enlightening is available only to select scholars who make free public use of reason. The promise of enlightenment is also ambivalent. Whether or not it will eventually lead to better government is described in caveated terms. If Kant has a quite definite view of enlightenment in mind, as Kant scholars suggest he does, then it is difficult to give an account of these equivocations. My suggestion is that the recurring ambivalences makes sense if the aim of the *Aufklärung* essay is a defense of a specific conception of modernity as a condition for the possibility of enlightening, not any specific conception of enlightenment.

From this perspective, as Kant writes the *Aufklärung* essay he is speaking to the readers of the *Berlinische Monatsschrift* but he is addressing the prince. In the way of Machiavelli and Hobbes, Kant accedes that the concern of the modern prince — the official duty of the prince — is to maintain civil order. The prince does this by maintaining civil obedience. Maintaining civil order is no mean feat, and it requires the judicious use of force. On the one hand, the prince cannot be a thug, like Agathocles who created order by vicious executions. On the other hand, the prince cannot be weak and make the mistake of the Florentines in Pistoia who granted clemency to rebels only then to be faced with the bloody task of subduing an insurrection. While difficult to maintain, civic order is essential for *Gelehrten* to go about their public work of enlightening; as Hobbes highlighted, there can be no art, commerce or industry in the state of nature.

Kant's specific advice to the prince is that it is a mistake to believe that civil order requires consensus or agreement amongst those who are ruled. The maintenance of civil order depends only on the efficient performance of civic duty and nothing else. So long as the officer, tax collector, clergyman and other officials discharge their duties of office without question, they can disagree on their own time about how taxes are distributed, military aims are pursued, and ecclesiastic doctrines are preached. Order requires obedience alone. Once this is recognized then it follows that it is unbecoming a prince to be concerned with matters of conscience. Indeed, deigning to participate in public arguments might lead to the dangerous misunderstanding that such issues even could have a bearing on the matter of civil obedience. The prince's overriding injunction is: “Argue as much as

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<sup>59</sup> Fleischacker, 169.

you will, and about what you will, only obey!” This command is backed up by the threat of “a numerous and well-disciplined army.”<sup>60</sup>

“A republic could not dare say such a thing,” Kant whispers, recognizing that with the separation of the personal and occupational the classical republican tradition has been eclipsed.<sup>61</sup> In the republican model, deliberation and consensus-building in the *agora* was the basis of political authority. What Kant understands — or perhaps better what Kant built — but Lyotard doesn’t understand is that classical republicanism is not the model of modernity. In modernity, political authority demands civil order, and it is organised around the model of positive law (rules backed up by threats). Only once civil order is guaranteed can there be a modernity in the form of the free public use of reason on all matters of conscience. The modern allowance for the free public use of reason is enlightening, and over time, a consensus about enlightenment values *might* be achieved. By contrast, avant-gardists are arch-moderns, but they reject all claims to consensus about enlightened values. Thus, modernity and enlightenment come apart in a strange modal asymmetry. While modernity is necessary for enlightenment, enlightenment is merely possible under conditions of modernity.

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<sup>60</sup> WA 18.

<sup>61</sup> WA 18.

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## ***Solus Secedo and Sapere Aude: Cartesian Meditation as Kantian Enlightenment***

### ***Solus Secedo y Sapere Aude: La meditación cartesiana como Ilustración kantiana***

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#### **Abstract**

Recently Samuel Fleischacker has developed Kant's model of enlightenment as a "minimalist enlightenment" in the tradition of a relatively thin proceduralism focused on the form of public debate and interaction. I want to discuss the possibility that such a minimalism, endorsed by Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls, and others, benefits from a metaphysics of critical individual subjectivity as a prerequisite for the social proceduralism of the minimalist enlightenment. I argue that Kant's enlightenment, metaphysically thicker than much contemporary proceduralism, constitutes a recovery and transformation of a subjective interiority deeply Cartesian in spirit and central to the *reciprocity* of the community of subjects in *What is Enlightenment*. This opens a space for a site of resistance to the social. Descartes' *solus secedo* describes the analogical space of such a resistance for Kant's *sapere aude*. The *Meditations* thus point forward implicitly to how a rational subject might achieve critical distance from tradition in its various forms, epistemic, ethical, moral, and political.

#### **Key words**

Kant; Descartes; Enlightenment; Subject, Individual, Critical, Space, Reason, *What is Enlightenment*; *Meditations*

#### **Resumen**

Samuel Fleischacker ha desarrollado recientemente el modelo kantiano de Ilustración como una "Ilustración minimalista", en la tradición de un procedimentalismo relativamente débil condensado en la forma del debate e interacción públicos. Pretendo discutir la posibilidad de que tal

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minimalismo, sostenido por Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls y otros, dependa de una metafísica de la subjetividad individual crítica como prerequisite para el procedimentalismo social de la Ilustración minimalista. Discuto que la Ilustración de Kant, metafísicamente más densa que la mayor parte del procedimentalismo contemporáneo, constituye una recuperación y transformación de una interioridad subjetiva profundamente cartesiana en espíritu y central para la *reciprocidad* de la comunidad de los sujetos en *¿Qué es Ilustración?* Esto abre paso a un espacio de resistencia a lo social. El *solus secedo* de Descartes describe un espacio de semejante resistencia análogo al del *sapere aude* de Kant. Las *Meditaciones* señalan así de manera implícita el modo en que un sujeto racional podría ganar distancia con respecto a la tradición en sus múltiples formas: epistémica, ética, moral y política.

### **Palabras clave**

Kant; Descartes; Ilustración; sujeto; individuo; crítico; espacio; razón; *¿Qué es Ilustración?*; *Meditaciones*

## **1. Introduction: The metaphysics of minimalist Enlightenment**

Recently Samuel Fleischacker has interpreted and developed Kant's model of enlightenment as a "minimalist enlightenment" in the tradition of a relatively thin proceduralism, one which focuses on the form of public debate and interaction rather than on any specific content of enlightened ideas, such as individual freedoms or scientific ideas.<sup>1</sup> I want to discuss the possibility that such a minimalism, endorsed by Fleischacker, Habermas, Rawls, and others, benefits from a metaphysics of subjectivity which emphasizes individuality over the socially inflected account of minimalist proceduralism. I will argue further that such individuality is a prerequisite for the social proceduralism of the minimalist enlightenment. At first glance the virtues of minimalism per se are clear and distinct: with emphasis on actual conversation and its rules and procedures, we get to a community of actual conversation with different points of view and cultures and actually different subjects<sup>2</sup> who interact with each other—an attractive picture of living reciprocity on, say, a Habermasian model. However, I will argue that the virtues of a concrete community and its need for a minimalist and thin enlightenment may, without certain constraints, endanger a different aspect of being enlightened, the individual subject's ability to distance him or herself from an actual community so as to bring a critical voice to it. This danger is already evident in the historical context of Descartes' *Meditations*, given such seventeenth century events as the trial and condemnation of Galileo.<sup>3</sup> With this and

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<sup>1</sup> Unless such specific items turn out to be prerequisites for public debate. As Fleischacker makes clear, one could, on such a procedural definition have, for example, robust religious beliefs, and, presumably possible skepticism about the scope of science.

<sup>2</sup> I say "actually" to distinguish actual embodied human subjects who differ in many empirical ways from, say, the different interlocutors who occupy Descartes' Meditator's internal conversation or even the different perspectives a Kantian subject might consider while debating the validity of his or her maxims.

<sup>3</sup> Another example would be the trial of Socrates. Presumably the cosmopolitan community of the minimalist enlightenment would be, in its nature, immune to the problems surrounding such events but this is precisely because a Cartesian synthesis, I will argue, both enacts and grounds the fundamental structure of an

other such historical contexts in mind, I will argue further that Kant's enlightenment, metaphysically thicker than most contemporary proceduralism, constitutes a recovery and transformation of a subjective interiority which is deeply Cartesian in spirit. Such a reflective and critical subjectivity is no unfortunate early modern remnant in Kant but is central to one side of the reciprocity of the community of subjects in *What is Enlightenment*, namely, the side of the critical individual subject who uses his or her own understanding.<sup>4</sup> I will argue that ethical and political subjectivity for Kant involves achieving both some distance from actual empirical community and an effectively Cartesian turn to the self, though Kant's transcendental model more *explicitly* defines that distance<sup>5</sup> as being in reflection rather than empirical reality.<sup>6</sup>

This should still be good news for the supporters of the minimalist enlightenment as Kant's goal is the maintenance of the same autonomy and critical stance which the minimalist enlightenment also supports; what may be more difficult to accept is that Kant's emphasis on a kind of isolation for the subject (though balanced by the public nature of reason) is not a moral or ethical narcissism but in fact an attempt to define humanity through its ability to be a site of resistance to the social. Descartes' quasi-aesthetic and

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enlightened community, whether minimalist or not. The cosmopolitan community requires and makes *explicit* a space of enquiry: what we see in the *Meditations* is that such a space is Cartesian, requiring some trench work in metaphysics, the kind of work Descartes does in both creating this space artificially and then moving from it to things external to the enquirer (in Descartes' case, God and the material external world). My thanks to Joël Madore for drawing my attention to the question of the cosmopolitan community and why it needs the Cartesian synthesis.

<sup>4</sup> The other side, the delicate relation to others, is reflected in the three-fold version of enlightenment in the *Critique of Judgment*, in section 40's discussion of the *sensus communis*. This larger aspect of enlightenment, a *community* of subjects, ideally self-critical and autonomous but actually and empirically probably not, needs to be addressed in the light of the complexity of Kant's account of the living moral subject of the WIE and its possible conceptual relationship to Descartes' own account of how to deal with a concrete community as a rational subject. Since the Meditator has so much more freedom from institutional constraint than Kant's enlightened subject, the relationship between Descartes and Kant on this point is bound to be more vexed.

<sup>5</sup> Descartes *implicitly* defines that distance as reflection in the artificiality of the *solus secedo*. This fits in with Jean-Luc Marion's claims that the *Meditations*, both in its conception as a work and in its structure, is "responsorial". (Marion 2007, pp.38-41) My discussion is focused more on the solitude aspect of enlightenment but I agree with Marion's important point that such a responsorial nature means that the *Meditations* as a project is not "soliloquy or solipsism". (Marion 2007, p.41) See Henry Allison's 2012 discussion of the need for all three maxims of true enlightenment, which combine publicity and thinking for oneself.

<sup>6</sup> Katerina Deligiorgi cogently argues that Kant's enlightenment is grounded in a publicity which seems to leave a more Cartesian emphasis on correct method in using reason aside, while sharing Descartes' egalitarian commitment to the capacity of each person to engage in enlightened reasoning. (Deligiorgi 2005, p.62) In fact, according to her the Kantian "culture of enlightenment" undermines the Cartesian certainty of foundationalism in favour of a more dynamic approach. (Deligiorgi 2006, p.6) This seems entirely in line with a minimalist enlightenment and also, in my view, a legitimate difference to draw between Descartes and Kant. However, the legitimacy of this distinction seems not to rule out a connection between Cartesian *method*, particularly the issue of isolation, and Kantian publicity. This is especially true because, as Deligiorgi points out, what does the "heavy lifting" in Kant's emphasis on free communication, is the freedom to communicate things which are *different* from the empirical community or culture around one, the freedom to *challenge*. (Deligiorgi 2006, p.8) This is where the legacy of Cartesian method shows itself, even where Kant differs in actual claims about community or, more importantly, in his transcendental approach to the question of the self and its relation to others. See also Marion's point, mentioned in the note above, about the "responsorial" function of the *Meditations*.

definitely imaginative empirical separation of self and social sketches a seventeenth century analogue for the transcendental reconceptualization of moral agency and of the self which is the eighteenth century basis for Kantian enlightenment. *Solus secedo*, the Cartesian assertion of an isolated space of epistemological investigation, describes the space of resistance to the social, the space of Kant's *sapere aude*.

I will begin by looking at the general context of Kant's "court of reason" and how this general notion of enlightenment is developed in four of the criteria for enlightenment spelled out in *What is Enlightenment* (WIE).<sup>7</sup> I will then turn to a discussion of Meditations One and Two in order to show that these criteria are also articulated by Descartes in an epistemological context. I will argue that the project of the *Meditations*, as developed in Meditations One and Two, show the actual workings of epistemic enlightenment<sup>8</sup> and thus point forward implicitly<sup>9</sup> to how a rational subject might achieve critical distance from tradition in its various forms, epistemic, ethical, moral, and political.

## 2. The Metaphysics of Kant's Morals: The court of reason in the *Critique of Pure Reason*

What Kant takes to be the issue of metaphysics is set out in the A edition of the Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, in 1781, three years earlier than WIE. Human reason inevitably asks questions which we are incapable of answering, such as Does God exist? Am I free? Kant eventually sketches out what must be done to solve the problem of the claims of metaphysics. First he shifts from what looks like a bemoaning of scepticism and indifferentism to saying that, in fact, the questioning of the claims of metaphysics is the result:

«not of the thoughtlessness of our age, but of its ripened **power of judgment**, which will no longer be put off with illusory knowledge, and which demands that reason should take

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<sup>7</sup> These are only four of the more "metaphysical" criteria. There are others which I will not address in detail here, though further discussion of these will eventually be necessary in a fuller account of the relationship between Kant and Descartes.

<sup>8</sup> For the sake of simplicity I refer to "epistemic enlightenment" in Descartes as contrasted with the more clearly ethical, moral, and political enlightenment in Kant. However, the point of this essay is that the latter builds on the former. I also use "epistemic" since it is not clear, especially in Descartes and even in Kant, how much enlightenment requires a metaphysical or ontological rejection of tradition. In Descartes, for example, there is no rejection of God or the soul or immortality or even of religion; there is merely the thinking through of why I should accept these rationally. They pass the test, for Descartes, in the court of reason, where for Kant, given transcendental idealism, the results are not clear cut, for, say, God.

<sup>9</sup> The same epistemic enlightenment and its ethical trajectory is displayed much more *explicitly* in Descartes' earlier work, the *Discourse on the Method*, especially Parts I and II, with Part III the equivalent, in effect, of Kant's distinction between the public and the private use of reason. Descartes' autobiographical Part I shows him leaving his minority; Part IV shows the results of this in the "Je pense". This "I think" can be fruitfully glossed, in Kantian terms, as "I think for myself, therefore I am", as Scott Johnston has suggested to me in conversation. However, discussing the details and implications of such a gloss in the text of the *Discourse* is beyond the scope of the current essay, though a crucial stage in recovering the extent of Descartes being an "enlightener." In this discussion I intend only to show that the enlightenment point is definitely there in the text of Meditations One and Two, including the *sum, existo* of the Meditation Two *cogito*.

on anew the most difficult of all its tasks, namely, that of self-knowledge, and to institute a court of justice, by which reason may secure its rightful claims while dismissing all its groundless pretensions, and this not by mere decrees but according to its own eternal and unchangeable laws; and this court is none other than the **critique of pure reason** itself». (A xi-xii, GW 100-101)

In a well-known footnote he explains further what such a court would be and what it would accomplish:

«Our age is the genuine age of **criticism**, to which everything must submit. **Religion** through its **holiness** and **legislation** through its **majesty** commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination». (A xii, GW 100-101)

No “free and public examination” hence no accountability—thus no genuine respect.<sup>10</sup> Given that this is only three years earlier than WIE, we can probably assume that ‘public’ here means what it does in WIE, the public of reasonable discussion, of literate discussion, of the public use of reason. It may be reasonable to assume also that the opposite would be the world of the private<sup>11</sup>, trammled with vested interest, behind closed doors, fettered with private desires and relations of power, in which one would be subordinated as a part to a whole through artistic unity but not organic reciprocal unity. In such a context there could be no interrogation of authority through which it would be required to justify its actions. In the end, Kant’s solution will involve a delicate balancing of private and public, one in which he will call upon an ideal ruler to allow the public use of reason. The starting point, however, is the untrammled, unfettered, independent reason of the adult citizen, a reason which has emancipated itself initially from the weight of tradition, even if eventually to recover and critically discuss such tradition, properly justified in its claims, if they can be so justified, in the court of reason. One important condition for such an emancipation, the ability to be “quite alone” as a thinking subject in some sense<sup>12</sup>, is presented to us in the project of the *Meditations*. As we will see eventually<sup>13</sup>, the marks of enlightenment are the marks of the Cartesian project.

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<sup>10</sup> Note that this respect is *unverstellte*, genuine, unfeigned, hence, one can assume, uncoerced or free.

<sup>11</sup> I say the “private” rather than the “secretive” because there is nothing necessarily secret about the private interests governing an individual who is subject to them in society, in fact. Kant makes it clear in WIE that his notion of “public” involves the public of educated readers who ought to be free to engage in debate. In *Perpetual Peace* and elsewhere this notion of public expands to one involving politics as well, something already implicit in the WIE, especially in the latter part’s discussion of educating the people to be good citizens.

<sup>12</sup> Of course Kant and Descartes have, *prima facie*, striking differences about first person subjectivity and many of these differences are relevant to a full discussion of Descartes and Kant on enlightenment. Kant’s discussion in the Refutation of Idealism and the Paralogisms indicate many of these differences. A full discussion would need to address such differences in detail; all I seek to do here is sketch some of the possible connections between these two thinkers of enlightenment, particularly in the kind of “space” indicated by Descartes as necessary for independent thinking. Kant’s transcendental turn of course radically redefines this space just as he redefines the place of theoretical and practical reason, but the space of solitary

### 3. Marks of Enlightenment

In *What is Enlightenment?* Kant expounds a principle fundamental to his practical philosophy, the principle of thinking for oneself. He opens with:

«*Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to make use of your own understanding! is thus the motto of enlightenment*». <sup>14</sup>  
(AA 8:35, Gregor 17)

The two stresses on “one’s own understanding” are instructive here because in the first instance one is indeed using one’s *own* understanding but in the leading-strings of someone else’s direction, a book, a spiritual or medical advisor, or others. Once one embarks on the process of enlightenment, one begins to make use of one’s own understanding again, but this time *independently* of another’s direction.

Kant spells this out in the rest of the essay, including his famous and perhaps notorious distinction between the enlightened public use of reason and the less autonomous (and necessarily so) private use of reason, when one has a job or a function. In the latter cases one is bound, as a part, to the direction of the whole; but merely as someone who thinks, one has freedom in the public use of one’s reason, a freedom a monarch or governing power should not restrict. As Kant eventually explicates it, the binding nature of private reason makes one a cog in a machine, in a sense, while the freedom of the public use of reason, properly used, allows one to avoid complete reduction to such mechanism, while allowing a limited amount of such mechanical existence.

There are four explicit criteria for enlightenment, which Kant articulates all of which link autonomy and being non-mechanical<sup>15</sup>, not a machine, as he explicitly states in several differences places in the essay. The first is where Kant is referring to those who would like to make human beings essentially non-autonomous:

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thinking needed to be laid out first by Descartes (and Rousseau, according to Deligiorgi—and possibly Augustine, in a sense) before itself being critically transformed.

<sup>13</sup> In sections 4 and 5 of this essay.

<sup>14</sup> All references to *What is Enlightenment* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* are from Gregor’s translations in Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, and are cited in the text with the Akademie pagination and the pages in Gregor. References to the German text of the *Critique of Practical Reason* are to the *Akademie Textausgabe in Kants Werke*, Vol.V; references to the German text of WIE are to the *Akademie Textausgabe in Kants Werke*, Vol. VIII.

<sup>15</sup> In the *Critique of Practical Reason* and in the *Critique of Judgment*, works later than WIE, Kant gives us a detailed account of mechanism that links both his theoretical and practical uses of the term and thus helps to shed some light on the use of machine language in WIE. The second Critique highlights the independence of thinking that makes a moral subject non-machine like while the third Critique emphasizes the reciprocity and interaction which characterize non-machines, specifically, biological organisms. I have addressed both these discussions of mechanism elsewhere in some detail.

«...those guardians who have kindly taken it upon themselves to supervise them; after they have made their domesticated animals dumb and carefully prevented these placid creatures from daring to take a single step without the walking cart [*Gängelwagen*] in which they have confined them, they then show them the danger that threatens them if they try to walk alone». (AA 8:35, Gregor 17)

The “walking cart” Kant has in mind is revealed in the next paragraph where he refers to “Precepts and formulas, those *mechanical* instruments of a rational use, or rather misuse, of his [anyone’s] natural endowments, are the ball and chain of an everlasting minority.” (AA 8:36, Gregor 17, emphasis added) Extrapolating from these two references, we can say that these are akin to the rules or concepts Kant refers to in the first *Critique*, when he discusses the difficulty of judgment as subsuming correctly under a rule: such subsumption, not at all identical with knowing the rules or concepts, is difficult to learn and almost impossible to teach, since it is essentially the art of having judgment. One can have all the rules in the world without being able to apply them.

Generally Kant has nothing against rules at all; in fact, the hallmark of well-formed judgment is to use rules, either theoretically or practically. The point, as we will see, is not to use them *mechanically* which in the WIE discussion means using them unreflectively, on the say-so of someone else, or on the say-so of some putative authority; in other words, the problem is not necessarily the rules as such, but the issue of whether they are self-imposed or imposed by another<sup>16</sup> If it is right then the gods will say so, but it is not right *because* the gods say so.

A third reference to the activity of the citizen comes once Kant has made a transition from the possible enlightenment of individuals to the more probable enlightenment of the public at large, provided they are allowed freedom in the public use of reason:

«Now, for many affairs conducted in the interest of a commonwealth a certain *mechanism* is necessary, by means of which some members of the commonwealth must behave merely passively, so as to be directed by the government, though an artful unanimity (*künstliche Einhelligkeit*), to public ends... Here it is, certainly, impermissible to argue; instead, one must obey. But insofar as this part of the *machine* also regards himself as a member of a whole commonwealth, even of the society of citizens of the world, and so in his capacity of a scholar who by his writings addresses a public in the proper sense of the word, he can certainly argue without thereby harming the affairs assigned to him in part as a passive member». ( AA 8:37, Gregor 18, emphasis added)

For example, says Kant, one cannot refuse to pay taxes as a citizen but “the same citizen does not act against the duty of a citizen when, as a scholar, he publicly expresses his

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<sup>16</sup> My thanks to Joël Madore for this point.

thoughts about the inappropriateness or even injustice of such decrees”<sup>17</sup>. ( AA 8:37-38, Gregor 19) In giving us an account of the balance between public and private uses of reason, Kant also lays out what it means to be mechanical. Precepts and formulas certainly play a role but now mechanism is also revealed as necessary for many aspects even of a commonwealth<sup>18</sup> and it consists in accepting that one is a passive part of a machine, a part whose unity with the whole is simply artful (*künstliche*) or constructed.<sup>19</sup>

There are several other references which can be connected to passivity and mechanism but the one we will conclude with is at the end of WIE. After teleologically analyzing the development of human beings to the point where, as people they are capable of being free, Kant says that the tendency and vocation of thinking freely “gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of freedom in acting<sup>20</sup>) and eventually even upon the principles of government, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity.” (AA 8:41-42, Gregor 22). Kant is clearly connecting the capacity to be free in one’s actions with being more than a machine and connecting this “moreness” with human dignity, which he will later make the hallmark of being a human being in the *Groundwork*, even if he over-optimistically sees this as profitable to government.

Thus, WIE indicates that being mechanically unenlightened involves over-reliance on precepts and formulas and other kinds of rote learning, fundamental and perpetual direction from others, being a passive part rather than an active member,<sup>21</sup> and thus lacking dignity and being treated as a virtual child if not an actual one. As we will see, all four points are addressed by Descartes’ Meditator<sup>22</sup>, both in the content of Meditations One and Two and in the very formulation of the project.

<sup>17</sup> There is, of course, the question of whether such obeying in action and being critical in speech is a sufficient or acceptable *political* move. Kant famously is more supportive after the fact of things, like revolution, that he beforehand would not endorse, and in the case of revolution, actually condemns. See Ripstein (2009) for a lengthy discussion of the relationship between Kant’s political theory and his theory of freedom, especially chapter 11 which deals with the thorny issue of revolution.

<sup>18</sup> I say “even” because the image of the commonwealth most favourably expressed by Kant is that of an organic body, where, of course, the parts and the whole enjoy a *reciprocal* relationship rather than a top-down relationship. See the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, sect.59, (AA5: 352). Given Kant’s comments in this section, the mechanism of state is the body to its “soul,” which would be its “life,” The reciprocal unity of citizens and rulers/governments.

<sup>19</sup> This point about the “artful” is significant when Kant denies in teleological judgment that organic life can be regarded as an artwork in which parts are subordinated to the whole. See the second half of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, especially the discussion of the Analytic (AA 5: 359-383).

<sup>20</sup> Earlier in the discussion Kant says that people move in this direction normally if not actively prevented from so doing. See AA 8:41, Gregor 21.

<sup>21</sup> The issue of passivity probably comes out of Kant’s reading of Rousseau. Certainly elements of his linking life with freedom and organisms analogously with proper commonwealths comes out of Rousseau’s distinction between an aggregate and an association and the resulting notion of the general will. However, see Deligiorgi for a discussion of important *differences* from Rousseau in this context.

<sup>22</sup> Aryeh Kosman (1986) has a well known discussion in which Descartes and the Meditator are importantly distinct. For one thing, Descartes knows how the project finishes, while the Meditator, speaking in the present tense, does not. A similar point has been developed more recently by Charles Larmore (2006), who points out that the Meditator’s attitudes reflect a more traditional semi-Aristotelian view which Descartes himself would not have held. Larmore thus reads the Meditations as almost a dialogue (which in form it



#### 4. Descartes' project of critical reflection

In *Truth and Method*, Gadamer critically comments on Descartes' role in the enlightenment issue of authority<sup>23</sup> versus individual reason:

«Enlightenment's distinction between faith in authority and using one's own reason is, in itself, legitimate. If the prestige of authority displaces one's own judgment, then authority is in fact a source of prejudices. But this does not preclude its being a source of truth, and that is what the Enlightenment failed to see when it denigrated all authority. To be convinced of this, we need only consider one of the greatest forerunners of the European Enlightenment, namely Descartes....». (Gadamer 2006, p.280)<sup>24</sup>

Gadamer goes on to point out a central feature of authority radically distorted by Enlightenment thinking, thus presumably by Descartes as well:

«...the authority of persons is ultimately based not on the subjection and abdication of reason but on an act of acknowledgment and knowledge—the knowledge, namely, that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence—i.e., it has priority over one's own. This is connected with the fact that authority cannot actually be bestowed but is earned, and must be earned if someone is to lay claim to it. It rests on acknowledgment and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of its own limitations, trusts to the better insight of others. Authority in this sense, properly understood, has nothing to do with blind obedience to commands....its true basis is an act of freedom and reason.... acknowledging authority is always connected with the idea that what the authority says is not irrational and arbitrary but can, in principle, be discovered to be true». (Gadamer 2006, p. 281)

Gadamer's overall reasoning about authority seems cogent; but, is it an accurate description of the Enlightenment or, more specifically, of its forerunner, Descartes?<sup>25</sup> Such

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frequently is, though within one person) between a number of views, and this is similar to Marion's characterization of the Meditations as "responsorial". These claims are both thought-provoking and textually grounded, though the *prima facie* evidence for Descartes as the Meditator is suggested by his own claiming of the meditative process in both the *Discourse* and the Preface to the Reader of the Meditations. In any case, neither Kosman's nor Larmore's argument (nor Marion's, of course) are incompatible from the notion that the Meditator, whoever he may be, is creating the space in which to undergo the process of enlightenment. Similarly, Louis Loeb's 1986 arguments for a "dissimulation hypothesis" for the *Meditations*, much qualified recently (Loeb 2010, pp.34-57), do not, I think, affect the notion that Descartes' project is to create an enlightened space. If anything, Loeb's ascription of a naturalist epistemology to Descartes (which eschews reliance on God) is, independently of its own merits, a point in favour of Descartes as Kantian style enlightener.

<sup>23</sup> As the context suggest, the issue involves authority *external* to the individual reasoned.

<sup>24</sup> He goes on to say his own view is that there is no absolute antithesis between authority or tradition on the one hand, and reason on the other. (Gadamer 2006, p.282)

<sup>25</sup> See Allison's 1990 discussion for a response to Gadamer's worries with regard to Kant. Allison shows that only when one isolates the maxim of thinking for oneself from the other two maxims of enlightenment, in the third Critique, in the *Anthropology*, and in the *Jäsche Logic*, does the issue of abstract and hypercritical ungrounded reason arise. I think this can be done for Descartes as well, but this requires a fuller treatment of

a hypercritical reason is also criticized as an *individual* reason, the isolated and abstractly rational subjectivity that Hans Jonas connects to Kant (Jonas 1973, pp. 43-35) but which could easily be attributed (and often is) to Descartes. This is an abstract and empty rationality, the pale anemic subjectivity of Ryle's ghost in the machine. Taken together with the anti-authoritarianism, such features make Cartesian subjectivity look thoroughly isolated, abandoning the robust social sense of the self, such as that found in Hegel, perhaps.<sup>26</sup>

However, Descartes does much more than just radically deconstruct authority and tradition; he uses hyperbolic doubt as a particular kind of tool, to articulate a synthesis of rationality and authority not unlike that found in Kant's *What is Enlightenment?* He has to achieve the abstraction and isolation of the *Meditations* with a good deal of effort and while the content of his world presents itself to him under the aspect of authority and tradition, his goal is to provide a sound *foundation* for any content which is true.

Moreover, reading the *cogito* as abstract and empty ignores the relationship in Meditation Two between the *cogito* and the *cogitationes*, which constitute a rich though unsatisfying "world" of sorts for Descartes. We thus definitely find a social sense of the self in Descartes alongside his rejection of an *uncritical* sociality of which Descartes was only too keenly aware and which he sought to limit.

### **5. Meditation One: Artificial secession as power over my own epistemic attitude, power over my judgment, power to think for myself**

Descartes opens the *Meditations* with his famous backward glance at what he once knew, what he eventually realized as false, and what his project is for overcoming such falsity:

«Some years ago I was struck by the large number of falsehoods that I had accepted as true in my childhood, and by the highly doubtful nature of the whole edifice that I had subsequently based on them. I realized that it was necessary, once in the course of my life, to demolish everything completely and start again right from the foundations if I wanted to establish anything at all in the sciences that was stable and likely to last». (AT 17; CSM 12).<sup>27</sup>

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the *Meditations* as a whole and the project of the *Discourse*, especially the publicity which Descartes eventually endorses.

<sup>26</sup> In his recent book on Kant's *What Is Enlightenment?* Samuel Fleischacker ably defends Kant against charges of isolation and anti-social thinking. (as does, of course, Deligiorgi) It is not clear who does quite the same for Descartes, but Jean-Luc Marion's recent volumes on Descartes seem to go some way toward at least showing that he is not quite the thinker of isolation as usually portrayed. Many Descartes scholars interested in his relation to mediaeval thinkers (e.g., Anthony Kenny) also emphasize this.

<sup>27</sup> Quotations from Descartes are from the *Meditations* and are from the translation in *The Philosophical Writings* by Cottingham. The Latin is from *Oeuvres de Descartes*, Volume IX, edited by Adam and Tannery. Citations are given with from the Adam and Tannery first, with the Cottingham page abbreviated to the standard CSM; I have also consulted Cottingham's 2013 stand alone translation of the *Meditations*, which is based in large part on the previous CSM version.

After retailing his reservations about the enormity of the task and his procrastination on it, he switches from the historical past into the perfect tense and thence into present tense as he states that "...today I have expressly rid my mind of all worries and arranged for myself a clear stretch of free time. I am here quite alone, and at last I will devote myself sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition<sup>28</sup> of my opinions." (AT17-18; CSM 12)

It is worth noting that the verb, *secedo*, used in "I am here quite alone" (*solus secedo*), means "to go apart, separate, withdraw" with other overtones of retiring from public life and political overtones of rebellion.<sup>29</sup> I want to suggest that Descartes is turning himself quite artificially and temporarily into a *whole*, rather than accepting his social aspect as a *part*, the aspect linked to mechanism by Kant. The artifice is reinforced by the "pretence within pretence" motif of Meditation One, where the project of hyperbolic doubt, rejected by Descartes elsewhere as a real issue (including the Synopsis of the *Meditations*), is presented to us as "pretending for a time that these former opinions are utterly false and imaginary." (AT 22; CSM II, 15) This pretence is implicit in the dream hypothesis but is quite explicit in the adoption of the demon hypothesis, which is a "supposing" done by Descartes himself.

In this framework of conscious pretence, Descartes does not question (rightly or wrongly) whether the actual phenomena he is experiencing could be different *qua* actual phenomena. He says: "Suppose then that I am dreaming, and that these particulars—that my eyes are open, that I am moving my head and stretching out my hands—are not true. Perhaps, indeed, I do not even have such hands or such a body at all." (AT19; CSM II, 13) He does *not*, however, say that he is doing something else, at least, from the point of view of his own observation. He could be a brain in a vat, of course, not a man in a dressing gown, as described in the earlier paragraph. But his experience right now is not describable as "brain in vat" but as "man wearing dressing gown near fire, my eyes open, etc." He may be worried that he is *actually* something utterly different (the brain in the vat) but he is not worried about what he will later call the "objective reality" of the ideas he is experiencing. He is worried about their "formal reality," about their ontological not their phenomenological status.

<sup>28</sup> In the light of Gadamer's worries, it is important to note that for Descartes such a demolition is strictly in the space of theoretical reason.

<sup>29</sup> *sē-cēdo*, *cessi*, *cessum*, 3, v. n., I. *to go apart, go away, separate, withdraw* (class.; not in Cæs.; but cf. *secessio*). B. In partic. 1. *To go aside, withdraw, retire* b. In post-Aug. authors (esp. in Suet.), *to retire from public into private life; absol.*: c. *To seek the exclusive society of any one, to retire from the world*: "ad optimos viros," Sen. Ot. Sap. 1, 1. —2. Polit., *to separate one's self by rebellion, to revolt, secede* II. Trop. (very rare; perh. only poet. and in post-Aug. prose): "antequam ego incipio secedere et aliā parte considerare," *to dissent from the opinion*, Sen. Ep. 117, 4: "a fesso corpore sensus," Cat. 64, 189: "qui solitarius separatusque a communi malo civitatis secesserit," *has withdrawn himself*, Gell. 2, 12, 1: "cum ad stilum secedet," *shall give himself up to writing*, Quint. 1, 12, 12: "in te ipse secede," *retire within yourself*, Sen. Ep. 25, 7. All this material selected from the entry in: A Latin Dictionary. Founded on Andrews' edition of Freund's Latin dictionary. revised, enlarged, and in great part rewritten by. Charlton T. Lewis, Ph.D. and. Charles Short, LL.D. Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1879. The National Endowment for the Humanities provided support for entering this text.

<http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.04.0059%3Aentry%3Dsecedo>  
Accessed Friday, September 05, 2014

This is at the core of his artificial hypotheses. Descartes worries about the *causes* of his ideas, identifying false information about these causes as something he “had accepted as true” (*admiserim*: had admitted, had allowed in). He states, right after the explicit supposition of the all powerful demon, that “I shall stubbornly and firmly persist in this meditation; and even if it is not in my power to know any truth, I shall at least do what is in my power, [to suspend my judgment (French version)] that is, resolutely guard against assenting to any falsehoods, so that the deceiver, however powerful and cunning he may be, will be unable to impose on me in the slightest degree.” (AT23; CSM II, 15).

This is not a passive subjectivity, even in its worries. Moreover, the activity, much like Kantian subjectivity, is a formal activity, a consciousness of the idea of freedom. For Descartes deception can take away my freedom at the deepest level in some ways but not when I can ask the question about deception in Meditation One and then continue unfolding its implications in Meditation Two.

We can now ask whether the project, as set up in Meditation One, shows the marks of enlightenment. With the four points of non-enlightenment in mind, we can see that Meditation One’s project itself addresses all four problems. The Meditator is anxious *not* to rely on rote learning, on traditional knowledge, without at least testing for its truth in the court of reason. In this context he will take hyperbolic pains to rely on no one, at least at the outset and the very point of *solus secedo* is to guard against the unreflectively accepted intellectual influence of others. Additionally, the Meditator is no mechanical part, subordinated to others but, rather, is making the whole answerable to him by proving its epistemic worth. This interaction or feedback by one whom Descartes himself understands to be a part (himself normally), is essentially enlightenment, even if one thinks the later Meditations move away from this.<sup>30</sup> And, finally, the Meditator is no child, either actually or metaphorically: he has left his minority in virtue of his isolation and also in virtue of his demand that everything answer to his reason. In other words, the Meditator is trying to think for himself and has, through the *solus secedo*, created the artificial space, physical, social, epistemic, within which such thinking can safely take place.<sup>31</sup> In this artificial space, tradition becomes answerable to the court of reason.

## 6. Meditation Two, Part I: Actively asserting the subject

What then is this self which is trying to emerge from its minority, from the heavy hand of tradition, or, at least, unreflective tradition? Is it, fundamentally, a statement about my

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<sup>30</sup> I would argue that they do not. But this is too large a topic to address here, especially in its relationship to the nature and power of God. . Tom Vinci’s discussion of Descartes’ epistemology, especially of his truth rule of clarity and distinctness, meticulously constructs an argument involving the nature of the rule and its use, which allows a convincing solution to the “Cartesian Circle” problem. See Vinci 1998, especially chapters 1-3 and the epilogue, in which Cartesian epistemology’s relation to scepticism is explored in more general terms.

<sup>31</sup> The precepts of the *Discourse*, Part III, make clear how important such safety is for Descartes, reflecting his clear understanding that theoretical and practical reason are quite distinct. In Part III, as in much of the *Discourse* and the *Meditations*, the spatial motifs are abundant.

isolated subjectivity and not a statement about the world? This last point will affect just how enlightened the Cartesian *res cogitans* can be, since Kantian enlightenment cannot be, in the nature of things, about an isolated non-social subjectivity.<sup>32</sup>

John Cottingham points out that the *cogito*, as what Descartes calls *cognitio*, knowledge of a sort by immediate acquaintance, is different from *scientia*, systematic knowledge, such as science or a system of natural philosophy and that this difference has implications for certain Cartesian problems, such as the Cartesian circle. For example, in the second set of Objections Descartes is asked about his claim in the Meditations, especially Meditation Five, that God is necessary to guarantee the veracity of all genuine knowledge, especially knowledge dependent on memory. Specifically the objectors (AT124-125; CSM II, 89) want to know whether the veracity of the *cogito* depends on God. If it does, Descartes cannot escape the Cartesian circle: if we need the *cogito* for the idea of God in order then to prove God's existence through the nature of this idea, then we need the *cogito* to be independently true. We cannot say that we know its truth only if a veracious God exists, since we need the *cogito* to know that a veracious God exists.<sup>33</sup>

In the second set of replies, Descartes sidesteps the objectors' question by stating that the *cogito* is a first principle and that knowledge of first principles is not knowledge in the normal sense (AT 140; CSM II, 100). It is, as Cottingham points out, *cognitio*<sup>34</sup>, whereas God is necessary for *scientia*, systematic knowledge.

There is good reason not to see the *cogito*, even as *cognitio*, as hyper-isolated and abstract way. For one thing, it does not make sense of the discussion of the *cogitationes*, the *pensées* which are part and parcel of the Je pense. As Anthony Kenny points out there is probably no limit the subject can raise to the number of examples of the *cogitationes*<sup>35</sup>, each of which is a "worldly" reinforcement of the thinking subject. (Kenny 2009, p. 47).<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> Deligiorgi strongly emphasizes and develops this point in her discussion of Kant's "culture of enlightenment."

<sup>33</sup> The entire problem of the "Cartesian Circle" is, in many ways, vitally important for any assessment of Descartes' complete project and system as reflecting enlightenment.

<sup>34</sup> Cottingham: "Descartes seems to distinguish here between an isolated cognition or act of awareness (*cognitio*) and systematic, properly grounded knowledge (*scientia*)." (CSM II, 100, note 2) While I disagree with the characterization of "an isolated cognition" (as the next section's discussion of the *cogitationes* makes clear), Cottingham elsewhere has put his finger on the central problem for seeing Descartes as an "enlightener", though this important problem will not be addressed in this article. This is the tension between the autonomy and independence of reason on the one hand and what Cottingham calls Descartes' conception of "creatureliness", a conception that brings us back, as Meditations Three, Four, and Five do, to a necessary dependence on "a creative power", i.e. God. "This tension between independence and creatureliness pervades the entire structure of the *Meditations*." (Cottingham 2013, "Philosophical introduction", xxiii). Much of this is discussed, at greater length, in Cottingham's 2008 book, *Cartesian Reflections*.

<sup>35</sup> Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the importance of the *cogitationes* as well and seems generally to stress the role of attention and judgment in Descartes, something which will be discussed further below. See the, preface xiv, Introduction section: Chapter 3 on attention and judgment, especially pp. 47-50, and Part 3, Chapter 1, on "The Cogito".

<sup>36</sup> This more cognitive dimension to the "I think" is illuminated by reading Descartes through an Augustinian lens, as Cottingham and others have commented, even if, as Marion has noted, there are important and radical differences between the two thinkers. (Marion 2007, pp.23-26) I have discussed some of these Augustinian/Cartesian similarities and differences elsewhere.

## 7. Meditation Two, Part II: The “world” of the *cogitationes*

If the *cogito*, the “I think,” is rooted in the struggles of the Augustinian *fallor*, then the world of the Cartesian *cogitationes*, the thoughts, gives the *cogito* some purchase on its otherness as they unfold the richness of the thinking self and its activity.<sup>37</sup> In so doing, they draw attention to how content of thinking can be questioned by the Meditator in the process of enlightenment. Appearing initially to present the world, the *cogitationes*, at this stage, show no such warrant; when the Meditator dares to know them they turn out, for the time being, to be only his thoughts, to lead him back to himself, rather than forward toward the world.<sup>38</sup> This is itself an advance, since the Meditator now knows that he needs a foundational epistemic warrant for his knowledge (*scientia*), namely, the secure and grounding existence of an absolute idea, the idea of God. While Kant and Descartes are bound to disagree on the need for this particular type of foundational epistemic warrant, they should agree that coming to understand the *status* of one’s ideas *as* one’s ideas initially is already an advance over naïve or unenlightened notions of experience. This is the first step in the enlightenment project as laid out in section 40 of the *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, to think for oneself and also the main step of *WIE*; the second step, to think from the point of view of everyone else, is not available to the Meditator at this stage in the *Meditations*.

Descartes makes a well-known and much challenged transition from the *cogito* (strictly, *sum, existo*) to the *res cogitans*, the thinking thing. He then gives a very inclusive definition of thinking, one which will be changed considerably first in Meditation Four and then in Meditation Six. Here the definition comprises everything that one could see as falling under consciousness generally: “But what then am I? A thing that thinks. What is that? A thing that doubts, understands, affirms, denies, is willing, is unwilling, and also imagines and has sensory perceptions.” (AT 28; CSM II, 19)<sup>39</sup> He then asks if everything on this “considerable list” belongs to him and in so doing finds that he is a much more complicated centre of activity than the opening of Meditation Two might suggest. He is diversified into a series of activities, all of which presage the *cogitationes*:

«Is it not one and the same ‘I’ who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands some things, who affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the time, and

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<sup>37</sup> This richness of the self comes to fruition in Spinoza and Leibniz, particularly in Leibniz’s interplay of possible world and monad.

<sup>38</sup> In the end, of course, the *cogitationes* do lead to the world, first through the idea of God in Meditations Three and Five and secondly, through the idea of body in Meditation Six.

<sup>39</sup> The last line consists of present active participles such as *dubitans, intelligens, negans, volens, sentiens* and could be translated: a thing doubting, understanding, ...perceiving etc. Descartes is conscious of himself doing all of these things in the present moment, thus lending some credence to his own claim that he is not making an inference in the initial presentation of the *cogito*.

even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself?». (AT 28-29; CSM II, 19)

Descartes then goes on to say that those objects which appear to him in sensation may not exist but he certainly seems to experience them and that it is in this limited way he can be said to “image and sense” even though what he is imagining and sensing may be false. In this limited sense, even an activity like perception, so different initially from the abstract rational claim of the *cogito*, is actually the enriched version of the *cogito*.

At this stage, then, the differentiation in the activity of the thinking self becomes a differentiation in the objects of the cogitated world. Descartes, finding himself slipping back into the old, socialized, traditional, common sense way of thinking and thus finding his *solus secedo* threatened by his mental embeddedness, decides to allow his mind free rein in considering one of the objects of the traditionally viewed world, the notorious piece of wax.

In its strange transformations, the wax could, somewhat imaginatively, be read as a material record of all the Cartesian transformations to date and, indeed, many of those to come. Less imaginatively, it becomes the representative of all the *res extensa*, all the material things of the world which become transformed under the modern mathematical eye. The wax goes through two significant transformations, firstly, from its one sensory thing to another, sensibly different thing, and secondly, from a sensory object to a mathematical, geometrical object. In the sensory transformation we are informed that the fragrant smell of the flowers, the sweet taste of the honey, are all transformed in the wax into melted, hot, liquid, no longer possessing these qualities. The wax remains, even in this strange pool. Why? Descartes concludes that the wax was none of these things, not the sweet taste, the fragrant scent, the cold hardness or the hot liquid. Just as Descartes himself was “*Nempe dubitans, intelligens*” etc., the active thinking thing, the wax is “*nempe nihil aliud quam extensum quid, flexibile, mutabile*”, something extended, flexible, changeable. How does Descartes know this? As with Plato and Augustine, the answer is through my judging intellect, something applicable to the next example, when Descartes asks whether the humans he sees crossing the square could, under their hats and coats, be “*automata*”. “*Sed judico hominess esse*”, but I judge that they are human beings, solely through the “*scrutiny of the mind alone.*” And, should anyone think the wax and the people are unrelated, Descartes refers to regarding the wax as taking off its clothing and considering it naked, and solely through the mind.

However, as Anthony Kenny has emphasized, the *cogitationes*, including the wax and the humans, prove also that Descartes is a thinking thing. Meditation Two concludes that this peculiar “world” is tied into the proof of the *cogito*:

«For if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I see it, clearly this same fact entails much more evidently that I myself also exist. It is possible that what I see is not really the wax; it is possible that I do not even have eyes with which to see anything. But when I see, or think I see (*I am not here distinguishing the two*), it is simply not possible that I who am

now thinking am not something. By the same token if I judge that the wax exists from the fact that I touch it, the same result follows, namely that I exist. If I judge that it exists from the fact that I imagine it, or for any other reason, exactly the same thing follows. *And the result that I have grasped in the case of the wax may be applied to everything else located outside me*<sup>40</sup>....This is because every consideration whatsoever which contributes to my perception of the wax, *or of any other body, cannot but establish even more effectively the nature of my own mind*». <sup>41</sup> (AT 33; CSM II, p.22; emphases added)

The “world” of the *cogitationes*, though still a world of thought, thus continues the project of enlightenment by presenting the thinking subject, the Meditator, with the worldly material whose status he or she must interrogate. Real or not, I must be satisfied that the status of my ideas has been satisfactorily proven to me, even if, as Meditation Three will go on to discuss, such satisfaction may involve ideas which could never have only been part of my mind.<sup>42</sup> That, however, is a new and troubling stage in the journey of enlightenment, a rocky journey which for Kant, unlike Descartes, constitutes the battlefield of metaphysics. Nonetheless, Descartes enters this contest as someone ready for an answer, however different from Kant’s, which at least locates itself in the court of reason, if not quite in a critique of *pure* reason.

## 8. Conclusion: Building the court of reason?

Thus, the Cartesian *solus secedo* licenses and indeed is the explicit space of the Kantian *sapere aude*. Kant’s semi-Cartesian<sup>43</sup> recovery of the troubled insights of a subjectivity not fully dominated by social or empirical determinations, is, of course, a recovery which then tries to balance the social and the subjective *not* through transcendence as such, unlike Descartes, but through the highly involved and weighty means of the critical philosophy and its substitution of transcendental method for transcendent insight. The calm, cold, waters of Kant’s transcendental idealism may or may not be an advance of some sort over the “metaphysics, hot, spicy, and eternal”<sup>44</sup> of Descartes. Nonetheless, reflecting on one’s rational subjectivity and its status and limitations sets the stage for an enlightenment project by building part of the foundation of a court of reason: Such reflection forms the precondition for a minimalist enlightenment. Kantian or not, this artificially induced and temporary epistemic solitude is a crucial step in emerging from one’s minority,

<sup>40</sup> Descartes’ worries about the relation of his subjectivity to what is outside him, God and the external world are revealed, especially in Meditations III, V, VI, through the expressions *in me, a/ad me, extra/ex me, ex meis ideis, sine me*.

<sup>41</sup> Merleau-Ponty emphasizes this point in his chapter, “The *Cogito*.” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, p.435)

<sup>42</sup> Chief among these, of course, is the idea of an infinite substance: God.

<sup>43</sup> This is not a self-professed Cartesianism, in spite of Kant’s relatively mild position toward Descartes in the “Refutation of Idealism” and in spite of sympathies with aspects of the Cartesian “I think”

<sup>44</sup> Thus Gil Shalev, in his comments on Peter Harris’ presentation in the Philosophy Winter Colloquium 2015, Memorial University. I am myself inclined toward the colder ice palace of a bounded Kantian reason but this itself does not exclude Descartes, at least in principle, from being a full enlightener. Generally, I want to thank Gil for discussions with me about Descartes over the years which have been a source of much insight, especially on the proofs of God’s existence, and the general import of the Cartesian Circle



untrammelled, at least initially, by the forced guidance of others. The metaphysics of individual subjectivity thus takes us a long way toward a critique of pure reason<sup>45</sup> and thence to, perhaps, a social proceduralism which, given a strong individual site of resistance, can be engaged in by rational actors who can engage in the reciprocity of dialogue without their individual voices being overwhelmed. The *solus secedo* ensures that one side of the dialogue, my individual interiority, no matter how difficult to conceive today in the face of language games and other notions of socialization, eludes a reduction to my social context, thus allowing me, a Kantian moral agent with critical reason, to say “no” to society’s “yes”.<sup>46</sup> In this normative sense, social transformation presupposes the possibility of the *critical* individual, in community with critical *others*, imagining such transformation (and possibly enacting it).<sup>47</sup> To paraphrase R.H. Tawney, the great social historian, Karl Marx was the last of the Cartesians.<sup>48</sup>

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<sup>45</sup> I owe much to the patience and critical engagement of many of my classes, in this case, especially to the students, undergraduate and graduate, from various iterations of the Descartes course, several seminars on Spinoza and Leibniz, and, in the last couple of years also classes in Rationalism and in the History of Modern philosophy. They have tolerated, encouraged, and written about tortured reflection on rational subjectivity in its own right and in relation to eternity, helping me in my own reflections on these topics.

<sup>46</sup> This paper came, in part, out of a commentary on Samuel Fleischacker’s keynote talk for an inaugural conference at Memorial organized by Scott Johnston and Joël Madore in 2013, on Kant’s *What is Enlightenment?* My thanks to the organizers for their encouragement, comments, especially Joël Madore’s detailed editorial feedback, and patience as organizers and editors. I have also benefited from comments on the Descartes material at the 2015 Atlantic Canada Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy and from discussions with Tom Vinci, whose work has always made Descartes convincing to me.

<sup>47</sup> I do stress “normative.” Why social transformation actually happens when it does may have little or nothing to do with critical individuals, critical communities, or any such rational actors; the likelihood is that transformation may happen for a host of other, non-rational reasons. But transformation still presumes that things can be otherwise, both socially and for an individual.

<sup>48</sup> Tawney’s actual comment (in *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*) was that Karl Marx was the last of the *Schoolmen*, probably an even more remarkable (or unlikely) comparison. My own comment is primarily to emphasize that Descartes, who says “change yourself, not the world” in the *Discourse*, has a link of sorts to a social revolutionary like Marx, for whom such transformation should be of the world as well. And, as Tom Sorell points out, the two have this in common, that there is a “Cartesianism” quite distinct from though related to Descartes himself just as there is a Marxism quite distinct from though also related to Marx. (Sorell 2005, p.xxi)

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## Afterword.

### On Enlightenment and the Most Difficult Problem of the Human Species

#### *Epílogo.*

#### *Sobre la Ilustración y el mayor problema de la especie humana*

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#### **Abstract**

In this Afterword, I discuss the papers contained in the *dossier* in regards to a central issue for Kant: leadership. The issue for Kant is the paradox of the human species' need for a master that is human yet morally perfect. This of course is an as-yet unobtainable requirement that Kant thinks can only be properly met through a civil constitution. The issues of elitism and the tension between a 'maximal' and 'minimal' Enlightenment in light of Kant's requirement will be discussed.

#### **Key words**

Kant; Enlightenment; Civil Constitution; Leadership; Master; Elitism

#### **Resumen**

En este epílogo comento los artículos recogidos en el *dossier* en relación con una cuestión central para Kant: el liderazgo. Kant plantea la cuestión de la paradoja consistente en la

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necesidad que la especie humana tiene de un jefe que sea humano, pero moralmente perfecto. Esta es sin duda una exigencia no alcanzable aún, que Kant considera plausible solo a través de una constitución civil. Se discutirá el elitismo y la tensión entre una Ilustración ‘maximalista’ y ‘minimalista’, a la luz de la exigencia de Kant.

### Palabras clave

Kant; Ilustración; constitución civil; liderazgo; jefe; elitismo

In providing an afterword for this set of papers on Kant and the Enlightenment – drawn for our first Kant Conference at Memorial University –, I am conscious of the likelihood of merely adding my claims to the claims already put forth. Now all papers raise the question of elitism to some degree. And this seems a fitting point of departure. But I don’t want to raise an issue that is already raised (and dealt with) by the papers. As such, I intend to take a different tack: I want to see what theme(s), beyond the Enlightenment itself, these papers raise. I see one immediately spring forward--leadership. The problem of leadership as I construe it concerns Kant’s admonition that humankind needs a master, yet every (human) master requires a master, for the human species and every human being therein is morally imperfect. Because this condition cannot hold (we cannot have an infinite regress of leadership), humankind must rely on masters that are morally imperfect.

In what follows I will briefly outline Kant’s views on the matter and then discuss the problem in light of the various claims of the papers. I don’t intend on solving the problem here: I merely suggest that any discussion of the Enlightenment must face this question, and it is one that has no immediate solution—at least not in the short-term. As such, I think I can fairly say that for Kant, we belong to an Enlightenment that is as yet unfinished.

### 1. The Greatest Problem for the Human Species.

Kant is direct about the quandary in which the human species finds itself. He begins the Fifth Proposition of his “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitical Aim” with the following: “*The greatest problem for the human species, to which nature compels him, is the achievement of a **civil society** universally administering right*” (IAG AA 8:22).<sup>1</sup> In the Sixth Proposition he makes the claim that

<sup>1</sup> I follow for the most part the English translation of Kant’s works in the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. These are: *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?* Translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; *Groundwork on the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; *On the Saying: That may be Correct in Theory, But It is of no Use in Practice*, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; *The Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by M. Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996; *Idea for a Universal History with Cosmopolitical Intent*, translated by A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University

«This problem is at the same time the most difficult and the latest to be solved by the human species. The difficulty which the mere idea of this problem lays before our eyes is this: the human being is an animal which, when it lives among others of its species, has need of a master (*Herrn*). For he certainly misuses his freedom in regard to others of his kind; and although as a rational creature he wishes a law that sets limits to the freedom of all, his selfish animal inclination still misleads him into excepting himself from it where he may. Thus he needs a master, who breaks his stubborn will and necessitates him to obey a universally valid will with which everyone can be free. But where will he get this master. Nowhere else but from the human species. But then this master is exactly as much an animal who has need of a master...The highest supreme authority, however, ought to be just in itself and yet a human being».<sup>2</sup>

The solution to this latest problem of humankind, Kant suggests, lies in “correct concepts of the nature of a possible constitution,” together with “great experience practiced through many courses of life,” as well as “a good will that is prepared to accept it” (IAG, AA 8: 22-23).

“Idea for a Universal History” appeared in 1784--the same year as “What is Enlightenment?” “Idea”, both being published in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*. The one and the other deal with similar themes, including the political conditions required for any enlightened age to prosper. But “Idea” strikes a less sanguine note than “What is Enlightenment?” for it presents the problem of leadership of the species as obdurate. And herein lies the cautionary message regarding the prospects of an enlightened age I think Kant means for us to grasp: no matter how civil the Enlightenment is, it requires leadership. The paradox of the human species in need of a master yet supposedly free and capable of practicing autonomy is perhaps the most intractable controversy to arise from Kant’s “Ideas” essay. Kant doesn’t offer a solution to this paradox—at least not here. Indeed, Kant is quite clear about the nature of the problem—after all, it *is* the most difficult of all for the human species. But it is also clear Kant does not think the need for a master contradicts the autonomy or freedom of subjects; rather(to put it with more precision) he thinks a resolution to the paradox is forthcoming.

Leadership puts the problems of an enlightened age—those of fractiousness and disagreement (Foster), the problem of an aristocracy of the *Gelehrten* (Foster, Piché), the problem of autonomy and subjectivity on the part of the enlightened (Rajiva), the problem of the scope or reach of the Enlightenment (Fleischacker), and that of courage (Madore) in context. For an answer to each of these is partly dependent on the response to the problem of leadership. And the problem of leadership has no facile solution, for until the conditions for a civil society and constitution are fully met, the fact remains that humankind will need

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Press, 1999; *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, translated by A. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

<sup>2</sup>I have somewhat adjusted Wood’s translation.

a (imperfect) master. I will take up each of these problems in the context of the problem of leadership, in turn.

## 2. The Need for a Master.

The insistence on a master for the human species in no way precludes Kant's claim in "What is Enlightenment?" that the public has the right to participate in scholarship. Nor does it preclude the public from disagreement with its sovereign, as Kant also maintains the *Rechtslehre* (RL AA 06: 318). And it is well in accord with Kant's republicanism. But it does place limits on what autonomous human subjects can do for themselves. The condition of civil society can never merely be a matter left up to the autonomous subject; while a subject certainly has (and must practice) autonomy in Rajiva's sense, there is no guarantee that the practice of this autonomy by itself will lead to civil society administered under a civil constitution.<sup>3</sup> This is a message I think Kant makes clear in "Idea for a Universal History:" there must be in place *correct concepts* of a possible constitution.

A constitution is valid for all who would claim the rights enshrined therein. This much is self-evident. Beyond the mere claiming of rights enshrined in a constitution, however, lies the need for the practice of those rights. This, I think, accounts for Kant's insistence that great experience is needed in many spans of life. It is not enough to have rights; we must practice them if we are to get good at asserting them and undertaking our (reciprocal) obligations. Enlightenment is a continuing process, not a once-and-for-all destination. Regardless of how procedural the Enlightenment turns out to be, this is the thinking behind the claim that the project of the Enlightenment is unfinished—and likely never to be complete.<sup>4</sup> Madore is correct regarding the need of courage, as it will take resolve on the part of those members of civil society—let's call them citizens—that carry forth the ideals of Enlightenment and the practice of their rights and obligations. The sort of courage I think Kant has in mind (beyond the 'courage of convictions' discussed in the opening paragraphs of "What is Enlightenment?") has to do with virtue: that is, self-constraint. To have a good will is to make obligations the ground of one's will, and not incentives. Self-constraint is the wherewithal to prevent those incentives from becoming the grounds of our wills. And this resistance—this struggle--takes courage. Even the

<sup>3</sup>Thus I am saying that without a civil constitution, it is less likely that subjects can practice their (moral) autonomy effectively. As such, the civil constitution enshrines what is a sort of political 'kingdom of ends.' I realize that this is a controversial issue in Kant scholarship and I don't want to make light of it by such a facile assertion. However, given the stress Kant places on both enacting a civil constitution and incorporating that constitution into the (good) wills of humans in communities, I think that, at least in 1784, Kant did think the two ran together.

<sup>4</sup>See for example, *Cultural-Political Interventions in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment*, edited by A. Honneth, T. McCarthy, C. Offe, and A. Wellmer (Cambridge, Ma: MIT Press, 1992). I am here thinking of Habermas and the attempts of German social theorists to construct a legal-political discourse from conditions of universality and reciprocity. While this view is controversial—it seems to deny the sense of Bildung Kant maintains regarding the Enlightenment in favour of a more procedural accounting of rights—it does seem to me to fairly represent at least part of what Kant is trying to get at.

formation of a disposition to self-restraint in the face of ceaseless un-moral incentives is no cause for the slackening of one's vigilance, as Kant makes clear in the *Religion* (R AA 06: 43-47). The citizens of a civil society, acting under a civil constitution will need an abundance of courage in the guise of self-constraint to enact the conditions of *Recht*.

This raises the thorny issue of the role of the *Gelehrten* under such a constitution. We have seen that scholars are to be granted the right to publicize their disagreements with the sovereign. There is suspicion, however, that the *Gelehrten* belong to a distinct social class and/or require a specific and even elite education. Foster's paper trades on this suspicion, as does Piché's in suggesting an aristocracy of the enlightened. If this is the case, it augurs against the 'minimal' Enlightenment endorsed by Fleischacker. Fleischacker's 'minimal' Enlightenment concerns the scope of freedom of speech as well as the responsibility of and for, thinking.<sup>5</sup> However, if there are two or more classes of peoples in Kant's Enlightenment, and the only 'public' that is granted access to the presses ("scholarship") is the *Gelehrten*, only the *Gelehrten* will be able to challenge the sovereign. And this serves to curb the reach of any 'minimal' program of Enlightenment speech and thought.

Another way to put the point is to suggest that restricting the freedom of the press to the *Gelehrten* is tantamount to endorsing a 'maximal' program of Enlightenment. I think both Foster and Piché are suggesting Kant moves in this direction. Even if we set aside the hermeneutics of suspicion regarding Kant's intention with respect to the *Gelehrten*, there remains the larger and ever-looming concern of humankind's need for a master—a concern that seems to me to push Kant even further in the direction of a 'maximal' Enlightenment. This is a concern unlikely to resolve itself in the near future. And therefore we must, if we agree with Kant, accept that a master to rule over humankind must be our fate.<sup>6</sup> Our need for leadership in the face of an imperfect civil constitution and the ongoing struggle to obtain and maintain a good will necessitate this because our tendency to self-love and self-deception is built into to what it means to be a rational animal. While a 'minimal' Enlightenment can likely operate with a sovereign that allows expansive freedoms (especially freedom of speech), a 'maximal' Enlightenment will place restrictions on these in the name of maintaining civil order and the rule of law until such time as a civil constitution is enacted in practice and the rule of law takes its place in the hearts of humankind.

A 'maximal' Enlightenment need not accept Piché's premise that an aristocracy of *Gelehrten* has and should have the only access to freedom of the press. I do not think he meant to endorse this, as seems sufficiently clear in his (later) essay on Theory and Practice, where Kant makes it abundantly clear that "freedom of the pen" belongs to the

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<sup>5</sup> Fleischacker brings this out with particular clarity in the final chapter of his book, *What is Enlightenment?* See Samuel Fleischacker, *What is Enlightenment?* New York: Routledge, 2013.

<sup>6</sup> At least in the short-to-intermediate term. Regardless of Kant's gesture towards a less rhetorically hierarchical ordering of the human species in the *Doctrine of Right*, it is the case that here he is unequivocal.



“peoples” and not simply a distinguished social or learned class (TP AA 08: 304). But it does, I think, require us to extend beyond the reach of the Enlightenment that Fleischacker wants to say stops at the borders of censorship. A master has the right to dictate what speech is permitted and what denied through a civil constitution. Does this restrict the “freedom of the pen?” No. It doesn’t restrict this freedom, as it nowhere inhibits or implies the inhibition of scholarship; rather it provides penalties to those that contravene the sovereign. In a ‘maximal’ Enlightenment of the sort Kant lays out in “Idea for a Universal History,” the sovereign through the civil constitution has the wherewithal to lead.

The example I want us to think about is that of hate speech codes. Fleischacker discusses these most fully in *What is Enlightenment?* There, the argument turns on the assumption that obstruction to access of speech or works results in a net restriction of free speech. So, if restriction of free speech (say, restriction of sexist posters in the workplace) takes place, there will be a “burden on whoever imposes that restriction to create other spaces where the restriction is lifted.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, a corresponding obligation is owed to those whose free speech is restricted--an obligation that must be carried out by the sovereign under the civil constitution. But this is not the ‘minimal’ Enlightenment towards which Fleischacker gestures; it is ‘maximal.’ And it is ‘maximal’ because the civil constitution works through a sovereign--a civil constitution works through a master.<sup>8</sup>

### 3. Autonomy, Subjectivity, and “Freedom of the Pen”.

The upshot of the pressing need for sovereign leadership is we cannot understand Kant’s discussion of public and private, nor his insistence on having the courage of our convictions, apart from his concern that the human species requires a master. This is a historical condition to be sure; but it is also a universal condition of the human species. It is a condition involving more than the merely empirical situation we find ourselves in, for it involves and invokes *Recht*. The very possibility of a perfect civil constitution hangs on lawful internal relations within states and external relations between states (IAG AA 08: 24-25). And this is a condition of Public and Cosmopolitan Right (RL AA 06: 318-320; 352-353). We would do well to heed Kant’s words regarding an inquiry into the nature of the sovereign, here: once the issue of the General Will (civil constitution) is settled, the proper activity the people are to undertake is obedience (RL AA 06: 318-319). “Freedom of the pen” must be understood in the context of this claim.

<sup>7</sup> Fleischacker, *What is Enlightenment?*, p. 178.

<sup>8</sup>Of course, Kant allows for the civil constitution itself to be the sovereign—the master. This is what ideally takes place in a full-fledged republic. However, as Kant makes clear in “Idea for a Universal History,” humankind is not yet ready for this. There will, one hopes, come a time when a fully enacted civil constitution operates *as* sovereign, but that time had not yet come for Kant. And judging by the shenanigans (Donald Trump is a front-runner in the race leading to President of the United States of America at the time this is written) in the leadership of many liberal-democratic nations, it still hasn’t come.

The question remains: does this ‘maximal’ Enlightenment demand infringe on the autonomy and subjectivity of the person, as Rajiva worries? I answer, no. It does not because, to best operate, autonomy and subjectivity must function under conditions of *Recht*, which is a Categorical Imperative (RL AA 06: 6: 230-231). Indeed, autonomy and subjectivity are possible *only under the Law*, and the Law is *Recht*. Autonomy and subjectivity will require the practice of “freedom of the pen,” but this requires more than simply enlightened scholarship. The hard business demanded of us is to strive for a “perfect” civil constitution and to practice this constitution (likely through judicial cases, though Kant does not say in the context of “Idea for a Universal History”), together with accepting this constitution into our wills (IAG AA 08: 23) and in so doing, making the constitution and the laws enshrined therein the principle of our maxims. When we have such a constitution, and we incorporate that constitution into our wills, then and only then we will have the master that will bring the human species to its perfection.

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**Renovando el canon filosófico.**

**Schiller antes, después y más allá de Kant**

*Renewing the Philosophical Canon.*

*Schiller Before, After and Beyond Kant*

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**Resumen**

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) es uno de esos autores que puede ser abordado tanto desde la perspectiva literaria como desde la filosófica. Dada la diversidad de sus obras, que comprenden poemas, novelas, así como diálogos y ensayos filosóficos, siempre ha constituido un desafío para las distinciones entre disciplinas, haciendo surgir inevitables dificultades metodológicas. Incluso su presencia en el canon aún suscita controversias entre los estudiosos: mientras que su papel como poeta destacado en la Ilustración tardía y el clasicismo weimariano está con justicia fuera de toda duda, Schiller ha sido en cambio considerado o bien como un mero filósofo aficionado, completamente deudor de Kant, o bien como un pensador independiente enfrentado a Kant; estas dos consideraciones han conducido obviamente a diferentes visiones sobre su posición en el interior del canon. En ambos casos, de todos modos, las únicas obras que se han tomado en consideración son las que se refieren al pensamiento kantiano, compuestas y publicadas por Schiller en la década de 1790. Por esta razón, ha ganado peso la creencia de que Schiller como filósofo sólo existe gracias a Kant. El propósito de este artículo es poner en duda esta tesis mostrando la profundidad de la filosofía schilleriana de juventud, así como apuntando a la continuidad de sus intereses antes, después y más allá de Kant.

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## Palabras Clave

Schiller; Kant; Ilustración; sentido moral; egoísmo

## Abstract

Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) belongs to that category of authors which can be approached from both a literary and a philosophical angle. His work consists of poetry and novels, but also philosophical dialogues and essays, and his range has always challenged disciplinary distinctions, thus necessarily raising methodological issues. Scholars have yet to agree upon his position within the canon: whereas his role as a leading poet in the late Enlightenment and Weimar Classicism is justly undisputed, his inclusion in the philosophical canon requires a great deal more investigation. Schiller has variously been viewed as a mere philosophical dilettante who owes everything to Kant, or as an independent thinker who challenges Kant on equal terms, and these two different attitudes have obviously led to similarly different views on his role in the canon. Be that as it may, the only writings of his to have received scholarly attention are those relating to Kant's work, which he composed and published in the 1790s. Hence the conviction that Schiller as a philosopher exists only in virtue of Kant. The aim of this paper is to question this thesis by showing the depth of Schiller's early philosophy and pointing to the continuity of his concerns before, after and beyond Kant.

## Key words

Schiller; Kant; Enlightenment; Moral sense; Egoism

## 1. Introducción

La pertenencia de Friedrich Schiller (1759-1805) al canon filosófico es una cuestión controvertida y, precisamente por ello, siempre actual. Poeta y médico, dramaturgo e historiador, Schiller no se ajusta a los normales límites entre las disciplinas en muchos sentidos, y representa justamente por ello un desafío y al mismo tiempo un estímulo para los estudiosos de su obra. Su talla intelectual no está en discusión y tampoco lo está su contribución a la cultura posterior, y no sólo la alemana: desde la *Novena Sinfonía* de Beethoven hasta las óperas de Verdi, el impacto de Schiller sobrepasa con mucho la literatura hasta influir en la música sinfónica, la lírica y, más recientemente, la misma identidad europea. A pesar de ello, paradójicamente, la posición de Schiller en el panorama más específicamente filosófico, desde su época hasta nuestros días, no ha sido definida aún de manera unívoca, hasta el punto de que todo análisis estrictamente filosófico de su obra necesita todavía hoy una justificación preliminar; en efecto, a menudo esos análisis son introducidos por capítulos metodológicos y/o historiográficos en los que se exponen las razones teóricas y/o históricas que legitiman dicho enfoque filosófico.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sirva como ejemplo por encima de todos: Beiser 2005, pp. 7-10 (*Schiller's Status as Philosopher*).

A pesar de esta situación de incertidumbre, es posible de todos modos rastrear un elemento común, una toma de conciencia compartida que funciona como un supuesto tácito de ambas perspectivas en liza: tanto si se sostiene que fue un pensador completo a todos los efectos como si se defiende que no fue más allá del simple diletantismo filosófico de un poeta y literato, lo que todos comparten es que Schiller no se adentró en las tierras desconocidas del saber teórico antes de haber leído a Kant, auténtico artífice del “cambio de rumbo disciplinar” acontecido en la actividad intelectual de Schiller en la primera mitad de la década de 1790. Por tanto, los debates acerca de la pertenencia o no de Schiller al canon filosófico se han centrado en su interpretación del sistema crítico, en su adhesión a la teoría kantiana o en la pertinencia de sus críticas.<sup>2</sup> Sin embargo, ha faltado por completo una atención programática sobre la producción, tanto literaria como ensayística, del joven Schiller. Las escasas referencias a los escritos de la década de 1780 se han limitado por lo general a dar por hecho la total dependencia de Schiller hacia el contexto de la Ilustración tardía alemana, reduciendo de esta forma sus tesis a la influencia de figuras más conocidas, y ya unánimemente aceptadas en el canon filosófico, como Christian Garve o Moses Mendelssohn.<sup>3</sup> Sin embargo, recientemente se ha producido un aumento significativo de estudios en los que el joven Schiller es definido como un «visionario» y sus tesis como una «anticipación» de desarrollos posteriores en ámbito jurídico y político no sólo de obras del propio Schiller, sino también de desarrollos posteriores en su época, e incluso en la nuestra;<sup>4</sup> por lo que respecta al ámbito filosófico, se ha hablado específicamente de «notables coincidencias» entre la producción juvenil y la madura,<sup>5</sup> y de un Schiller que «se anticipa y al mismo tiempo se adelanta a Kant», enterrando el tópico generalizado según el cual la lectura de las obras kantianas habría constituido el «momento cero» de su evolución intelectual.<sup>6</sup> Yo misma he tenido ocasión de hablar de Schiller, o mejor, del joven Schiller, como un «kantiano *ante litteram*».<sup>7</sup>

Es decir, estamos ante una auténtica revolución historiográfica.<sup>8</sup> Y sin embargo, paradójicamente, este viraje parece haber sido puesto en marcha y percibido sólo en el ámbito de la filología alemana, disciplina a la que, en el fondo, pertenecen (casi) todas las contribuciones en este sentido. Entre los historiadores de la filosofía sigue siendo todavía válido, a pesar de todo, el viejo cuento de un Schiller introducido en los misterios del pensamiento por Kant, y deudor de todas las consideraciones teóricas presentes en sus escritos estéticos de la década de 1790. Ni siquiera Frederick Beiser, autor de una monografía en muchos sentidos revolucionaria, aparecida en 2005, ha conseguido salirse de esta senda. Aun partiendo de la convicción de tener que rehabilitar a Schiller frente al manido cliché del poeta carente de la coherencia y competencia propias de todo verdadero filósofo, Beiser no se ha atrevido a mover el foco de su investigación hacia la producción

<sup>2</sup> Véase a este respecto: Sharpe 1995.

<sup>3</sup> Una vez más, Beiser constituye un ejemplo emblemático: Beiser 2005, pp. 14-37.

<sup>4</sup> Nilges 2012, pp. 11, 83, 129, 137, 153, 159; Schings 2012, p. 68.

<sup>5</sup> High 2004, p. iii.

<sup>6</sup> Robert 2011a, pp. 22, 421.

<sup>7</sup> Macor 2011.

<sup>8</sup> Cfr. Rocco Lozano 2009.

juvenil de Schiller, que en teoría sería la única que podría confirmar la presencia efectiva de las citadas (y supuestas) cualidades de auténtico filósofo; limitarse a reconocerlas, como hace Beiser, sólo después de la lectura de las obras kantianas, no hace sino confirmar, aunque sin duda de manera más refinada y en este caso más original, la antigua imagen del filósofo “por reacción”. De hecho, no es casual que Beiser presente el estudio schilleriano de Kant como una auténtica «revolución de su pensamiento moral», que lo habría alejado del contexto de Ilustración tardía de sus primeros escritos y arrojado a un horizonte completamente nuevo, transformando asimismo su visión general del mundo en un sentido «no metafísico».<sup>9</sup>

El énfasis que Beiser pone en la centralidad de la dimensión ética, así como la alusión a la dirección progresiva e irreversiblemente no metafísica de la reflexión schilleriana, deben ser vistos indudablemente como un avance, dado que ambos aspectos representan elementos teóricos novedosos sin los que no es posible comprender el pensamiento de Schiller en su globalidad, esto es, en la totalidad de sus fases. Atribuir a la lectura de Kant estas dos adquisiciones, sin embargo, implica repetir una vez más la tesis de la pasividad de un Schiller que, aunque sí tendría sus propios recursos y competencias, seguiría dependiendo de tesis e ideas ajenas.

A lo largo de esta investigación intentaré sin embargo mostrar hasta qué punto también el joven Schiller, esto es, el Schiller antes de las lecturas kantianas, revela una madurez y una autonomía tan notables en su reelaboración de las influencias intelectuales procedentes del amplio contexto ilustrado que deberían hacer replantearnos su deuda hacia Kant y, sobre todo, su puesto en el interior del canon filosófico.

## 2. Schiller antes de Kant

Schiller se estrenó muy pronto en el estudio de la filosofía. Fue admitido en enero de 1773 en la *Karlsschule*, una institución militar que habría de evolucionar hasta convertirse en universidad; situada primero en Ludwigsburg, traslada más adelante a Stuttgart, Schiller asistió en su seno desde el principio a las clases de filosofía.<sup>10</sup> Entre 1773 y 1780, año en que termina sus estudios y se gradúa en el colegio, Schiller cursó clases de lógica, metafísica, moral, estética, psicología e historia de la filosofía, mostrando un creciente interés hacia las materias tratadas en clase y llegando hasta el punto de asistir a una asignatura de filosofía en su último año, aunque no estuviera obligado a ello. Forzado en un principio a seguir un *curriculum* de derecho,<sup>11</sup> Schiller aprovecha una ampliación de la oferta académica llevada a cabo en 1775 para pasarse en 1776 al nuevo itinerario en medicina,<sup>12</sup> a lo que contribuyó también el escaso éxito obtenido hasta entonces en las

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<sup>9</sup> Beiser 2005, pp. 44-45.

<sup>10</sup> Para una introducción a la historia de la *Karlsschule* véase: Riedel 1995, pp. 389-401.

<sup>11</sup> Acerca de la educación jurídica recibida entre 1774 y 1775, así como sus repercusiones en la posterior producción literaria, incluso tardía, remito a Nilges 2012; Foi 2013.

<sup>12</sup> Sobre la formación médica de Schiller existen hoy en día numerosas contribuciones, aunque siguen siendo cruciales las investigaciones de Dewhurst/Reeves 1978; Riedel 1985.

asignaturas jurídicas, pero también la convicción de que la poesía, ya desde entonces su mayor pasión, podría beneficiarse del estudio de la naturaleza humana.<sup>13</sup> En este viraje curricular la enseñanza de la filosofía fue en cambio una constante.

A lo largo de ocho años, por tanto, Schiller aprende disciplinas aparentemente muy distantes entre sí, adquiriendo competencias y habilidades que no se perdieron en absoluto en su posterior recorrido literario. Al revés, muchos aspectos, incluso quizás los más relevantes e innovadores de su producción teatral y poética posterior, serían incomprensibles si no se tuviera en cuenta la educación recibida en la *Karlsschule* y los aprendizajes en las asignaturas principales, esto es, antes derecho y después medicina, pero también en esas materias que hoy llamaríamos “propedéuticas”. Este era el caso de la filosofía, que en la *Karlsschule* era obligatoria, con muchas horas semanales, para los estudiantes de todos los itinerarios, por lo que terminaba por jugar un papel que, más que propedéutico, sería más correcto definir como fundamental.<sup>14</sup>

Los profesores a los que Schiller tuvo en este ámbito fueron cuatro: Johann Friedrich Jahn (1728-1800), que anteriormente había tenido a Schiller como alumno en la *Lateinschule* de Ludwigsburg, y que entre 1773 y 1774 lo introduce en la filosofía; August Friedrich Bök (1739-1815), que forma parte del claustro de la *Karlsschule* sólo durante 1775 para volver después a la Universidad de Tubinga como catedrático de filosofía práctica, retórica y poesía a partir de comienzos de 1776; Jakob Friedrich Abel (1751-1829), que tiene a su cargo la clase de Schiller entre 1776 y 1777; y por último Johann Christoph Schwab (1743-1821), que parece que tuvo a Schiller entre sus alumnos en el año 1779. En 1778 los estudiantes de medicina no recibieron ninguna enseñanza filosófica, mientras que en 1780, como ya se ha dicho, Schiller decide de manera autónoma y sin ninguna obligación curricular cursar otra asignatura de filosofía, impartida por Abel. Y no es una casualidad. En efecto, Abel era «el profesor más amado por los alumnos»,<sup>15</sup> y Schiller entabló con él, que era sólo ocho años mayor, una relación muy estrecha que lo habría llevado en poco tiempo a ser su amigo y colaborador.

Se ha subrayado a menudo que Schiller no fue un alumno entregado en cuerpo y alma a los estudios: en 1775 repite derecho romano y derecho natural porque sus resultados no son considerados suficientes por su profesor, Johann Georg Friedrich Heyd,<sup>16</sup> lo que provoca que a finales de año aproveche la ocasión que se le presenta para pasarse al itinerario de medicina. En el mismo año 1775, Bök propone a Schiller como participante activo de la discusión pública de noviembre-diciembre, que marcaba el final del curso académico y al mismo tiempo determinaba la evaluación final; sin embargo, en las actas finales no aparece su nombre, muy probablemente a causa de la opinión contraria del duque, quizás no muy impresionado por el rendimiento del estudiante;<sup>17</sup> en 1776 y en 1777, Schiller sí aparece entre los estudiantes que participan en el debate relacionado con las asignaturas de Abel,

<sup>13</sup> Cfr. Hecker/Petersen 1904, p. 136; Hoven 1984, p. 53.

<sup>14</sup> Acerca del papel de la filosofía en la *Karlsschule*, con una especial aunque no exclusiva atención a Jakob Friedrich Abel, véase Riedel 1995.

<sup>15</sup> Hoven 1984, p. 45.

<sup>16</sup> Cfr. Nilges 2012, p. 53.

<sup>17</sup> Cfr. Buchwald 1936/37, p. 66.

pero en un catálogo manuscrito, redactado al final de los exámenes, no figura entre los alumnos destacados en asignaturas filosóficas, mientras que se cita a varios de sus compañeros;<sup>18</sup> entre 1779 y 1780, finalmente, Schiller presenta no una sino dos disertaciones finales para obtener el diploma en medicina, pero se le obliga a redactar otra más para poder graduarse definitivamente en la *Karlsschule*.

Podría parecer por tanto que Schiller no se dedicó mucho a su formación y a la adquisición de competencias específicas. Sin embargo, existe otra cara de la moneda, obviamente la más importante. Si permanecemos en el ámbito exclusivo de las asignaturas filosóficas, las palabras de Abel testimonian el esfuerzo, la asiduidad y la agudeza de Schiller. Abel señala en efecto que a Schiller le apasionaban especialmente la «psicología, la estética, la historia de la humanidad y la ética», que «no sólo escuchaba muy atentamente» en clase, sino que además leía de manera autónoma «los mejores escritos al respecto» y, «en cuanto se le presentaba la ocasión, se entretenía hablando sobre estos» asuntos con compañeros y profesores.<sup>19</sup> La ética parece haber interesado especialmente a Schiller que, en verano de 1780, cuando debía proponer temas para la tercera disertación, sugiere entre otros el título *Ueber die Freiheit und Moralität des Menschen*, el cual, sin embargo, a causa del desequilibrio hacia la filosofía, excesivo para un diploma en medicina, no será el tema del trabajo efectivamente presentado ante el tribunal académico. Lo que cuenta para nosotros es, sin embargo, no sólo la declaración de intenciones, sino también las motivaciones aducidas por Schiller para elegir el tema, que en su opinión habría estado entre los principales problemas estudiados durante ese año (NA XXI, p. 124). Por tanto, en su último año en la *Karlsschule* – un año en el que, es preciso recordarlo una vez más, cursa sin estar obligado a ello una asignatura de Abel – Schiller, exestudiante de derecho y aspirante al título en medicina, se interesa fundamentalmente por el problema de la libertad y la moralidad del hombre.

Las concepciones con las que Schiller había entrado en contacto en los años anteriores, sobre todo gracias a Abel, y que representan por tanto el fundamento de su explícito interés por los temas éticos, hunden sus raíces en la Ilustración europea y, concretamente, reflejan en este contexto las posturas de la Ilustración alemana. En el marco de un campo de fuerzas en el que los papeles preponderantes eran los de Inglaterra y Francia, los intelectuales alemanes se alinearon con el bando anglófilo y frente a los franceses, acogiendo la tradición anglo-escocesa del *moral sense* y rechazando el egoísmo de raigambre materialista: las referencias positivas son por tanto Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume y Ferguson, mientras que los blancos polémicos serían principalmente Le Mettrie e Helvétius.<sup>20</sup> Frente a la provocación materialista de una moral torpemente destinada a ocultar los intereses escondidos en toda acción y en todo proyecto humanos, se contraponen la insistencia anglo-escocesa en las inclinaciones altruistas activas de manera espontánea

<sup>18</sup> Cfr. *ibidem*, p. 71.

<sup>19</sup> Hecker/Petersen 1904, p. 101.

<sup>20</sup> Profundizar en todo este contexto requeriría un análisis que sobrepasa los límites de la presente contribución; permítaseme sin embargo remitir a algunas de las investigaciones más recientes sobre el tema: Krebs 2006; Dehrmann 2008; Stachel 2011.



en el hombre, que son llamadas según el contexto y el autor como *moral sense*, *benevolence* o *sympathy*.<sup>21</sup> En los territorios alemanes estas tesis empiezan a difundirse en la década de 1740 y ganan progresivamente terreno. Se trata de una región fronteriza entre la ética y la religión. El “sentido moral” (o “benevolencia” o “simpatía”), a menudo traducido en alemán como *moralischer Sinn*, *Wohlwollen* o *Sympathie*, llega a ser una palabra clave no sólo en el ámbito moral, sino también en el teológico, dado que es presentado como la voz divina en el interior del hombre, que es conducido de esta manera a la virtud y, por consiguiente, a la inmortalidad entendida como continuo e infinito perfeccionamiento.<sup>22</sup>

Estas tesis constituían el patrimonio común de la reflexión de Siglo XVIII tardío, y eran sostenidas con convicción no sólo por Abel, el profesor preferido por Schiller y con el que estuvo durante más tiempo en contacto, sino también por la mayor parte de los intelectuales del tiempo. Schiller se adueña en todo caso del léxico de Abel quien, más que de “sentido moral”, habla de “amor” (*Liebe*) y “benevolencia” (*Wohlwollen*).<sup>23</sup> El primer párrafo de la primera disertación médica, rechazada en 1779 por el claustro de la Academia y titulada *Philosophie der Physiologie*, muestra de manera clara la unión entre la moral sentimental de raigambre anglo-escocesa y una perspectiva religioso-metafísica.

### 2.1. El destino del hombre [*Bestimmung des Menschen*]

«Antes o después se demostrará con una certeza razonable, creo yo, que el universo es obra de un entendimiento infinito y que está concebido en base a un designio excelente.

[...] el hombre existe para emular la grandeza de su creador y para abrazar el mundo con la misma mirada con la que él lo abraza – la semejanza a Dios es el destino del hombre [*die Bestimmung des Menschen*]. Infinito, ciertamente, es este ideal suyo, pero el espíritu es eterno. La eternidad es la medida de la infinitud, esto es, él crecerá hacia el infinito, sin alcanzarlo jamás.

[...] Pero otra ley, tan bella y sabia [...] ha conectado la perfección del todo con la felicidad del individuo, a los hombres con los hombres e incluso con los animales, mediante el vínculo del amor universal. El amor es, por tanto, el impulso más bello y noble del alma humana, la gran cadena de la naturaleza sintiente, que no es otra cosa que el intercambio de mí mismo con el ser del prójimo. [...]

¿Y para qué el amor universal, para qué todos los placeres del amor universal? Sólo en virtud de esta intención universal y última, para favorecer la perfección del prójimo. Y

<sup>21</sup> Cfr. Turco 1999.

<sup>22</sup> El autor de referencia es aquí Johann Joachim Spalding, al que hay que reconocer el mérito de haber introducido a Shaftesbury en los territorios alemanes y haberlo convertido en fundamento de una nueva visión teológica y religiosa (sobre este punto véase: Dehrmann 2008, pp. 130-155; Macor 2013, pp. 79-84). En la introducción a su edición alemana (1747) de la *Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit*, Spalding sitúa en la «sensación moral [*moralische Empfindung*]» inaugurada por Shaftesbury la fuente de la virtud, y se muestra disponible a aceptar muchas de sus formulaciones: «Llámela como quiera, llámela sentido moral [*moralischer Sinn*], gusto moral [*moralischer Geschmack*], conciencia [*Gewissen*] o, si es usted lo bastante audaz para hacerlo, una luz interior [*ein innerliches Licht*]. Para mí no hay diferencias» (Spalding 1747, p. 177).

<sup>23</sup> Cfr. Riedel 1995, pp. 61-73, 436-438, 491-493.

esta perfección es visión global, investigación, admiración hacia el gran plan de la naturaleza [...]. Invariablemente esta verdad permanece igual a sí misma: el hombre está destinado a la contemplación, al estudio, a la admiración del gran plan de la naturaleza» (NA XX, pp. 10-12).

La utilización en este punto, e incluso en el título, del concepto de “destino del hombre” (*Bestimmung des Menschen*) es una prueba decisiva de la deuda de Schiller hacia la ética de su tiempo: introducido hacia la mitad de siglo por el teólogo Johann Joachim Spalding, esta noción se había vuelto más adelante la palabra clave del cruce entre dimensión metafísica y ética en la línea de la tradición del *moral sense* de procedencia anglo-escocesa.<sup>24</sup>

Otro pasaje, extraído de la novela inacabada *Philosophische Briefe*, publicada en 1786 pero probablemente redactada inmediatamente tras la educación recibida en la *Karlsschule*, confirma el entrelazamiento entre moral y metafísica en el pensamiento del joven Schiller.

«Desear la felicidad ajena es lo que llamamos benevolencia [*Wohllollen*], amor [*Liebe*]. [...] El amor – el fenómeno más bello de la creación animada, el imán omnipotente del mundo espiritual, la fuente de la devoción y de la virtud más sublime [...] El amor, por tanto, querido Raphael, es la escalera por la que nos encaminamos hacia la semejanza a Dios» (NA XX, pp. 119, 124).

Hasta aquí la *pars construens* de la filosofía del joven Schiller. Como suele ser habitual, hay sin embargo también una *pars destruens* que toma su blanco polémico del contexto de la Ilustración tardía, y que se lanza consiguientemente contra el materialismo de cuño francés. En el discurso escrito con ocasión del cumpleaños de Franziska von Hohenheim, *Die Tugend in ihren Folgen betrachtet* (1780), el «espíritu imperfecto de un *La Mettrie*» se define como una potencial semilla de corrupción para sus semejantes, cuyas «almas indefensas» podrían contagiarse del «dulce veneno» difundido por su «pecado» y encaminarse así «lejos de su alto destino [*hohe Bestimmung*] hacia la antigua oscuridad bárbara del animal estado salvaje» (NA XX, p. 33).

Una vez más en los *Philosophische Briefe*, Schiller formula claramente la contraposición frontal entre amor y egoísmo, que no acepta compromisos, y la inserta en el contexto de su propio tiempo:

«La filosofía de nuestra época contradice – me temo – esta teoría [*sc.* del amor]. Muchas de nuestras cabezas pensantes han creído poder ahuyentar gozosamente este impulso

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<sup>24</sup> En 1747, una vez más en la introducción de su traducción alemana de la *Inquiry concerning Virtue, or Merit* de Shaftesbury, Spalding identifica en «nuestro destino [*Bestimmung*]» lo que «debemos o no debemos ser», lo que «nos es tan querido» y a lo que estamos conducidos por el sentimiento moral «de modo mucho más rápido» con respecto a la «senda cansada y aburrida de las conclusiones racionales» (Spalding 1747, p. 177). Acerca del concepto de *Bestimmung des Menschen* véase Brandt 2007; Tippmann 2011; Macor 2013. Sobre el papel de Spalding en la introducción de la filosofía moral anglo-escocesa en la cultura alemana, cfr. *supra*, nota 22.

divino [*sc.* el amor] del alma humana, borrar la huella de la divinidad y disolver este noble entusiasmo en el frío aliento mortífero de una mezquina indiferencia. En el sentimiento servil de la degradación de uno mismo se han aliado con el más peligroso de los enemigos de la benevolencia [*Wohlwollen*], el egoísmo [*Eigennuz*], con el fin de explicar un fenómeno que era demasiado divino para sus corazones limitados. De un mísero egoísmo [*Egoismus*] han extraído su doctrina descorazonadora, y han hecho de su limitación la única unidad de medida del creador – esclavos degenerados, que en el fragor de sus cadenas gritan contra la libertad [...] estos peligrosos pensadores [...] con gran derroche de inteligencia y genialidad embellecen el egoísmo y lo ennoblecen, convirtiéndolo en sistema.

[...]

Yo declaro abiertamente que creo en la existencia de un amor no egoísta. Estoy perdido si no existe, renuncio a la divinidad, a la inmortalidad y a la virtud. No me queda prueba alguna de que pueda confiar en ellas si dejo de creer en el amor» (NA XX, pp. 121-122).

Estas son las posiciones con las que Schiller, como alumno de la *Karlsschule*, entra en contacto y de las que se apropia: amor, Dios e inmortalidad, es decir, ética y religión están íntimamente conectadas y cualquier infiltración del materialismo debe ser duramente combatida, dado que puede ser una potencial semilla de destrucción para todos estos supuestos. A primera vista, la antigua historieta de un joven Schiller adhiriendo completamente a las posiciones de la Ilustración tardía y en absoluto preocupado por problematizarlas no parecería tan errónea. *A primera vista*, justamente. ¿Pero qué es lo que cambia en el Schiller lector de Kant? ¿Qué pasa cuando el ex alumno de la Academia, empapado en *moral sense* y tesis metafísico-religiosas, entra en contacto con la drástica reducción de las facultades cognoscitivas del ser humano y con la fundamentación trascendental de la moral que instaura el criticismo?

### 3. Schiller después de Kant

Schiller empieza a leer a Kant durante el verano de 1787, cuando se acerca a los escritos menores aparecidos en la *Berlinische Monatsschrift* entre 1784 y, precisamente, 1787, como la *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* y el célebre ensayo *Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?*.<sup>25</sup> La aproximación a las tres *Kritiken* se pospone hasta comienzos de 1791, cuando Schiller anuncia no sin cierto orgullo a su amigo, el ferviente kantiano Christian Gottfried Körner, que se ha hecho con una *Kritik der Urteilskraft* y que le ha apasionado tanto que siente una urgencia teórica de profundizar en el estudio de todo el sistema (NA XXVI, pp. 77-78). No es casual que, a finales del mismo año, Schiller encargue un ejemplar de la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (NA XXVI, p. 112), de la *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (NA XXVI, 119), y, en muy poco tiempo, su propósito se haya vuelto el de «no abandonar la filosofía kantiana antes de haberla desmenuzado del todo, aunque ello tenga que llevar[me] tres años» (NA XXVI, p.

<sup>25</sup> Para un análisis del primer acercamiento de Schiller a Kant cfr. Macor 2010, pp. 129-150.

127), una previsión que Schiller respeta casi matemáticamente hasta el 17 de diciembre de 1795, cuando le comunica a Goethe que ha llegado el momento de cerrar su «barraca filosófica [*philosophische Bude*]» (NA XXVIII, p. 132).

En sus obras Kant profundiza en el mismo núcleo teórico por el que también el joven Schiller se había interesado, esto es, las relaciones entre religión y metafísica, moral y sentimiento, y lo hace confrontándose con las mismas tradiciones filosóficas y con los mismos autores que habían guiado la formación del entonces aspirante a médico.

La crítica a los materialistas franceses es inapelable también para Kant:

«El sistema del egoísmo [*Selbstliebe*] muestra que toda evaluación moral juzga la prudencia [*Klugheit*] conforme a la cual nosotros satisfacemos nuestras inclinaciones. Cuanto más largamente satisfacemos nuestras inclinaciones, tanto más seguimos las leyes morales – este es el núcleo del egoísmo y, en épocas más recientes, del sistema de Helvétius y La Mettrie. [...] Helvétius no dice sólo que los hombres son egoístas, sino también que sin ese egoísmo no estarían capacitados para producir una acción moral. Reducir la moralidad a principios tan burdos es sin embargo reprobable» (V-PP/Powalski, AA 27, pp. 106-107).

Por lo que respecta a la *pars destruens*, evidentemente, existe una identidad de perspectiva entre el Schiller alumno de la *Karlsschule* y Kant. Si nos desplazamos a la *pars construens*, sin embargo, parece haber una fuerte divergencia: según Kant, de hecho, la perspectiva religiosa, más o menos ligada al sentimentalismo de raigambre anglo-escocesa (Kant asigna a la tradición wolffiana un papel central que no tiene en Schiller),<sup>26</sup> no se distingue en el fondo de la materialista, en el sentido de que ambas son generadas por el egoísmo. Hacer el bien porque se espera cualquier tipo de recompensa no en la tierra, sino en el más allá, no vuelve la buena acción menos egoísta (cfr. KpV, AA 05, p. 36), y también «el sentimiento moral, este pretendido sentido especial», concede, es verdad, «a la virtud el honor de atribuirle *inmediatamente* la complacencia y la alta estima hacia ella», pero se limita sólo a no «echarle en cara, por así decirlo, que lo que nos ata a ella no es su belleza, sino nuestro beneficio» (GMS, AA 04, pp. 442-443). A pesar de su convicción de tener que rechazar el desafío materialista, los filósofos de la Ilustración tardía no habrían sabido, en realidad, estar a la altura de ese desafío, porque habrían terminado por dejarse contaminar por el enemigo, alojándolo de incógnito en sus sistemas.

«Sólo hay que examinar los ensayos sobre la moralidad [...], y enseguida se encontrará una mezcla portentosa, sea el destino específico de la naturaleza humana [*die besondere Bestimmung der menschlichen Natur*] (y junto con ella la idea de una naturaleza racional general), sea la perfección, sea la felicidad, aquí el sentimiento moral, allá el temor de

<sup>26</sup> Sobre la filosofía moral de Kant y sus fuentes, tanto respecto a la vertiente anglo-escocesa como a la wolffiana, existen hoy en día numerosísimos estudios, entre los que cabe remitir a algunos de entre los más relevantes: Schneewind 1992; Schwaiger 1999; Wood 2008; Sánchez Madrid 2013; Sensen 2013. Schwaiger 2013 (pp. 136-139) ha reivindicado justamente el papel jugado por Baumgarten en la reflexión sobre el egoísmo moral.

dios, un poco de esto y de lo otro ...» (GMS, AA 04, p. 410).

Es preciso notar, obviamente, la vuelta del concepto de *Bestimmung des Menschen*, que Kant aquí critica exactamente en la versión de la que Schiller se había apropiado en la época de la *Karlsschule*, pero que – hay que recordarlo – el mismo Kant retoma de manera positiva y transforma tanto en el ámbito de la filosofía moral como en el de la filosofía de la historia.<sup>27</sup>

Una única «fuente» subyace a «*todos [estos] principios espurios de la moralidad*», esto es, la «heteronomía de la voluntad», que tiene lugar cuando el hombre sigue imperativos hipotéticos: «*debo hacer algo, porque quiero otra cosa*», y no el imperativo categórico: «yo debo actuar de esta o de la otra manera, aunque no quiera nada ulterior» (GMS, AA 04, p. 441).

De esta crítica no se libra, como ya ha sido mencionado, la ética del sentimiento moral, hasta el punto de que incluso el filántropo no puede evitar la sospecha de egoísmo en su acción:

Ser benéficos, cuando se puede, es un deber, y además hay algunas almas tan propensas a la participación que, aun sin un motivo ulterior que derive de la vanidad o del interés, sienten una íntima satisfacción en la difusión de la alegría a su alrededor, y saben gozar del contento ajeno, si éste es obra suya. Sin embargo afirmo que una acción semejante, por muy conforme al deber, por muy amable que sea, no tiene valor moral alguno, y que más bien se une con otras inclinaciones, como por ejemplo la inclinación al honor, que cuando afortunadamente se dirige hacia lo que constituye la utilidad general y es conforme al deber, y por lo tanto es digno de honor, merece elogios y ánimos, pero no admiración; en efecto, esa acción carece de contenido moral, esto es, del cumplimiento de la acción no por inclinación, sino por *deber*. Imaginemos de hecho que el ánimo de este filántropo [*Menschenfreund*] estuviera ennegrecido por un dolor propio que apagase toda participación en el destino ajeno, y que siguiera teniendo la posibilidad de ayudar a otros menesterosos, pero que la pena ajena no lo conmoviera ya porque está demasiado ocupado con la propia, y ahora que ninguna inclinación le lleva a hacerlo, se despojase de esa mortal insensibilidad y llevase a cabo la acción sin inclinación alguna, sólo por deber: entonces esa acción tendría verdaderamente un auténtico valor moral por sí misma (GMS, AA 04, p. 398).

La conclusión es célebre:

Ahora bien, si es preciso que una acción llevada a cabo por deber prescinda enteramente del influjo de la inclinación y por ende de todo objeto de la voluntad, no queda nada que pueda determinar la voluntad sino, objetivamente, la *ley [das Gesetz]* y, subjetivamente, el *puro respeto [die reine Achtung]* hacia esta ley práctica, y por lo tanto la máxima de seguir esta ley incluso en detrimento de mis propias inclinaciones (GMS, AA 04, pp. 400-401).

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<sup>27</sup> Sobre estas dos vertientes véase: Hinske 1994; Brandt 2007, pp. 57-60, 108-125, 180-221; Macor 2013, pp. 208-212, 248-267.

La lectura de estos pasajes deja una marca profunda en el pensamiento de Schiller, hasta el punto de que tanto en su epistolario como en los escritos publicados encontramos la imagen de un entusiasmo incondicionado hacia la filosofía kantiana. La fundación no religiosa de la moral y la motivación no sentimental de la acción son las dos teorías a las que Schiller adhiere con evidente convicción. En definitiva, lo que está en juego es precisamente el cruce entre ética y metafísica que había sido tan caro al alumno de la *Karlsschule*.

En febrero de 1793 Schiller escribe a Körner que la «razón práctica hace abstracción de todo conocimiento y que sólo tiene que ver con voliciones, con actos internos», y en este sentido la «[r]azón práctica y la volición únicamente por la razón son uno y lo mismo». La «forma de la razón práctica es la conexión directa de la voluntad con las representaciones de la razón», y prevé por tanto «la exclusión de toda motivación externa», dado que «una voluntad que no está determinada por la sola forma de la razón práctica está determinada externa, material, heterónomamente». «Acoger [...] la forma de la razón práctica significa por tanto tan sólo: no estar [...] determinado por el exterior sino sólo por sí mismo, autónomamente». La conclusión remite perfectamente a la “ortodoxia kantiana”: «Todos los actos morales son de este tipo», esto es, «son un producto de la voluntad pura, esto es, de la voluntad determinada por su sola forma y por lo tanto autónoma» (NA XXVI, p. 181). «Autodeterminación pura [*reine Selbstbestimmung*] en cuanto tal es por tanto la forma de la razón práctica», y por ello, «[c]uando actúa, un ente racional debe actuar por pura razón, si es preciso que muestre una autodeterminación pura» (NA XXVI, p. 182). En diciembre del mismo año, dirigiéndose a su mecenas, el Príncipe de Augustenburg, Schiller escribe una auténtica profesión de fe filosófica, pues se declara «totalmente kantiano en el punto principal de la doctrina moral», dado que, igual que Kant, considera «que sólo deben ser denominadas *morales* las acciones a las que estamos determinados exclusivamente por el respeto [*Achtung*] hacia la ley de la razón y no por impulsos [*Antriebe*], por muy refinados y convertidos en solemnes por cualquier denominación». Schiller se alinea sin reservas en el bando de los «más rígidos moralistas», con los que comparte la idea de que «la virtud debe reposar únicamente en sí misma y no debe referirse a ningún otro fin». Hay que reconocer como «bueno (según los principios kantianos que en este aspecto suscribo plenamente), [...] lo que acontece sólo porque es bueno» (NA XXVI, p. 322).<sup>28</sup>

Posicionamientos semejantes pueden encontrarse también en una gran cantidad de los denominados escritos estéticos, que en algunos casos retoman casi al pie de la letra las expresiones antes comentadas. En *Ueber Anmuth und Würde*, redactado y publicado en 1793, al «inmortal autor de la Crítica» se le reconoce el mérito de haber liberado la ética del eudemonismo imperante (NA XX, p. 282) y de haber sacado a la luz que «en la

<sup>28</sup> Las seis cartas al Príncipe de Augustenburg, escritas entre febrero y diciembre de 1793, nos han llegado únicamente a través de transcripciones y no enteramente (de la última sólo se conserva el comienzo); se trata de documentos decisivos y olvidados por los estudiosos, que afortunadamente recientemente se han vuelto a ocupar de ellas. Véase al respecto el amplio y revolucionario aporte de Riedel 2013.

actuación moral lo que cuenta no es la *conformidad* de las acciones *a la ley*, sino más bien tan sólo la *conformidad* de las intenciones *al deber*», razón por la que Kant «justamente no [...] atribuye importancia alguna a la observación según la cual suele ser más ventajoso para la primera si la inclinación está alineada con el deber» (NA XX, p. 283). En *Ueber die Gefahr ästhetischer Sitten*, publicado en 1795, pero redactado en 1793, el «respeto [*Achtung*] es un sentimiento que sólo puede experimentarse hacia la ley y para lo que le corresponda» y que «impone una obediencia absoluta» (NA XXI, p. 24), mientras que en *Ueber den moralischen Nutzen ästhetischer Sitten*, también escrito en 1793 pero reelaborado y entregado a la imprenta sólo tres años después, «la moralidad de una acción interna [depende] únicamente de la *determinación inmediata de la voluntad a través de la ley de la razón*», y no de sentimientos o sensaciones concomitantes (NA XXI, p. 29).<sup>29</sup> En 1794 Schiller condena abiertamente la virtud religiosa, «que cierra un trato con el creador y concede préstamos con intereses de buenas acciones», y afirma que «las virtudes que son ejercitadas exclusivamente a cambio de asegurarse bienes futuros no valen nada», porque «la virtud tiene una necesidad *interna*, que seguiría siendo válida aunque no hubiera otra vida», y «nuestros deberes morales no nos vinculan por contrato, sino de manera incondicionada» (NA XXII, p. 178).

Es fácil reconocer las influencias del pensamiento kantiano, que Schiller evidentemente abraza en su sentido fundamental: impulsos, sensaciones e inclinaciones no juegan ningún papel en la determinación de la carga moral de una acción, la propia felicidad está excluida del cálculo de opciones a elegir y el único móvil moral es el respeto (*Achtung*) hacia la ley. Como confirmación del completo acuerdo con Kant encontramos la crítica del Schiller lector de la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* y la *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* a la ética del «buen corazón [*gutes Herz*]», llamada también «*virtud del temperamento* [*Temperamentstugend*]»: ésta no tiene valor moral alguno, dado que presupone que la «inclinación» está «del lado de la justicia sólo porque afortunadamente la justicia se encuentra del lado de la inclinación», lo que indudablemente compromete la pureza de la intención. En el caso en que, en efecto, «hiciera falta un sacrificio, será la moralidad y no la sensibilidad la que lo ofrecería», dado que «el instinto natural ejercerá en el afecto», como es costumbre, «una perfecta constricción de la voluntad» (NA XX, p. 294). Parece legítimo suponer que Schiller retome aquí el ejemplo del filántropo propuesto por Kant en la *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (cfr. GMS, AA 04, p. 398) y, al hacerlo, ataca directamente el sistema del amor que había esbozado en sus propios primeros escritos.

Y la crítica prosigue. «El amor es al mismo tiempo lo que en la naturaleza es más magnánimo y más egoísta» porque, por una parte, «no recibe nada de su objeto y le da

<sup>29</sup> En este texto confluye, con algunas modificaciones y omisiones, la penúltima de las cartas al Príncipe de Augustenburg, esto es, la que lleva fecha de 3 de diciembre 1793, ya citada anteriormente (cfr. NA XXI, pp. 322-333). La tesis según la cual la eliminación en el texto publicado de la profesión de fe kantiana (que se ha recogido en esta contribución en la nota 28) constituiría la muestra de un alejamiento de la fundación kantiana de la moral, progresivamente sustituida por una mayor atención al papel de la «perfección sensible» (NA XXVI, p. 325), no parece sólida, en primer lugar si se repara en las muchas otras afirmaciones kantianas, equivalentes a aquéllas, sobre la pureza de la intención moral, de las que está plagado el ensayo; en segundo lugar, por la presencia de una especial consideración hacia lo sensible ya en 1793. Sobre el carácter no contradictorio de esta posición remito a Beiser 2005, pp. 169-182.

todo», pero por otra «lo que busca y ama en su objeto es siempre a sí mismo». El amor es «fácilmente víctima de engaños», dado que al amante le pasa a menudo que entregue al amado «lo que no ha recibido por parte de él» y, al comportarse así, oculta con su propia «abundancia [...] la pobreza del amado» (NA XX, p. 394). Ciertamente el «*amor*» es un «afecto ennoblecido», portador de «intenciones que corresponden a la verdadera dignidad del hombre», y capaz de destruir con su «fuego sagrado toda inclinación egoísta» de manera incluso más eficaz que los «principios», que a menudo están obligados a luchar ahí donde «el amor ha conseguido ya para ellos la victoria» y ha «acelerado con su fuerza omnipotente decisiones que el simple deber habría exigido sin éxito a la débil humanidad». Y sin embargo se trata de una «guía» falaz, que en el momento crítico no tendría dificultades para «desprenderse de las perplejidades morales» para beneficiar al «objeto amado». El espejo deformado del amor de hecho devuelve una imagen alterada de la incondicional prioridad de la ética con respecto a la felicidad ajena. Schiller imagina la hipótesis de que la persona amada «sea infeliz por nuestra culpa y que nos sea posible hacerla feliz», aunque sea pagando el precio de derogar en algún sentido la absoluta validez de la ley moral (NA XXI, p. 24). Los escrúpulos morales se invertirían entonces «de manera sofista», se volverían máscaras del egoísmo y se aceptarían como precio que hay que pagar para demostrar un genuino altruismo, porque «¿debemos dejarle sufrir para mantener limpia nuestra conciencia? [...] ¿acaso se *ama*, si ante el sufrimiento ajeno se piensa en uno mismo?». Evidentemente, «estamos más preocupados por nosotros mismos que por el objeto de nuestro amor, porque preferimos verle a él infeliz antes que serlo nosotros a causa de los reproches de nuestra conciencia» (NA XXI, p. 25).

A fin de cuentas, la postura de Beiser que citábamos al comienzo no parecería demasiado equivocada, dado que el Schiller lector de Kant termina por criticar exactamente las mismas tesis que él mismo defendía en su juventud con idéntico entusiasmo: fundación religiosa y sentimental de la moral, o mejor, metafísica y ética del amor; todo esto, sin duda, sobre la base de una común y compartida aversión al materialismo de cuño francés. Como se dijo al comienzo, sin embargo, existen elementos que permiten poner en duda esta “narrativa de la discontinuidad” y situar a Schiller en una posición que no es definible ni como un “antes” ni como un “después”.

#### 4. Schiller más allá de Kant

Schiller no se mueve meramente porque esté en consonancia con las tendencias más difundidas en su tiempo, heredando las referencias positivas y los blancos polémicos de los sistemas filosóficos con los que se va topando cada vez, desde la filosofía de la Ilustración tardía hasta la kantiana. No es un simple receptáculo de tesis ajenas que habría leído, estudiado y comprendido, pero que en el fondo se limitaría a repetir en versiones más o menos fieles al original y según el contexto. Al revés, demuestra ser un pensador en el sentido más pleno de la palabra, y se compromete con un radical y atrevido proceso de reflexión, que concierne potencialmente todo el espectro del saber. En esta tarea Schiller



sigue sin duda las ideas ilustradas de “eclecticismo” (*Eklektik*), “pensamiento autónomo” (*Selbstdenken*) y “mayoría de edad” (*Mündigkeit*), encaminadas a reivindicar la necesidad de un «pensamiento libre y autónomo, que se ha vuelto independiente del vínculo con una determinada escuela o autoridad, y que ha alcanzado un juicio propio».<sup>30</sup>

En particular, Schiller muestra hasta qué punto ha absorbido el mensaje didáctico presente en la *Karlsschule*, en la que estos supuestos programáticos se erigían como pilares educativos, válidos tanto en la concepción de las clases como en la organización de los exámenes finales. El fin último de la formación en asignaturas filosóficas era en efecto el fomento de una capacidad de juicio autónoma por parte de los estudiantes, adquirida a través de la costumbre de la reflexión y la reelaboración por parte de cada una de las enseñanzas recibidas. Esta tendencia no había sido recibida favorablemente por todos los profesores de la Academia, a los que preocupaba que los estudiantes fueran «más allá de los límites establecidos» «al discutir y objetar», revelando de este modo «un prurimum dubitandi» que, «si se volviera habitual, podría degenerar en un libertinismus sentiendi».<sup>31</sup> A pesar de estas críticas, por otra parte aisladas, el método didáctico con el que Schiller entra en contacto a través de todos sus profesores de filosofía (Jahn, Bök, Abel y Schwab) sigue siendo el del replanteamiento crítico de las enseñanzas recibidas: la referencia polémica constante en todas las reflexiones pedagógicas de Jahn está representada por el aprendizaje mnemónico, repetidamente señalado como extremadamente dañino si no se acompaña de un oportuno ejercicio del sentido crítico. Según Jahn, ni siquiera la historia debe entenderse como una mera compilación de fechas y hechos, porque en tal caso se dejarían de lado «cosas mucho más necesarias e indispensables para la formación [*Bildung*] de un hombre que piensa», y se produciría un grave fracaso educativo.<sup>32</sup> A la memoria, indudablemente útil, siempre debe acompañarse la necesaria «clara comprensión de las relaciones [*deutliche und zusammenhängende Einsicht*]» entre las nociones aprendidas, que falta del todo en un estudio meramente mnemónico, terminando por perjudicar el desarrollo completo de la razón y por favorecer la introducción en la mente del estudiante de «frases comprendidas insuficientemente».<sup>33</sup> También Abel está convencido de que el fin de la formación es formar «hombres ilustrados y rectos [*aufgeklärte und gesittete Menschen*]», que deben ser capaces de comprender el «orden y la conexión [*Ordnung und Zusammenhang*]» de los conceptos y por tanto «pensar y razonar» autónomamente.<sup>34</sup> La memoria es, también en este caso, el peligro a evitar en todos los campos del saber, desde el estudio de idiomas, latín y francés, y hasta el de la geografía, donde debe ser sustituida respectivamente por la «exposición y composición» y por la «imaginación [*Imagination*]», que permiten formar, en vez de una «vacía palabrería» conformada por «definiciones, investigaciones y distinciones inútiles», a un hombre sabio,

<sup>30</sup> Hinske 1985, p. 1002. Sobre los conceptos clave de la Ilustración alemana, tanto en filosofía como en literatura, véase también: Hinske 1999; Godel 2007. Acerca de la importancia de estos conceptos para Schiller, cfr. Macor 2010.

<sup>31</sup> Buchwald 1936/1937, p. 64 (1774).

<sup>32</sup> Ibidem, p. 50 (1773).

<sup>33</sup> Ibidem, p. 52 (1774).

<sup>34</sup> Riedel 1995, pp. 17, 23 (1773).

que esté a la altura de las exigencias de la *Aufklärung*.<sup>35</sup> De manera programática, Abel señala que querría fomentar en sus estudiantes la capacidad de reflexión y de «razonamiento racional [*Raisonnement*]», porque la educación en un «pensamiento autónomo [*Selbstdenken*]» constituye la «intención principal» de sus asignaturas.<sup>36</sup>

También Bök comparte esta orientación general. Un compañero de estudios de Schiller, Friedrich Wilhelm von Hoven, lo presenta sin ambages como un «filósofo y pensador autónomo [*selbstdenkender Philosoph*]»,<sup>37</sup> y no es casual que precisamente a Bök se le atribuya la instauración de una praxis disputatoria en el desarrollo de los exámenes anuales. Esta costumbre preveía la división de los estudiantes en *Respondentes*, defensores, y *Opponentes*, acusadores, de los escritos elaborados por los profesores, que simplemente asistían a los debates y eventualmente intervenían alimentando la disputa con ulteriores objeciones, a las que los estudiantes debían responder, adoptando esta vez todos ellos el papel de *Respondentes*. Las series de tesis se solían imprimir y contenían en el retro del frontispicio el catálogo de los alumnos examinados, divididos en las dos categorías mencionadas; en el caso de que el catálogo no distinguiera los *Respondentes* y los *Opponentes*, a los alumnos más brillantes se les confiaba el papel doble de tener que defender y refutar las afirmaciones que en cada momento se ponían sobre la mesa.<sup>38</sup>

Es evidente la correspondencia de esta técnica con las exigencias ilustradas que fundamentaban el programa pedagógico de la *Karlsschule* desde sus comienzos, y a su institucionalización a partir de 1775 hay que atribuirle un papel crucial en el recorrido formativo de Schiller. Éste asiste de hecho tanto a las clases de Bök como a las de Abel, y desde sus primeros escritos muestra haber comprendido plenamente la importancia de la discusión abierta de toda posición filosófica: las declaraciones metodológicas que proliferan en las disertaciones y las primeras obras literarias son una clara prueba de ello.

En 1780, Schiller escribe que «no hay nada tan peligroso para la verdad como el hecho de que posiciones unilaterales encuentren opositores unilaterales», y también que «lo más aconsejable es por tanto [...] mantener el equilibrio entre las dos posiciones para captar la línea intermedia de la verdad [*die Mittellinie der Wahrheit*] con la mayor certeza posible» (NA XX, p. 40). Poco tiempo después, Schiller señala que «raramente alcanzamos la verdad si no es a través de los extremos: debemos antes culminar en el error – y a menudo en lo absurdo – antes de alcanzar las hermosas metas de la serena sabiduría» (NA XX, p. 107); la obra que Schiller está a punto de redactar, esto es, los ya mencionados *Philosophische Briefe*, «mostrarán de qué manera estas afirmaciones unilaterales, a menudo excesivas y contradictorias, se disolverán por fin en una verdad general, purificada

<sup>35</sup> Ibidem, p. 18 (1773).

<sup>36</sup> Buchwald 1936/1937, pp. 64-65 (1774). Sobre la predilección de Abel por los conceptos de *Eklektik*, *Selbstdenken* y *Mündigkeit* remito a Riedel 1995, pp. 411-415.

<sup>37</sup> Hoven 1984, p. 46.

<sup>38</sup> Esta costumbre, habitual en las universidades, estaba cayendo en desuso a finales del Siglo XVIII, así que su introducción en la *Karlsschule* adquiere un valor aún más significativo precisamente si se enmarca en este contexto histórico. Cfr. Paulsen 1921, pp. 132-135; Riedel 1995, pp. 393-394.

y bien fundada» (NA XX, p. 108).<sup>39</sup>

Por decirlo brevemente, la herencia del método disputatorio aprendido y practicado en la *Karlsschule* entre 1775 y 1780 consiste en el desarrollo de una toma de conciencia crítica, que lleva a Schiller a problematizar cualquier planteamiento teórico, incluso los aparentemente pacíficos, y a no rechazar ninguna posición si no es tras haberla sometido a un cuidadoso examen sin ningún tipo de prejuicios. Esto es lo que ocurre en el caso de las tesis de filosofía del amor, comentadas en el primer párrafo del presente artículo, y también en el de su correspondiente polémico: Schiller no se niega a problematizar de manera radical la ética sentimental de cuño anglo-escocés, así como la perspectiva religiosa sobre la inmortalidad a ella vinculada; por otra parte, tampoco le niega a la provocación del materialismo toda credibilidad, sino que llega a indagar su presunta legitimidad.

El amor (*Liebe*) como fundamento moral empieza a derrumbarse ya en el primer drama publicado por Schiller, *Die Räuber* (1781), en el que se vuelve una mera máscara del egoísmo: los dos protagonistas, los hermanos Franz y Karl Moor, demuestran en efecto estar dispuestos a amar sólo en la medida en que haya previsión de una recompensa para este amor; y no es casual que ambos renuncien al amor hacia el padre en cuanto la posibilidad de recompensa se desvanece, en el caso del primero a causa de la preferencia del anciano Moor por Karl (cfr. NA III, pp. 14, 18), y en el de este último debido a las intrigas del hermano (cfr. NA, III, pp. 31-32). No sorprende pues que la consigna de ambos se exprese en dos frases sustancialmente idénticas: «pero, ¿es este amor contra el amor? [*ist das Liebe gegen Liebe*?]» (Franz) (NA III, p. 16), y «¿es este amor por amor? [*ist das Liebe für Liebe*?]» (Karl) (NA III, p. 31).<sup>40</sup> Pero Schiller no se detiene aquí: en la carta del 18 de abril de 1783 a Reinwald define el amor como «una *feliz ilusión*», que nos lleva a sufrir no tanto a causa de la criatura amada sino más bien «sólo por nosotros mismos, por el *yo* del que esa criatura es un espejo» (NA XXIII, p. 79).<sup>41</sup>

En los *Philosophische Briefe* la toma de conciencia de la naturaleza fundamentalmente egoísta del amor alcanza su culmen, llegando a incluir en el proceso de corrupción teórica también el tema religioso de una recompensa ultraterrena:

«El amor ha producido sin embargo efectos que parecen contradecir a su propia naturaleza.

[...] El supuesto de la inmortalidad [...] destruye para siempre la gracia de este

<sup>39</sup> Para referirse a este modo de proceder a través de, pero contra los extremos, se ha hablado de un «procedimiento dialéctico-sintético» desarrollado por Schiller desde los últimos años como estudiante y que mantiene hasta la fase kantiana (Hinderer 2013, pp. 161-162). Riedel (1998, pp. 569-570) identifica en la predilección de Schiller por el género literario del diálogo una clara herencia de la praxis disputatoria conocida en la *Karlsschule*.

<sup>40</sup> Para un análisis más preciso de los *Räuber* desde este punto de vista permítaseme remitir a Macor 2011. Una atención programática a toda la producción dramática de Schiller permitiría probablemente seguir el desarrollo del desenmascaramiento del amor también en *Kabale und Liebe* (1784) y en el *Don Karlos* (1787). Algunos apuntes en este sentido pueden encontrarse en Riedel 2009; Foi 2013, pp. 81-94.

<sup>41</sup> Algunas consideraciones interesantes sobre la naturaleza narcisista del amor y de la creación artística como forma de amor a partir de esta carta han sido formuladas por: Pugh 1996, 179-180, 187, 189, 191-192; Driscoll Colosimo 2007, 25-27; Robert 2011b.

fenómeno [*sc.* del amor]. La consideración de una recompensa futura excluye el amor. Debe haber una virtud que sea suficiente sin la creencia en la inmortalidad, que sea válida aún a pesar de la aniquilación.

Ciertamente sacrificar una ventaja actual ante otra eterna es ya un ennoblecimiento del alma humana – y es el grado más noble del egoísmo [*Egoismus*] – pero [...] frente al trono de la verdad que juzga es indiferente mirar al placer del instante sucesivo o a la corona del martirio – ¡es indiferente si los intereses se dan en esta vida o en otra!» (NA XX, pp. 122-123).

La conexión entre fundamentación sentimental de la moral y esperanza en una recompensa ultraterrena se vuelve hasta tal punto sospechosa a los ojos del protagonista de los *Philosophische Briefe* que éste llega a decir sin medias tintas que «un ataque decidido del materialismo hace caer [su] creación» (NA XX, p. 115). Frente a lo que podría parecer a primera vista, por tanto, Schiller en realidad parece más inclinado a conceder credibilidad a las tesis materialistas que a las ligadas a *moral sense* y religión, que nada casualmente son sometidas a una dura crítica en otros escritos de la misma época.

En particular, es preciso traer a colación ahora una composición publicada en 1786 pero concluida en 1784, dado que es en ella donde se produce el definitivo adiós, del que nunca se retractará, de Schiller a la trascendencia. La poesía *Resignation* presenta la situación *post mortem* en la que se encuentra un alma que ha confiado todas sus esperanzas de felicidad a la vida ultraterrena y que se siente por tanto legitimada a reclamarla una vez que se encuentra en la dimensión de la eternidad: «[e]n esa estrella», esto es, en la Tierra, «se había difundido una jocosa saga», según la cual en el más allá «los males aguardan al malvado / y las alegrías al honrado» y «los misterios de la Providencia» serán al fin resueltos (NA I, p. 166). El alma recuerda no haber dudado nunca ante la posibilidad de que las representaciones religiosas sean un producto de la «fantasía del soñador», nada más que una «gigantesca sombra de nuestros propios miedos», «imagen engañosa» y «delirio febril» (NA I, pp. 167-168).<sup>42</sup> Las expectativas del alma sin embargo son defraudadas drásticamente: el genio que responde a sus preguntas, a cuyas afirmaciones hay que reconocer un estatuto privilegiado, afirma en efecto que tiene dos «hijos», a los que ama igualmente y de los que por tanto garantiza el mismo valor, que son «la *esperanza* [*Hofnung*] y el *placer* [*Genuß*]». Al hombre se le concede la posibilidad de recoger sólo una de estas dos «flores»: «El que no pueda creer, que goce» y «El que puede creer, que renuncie» (NA I, p. 168). El que ha elegido esperar una realización ultraterrena de los designios incumplidos ya ha tenido su «recompensa», dado que su felicidad consiste precisamente en su fe, y no tiene por consiguiente el derecho de exigir nada más en el momento de morir (NA I, p. 169).

El mismo resultado teórico lo encontramos en el *Philosophisches Gespräch* del

<sup>42</sup> Estas referencias a la posible naturaleza ilusoria de la religión deben ser reconducidas a los estudios realizados en la *Karlsschule*, y en particular al método psicológico propuesto por Abel en la línea de la *Natural History of Religion* de Hume (1757). Sobre este punto véase Burtscher 2013 y 2014.

*Geisterseher*, una digresión en forma de diálogo escrita en 1789 e insertada en la trama de una novela inacabada publicada por episodios entre 1787 y 1789. Una vez más Schiller aborda el problema de los fundamentos de la moral llegando a renunciar a la dimensión de la eternidad, pero a diferencia de lo que ocurre en los escritos comentados hasta ahora llega más allá, buscando una nueva fundamentación de la ética.

El «impulso hacia la inmortalidad» se agota completamente «con la finalidad temporal de la existencia», exactamente como le ocurre a «los impulsos más sensibles» (NA XVI, p. 162), y la pretensión de reconocer un designio inteligente en el conjunto total sólo se apoya en una proyección tan inevitable como falaz. También el «cristal», de hecho, si se le concediera «facultad representativa», se figuraría «su supremo plano cósmico» como una «cristalización» y su divinidad como «la forma más bella de cristal». Todas las convicciones religiosas no se basan sino en una indebida aplicación a la naturaleza de lo que los hombres «han extraído del propio seno» y que se debe a una necesidad, sin duda comprensible, pero inválida como fundamento demostrativo. «Lo que me ha precedido y lo que habrá después de mí son dos velos oscuros e impenetrables que cierran los dos límites de la existencia humana» y que «ningún ser viviente hasta ahora ha conseguido levantar» (NA XVI, p. 166). El protagonista de la novela, el príncipe von \*\*, sostiene que ha tenido que esforzarse largamente para «desacostumbrar[se] a aquella riqueza imaginaria», garantizada por las más comunes representaciones religiosas, y «para liberar los sostenes de [su] moral y de [su] felicidad de ese dulce sueño» (NA XVI, pp. 167-168). La renuncia a toda especulación metafísica no perjudica sin embargo el papel de la «moralidad», entendida como medio que la naturaleza utiliza para realizar su fin a través del hombre, el cual, no pudiendo conocer sino lo que se refiere al ámbito terrenal, ve en ella «todo lo que es [suyo]» y que, precisamente por ello, es «aún más sagrado» para él (NA XVI, p. 167).

Al revés: la moralidad parece poder aspirar ahora a un grado mayor de pureza.

En efecto, el príncipe le echa en cara a su interlocutor, que defiende una visión completamente anclada a la religión, que «vuestra moralidad tiene necesidad de un andamio, mientras que la mía se apoya en su propio eje» (NA XVI, p. 168), pues recibe fuerza del hecho de que «el ser moral», «para ser perfecto», «no necesita ninguna otra instancia», y menos aún «un sistema completo y ordenado según un designio racional, una infinita justicia y bondad, una supervivencia de la personalidad, un eterno progreso» (NA XVI, pp. 178-179). La «moralidad es una relación que puede pensarse sólo en el interior del alma, nunca fuera de ella» (NA XVI, p. 173), «el ser moral» está «completo y concluido en sí mismo a través de su moralidad», del mismo modo que el ser orgánico lo está «a través de su estructura», por lo que una fundamentación adecuada de la moralidad puede y debe darse sobre una base exclusivamente inmanente (NA XVI, p. 178).

Ahora bien, si se comparan estos posicionamientos, escritos precisamente en enero de 1789, con los del Schiller “kantiano”, correspondientes al período comprendido entre 1793 y 1796, la imagen que puede extraerse es la de una clara continuidad, más que la de una radical transformación o conversión teórica: la presunta revolución ética

provocada según Beiser por la lectura de la *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* entronca con una senda ya iniciada anteriormente y, ahora sí, en clara sintonía con las tesis kantianas. Schiller se aleja de la ética del *moral sense* y de la perspectiva religioso-metafísica de la filosofía de su tiempo mucho antes de acercarse a la obra de Kant que, muy al contrario, si resulta extremadamente interesante a sus ojos es justamente en virtud de la consonancia con su propio recorrido personal y autónomo.<sup>43</sup>

Por tanto, Schiller es filósofo tanto *antes* como *después* de Kant, pero lo es independientemente de él. Es filósofo, por tanto, *más allá* de Kant.

Traducción: Valerio Rocco Lozano

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<sup>43</sup> Probablemente no sea casual que una posición análoga pueda encontrarse en Goethe, que en sus diálogos con Eckermann sostiene haber seguido un camino semejante al de Kant, pero independiente del suyo; cfr. Reed 2001.

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**La problematización de la relación entre Kant y Schiller.  
Reflexiones en torno a “Renovando el canon filosófico. Schiller  
antes, después y más allá de Kant”, de Laura Anna Macor**

***The Problematization of the Relationship Between Kant and  
Schiller. Reflections on Laura Anna Macor’s “Renewing the  
Philosophical Canon. Schiller Before, After and Beyond Kant”***

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#### **Resumen**

Dentro de la hermenéutica filosófica, no es fácil encontrar un trabajo que se acerque con tanto respeto al pensamiento del poeta, dramaturgo y filósofo Friedrich Schiller como el de Laura Anna Macor. Si su trabajo destaca dentro de lo que Valerio Rocco ha denominado una auténtica revolución historiográfica, es porque es uno de los pocos acercamientos a la obra schilleriana que hace un deliberado esfuerzo por tomarse su relevancia filosófica en serio, con independencia de la adherencia de Schiller a la filosofía trascendental kantiana. Frente a obras como la de Frederick Beiser que, por otra parte, merece un gran reconocimiento por su riguroso estudio y defensa de la filosofía schilleriana, Macor bucea en la producción médica, poética y dramática del joven Schiller para dar allí con contenidos de carácter legítimamente filosófico, con la intención de demostrar no sólo la íntima coherencia de su pensamiento, sino también su calidad filosófica antes, después y más allá de Kant. Lo interesante de este planteamiento es que, al contrario que la mayoría de los intérpretes, Macor no se acerca condescendentemente al carácter híbrido del pensamiento de

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Schiller, sino asumiendo que el mismo es, de hecho, una fuente de riqueza multidisciplinar que no jerarquiza los saberes. Una riqueza que, además, es una clara señal de la relevancia actual del planteamiento schilleriano.

### Palabras clave

Friedrich Schiller; Immanuel Kant; *Spätaufklärung*; educación; diletantismo

### Abstract

Within philosophical hermeneutics, it is not easy to find a work that addresses the thought of the poet, playwright and philosopher Friedrich Schiller with the respect of Laura Anna Macor's. If her work stands out within what Valerio Rocco has called an authentic historiographic revolution, it is because is one of the few approaches to the Schillerian work that makes a deliberate effort to take its philosophical relevance seriously, independently of Schiller's adherence to Kant's transcendental philosophy. Opposite to analysis as the one of Frederick Beiser, one that on the other hand deserves a great recognition for its meticulous study and defense of Schillerian philosophy, Macor dives in the young Schiller's medical, poetical and dramatic production, finding there genuinely philosophical content, with the intent not only of stating the intimate coherence of his thought, but also his philosophical quality before, after and beyond Kant. The most interesting part of her approach is that, opposite to most of Schiller's readers, Macor does not address the hybrid character of Schiller's thought in a condescending way, but assuming it as a source of multidisciplinary richness that does not hierarchically organize the knowledges. A richness that, on top of that, is a clear sign of the actual relevance of Schiller's thought.

### Key words

Friedrich Schiller; Immanuel Kant; *Spätaufklärung*; Education; Dilettantismus

El significado de la relación entre Schiller y Kant es algo que en la historia de la filosofía parece haberse dado prácticamente por sentado. Como si se tratara de una relación que no es lo bastante problemática de por sí, la mayoría de intérpretes entienden que si se ha de considerar la obra de Schiller filosóficamente, sólo es posible hacerlo a partir de la *elaboración* que Schiller realiza de la obra de Kant. Aunque dicha actitud hermenéutica no afecte a la consideración de su estatus intelectual, lo que está en tela de juicio entonces es la pertenencia de Schiller al canon filosófico. La premisa de la que parte la obra de Laura Anna Macor es que este hecho se debe a que siempre se ha privilegiado el estudio del desarrollo del pensamiento schilleriano a partir de su lectura de Kant, dejando de lado su tránsito hacia éste. Macor había dedicado su estudio *Il giro fangoso dell'umana destinazione* (2008) a analizar cómo la mayor parte de los intérpretes de Schiller habían reservado sus análisis a la influencia de las tres *Kritiken* sobre nuestro autor, habiendo omitido que el primer acercamiento de Schiller se refiere no a la obra magna kantiana, sino a los escritos breves del *Berlinische Monatsschrift* que Kant realiza entre 1784 y 1786, y en los que Schiller encontró una respuesta no metafísica al problema de la destinación

humana (*Bestimmung des Menschen*<sup>1</sup>), un problema que Macor coloca como piedra de toque del pensamiento del joven Schiller.

Centrándose en la influencia de las *Kritiken*, estos intérpretes habrían olvidado que Schiller recurre en primer lugar a Kant para resolver sus dudas respecto al problema de la autonomía de la autoridad y la mayoría de edad (*Mündigkeit*). Mediante el minucioso estudio principalmente de dos de las primeras obras dramáticas schillerianas, *Die Räuber* y *Don Karlos* (1781 y 1787 respectivamente), Macor no sólo había dado allí con contenidos e ideas de carácter legítimamente filosófico, sino que situaba el recorrido de Schiller como pensador autónomo dentro del propio contexto específico de la *Spätaufklärung*. En este sentido, Macor había tratado de demostrar cómo la adherencia de Schiller a la Filosofía de la Historia kantiana surgía de su mismo desarrollo intelectual y cómo la omisión de este hecho ha impedido ver la íntima coherencia de su pensamiento<sup>2</sup>. En el texto del que nos ocupamos aquí, Macor vuelve a hacer suya dicha tarea, esta vez centrándose, sobre todo, en las disertaciones médicas que Schiller habría realizado para graduarse en la *Karlsschule*, considerando las enseñanzas allí recibidas como absolutamente fundamentales en la construcción del pensamiento schilleriano e intentando mostrar como éstas hacen de Schiller un filósofo “antes, después y más allá de Kant”.

Es necesario enfatizar que la posición de Macor no puede definirse como una mera aclaración bibliográfica que simplemente ponga de relieve ciertos textos “desconocidos” de Schiller, sino que adquiere una relevancia fundamental a la hora de poder entender no sólo su proceder filosófico, sino el pensamiento schilleriano en su totalidad. Dicha omisión habría convertido a Schiller en un mero intérprete de Kant para sus críticos, una suerte de filósofo menor o poeta metido a filósofo aficionado, “el poeta filosofante o filósofo politizante”<sup>3</sup>, repitiendo de mejor o peor manera las palabras de su antecesor, la mayoría de las veces sólo para caer en un burdo idealismo o para acabar tergiversando la filosofía trascendental. ¿Qué interés o qué fecundidad podría tener hoy día el estudio de un pensador así? No obstante, precisamente esta acusación de, finalmente, ser un “mal filósofo”, alguien que “no se ajusta a los límites entre las disciplinas”, como dice Macor, o, en definitiva, un “filósofo popular”, por usar la terminología kantiana de la *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (1797), es lo que ha hecho del de Schiller un pensamiento controvertido y merecedor de incontables análisis. Así, ésta sería una de las grandes causas del acercamiento de tantos filósofos a la obra schilleriana, ya que, finalmente, esa “mala” interpretación de la filosofía trascendental kantiana habría abocado la propia propuesta de Schiller, la educación estética, a generar una política peligrosa o irresponsable. En palabras de María del Rosario Acosta,

«Leer a Schiller en el siglo XXI no puede ser lo mismo que leer a Schiller en cualquier otro momento. Todo lo obvio que esto pueda parecer a cualquier lector entendido en la

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<sup>1</sup>Éste, “Die Bestimmung des Menschen”, era de hecho el título del primer párrafo de su primera disertación médica de 1779, *Philosophie der Physiologie*, NA XX, pp. 10-29.

<sup>2</sup> Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 16-20 y pp. 124-147.

<sup>3</sup> Storz, G, 1969, p. 19.

tradición hermenéutica, en el caso de Schiller, esta afirmación debe ser considerada cuidadosa y seriamente. Aquellos que leen a Schiller hoy –y no simplemente lo leen, sino que hacen el intento de entender su pensamiento político y sus teorías sobre nuestro ser estético en el mundo– corren el riesgo de aparecer como pensadores ingenuos, optimistas, a-críticos y, por lo tanto, muy peligrosos»<sup>4</sup>.

Sumariamente, el problema sería que, al aplicar mediante confusiones el sistema kantiano a lo que sería su propósito principal, la educación estética, Schiller habría acabado, dependiendo de los intérpretes, bien generando un idealismo ingenuo, bien sentando los precedentes para una peligrosa estetización de la política. Sin ánimo de realizar un catálogo de los intérpretes de Schiller que tienden a entenderle como un mero “tergiversador” de la filosofía trascendental kantiana, un breve repaso es interesante a la hora de poner de relieve dicha tendencia. Käte Hamburger, por ejemplo, realiza un estudio en el que trata de demostrar cómo Schiller habría sido culpable de una confusión semántica, ya que habría mezclado ilegítimamente un análisis lógico con una aplicación metafórica de los conceptos que está interpretando (1956). Eva Schaper, en su por otro lado muy interesante análisis “Friedrich Schiller: Adventures of a Kantian” (1964), habría hecho una interpretación similar: Schiller como el gran tergiversador de la filosofía trascendental kantiana. Para Schaper, si bien Schiller consigue revelar el carácter claustrofóbico del universo al que la filosofía kantiana aboca al ser humano, lo hace a partir de serias confusiones lingüísticas y conceptuales<sup>5</sup>, matizando al mismo tiempo que el problema es que lo que Schiller hace es intentar forzar conceptos no kantianos en categorías sistemáticas kantianas<sup>6</sup>. La lista de filósofos que tienden a leer a Schiller como un mal intérprete de Kant parece no tener fin<sup>7</sup>, culminando probablemente en los también controvertidos análisis de Paul de Man<sup>8</sup>, que convierte las *confusiones* de Schiller respecto a la filosofía trascendental kantiana en el comienzo de un terrible totalitarismo estético –un problema que, por otro lado, surgiría para De Man del hecho precisamente de que Schiller, al contrario que Kant, no era un filósofo<sup>9</sup>, sino un *esteta*, un constructor de metáforas que simplificó y *popularizó* la filosofía kantiana. Por otro lado, hay quienes que, insistiendo en esa perspectiva única de Schiller como intérprete *sui generis* de Kant<sup>10</sup>, le reprochan su empeño por permanecer dentro de las categorías kantianas, siendo ésta la razón de que, finalmente, la razón acabe

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<sup>4</sup> Acosta, M. A., 2011, p. 187.

<sup>5</sup> Schaper, E., 1964, p. 355.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 361.

<sup>7</sup> Cfr. Henrich, D., 1982, pp. 237-257; Podro, M., 1989, pp. 36-60; Hammermeister, K., 2002.

<sup>8</sup> Cfr. De Man, P., 1984, pp. 355-374; 1996, pp. 185-229.

<sup>9</sup> La posición de De Man denota un esnobismo absoluto en su análisis del pensamiento de Schiller, un esnobismo que, de hecho, raya no sólo con la fetichización de la figura de Kant, sino de la filosofía misma. Cfr. “Kant and Schiller”, *cit.*, p. 219: “La filosofía no se enseña en la educación estética. Kant no se enseña. Schiller se enseñaría porque representa una popularización, una metaforización de la filosofía. Como tal, la estética pertenece a las masas”. Para un estudio del acercamiento de De Man a la estética schilleriana y sus implicaciones cfr. Bodas, L. (2013), “El carácter usurpador de la estética: la larga sombra de Schiller” en *La Actualidad de Friedrich Schiller*, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid, pp. 235-259.

<sup>10</sup> Cfr. Taminiaux, J., 1963 y 1993; Murray, P. T.; Behler, C., 1995; Brooks, L. M., 1995.

derrotando e imponiéndose a la sensibilidad. A pesar de reconocerle a Schiller haber sido capaz de sobrepasar a Kant en varios aspectos, habrían señalado, por tanto, su incapacidad para ir verdaderamente *más allá* de Kant y, con ello, su asunción del fracaso de su propio programa<sup>11</sup>.

Evidentemente, este punto de vista no es el único que puede encontrarse entre los estudiosos de Schiller. Otros intérpretes se centran más en el acercamiento crítico que, desde la estética, Schiller habría realizado al pensamiento kantiano. Por ejemplo, Jeffrey Barnouw (1980) considera a Schiller como uno de los primeros verdaderos críticos de Kant; o Claudia Brodsky (1988) que afirma que la crítica schilleriana a Kant apunta más a generar un idealismo en el sentido hegeliano: esto es, la concepción de la belleza como aparición sensible de la idea<sup>12</sup>. Al respecto de esta línea de interpretación, Eva Schaper (1964), subrayaba que Schiller es incapaz de responder a la pregunta “¿Qué es la belleza?” precisamente por ser incapaz de abandonar las categorías kantianas, pero acaba destrozando el sistema de su predecesor para alcanzar una posición propia, aunque expresada en términos todavía ostensiblemente kantianos<sup>13</sup>. Karin Schutjer (1996), por su parte, pretende llevar a cabo una narrativa de la comunidad más allá de Kant. Según éste, Schiller habría intentado ir más allá del carácter abstracto del *sensus communis* kantiano, para pensar a partir de la estética un encuentro intersubjetivo real. Sin embargo, al pretender mantener la forma básica de la estética kantiana, su intento de superarla resulta conceptualmente débil y finalmente acaba basándose en una mera analogía entre el individuo y la comunidad, que genera, cuanto menos, una política irresponsable<sup>14</sup>. No importa cuál sea la perspectiva que se tome sobre el pensamiento de Schiller; todas tienen algo en común: si Schiller es filósofo, parece que es solamente a partir de su lectura e interpretación mejor o peor de Kant.

No se trata de defender aquí la precisión de Schiller a la hora de analizar o retomar el pensamiento kantiano. O de defender el estilo schilleriano, más poético, frente al más filosófico estilo kantiano. El mismo Duque de Augustenburgo, a quién estaban dirigidas las *Ästhetische Briefe* (1795), ponía en duda la calidad filosófica de Schiller en las *Augustenburger Briefe* (1793) y que serían una especie de elaboración previa de las célebres *Briefe*: “nuestro buen Schiller no tiene el corte del filósofo; necesita un traductor que elabore sus bellas frases con precisión filosófica y que lo trasponga del poético al modo filosófico”<sup>15</sup>. Ni siquiera se trata de, cómo hace Frederick Beiser (2005), afirmar el estatus plenamente filosófico del pensamiento de Schiller o que éste consiga superar filosóficamente a Kant en muchos aspectos, como por ejemplo a la hora de analizar la acción moral y el juicio estético<sup>16</sup>. Se trata de intentar pensar a Schiller en su especificidad,

<sup>11</sup> Éste es el caso también de muchos de los intérpretes marxistas de Schiller. Véase especialmente, Lukács G., 1947, 1954a y b; y Abusch, A., 1980.

<sup>12</sup> Brodsky, C., 1988, p. 132.

<sup>13</sup> Schaper, E., 1964, p. 361.

<sup>14</sup> Schutjer, K., 1996, pp. 81-115.

<sup>15</sup> Cit. en Schulz, H., 1905, p. 153 y Wilkinson, E. M. y Willoughby L. A., 1967, p. cxxxviii.

<sup>16</sup> Cfr. Beiser, F. (2005), *Schiller as Philosopher*, cit., p. 3: “Schiller’s account on aesthetic judgment is superior to Kant’s because it recognizes that it is necessary to give reasons for such judgments, reasons that

en su carácter *híbrido*, a caballo entre poeta, dramaturgo y filósofo, no como una tara para sus propuestas, sino como una fuente de riqueza multidisciplinar.

El trabajo de Laura Anna Macor forma parte de un esfuerzo hermenéutico revolucionario por pensar a Schiller de otra manera, ejemplificando de manera privilegiada el cambio en la *Schiller-Forschung*, “esa revolución historiográfica” enfatizada por Valerio Rocco (2009) y que pretende, precisamente, hacer un esfuerzo por tomarse a Schiller y a su pensamiento en serio. El de Macor es un acercamiento realmente original en tanto que se distancia por completo del modo en que normalmente se tiende a estudiar filosóficamente a Schiller. Esto es, como un mero intérprete sui generis de Kant, “un mero receptáculo de tesis ajenas”. Ni siquiera un acercamiento como el de Frederick Beiser en *Schiller as Philosopher*, a pesar de su deliberado y explícito esfuerzo no sólo por exponer, sino por reivindicar la filosofía schilleriana, consigue deshacerse por completo de dicha tendencia. En definitiva, como Macor subraya, cualquiera que pretenda acercarse a Schiller como filósofo parece obligado a ofrecer una justificación para ello. Y, sin embargo, el hecho de que Schiller haya tenido una recepción tan problemática y multifacética es otro signo más de su relevancia actual. Es un signo de que señala e identifica problemas que hoy todavía siguen abiertos. De este modo, la razón más probable de que Schiller haya generado tanta controversia es que, como afirma Steven A. Taubeneck (1988), el pensamiento de Schiller posee múltiples dimensiones que “son actualmente más relevantes que nunca”<sup>17</sup>. O, como afirma Eva Schaper (1985), que Schiller “nos habla hoy más directamente que muchos de los más recientes pensadores”<sup>18</sup>. ¿Qué hay en Schiller que le confiera esta actualidad? Esta es, de hecho, la cuestión crucial y no se puede responder a ella sin, como hace Macor, acudir al pensamiento de Schiller en su totalidad.

Así, más allá de lo que se conoce como la famosa “pausa filosófica” schilleriana, entre 1791 y 1795, y durante la que Schiller habría desarrollado, puntualmente, toda su producción filosófica a partir del pensamiento kantiano, Macor propone a Schiller como un

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refer to objective qualities of the work of art. [...] Schiller has a more complete account on moral action than Kant, because he recognizes that an action has moral worth only if it derives from moral character or virtue”. Aunque es imposible desarrollar aquí la interesante propuesta de Beiser, el cuidadoso estudio que éste realiza acerca de las influencias de otros pensadores en Schiller, como Spinoza o Fichte, a la hora de pensar la idea de libertad demuestra cómo la concepción schilleriana es, de hecho, en muchos puntos incompatible con la kantiana, por ejemplo, la idea de que la razón puede llegar a causar una falta de libertad si domina por completo a la razón (pp. 214-217), cfr. p. 214: “First, [...] Schiller’s thinking about freedom also contains Fichtean and Spinozist themes, which are incompatible with Kantian doctrine. Second, in the early 1790s Schiller gradually developed a conception of freedom that, in fundamental respects, is a reaction against Kant’s. Essentially, he supplemented the Kantian conception of freedom as moral autonomy with a conception of freedom as aesthetic self-determination. According to the Kantian conception, freedom consists in the independence of our rational nature, in willing and acting according to the laws of morality, which are determined by pure reason alone. According to Schiller’s conception, however, freedom consists in acting according to our whole nature, in the harmony of reason and sensibility”. Al respecto de la concepción temprana de la libertad en Schiller, Laura Anna Macor habría enfatizado, sin embargo, cómo la preocupación por la libertad en el primer nivel de salvaguardar la autonomía de toda influencia externa no surge en Schiller a partir de su encuentro con Kant, sino que responde al contexto del problema en la *Spätaufklärung*, siendo el encuentro con Kant lo que le permite confirmar sus ideas previas. Cfr. Macor, L. A., 2008, cit., p. 19 y passim.

<sup>17</sup> Taubeneck, A., 1988, p. 103 y p. 107.

<sup>18</sup> Schaper, E., 1985, p. 156.

pensador legítimo y genuino, antes, después y más allá de Kant, y lo hace centrándose en lo que caracteriza como algo necesario para demostrar el contenido filosófico del pensamiento de Schiller en su totalidad: su obra de juventud, sus escritos médicos, sus primeras obras dramáticas, sus poemas, para dar allí con las raíces de lo que sería su pensamiento autónomo. Este planteamiento no sólo le permite a Macor sortear hábilmente el típico acercamiento interpretativo a Schiller, que tiende a centrarse en la que, ya desde el mismo Hegel, es considerada “la obra maestra” schilleriana, las *Ästhetische Briefe*. También abre un horizonte hermenéutico totalmente distinto: si el germen del pensamiento filosófico de Schiller puede encontrarse en sus escritos médicos, en sus dramas y poemas, esto también puede suponer que, de hecho, Schiller no tenía unas intenciones idénticas a las de Kant a la hora de desarrollar su pensamiento. No obstante, también cabría preguntarse ¿por qué este énfasis en desmarcar a Schiller de Kant cuando el mismo Schiller había admitido en varias ocasiones su adhesión a la filosofía de Kant? La respuesta, quizá, se encuentre precisamente en la misma definición que el propio Schiller da de lo que él considera una “mente filosófica”.

Ésta es una idea que puede encontrarse en uno de sus primeros escritos de Filosofía de la Historia, “Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?” (1789, NA XVII, pp. 359-376)<sup>19</sup>, también conocida como su “Lección Inaugural” como profesor invitado de filosofía en la Universidad de Jena<sup>20</sup>. Este texto destaca dentro de la producción schilleriana por un notable optimismo acerca de la modernidad. Por ello, como afirma Villacañas Berlanga<sup>21</sup>, contrasta fuertemente, hasta el punto de casi carecer de sentido, con el pesimismo y realismo históricos de los dramas juveniles. Sin embargo, en él se halla una distinción que resulta muy esclarecedora no sólo a la hora de entender la concepción de Schiller de lo que constituiría un proceder auténticamente filosófico, sino también a la hora de poner en tela de juicio ciertos componentes de la misma idea de “ilustración” y que revela una característica específica del pensamiento schilleriano. En este texto, que comienza con el propósito de determinar lo que sería el “valor de una ciencia” (NA XVII, p. 363), lo que Schiller lleva a cabo, tal y como lo define Rüdiger Safranski (2004), no es sólo “un esbozo programático de una ética de la ciencia”<sup>22</sup> que trasluciría una clara desconfianza frente al modelo pedagógico ilustrado, sino también una defensa del carácter *ultra-crítico* e *híbrido* del pensamiento filosófico. Este carácter del pensamiento filosófico, para Schiller, es determinante si es que éste quiere tener un significado en el mundo real.

Schiller comienza su disquisición acerca del “valor de una ciencia” mediante la distinción

<sup>19</sup> Schiller, F. (1789) “Was heißt und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?” (Antrittsvorlesung am 26, Mai 1789, Jena). NA XVII, T. 1., pp. 359-376). Existe una traducción de Faustino Oncina (1991), pp. 1-18.

<sup>20</sup> Macor había hecho notar cómo la extendida convicción entre los intérpretes de que Schiller había sido llamado a Jena para ocupar la cátedra de historia en lugar de la de filosofía se debe a una confusión del mismo Schiller que, en la portada de la lección inaugural se había definido a sí mismo como “Professor der Geschichte”. Cfr. Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 135-136.

<sup>21</sup> Villacañas Berlanga, J. L., 1996, p. 226.

<sup>22</sup> Safranski, R., 2004, p. 308.



entre “académico a sueldo” y “mente filosófica” (NA XVII, p. 360). El académico a sueldo, aparte de trabajar únicamente buscando el reconocimiento ajeno y el provecho económico (NA XVII, p. 361), se reconoce por el cariz “fragmentario” de su trabajo, “se siente ajeno, apartado del entorno de las cosas, porque no se ha preocupado de conectar su actividad del conjunto al mundo” (NA XVII, p. 362). Resultan extremadamente reveladores los tres ejemplos que escoge para ejemplificar lo que le ocurre al académico a sueldo, y que de ningún modo parecen escogidos al azar, sino de hecho, un lamento autobiográfico:

«El *jurista* retira sus preocupaciones de la ciencia del derecho tan pronto como el brillo de una cultura mejor ilumina sus deficiencias, en lugar de tratar de ser un nuevo creador de ésta y tratar de completar sus carencias con sus capacidades personales. El *médico* se desatiende de su trabajo tan pronto como sus importantes fracasos le muestran la incompetencia de su sistema. El *teólogo* pierde respeto a lo suyo tan pronto como empieza a tambalearse la creencia en la infalibilidad de su edificio doctrinal» (NA XVII, p. 362).

Schiller parece justificar el carácter truncado de su inicial vocación por la teología, así como de sus posteriores estudios, forzados por el Duque de Suabia Karl Eugen, primero del derecho y luego, debido a las pésimas calificaciones de Schiller en este campo, de la medicina<sup>23</sup>, mediante ese carácter fragmentario de las disciplinas. A pesar de la importancia de su formación en la *Karlsschule* para el desarrollo de su pensamiento, Schiller parece renegar abiertamente del orden impuesto por el despotismo ilustrado del Duque de Suabia que, de hecho, amenazó a Schiller con el exilio si es que se atrevía a seguir interesándose por la poesía y obras dramáticas tras la escritura de *Die Räuber*<sup>24</sup>, una obra que, tal y como él mismo describía en su “Ankündigung der Rheinischen *Thalia*” (1784), le costó “la familia y la patria” (NA, XXII, p. 94). Frederick Beiser sugiere que, de hecho, la importancia de la libertad para Schiller como el supremo valor intelectual, espiritual y moral proviene de la diaria experiencia del absolutismo y el despotismo en la *Karlsschule*<sup>25</sup>.

Incapaz de identificarse a sí mismo con el “académico a sueldo”, una posición que impediría por completo su auto-realización como individuo, Schiller propone la de la “mente filosófica”. Frente al académico, ésta aspiraría, sin dogmatismo, con “entusiasmo a la verdad”. Incluso, y sobre todo, si esa verdad implica el hundimiento del sistema establecido, el “edificio del orden intelectual”: incluso si “nuevos descubrimientos”, “nuevos pensamientos [...] derribaran el edificio de su ciencia, [no importa], él ha amado más la verdad que a su sistema” (NA XVII, pp. 362-363). Entonces, Schiller está invitando a sus oyentes a la *arrogancia*, a atreverse a salirse de los supuestos límites que el modelo previo de su sistema impone, para poder explorar libremente lo que sería la infinita riqueza multidisciplinar que se esconde más allá de esos límites (NA XVII, pp. 361-363). El

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<sup>23</sup> Para un recorrido por los diferentes estudios de Schiller en la *Karlsschule*, cfr. Safranski, R., *Schiller o la invención del Idealismo Alemán*, cit., pp. 35-146.

<sup>24</sup> Dewhurst K. y Reeves, N. 1978, p. 73.

<sup>25</sup> Beiser, F., 2005, pp. 14-15.

modelo de pensamiento y de conocimiento que Schiller está proponiendo prácticamente desde el principio no se basa en la transmisión, memorización y adquisición de un conocimiento, sino en el cuestionamiento constante de la “verdad” establecida: de las posiciones consideradas como “normales”. Siguiendo de cerca este texto, parece que, desde muy temprano, tenía ya claro su modelo de filosofía. Schiller sugiere un pensamiento filosófico y una forma de educación que trastoca por completo la concepción de los mismos como instrucción, como adoctrinamiento, incluso como la mera transmisión de un conocimiento que el aprendiz o estudiante debería memorizar. Incluso en este texto *menor*, al poner en tela de juicio la misma idea de *ilustración*, Schiller demuestra ser, como afirma Faustino Oncina (2006), “un ultrailustrado en la doble acepción de prefijo”. Continúa Oncina:

«Porque, por un lado, fue un crítico impenitente de la época de la crítica, trascendió el Siglo de las Luces, no inmune a taras y lacras, y vislumbró una nueva era. Por otro, a pesar de ir más allá del concepto epocal y estrictamente histórico de la Ilustración, participó de una actitud típicamente ilustrada, maximizando su programa, atreviéndose a poner en práctica incluso una higiene de sus propios ideales al compulsarlos con la cruda realidad, y no con la sublimada. El antiilustrado epocal se muda en un ilustrado radical, pues la autocrítica es, o al menos debe ser, el afluente más caudaloso de la crítica, y ésta, no lo olvidemos, es el elixir vital de la Ilustración»<sup>26</sup>.

En definitiva, mediante esta distinción entre “académico a sueldo” y “mente filosófica”, Schiller está proponiendo de forma programática lo que él considera como esencial en todo proceder filosófico. Esto es y tal y como afirma Macor, Schiller se está adhiriendo explícitamente a las ideas de “eclecticismo”, “pensamiento autónomo” y “mayoría de edad”, que constituían los pilares educativos fundamentales en la *Karlsschule* y, de este modo, demostrando “ser un pensador en el sentido más pleno de la palabra” y comprometiéndose con “un radical y atrevido proceso de reflexión que concierne potencialmente a todo el espectro del saber”. Decir entonces que Macor enfatiza la importancia de la *Karlsschule* sería quedarse corto. En su estudio de los años de Schiller en la academia del Duque de Suabia, Macor encuentra las semillas de una gran parte de los desarrollos posteriores del pensamiento schilleriano. Macor subraya el carácter ecléctico del paso de Schiller por la escuela, su estudio primero del derecho, y luego de la medicina, siempre acompañados por la transversalidad de la filosofía que se daba en la academia, en donde, tenía “un papel que, más que propedéutico, sería correcto definir como fundamental”. Además de su constante vocación prohibida por la poesía y el drama, Macor subrayaba el temprano interés de Schiller no sólo por la filosofía, sino también por la psicología, la estética, la historia de la humanidad y la ética a través de sus profesores, Abel, Jahn y Bök, cuya influencia sobre Schiller queda prácticamente equiparada a la de Kant en el planteamiento de Macor. Podría decirse, entonces, que más que su adherencia a la filosofía kantiana, son los supuestos programáticos que componían los pilares educativos

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<sup>26</sup> Oncina, F., 2006, pp. 94-95.

de la *Karlschule*, tan minuciosamente descritos por Macor, lo que hacen de Schiller un filósofo. Un filósofo tal y como el mismo Schiller lo define, esto es, conscientemente crítico y, de hecho, *híbrido*. Alguien empeñado, de hecho, en separar la filosofía como ámbito con fronteras intraspasables, no sería más que un “académico a sueldo”:

«De la misma forma tan cuidadosa en que el sabio a sueldo separa su ciencia de todas las restantes, se esfuerza aquél [la mente filosófica] en ampliar su campo de trabajo, y volver a crear su unión con el resto –y digo crear porque el entendimiento que abstrae es el que ha trazado las fronteras, ha separado estas ciencias entre sí. Donde el sabio a sueldo separa, une el espíritu filosófico» (NA, XVII, p. 362).

El espíritu filosófico, de esta manera, no jerarquiza los saberes, ni se pone a sí mismo frontera alguna. Analicemos desde esta perspectiva una afirmación como la de De Man, que sugiere que el análisis de las condiciones trascendentales del Juicio es “legítimamente filosófico”<sup>27</sup>, frente al acercamiento schilleriano, perteneciente al “reino de lo empírico” y que consistiría en una serie de reglas interesadas acerca de cómo utilizar lo bello y lo sublime para llenar sus teatros de público<sup>28</sup> y que carecería de “todo valor filosófico”<sup>29</sup>. Si, para De Man, se puede hablar de una diferencia de legitimidad de ambos planteamientos es porque el acercamiento kantiano es válido en tanto que es genuinamente filosófico. El schilleriano, por el contrario, al beber de su propia práctica dramática y poética, estaría contaminado por esas cuestiones “empíricas”, produciendo un pensamiento condicionado por cuestiones ajenas a la teoría kantiana, desdibujando y desvirtuando su criticismo al cubrirlo con el amable velo del discurso estético: “no podríamos entender a Kant transponiéndolo a ninguna clase de experiencia pragmática, psicológica, empírica. Esa es la diferencia entre un filósofo y Schiller, que no era un filósofo”<sup>30</sup>. La filosofía pura sería un ámbito apriorísticamente legítimo para abordar la problemática de lo sublime; la práctica dramática y el arte como tal, en cambio, sólo pueden aportar datos “empíricos” que, si bien pueden ser psicológicamente válidos, no suponen más que un espurio acercamiento y una degradación de lo que Kant, tan cuidadosa y filosóficamente, habría abordado. Parece que, para De Man, Schiller no es más que un poeta, un dramaturgo que se sale de su lugar para entrometerse en un tipo de discurso que sería únicamente prerrogativa de un filósofo *puro*. Para Schiller, una afirmación semejante carecería probablemente de todo sentido, ya que, “No lo que él emprende, sino cómo trata lo que emprende es lo que caracteriza al espíritu filosófico” (NA XVII, p. 363). La filosofía no se restringiría a ámbito *propio* alguno, el hecho de que, en el caso de analizar lo sublime, el interés de Schiller tenga un cariz eminentemente práctico no supone una degradación de su “valor filosófico”, sino que simplemente denota un acercamiento y unas intenciones distintas a las

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<sup>27</sup> De Man, P., 1998, p. 193.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 202.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 209.

kantianas<sup>31</sup>. En el caso de las ideas de lo bello y lo sublime, Macor subrayaba cómo Schiller se acerca a la *Kritik der Urteilskraft* movido por sus intereses como poeta y dramaturgo, buscando resolver los problemas de la autonomía respecto a toda autoridad, y de la mayoría de edad que habían quedado expresados en sus primeras obras dramáticas. Así, Schiller encuentra en Kant una fundamentación para su propia dramatización y teorización previa<sup>32</sup>. Gracias a Kant, Schiller es capaz de afrontar y desarrollar más a fondo los problemas suscitados en torno a la tensión entre autonomía e ilustración, cosa que lleva a cabo en el desarrollo de su propia idea sobre lo trágico<sup>33</sup>.

En este sentido, puede considerarse muy acertada la consideración que Jutta Heinz hace de Schiller como un filósofo diletante, aficionado, un *philosophischer Dilettant*. Lejos de suponer un acercamiento condescendiente al pensamiento de Schiller –se trata de un “diletantismo no ingenuo, sino elaborado”<sup>34</sup> (2007, p. 203), simplemente toma en consideración lo que el mismo Schiller consideraba como necesario para todo proceder filosófico: la *usurpación* de los supuestos límites que los “académicos a sueldo” imponen a sus *propias* disciplinas. Tal y como Valerio Rocco sugiere<sup>35</sup>, éstas consideraciones forman parte de la misma auto-interpretación y auto-crítica de Schiller, que creía que sólo una conexión con la realidad, en su caso a través del arte, podría dotar de una fuerza práctica, capaz de afectar al mundo, a la filosofía que, de otro modo, permanecería estéril. ¿Cómo sería posible dar cuenta de un pensamiento semejante si sólo se tiene en cuenta la producción schilleriana a partir de su lectura de Kant o desde la perspectiva de una filosofía pura?

Es de este modo cómo el planteamiento de Macor nos permite acercarnos, sin prejuicios, a un Schiller como un pensador legítimo, un *ultrailustrado* en el sentido de Oncina, y no como un “mero receptáculo de tesis ajenas”. Y lo hace mediante el análisis de esos supuestos programáticos que conformaban el pensamiento de Schiller: el pensamiento autónomo, el eclecticismo y la mayoría de edad, y que en la *Karlsschule* conformaban realmente los pilares educativos fundamentales. Se trata, finalmente, del constante replanteamiento crítico de las enseñanzas recibidas, que no es sino una herencia del método de la academia: una toma de conciencia crítica. Es así como Macor iguala, por no decir que pone por encima, el valor que el paso por la *Karlsschule* tuvo para Schiller, con

<sup>31</sup> Al respecto, es muy interesante el modo en que María del Rosario Acosta plantea esta cuestión. Lejos de poner en duda el valor filosófico del planteamiento de Schiller, Acosta sugiere lo siguiente en *La tragedia como conjuro*, cit., p. 143: “Frente al interés kantiano en las condiciones transcendentales del juicio estético, el análisis de lo sublime en Schiller muestra que su interés primordial es la pregunta por qué papel juega lo sublime en la realización de la idea de humanidad en aquellos individuos que lo experimentan”. Acosta sugiere que es precisamente en el análisis final de Schiller de lo sublime donde comienza a percibirse un claro alejamiento del planteamiento kantiano (p. 121). En definitiva, el interés schilleriano por lo sublime, más allá del acercamiento kantiano, tendría que ver con la posibilidad de la realización de la libertad en lo real. De hecho, pensar en la posibilidad de una libertad que aparezca, que se manifieste en lo sensible, es para Acosta una de las grandes diferencias que Schiller establece respecto a Kant (p. 191).

<sup>32</sup> Macor, L. A., 2008, pp. 146-7.

<sup>33</sup> Beiser F., 2005, p. 203.

<sup>34</sup> Heinz, J., 2007, p. 203.

<sup>35</sup> Rocco, V., 2009, p. 212.

su encuentro con Kant. El encuentro con la filosofía de éste no supone entonces sino la confirmación del cambio producido por su “propio recorrido personal y autónomo”. Macor, lejos de negar la importancia que pudo tener para Schiller la filosofía kantiana, problematiza y desfetichiza la influencia de Kant sobre Schiller. Esta problematización no es algo que se pueda pasar por alto, precisamente porque es la comprensión de este Schiller ultra-crítico, de este Schiller como pensador híbrido, capaz de pensar la filosofía en conexión con el mundo real lo que habla de la actualidad y relevancia de su pensamiento.

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«Do engenho e da faculdade de julgar»  
(Lição de Antropologia de Kant. *Anthropologie Mrongovius*)

Apresentação

«*On Wit and Faculty of Judgment*»  
(*Kant's Anthropology Lecture. Anthropologie Mrongovius*)

*Presentation*

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O presente texto, de que se dá em seguida a tradução portuguesa, consiste numa lição de antropologia versando engenho [*Witz*] e faculdade de julgar [*Urtheilskraft*], intitulada «Vom Witz und Urtheilskraft». A lição foi proferida por Kant durante o ano lectivo de 1784/85, transcrita pelo seu aluno Mrongovius, e concordantemente colocada entre o grupo de lições por este transcritas no volume 25.2 da *Akademie Ausgabe*, respeitantes às *Lições de Antropologia* do filósofo, mais especificamente, em AA, 25.2: 1262-1272.

A lição em questão, e o importante tema que ela encerra, não seriam porém ocorrência única nos dois volumes das lições recolhidas. São aliás *sete*, as lições que Kant devota ao problema do engenho, e de que esta de 1784/85 faz parte; e se não são tantas quantas as divisões das lições que até nós chegaram, e que estão reunidas na *Akademie-Ausgabe*, é porque em Parow, Kant dedica duas lições ao tópico do engenho, ao passo que

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em Pillau, Kant devota-lhe não tanto uma lição, mas apenas uma breve menção do problema. A primeira versão, datada de 1772/73, intitulou-a Kant «Vom Witz und Scharfsinnigkeit». As restantes receberiam, com maior ou menor exactidão de termos, um título similar ao da nossa lição: «Vom Witz und von der Urtheilskraft»<sup>1</sup>. Outra circunstância importante, por certo não apenas fortuita, é que os textos surgem invariavelmente ladeados de lições de tema similar ao do engenho, a saber, versando «Die Stärke der Phantasie», «Vom Vermögen zu Dichten», «Von den eigentlichen Sinnbilder, oder Symbolis» ou «Vom unwillkührlichen Dichten»; temas que, dir-se-ia, desde logo encaixam a reflexão kantiana sobre o engenho e a faculdade de julgar justamente entre os domínios do entendimento e da imaginação, mas também da filosofia e da poesia – o âmbito que, por sinal, viria a ser o da análise kantiana ao conceito de engenho.<sup>2</sup>

Ao se abordar o *conteúdo* da lição em si, e se comparar este com aquele das outras versões versando o mesmo tema, constatamos que também aqui a recorrência se mantém, dela relevando aquela que facilmente se diria ser a trave-mestre das referidas lições sobre «engenho» em Kant. A saber, *ao engenho opõe-se a faculdade de julgar, e isso tanto na sua função de faculdades do ânimo opostas, quanto nas suas próprias índoles*, as quais, como se verá, para esta cisão tanto contribuem. Assim, diz Kant, natural é que entre as coisas não haja a mínima semelhança (AA, 25.1: 132), a não ser aquela que o sujeito crie para si; isto é, só o homem pode, só ao homem compete, criar tais semelhanças invisíveis; e aí, no processo de criação das mesmas, o *engenho* é o *poder de comparar as representações*, isto é, a faculdade para, olhando para os objectos de modo diferente, e neles descobrindo pontos de contacto, criar essas semelhanças como que do nada, e a *faculdade de julgar*, por seu turno, é o poder para, mediante *diferenciação e associação das representações provindas do engenho, os determinar coincidentes ou não com a verdade* dos objectos no espírito humano e, como tal, por fim aceitar ou não tais representações naquele que é o domínio de conhecimento do espírito humano.

O engenho, dir-se-ia pois, *cria analogia entre as coisas*; e porque esse feixe é invisível, na medida em que não há entre as coisas ligações aparentes, ele tem de ir para além dessa aparência, e descobrir não comuns semelhanças, mas justamente *as mais*

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<sup>1</sup> A saber: «Vom Witz und Scharfsinnigkeit» (Collins, AA, 25.1: 132-139); «Vom Witz und von der Urtheilskraft. oder vom Vermögen Aehnlichkeit und Unterschied zu bemerken» (Parow, AA, 25.1: 310-328); «Vom Witz und von der Urtheilskraft» (Parow, AA, 25.1: 341-358); «Vom Witz und der Urtheils Kraft» (Friedländer, AA, 25.1: 515-520); «ad §572» (Pillau, AA, 25.2: 754-756); «Von dem Vermögen unserer Seele, Vergleichen anzustellen» (Menschenkunde, AA, 25.2: 959-974); «Vom Witz und UrtheilsKraft» (Mrongovius, 1262-1272); «Von dem Witz und der Urtheilskraft» (Busolt, AA, 25.2: 1459-1462).

<sup>2</sup> O tema do engenho em Kant foi, até hoje, alvo de escasso interesse; ou então, mais frequentemente, de um interesse meramente pontual, complementar, servindo a análise de outros temas. Entre os contributos que a isto constituem excepções, por se focarem propriamente sobre o tema da abordagem kantiana ao tópico filosófico do engenho, destaco, entre outros: Best, Otto F., *Der Witz als Erkenntniskraft und Formprinzip*, especialmente o sub-capítulo «“Hülle für die Vernunft“: I Kant», pp. 64-66, Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989; Ritzel, Wolfgang, «Kant über den Witz und Kants Witz», in *Kant-Studien* 82 (1):102-109 (1991); «Witz und reflektierende Urteilskraft in Kants Philosophie», en Bacin et alii (ed.): *Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, Berlin & New York: Walter de Gruyter, vol. IV, 487-96; Silva, Fernando M. F., «“Zum Erfinden wird Witz erfordert”». On the evolution of the Concept of Witz in Kant’s *Anthropology Lectures*», in *Kant’s Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen*, pp. 121-132, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio la Rocca, Robert Loudon, Ubirajara R. De A. Marques, Berlin/Boston, W. de Gruyter, 2015.

*inusitadas, as mais singulares destas* (AA, 25.1: 311, 516, etc.); e portanto, «o engenho tem uma utilidade positiva, e, por certo, a de expandir os nossos conhecimentos, e dar-lhes uma aplicação ampla» (AA, 25.2: 1263)<sup>3</sup>; já a faculdade de julgar, precisa de usar da mesma subtilidade na análise aos materiais que lhe são dados pelo engenho; mas isso, guiando-se ao mesmo tempo pelas suas mais gerais e inflexíveis regras, a fim de jamais se desviar da aplicação destas; sim, pois se o engenho é aqui um instrumento da *faculdade de imaginação*, ao serviço da formação de novas imagens e do enriquecimento do espírito humano, a faculdade de julgar liga-se aqui com o *entendimento*, e portanto, trabalha em prol da clarificação e correcta ordenação de tais imagens; ela visa, pois, a rigorosa dieta, a mais estrita economia do campo de conhecimento humano, e portanto, diz Kant, «a faculdade de julgar tem uma utilidade negativa. A saber, ela serve para a distinção de um conhecimento de outro, e portanto para o impedimento de erros.» (id.) –

Mas, como disse, a oposição entre engenho e faculdade de julgar não é apenas uma entre faculdades naturalmente opostas, mas também uma de diferentes *indoles*, a ponto de ambas as faculdades assumirem em Kant características orgânicas, senão mesmo *humanas*. Isto, aliás, o provam palavras do próprio Kant, nesta e noutras lições. Assim, por certo, «O engenho traz as forças [do ânimo] ao movimento. A faculdade de julgar, ao invés, tolhe-as e confina o irrefreamento do engenho.» (AA, 25.1: 135)<sup>4</sup> E, ao assim agirem contrariamente, «O engenho estimula o ânimo mediante amenidade[,] a faculdade de julgar satisfá-lo mediante profundidade.» (AA, 25.2: 1263)<sup>5</sup>; pois «O engenho abre um campo para perspectivas, ele emparelha as coisas, ele dá a uma inspiração [*Einfall*] a força de pôr em movimento um conjunto de outras, e cria novas ideias; a faculdade de julgar deve tolher os incautos excessos do engenho, e trazê-los à ordem.» (id.)<sup>6</sup> Mas a oposição de ambas as faculdades não se esgota nisto. O engenho, aduz Kant, «é mutável, ávido de novidade e torna-se impaciente quando algo o detém por demasiado tempo» (AA, 25.1: 345)<sup>7</sup> (a ponto, diz Kant, de o poeta *preferir enforçar-se do que sonegar o engenho à nascença* (id.: 133)), ao passo que a faculdade de julgar é sóbria, circunspecta e também prudente (tanto assim, que «O engenhoso é livre no ajuizar (...). Aquele que possui faculdade de julgar é circunspecto no ajuizar» (AA, 25.2: 1264))<sup>8</sup>; e portanto, o engenho

<sup>3</sup> Doravante, todas as citações de Kant em língua portuguesa serão da minha autoria, e portanto da minha responsabilidade, à excepção daquelas respeitantes ao «Opponenten-Rede», que extraio da tradução que da peça fez Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos: «Sobre a ilusão poética e a poética da ilusão», Apresentação, Tradução e Notas de Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, in *Estudos Kantianos*, Marília, v. 2, n.2, pp. 291-314, Jul/Dez.2014. As únicas citações que opto por deixar no original são aquelas extraídas de dicionários, por razões óbvias. Já com respeito às citações da palavra de Kant, elas reportam-se sem excepção à *Akademie-Ausgabe: Gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg. Königlich-Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Berlin: Georg Reimer/de Gruyter, 1900ff.

<sup>4</sup> «Der Witz bringt die Kräfte in Bewegung. Die Urtheilskraft hingegen hemmt sie und hält die zugellösigkeit des Witzes im Zaum.»

<sup>5</sup> «Der Witz belebt das Gemüth durch Annehmlichkeit die Urtheilskraft vergnügt es durch Gründlichkeit.»

<sup>6</sup> «Der Witz öffnet ein Feld zu Aussichten, er paart die Dinge, er giebt einem Einfall die Kraft eine Menge von andern in Bewegung zu setzen und schafft neue Ideen; die Urtheilskraft soll die unbedachtsamen Ausschweifungen des Witzes hemmen und in Ordnung bringen.»

<sup>7</sup> «Der Witz ist veränderlich um Neuigkeiten begierig und wird ungeduldig wenn ihn etwas lange aufhält.»

<sup>8</sup> «Der Witzige ist frei im Urtheilen (...). Der Urtheilskraft besitzt ist behutsam im Urtheilen.»

alimenta, o entendimento é por ele alimentado (id.:1263); a disposição da faculdade de julgar é sempre igual, e constante, a do engenho surpreendente, e «repousa sobre uma disposição original do ânimo (id.:1264). A faculdade de julgar cria sempre algo igual, e o engenho «algo novo» (id:1266); e portanto, não pode espantar que «a força do engenho esteja em trazer à vida coisas deveras inesperadas» (id.: 1267), como *bon mots*, inspirações, e a faculdade de julgar, ao invés, regras, ordenação, compartimentação: «O engenho produz inspirações [*Einfälle*] , a faculdade de julgar intelecções [*Einsichten*]]» (AA, 25.1: 136)<sup>9</sup>, e «O engenho tem de ser mero veículo, e a faculdade de julgar como realidade.» (AA, 25.2: 1270)<sup>10</sup>.

Assim, por todas estas razões, e para não maçar o leitor, dir-se-ia de um fôlego que o engenho é jovem, «um atributo da juventude» (id.: 1263), a faculdade de julgar velha, [um atributo] da idade madura» (ibid.); a faculdade de julgar é em elevado grau cismática; o engenho é sempre um jogo (AA; 25.1: 517, AA, 25.2: 1266), e um *jogo livree salutar* (pois ele «convalesce (...) o ânimo» (ibid.). O engenho é, pois, «por assim dizer, o prestidigitador na alma humana» (AA, 25.1: 353): ele é efêmero, mutável (id: 137), «impaciente» (id.), até mesmo «sedutor» (ibid: 133); a faculdade de julgar é tarda (ibid: 520), «lenta e séria» (AA, 25.2: 1263).

Por certo, isto bastará quanto à *clara e inequívoca oposição entre engenho e faculdade de julgar* – a qual não existe apenas enquanto tal, antes parece ser visceral em ambas as faculdades – o que, por si só, poderia já introduzir os traços gerais da questão em Kant.

Porém, que me seja aduzir a esta pequena introdução ao texto uma leitura não inteiramente contrária, não divergente em relação a esta, mas que antes poderá vir a complementá-la: a de que *entre engenho e faculdade de julgar possa haver, para Kant, não apenas pura dissensão e afastamento*.

Assim, de modo algum pondo em questão o que se disse, e muito menos faltando à sua própria palavra sobre o tema, Kant reitera em todas as referidas lições a necessária cisão entre engenho e faculdade de julgar: o engenho, sob a forma de *bon mots* e inspirações, como o súbito e singular assomo imagético com que o entendimento se vê confrontado; a faculdade de julgar, como o pólo receptor, analisador e apreciador da validade de tais materiais, um ofício judicioso para o qual tem de usar de toda a sua parcimónia e circunspeção. E nisto, ambas as faculdade não são menos do que diferentes; e, aliás, *assim têm de ser para Kant*. Mas, justamente nesta versão de Mronovius, diz-se que, malgrado as suas diferenças, «o engenho é insípido quando nada contém em si de entendimento» (AA, 25.2: 1264)<sup>11</sup> - aduzindo Kant a isto os exemplos dos jogos de palavras, ou da própria companhia em sociedade, que é animada pelo engenho, mas que é tornada sem gosto pela «falta da faculdade de julgar» (id.)<sup>12</sup>. Isto é: *o engenho carece da faculdade de julgar, e esta deste*; e isso porque, bem visto o engenho, enquanto ligação,

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<sup>9</sup> «Der Witz bringt Einfälle, die UrtheilsKrafft Einsichten hervor.»

<sup>10</sup> «Der Witz muss bloss Vehiculum und UrtheilsKrafft wie Realitaet sein.»

<sup>11</sup> «Da der Witz dann schaal ist wen er nichts von Verstand in sich enthält.»

<sup>12</sup> «Der Witz belebt die Gesellschaft der Mangel aber an UrtheilsKrafft darin macht sie abgeschmackt.»

mesmo que inusitada, mesmo que singular, entre as coisas, ele tem de ser porém uma ligação *minimamente* (ou *ulteriormente*) sensata e racional entre estas, e não uma mera invenção por amor cego ao novo, uma simples manifestação de insensatez, um impulso de loucura – e portanto, *ele tem de ter aí, mesmo após a sua intempestiva passagem no ânimo humano, mesmo no seio do «ruído cego»<sup>13</sup> que inicialmente cria, uma possibilidade de sentido ulterior, não apenas imaginativo ou fantasioso, mas também racional, que justamente lhe possa garantir a oportunidade de ser encarado e aceite pelo entendimento enquanto possível (novo) conhecimento humano*; de outro modo, o engenho seria invariavelmente negado por aquele, bem poderia até não existir enquanto tal. Numa palavra, pois, talvez seja de pensar que, para Kant, e especialmente para o Kant desta lição, o engenho não se opõe apenas à faculdade de julgar, tal como a faculdade de imaginação se opõe ao entendimento, antes isto é necessário na medida em que, com igual necessidade, tem de haver uma qualquer *ligação ulterior* entre aquelas, e também entre estas faculdades superiores, muito para além de uma simples oposição, ou de uma simples cisão. E essa possibilidade de ligação, vê-se já, *é para Kant obra do engenho*.

Assim, e tomando em consideração os anteriores dados, poder-se-ia colocar aqui *duas questões*; por certo, aquelas que mais prementemente derivam da suspeita levantada nesta lição: *primeiro*, de onde vem ao engenho esta para si tão natural, mas para nós tão estranha convivência entre fantasioso e racional, que no fundo *é aquela mediante a qual o engenho vem a oferecer-se à faculdade de julgar, podendo por ela não ser rejeitado, e valendo por isso enquanto tal?* E *segundo*: a existir esta convivência, e a ser ela tão natural para o engenho quanto parece, como se dá ulteriormente a fusão entre contrários, isto é, como pode ser operada e reconstituída esta mesma convivência no espírito humano, sem que o entendimento com isso seja ofendido, e o engenho rejeitado sem mais contemplações?

À *primeira* questão, responderíamos que, não obstante todas as suas características exóticas, esta sua lógica outra, o seu carácter singular, o engenho nunca fora, e muito menos o era na época de Kant, inteiramente desconhecido nem da mera racionalidade, nem do próprio cariz judicioso que é o do entendimento; bem pelo contrário, o engenho privara já de muito perto com estes, e poder-se-ia dizer, e que me seja perdoada a liberdade, que *o engenho conhecia bem os cantos à casa do espírito humano* – e Kant, que por sinal não estava habituado a debruçar-se sobre um assunto sem o esgotar, sabia disso mesmo.

A questão principal é, pois: *que conceito de engenho, ou que fase da história deste conceito, era esta que chegava até à época de Kant?* A resposta a isto, e ao que afirmámos ainda agora, dá-a a própria – e longa – história do conceito na língua alemã.

Assim, originariamente, engenho [*Witz*], ou *wizzi*, vem do sânscrito *vid*, do latim *videre* e do grego *îdeá*, e significava não inventividade, não fantasia, inspiração ou assomo do pensamento, como na época de Kant, mas antes conhecimento, saber, sabedoria, e até

<sup>13</sup> «Das Spiel des Witzes gefällt uns wol sehr aber wenn es am Ende ist, sind wir doch nicht damit zufrieden. Der Verstand sucht sich vom ganzen und Manigfaltigen eine Idee zu machen. Kann er das nicht, so ist er unzufrieden.», e nós, aduz por fim Kant, somos deixados com um «blindes Getön».

mesmo razão (*ratio*), *intelligentia*, *prudentia*. Aliás, ao consultarmos o *Altdeutsches Lesebuch*<sup>14</sup>, de Oscar Schade, este diz sobre «wizî, wizzî, wizze» (de *vitan*, ver, observar): «Wißen, Einsicht, Verstand, Weisheit», e sobre «wizîg, wizîe, wizzîg, wizzîe»: «kundig, gnarus, verstândig, klug, prudens, astutus, weise» (AL, II: 731) – e daqui, diz também Eberhard G. Graffno seu *Althochdeutsche Sprachschatz* (1835-1843)<sup>15</sup>, é extraída a sua mais originária significação sensível: a de *ver*, na sua conjugação semântica com a noção de *saber*: «wißen (nicht wissen), scire» (AS, I: 1089); e portanto, *o engenho tem, já na sua origem, uma raiz marcadamente racional*: dir-se-ia, uma ligação à razão, à dissociação própria do conhecer, à singularização própria da consciência de si do Eu que conhece e, por fim, até mesmo à sistematização rígida do ver e do saber científicos – e foi em tempos um conceito de uma *frieza racional*, bem diferente daquele que, cerca de nove séculos depois, foi dado a conhecer à época de Kant.

Com o passar dos séculos, e a chegada do período do alemão médio, entre 1050 e 1350, dá-se porém uma pouco perceptível, mas certa modulação no âmbito semântico do conceito. A saber, dá-se então uma gradual *des-racionalização* do conceito de engenho, sob a forma de uma evolução do mesmo para uma outra faculdade do espírito humano: adquirindo este, pois, uma nova, cada vez mais notória componente judiciosa – isto é, discriminatória, inquisitiva, escrutinante, senão mesmo judicial, e em derradeira instância punitiva. Prova disto, dão-nos, uma vez mais, os dicionários da época: quer Johann C. A. Heyse, no seu *Handwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache* (1833-1849)<sup>16</sup>, dizendo que «Witz» significara outrora «klares Bewußtsein, Besonnenheit, Wissen, Einsicht (...), Klugheit» (HdT, 2.2: 1968), mas que na sua época, não mais assim era; e também Georg F. Benecke, que, no seu *Mittelhochdeutsches Wörterbuch* (1854-1866)<sup>17</sup>, corrobora isto mesmo, dizendo que do alemão antigo para o alemão médio o termo «engenho» mudara, e não pouco, pois «im mhd. ist ich wize (ahd. wizu) ich werfe vor, ich strafe, vgl. lat. animadvertere» (MW, 3: 781). E portanto, numa palavra, o engenho, por certo não abandonando as suas faculdades legisladoras, de razão, transitara agora porém para uma sua faceta executora; e do mundo das meras ideias, ele descera a um mundo intermédio, mais físico, e se não totalmente, pelo menos o suficiente para poder fazer valer estas suas recém-adquiridas competências – por certo, um mundo entre o da razão e o dos meros sentidos, o da vida contemplativa e da vida real. O engenho, dir-se-ia pois – e até para recorrer mais uma vez à tabela kantiana –, era agora cada vez mais *entendimento* (*Verstand*, *judicium*) no seu judicioso processo de dissociação, classificação e conseqüente formação de representações; e quando necessário fosse, o engenho, como o entendimento, traduziria noções de aceitação ou rejeição, e clemência ou punição, e assim seria também durante os

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<sup>14</sup> Schade, Oscar, *Altdeutsches Lesebuch Gothicisch Altsächsisch Alt- und Mittelhochdeutsch, mit Literarischen Nachweisen und einem Wörterbuche* (2 Bde.), Halle, Verlag der Buchhandlung des Waisenhauses, 1866.

<sup>15</sup> Graff, Eberhard G., *Althochdeutsche Sprachschatz, oder Wörterbuch der althochdeutschen Sprache*, Berlin, beim Verfasser und in Commission der Nikolaischen Buchhandlung, 1835-1843.

<sup>16</sup> Heyse, Johann C. A., *Handwörterbuch der deutschen Sprache mit. Hinsicht auf Rechtschreibung, Abstammung und Bildung, Biegung und Fügung der Wörter, so wie auf deren Sinnverwandtschaft*, Magdeburg, bey Wilhelm Heinrichshofen, 1849.

<sup>17</sup> Benecke, Georg F., *Mittelhochdeutsches Wörterbuch, mit Benutzung des Nachlasses*, Ausg. von Wilhelm Müller und Friedrich Zarncke, Leipzig, Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1854-1866.

séculos subsequentes, onde, já bem dentro do alemão moderno, e apesar de inevitáveis mutações semânticas, o engenho continua a ser tomado por *entendimento*, prudência, sensatez, entre outros. E eis como, pouco a pouco, o conceito de engenho toma já aqui uma forma, senão ainda próxima, pelo menos mais próxima daquela que teria na época de Kant, albergando ele mesmo o conceito de faculdade de julgar, e acolhendo em si o campo semântico de *duas* faculdades do ânimo.

E assim seria, até que, dizem-nos os irmãos Grimm, no seu *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (1838-1961)<sup>18</sup>, uma *última influência* viria a causar uma derradeira modulação no termo, e a oferecer-lhe o singular cunho que ele teria aquando da época de Kant, e que ainda hoje não terá perdido por completo.

Essa influência dá-se porque, talvez devido ao carácter originariamente abstracto da palavra, ou devido também à sua ainda insuficiente delimitação nos séculos anteriores, à chegada do séc. XVII, porém, o conceito de engenho «noch keine feste deutsche Bezeichnung [hat]». Ainda e apenas «Witz», o conceito era ainda muito díspar dos seus congéneres «*esprit*», na França, e «*wit*», na Inglaterra; e não fosse a sua ligação com o *ingenium* latino, e poder-se-ia até dizer que este nada teria a ver com aquelas. Mas, à entrada do século XVII, dá-se uma paulatina *desarbitrarização* do conceito de engenho. Ao mesmo tempo que se dá a *elevação da própria estética a disciplina filosófica* (com Baumgarten), o engenho, tal como o génio ou o gosto, são elevados a *instrumentos estéticos*. No caso do engenho em particular, o termo eleva-se a *força ou faculdade do ânimo humano*; e encontrando-se «*esprit*», «*wit*» e «*Witz*» *simultaneamente nesta nova condição*, dá-se entre eles uma decisiva *aproximação*, consentânea com a subsequente aproximação, quer pacífica, quer não tão pacífica, entre as literaturas e filosofias dos países em questão em torno dos conceitos acima referidos. Assim, sem nunca perder o seu carácter racional, mas agora assumindo um seu novo, mais específico e também mais relevante papel como faculdade do ânimo, o engenho alemão apropria-se das *características modernas*, temporalmente mais avançadas dos seus congéneres de outras línguas<sup>19</sup>, a fim de as unir às suas, marcadamente intelectuais, e a própria Alemanha começa a aplicar estas mesmas no uso do termo na sua literatura, dizem os Grimm, a partir do início do séc. XVIII. Mas – sublinho – não se apropria *de todas as características*; mas apenas daquelas que melhor serviam, melhor se adaptavam à sua transformação em curso, a saber, aquelas que favoreciam a sua natural evolução de entendimento para um «dom do espírito» (segundo os Grimm) - um de uma outra gadanha que não a intelectual, e portanto, de um outro enfoque que não apenas o da generalidade da razão humana, mas mais da *especificidade do sentimento do indivíduo*.

Assim, primeiro por certo na França e na Inglaterra, e depois na Alemanha, o engenho, que fora outrora razão, *scientia*, sabedoria, ver e saber, e em séculos mais recentes aperfeiçoara o seu significado, e portanto também o seu conhecimento e a sua visão, assumindo-se cada vez mais como o judicioso *analogon* do entendimento humano,

<sup>18</sup> Consultado em [www.http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/](http://woerterbuchnetz.de/DWB/)

<sup>19</sup> «Immer wahr witz den rein rationalen charakter, auch dort, wo einfluss von esprit vorliegt» (Grimm).

discriminando e punindo, era agora enfim um «dom do espírito», no dizer dos *Grimm*; uma «qualité de l’ame» (E, 13: 34), no dizer de *Diderot*<sup>20</sup>; um «power of the mind» (DeL: 822), no dizer de *Johnson*<sup>21</sup> – mas não do espírito em geral, não algo comum a todos os homens, como o fora na sua origem, e o era, ainda que cada vez menos, no segundo estágio da sua evolução. Engenho era agora, isso sim, «*persönliche Fähigkeit*» (it. meus, *Grimm*) – ela era marca da individualidade do Eu –, e não só do indivíduo, mas, a julgar pelos anteriores testemunhos, de indivíduos especiais, dotados de vivacidade, brilho, fecundidade, gosto, talento, fineza de pensamento, génio. Isto é, de marca da razão, da racionalidade em geral do homem, cujas representações eram geralmente tidas como racionais, o engenho enquanto entendimento passara a designar, com o tempo, o escrutínio dessas mesmas representações, e punição das ditas incorrectas ou proibitivas: proibitivas, no fundo, para a racionalidade que o engenho nunca perdeu. Mas agora, segundo parece, o próprio engenho, atingido o máximo rigor da sua tarefa, cristalizado esse seu ofício, abria um *veio de excepção* (ou de excepcionalidade), não só na sua definição, como também nas representações que trabalha. Pois, dir-se-ia, como resultado de todo o trabalho escrutinante, analítico, diferenciador que era o do engenho enquanto entendimento, só pode estar *a síntese, a analogia, enfim, a semelhança* – numa palavra, o trabalho que compete à imaginação, à faculdade de comparar e à fantasia. E, no fundo, *justamente isso* ocorre com o engenho a partir das primeiras décadas do século XVIII, época de Kant: *o engenho passa a ser... imaginação; e em plena transição entre a sua faceta de entendimento, e a sua faceta de imaginação* (e sem nunca ter deixado de ser razão), o engenho passa a ser tanto a anterior busca, a anterior análise de representações, como a sua posterior conjugação sob a forma de uma representação não só boa, como denotando espírito, talento e profundidade, senão mesmo *génio*; tanto a morosa, rigorosa análise da representação, como a sua subsequente e súbita formação enquanto assomo do espírito, manifestação espontânea de gosto e graça («quickness of fancy» (DeL: 822)); enfim, tanto racionalidade e intelectualidade («sense»; «judgment» (id.)), frieza de dissociação e inflexibilidade, quanto faculdade de imaginação e inventividade, cálida associação e analogia (numa palavra, como diria *Diderot*, «raison ingénieuse» (E, 13: 34)); e só é todas estas coisas, diz S. Johnson, porque as suas representações, apesar de denotarem «invention» e «ingenuity» (DeL: 822), justamente porque estão apoiadas no entendimento que ele próprio é, indicam também «soundness of understanding, intellect not crazed; sound mind» (id.), e portanto representações elas próprias sãs, não só não-conflituosas com a própria essência lata do engenho, como antes promotoras do mesmo.

Importa, pois, ressaltar o seguinte: no engenho, ainda razão, e ainda mais entendimento, «emergem agora claramente», dizem os *Grimm*, «a vivacidade espiritual e o carácter de surpresa da inspiração», próprios do acto de imaginar – e o engenho passa a ser não tanto a generalidade dos conceitos da racionalidade, mas a especificidade dos

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<sup>20</sup> Diderot, D., D’Alembert, J. le R., *Encyclopédie, ou Dictionnaire raisonné des Sciences, des Arts et des Métiers*, Berne, Lausanne, Chez les Sociétés Typographiques, 1751-1772.

<sup>21</sup> Johnson, Samuel; Walker, John, *Dictionary of the English Language*, London, William Pickering, George Cowey and Co. Poultry, 1755 (Rev. 1827).

conceitos do *sentimento individual* que ele próprio desperta – ambos moderados pelo carácter de entendimento que não desaparece. O percurso de emancipação do engenho, agora estimulado como um dos instrumentos da recém-reconhecida estética, *cumprе aqui o seu círculo completo, e o engenho assume-se aqui, finalmente, como as três faculdades do ânimo a um tempo*, ora mais umas (no seu passado), ora mais outras (no seu presente e futuro) – mas sempre as três a um tempo – e é isso, por fim, que pode responder à nossa primeira questão, e explicar o porquê de, na época de Kant, o engenho mostrar ter já uma mais que apenas possível convivência com faculdades (apenas aparentemente) tão diferentes de si.

A segunda questão, complementar em relação à primeira, reformulamo-la agora do seguinte modo: *trabalhando a faculdade de julgar com intelecções, e portanto com a validade, a racionalidade, a verdade das imagens, como há-de ela alguma vez aceitar as excêntricas, tão violentas produções do engenho, elas que, como vimos, se dão a conhecer pela sua singularidade, o seu carácter fantasioso e até uma sua aparente inverdade, ou ludíbrio?* Isto é, como é possível que ambas as faculdades cooperem? Sim, pois não raras vezes Kant aponta antes para o risco de que as imagens do engenho iludam os homens (AA, 25.1: 316), a necessidade de que lhe seja posto um freio, sob pena de elas conduzirem à loucura ou ao desespero de quem as forja; e isso porque, atalha Kant, quando descontrolado, o engenho não passa de uma «jiga-joga de representações que é muito nociva para os conceitos do entendimento» (AA, 25.2: 1463)<sup>22</sup>.

Ora, com respeito a isto, sublinhámos já que o entendimento é inflexível; pois, salvaguardando-se a si próprio, e obedecendo cegamente ao progresso em direcção à verdade, ele vive para eliminar as imagens que considere falsas, enganadoras ou confusas; no fundo, ele existe para *sanear* o espírito humano, concedendo que nele entrem apenas representações depuradas, reais, verdadeiras. Mas, como vimos, o engenho não é estranho à verdade, à depuração, à validade que o entendimento tem por boas. Pois *o engenho foi também já, e era ainda intelectual* – e Kant não só sabia disto, como reconhece ainda outras capacidades ao engenho. Pois o engenho, *se provido de entendimento*, e não agindo apenas por conta própria, não é nem mera racionalidade morta, nem porém excesso de vida – loucura exuberante, absurdo ou insensatez – e isso, nem mesmo neste ponto da sua evolução em que ele é o contrário da razão que outrora foi, nunca foi porém loucura, absurdo ou insensatez, e tão-pouco o é mesmo neste ponto da sua evolução em que ele é o contrário do que outrora foi, nem mesmo num momento de seu máximo arrebatamento.

Assim, no fundo, *o que encerra o momento de enlevamento do engenho, e como lhe reage a faculdade de julgar?*

Como vimos, no turbilhão de imagens criado pelo engenho, mediante rememoração estética ou engenhsosa, o engenho promove a mútua comparação de imagens, e isso tanto entre imagens cuja relação é cristalina, como entre imagens cuja relação é de todo absurda, ou obscura, pelo menos ao olhar do entendimento (*iudicium discretivum*). Mas, no meio

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<sup>22</sup> «(...) ein Mischmasch von Vorstellungen der den Verstandes Begriffen sehr schädlich ist.»



deste *barulho* (*Getön*), o poeta e o seu engenho *não elegem nem umas, nem outras*; isto é, ele não elege de todo imagens apenas «jogando com o lado externo das coisas» (AA, 25.1: 317), ou então jogando sem finalidade aparente; bem pelo contrário, o engenho, porque era então ainda intelecto, e cada vez mais imaginação, *porque estava então na charneira entre ambas*, joga deveras, mas joga, diz Kant, discernindo uma «semelhança verdadeira nas coisas, mas não em sinais arbitrários» (id.: 318)<sup>23</sup>; e portanto, assomam-lhe ao espírito, sob a forma de inspirações, *representações que, dir-se-ia, têm algo de óbvio, e ao mesmo tempo de estranho*: que são, pois, singulares, mas que não deixam de ter uma ligação intelectual ao referido tesouro do conhecimento já adquirido; e que, inscrevendo-se por certo neste, neste parecem porém destoar em razão do seu cariz extrâneo. Isto é, o engenho cria imagens que, *dir-se-ia, são verdade e não são*; são reais e não são; e por conseguinte, *iludem, e ligam-nos à realidade de um modo diferente*, mediante um sentimento e uma racionalidade diferentes daqueles do sentimento e da racionalidade em geral – o que, para Kant, é apenas o óbvio resultado da dupla forma contrária que se estabelece entre imaginação e entendimento, e do equilíbrio dinâmico de forças que em resultado deste se concentra na imagem do engenho.

Aliás, quiséssemos nós compreender de vez este *efeitoilusório do engenho*, e, segundo creio, apenas teríamos de ver como ele surge exposto não só noutras lições de antropologia de tema afim, mas, mais particularmente ainda, no pequeno conjunto de anotações que Kant escreveria como esboço de arguição da tese de Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld, em 1777, texto posteriormente publicado na *Akademie-Ausgabe* sob o título «Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede» (AA XV.2: 903-935); aí, a saber, *sob a designação de ilusão poética*.

Pois, com efeito, é aí argumento fulcral que *a ilusão poética – tal como o engenho –, distingue-se do mero engano dos sentidos*, e nisso, ao contrário daquele, não é «lucrativo», mas tão-pouco «inglorioso» (AA 15.2: 906); pois o que o engano dos sentidos faz, é servir-se da natural propensão do espírito para ser enganado, e até da vontade deste para ser ludibriado, e nisso apresenta à faculdade de julgar imagens ficcionadas, falácias dos sentidos que visam apenas um ganho físico, e que talvez até satisfaçam o corpo, mas nada trazem, nada acrescentam ao ânimo, e que por fim se revelam mera «vacuidade e ludíbrio» («vanitate et ludibrio» (id.: 907)), e que por isso são ulteriormente sem mais rejeitadas por aquela suprema censora do conhecimento humano, e da verdade do mesmo. O mesmo é dizer, pois, que o engano dos sentidos trabalha com o já referido «lado externo das coisas» (AA 25.1: 317), e nisso, apresenta ao espírito ou coisas que ele já conhece, ou, para aparentar ser novo, falsidades apoiadas não em sinais verdadeiros, mas em «sinais arbitrários» (id.: 318). Ao passo que a *ilusão*, embora radicando por certo na propensão do primeiro, antes lhe confere uma outra direcção, a saber, a de uma aparência lúdica criada pelos poetas com o muito específico propósito de enlevar, vivificar, *animar* o espírito; e por isso Kant diz: «Há, com efeito, certas imagens das coisas mediante as quais a mente

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<sup>23</sup> «Wenn man durch eine Aehnlichkeit eine Sache reproduciren will, so muß es eine wahre Aehnlichkeit in den Sachen, nicht aber in willkührlichen Zeichen seyn.»

joga, mas não é por elas iludida.» (AA 15.2:906)<sup>24</sup>. Isto é, enquanto o engano, reitera, «induz os incautos no erro» (ibid.), e «defrauda os ingénuos e crédulos com adorno e enganos» (id.: 906-7), e a sua imagem desaparece, causando desagrado e tédio, a da ilusão poética, sendo ela um jogo, e jogando-se este jogo justamente através da novidade, do carácter inesperado, até do choque de relações insuspeitadas entre os objectos que suscitaram tais representações, suscita agrado, o prazer do jogo, e nisso a imagem permanece; e ainda que num primeiro momento possa causar estranhamento, singularidade (o já referido «blindes Getön»), ela ganha posteriormente e infalivelmente uma nova vida, uma nova lógica, um novo sentido antes inusitado, que é o de se estar a apresentar ao entendimento imagens sob «cores sensíveis» (id.: 907), ou, se se quiser, a verdade sob outras vestes que não aquelas a que o entendimento está acostumado – uma permanência, aliás, garantida justamente pelo posterior prazer que é proporcionado ao espírito percepçionante.

Ora, estas características da *ilusão poética* – o carácter de verdade inverdadeira, o estranhamento causado, a posterior adaptação ao espírito, a surpresa, o prazer tardio, mas certo –, elas são, no fundo, as mesmas que Kant vem descrevendo como sendo as propriedades mais óbvias do *engenho*: a sua simultânea realidade e irrealidade, a sua diferente forma de apresentar a verdade, o seu carácter súbito e violento. E portanto, isto apenas prova que *há entre o engenho e a ilusão poética mais do que uma feliz coincidência, e sobretudo, entre o engenho e a poesia mais do que uma casual confluência*. Assim, se com respeito ao par engenho-ilusão poética, eles parecem de facto ter características similares, e até, como veremos, pugnar por um propósito comum; é porém olhando para esta sugerida *afinidade* que melhor se vê que, justamente, há para Kant entre poesia e engenho mais do que uma mera aproximação, antes, porventura, *um ulterior sentido comum*, uma existência, e um destino por ambos partilhados. Sim, pois, nas palavras de Kant, segundo Swift, «o cérebro dos poetas está cheio de vermes que, ao roerem diferentemente os nervos, suscitam diferentes inspirações.» (AA, 25.1: 311) – isto, numa clara alusão à afinidade entre engenho e inspiração poética; e mais claramente ainda, diz Kant, «As condições para se ser poeta são as mesmas que do engenho: «I. Ele tem de ser novo nas imagens que faz – (...); II) Nos seus escritos, o poeta tem de observar sempre um analogon da verdade (...). O poeta tem de inventar, e saber colocar a sua invenção numa claridade intuitiva. (id.: 323) Isto é, numa palavra, *o engenho é propriamente a ilusão poética*, pois ele inventa, e é novo nas imagens que faz; mas ao ter de criar um «analogon da verdade», o qual será apresentado pelo engenho à faculdade de julgar, o poeta, a poesia forja com o engenho *um elo de uma outra natureza*. Assim, parece dizer Kant, *a poesia é o efeito final do engenho, o engenho a causa inicial da poesia; e portanto, o engenho é o acto poético por excelência, poesia em si*. Mas sobretudo, sugere Kant, nesse acto do fazer criativo ocorre *uma analogização da verdade*, e por certo uma nova, em que se dá do objecto *uma sua nova imagem, mais sensível e verdadeira, porque criada a partir de sinais não-arbitrários, e porque trazido do roer certo dos vermes do*

<sup>24</sup> «Sunt autem quaedam rerum species, quibus mens ludit, non ab ipsis ludificatur.»

*engenho*. E se assim acontece, então, *com o engenho, como com a poesia, dão-se não só inventividade, não só ilusão agradável, mas também, por meio destes, novos, muito importantes conhecimentos para o espírito humano, e com isto um novo e inesperado ganho para a racionalidade do mesmo*. A poesia, bem como o engenho, enfim unidos, largam aqui os injustos trajes que por vezes lhes vestem, de ludibriadores, impostores do espírito humano e lacaios dos sentidos, para passarem a assumir novas faces, antes cooperando activamente no processo de enriquecimento do tesouro da cognição do espírito humano; e o engenho, em particular, cumpre assim aquela que sempre terá sido a sua destinação: a de, mesmo conotado com o jogo e a ilusão poética, assumir-se como aquilo que sempre fora, e agora era ainda: uma paleta viva das três faculdades do ânimo humano, em si comprovadas não só pela sua história, mas agora sobretudo por esta sua singular eficácia.

E por isso, pergunta-se por fim: que faz perante tudo isto a faculdade de julgar?

A faculdade de julgar, sabemos-lo por Kant, assiste a todo o processo; pois ela acompanha-o sempre como uma necessária contra-força. Mas vendo-se deparada com tão singulares imagens do engenho, ela não só não é capaz, como não *pode* de todo negá-las; e aí, e só aí, se dá *o tão esperado momento em que o entendimento, dir-se-ia, baixa a guarda, e pode e deve aceitar tais representações do engenho*. Pois embora estas tenham em si algo aparentemente ilusório, elas têm também em si o referido «analogon da verdade», e logo uma verdade que, por surgir sob vestes mais ricas e exóticas do que seria de esperar, se afigura irrefutável. E se isto assim é, não é apenas porque tal imagem do engenho *tenha* uma relação com a verdade; e não é apenas isto, diria Kant, que leva a faculdade de julgar a aceitar o engenho. Bem pelo contrário, isto dá-se porque a imagem do engenho, se pura, e se inaudita nos seus contornos; numa palavra, se poética, e portanto nova para o entendimento, mas ancorada neste e portanto por este legitimada, aparenta ser – e *é de facto* – *mais verdadeira do que a verdade racional das coisas*. E portanto a faculdade de julgar, por certo perante a ilusão, mas sobretudo perante esta verdade mais verdadeira, *nada tem a opor*, e não só lhes concede acesso ao conhecimento, não só lhes faculta passagem para o espírito humano, onde elas têm o seu derradeiro efeito, como *reconhece nelas a sua própria vantagem, o efeito balsâmico de novos conhecimentos, e do súbito e imediato prazer por eles proporcionado, próprio apenas de uma verdade única, mais real, mais sensível do que aquela que o entendimento está habituado a aceitar*; e isto, enquanto ela própria age enquanto tal, isto é, movendo uma simultânea resistência ao engenho, de que a faculdade de julgar nunca pode prescindir, e que aliás impede o engenho de se exceder e de degenerar no absurdo.

Assim, concluir-se-ia, o *engenho* vê-se aqui, *da única maneira possível*, unido com a *faculdade de julgar*, sua oposta, por certo, mas também sua indispensável concorrente no natural processo de formação de imagens e respectivos conceitos por parte do espírito humano. E com isso, o *entendimento* vê-se, nesta sua cooperação com a imaginação, mediante o engenho, libertado da «força indómita dos sentidos» (AA, 15.2: 910) e dos enganos inerentes a estes, assim se promovendo «o império do entendimento sobre o ignóbil vulgo dos sentidos» (id.: 909); e a *imaginação*, ilibada aqui da fraca suspeita de ser

o engenho, seu instrumento, um emissário dos sentidos, contribui decisivamente para a libertação do entendimento, e é ela própria refreada por este (num mútuo diálogo de forças opostas, mas concorrentes). E, por fim, por isto se vem a perceber no *engenho*, e no seu cariz poético, o seu *fim último*, e com isso também o seu *benefício último*: a saber, por um lado, a ulterior *ligação entre imaginação e entendimento*, sem desfavor ou rejeição da primeira (a quem é concedida a liberdade em que tanto gosta de operar), e em prol do último (que se vê assim favorecido, e também enaltecido no seu ofício): «Engenho e faculdade de julgar servem para a ligação da imaginação com o entendimento. O engenho traz a imaginação mais próxima do entendimento» (AA, 25.2: 1267-1268)<sup>25</sup>; e, por outro, a daí decorrente, mais ampla ligação entre poesia e filosofia, que não só deve ser «louvada pelo filósofo» (AA, 15.1: 909), como, aliás, muito naturalmente decorre do natural efeito do engenho: «Assim, o engenho muito se presta à filosofia. O engenho serve ao entendimento como invenção.»<sup>26</sup>

**Breve nota  
sobre critérios de  
tradução**

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<sup>25</sup> «Witz und UrtheilsKraft dienen zur Verbindung der EinbildungsKraft mit dem Verstand. Der Witz bringt die EinbildungsKraft dem Verstand nahe»

<sup>26</sup> «Es gehört also zur Philosophie viel Witz. Der Witz dient dem Verstande zur Erfindung» (AA, 25.1: 518); e ainda: «Zu Erfindung und zu Wissenschaften gehört Witz, aber es muss noch Wahrheit dazu kommen» (AA, 25.2: 1266)

Se, por si só, o acto de traduzir qualquer autor implica perceber diferentes especificidades, diferentes mecanismos, diferentes tons próprios de cada modo de escrever, traduzir Kant, que não raras vezes deploraria a sua própria falta de eloquência, e cuja palavra se encontra *aqui* em circunstâncias ainda mais especiais, tem de obedecer a certos, sem dúvida não menos especiais critérios. Pois o texto em questão consiste numa *lição* – ou antes, a *transcrição* de uma lição; e portanto, não só não proveio *directamente* da pena de Kant, como é de pensar que, mesmo tendo sido proferida por Kant, a espaços, porém, Kant não a terá proferido *ipsis verbis* como ela chegou até nós; ao que há que acrescentar que, tratando-se o texto em questão de uma lição, então a estrutura do mesmo terá sido disposta por Kant de um modo determinado, o uso de linguagem obedecerá por certo a pressupostos académicos, tendo em vista beneficiar a apreensão da mesma pelos seus alunos, e até mesmo o seu tom é um que, como é sabido, não poderá ser rigorosamente igual ao de outras obras pela mão do autor. Para além disto, como disse, a linguagem de Kant tem em geral traços muito próprios, únicos, a princípio parecendo fazer justiça à falta de loquacidade do autor, mas sobretudo, uma vez criada habitação à mesma, por fim transparecendo uma simplicidade profunda, e porém um despretensiosismo e uma leveza deveras agradáveis, a certa altura facilmente reconhecíveis como característicos do modo de pensar e escrever kantiano; traços que, como é natural, terão de surgir ainda mais vincadamente numa lição como esta, e terão de ser correspondidos com igual rigor e simplicidade, igual humildade e leveza, por parte do tradutor.

Assim, tudo no presente tentame de tradução vai no sentido de respeitar as referidas propriedades do estilo kantiano, e de apresentar ao leitor uma versão da lição de Kant tão fiel, tão próxima do texto original – quer no seu conteúdo, quer na sua forma –, e portanto tão pouco intromissiva ou invasiva, quanto possível.

Por conseguinte, a nível *estilístico*, procurou-se, tanto quanto possível, guardar fidelidade ao tom de época do discorrer kantiano, e isso não só em geral, mas mais visivelmente, por um lado, ao nível das classes de palavras, que foram mantidas quase sem excepção, e por outro, ao nível aos artigos, e também à ausência dos mesmos; e só quando a língua portuguesa, de raiz diferente da alemã, o não permite de todo, é que a voz de Kant se vê forçada a soar diferente do original. Ditos, provérbios, entre outros, foram quando possível mantidos em respeito à especificidade da língua alemã, e não traduzidos pelos seus ditos correspondentes em língua portuguesa (excepção feita, por exemplo, na expressão: «Man nent Leute Pinsel», cuja tradução literal esconderia o significado do original); e o mesmo foi por nós aplicado até mesmo a expressões não idiomáticas, ambas as decisões num esforço de poder reproduzir, se não todo, pelo menos algum do estranhamento com que a palavra de Kant hoje por nós tem de ser recebida.

Com respeito a aspectos *formais* do texto, os objectivos desta tradução são similares. A pontuação, tanto quanto possível, foi deixada intocada (travessões, pontos finais não substituídos por vírgulas, ou vice-versa, entre outros); mas porque, nesta lição em específico, é perceptível uma forte ausência de pontuação, a ponto de por vezes não ser bem perceptível onde uma frase começa ou acaba, ou até onde começam e acabam as

diferentes premissas de uma frase – um sintoma próprio da transcrição de uma lição –, então vimo-nos forçados a incluí-la onde necessário, o que fizemos por meio de parênteses rectos (por exemplo, [.] ou [;]). Já a ocorrência de números («2», «4»...), foi deixada enquanto tal, o mesmo acontecendo com os sublinhados e com os itálicos presentes no texto original («moda», «rico de sentido»); o mesmo fizemos ainda com todas as palavras não-alemãs por Kant usadas no texto («hardi», «metier», «bon mots», «vehiculum», «coffee house», entre outras), as quais deixámos intocadas na sua língua de origem, mas, a bem de uma mais fácil compreensão das mesmas, decidimos grafar a itálico, nisto diferindo da edição da Academia.

Por fim, as exceções a este esforço de fidelidade são *duas*; ambas, no entanto, tendo em vista apenas complementar a lição em questão, e, se possível, favorecer uma leitura mais completa e rigorosa deste texto. Uma, dá-se ao ocorrerem palavras centrais para a compreensão do texto, ou palavras que, no encadeamento, encontram similar correspondente, e por isso possam ser confundidas, ou, por fim, palavras cuja tradução, pela sua dificuldade, merece ser acompanhada da palavra original. Em qualquer um destes três casos, fazemos seguir a palavra traduzida do seu original, entre parênteses rectos (por exemplo, o próprio engenho [*Witz*], inspiração [*Einfall*], ou intelecção [*Einsicht*]). Outra, ocorre na complementação de certos passos da tradução com passos afins em tema de outras lições de antropologia de Kant, que traduzimos a bem da completude, e que incluímos sob a forma de notas de rodapé, precedendo-as aí do ano em que foram proferidas e do nome do aluno de Kant que procedeu à transcrição das mesmas, e registando no fim destas a respectiva paginação.

## Tradução

### Do engenho e da faculdade de julgar

Immanuel Kant

1784/85

[AA, 25.2: 1262-1272]

Aquela representação que oferece as representações da imaginação ao entendimento, para que este nelas labore, designa-se por faculdade de comparar[.] Esta é dupla: 1.) a faculdade de comparar as representações, essa chama-se engenho [*Witz*] 2.) a faculdade de conectar as representações chama-se faculdade de julgar [*Urtheilskraft*].<sup>27</sup>

Onde ambas estão juntas, isso é perspicácia. A faculdade de julgar tem uma utilidade negativa. A saber, ela serve para a distinção de um conhecimento de outro, e portanto para o impedimento de erros[.] O engenho tem uma utilidade positiva, e, por certo, a de expandir os nossos conhecimentos, e dar-lhes uma aplicação ampla.

Por isto, depreende-se já que o engenho será amado, mas a faculdade de julgar não o será; pois esta restringe, aquele expande. O engenho estimula o ânimo mediante amenidade[,] a faculdade de julgar satisfá-lo mediante profundidade.

Engenho é fugaz. Faculdade de julgar é lenta e séria; *aquela* satisfaz, esta granjeia respeito.

Engenho é um atributo da juventude. Faculdade de julgar – da idade madura[;] infeliz escolha, pois, a daquele que faz da poesia o seu principal ofício, *pois* o engenho desaparece com a idade, e com esta também a sua arte, a beleza da sua poesia – Um conhecimento do entendimento, na medida em que dele emana engenho, é rico de sentido – na medida em que nele transparece faculdade de julgar, é perspicaz. Engenho é a fonte de inspirações [*Einfälle*] e *bon mots*[;] já a faculdade de julgar, gera intelecções [*Einsichten*][.] Inspirações são pensamentos não-procurados, e quando estas são engenhosas, designam-se por felizes. Já as intelecções, são pensamentos preparados que têm de ser adquiridos mediante zelo. O engenho visa o secundário, a faculdade de julgar, porém [também] o principal, ou o sustento para o entendimento. É por certo uma

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<sup>27</sup> Collins, 1772/73: «Ao engenho, opõe-se a faculdade de julgar. Para inventar é exigido engenho, para aplicar a faculdade de julgar. Para trazer as coisas à confluência e conexão, é necessária faculdade de diferenciação. O engenho é a faculdade de comparar, a faculdade de julgar é a faculdade de associar e separar as coisas. Às pessoas engenhosas, assoma-se-lhes sempre algo semelhante. Coisas semelhantes não estão por isso associadas, pois entre as coisas não deve haver a mínima semelhança. Embora os conceitos sejam um e o mesmo. Semelhança não é uma associação de coisas, mas sim da representação de coisas. A faculdade de compreender a diferença pertence não propriamente ao engenho, mas sim à faculdade de julgar. A perspicácia é o género de ambas, ela é uma capacidade para encontrar detalhes extremamente ocultos.» (AA, 25.1: 132)

contingência para além da sua tarefa, que, a par do principal, o engenho amplie também o secundário.

*Bon mots* são frutos do engenho, e são produzidos mediante o jogo da imaginação. Eles têm de ser mutáveis [...] A caça aos *bon mots* é uma ocupação repugnante – aquele que deixa ver o seu engenho designa-se por um zombeteiro [*Witzling*]. Aquele que alardeia a sua faculdade de julgar é um sofista [*Klügling*]. O último é o mais desprezível dos dois. Pois visto que a faculdade de julgar é algo sério, é intolerável ver brincar com ela.

O engenho gera moda, ou um objecto de imitação por amor ao novo. As modas são engenhosas pois aprazem mediante a representação de novidade. Por conseguinte, a moda deixa de ser moda logo que se torna um uso. O uso é um objecto de imitação por amor ao velho. O uso encontra-se entre ingleses e alemães, a moda mais entre os franceses – Uma nação enverga uma capacidade de ânimo mais do que a outra [;] por exemplo, os franceses envergam o engenho, os alemães e os ingleses mais a faculdade de julgar[.]

O engenhoso é livre no ajuizar; daí que os seus juízos sejam também ditos *hardi*, pois até por força de uma pequena semelhança ele se decide a ajuizar. Aquele que possui faculdade de julgar é circunspecto no ajuizar, mas tão-pouco deve por isso retirar facilmente o seu juízo. O génio *ousa* e ajuíza com celeridade, e, por conseguinte, não raras vezes tem de retirar o seu juízo. Cromwell – ou, melhor ainda, o engenhoso Swift diz: a circunspecção é uma virtude de cônsul. Engenho é popular. Já a faculdade de julgar, tem sempre algo de escolástico. O engenho é insípido [*schaal*] quando nada tem de entendimento. A faculdade de julgar é cismática quando nada tem de engenho, e portanto nada tem para os sentidos.

O engenho anima a companhia social, mas a falta de faculdade de julgar nesta torna-a sem gosto [*abgeschmackt*]. Assim, porque o engenho é insípido quando nada contém em si de entendimento, também todos os jogos de palavras são insípidos, pois também eles nada contêm em si de entendimento.

Os franceses têm 2 palavras, *sot* e *fat*, que entre nós são usadas quase como uma só, e apesar de se traduzir *sot* por um fátuo, e *fat* por um louco, o primeiro é porém um louco jovem, e o segundo um louco com mais idade. Kästner, tendo em vista os alemães, explica isto do seguinte modo: *sot* é aquele que viaja até Paris para aprender engenho e uma maneira de viver, *fat* aquele que de lá regressa com provas de loucura. Um engenho é chamado humoroso onde lhe está como fundamento uma incomum disposição de ânimo [...] Habitualmente, cada qual tem uma disposição de ânimo característica, a qual, porém, amiúde é movida por circunstâncias e raramente permanece no seu lugar. O engenho humoroso repousa sobre uma disposição original do ânimo, e ele é encontrado entre os ingleses, e por certo, porque a corte não dá ela própria o tom [;] o humor astuto é uma parte muito própria de algumas pessoas [...] Swift tinha-o; por exemplo, uma vez, na igreja, ele proferiu perante o parlamento um discurso (o que sempre acontece antes de o parlamento dar por abertas as suas sessões). Ele falou dos dotes do entendimento, da riqueza, etc., e quando por fim chegou aos do entendimento, disse: Visto que ninguém nesta reverendíssima reunião os pode reivindicar, então termino, etc.



Um engenho leve é aquele cuja produção pouco esforço custa ao entendimento. Este tem-no em especial Swift. O engenho cogitabundo encontra-se especialmente nos escritos de Young e Pope [...] Quando se entra em contradição no discurso, os ingleses chamam a isto *bull*; por exemplo, quando alguém diz: Eu fui passear com alguém sozinho. Os alemães fazem isto com frequência. Engenho popular é engenho vernacular, ao qual pertencem primariamente provérbios. Provérbios são a linguagem e a sabedoria da população, e pessoas cultivadas não se servem deles, pois quando se desenterra pensamentos de outros isso mostra uma cabeça vazia, e falta de pensar por si próprio. Aforismos são provérbios eruditos, e produzi-los, e isso com frequência, é também um erro – Provérbios são um modo especial de exprimir de maneira concisa ou alegórica um conhecimento de outro modo muito comum. Por vezes, os aforismos suplantam até comuns conhecimentos. Os provérbios são bons para se aprender a conhecer o carácter nacional de um povo. À invenção e às ciências, presta-se o engenho, mas há que lhe juntar ainda verdade. Alguns grandes homens conservaram a sua pretensa fama apenas através do seu engenho. Pois o engenho mostra algo novo, e isso ofusca e agrada. Em particular, na explicação dos Antigos não mais se pode [ir atrás] do correcto entendimento, e por conseguinte o engenho tem aí campo livre. Muita erudição é, pois, apenas divertimento do engenho. O engenho serve para desígnios, a faculdade de julgar para a execução. Colbert dizia que remunerava todos os projectos, pois se entre 100 apenas um for bem sucedido, todos estarão já pagos. Amiúde, o projectista é inepto para a execução. Pois ao primeiro, pertence vivacidade, leveza; à execução, *diligência*, paciência<sup>28</sup> – Há nações que logram fazer mais execuções do que planos, por exemplo, os alemães. O engenho falha amiúde na execução, razão por que a faculdade de julgar tem de se lhe juntar. Engenho com ingenuidade agrada. Mas quando transparece arte, desagrada. O engenho é um jogo, e por isso não deve ser árduo. Isto, é-o a faculdade de julgar.<sup>29</sup> No engenho, o ânimo é revigorado. Na faculdade de julgar, o ânimo é por certo fortalecido, mas também fatigado. Semelhanças são fáceis de encontrar, especialmente numa imaginação vivaz [...] <sup>30</sup> E isso dá-se, porque o nosso

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<sup>28</sup>Collins, 1772/73: «O engenho é mutável, e ama também a mutação. Ele ama a novidade, e é impaciente quando tem de esperar muito, a delonga num sítio é-lhe adversa e intolerável, ele procura sempre forjar comparações e novas semelhanças, aí mostra ele também a sua utilidade.» (AA, 25.1: 137)

<sup>29</sup>Collins, 1772/73: «Engenho e faculdade de apreciação agradam não só a nós, mas também aos outros. O engenho diverte e apraz, a faculdade de julgar tranquiliza a satisfaz. Amamos o engenheiro, mas respeitamos e reverenciamos aquele que possui faculdade de julgar. O engenho traz as forças [do ânimo] ao movimento. A faculdade de julgar, ao invés, tolhe-as e confina o irrefreamento do engenho. O engenho abre um campo para perspectivas, ele emparelha as coisas, ele dá a uma inspiração a força de pôr em movimento um conjunto de outras, e cria novas ideias; a faculdade de julgar deve tolher os incautos excessos do engenho, e trazê-los à ordem.» (AA, 25.1: 135)

<sup>30</sup> Parow, 1772/73: «A memória é a faculdade de reproduções aleatórias de representações outrora tidas. - Por conseguinte, ela diferencia-se da fantasia principalmente na medida em que há que poder reproduzir as suas representações a contento, uma vez que a fantasia, de modo arbitrário, volta a trazer as anteriores imagens ao nosso ânimo. A fantasia é igual a uma actividade infatigável, ela é, por assim dizer, uma torrente de imagens que para aí flui incessantemente. Por vezes, estas imagens são-nos sabidas, por vezes não, aqui uma imagem estimula a outra, e assim por diante, sem fim.» (AA, 25.1: 314)

Parow, 1772/73: «Estas capacidades consistem propriamente apenas no *actibus* da comparação, e são totalmente diferentes da sensibilidade, mediante o que as representações são geradas em nós. Assim, nestas capacidades, algo depende realmente da constituição física do nosso cérebro, e não é incorrecto,

entendimento está orientado para género e espécies, os quais, por sua vez, repousam sobre a afinidade<sup>31</sup>. Mas a faculdade de julgar é difícil, pois aí tem de se perceber as mais pequenas diferenças. Pois aí, eu tenho de fixar a atenção num ponto, e deste modo somos agrilhoados, e isso é fastidioso. É como se se quisesse permanecer completamente imóvel. É por isso que, como assegura Tschirnhausen, quando um homem se deita e se mantém algum tempo numa posição totalmente imóvel, ele começa pouco a pouco a suar por essa razão.

Mas quando eu dirijo a minha atenção para diversos objectos, isso vivifica o ânimo. O jogo do engenho agrada-nos deveras, mas quando chega ao fim, não ficamos porém

quando, nas suas observações físicas, Swift diz da poesia: que o cérebro dos poetas está cheio de vermes que, ao roerem diferentemente os nervos, suscitam diferentes inspirações. Embora ele diga isto de modo satírico, é porém certo que nenhuma capacidade característica do homem é possível sem alteração física no cérebro – isto, ainda que ninguém observe esta alteração no próprio cérebro através de lupas. Cada sensação distinta exige uma organização especial do cérebro, pois é sabido que há certos génios empíricos que estão em condições de observar tudo com exactidão, especialmente aqueles que têm uma notável acuidade. Assim sendo, as imagens das coisas são conservadas na minha alma, ou no meu cérebro? Por vezes, encontramos numa tal falta de pensamentos, que, quando em sociedade nos é pedido que contemos algo, não sabemos como começar; mas ao começar alguém, muito facilmente chegamos a matérias que servem de entretenimento. Mas então, algo tem de haver na cabeça que tem imagens confinantes. Ao ser avivada uma imagem, uma ocorrência opera aqui a outra. É provável que todas as imagens que acedem ao nosso cérebro não mais desapareçam do mesmo, mas, ao não serem usadas, elas, por assim dizer, jazem soterradas em poeira e entulho, a ponto de serem totalmente irreconhecíveis. Aqueles médicos que, à ciência da medicina, aliaram o conhecimento das forças da alma, dizem que as imagens das coisas são conservadas no cérebro. A verdadeira erudição é apenas a arte de guardar na memória aquilo que, devido à sua utilidade na vida comum, merecem ser conservadas no mesmo. Mas a curiosidade consiste numa vã atenção a tudo o que a isto não pertence, e àquilo a que, por ser inútil, o mundo menos atenta. A exacta correcção é a correcta relação das partes umas com as outras, e a sua concordância com um todo que a não tem contenta-se com uma exactidão em minudências, e ocupa-se com sílabas e palavras./ Temos uma imaginação vivaz, mas também árida. Se pensarmos em alguma coisa e quisermos escrever algo, muitas coisas têm de se oferecer na nossa alma, a partir das quais podemos procurar aquela que é útil à nossa matéria: tal como um oficial que, ao ter de separar as maiores personalidades de um regimento, as deixa porém convergir, assim temos de agir também em relação às nossas imagens. Assim, temos de, por assim dizer, fazer barulho no cérebro, e pôr em movimento todas as imagens; depois, abandonamo-nos à torrente das nossas representações, após o que uma representação produz a outra, e mais não temos aqui a fazer senão não perder de vista a representação principal, pois as imagens progridem ainda e sempre após terem sido associadas no cérebro, e porque a imaginação toma amiúde o curso que as imagens têm com respeito ao tempo, muito facilmente podemos ser totalmente desviados do nosso objecto, se não estivermos atentos. Temos tão pouco poder sobre a nossa imaginação, como sobre a corrente do nosso sangue [;] a única coisa que podemos fazer é, quando ela exagera demasiado, sustê-la. Então, tem de se começar a pensar uma vez mais aí, onde se começou inicialmente, e a partir daqui voltar a dar-lhe rédea livre, então ela voltará a tomar um outro curso. Mas há que evitar fazer violência à sua imaginação, pois desta maneira impede-se toda a progressão das ideias. Nesta corrente da imaginação, as imagens fluem ou segundo a sua vizinhança, consoante estejam juntas, ou segundo a sua afinidade, que é totalmente diferente daquela. Por vezes, a vizinhança das ideias irrita tanto, quanto o zangar-se na vida comum com um vizinho indigno. A imaginação ela própria não pensa, antes noto apenas se na torrente da minha imaginação não descubro imagens que se refegam na minha matéria. Por vezes, acontece que no rio destas imagens uma se me escapa subitamente que eu poderia porém ter usado, após o que habitualmente se fica inquieto e preocupado. O melhor meio para se voltar a esta imagem é que se comece a pensar de novo [;] se ainda assim não lograr descobri-la, começo justamente desse ponto, e habitualmente é-se bem sucedido em surpreender a imagem desejada, pois agora ela deve surgir apenas uma vez: assim ela será facilmente notada, pois já se está preparado para a apreender.» (AA, 25.1: 310-312)

<sup>31</sup>Busolt, 1788/89: «O engenho é livre, a faculdade de julgar restringe. A perfeição negativa da faculdade de julgar impede que o engenho não degenere no falso. Mediante o engenho descobrimos os géneros, mediante a faculdade de julgar as espécies» (AA, 25.2: 1459)

satisfeitos com isso.<sup>32</sup> O entendimento tenta fazer para si uma ideia do todo e do diverso. Se não o puder fazer, ele fica insatisfeito. O mesmo acontece em sociedade. Quando os diálogos não são aí travados de modo coerente, antes todos falam entre si, então ao sairmos da companhia social estamos completamente confusos, e como que inebriados, e a companhia não nos agrada, pois no ânimo não permanece senão um ruído cego. Como disse um dos amigos de Platão, no seu Simpósio, uma companhia social tem de ser uma tal que lhe tenha agradado não só então, quando dela desfrutou, mas também ainda e sempre que nela pensava.

Um inglês queria ir com outro ao hospício, mas o outro falou no *coffee house* Lloyd's. Este viu uma grande turba de pessoas, e disse ao seu camarada: Vamo-nos. Vejo que os loucos foram libertados. Ele pensava que era o hospício[.]

Tanto no engenho como na faculdade de julgar ocorre subtileza; mas ela presta-se melhor à faculdade de julgar, pois é difícil. Amor à subtileza é micrologia. Ela presta-se melhor à faculdade de julgar. As leis dos romanos são deveras micrológicas, e repousam sobre as mais pequenas diferenças [;] por isso é que são causa de muita chicanice. Quando o engenho ajuíza, ele ajuíza *en gros*, e não *en detail* – Madame Geoffrin, que organizava um *bureau d'esprit*, isto é, um convénio de espíritos belos, dizia que não se pode ajuizar sobre os homens *en detail*, mas sim *en gros* – mas então, eu não ajuízo de todo sobre uma coisa. Em sermões fúnebres, não raras vezes é bom e também necessário ajuizar *en gros*. – As recensões ajuízam amiúde *en Gros*[.] Engenho e faculdade de julgar servem para a ligação da imaginação com o entendimento. O engenho traz a imaginação mais próxima do entendimento – desde que o entendimento vise o universal –, a faculdade de julgar tem de ver se aquilo que é imaginado é aplicável in concreto.<sup>33</sup> Para se poder aplicar os conceitos universais, é necessária faculdade de julgar[.] Todas as acções do engenho são designadas por jogo, e o jogo e o engenho são insípidos quando produzem falsa semelhança, e então são deveras repugnantes. Este engenho insípido consiste em jogos de palavras [.] A dada altura, isto foi moda em França. Assim, ao entornar uma sopa sobre o chanceler de França, disse-lhe um laçai: *Summum jus, summa injuria*. Para o chanceler, isto foi engenhoso. Amiúde, encontra-se algo engenhoso em outra pessoa quando o outro não pensa sequer em produzir algo engenhoso [;] por exemplo, quando, em honra de Luís XIV, foi erigido um arco triunfal sobre uma ponte que ele tinha de atravessar, na qual se perfilava um anjo com uma coroa na mão, disse um homem da Gascónia: não se sabe se ele lhe está a dar a coroa,

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<sup>32</sup> Friedländer, 1775/76: «O engenho é fugaz, tal como a faculdade de julgar é pesada. Assim, os conhecimentos do engenhoso são efémeros, eles fazem por certo uma impressão, mas não se mantêm e não são interiorizados. (AA, 25.1: 520)

<sup>33</sup> Parow, 1772/73: «O engenho é muito sedutor; se ocorrer a um poeta uma inspiração devidamente engenhosa, ele antes preferiria ser enforcado, do que asfixiar a inspiração à nascença. Ele vê nisto uma espécie de infanticídio, que se oblitere uma tão bela criatura do entendimento. Quem tem uma propensão para o engenho, não a pode sonegar.» (AA, 25.1: 133)

Parow, 1772/73: «Para além disso, temos uma faculdade para produzir representações que nunca foram conservadas na nossa fantasia, sim, que nunca foram postas nos nossos sentidos, e esta é a faculdade de poetar [*Dichtungs Vermögen*]. Esta faculdade não é apenas um *promus condus* que exige a representação, e as representações tão-pouco são *renovadas* mediante ela, antes representações novas são produzidas ou fingidas.» (AA, 25.1: 321)

ou a tirar-lha [;] isto soa engenhoso, e todos o louvaram sobremaneira. Traz-se o engenho ao [acto de] motejar, e ele ocorre quando é refinado e o outro replica. Se o último não acontecer, ele é ofensivo. Engenho é o mais preeminente do divertimento em sociedade [.] Engenho é o mais essencial da sátira. Ela é travessa e astuta, quando alguém parece estar a louvar a coisa, falando com toda a seriedade, e aparentando simplicidade de espírito ao fazê-lo, de tal modo que não se crê que ele esteja a pensar nisso. Uma tal sátira, tem-na principalmente Swift. Os franceses são cheios de engenho, mas zombeteiros originais há-os especialmente entre os ingleses [;] por exemplo Swift, em especial no conto do tonel, e Anti-Longino, e Butler no seu Hudibras, do qual Hume diz que em nenhum livro algum dia escrito há tanta erudição como neste, e é bem verdade. Este é uma sátira ao fanatismo religioso de então. É um contra-ponto de D. Quixote.

Alguns exemplos do engenho de Butler são, por exemplo, quando o seu cavaleiro errante diz a alguém que quer fazer dele um pêndulo em vista do qual todas as jardas de alfaiate na Inglaterra deveriam ser rectificadas; isto significa, em primeiro lugar, que ele queria enforcá-lo; por outro, isto refere-se ao facto de que à altura, na Inglaterra, queria-se fazer do comprimento da oscilação de um pêndulo a cada segundo uma medida universal, a fim de que esta sempre se mantivesse uma e a mesma – Assim diz Ralph[o], o ferreiro deste cavaleiro: as doenças do espírito dos homens são como os tribunais, que umas vezes realizam julgamentos, outras vezes fazem férias. A minha consciência moral está agora de férias, e não deixa ninguém comparecer perante si – Uma vez, estando o cavaleiro em perigo, Ralph[o] aconselhou-o a fugir, e provou-lhe por fundamentos que a fuga era algo louvável, a saber: porque àquele que salvasse um cidadão, os romanos haviam prometido uma coroa; assim, se fugisse, ele mereceria uma coroa, na medida em que salvara a vida de um cidadão, mais concretamente, a sua própria. Para além disso, se ele fugisse, os outros persegui-lo-iam, e ele chegaria a todo o lado mais cedo, etc. O que convence alguém da verdade e do bem de uma coisa? 200 libras esterlinas [;] e o que volta a convencer alguém do contrário? Mais 200 libras esterlinas. A força do engenho consiste em que se faça surgir coisas totalmente inesperadas. Ela serve para um arsenal de aforismos. Um terceiro inglês é Sterne, que muitos imitaram e macaquearam. O engenho faz-nos felizes ou infelizes? Infelizes [.] Butler morreu à fome, embora os seus escritos muito agradassem a Carlos II, que porém se esqueceu de o apoiar.

Sterne encurtou a sua vida devido às recorrentes sociedades para onde era arrebatado. Por fim, Swift enlouqueceu, presumivelmente por se ter consumido demasiado – o que se explica por terem descurado a faculdade de julgar. O engenho tem de ser mero *vehiculum*, e a faculdade de julgar como a realidade. Aquele que não tem nenhum engenho, é uma cabeça obtusa [*stumpf*]. Aquele que não tem nenhuma faculdade de julgar, tem uma cabeça estúpida [*Dummkopf*] [;] mera ignorância não é nenhuma estupidez. Em rigor, só é estúpido aquele que, ao lhe ser dada uma regra, não sabe aplicá-la[;] os servos só são estúpidos quando tomam as regras à letra. Os russos quedam-se amiúde sem faculdade de julgar quando o Neiva gela; por isso, um canhão é disparado para o mostrar às pessoas. Quando alguém da margem oposta atravessa para a de cá, e só então o canhão é

disparado, ele é obrigado a voltar para [a margem de] lá. Quem tem faculdade de julgar é sensato, e isso, pode-se vir a sê-lo também através de adversidades. Sábio é aquele que se faz sensato através do ludíbrio de outros. Um homem que é jovem, e não tem muita faculdade de julgar, tem de ser amiúde trapaceado. A falta de entendimento é inocência, e é diferente de estupidez. Assim, existem povos que só conseguem contar até 5, por exemplo, no rio Amazonas. Diz-se que um homem progride apesar da sua estupidez, o que se dá porque o estúpido não faz ninguém invejoso, não pode ofuscar ninguém, e por conseguinte ele é tolerado entre homens. Aquele que deixa transparecer mais visão e entendimento, faz os outros invejosos. O estúpido tão-pouco compreende de quanto carece; daí que apreenda tudo com petulância, e isso ajuda já muito ao sucesso, e com o tempo ele adquire uma medíocre, pequena habilidade. Mas o que tem plena visão [*der Einsichtsvolle*] compreende a grandeza dos seus deveres, e faz tudo [;] pequenos mecenas sempre foram ignorantes, por certo amantes, mas não conhecedores da erudição. Colbert foi um dos grandes *mecenas*, mas não um erudito. Num Estado, nenhuma erudição florescerá num conhecedor erudito das ciências, mas sim num inculto e num amante, pois um inculto estima o erudito. Já um erudito, dirige tudo para os seus conhecimentos.

É visível que se tenha uma fraca memória, mas nunca que se seja estúpido – Pois isso requer faculdade de julgar e entendimento, para que se discirna em si o grau disto.

A falta de faculdade de julgar com engenho é tolice [*Albernheit*]; sem engenho é estupidez. O que possui o primeiro não é inteiramente sensato; o que possui o 2º é estúpido. Um homem é mais tolerável quando é estúpido, do que quando é sensato ou tolo. Mas estas palavras não são empregáveis na vida comum, pois elas trazem consigo relutância ou rancor, pois mostram meros delitos. Se um homem é estúpido, e porém imagina ser prudente, tem-se contra esta sua altivez aversão, e então designamo-lo por genuinamente estúpido – Chama-se às pessoas simplório, o que se explica porque aquele que usa de tanta meticulosidade na letra, e por isso tanto se delonga a fazer coisas fáceis, mostra uma falta de faculdade de julgar – falta apenas de faculdade de julgar é simplicidade. Ser sensato vem por experiência, não por capacidade e entendimento. Daí que seja mais ofensivo quando um diz ao outro que ele não é sensato, do que quando diz [que] ele não é prudente. Pois com o último, diz-se ao outro que lhe falta capacidade, com o primeiro, que ele não a usou. Honorabilidade e estupidez são muito confundidas e ligadas – Isto dá-se porque os homens, quando têm alguma supremacia de prudência sobre outro, usam-na imediatamente para o mal. Mas quem não tem nenhum talento, desse tem-se a certeza de que ele fará algo mal [.] No entanto, nenhum homem quer que lhe digam que ele não tem nenhuma capacidade para o mal. Isto, visam-no muitos provérbios, por exemplo: ele não trairá a pátria, ele não é nenhum feiticeiro. Georgi conta dos Tungus que estes são muito honrados, mas acrescenta que sempre que querem mentir, produzem disparates tão absurdos, que há que rir, pois eles só são honrados porque não têm nenhum talento para o contrário. O ludibriador nem sempre é mais prudente do que o ludibriado. Este supera amiúde aquele, mas quando age segundo princípios do altruísmo, ele não suspeita nada de mal[.] E se ele vier a descobrir o ludibriador, por certo não mais volta a ser ludibriado por ele. O ludibriador é amiúde mais estúpido do que o ludibriado. Até as cabeças mais

prudentes podem amiúde ser ludibriadas. Por exemplo, quando Abelardo viajava numa carruagem com um abade, este disse: Meu Senhor, um boi a voar! Onde? Onde? disse Abelardo. Ao que o outro respondeu: nunca pensei que um homem tão erudito pudesse acreditar em algo assim. Abelardo, porém, deteve-se e retorquiu: E eu antes acreditaria que um boi pudesse voar, do que um clérigo mentir. É por isso muito injusto que se tome um homem honrado por estúpido.



## El concepto kantiano de propiedad

### *Kant's Concept of Property*

HOWARD WILLIAMS

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#### 1. Introducción de la traductora

“El concepto kantiano de propiedad”, de Howard Williams, se publica por primera vez en la revista *The Philosophical Quarterly*, en enero de 1977<sup>2</sup>. La frase que da inicio al artículo: “Kant no se considera como una de entre las grandes figuras de la filosofía política”, justifica doblemente la razón y, en gran parte, el contenido del artículo de Williams. Es cierto que hasta bien entrada la segunda mitad del siglo veinte la filosofía política kantiana no acapara el interés que ha suscitado en los últimos decenios. Con anterioridad a este periodo, la reflexión sobre la obra de Kant se centra mayoritariamente en su epistemología, doctrina ética y en la filosofía de la religión. Esto no quiere decir que los trabajos sobre la filosofía política de Kant sean inexistentes, así como pienso que el lector concordará en que la afirmación de Williams con respecto al lugar de Kant en la historia de la filosofía política es desafortunada, en ningún modo justificada<sup>3</sup>. Lo que sí es

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<sup>2</sup> Williams, H.; “Kant’s Concept of Property”, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 27 (106), 1977, 32-40.

<sup>3</sup> Para una lista de las publicaciones sobre Kant en el periodo anterior a la publicación del artículo de Williams véase: *Kant-Bibliographie 1945–1990*, Ruffing, M. (ed.), V. Klostermann: Frankfurt am Main, 1999. Como hemos señalado, se puede comprobar que el número de publicaciones relativas a la política y al derecho en Kant es ciertamente escaso si lo comparamos con aquellas referidas a los tres ámbitos de investigación por excelencia sobre Kant. Sin embargo, las referencias existen y son relevantes. Curiosamente,

cierto es que Williams ha contribuido en medida importante a los estudios sobre el pensamiento político de Immanuel Kant. De hecho, pocos años después de la redacción de este artículo Williams publicará un volumen dedicado en exclusiva al pensamiento político kantiano<sup>4</sup>, y en los treinta años precedentes a esta publicación podemos encontrar solo dos obras que traten acerca del concepto de propiedad en Kant<sup>5</sup>. Es esta falta de atención dedicada en general a la filosofía política de Kant, y en concreto al concepto de propiedad, lo que le permite a Williams tratar este tema con, podemos decir, una cierta “ligereza”.

Con esto queremos indicar aquí el hecho de que Williams explicita la noción de libertad desde la literalidad de las primeras páginas de la Doctrina del Derecho. Siguiendo el texto a la letra, el autor da cuenta de la propiedad como nómeno, objeto de la Razón alejado de la competencia del Entendimiento y del mundo empírico. Del mismo modo, siempre siguiendo el texto, explica Williams cómo este carácter de nómeno hace necesario pensar a la propiedad en Kant acompañada necesariamente de las nociones de propiedad común de la tierra, voluntad general y sociedad civil de derecho o, sociedad jurídica coactiva. Su análisis de la propiedad le conduce adecuadamente también a problematizar la relación entre derechos naturales y derechos jurídicos por lo que respecta a su prioridad en la filosofía jurídica kantiana. El autor hace justamente del concepto de propiedad un concepto clave para la comprensión del pensamiento político de Kant.

Por otra parte, esta ligereza de la que hablábamos se manifiesta en la dirección que toma el artículo hacia la mitad del texto y en las conclusiones que le siguen. En este caso Williams da un paso en falso, forzando una problematización que surgiría de contraponer al mismo nivel el análisis teórico del concepto de propiedad con las posibles reificaciones de dicha noción en un estado de derecho.

La confusión comienza cuando Williams da el paso del análisis teórico de la propiedad a la evaluación de las consecuencias (en este caso creo que podemos sin error calificar de “psicológicas”) que suponen para el sujeto el pasar de un estado de propiedad natural a un estado de propiedad real. Al explicitar el concepto de propiedad kantiano como un nómeno se hace referencia al hecho de que la propiedad es un título independiente de la posesión empírica de un objeto. El derecho de propiedad, es, en realidad, nunca un derecho directo a un objeto, sino que más bien, como dice Kant y cita también Williams al final del artículo: “no hay ningún derecho (directo) a una cosa, sino que se denomina así únicamente al que corresponde a alguien frente a una persona, que está en posesión común junto a todos los demás (en el estado civil)” (6:261)<sup>6</sup>. Estamos

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la mayoría de estas son estudios llevados a cabo en lengua española, italiana, y (en menor cantidad pero de especial relevancia) en lengua francesa.

<sup>4</sup>Williams, H.; *Kant's Political Philosophy*, St. Martin's Press: New York, 1983.

<sup>5</sup> Las dos obras, ninguna de las cuales menciona Williams en su artículo son: Lehmann, G.; *Kants Besitzlehre*, Akademie-Verlag: Berlin, 1956; Córdoba, A.; ‘De Grocio a Kant: Génesis del concepto moderno de propiedad’, *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, 30 (4), 1968, pp.959-98.

<sup>6</sup>Los textos de Kant se citan de acuerdo a la *KantsgesammelteSchriften*, Hrsg. von der Preussichenund der DeutschenAkademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1902 y ss. Las traducciones al español corresponden a las de Adela Cortina y Jesús Conill en su edición de *La Metafísica de las Costumbres: Kant, I.; La Metafísica de las Costumbres*, Tecnos: Madrid, 2005.



hablando por lo tanto de una noción que no tiene sentido en la relación directa entre el sujeto y el objeto, sino que se explicita solo como derecho (es decir, como la contrapartida de un deber) al que, en este caso, le sigue también el hecho de poder ser considerado de naturaleza jurídica. Hasta aquí no se da ninguna contradicción entre la explicación del autor y el texto kantiano. De hecho, Williams hace hincapié precisamente en la necesidad de pensar el contrato social o la voluntad general como idea de la Razón que sirve a fundamentar el concepto de propiedad privada perentoria, dado que esta noción surge del reconocimiento por parte de los sujetos de los deberes y derechos que se siguen de una relación que hasta el momento el pacto ha permanecido “oculta”. Esta relación entre sujetos se convierte en una consciente y libre, justa, solo bajo la forma de una aceptación universal o pacto social. Es en este punto donde la argumentación se vuelve problemática, en el momento en que Williams continúa el discurso debatiendo no ya entre la *possessio phaenomenon* vs la *noumenon*, sino entre el estado de naturaleza y el estado civil como dos opuestos que reflejarían, respectivamente, libertad y coacción. Williams presenta la problemática que él atribuye al concepto de propiedad kantiana en los siguientes términos: “Tenemos que imaginar que la tierra una vez perteneció a todos en común y que posteriormente decidimos distribuir esta herencia en común. Pero claramente estas dos perspectivas se contradicen entre sí. O suponemos que los individuos acordaron la existente distribución de la propiedad en base a la previa propiedad común, o podemos suponer que discutieron tal distribución de la propiedad y tuvieron que ser forzados a aceptar dicha posición. Es imposible suponer que los mismos individuos estuvieron al mismo tiempo en acuerdo y en desacuerdo con tal distribución existente de la propiedad”<sup>7</sup>.

Es decir, desde el punto de vista de Williams, el hecho de que la propiedad no se convierta en perentoria si no hay una coacción jurídica que la acompañe (se cree un estado de derecho), que surge a su vez de un derecho (natural) de todo sujeto a coaccionar a los restantes a entrar en dicho estado jurídico, hace de la propiedad un concepto incoherente si se considera que al mismo tiempo, y a la base de la fundamentación de este concepto, subyacen las precondiciones morales de la propiedad común de la tierra y la de voluntad común. De este modo pretende el autor establecer una contradicción entre el concepto “preliminar” de propiedad (o como esta se presenta en el estado de naturaleza bajo las ideas morales antes mencionadas, que sería dependiente completamente de la voluntad del hombre), y el concepto “definitivo” o real de la misma (que dependería en su existencia de la sanción del derecho). Contrapone pues Williams, como muchos otros, la moralidad del estado de naturaleza a la legalidad del estado civil, presentando esta contradicción en términos de “liberalidad” vs “coaccionabilidad”, y analizando por tanto y en definitiva a la propiedad inteligible en Kant en base a las consecuencias que esta noción supondría para el sujeto por lo que respecta a la autonomía de su decisión en una situación de derecho concreta. Esta es una oposición común pero del todo desacertada que por lo general justifica la falta de libertad del sujeto en el estado civil simplemente desde la perspectiva

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<sup>7</sup> p. 13.

de un “estar obligado a aceptar”<sup>8</sup>, sin acompañarse sin embargo de ningún criterio de justicia que permita dar cuenta de la evaluación de dicha afirmación. Presentando la problemática de este modo Williams condena además al derecho al ámbito de lo meramente fenoménico, obviando la fundamentación moral del principio del derecho que hace de la coacción jurídica una cuya justificación estriba en que la forma permite al sujeto ejercer su libertad externa. Por otra parte, esta supuesta contradicción entre la libertad moral y la coacción jurídica en términos de “constricción de la voluntad del sujeto” es una que en Kant se puede refutar fácilmente desde numerosos frentes, el más simple quizás sea el análisis del imperativo categórico como principio de auto-coacción de la voluntad del sujeto<sup>9</sup>. En todo caso, presentando así la propiedad, Williams acaba por definirla como un concepto incoherente que refleja en su opinión, no la calidad del filósofo que la ha creado, sino la falta misma de coherencia que se da en las relaciones sociales.

Al lector le basta referirse a algunos trabajos posteriores a este acerca del concepto de propiedad en Kant para evitar este tipo de conclusiones<sup>10</sup>. En esta introducción nos basta señalar brevemente una línea de argumentación que incluye algunos puntos que Williams obvia en su análisis y que, quizás por esto, le llevan a confundir y cuestionar la teoría a partir de conclusiones extraídas de la observación empírica, socio-psicológica. El paso primero y fundamental es explicitar que la propiedad es una noción clave de la filosofía política kantiana porque es a través de este concepto que se construye la noción de libertad externa del sujeto. La tenencia de objetos exteriores es necesaria para realizar la finalidad del sujeto humano, de ahí que la libertad exterior se presente en la Doctrina del Derecho como posible bajo el postulado jurídico de la razón práctica. Este hace de las cosas objetos ya siempre propiedad de un sujeto (evitando de este modo la categoría del *res nullius* que es propia de la tradición jurídica romana y que está a la base de la justificación de la casi totalidad de las teorías sobre la propiedad que preceden a Kant), y sitúa al sujeto, por lo que concierne al ejercicio de su libertad externa, en una relación inmediata de deberes y derechos con respecto a todos los demás. Una relación que debe ser sometida al criterio de la universalidad si es que ha de ser una justa entre seres libres e iguales; regulada por tanto de acuerdo al único modo en el que las libertades “externas” pueden ser regladas, según el principio del derecho. Este esquema que va desde lo “natural” a lo “social” o “legal” no es uno que va desde lo moral o libre a lo jurídico o involuntario; es de hecho el esquema que presenta el modo en el que esta relación que se da naturalmente puede ser ejercida libremente, de acuerdo a la idea de libertad externa. Muestra pues el esquema el modo en el que todo hombre puede ejercer su libertad en

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<sup>8</sup> Véanse como ejemplos de esta posición: Willaschek, M.; ‘Right and Coercion: Can Kant's Conception of Right Be Derived from his Moral Theory?’, *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*, 17,2009, pp.49–70. Wood, A.; ‘The Final Form of Kant’s Practical Philosophy’, en Timmons, M. (ed.), *Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. Interpretative Essays*, Oxford University Press: New York, 2002, pp. 1-21.

<sup>9</sup> Kant, I.; 5: 33; 6: 222, 394.

<sup>10</sup> Véanse por ejemplo: Shell, S.M.; ‘Kant’s Theory of Property’, *Political Theory*, 6(1), 1978, pp.75-90.; Tierney, B.; ‘Permissive Natural Law and Property: Gratian to Kant’, *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 62, 2001, pp.381-99; Hodgson, L.P.; ‘Kant on Property Rights and the State’, *Kantian Review*, 15, 2010, pp. 57-87.

condiciones de igualdad y justicia. Obviamente, la postulación de una libertad externa que se ejerce en parte a través de la posesión y de la garantía de su ejercicio justo bajo la instauración de una ley, sirve como punto de partida para una eventual crítica de la distribución real de la propiedad en una sociedad -sea como propiedad directa de los sujetos, sea como beneficiarios de un estado social de derecho. La conclusión de Williams en este artículo podemos considerarla así, como denuncia de una sociedad insatisfecha porque injusta, porque no garantiza sino que dificulta el ejercicio de la libertad exterior del sujeto.

### 2. *El concepto kantiano de propiedad. Por Howard Williams (traducción de Lorena Cebolla Sanahuja)*

Kant no se considera como una de entre las grandes figuras de la filosofía política. En comparación con las obras de su colega idealista alemán Hegel, sus escritos políticos han recibido escasa atención. Esta suerte no es del todo merecida. Kant, es cierto, se ocupa de la política en un modo más sucinto que Hegel, pero esto no significa que lo que escribe sea en ningún modo menos profundo.

De hecho, como intentaré demostrar, Kant ofrece una importante contribución a la comprensión del Estado Moderno. Esta contribución se hace especialmente patente, a mi parecer, en su análisis de la propiedad en los *Principios Metafísicos de la Doctrina del Derecho*. Lo que más le interesa a Kant de la propiedad es su posibilidad en general, o, como él dice: “el modo de tener algo exterior como suyo” (6:245). Para él, esta es un concepto extremadamente problemático, cuya pertinencia a los asuntos del hombre tiene que ser explicada por completo. Kant comienza distinguiendo los modos en los que puede decirse que se posee (*besitzen*) un objeto. El primer modo de la posesión es el que él llama la posesión sensible, o física, de un objeto; el segundo es el de la posesión “inteligible” del objeto. Es este segundo modo de la posesión el que, según Kant, es con diferencia el más importante. Mientras que la “posesión sensible” de un objeto significa su mera apropiación corporal, la “posesión inteligible” indica una posesión que no es dependiente de la apropiación física. Posesión inteligible significa, por lo tanto, que una cosa es mía aun cuando se da el hecho de no tenerla conmigo (*ibíd.*). Este tipo de posesión es la que Kant define como posesión *de jure*, o posesión legal de un objeto. En este punto somos quizás más afortunados que Kant por el hecho de que el idioma inglés, al contrario del alemán, posee una palabra que se refiere específicamente a este tipo de posesión: “propiedad”<sup>11</sup>. La

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<sup>11</sup> En el texto original se está refiriendo a la palabra “ownership”, que traduce el concepto de propiedad por clara oposición a la de posesión, entendida esta última como tenencia física no acompañada necesariamente de un título legal. No existe ni en alemán ni en español una palabra equivalente en este campo que sustantive el concepto de “ser el propietario o dueño de algo”, que sea diferente del sustantivo propiedad y que, al mismo tiempo, se contraponga en un modo claro al “tener en posesión algo” en un mero sentido de tenencia. En el texto hemos decidido mantener la traducción de ownership como “propiedad” por oposición a la posesión, con la asunción de que a la primera le acompaña en el texto la característica de la legalidad

propiedad, como Kant quiere indicar, se diferencia claramente de la posesión física de un objeto. Pero ambas, tener en propiedad y la posesión son imprescindibles para que un objeto exterior sea propiamente mío. Un objeto exterior no es mío, dice Kant, al menos que yo lo tenga en propiedad y sea al mismo tiempo capaz de tenerlo físicamente en mi poder; solo entonces el objeto es mi propiedad.

Kant aplica a continuación este análisis a los tres tipos de objetos que según él pueden ser la propiedad de una persona. Estos tres objetos son, primero, una cosa corpórea externa a mí; segundo, lo que él llama el arbitrio de otro respecto a un acto determinado (contraído mediante contrato); y finalmente, el estado de otro en relación conmigo (6:247). Así que puedo decir, por ejemplo, que tengo una manzana en mi posesión simplemente porque en este momento la sostengo en mi mano, pero solo puedo decir que la tengo en propiedad si sigue siendo mía aun cuando se encuentre fuera de mi alcance. La intención de Kant es obviamente la de señalar que si confiara solo en la posesión física de un objeto para demarcar mi propiedad, en el momento en el que dejara de sostener la manzana o cualquier objeto similar este no sería ya mío. La propiedad no puede coincidir con la posesión física. Igualmente, señala Kant, el poder contractual que poseo sobre el arbitrio de otro para asegurar que una tarea concreta se realice tiene que ser válido también cuando la persona con la que he establecido el contrato no está presente. El contrato tiene que ser válido aun cuando entre las dos partes no se da un contacto personal. Esto significa para Kant que un contrato, al igual que la propiedad en general, no es algo empírico. La tercera categoría de objetos que pueden convertirse en la propiedad de una persona la define Kant como “posesiones domésticas”. Con este término no se está refiriendo a la vajilla, utensilios de cocina o similares, que caen por supuesto bajo la primera categoría, sino a la mujer, hijos y sirvientes de un hombre (6:248)<sup>12</sup>. Todos estos son aptos para convertirse en la propiedad de un hombre. Kant se refiere a este derecho como a aquel que permite poseer un objeto exterior como una cosa y usarlo como una persona. Lo que quiere decir con esto es que la familia de un hombre puede ser considerada su propiedad desde un punto de vista legal, pero cada miembro de la familia debe de ser considerado como un individuo autónomo desde el punto de vista moral. El padre y marido no obtiene este derecho mediante fuerza o contrato, sino simplemente a través de la propiedad en su propia persona. Según Kant, la familia, desde el punto de vista legal, es una persona, y esa persona es el cabeza de familia. De nuevo en este caso, Kant afirma, mi propiedad no dependería de mi presencia para ordenar a mi mujer, hijos o sirvientes. Puedo decir con certeza que son mi propiedad si puedo decir que son míos en tanto que están vivos en un lugar y en un tiempo en este mundo. Por lo tanto, una cosa exterior es mía, concluye Kant, cuando su “uso discrecional no puede impedírseme sin lesionarme” (6:249). Para que haya

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mientras que la otra viene limitada a la posesión física de un objeto. Por lo tanto, cuando el texto en inglés usa el verbo “to own”, lo traduciremos en la versión española por “tener en propiedad”, y usaremos el sustantivo “propiedad” sea para traducir el vocablo “ownership”, sea para referirnos al vocablo “property” en inglés que es el concepto a aclarar en la filosofía kantiana.

<sup>12</sup> Hegel considera esto como otra de las nociones bárbaras de Kant. Igualmente bárbara es la noción kantiana del matrimonio como un contrato. Véase Hegel, F; *Rechtphilosophie*, Werke 7, Suhrkamp: Frankfurt am Main, 1970, p.130.

propiedad, por tanto, la posesión inteligible (*possessio noumenon*) debe ser una realidad. Por el contrario, la posesión empírica es solo posesión en apariencia (*possessio phaenomenon*) (*ibíd.*).

Por lo tanto, el problema de cómo la existencia de la propiedad acontece se reduce ahora a la pregunta: ¿cómo es posible una posesión meramente jurídica (inteligible)? (*ibíd.*). Otro modo de formular esta pregunta puede ser, sugiere Kant: ¿cómo son posibles las proposiciones jurídicas sintéticas a priori?, ya que de este tipo sería, en efecto, una proposición que gobernara la propiedad de los objetos más allá de su posesión fenoménica. Según Kant, la proposición prescindiría necesariamente de todas las condiciones empíricas de la posesión en el espacio y en el tiempo. Esto nos conduce a una distinción que reside en el núcleo de la filosofía kantiana. Desde el punto de vista de Kant, es el Entendimiento quien se ocupa de los objetos situados en el tiempo y el espacio. En otras palabras, el Entendimiento se ocupa de los objetos empíricos. Pero es la Razón quien emplea proposiciones que tiene que ver con objetos no limitados en este sentido. La Razón, en otras palabras, se ocupa de objetos nouménicos. Por lo tanto, el acto de mostrar cómo son posibles las proposiciones sintéticas del derecho es una tarea de la Razón. Entendimiento y experiencia no son instancias en las que confiar para establecer la realidad de estas proposiciones. Esto se sigue del hecho de que la propiedad es un noumeno y no un fenómeno.

Kant presenta de este modo un punto sensato. Al decir que la propiedad es nouménica lo que está afirmando es que no es un hecho accesible al descubrimiento empírico. Esto es sensato porque la proposición que dice “esto es mío” no puede establecerse del mismo modo en que se establece la proposición “esto es verde”. La observación empírica, por muy sistemática que sea, poco puede hacer para aclarar el problema. Puede ser que Kant perciba aquí que la propiedad no es un objeto, sino una institución que depende para su funcionamiento de la observancia de un sistema de reglas determinado. Un individuo no puede por sí mismo establecer el derecho a una cosa, porque el derecho consiste en la aceptación pública de un estado de cosas existente o deseado en el futuro. Los derechos, y en concreto los derechos de propiedad, deben ser tan válidos para los demás como lo son para uno mismo, de otro modo no existirían los derechos. Kant es extremadamente claro en este punto. Desafortunadamente, sin embargo, es un punto que en el que no profundiza, ya que está más preocupado en mostrar cómo es posible la posesión nouménica que en descubrir en qué consiste.

Si tal proposición que permite la posesión nouménica fuera posible, defiende Kant, tomar posesión de una cierta parte de la superficie de la tierra sería un acto del arbitrio (*Willkür*) sin ser una usurpación. El poseedor basaría tal acto, discute Kant, en nuestra innata común posesión de la superficie de la tierra, así como en la Voluntad General *a priori* que corresponde a tal común posesión (6:359/7), y que permite la existencia de la propiedad privada. Pero aunque esto implicaría que el uso de la tierra estaría disponible para todos (sin distinción), no significa sin embargo que haya sido así natural u originalmente. La opinión de Kant es, por lo tanto, que la propiedad privada no puede ser independiente de, ni previa a, todo acto legal.

En este punto surge una dificultad. Kant afirma que las proposiciones sintéticas a priori presuponen un derecho natural a la propiedad privada, pero añade que esto no significa que tengamos natural u originariamente un derecho a la propiedad. Está claro que la dificultad aquí estriba en qué significa para Kant “derecho natural”. Parece ser que un derecho natural es, en cierto modo, no natural, porque Kant no quiere decir que este sea un derecho inherente al sujeto *per se*. De hecho, él cree que los derechos naturales son derechos adquiridos; y esto es así también en el caso del derecho a la propiedad privada. El derecho natural a la propiedad privada se convierte en seguro e indiscutible a través del contrato social que une todas las voluntades. Y este contrato se funda sobre la posesión común de la superficie de la tierra. El consentimiento de todos ha de ser en primer lugar adquirido, dice Kant, antes de que un individuo pueda tomar como propiedad privada una parte de la superficie de la tierra (6: 250)<sup>13</sup>.

En este caso Kant sigue un camino diametralmente opuesto al de Locke en su deducción de los derechos de propiedad en el *Segundo Tratado*. Locke adopta la visión de que el consenso previo de todos a un contrato social no es necesario para asegurar del derecho (natural) del hombre a la propiedad privada. De hecho, Locke defiende que “si tal consenso fuera necesario, el hombre habría muerto de hambre, a pesar de la abundancia que Dios le había dado”<sup>14</sup>. La tierra y sus productos fueron dados al hombre, en opinión de Locke, para usar según sus necesidades, pero antes de que cualquier hombre pueda hacer uso de la generosidad de la naturaleza este tiene primero que apropiársela. “Deben por tanto existir” dice Macpherson “medios legítimos para la apropiación individual”<sup>15</sup>, y este derecho Locke lo deduce del postulado que establece que todo hombre tiene una propiedad en su propia persona. De este modo, como afirma Macpherson, “a partir de dos postulados, que el hombre tiene derecho a preservar la propia vida, y que el trabajo de un hombre le pertenece, Locke justifica la apropiación individual del producto de una tierra que fue dada originalmente en común a la humanidad”. En opinión de Kant, sin embargo, esta deducción de los derechos de propiedad carece de dos cosas, universalidad y necesidad. La circunstancia que Locke cita en su intento de fundamentar los derechos de propiedad (un individuo necesitado en la situación concreta y afortunada de general abundancia natural) tiene poco o nada que ver con las reglas que atan el todo de la sociedad. Las reglas que establecen nuestro derecho a la tenencia de propiedad han de ser inferidas con independencia de cualquier estado concreto de cosas. Tienen que ser, al mismo tiempo, universalmente operables y necesarias. El error que comete Locke, si seguimos el razonamiento de Kant, es el de confundir la posesión empírica con la posesión inteligible o

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<sup>13</sup>“Aunque un terreno se considerara o se declarara libre, es decir, abierto al uso de cualquiera, no se puede decir, sin embargo, que sea libre por naturaleza y originalmente antes de todo acto jurídico., porque también aquí habría una relación con las cosas[...] esta libertad del terreno sería para cualquiera una prohibición de servirse de él; para lo cual precisa una posesión común del terreno que no puede darse sin contrato. Pero un suelo que solo puede ser libre mediante contrato tiene que estar realmente en posesión de todos aquellos (asociados entre sí), que se prohíben recíprocamente el uso del mismo o lo suspenden”.

<sup>14</sup> John Locke, *Segundo Tratado sobre el Gobierno Civil*, sección 25.

<sup>15</sup> C.B. Macpherson, *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1962, pp.200-1.

*de jure*. La apropiación física de un objeto es de hecho necesaria para que este sea mi propiedad, pero no es una condición suficiente. La posesión empírica no puede ser equivalente a la propiedad, porque si así fuera, como hemos visto, una cosa no sería nuestra una vez que estuviera fuera de nuestro alcance. Pero Locke confunde esta forma de posesión con la propiedad y por esta razón, sugiere Kant, no consigue percatarse de la necesidad de un contrato social inicial que haga posible la propiedad privada. Desde la perspectiva kantiana, es la posesión inteligible la que constituye la propiedad privada.

Esto no significa que Kant prescindiera enteramente de la noción de un estado de naturaleza al tratar el concepto de propiedad. A primera vista podría parecer que debe inevitablemente prescindir de esta noción. Aquellos teóricos de la política que atraen nuestra atención al “estado de naturaleza” lo hacen con la finalidad de que imaginemos cuáles serían las circunstancias si no existieran ni leyes ni gobierno. La intención de Hobbes, por ejemplo, es la de despertar un malestar y miedo genuinos con respecto al estado de naturaleza que representa. La vida sin el Leviatán es, cree Hobbes, menos que humana. Por lo tanto, para él, como para otros muchos teóricos del derecho natural, el estado de naturaleza ha de ser algo que podríamos experimentar. Y experiencia es un término clave aquí. Kant usa experiencia en el sentido limitado de experiencia sensorial o *Anschauung*. Esta es la experiencia que presenta la filosofía empirista: las cosas en cuanto inmediatamente aprehendidas a través de “la mirada de ellas” (una traducción literal de *Anschauung*). Y es en este sentido en el que el estado de naturaleza no es, según Kant, algo que podamos haber experimentado; no ha existido nunca como un estado de cosas empírico. Los atractivos de Hobbes y Locke con respecto al estado de naturaleza desaparecen en Kant. Pero, como he sugerido, esto no significa que Kant no haga uso de la noción de estado de naturaleza en su deducción de los derechos de propiedad. De hecho, la noción es crucial para él. Sin embargo, esta noción es una idea de la razón pura práctica, la cual tiene una realidad moral en lugar de empírica. Como él mismo dice, “esta comunidad originaria del suelo y, por tanto, también de las cosas que hay en él, es una idea que tiene realidad objetiva (jurídico-práctica), y se diferencia de la noción de una real “comunidad primitiva que es una ficción (*Erdichtung*)” (6: 251). Del mismo modo que Dios existe en su filosofía moral para explicar y respaldar nuestras predisposiciones morales, Kant invoca la idea de un estado de naturaleza como un postulado a priori que procura los fundamentos racionales para la existencia de la propiedad. Como postulado de la razón pura práctica se da al parecer un estado natural en el que la tierra estaba en nuestra común posesión, y, como postulado similar, se da un contrato social subsiguiente que permite la propiedad privada de la tierra y sus productos.

Pero no debería sorprender a nadie, añade Kant, el hecho de que los principios teóricos subyacentes a la propiedad de las cosas exteriores “se pierdan en lo inteligible y no supongan ninguna ampliación del conocimiento”(6:252). Esto es así porque el concepto de libertad en el que se basan los principios no permite una deducción teórica. Los principios, en otras palabras, no tienen realidad empírica alguna. El concepto de libertad puede derivarse solamente “a partir de las leyes prácticas de la razón (el imperativo categórico) como un hecho de la misma” (*ibid.*).

Los derechos de propiedad parecen de este modo pender de un hilo muy fino en la filosofía política kantiana. Parece ser que dependen enteramente de la buena voluntad de los hombres de comportarse moralmente los unos con respecto a los otros; y Kant reconoce que el imperativo categórico que ordena a los hombres comportarse en este modo no tiene una significación empírica directa. Esto surge del hecho de que la propiedad es una cosa en sí misma o noúmeno. Esta debe sin embargo, reconoce Kant, tener una realidad práctica; en otras palabras, tiene que ser aplicable a los objetos de la experiencia. Para Kant existe solo un modo para resolver este dilema. Como estado empírico real de las cosas, defiende, solo en una sociedad civil (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) es posible tener cosas externas como propiedad personal. Así pues, para que el noúmeno, propiedad, sea una realidad, “el sujeto debe estar [...] autorizado a obligar a cualquiera, con quien entre en conflicto sobre lo mío y lo tuyo acerca de tal objeto, a entrar con él en una constitución civil” (6:256). Claramente, la posibilidad nouménica de que un objeto exterior pueda convertirse en mi propiedad no es por sí sola suficiente para asegurarla como mi propiedad en realidad. Tiene que existir siempre la posibilidad de usar la coerción para crear un estado de cosas donde antes no existía ninguno. Esta posibilidad de ser coaccionado a entrar en un estado civil está fundamentada en Kant en una voluntad general (que es de nuevo una posibilidad nouménica) de fundar dicha sociedad. Según Kant, el poder de coaccionar no puede confiarse a una voluntad particular (*einseitige*), pues se negaría de este modo la universalidad de la ley y nuestra libertad bajo ella. Por esto, la constitución de tal sociedad puede fundarse solo de acuerdo a una voluntad que obligue a todos aquellos que están sujetos a su libertad. En otras palabras, es solo un contrato el que puede procurar la garantía necesaria. No es necesario que exista en realidad tal contrato para que sea real la posibilidad de una coacción a entrar en esta sociedad. Esto es así porque la existencia de dicha voluntad universal que sanciona dicho uso de la fuerza es una idea a priori de la razón pura práctica, y allí donde existe una sociedad civil ha de presuponerse esta voluntad universal. El concepto de este contrato debe servir como guía para nuestro comportamiento en sociedad, de otro modo no estaríamos obligados a dejar intacta la propiedad del otro. Es solo a través de la garantía recíproca de propiedad en el contrato que la propiedad se convierte en un estatus fiable. Kant cree que esta obligación recíproca es inherente a la aserción de propiedad a modo de idea de la razón pura práctica, ya que las condiciones bajo las cuales yo puedo tener en propiedad un objeto son aquellas bajo las cuales todos los demás son potencialmente capaces de tenerlo.

Aquí se ve claramente por qué Kant concibe la propiedad como una idea de la razón pura práctica. La propiedad, defiende, es una realidad objetiva pero no empírica. Kant estaría entre los primeros en admitir que, en tanto que simple hecho histórico, la sociedad civil puede no haberse fundado sobre un contrato. De hecho, Kant considera ingenua aquella perspectiva que afirma que un contrato social real ha sido de hecho firmado. Sin embargo, en su opinión, donde existe una sociedad civil (*bürgerliche Gesellschaft*) existen ciertos acuerdos tácitos que la sustentan y que han de ser reconocidos por todos los hombres capaces de un razonamiento práctico. Sin el cumplimiento de dichos



acuerdos tácitos por la mayoría de los hombres la cohesión social estaría en peligro. Como señala Kant, las condiciones para que yo sea capaz de tener propiedad son las mismas condiciones que hacen posible para todos el tener propiedad. Sin embargo, como dichos acuerdos no son existentes realmente ni son reconocibles en las acciones de todos los hombres, Kant los denomina ideas de la razón pura práctica.

Por lo tanto, en el estado de naturaleza “puede haber propiedad externa, pero es solo provisional” (6:256). Es provisional hasta la fundación de una sociedad civil; consecuentemente, Kant considera que toda forma de sociedad que no posea una constitución se encuentra en un estado de naturaleza. El derecho a tener propiedad le pertenece a todo sujeto en dicho estado natural, pero esto sucede solo de acuerdo a un derecho natural que sirve como anticipación a la sociedad civil. Este derecho no se asegura gracias al estado de naturaleza, sino mediante la subsiguiente fundación de una sociedad civil. En cualquier caso, en el estado de naturaleza poseemos un derecho natural a obligar a los demás a entrar con nosotros en una sociedad donde la tenencia de propiedad sea sancionada mediante poderes legales positivos (6:257). Este derecho se considera una demanda moral absoluta sobre el hombre en el estado de naturaleza. Tan irresistible es esta demanda que aunque la mayoría de hombres en el estado de naturaleza desearan que no hubiera un estado legal, la suya puede considerarse como una opinión unilateral. Es nuestro derecho, defiende Kant, forzar a la mayoría a ser libre en una *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.

Este argumento es característico, ya que contradice en apariencia el argumento general de los derechos naturales. Kant está diciendo, en efecto, que no existen derechos naturales tal y como estos se entienden normalmente. Esto se sigue claramente del sugerir que no existen derechos antes del establecimiento de la sociedad civil. A la base de todos nuestros derechos reside una constitución civil (*bürgerliche*). El estado de naturaleza, por tanto, no confiere de por síningún derecho. Los derechos no son nuestros en un modo innato. Sin embargo, Kant retiene un uso para la noción de derechos innatos, y sugiere que estos están basados en una presuposición legal. Esta presuposición legal consiste en que los hombres se unirán en un contrato social para establecer un estado civil. Así pues, con Kant, los derechos naturales, paradójicamente, son solo derechos naturales desde el punto de vista de una ya establecida la *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. Esto es lo que quiere decir Kant cuando afirma que el derecho de propiedad dentro del estado de naturaleza es solo provisional. El derecho depende enteramente de la suposición que el demandante entrará con otros en una sociedad civil; y como última medida, de que puede ser obligado a entrar en dicha sociedad<sup>16</sup>.

La deducción de los derechos de propiedad no es por tanto tan frágil como podría parecer en un primer momento. No es una deducción que dependa enteramente de la voluntad moral del hombre. Lo que ha de tenerse en cuenta es que Kant establece como precondiciones morales para la propiedad la de una propiedad común originaria de la tierra y sus productos, y un subsiguiente contrato social que permita a cada uno establecerse en

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<sup>16</sup>Véase Rousseau, J.J.; *El contrato social*, Libro I, cap. VI.

una sociedad civil; y que estas son condiciones que no tienen que darse históricamente, sino que son, más bien, ideas de la razón pura práctica. En opinión de Kant, estas son ideas que tienen que subyacer racionalmente a las relaciones sociales de propiedad y a las que se llega a través de un análisis de la institución tal y como existe en el presente. Consideradas desde un punto de vista moral, estas ideas son nociones que hacen posible la existencia de la propiedad. En otras palabras, el hombre contemplándose a sí mismo desde un punto de vista moral puede considerar que estas ideas de la razón pura práctica residen en el “origen” de la propiedad. Pero desde un punto de vista empírico-práctico la deducción kantiana de los derechos de propiedad permite la tenencia de propiedad independientemente de cómo esta se establezca. El origen empírico real del derecho de propiedad es un asunto del todo contingente. La deducción de Kant no es incompatible, por tanto, con la fundamentación de los derechos de propiedad a través de la fuerza en el mundo histórico, real. De hecho Kant, como hemos visto, sanciona el uso de la fuerza allí donde se considera necesario para lograr el fin de una sociedad teniente-propietaria. Kant sanciona el uso de la fuerza porque la tenencia de propiedad es la base de la sociedad civil, y no puede concebir una sociedad humana genuina que no sea una *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*.

Esto no significa, sin embargo, que deberíamos considerar a Kant meramente como a un apologista del moderno *bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. Kant es un pensador demasiado original como para ser considerado en esos términos. Por otra parte, depende de nosotros el defender que su teoría de la propiedad desemboca en ciertas implicaciones críticas. Estas implicaciones críticas surgen, en mi opinión, de una dificultad que Kant deja sin resolver en su análisis. La dificultad es la siguiente: por una parte, Kant reconoce que para que una sociedad de propietarios exista, es casi seguro que la coacción será necesaria; incluso cuando la sociedad civil está fundada, debe existir siempre la posibilidad de usar la coerción para hacer cumplir los derechos de propiedad que han sido establecidos. Por otra parte, sin embargo, Kant argumenta que el derecho de propiedad no puede existir sin el postulado a priori de una comunidad original de propiedad. La finalidad de este postulado es mostrar que la distribución de la propiedad existente se ha dado de acuerdo a una base acordada. Tenemos que imaginar que la tierra una vez perteneció a todos en común y que posteriormente decidimos distribuir esta herencia en común. Pero claramente estas dos perspectivas se contradicen entre sí. O suponemos que los individuos acordaron la existente distribución de la propiedad en base a la previa propiedad común, o podemos suponer que discutieron tal distribución de la propiedad y tuvieron que ser forzados a aceptar dicha posición. Es imposible suponer que los mismos individuos estuvieron al mismo tiempo en acuerdo y en desacuerdo con tal distribución existente de la propiedad. Además, la sugerencia de Kant de que la fuerza es necesaria en cierto punto para establecer y mantener la propiedad privada implica claramente que esta no es una institución que goce del respaldo inmediato y sentido de la comunidad. Aun así, la noción del acuerdo de toda la comunidad debe, según Kant, subyacer a esta institución. Esto lo hace explícito cuando dice: “no hay ningún derecho (directo) a una cosa, sino que se denomina así

únicamente al que corresponde a alguien frente a una persona, que está en posesión común junto a todos los demás (en el estado civil)” (6:261). Aquí Kant expresa su punto de vista con firmeza. Lo que está diciendo es que la propiedad privada depende siempre de nuestra original posesión común de la superficie de la tierra. Tenemos una situación, por tanto, en la que se considera a todo el cuerpo de ciudadanos como la salvaguardia de una institución que debe ser aceptada en un primer momento a través de la coacción.

El fracaso de Kant para resolver esta dificultad en su argumentación representa una falla seria de su filosofía política que podría llevarnos a rebajar su valía como filósofo. Pero supongamos por un momento, como hace Goldmann<sup>17</sup>, que esta falta de coherencia en el argumento kantiano refleje una falta de coherencia en las relaciones sociales existentes. El panorama que nos encontramos es el de una población insatisfecha que soporta una institución que no refleja del todo sus deseos. Si añadimos a esto la suposición de Kant de que los modelos de propiedad en una sociedad deben ser decididos por la comunidad como un todo, nos encontramos con la imagen de la sociedad civil como una sociedad continuamente atormentada por la posibilidad del conflicto. El hincapié que Kant hace en el uso de la fuerza para mantener a la sociedad unida, y el énfasis equivalente que pone en el acuerdo común para el establecimiento de las principales instituciones de la sociedad, son, cuando se los considera a un mismo tiempo, incompatibles. Es esta tensión en la filosofía política de Kant la que explotan los intérpretes marxistas, que dan una preeminencia particular al postulado *a priori* de la propiedad común que provee las bases para la justificación kantiana de la propiedad privada. Podemos ver sobre estas bases la razón por la cual Marcuse afirma que la justificación kantiana de la moderna *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* nos lleva más allá de dicha sociedad<sup>18</sup>. Porque, como el mismo Marcuse señala, los fundamentos que Kant aduce para la organización existente de la sociedad no residen dentro de tal sociedad sino en su opuesto. Según esta perspectiva, Kant no yerra al ofrecer una explicación contradictoria de las relaciones de propiedad; está más bien señalando las dificultades que residen en el corazón de la sociedad occidental<sup>19</sup>.



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<sup>17</sup>Goldmann, L.; *Immanuel Kant*, NLB: London, 1971. Su tesis principal es que la filosofía kantiana refleja fielmente los dilemas del individuo burgués. Véase especialmente caps. 1 y 3, part.2.

<sup>18</sup>Marcuse, H.; *Studies in Critical Philosophy*, Beacon Press: London, 1972, p. 94. La ley civil con Kant, dice: “permanece como una autoridad que no puede ser justificada racionalmente en sus orígenes sin ir más allá de los límites de aquella sociedad para cuya existencia esta es necesaria”.

<sup>19</sup> Durante la escritura de este artículo hice gran uso de los comentarios de W.H. Walsh y Henry Tudor a una versión anterior del mismo.

**De la teleología tradicional a la teleología trascendental.  
La orientación a fines como aspecto consustancial de la  
racionalidad humana**

*From Traditional Teleology to Transcendental Teleology.  
Purposiveness as a Consubstantial Feature of Human  
Rationality*

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**Reseña : Fugate, Courtney, *The Teleology of Reason. A Study of the Structure of Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte, Band 178, De Gruyter, 2014, 433 pp. ISBN: 9783110306262**

La investigación desarrollada por Courtney Fugate examina la función que desempeña la concepción teleológica de la razón en el desarrollo del proyecto crítico, y considera de manera pormenorizada el modo en que operan diversos elementos teleológicos en la articulación sistemática de tópicos fundamentales de la filosofía

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kantiana. La tesis principal que recorre el desarrollo de la línea interpretativa desarrollada por el autor sostiene que, tanto en el ámbito de la experiencia como en el plano de la acción, la razón humana se orienta hacia ciertos fines, a cuya representación arriba como resultado de su propia constitución interna.

Como bien señala Fugate, más allá del círculo de los estudios kantianos especializados suele predominar la idea de que Kant asigna escasa importancia a la teleología, cuyo tratamiento quedaría restringido principalmente a la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar*. Bajo tal premisa, se ha considerado a la teoría crítica del conocimiento como una doctrina filosófica esencialmente ligada a una concepción físico-mecánica de la naturaleza, en cuyo marco la teleología sería invocada como mero dispositivo heurístico. Por su parte, ciertas lecturas tradicionales de la doctrina moral kantiana han desatendido, de manera análoga, la presencia de elementos teleológicos, predominando así la interpretación de dicha doctrina como una deontología en la que serían sistemáticamente rechazados tales elementos, cuanto menos en el nivel decisivo en el que se lleva a cabo la fundamentación de la *metafísica moral* o *filosofía moral pura*. Pese al amplio consenso que han generado este tipo de interpretaciones, lo cierto es que Kant apela de manera recurrente a un lenguaje teleológico, tanto en sus escritos gnoseológicos como en sus obras morales y, desde luego, en la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar*. En lo referido al plano gnoseológico, los fines a los que se orienta la razón teórica en su búsqueda de una unidad sistemática de los conocimientos empíricos constituyen principios regulativos que articulan y dotan de unidad a la experiencia científica. En lo que respecta al plano moral, la presencia de la teleología resulta igualmente decisiva: si bien Kant niega que el valor moral de las acciones pueda ser determinado en relación con los fines que las acciones persiguen (pues, como sabemos, es la mera correspondencia entre la máxima subjetiva y la ley moral objetiva aquello que permite establecer la moralidad de la acción), la referencia a fines sólo es rechazada en cuanto principio o fundamento de determinación de la voluntad, lo cual no impide que se atribuya una enorme importancia a los fines que emergen a partir de la propia representación de la ley moral. En tal sentido, la concepción de la humanidad como un *fin en sí mismo*, o la definición de la ética como un *sistema de fines*, ponen en evidencia la presencia fundamental de componentes teleológicos en la ética kantiana; más aún: la razón práctica es, en cuanto tal, una *facultad de fines*, como facultad que nos determina a la realización o actualización de fines éticos en el orden empírico de la naturaleza.

Fugate examina, a modo de introducción, la presencia de aspectos teleológicos en los textos del período pre-crítico, con el propósito de mostrar el desarrollo progresivo de una nueva concepción de la teleología, irreductible a la concepción imperante en la metafísica racionalista. En efecto, los rasgos propios y originales que introduce la concepción teleológica kantiana señalan un desplazamiento desde una teleología de inspiración teológica –presente en la metafísica racionalista alemana–, hacia una nueva concepción de la teleología como un producto de la razón humana. Si bien en los textos tempranos de Kant la teleología se halla vinculada aún a la noción de Dios, en los textos

del período crítico se desarrolla una *teleología trascendental*, cada vez más ligada a la propia naturaleza y modo de funcionamiento de nuestra facultad racional.

La investigación se estructura en tres partes. En la primera parte se aborda el problema de cómo interpretar la teleología de manera tal que ésta no resulte reducida a un mero patrón de comportamiento, y pueda advertirse su conexión esencial con el concepto de intencionalidad o estructura propositiva (*purposiveness*) de la razón. En esta parte inicial se examinan asimismo las características propias de toda *explicación* en general, a fin de señalar que el componente teleológico se halla presente tanto en las explicaciones científicas –entendidas como procedimientos a partir de los cuales un evento singular es interpretado como un ítem integrado en una serie de relaciones legalmente regladas– como en nuestra explicación o interpretación de los eventos en el marco de la experiencia cotidiana. Ambos modos de explicación exhiben –argumenta Fugate– un carácter intrínsecamente teleológico, en la medida en que consideran un fenómeno particular como expresión de ciertas leyes universales: “toda forma humana de explicación y comprensión es irreductiblemente teleológica en su nivel estructural más básico” (p. 99). Bajo la premisa de una presencia ineludible de aspectos teleológicos en todo modelo explicativo –ya se trate, reiteramos, de investigaciones científicas o de la experiencia cotidiana–, Fugate intenta mostrar que en el marco de la doctrina crítica del conocimiento, el objeto fenoménico exhibe una estructura intrínsecamente teleológica, por cuanto se lo concibe como una entidad cuyas características son resultado del propio modo de funcionamiento de la razón. El modelo teleológico de explicación no debe ser pensado, así pues, como un modelo contrapuesto a los principios mecanicistas de la ciencia moderna, sino que resulta compatible con tales principios y, por tanto, con la justificación trascendental de la experiencia científica, fundada en los principios de la física mecanicista.

La segunda parte de la investigación profundiza en el análisis de los componentes teleológicos presentes en la teoría kantiana del conocimiento, para lo cual se examinan, en primer lugar, algunos antecedentes históricos fundamentales para la comprensión del concepto kantiano de *experiencia*. Fugate sostiene que, pese a sus discrepancias, autores como Hoffmann, Crusius y Wolff conciben ciertos principios ontológicos como resultado de leyes que regulan el funcionamiento del entendimiento humano, y parecen coincidir en el reconocimiento de una estructura teleológica interna que sería inherente a nuestras propias facultades cognitivas. Sin embargo, desde la perspectiva crítica, el error principal en el que incurre el racionalismo dogmático es que confunde subrepticamente los principios de la experiencia con principios determinantes de las *cosas en sí mismas*, y no reconoce, por consiguiente, los límites insuperables del conocimiento humano (cf. p. 143). Si bien Kant recupera nociones de la tradición racionalista en el desarrollo de su propio concepto de *experiencia*, la doctrina crítica trasciende los desarrollos previos, no sólo al establecer el límite insuperable de todo conocimiento humano, sino al acuñar un nuevo concepto de teleología. Kant transformaría radicalmente los rasgos teleológicos presentes en los sistemas dogmáticos previos al introducir la noción de una estructura

fundamentalmente intencional de la razón humana, desarrollando así lo que Fugate caracteriza como una *teleología trascendental*.

El autor intenta mostrar que la propia estructura de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, sustentada en la estructura inmanente de la razón humana, exhibe una dimensión teleológica, y bajo esta premisa examina principios fundamentales de la doctrina crítica del conocimiento desarrollados en la *Estética*, la *Analítica*, y la *Dialéctica*, tales como el problema de la posibilidad de los juicios sintéticos *a priori*, la concepción del espacio y el tiempo como condiciones formales de la sensibilidad, la deducción de las categorías, o la finalidad práctico-regulativa de las ideas de la razón pura. En este recorrido, el autor procura enfatizar la finalidad o intencionalidad como un rasgo intrínseco y esencial de las operaciones cognitivas humanas. La unidad trascendental de la razón es teleológica en cuanto proporciona un horizonte intencional en el que se inscribe toda *objetividad*; la determinación conceptual que es constitutiva del objeto de la experiencia, es, desde esta perspectiva hermenéutica, de carácter teleológico (cf. p. 401).

El carácter espontáneo y legislador del uso teórico de la razón se hace presente, a su vez, en su uso práctico, examinado en la tercera y última parte de la investigación. El tratamiento de la teleología práctica –o *teleología de la libertad*– exige considerar tópicos fundamentales de ética kantiana, tales como las diversas definiciones de los conceptos de *libertad* y de *voluntad*, la noción de *auto-conciencia moral*, el principio de *autonomía*, el concepto de *virtud*, la noción de *carácter* o la doctrina del *bien supremo*. En lo que respecta a esta última cuestión, Fugate examina en qué sentido la creencia racional en la existencia de Dios impulsa o refuerza el incentivo moral: la creencia es expresión directa de un uso óptimo de nuestras facultades en cuanto orientadas al cultivo de la virtud, y es, en tal sentido, consecuencia del deber moral. Esta profunda articulación sistemática entre la filosofía moral kantiana y su concepción de la religión se vincula, a su vez, con principios del uso teórico de la razón, ya que es el carácter intencional (*purposive character*) de la razón en su uso teórico aquello que conduce a un concepto de *lo incondicionado* que ostenta una significación profundamente moral; a su vez, el uso práctico exige postular la existencia de un ser originario como fundamento último de toda realidad. Fugate sostiene que a través de este supuesto (la existencia de Dios) puede darse la concordancia entre el ámbito fenoménico y los fines últimos del hombre, concordancia cuya posibilidad debe ser asumida o postulada, de acuerdo con las propias exigencias de la razón. Desde este clave de lectura, el autor aborda el problema de la articulación entre los usos teórico y práctico de la razón, re-interpretándolo como un problema referido a la articulación entre una *teleología natural* y una *teleología moral*, posible a partir del postulado de la existencia de Dios.

Fugate se refiere, finalmente, a la cuestión de la unidad teleológica de la razón, vinculando este tópico con el desarrollo del concepto kantiano de la *filosofía* como adquisición de la *sabiduría*. La filosofía kantiana se orienta a la búsqueda de la sabiduría – que prescribe vivir de acuerdo con el mandato incondicionado de la ley moral– en tanto se

ocupa de señalar los fines esenciales a los que se dirige la razón en virtud de su constitución intrínseca; tanto nuestra actividad cognitiva como práctica encuentran sentido en relación con la sabiduría como meta final. Los objetos de la razón teórica, así como los objetos de la práctica (*i.e.* los fines representados por la voluntad), reflejan una estructura interna esencialmente teleológica, que es, a su vez, resultado de la propia constitución teleológica de la razón.

En síntesis, esta incursión pormenorizada en tópicos fundamentales de la filosofía kantiana propone considerar la teleología como *hilo conductor* a partir del cual interpretar el carácter unitario y sistemático de la filosofía crítica en su totalidad, invitando a una reflexión acerca de las tareas que Kant asume como esenciales en el desarrollo de su extensa obra filosófica. Fugate desarrolla una lectura que procura traer a la luz la función específica y sistemática que desempeña la teleología en los escritos kantianos, realizando una contribución significativa a las importantes discusiones que han tenido lugar, en las últimas décadas, acerca de la cuestión.





## And The Corpus Still Breathes

### *Y el corpus sigue respirando*

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**Reseña : Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Theory*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2013, 258 pp., ISBN: 978022602198**

In *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of the Critical Philosophy* (University of Chicago Press, 2013), Jennifer Mensch provides a reading of Kant's theory of cognition that brings its biological and naturalist influences to the fore. In the interest of defending an interpretation of Kant's philosophy as an epigenetic theory of reason, the author tracks Kant's own intellectual development from his pre-critical to his critical stage, with an elucidating reading of the infamous "silent decade" that separates them. Along the way, she explores how the concept of *epigenesis* that served as the guiding-star for so many debates in natural history from the seventeenth to the eighteenth centuries became the dominant model through which Kant approached the theory of knowledge. On the whole, the work paints a portrait of Kant in which the father of transcendental idealism figures not as the great taxonomer of the understanding (as he is often portrayed) but as a theorist of reason's organic emergence from out of itself. This ambition is elegantly contained in the opening sentence of the "Introduction," where Mensch writes: "This book is oriented by the conviction that Kant should be fitted into a framework that has begun to take shape in a number of fields when it comes to thinking about the mid- to late eighteenth century, a framework that can be called something like 'organic thinking,' or, better yet, 'organicism.'"<sup>1</sup>

Interestingly, this organicist reading of the Kantian philosophy is not achieved through some in-depth analysis of the passages in the third *Critique* where Kant talks about organisms and

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<sup>1</sup> Mensch, Jennifer, *Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University), 1.

teleology or even through a focused study of Kant's select writings on the life sciences. Rather, it is established more through a comprehensive re-framing of the Kantian project as a whole. For Mensch's work here is, in a strong sense of the term, a *narrative* that tells a story about of all the parts of the architectonic relate as one. This is, I take it, one of the book's most impressive accomplishments—namely, that it does not tie its fate either to a passage from one of Kant's various magnum opuses or to a "reading" of some of his less-known publications, but instead wagers the weight of its thesis solely on the author's ability to change the reader's perspective concerning the conceptual thread by which these works "hang" individually and as a collective.

The book is composed of seven chapters (spanning less 160 pages in total) organized in chronological order. Yet, because of the organic nature of the book itself, the reader may find it helpful to begin *and end* her reading of it with the author's brief but commanding "Introduction," which proffers a condensed account of the book's global thesis as well as a helpful sketch of the historical trajectory of Kant's development as a thinker from the 1840s to the 1870s. The details of this sketch get "filled out" over the course of the book, as the author guides the reader through Kant's many and varied attempts to come to term with what was, quite literally, the problem of the century: "the problem of genesis." How do we understand the emergence of the new? Surely, mapping the general arc of this trajectory seems to be the book's overriding scholarly interest. But it is also clear that the author has another, more local, goal in mind. She wants to convince her audience that this trajectory genuinely matters for how we think and talk about Kant's single most groundbreaking advancement: his theory of cognition in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781).

The first two chapters provide the historical background for this organicist reading of Kant. The first one, "Generation and the Task of Classification," discusses seventeenth century debates in natural history about the possibility of a systematic classification of nature that function as the backdrop to Kant's own organic interests and concerns. Is a taxonomic system of nature possible? Does such a system presuppose the ontological existence of natural kinds or natural essences? If not, what grounds taxonomic kind terms? And, if so, how are these metaphysical essences to be assimilated into the conceptual armature of a largely empirical science? How are these fixed kind-terms, moreover, to be reconciled with the evident flexibility and variability of species? Mensch notes that these debates received their first impetus from Robert Boyle's re-introduction of the Aristotelian concept of *natural entelechies* into naturalist discourse and that this re-introduction culminated in the theoretical confrontation between the *species nominalism* of John Locke and the *preformationist theory* of Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz that Kant would eventually make it his job to overcome.

Chapter two, "Buffon's Natural History and the Founding of Organicism," follows the consequences this polemic through the eighteenth century. In the eighteenth century, naturalists such as Georges Buffon made remarkable headway in the study of living matter by shifting the terms upon which the seventeenth century debates rested. First, they replaced the taxonomic framework of their predecessors with a genealogical one, effectively replacing concerns about the position of species within a classificatory grid (*tables of differences*) with new ones about the phyletic histories of species as a whole (*lines of descent*). Second, they began employing a new concept in their study of organisms that wasn't available the preceding century: the concept of "force." Although this concept was originally forged in the context of Newtonian physics, various naturalists appropriated it for the study of the living. Why? Because this concept gave naturalists a

model for describing and explaining natural phenomena (organization and reproduction for example) *without* having to appeal to outright metaphysical principles, such as Boyle's Aristotelian *entelechies*. Buffon's concept of "embryonic expansion" and Maupertuis's theory of "organic forces" are examples of this cross-disciplinary appropriation. And, as Mensch points out, these conceptual innovations in natural science were by no means unique or isolated events that stood out as anomalies in their cultural milieu. Both were part and parcel of a "revolution that came to place organicism at the heart of both science and the arts in the mid- to late eighteenth century."<sup>2</sup> This is the same revolution that Kant would eventually stage in the domain of epistemology.

Chapter three, "Kant and the Problem of Origin," is (along with seven) the most important chapter of the entire book for it lays out the position that will serve as both the foundation for the rest of the work as well as the author's lead criticism of current Kant scholarship—the position that Kant's long "pre-critical" period makes sense only when viewed as a sustained philosophical engagement with the problem of origin. Mensch makes two arguments that cut against the grain of received Kant scholarship. The first is that all of Kant's publications before the 1780s, from *On the True Estimation of Living Forces* (1747) to *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens* (1755) to *The Only Possible Argument In Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), share one the same objective: articulating a notion of *generation* [*erzeugen*] in which the development of a thing is more than the *unfolding* [*auszuwickeln*] of a pre-existent form. Kant thought there must be a kind of generation (epi-genesis) in which a thing's development is not merely the execution of a fixed blueprint but a creative process that allows for the emergence of something new. Mensch shows that during the "pre-critical" period Kant systematically invokes this idea so as to separate himself from the preformationist philosophy of Leibniz and the coarse empiricism of Locke, from the mechanistic writings of Newton and the mordant dogmatism of Wolff. Mensch's second argument is her "continuity thesis" (my term). This is her assertion that there is no real break between Kant's "pre-critical" and "critical" periods. There is only continuity. The theory of epigenesis he starts developing in the 1740s and '50s in his writings on natural science and cosmology is the same theory that, in refined and modified form, grounds his system of transcendental idealism in the 1780s and '90s.

The details of this continuity thesis then get spelled out in chapters four and five, where Mensch argues that Kant's epistemological writings (on the genesis of ideas) follow quite organically from his early writings on cosmology and natural science (on the genesis of planets and animals). In chapter four, "The Rebirth of Metaphysics," she argues that well *before* the "silent decade"—in works such as *Dreams of a Spirit Seer* (1766) but also the 1769 *Dissertation*—Kant was already wrestling two epistemological problems that would frame his critical account in 1781: (1) the problem of the origin of ideas (which Kant tackles by splitting sense and intellect) and (2) the problem of their rightful employment and possible abuse (which Kant described as a problem of "subreption," i.e., of using concepts outside their legitimate field of applicability). These epistemological ventures convinced Kant that the way to get metaphysics "unstuck" from the morass of empiricism and rationalism was to move metaphysics in the direction of *a science of limits*, which could only be achieved via an *epigenetic* theory of knowledge. But, as chapter five makes clear, it would be a mistake to think that these early interests in the problem of genesis appear before 1770 only then to be submerged during the "silent decade." During this period, to start, Kant was fully immersed in questions concerning the logic of *genesis, formation* and

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<sup>2</sup> Ibid., 50

*inheritance*. Indeed, it is in the years *leading up* to the full-fledged articulation of the critical standpoint that he manages to “crystalize” (Mensch’s word) the all-important concept of *teleology* that sneaks into the first *Critique* vis-à-vis the transcendental imagination and later acts as the organizing principle in the third *Critique*’s investigation of judgment. Furthermore, Mensch claims, it is also through the writings of this period (especially his anthropological discourses on race) that Kant first conceives of humanity as possessing a “germ of reason,” the same germ that spawns the laws of the understanding in the first *Critique* and secures the prospects of moral action in the second. With this move Mensch draws a continuous arch of epigenetic thinking that cuts through entire Kantian corpus and brings together under a single parabola the murmurs of the pre-critical stage, the presumed silence of the 1770s and the decisive roar of 1781.

Having establishing this continuity, Mensch directly takes up the question that would have been at the center of Kant’s thinking while writing the *Critique of Pure Reason*: What does it mean to talk about the “genesis” of reason or the “emergence” of concepts and concepts within a transcendental framework that stands in sharp opposition to empirical psychology? In “Empirical Psychology in Tetens and Kant”, Mensch claims that Kant develops a notion of “metaphysical epigenesis” that reconciles the anti-empirical demands of the newly born transcendental framework and the temporal logic of the concept of epigenesis itself. Framed through Kant’s often neglected relationship to philosophical writings of J.N. Tetens, this chapter sheds light on the two strategies by which Kant broke away from the allure of empirical psychology: 1) his appeal to the transcendental imagination and 2) his discussion of epistemic right.

*Kant’s Organicism* closes with an imposing final chapter that takes a bird’s-eye point of view on Kant’s architectonic of reason. Drawing on content from the previous chapters, Mensch clarifies that Kant’s view of reason and the philosophical system that articulates it (the *Bauplan*) are both modeled after an organic theory of animal development. Kant leans on the notion of *epigenesis* to explain how reason *grows*. He uses it to explain, on the one hand, the metaphysical genesis of the laws of reason and, on the other, the historical development of reason as a whole. More importantly, however, Mensch makes the strong claim that only *as an effect* of Kant’s appropriation of a biologically-informed theory of genesis does the “the centerpiece of [Kant’s] theory” make any sense: the infamous transcendental deduction of the first *Critique*. Readers interested in how this crucial component (the deduction) functions within the entire Kantian system or how the entire system turns on it are likely to find this final chapter particularly rewarding.

It is exciting to see a work of scholarship that combines textual exegesis with historical analysis in a clear yet sophisticated fashion. And it is even more exciting to come across a work that paints a picture of the man from Königsberg that is as relevant for philosophy as it is for history, biology and the history of biology.

Even so, the book suffers from two distinct shortcomings. The first one is the provinciality of its audience. Although its content is germane to debates in philosophy, history and biology, the work is written only with a philosophical audience in mind. In fact, it seems to be written almost exclusively for Kant scholars that already have a solid grasp of the three Critiques and their place in the history of Western philosophy. Philosophers who do not specialize either in Kantian philosophy or in the early modern period more generally might struggle with some sections (e.g., the discussion of Leibniz in chapter two, the description of the “logical” versus the “real” use of the

intellect in chapter four, and the analysis of the transcendental deduction in chapter seven), while non-philosophers might be entirely overpowered by them. My advice for these readers is to consult the footnotes whenever possible since the majority of them are elaborations of ideas contained in the body of the work and not simply references to primary or secondary sources.

The second shortcoming of the work is that, in a way, it lacks a conclusion. If Mensch is to be commended for her ambitiousness in taking Kant's whole intellectual trajectory as her object of study, she may be criticized for the chariness of her overall approach. She limits herself to describing the implications of her interpretation *only in relation to Kant's own philosophy*. But there is virtually nothing in the book about what this might mean beyond that; nothing about what this reading might teach us about Kantianism after Kant. What might Mensch's thesis tell us, for instance, about Hegel's meta-critique of Kant in *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) or about Nietzsche's attacks in *Genealogy of Morals* (1887) and *Twilight of the Idols* (1888) in the nineteenth century? Or about how the tenets of Kantianism were mobilized by neo-Kantians, phenomenologists, moral theorists and epistemologists in the twentieth? What might her argument, moreover, have to say about the state of Kantian scholarship today in Europe, North America, Latin America or elsewhere? And what might it teach us about the current uptake of Kant's teleological discourse in the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of evolution? Could it be that this epigenetic perspective brings to light new links between Kant's theory of cognition and contemporary neuroscience or that it helps us make new interventions in ongoing debates about the origin of consciousness, rational choice theory and social epistemology? Why and how, in short, should Kant's "organicism" matter?

To be sure, Kant was a complicated thinker with a multi-faceted legacy, and no single work can begin to "contain" all these facets at once. Plus, a book without self-imposed limits is hardly a book worth reading. Still, the book would have benefited from an additional chapter or two investigating some of the thesis's implications (maybe just one or two!) beyond Kant's own corpus. As it stands, it is almost as if Mensch finishes the book a few bricks short of a load; almost as if she refuses, perhaps in line with the spirit of the very Kantian philosophy she studies, to go beyond the bounds of her island of early modern research and leap into more speculative territory. Yes, she has rearranged this island from within in a creative manner and put Kantianism in a new frame. But readers interested in what this rearrangement and this reframing might mean to those who live in different islands have no choice but to turn their backs to the Pillars of Hercules and, as Francis Bacon would have it, embark on the voyage themselves.



## Una nueva lectura sobre la deducción trascendental B

### *A new reading on the B Transcendental Deduction*

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Caimi, Mario, *Kant's B Deduction*, Newcastle upon Tyne, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014, pp. 140. ISBN: 978-2-85944-569-0

El libro *Kant's B Deduction* de Mario Caimi es una traducción al inglés del francés *Leçons sur Kant. La déduction transcendantale dans la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure*, basado en un curso dado por el autor en la Universidad de la Sorbonne en el año 2004. El libro cuenta con un prólogo, una introducción, tres capítulos y una conclusión.

En el prólogo, el autor expresa que la intención del libro es exponer el argumento de la deducción trascendental de la segunda edición de la *Crítica de la razón pura* como un todo. Los lineamientos fundamentales de esta exposición consisten en presentar el argumento de la deducción como un enriquecimiento sintético y progresivo del principio aperceptivo. Así, este análisis propone leer el texto como una exposición ejecutada siguiendo el método sintético, lo que le daría una unidad argumental clara, atendiendo a su vez a la tarea negativa de la deducción de demostrar que las categorías no son conceptos vacíos.

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La introducción ofrece un recuento histórico del problema de la deducción trascendental, el vínculo entre ser y pensar. Partiendo de Parménides y atravesando el medioevo bajo la figura de Duns Scoto, el autor llega a la obra de filósofos racionalistas como Descartes, Malebranche, Leibniz y Lambert, en quienes el problema del vínculo entre el pensamiento y el ser se manifestaría ya sea como la distinción real entre dos tipos de sustancia, como la pregunta por la aptitud de la materia para generar ideas o como la armonía preestablecida que probaría la validez del pensar respecto de los objetos. En el caso de Lambert, los conceptos de la metafísica serían condiciones de todo pensar, lo que lo haría un precursor de la deducción trascendental kantiana. Luego, se aborda autores empiristas como Locke y Hume donde el problema se presenta como el vínculo causal entre objetos y representaciones. Finalmente, se presenta el problema tal como lo entiende Kant, consistente en explicar la aplicación de conceptos puros a cosas reales, i.e. el uso real del entendimiento, lo que se encuentra íntimamente vinculado con el problema de la posibilidad del conocimiento sintético a priori.

El autor señala que tanto la deducción como la *Crítica* siguen el método propio de la filosofía presentado en los textos de los años 1762-1763: un concepto originariamente confuso es vuelto claro y distinto aislando elementos en él contenidos e integrándolo con nuevos conceptos que se evidencian necesarios. Este método se aplica a la *Crítica* y a cada sección suya. El concepto investigado en la *Crítica* es la razón pura como facultad de conocimiento metafísico; su punto de partida, la representación como hecho lógico.

El trabajo de aislamiento e integración progresiva de elementos comienza con la “estética”, partiendo de la representación y describiéndose la sensibilidad como facultad receptiva. La lógica trascendental incorporará una facultad activa, una necesaria espontaneidad, el concepto de pensamiento sintético (entendimiento), una función activa requerida para la posibilidad de la representación. Esta actividad se diferenciará en funciones, cuyos conceptos son las categorías. Así, surge la pregunta por cómo se aplicarían estos conceptos a priori a objetos. La deducción trascendental comenzaría por el impreciso concepto de pensamiento sintético relacionado con un múltiple (el concepto de enlace en general). Aunque en su forma retórica y estructural siguiera al género literario típicamente jurídico del Siglo XVIII usado para la defensa de pretensiones ante la corte – exhibiendo que éstas se encuentran fundadas en principios admitidos–, la deducción tendría una estructura lógica propia.

El capítulo 1 (§§ 15-20) comenzará por el concepto impreciso de enlace y concluirá con la conexión necesaria de los conceptos puros del entendimiento con un objeto en general. El capítulo 2 (§§ 21-25) analizará cómo la estructura lógica del concepto da lugar al objeto dado bajo la forma de la sensibilidad, entrando en juego el tiempo y la imaginación. El capítulo 3 (§§ 26-27 y “breve concepto”) estudia cómo se amplía el alcance de esta deducción para abarcar la totalidad de la naturaleza.

El capítulo 1 “Unidad y el objeto” comienza (§15) por el método sintético que ha de aplicarse al pensar puro en tanto pretende referirse al ser. Los conceptos por enriquecer y esclarecer son *enlace* (“combination”) y *síntesis*. Aquí se descubre que el múltiple es condición de posibilidad de la síntesis, así como la unidad lo es de ambos. Mientras la síntesis de la imaginación se limita a reunir el múltiple, la síntesis pensada en el concepto da la regla de dicha reunión. La regla guía a la síntesis y le da unidad. Partiendo del concepto difuso de *enlace*, se aíslan las nociones de *múltiple*, *actividad sintética* y *regla* dada en el concepto. En tanto la regla brinda unidad a la síntesis y al múltiple, se revela que la unidad es condición de ellos. El enlace no es dado, sino que es la forma del pensamiento, la representación de la unidad sintética del múltiple, unidad que no es producto de la síntesis, sino su condición. Esta unidad dada por la regla no es dada en un hecho concreto, ni es la *categoría* de *unidad*; es la unidad de la experiencia como un único todo, cuyo sujeto debe ser un *sí mismo* único.

Al abordar el §16 el autor indica que aquí Kant intenta determinar el principio que se enriquecerá progresivamente por medio del método sintético a lo largo de la deducción: “El *Yo pienso* debe *poder* acompañar a todas mis representaciones” (B131). Este principio se presenta como aquello que posibilita la unidad de todas las representaciones, en tanto abarcadas en la única serie de las representaciones de un único *sí mismo*, de modo que “todo múltiple de la intuición tiene una referencia necesaria al *Yo pienso* en el mismo sujeto en el que ese múltiple se encuentra” (B132).

La intención de Kant no es probar la existencia de una *sustancia pensante*, ni abordar las características de la *persona*, sino tratar cierta característica de las *representaciones* mismas: deben poder ser pensadas por un mismo sujeto. Este principio sería adecuadamente cumplido aún si las representaciones fueran atribuidas a diversos *yoes*, sin mediar unidad ni síntesis de ellas.

Para garantizar la unidad de todas las representaciones en una única experiencia, el sujeto que las piensa debe concebirse como idéntico a *sí mismo*. Conciencia de *sí* y conciencia de su identidad son las notas distintivas del *yo*. La noción de *yo* se introduce para explicar la unidad que se impone a las representaciones por medio de la síntesis. Es la identidad del *sí mismo* lo que evita la dispersión de los actos del pensar y, en consecuencia, de las representaciones. El acto de la espontaneidad del entendimiento se llama *apercepción*, y la representación *yo pienso* es generada por la autoconciencia.

La *apercepción* se refiere a la unidad e identidad del *sí mismo* como a la de todas las representaciones en tanto referidas a un único *yo*. Estas representaciones pertenecen al sujeto por una actividad sintética. Esta síntesis es la condición de la identidad del *sí mismo*. No es el *yo pienso* asociado a cada representación lo que les brinda unidad, sino la conciencia de la síntesis del múltiple. Sólo la conciencia de la unidad de la síntesis permite la identidad de la conciencia y la unidad del múltiple. La conciencia de esta unidad de la síntesis requiere la unidad de múltiples actos sintéticos por medio de los cuales las



representaciones se reúnen. Así, hay una relación de dependencia recíproca entre identidad de la conciencia y múltiple intuitivo. Sin múltiple intuitivo, no hay síntesis; sin síntesis no hay conciencia de la identidad de sí a través de los múltiples actos de síntesis. Sin conciencia de la identidad no hay reunión del múltiple en la unidad. De esta manera, se descubren las notas distintivas de *identidad* y *apercepción* que hacen del *yo* y de la *síntesis* los conceptos a ser integrados en el principio aperceptivo. El término vago *yo pienso* es reemplazado por el concepto más preciso de *apercepción* que supone lo autoconsciente, idéntico y único de un sí mismo activo que lleva a cabo las síntesis estudiadas. La síntesis que ha de reunir al múltiple debe ser *a priori* en tanto su unidad (dada por la regla de un concepto) no puede ser tomada de la sensibilidad. Así, la unidad sintética no es un contenido de la conciencia, sino la forma de toda representación para poder ser contenida en una única conciencia, poder acompañar el *yo pienso*. Esta es una primera condición de la objetividad.

El §17 incorpora las nociones de uso del entendimiento, conocimiento y objeto. La cuestión será cómo la representación tiene validez objetiva, i.e. referencia a un objeto. La clave de la validez objetiva de las representaciones recae en la síntesis. Tendrán validez objetiva las representaciones cuya síntesis sea llevada a cabo según una regla que haga necesarios a los múltiples elementos de un concepto para conformarlo a éste.

Sólo a través de un concepto que imponga una regla a la síntesis de forma tal que sea necesario el enlace del múltiple intuitivo será posible para estas representaciones tener una referencia a un objeto (validez objetiva). El concepto de *objeto en general* es el que brinda la regla de síntesis del múltiple intuitivo que permite la representación de un objeto como tal. Pero la síntesis ejecutada en concordancia con este concepto no produce sólo la unidad analítica que puede encontrarse en todo concepto empírico, sino la unidad sintética, basada en la necesidad de la unidad de la apercepción. La unidad sintética que hace posible toda unidad analítica es la síntesis fundamental que brinda la regla universalmente necesaria de toda síntesis de las representaciones: el principio aperceptivo. Así, el principio aperceptivo es la condición suprema de toda validez objetiva de las representaciones. La unidad de la conciencia que hace posible al entendimiento como facultad del conocimiento, posibilita el conocimiento de objetos. La referencia de las representaciones a un objeto se basa en la unidad de la conciencia; y el objeto mismo es dependiente de la unidad de la apercepción.

El §18 precisa el sentido de la objetividad atribuida al principio aperceptivo. Para ello, se distingue una *unidad objetiva* de una *subjetiva* (síntesis asociativa). Mientras la síntesis asociativa se sostiene en la asociación contingente del contenido de la experiencia, la unidad objetiva supone una síntesis aplicada sobre el múltiple intuitivo puro y homogéneo del tiempo, unidad que no sería posible por una síntesis asociativa. El enlace necesario del múltiple intuitivo puro (cuya regla es el principio de la unidad necesaria de la apercepción) constituye la objetividad y la unidad objetiva sobre la cual se vuelve posible el enlace contingente de la conciencia empírica referida a datos de la experiencia.

El §19 se propone explicar la estructura interna de la síntesis antes considerada. Aquí se agrega un nuevo elemento: el juicio. Este juicio no es, advierte el autor, propio de la lógica formal que se ocupa de la relación entre representaciones, sino un elemento de la lógica trascendental en el que se trata de la relación de *conocimiento* bajo la unidad aperceptiva. Es aquello correspondiente a la actividad del entendimiento.

Mientras la síntesis asociativa se enuncia bajo la forma de juicios de percepción que expresan representaciones enlazadas contingentemente en la conciencia empírica, la síntesis objetiva se expresa en juicios que omiten toda referencia a *mí* y a *mis* representaciones y establecen únicamente un enlace de representaciones en el objeto mismo. Al enlace necesario establecido por el concepto de *objeto en general* se corresponde la forma impuesta por el juicio.

Demostrado que la subsunción del múltiple bajo la forma del juicio se corresponde con la unificación objetiva del múltiple bajo la unidad de la apercepción, resta evaluar si la forma del juicio supone un concepto a priori, lo que demostraría que esos conceptos a priori se refieren a objetos. La respuesta se encuentra al considerar las categorías como conceptos por los que el múltiple intuitivo es determinado con respecto a las funciones lógicas del juicio.

El §20 incorpora el concepto de categoría al principio aperceptivo. Hasta aquí, se concluyó que el múltiple intuitivo debe ser determinado por las funciones lógicas del juicio a fin de ser integrado en una única conciencia. Definiendo a las categorías como conceptos que refieren el múltiple intuitivo a un objeto, puede reemplazarse “las funciones lógicas” por las “categorías” como conceptos que expresan tal enlace. Así, se afirma que el múltiple intuitivo debe encontrarse sujeto a las categorías. Vemos cómo el texto avanza hacia la meta indicada por el autor (demostrar que las categorías no son conceptos vacíos) y por medio del método indicado (enriqueciendo progresivamente el principio aperceptivo).

El capítulo 2 “La aplicación de las categorías” (§§ 21-25) comienza indicando que, llamativamente, en el §20 no se hizo referencia al *objeto*, sino a la *objetividad* de los enlaces sintéticos. Luego de presentar la enorme variedad de interpretaciones que intentan explicar por qué la deducción trascendental tiene dos partes, el autor ofrece su punto de vista: esta segunda parte no se ocupa de la *objetividad* de la síntesis de las representaciones, sino que debe enfrentarse a un elemento absolutamente heterogéneo al pensamiento e independiente de las categorías: la presencia efectiva del *objeto* en la *sensibilidad*, dependiente de la *afección*. Debe explicarse la aplicación de las categorías al objeto dado.

Para esto, Kant reformula en B144 el principio aperceptivo, enriqueciéndolo al incorporar la referencia a la intuición empírica. En tanto la intuición empírica es dada por medio de la afección, debe incorporarse el particular modo en que ésta es dada a fin de acreditar la validez de las categorías respecto del objeto de los sentidos (B145). El análisis

de la apercepción no sería suficiente, pues de ella no podemos derivar la presencia de objetos empíricos en la sensibilidad.

En este sentido, la hipótesis interpretativa del autor juega un papel fundamental al explicar la continuación de la deducción: si la tarea de la deducción es demostrar que las categorías *no* son conceptos vacíos, es necesaria la referencia al objeto presente en la intuición. Sin tal referencia, sólo demostramos que las categorías pueden aplicarse a objetos *posibles* (objetos en general), pero no a *objetos efectivamente dados en la intuición*. Cabe la posibilidad, dice el autor, de que no haya objetos reales, con lo que las categorías serían meros conceptos vacíos.

Si hay o no objetos es una cuestión que se resuelve en el terreno de la sensibilidad, en tanto éstos son *empíricos*. Consecuentemente, dice el autor, la deducción está incompleta hasta que se demuestre que las categorías se refieren a dichos objetos empíricos.

En el §22 Kant caracterizaría la referencia de las categorías a los objetos como *conocimiento*. Para ello, dice el autor, no es suficiente la regla de síntesis que brinda la objetividad en general. Se requiere una intuición empírica que dé el objeto. Sin intuición empírica resulta imposible saber si hay algo que concuerde con el concepto. En tanto tal intuición es sensible, sin sensación no tendríamos la materia necesaria para tener un objeto empírico al que pueda referirse la categoría. Sin el carácter sensible de la intuición empírica no hay conocimiento en sentido estricto, sino que hay sólo un uso formal que no da certeza de mentar objetos reales. Sólo por medio de la intuición empírica la categoría recibe contenido y se vuelve conocimiento de un objeto.

El §23 trata la restricción de las categorías a objetos empíricamente dados. El autor explica que tal restricción no se encuentra estipulada en las categorías, sino en el tipo de intuición humana. En tanto se pretende demostrar que las categorías no son conceptos vacíos y, por tanto, que se aplican a objetos efectivamente reales, en tanto no contamos con otro tipo de intuición que pueda ofrecer tales objetos más que el sentido interno y externo, debe establecerse la limitación del uso de las categorías a este terreno.

En los párrafos siguientes Kant se ocupará de la aplicación de conceptos puros sobre el múltiple intuitivo empírico. Esto se llevará a cabo en dos etapas. Primero (§§24-25), estableciendo la relación del entendimiento con la intuición sensible humana *pura*. Segundo (§26), incorporando el múltiple empírico.

En el §24 se demuestra la relación de las categorías con la intuición pura del tiempo. Antes se había establecido la aplicación de las categorías a un múltiple sensible *posible*, es decir, *pensado*, no efectivo. En la aplicación de las categorías al tiempo se da la primera aplicación del pensamiento a un múltiple sensible real. Esto se expresa en el objeto a considerar: *el objeto de los sentidos en general*. Esta aplicación supone la determinación del sentido interno por medio del entendimiento con la constitución de un único tiempo, de

modo que el objeto empírico no sólo está sujeto a la forma del tiempo, sino contenido en un único tiempo.

La síntesis figurativa es aquella encargada de ejecutar esta actividad sintética sobre el múltiple puro de la intuición humana, diferenciándose de la síntesis intelectual, en la que se considera el enlace de un múltiple intuitivo en general. Se la llama también síntesis trascendental de la *imaginación*.

Esta facultad se presenta como una faceta de la espontaneidad. La actividad del entendimiento capaz de hacer que el múltiple sea acompañado por el “yo pienso” se dividiría en dos momentos. Por un lado, la síntesis; por el otro, el concepto o regla que le da unidad. La regla es seguida por la imaginación en su actividad de síntesis. Terminada esta tarea de síntesis, el entendimiento reconoce la unidad del concepto en el producto terminado de la imaginación. Con ello, recibe el múltiple su unidad y es reconocido como unificado. Con estos elementos, se ve enriquecido el principio aperceptivo, habiéndose descubierto que la unificación del múltiple intuitivo de la sensibilidad humana exige una actividad sintética ejecutada por la imaginación unificada por la regla brindada por el concepto del entendimiento (bajo la forma de un juicio).

En tanto la cuestión que debe resolver la incorporación de la imaginación consiste en explicar cómo el entendimiento aborda un múltiple absolutamente heterogéneo al pensar, la facultad de la imaginación debe corresponder tanto a la sensibilidad como a la espontaneidad. Mientras en la edición de 1781 la imaginación es considerada una facultad autónoma, en la segunda edición consiste en una función del entendimiento, en tanto éste se dirige a la sensibilidad. La imaginación no sería otra cosa que el entendimiento en tanto éste obedece no sólo a sus principios lógicos, sino también a aquellas determinaciones que le impone la forma de la intuición (la determinación del objeto no solamente por medio de la forma del antecedente y el consecuente, sino por medio del “antes”, el “después” y la simultaneidad).

El final del §24 presenta la paradoja del sentido interno. Autores como Paton, Carl, De Vleeschauwer y Allison han entendido que esta sección rompe la lógica argumental del texto de la deducción. El autor entiende que esto se concluye al no advertir que aquí no se trata de una exposición del concepto de “yo”, sino de una discusión sobre la aplicación del entendimiento a la sensibilidad pura, lo que no debe ser tenido por conocimiento de sí.

La paradoja del sentido interno constaría de tres paradojas. La primera trataría sobre el hecho de que la intuición pura del sentido interno no dé conocimiento sobre el sí mismo. La segunda trataría sobre el hecho de haber, aparentemente, dos sí mismos que concuerdan y no concuerdan a la vez (uno, pensante, el otro, de la intuición). La tercera paradoja trataría sobre el hecho de que la apercepción misma no sea auto-conocimiento. Las dos primeras paradojas se refieren a la intuición y se basan sobre la restricción del conocimiento al terreno de las apariencias. La tercera paradoja se apoya en un examen de

la apercepción: el yo, aun siendo autoconsciente, no puede conocerse sino es por medio de la auto-afección del sentido interno. El autor analiza este punto.

La cuestión se presenta bajo la forma de un análisis de la síntesis de la imaginación. La síntesis de la imaginación es llevada a cabo al “interior” del sujeto en tanto es efectuada sobre el múltiple de la intuición pura. Esto supondría una afección del sentido interno por medio de la actividad sintética del entendimiento. Atendiendo únicamente al acto sintético, debe explicarse por qué la pura espontaneidad no da conocimiento del sí mismo.

En el §25 se presenta el problema en su forma definitiva: “La conciencia de sí mismo dista todavía mucho de ser un conocimiento de sí mismo” (B158). El sentido común diría lo contrario: la autoconciencia intelectual debería bastar para conocer la existencia del sí mismo. Llamativamente, Kant también hace esta afirmación (cfr. B157), pero esto no sería una apropiación del *cogito* cartesiano. Lo existente no sería un yo en sí mismo, sino el sujeto como condición necesaria –aunque insuficiente– del conocimiento, una existencia en el *pensamiento* (la mera posibilidad de la existencia). La existencia efectiva del objeto exige intuición. Con ello Kant nos dice, entiende el autor, que el pensamiento no es una determinación suficiente de la existencia.

Ahora bien, cabe preguntarse qué es aquello que se nos presenta en la auto-afección. El material dado en el sentido interno no debe ser tenido necesariamente como la aparición del sí mismo. ¿Cuál sí sería el fenómeno del sí mismo? El sí mismo sólo podría ser conocido por medio de la sensibilidad, en la medida en que éste la afectara. Tal afección sería la elaboración formal del múltiple dado. Kant no explica cómo podríamos conocer la existencia del sí mismo a partir de esta actividad. Sólo indica que tal existencia no es la propia de los fenómenos, ni de las cosas en sí. No es la categoría de existencia aplicable a los objetos de la sensibilidad. En todo caso, quedaría claro que el conocimiento del sí mismo no puede estar sustentado en la apercepción.

El capítulo 3 “la aplicación de las categorías a los objetos reales” (§§26-27 y “Breve concepto de esta deducción”) comienza por abordar el §26. En él se llevaría a cabo el paso decisivo de la deducción. En él se introduce el múltiple intuitivo *empírico* que nos da objetos efectivamente reales. En tanto la deducción debía demostrar que las categorías no son conceptos vacíos, lo que debe demostrarse aquí es que este contenido empírico también puede ser sintetizado por el enlace categorial.

En su primera sección (B160-B163) se demostraría que toda representación empírica se encuentra sujeta a la síntesis de apercepción. Para ello, se introduce la síntesis de aprehensión, por medio de la cual se enlaza el múltiple produciendo una intuición empírica. En tanto el múltiple intuitivo sólo puede ser dado bajo las formas de espacio y tiempo, y éstos como intuiciones puras que ofrecen un múltiple intuitivo puro son unificados por la síntesis figurativa, la síntesis de la aprehensión debe adecuarse a la unidad de éstos dada por los conceptos puros del entendimiento. De esta manera, el múltiple intuitivo empírico, sintetizado por la síntesis de la aprehensión, es ubicado en su

respectiva parte de un tiempo y espacio unificados. La unidad de la síntesis del múltiple es condición de posibilidad de la síntesis de toda aprehensión (B160), de modo que ésta se encuentra sujeta a las categorías. Así se probaría la aplicación de las categorías a los objetos efectivamente existentes y, siguiendo el hilo conductor de la deducción, se completaría el enriquecimiento progresivo del principio aperceptivo, integrando el múltiple empírico a la apercepción.

En su segunda sección (B163-B165) se probaría que todo fenómeno debe estar sujeto a las leyes del entendimiento. Aquí, la cuestión será explicar la aplicación de las categorías a la naturaleza misma. En tanto la naturaleza es la suma de todas las apariencias, y éstas se encuentran sujetas al enlace categorial, puede decirse que el entendimiento prescribe leyes de uniformidad de los objetos y de la naturaleza. Así, el principio aperceptivo se ve enriquecido con la introducción del concepto de naturaleza.

En el §27 contamos con una conclusión y la introducción del concepto de epigénesis. La epigénesis sería una metáfora biológica para explicar el origen de las categorías y la relación del pensamiento con la existencia de objetos empíricos. Frente a un posible origen empírico de las categorías o una explicación innatista, la figura de la epigénesis explicaría metafóricamente a las categorías como conceptos adquiridos originados en la actividad del entendimiento humano. En segundo lugar, la noción de epigénesis se aplicaría al surgimiento del conocimiento empírico, originado por la intervención del entendimiento y la sensibilidad. Así, ni pensamiento ni ser preexisten el uno al otro. Entendimiento y sensibilidad son los padres del conocimiento en esta metáfora biológica. Por el contrario, la preformación habría supuesto que los conceptos puros, la naturaleza y sus leyes existieran independientemente y sin relación recíproca.

En el tratamiento del “breve concepto” el autor muestra la integración de todos los elementos considerados en una frase compleja que admite múltiples interpretaciones y traducciones.

Finalmente, en el capítulo “Conclusiones”, el autor recapitula sobre los puntos principales de su investigación: haber mostrado el método seguido por Kant en la deducción B, exhibiendo así su unidad estructural y argumentativa; esclarecer la meta de esta deducción en la demostración de que las categorías no son conceptos vacíos; presentar al principio aperceptivo como único principio admitido por la deducción y progresivamente enriquecido por la incorporación de los conceptos de identidad del sí mismo, apercepción, síntesis y unidad sintética, objeto, intuición y, finalmente, naturaleza.

En esta detallada reseña hemos intentado hacer apreciable la unidad y coherencia de la interpretación propuesta por Mario Caimi. El libro se propone objetivos precisos que cumple de manera clara y profunda. Sin desviarse innecesariamente en la discusión de problemas secundarios que harían al lector perder el hilo conductor de la propuesta interpretativa, el autor demuestra paso a paso la concatenación lógica del argumento

expuesto en la deducción, teniendo siempre a la vista la meta que él entiende este texto perseguiría y el método empleado por Kant para su consecución. A tal explicación, por un lado, detallada y, por el otro, integradora, se agrega como notas a pie un cuerpo textual que incluye la referencia a las obras de otros especialistas y la discusión de sus posiciones. Tal tratamiento ha sido acertadamente ubicado como notas a pie.

El texto reseñado será una referencia obligatoria en los años venideros para los especialistas kantianos que se propongan estudiar la deducción trascendental. En esta obra breve pero contundente, clara y lógicamente estructurada tenemos el ejemplo de una investigación filosóficamente profunda, académicamente rigurosa y unitaria que jamás pierde de vista la integración del objeto investigado en una totalidad. Por otra parte, la claridad expositiva del texto emula la voz del maestro ejerciendo su oficio ante sus discípulos.



**Regresso a Kant – Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política**  
*Return to Kant – Ethics, Aesthetics, Political Philosophy*

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**Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, *Regresso a Kant – Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política*, Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2012, 549 pp., ISBN: 978-972-27-1923-0**

*Regresso a Kant – Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política* é um volume de um dos intérpretes kantianos com maior visibilidade em Portugal, que tem igualmente grande visibilidade fora do país, sendo prova disso a sua afiliação a diversas sociedades científicas internacionais, Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos.

O volume sobre o qual recai a nossa atenção é revelador, como seria expectável, de um profundo conhecimento da filosofia kantiana, onde a sua organicidade e linguagem são claramente privilegiadas. Ainda que seja constituído por catorze ensaios que se poderão afirmar autónomos entre si, encontramos neles vários cruzamentos, bem ao jeito kantiano, diríamos.

O volume inicia-se com uma extensa introdução que explora o tópico do “Regresso a Kant” através da avaliação da situação dos Estudos Kantianos, bem como da sua evolução. O aspecto que nos parece mais interessante neste primeiro texto é a chamada de atenção do autor para a descoberta de alguns tópicos da filosofia kantiana que temos vindo a assistir hodiernamente. A importância dada à *Crítica do Juízo*, a consideração da linguagem e o estilo de Kant e a sua filosofia da linguagem, o reconhecimento da filosofia

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kantiana do direito e a política e, de forma ainda mais fecunda, o renovado interesse pela filosofia prática kantiana têm sido alguns dos temas com maior destaque.

Seguindo esta mesma orientação, Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos apresenta-nos este volume, que se divide em três grandes partes. A primeira parte intitula-se “Ética e antropologia” – seis ensaios-, a segunda “Estética e filosofia da religião” – quatro ensaios-, e, por fim, a última tem como título “Filosofia política” – quatro ensaios.

No primeiro ensaio da primeira parte da obra, “Actualidade e inactualidade da ética kantiana”, Ribeiro dos Santos recupera o que considera ser “o núcleo mais íntimo do pensamento kantiano” (p. 67), ou seja, a sua filosofia moral. Em primeiro lugar, o autor procura pensar o que é a actualidade da filosofia, bem como a actualidade duma filosofia. Realizando uma breve viagem histórica, na qual tem lugar Hegel e as suas *Lições de História da Filosofia*, Nietzsche, e as suas *Considerações Inactuais*, bem como Heidegger, e a sua *Introdução à Metafísica*, o autor aponta de forma pertinente para as dificuldades deste mesmo tema, dificuldades agravadas se da filosofia em geral nos direccionarmos para a ética.

Em segundo lugar, o autor investiga em que sentido existe ou não na actualidade uma preocupação filosófica especial com os problemas éticos. Ainda que haja “um inequívoco retorno das questões éticas em filosofia” (p. 73), que o autor atribui às novas situações que afectam a humanidade, há pensadores contemporâneos que consideram vivermos numa época desmoralizada, na qual a ética deixou de ter interesse. Outros autores, por seu turno, entendem já não nos situarmos no solo da Modernidade, do qual Kant se destaca. Não obstante, a actualidade de Kant é um facto para Ribeiro dos Santos e, arriscamos afirmá-lo, para todos nós. É um facto existir a presença do seu pensamento nos debates filosóficos da actualidade, em particular nos debates éticos, assim como é um facto existirem inúmeros estudos que evidenciam a actualidade do pensamento ético kantiano. Neste sentido, Ribeiro dos Santos entende que “a actualidade filosófica de Kant, para além de incontestável, não é comparável com a de nenhum outro filósofo, seja ele mais antigo ou mais recente. [...] Kant foi, sem dúvida, a mais expressiva voz da Modernidade no domínio do pensamento ético [...]” (p.76).

Estas considerações são o ponto de partida para a averiguação dos sinais pelos quais se poderá revelar ou medir a actualidade da filosofia moral kantiana, derradeira questão à qual o ensaio procura responder. Nesta linha, Ribeiro dos Santos apresenta a posição de alguns autores que retomam de forma explícita a ética kantiana ou, pelo menos, alguns dos elementos que a constituem. Poder-se-ão destacar, por exemplo, Karl-Otto Apel e Jürgen Habermas, que, à sua maneira, procuraram realizar uma “transformação”, “reformulação” ou “correção” da ética kantiana nas suas propostas da “ética do discurso”, se falarmos de Habermas, ou da “ética da sociedade de comunicação”, falando de Apel; Onora O’Neill, para quem o primado do prático não é uma ideia condutora apenas na filosofia prática kantiana, mas de todo o programa da crítica da razão; Barbara Herman, que aposta num distanciamento das interpretações estereotipadas da ética kantiana, visto entender que a posição do filósofo quanto à vida moral é bem mais complexa e subtil do que aquela que os seus intérpretes e críticos consideram; Christine M. Korsgaard, que

investiga a moral kantiana em confronto com posições éticas tradicionalmente consideradas antagónicas à de Kant e que procura, simultaneamente, dar luz aos problemas éticos contemporâneos tendo como base as considerações kantianas; Nancy Sherman, cuja principal finalidade é a apresentação de uma abordagem recente da ética kantiana, que assenta especialmente no confronto com a ética aristotélica, bem como com a dos estóicos, enveredando pelo estudo do seu profundo parentesco; e Robert Louden, que evidenciou de forma extraordinariamente interessante o plano da aplicação da ética kantiana, relevando o que considerou ser a sua parte impura.

Por fim, e atendendo à finalidade principal do ensaio, quanto à actualidade ou inactualidade da ética kantiana, a resposta do autor do volume é peremptória: “Aparentemente, em questões de ética, estamos hoje muito mais próximos de Aristóteles, de Epicuro ou de Nietzsche do que de Kant. Todavia, a actualidade da filosofia moral de Kant demonstra-se suficientemente na sua capacidade para continuar a ser a principal interlocutora e parceira no debate ético dos nossos dias” (p. 103).

O segundo ensaio, “A antropocosmologia do jovem Kant”, procura de forma inesperada mas muito interessante demonstrar a relevância que a III parte da *História Universal da Natureza e Teoria do Céu* possui quanto à compreensão da posição cosmológico-cosmogónica aí apresentada por Kant. O aspecto que nos parece mais fecundo destacado por Ribeiro dos Santos é a sua perspectiva de que tal ensaio possui as raízes das preocupações e meditações antropológicas de Kant, as quais se irão desenvolver exponencialmente no seu pensamento posterior: “conduzida pelo fio da analogia físico-cosmológica, começa a desenhar-se na obra de 1755, com seus contornos já bem definidos, a antropologia moral kantiana, apresentando o ser humano como um istmo, suspenso entre dois mundos – o sensível e o inteligível, o espiritual e o material, a razão e as paixões ou inclinações, a atracção para a virtude ou a tendência para o vício – tendo por tarefa reconciliá-los em si mesmo mediante o esforço e a luta permanentes no palco terreno onde se desenrola a sua existência” (p. 113).

O terceiro ensaio do volume, “Kant e os limites do antropocentrismo ético-jurídico”, tem como principal finalidade defender Kant das frequentes críticas que o apontam como tendo caído no vício do antropocentrismo. Inicialmente, Ribeiro dos Santos apresenta alguns autores críticos de Kant, de entre os quais destaca Hannah Arendt, para quem o pensamento kantiano possui um extremo antropocentrismo; Hans Jonas, que considera que a ética kantiana apenas reconhece sentido ético à relação directa do homem com o homem ou do homem consigo mesmo, como também e, virtude da sua abstracção e formalismo, não teria em consideração os efeitos das acções, nem, por isso mesmo, a possibilidade de destruição da natureza em virtude da intervenção técnica humana; e Roland Beiner, que, ao interpretar a doutrina kantiana do sublime encontrou nela uma forma disfarçada de “narcisismo antropológico”. Ainda que com problematizações distintas, Ribeiro dos Santos considera existirem dois tópicos recorrentes de tais acusações: a contraposição entre o homem e a natureza e a opção exclusiva pelo primeiro, e uma autocomplacência disfarçada do homem em si próprio. Sem grandes dificuldades e de uma

forma extremamente clara, Ribeiro dos Santos responde pertinentemente às críticas: “Nelas, não é tida em consideração, na sua complexidade e especificidade, a ideia kantiana de Humanidade [...]. A distinção kantiana entre *fins* e *meios*, entre *dignidade* e *preço* – e a respectiva aplicação à distinção entre *peçoas* e *coisas* – deve ser vista não como um defeito ou um fracasso (pelo que ainda não consegue), mas antes como um grande ganho e um decisivo passo no sentido de alcançar um ponto de vista que permitisse superar a racionalidade mercantil e contabilística, instrumentalista, interesseira e utilitária dos Modernos. [...] Por outro lado, segundo Kant, o sentimento do sublime não é propriamente a ocasião para uma autocomplacência antropocêntrica e narcisista do sujeito, mas coloca este numa situação de desconforto, pois o que o sujeito experimenta [...] é, por certo, a consciência da sua destinação supra-sensível” (pp. 127-28). Um pouco mais à frente no ensaio, e reforçando a sua posição, Ribeiro dos Santos refere ser no domínio da vivência estética, bem como na visão teleológica, que a natureza é claramente reconhecida por Kant na sua dignidade e autonomia. Aqui ela não é pensada apenas como meio mas como um sistema de fins. Enquanto na visão teleológica poder-se-á pensar a natureza como possuindo uma autonomia própria, na vivência estética do belo e do sublime, onde melhor se revela a transcendência da natureza, o homem tem a sua atitude mais originária para com ela, na qual tem lugar uma “contemplação desinteressada” ou uma “espécie de respeito” por ela. Será apenas pela mediação humana que a natureza pode ser resgatada para uma ordem dos fins e pensada, ela própria, como um fim em si mesma, como defende o autor.

No quarto ensaio da obra, “Kant e a ética da linguagem”, Ribeiro dos Santos enaltece sobretudo a insistência de Kant no tema da veracidade, evocando algumas das mais relevantes passagens kantianas quanto a este tópico. Uma consideração extremamente interessante do autor reside na sua pertinente chamada de atenção para o facto dos autores da conhecida “ética do discurso” não terem tido em consideração as reflexões kantianas em torno da mentira, da veracidade e, no geral, da própria ética da linguagem. Afirmando existir na insistência de Kant no presente tópico “a dimensão linguística e comunicacional da razão” (p. 191), Ribeiro dos Santos entende poderem ser desmentidas as críticas de Apel e Habermas ao carácter solipsista e monológico que, segundo eles, caracteriza a razão kantiana. Neste contexto, assume nuclear relevância a seguinte passagem, pelo seu inequívoco interesse e fecundidade quanto a este aspecto: “Falar é comunicar aos outros os próprios pensamentos e receber destes também os respectivos pensamentos. Mas este falar-pensar com os outros não se reduz a uma pragmática comunicacional, a acordos ou consensos já conseguidos ou a conseguir na experiência. O pensar, tal como Kant o entende, para além das dimensões da coerência e da autonomia, supõe um exercício transcendental – uma espécie de experiência que a razão faz consigo mesma – mediante a qual se divide em falante e ouvinte, em actora e espectadora, colocando-se no ponto de vista do outro e por assim dizer fora de si mesma, num ponto de vista universal” (p. 193). Nesta linha, à concepção simplista da consciência que os autores referidos atribuem a Kant, Ribeiro dos Santos contrapõe, e com toda a justeza, a complexidade do conceito kantiano de consciência moral, bem como todo o processo que o caracteriza.

O quinto ensaio do volume, “Da linguagem jurídica da filosofia crítica à arqueologia da razão prática”, realça a relevância da filosofia kantiana do direito, importância que nem sempre foi reconhecida. Ao invés de o considerar como um tópico secundário, Ribeiro dos Santos entende que a filosofia kantiana do direito é, com toda a certeza, “o domínio onde a filosofia kantiana tem o seu ambiente natural e de onde colhe os princípios e pressupostos que desde o início dirigem o seu próprio trabalho de reflexão” (p. 207). Considerando que o paradigma jurídico norteia toda a filosofia kantiana, até mesmo a teórica, Ribeiro dos Santos destaca a importância do alcance e da amplitude dessa grande alegoria político-jurídica que tem lugar em Kant, realçando particularmente um determinado domínio: “É a consciência do dever (ou do imperativo categórico) que constitui realmente o *Faktum der Vernunft*, o *Faktum* realmente *originarium*. E esse *Faktum* desencadeia um processo ou revela-se como um processo íntimo que tem a sua expressão externa no processo judicial. Se há na obra de Kant domínio onde a metáfora do tribunal seja abundante e pregnante de significado é sem dúvida este e sobretudo aqui vale dizer que a metáfora é muito mais do que metáfora, que não é o tribunal interior que é pensado por analogia com o exterior, mas que, ao contrário, é o tribunal exterior que é moldado à imagem do *fórum* que é a consciência moral” (p. 216).

O sexto ensaio, “Hércules e as graças, ou da “condição estética da virtude”: Kant, leitor de Schiller”, é para nós um dos ensaios mais interessantes do presente volume. Com grande rigor e profundo conhecimento dos dois autores aqui abordados, Kant e Schiller, Ribeiro dos Santos explora a relação entre eles, nomeadamente pelo lado de Kant. O autor do volume apresenta a perspectiva de Schiller sobre a filosofia moral kantiana, realçando determinados aspectos essenciais que a caracterizam, todos eles relacionados com a consideração da sensibilidade, não como inimiga da moralidade, mas como sua cúmplice. Ribeiro dos Santos apresenta a resposta de Kant a Schiller presente numa nota à segunda edição da sua obra *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft* (1794), destacando o facto deste não encontrar qualquer divergência entre a sua perspectiva e a de Schiller, dissolvendo assim esta suposta divergência num esclarecimento mútuo, ainda que Kant apresente uma visão não tão otimista quanto Schiller.

Ribeiro dos Santos termina este seu ensaio com um excelente apontamento que, na nossa perspectiva, sintetiza de forma eficaz todo o desenrolar do mesmo e no qual destaca a diferença entre os dois autores, muito embora as suas afinidades em relação à moral, bem como relativamente à estética: “Se quiséssemos reduzir a uma formulação sintética a diferença que, sob um fundo de essencial comunidade e afinidade de perspectivas, subsiste entre os dois pensadores, diríamos que domina em Schiller a sensibilidade estética (com o sentido pregnante que esta expressão nele adquire), mesmo tratando-se de assuntos da moral; em Kant, por seu turno, é preponderante a inspiração e a sensibilidade moral, mesmo quando se trata de questões estéticas” (p. 263).

O sétimo ensaio, que surge já na segunda parte do volume, “A teologia de Job, segundo Kant: ou a experiência ético-religiosa entre o discurso teodiceico e a estética do sublime”, investiga a teologia moral kantiana partindo sobretudo da exploração do ensaio

kantiano publicado no ano de 1791 numa revista de Berlim (*Berlinische Monatsschrift*), intitulado “Sobre o insucesso de todas as tentativas filosóficas na teodiceia” (*Über das Misslingen aller philosophischen Versuche in der Theodicee*). Segundo Ribeiro dos Santos, neste ensaio, Kant procura perscrutar a essência do que entende ser a “autêntica teodiceia”, exposta no livro bíblico de Job, reconhecendo na personagem central do livro a correcta atitude da filosofia crítica relativamente à teologia natural, à filosofia da religião e à filosofia moral. “Job é o símbolo da fé moral kantiana e na sua figura se condensa o essencial da filosofia kantiana da moral e da religião” (p. 277). O Deus de Job estará ligado ao Deus da consciência moral, tal como Kant o aborda: “Debatendo-se com Deus e com os seus amigos, Job está no fundo a debater-se consigo mesmo no tribunal da sua consciência moral, desdobrando-se aí em juiz, em acusador, em apresentador e advogado da sua causa, que é também a *causa de Deus*, e o incondicionado decreto divino que aí ouve e a que obedece – o juízo que aí categoricamente se pronuncia – é a sentença da sua própria razão” (p. 299).

No oitavo ensaio, “A concepção kantiana da experiência estética: novidade, tensões e equilíbrios”, o autor do volume tem como objectivo identificar alguns dos principais aspectos característicos da problematização kantiana do sentimento estético. Nesta linha, procura, sobretudo, realçar as tensões e os equilíbrios que a sustentam, bem como evidenciar a sua fecundidade especulativa que tem sido notória nos últimos tempos. Um dos aspectos que, em nosso entender, mais se destaca no presente ensaio é, por exemplo, a chamada de atenção do autor para a existência, em Kant, de um íntimo parentesco entre o sentimento estético e o sentimento moral. Ainda que o cultivo do gosto seja uma propedêutica para a moralidade, “a íntima e conatural solidariedade entre o gosto – sentimento estético – e a moralidade não se verifica apenas na capacidade de que o primeiro tem para insensivelmente preparar os indivíduos para a segunda. Passagens há, na própria *Crítica do Juízo* e também em outras obras posteriores de Kant, nas quais o filósofo aponta o íntimo parentesco entre o sentimento estético do belo e do sublime da natureza e o sentimento moral, em algumas chegando mesmo a sugerir uma origem moral do sentimento estético [...]” (p. 342), como refere Ribeiro dos Santos.

Um outro aspecto também bastante interessante, do nosso ponto de vista, é a comparação que Ribeiro dos Santos realiza, ainda que apenas a título de apontamento, entre as posições de Kant e Hegel no que concerne à abordagem das questões estéticas: “Se em Kant é a experiência da beleza da natureza que se revela como a matriz originária e o critério de toda a experiência estética e da própria experiência da beleza artística, em Hegel, pelo contrário, é a arte e a beleza artística que constituem o assunto próprio da Estética e só por reflexo destas se poderá ainda falar, embora impropriamente, de algo como a beleza da natureza” (p. 345).

No nono ensaio, “Kant e o regresso à natureza como paradigma estético”, o autor do volume realça o interesse que a redescoberta de alguns tópicos da estética kantiana pode ter, nomeadamente a redescoberta de aspectos relativos à ideia da estética da natureza e da vivência estética da natureza. O autor sugere este mesmo interesse, não apenas para melhor investigar o sentido e a coerência da proposta de Kant, mas, igualmente, para repensar o

interesse pela natureza que se regista na actualidade, e que parece surgir sobretudo como uma reacção ao desencantamento do mundo levado a cabo pela visão mecanicista dos modernos. “O sentimento estético não está [...] só para além da explicação científica, mas está também antes dela e de um modo muito mais originário. E não é já a linguagem do domínio, e muito menos a do domínio do homem e da sua razão sobre a natureza, a que pode traduzir esta nova atitude. É a linguagem da cortesia, duma cortesia recíproca, duma amabilidade retribuída” (p. 374).

O décimo ensaio, e último desta segunda parte do volume, “Da experiência estético-teleológica da natureza à consciência ecológica. Uma leitura da *Crítica do Juízo*”, possui três objectivos essenciais, que o autor destaca de forma clara. Neste ensaio procura-se perceber o motivo que terá tido Kant para, na sua última *Crítica*, ter associado as duas partes da obra (crítica do juízo estético e crítica do juízo teleológico) sob o mesmo princípio e também uma mesma faculdade do espírito, reconhecer as consequências que tal associação possui, quer para a sua doutrina estética, quer para a visão da natureza que daí emerge e, por fim, avaliar o interesse que os pontos anteriores podem ter para reavivar os debates actuais sobre a consciência ecológica, visto estes requererem uma nova filosofia da natureza. Procura-se, essencialmente, evidenciar o modo como o contributo kantiano possa iluminar o que nos nossos dias se chama de “ética da natureza” ou “ética ambiental”, ou seja, a responsabilidade ética do homem face à natureza. Ainda que à primeira vista a contribuição de Kant quanto a este assunto, e como bem aponta Ribeiro dos Santos, não seja evidente, ela existe. E, deste modo, o autor do volume reconhece o sentido de se falar, não apenas de uma nova relação com a natureza, mas no enobrecimento da própria humanidade do homem: “não só a consideração teleológica da natureza como um sistema de sistemas finalizados, como sobretudo a experiência estética do belo natural e a do sublime da natureza permitem que o homem aceda a uma relação com a natureza que não é já a da posse, a do uso instrumental e a do domínio mecânico e muito menos a da agressão e da violência, e nem sequer apenas a de respeito, mas a da recíproca dependência e solidariedade, e mesmo a da gentileza, a do livre favor, a da espontânea gratuidade e doação. Todavia, não é só a natureza que nesta nova relação é reconhecida na sua dignidade e transcendência por parte do homem, mas é também o homem que, deste modo [...] se sente ele próprio enobrecido e surpreende em si uma nova e mais originária dimensão, como se também ele visse desse modo ampliada a sua própria humanidade” (p. 403).

No décimo primeiro ensaio, que se encontra na terceira e última parte do volume, “Eurocentrismo e cosmopolitismo no pensamento antropológico e político de Kant”, Ribeiro dos Santos procura, em primeiro lugar, pensar a Europa, os Europeus e os outros continentes e povos tendo em consideração as reflexões kantianas sobre Geografia e Antropologia, e, em segundo lugar, pensar a Europa e os Estados europeus no contexto da filosofia kantiana da história universal da humanidade, a partir de um ponto de vista cosmopolita e do programa kantiano relativo à instauração de uma nova ordem jurídico-política de alcance mundial. O momento, para nós, mais interessante do ensaio, e para o

qual ele próprio desagua, é a referência do autor do volume à “grande utopia kantiana” (p. 424), que é a consideração da Europa como possuindo uma tarefa educadora em relação ao mundo: “o que a Europa tem a dar ao mundo é a experiência efectiva de um paradigma político-jurídico, o qual parece ser o único capaz de assegurar a liberdade sob a lei, de garantir o respeito pelos sagrados direitos e dignidade dos homens e tornar possível a coexistência pacífica e empreendedora dos povos” (p. 424).

O décimo segundo ensaio, “A paz como problema filosófico e a ideia kantiana de federalismo”, possui três momentos essenciais. Inicialmente, pretende-se apresentar como a ideia kantiana de Federalismo responde ao contexto histórico-político e ao contexto de reflexão político-jurídica sobre a situação do mundo, procurando-se melhor compreender a solução kantiana a partir do modo como o problema fora abordado e resolvido antes de Kant. De seguida, Ribeiro dos Santos realça a importância da ideia kantiana de “federação dos povos” no contexto da filosofia kantiana, afirmando, nomeadamente, que esta se relaciona com todos os domínios fundamentais da filosofia crítica. “Ela carrega consigo toda a densidade da filosofia kantiana” (p. 432). Por fim, o autor do volume investiga o conteúdo da ideia kantiana de Federalismo, explorando, igualmente, como poderá ela iluminar o debate actual em torno da construção de uma nova ordem europeia, assim como de uma nova ordem internacional, na qual os princípios político-jurídicos preservem a dignidade dos homens e dos povos. Um dos momentos mais interessantes do ensaio é aquele que apresenta a analogia cosmológica que se pode estabelecer entre o sistema dos Estados e o sistema das estrelas.

No seu décimo terceiro ensaio, “Kant e o republicanismo moderno”, o autor procura, principalmente, explorar o contributo kantiano para a ideia moderna de república e de republicanismo. O ensaio gira em torno de quatro momentos principais. O primeiro tem como finalidade evidenciar a conaturalidade e a intimidade existente entre a filosofia kantiana e a concepção republicana, enaltecendo, por exemplo, que a própria filosofia transcendental se move “no ambiente semântico de uma grande alegoria da razão concebida como instituição republicana” (p. 473). O segundo momento tem como objectivo a explicitação dos principais aspectos da noção kantiana de república e de republicanismo, dos quais aqui se poderão destacar a tarefa principal que a ideia de república procura realizar, que é a de garantir “a máxima liberdade humana segundo leis que permitam que a liberdade de cada um possa coexistir com a de todos os outros”, e, também, a consideração da república como um arquétipo ou uma ideia necessária, reguladora. O momento seguinte procura situar a noção kantiana de república e republicanismo tendo em conta a ideia de uma construção progressiva de uma paz duradoura entre os povos através da criação de instituições políticas que preservem os princípios do direito e da dignidade dos seres humanos, assim como investigar a necessária transição, que Kant defende, da república ou repúblicas estatais singulares à “república mundial” federalista e cosmopolita. “O programa kantiano visa, pois, um republicanismo generalizado” (p. 490). Finalmente, o quarto momento do ensaio apresenta os principais ingredientes da noção kantiana de republicanismo, nomeadamente os seus princípios

(liberdade, igualdade, auto-suficiência), o sistema representativo e a separação dos poderes, e a sua tendência pacifista.

No último ensaio do volume, “Da estética como filosofia política: Hannah Arendt e a sua interpretação da *Crítica do Juízo*”, e como o título sugere, Ribeiro dos Santos reconstrói a interpretação de Arendt da filosofia kantiana, em especial da *Crítica do Juízo*, procurando evidenciar a tese da autora de que a genuína filosofia política kantiana se encontra nesta mesma obra, assim como destacar as muitas lacunas que, segundo o autor do volume, existem na interpretação arendtiana da filosofia de Kant. Enaltecendo que o maior tópico do diálogo entre Arendt e Kant é o julgar, o juízo, Ribeiro dos Santos entende que a novidade que a filósofa nos traz a respeito da teoria kantiana do juízo reflexionante se encontra no facto da autora ter compreendido “que aquilo que Kant dizia do juízo de gosto vale também e com muito mais pertinência para o juízo político” (p. 531). Contudo, o autor do volume considera ousada a conclusão da filósofa “de que é na primeira parte da *Crítica do Juízo* que se encontra a verdadeira filosofia política kantiana, e não, como se costuma pensar e o próprio Kant o pensava, nos escritos de filosofia moral (como fundamentação) e nos escritos de filosofia política e do direito (como aplicação)” (p. 531). Ainda que concorde com o alcance para uma filosofia política tendo em atenção os tópicos identificados por Arendt na primeira parte da *Crítica do Juízo*, Ribeiro dos Santos critica, com toda a pertinência, a desconsideração da filósofa de tudo o que Kant refere sobre filosofia política noutros escritos seus. Apesar de tudo, e este parece ser o ponto mais essencial e positivo que o autor destaca, Arendt teve o mérito de colocar em relevo a ambiência eminentemente política e jurídica da filosofia kantiana.

Em resumo, o leitor de *Regresso a Kant – Ética, Estética, Filosofia Política*, de Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, encontra nestas páginas um conjunto de ensaios que parecem, não obstante a sua autonomia, dialogar entre si. Tal permite ao leitor ter uma visão da própria organicidade da filosofia kantiana, bem como familiarizar-se com a sua linguagem, se assim for o caso.

Uma das características mais interessantes do presente volume, na nossa perspectiva, é o facto do autor não realizar apenas uma abordagem histórica, mas investigar igualmente como poderá o contributo kantiano iluminar os debates filosóficos da actualidade. Uma outra característica particularmente interessante, e que atravessa todo o volume, é a reavaliação de alguns dos mais emblemáticos autores críticos de Kant, de entre os quais poderemos destacar, como vimos, Friedrich Schiller, Hannah Arendt, Karl-Otto Apel, Jürgen Habermas, etc.

Por fim, a qualidade científica deste volume, assim como de outras obras do mesmo autor e de outros autores portugueses, fazem-nos pensar, pelo menos, na pertinência e no interesse que a criação de uma revista dedicada à filosofia kantiana poderia ter em Portugal, à semelhança de outros países.





## **La filosofía práctica del profesor Immanuel Kant**

### ***The Practical Philosophy of Professor Immanuel Kant***

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**Reseña : Lara Denis y Oliver Sensen (eds.), *Kant's Lectures on Ethics: a Critical Guide*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015. 289 pp. ISBN: 1107036313**

Este libro es un comentario introductorio de los apuntes de clase tomados por los alumnos en los cursos de I. Kant sobre Ética, impartidos entre 1763 y 1794. Es decir, que la fuente que se estudia a lo largo de sus capítulos son los apuntes de los estudiantes que asistían a las clases que Kant dictaba en la Universidad de Königsberg a lo largo de su extensa, y multifacética, carrera docente. Como se hace evidente a través de las cifras enunciadas, los apuntes considerados recorren una gran parte de la biografía de nuestro filósofo. El primero de ellos es casi veinte años previo a la publicación de la Primera Crítica y contemporáneo de un texto que proporcionó a Kant un gran reconocimiento, el Ensayo premiado por la Academia de Ciencias de Berlín en 1763. El último es posterior a la Tercera Crítica, de 1790, y contemporáneo a la *Metafísica de las costumbres*. En sus clases, Kant utilizaba dos libros de texto, escritos por A. G. Baumgarten. En primer lugar, utilizaba su *Introducción a la filosofía primera práctica*, de 1760. En segundo término, en el desarrollo de los temas específicos seguía la *Ética filosófica*, primero en la edición de 1751 y después en la de 1763.

En virtud de estas consideraciones, podemos adivinar la cantidad de interrogantes que suscitan los apuntes de clase. En primer lugar se encuentra la cuestión de la autoría, que incluye a figuras reconocidas más allá de su intervención en las clases, como Herder y Collins. En segundo término, la datación de los textos es tema de estudio. Disponemos de

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copias de copias, y en algunos casos se discute la fecha de las clases a las que corresponden. Además, suponiendo la fidelidad de las notas con respecto a lecciones del filósofo, hay que tener presentes la referencia permanente al pensamiento de Baumgarten. Finalmente, luego de analizar las tesis desarrolladas en las clases, hay que considerar su relación con la obra publicada por el filósofo.

Algunos de esos apuntes fueron traducidos al inglés y publicados por la Cambridge University Press en un volumen que el libro de Denis y Sensen pretende glosar<sup>1</sup>. El comentario contiene un prólogo, una introducción y tres secciones de cinco capítulos cada una. Los paratextos del libro son herramientas útiles, aunque breves, para introducirse en el estudio de los apuntes de clase. En el prólogo, escrito por J. B. Schneewind, podemos reconocer tres temas. El primero está dado por las condiciones en las que Kant impartía sus clases. Luego, el autor discute un artículo del editor Werner Stark, que trata sobre las semejanzas y diferencias entre dos manuscritos sobre *Ética*. Finalmente, Schneewind se refiere a la relevancia de las lecciones para comprender la filosofía práctica de Kant. La introducción, por su parte, está a cargo de los editores del libro, Denis y Sensen. En ella, en primer lugar se evalúan los pro y los contra del uso de las lecciones como fuente para el estudio de la filosofía de Kant. En segundo término, se especifican las pretensiones y la naturaleza del libro. Éste no pretende ser un comentario exhaustivo de las lecciones sobre filosofía práctica de Kant, sino una guía crítica para la lectura de la selección de esas lecciones publicada en inglés por la CUP. La tercera parte de la introducción reseña los capítulos del libro.

La primera sección del volumen se titula "Las fuentes". Precisamente, contiene cinco contribuciones dedicadas a desarrollar, cada una, un aspecto de los apuntes compilados en la traducción inglesa. Su primer capítulo, a cargo de Stefano Bacin, se titula "Las lecciones de Kant sobre *Ética* y la filosofía moral de Baumgarten". Estudia la relación entre las clases de Kant y la *ética* de Baumgarten. La necesidad de esta investigación se basa en el hecho conocido de que en sus clases Kant desarrollaba un comentario de libros de texto. En las clases de *Ética*, en particular, seguía dos libros de Baumgarten, uno para presentar la filosofía práctica en general y uno para ocuparse de los detalles de la *ética*. Kant se alejaba sin embargo de esos textos en las partes introductorias de sus cursos, que año a año se volvían más extensas. El capítulo de Bacin proporciona argumentos sobre la deliberada selección de los manuales por parte de Kant y comenta cómo interpretaba nuestro filósofo algunos contenidos de la *ética* de Baumgarten. Con el tratamiento del concepto de obligación, de los fundamentos de la moral y de la estructura de las obligaciones *éticas*, Bacin ilustra que la selección de los libros de Baumgarten constituye un alejamiento de la *ética* wolffiana por parte de Kant. Para Bacin, los apuntes de *ética* muestran que nuestro filósofo establecía un diálogo crítico con Baumgarten, en estrecha continuidad con su propia producción filosófica. El capítulo siguiente, de Patrick R. Frierson, intitulado "Herder: religión y motivación moral", trata sobre el inicio de la

<sup>1</sup> Kant, I. (1997). *Lectures on Ethics*, Cambridge University Press. Eds.: Peter Heath y J. B. Schneewind.

relación entre Kant y su alumno Herder. Luego de un comentario histórico acerca de esa relación, se detiene en el tratamiento de la religión en las lecciones de Ética transcritas por Herder. En particular, el trabajo de Frierson se ocupa de la cuestión de la motivación moral y religiosa. A través del estudio del tratamiento que esta cuestión recibe en las anotaciones de Herder, Frierson reseña la función moral que tenía la religión, de acuerdo con las lecciones del joven profesor de Königsberg en los años '60. El capítulo de Manfred Kuehn, "Collins: la posición pre-crítica de Kant", estudia los apuntes Collins. En sus primeras páginas encontramos una detallada descripción de esos apuntes, Si el capítulo de Frierson, como vimos, establece las relaciones entre los apuntes de Herder y los manuales empleados en los cursos de Kant, la investigación de Kuehn se centra, antes bien, en las referencias de los apuntes de Collins a las obras de Kant: la *Fundamentación para la metafísica de las costumbres* y la *Metafísica de las costumbres*. El cuidadoso análisis de las anotaciones conduce a Kuehn a considerar la estrecha relación entre la ética y la teología para el joven Kant y a advertir el esfuerzo del regiomontano para autonomizar el ámbito de la ética. El estudio de los apuntes, concluye Kuehn, permite apreciar 1) el elemento teológico presente en la ética kantiana y 2) la importancia que tiene en ella la motivación moral. El cuarto capítulo, a cargo de Jens Timmermann, se titula "Mrongovius II: un complemento para la *Fundamentación para la metafísica de las costumbres*". Comienza con una sugestiva enumeración de los inconvenientes de ese texto, luego de la cual, empero, es reseñada su relevancia para la comprensión del pensamiento kantiano. En los apuntes se desarrollan algunas de las tesis propias del pensamiento de Kant. Además, en él es notable, señala Timmermann, el hecho de que las referencias a "el autor", es decir a Baumgarten, usuales en los apuntes de clase, en este caso se atenúen. Los temas que Timmermann rastrea en los la Moral Mrongovius II son: i) la buena voluntad como el bien supremo, ii) el imperativo categórico y el imperativo hipotético, iii) los conceptos de materia y de forma y la naturaleza del imperativo categórico, iv) el concepto de autonomía, v) los deberes para con Dios, vi) la función de la religión en la moral, y vii) el concepto de autocracia. El último capítulo de la primera sección de nuestro libro trata sobre la Moral Vigilantius y fue escrito por R. Louden. Su título es: "Vigilantius: moral para los seres humanos". Nuevamente en las primeras líneas de este texto encontramos una disquisición acerca de la importancia del estudio de las lecciones. Louden pone el énfasis en la estrecha relación biográfica del anotador, Vigilantius, con Kant. Además, estos apuntes, datados a mediados de la década de 1790, corresponden al único curso intitulado "Metafísica de las costumbres" por Kant. Por este motivo, el primer paso del comentario de Louden consiste en analizar la diferencia entre una "metafísica de las costumbres" y una "metafísica de la moral". Luego el autor desarrolla un comentario de las lecciones que se centra en el carácter humano de la metafísica de las costumbres. Es decir, en el hecho de que esta metafísica no se dirige a los entes racionales en general, sino particularmente a los hombres.

La segunda sección del libro se titula "Filosofía práctica". Los textos que la componen se concentran, principalmente, en los elementos introductorios de los apuntes de

clase. El título del primer artículo de esta sección, de Stephen Engstrom, es "Consideraciones antiguas en la concepción de Kant del bien supremo". Es un estudio de los apuntes de Collins que pretende exhibir que ya en el período precrítico del pensamiento kantiano la felicidad cumplía una función importante en la filosofía práctica. Por medio del estudio de ese concepto y del de bien supremo, Engstrom procura precisar cuál es la relación de la filosofía kantiana con la tradición eudemonista. El capítulo 7 del libro está escrito por Allen Wood. Se titula "La historia kantiana de la ética". También este texto contiene una reflexión acerca de la recepción de la historia de la filosofía, particularmente de la filosofía práctica. Wood propone rastrear la relación del pensamiento de Kant con la filosofía moral antigua y con la filosofía contemporánea en las consideraciones kantianas sobre la historia de la ética. El siguiente capítulo es de Oliver Sensen y se titula "Obligación moral y voluntad libre". A diferencia de los aportes previos, orientados a estudiar la inserción de Kant en la historia de la filosofía, el texto de Sensen desarrolla, en cambio, una tesis sistemática. Para el autor, la función central del concepto de obligación no se expresa en las obras publicadas de Kant, pero sí en sus lecciones, gracias a la elección del libro de Baumgarten como fuente para sus clases. El artículo propone una caracterización de ese concepto y de los argumentos para defender su rol en la ética. El texto "La escurridiza historia de las leyes permisivas de Kant", de B. Sharon Byrd propone una interpretación de las leyes permisivas en la filosofía kantiana. Byrd señala que a partir de los textos de Kant resulta sencillo identificar las acciones prohibidas y las acciones moralmente indiferentes. No es, empero, tan fácil la distinción de las acciones permitidas. Estas acciones, generalmente prohibidas, son permitidas en casos excepcionales. Para la expresión de este permiso se formulan leyes permisivas. Byrd sostiene que hay tres tipos de leyes permisivas, que se caracterizan en la *Moral Vigilantius*, en *Paz perpetua* y en la *Metafísica de las costumbres*. El último capítulo de esta sección, a cargo de Joachim Hruschka, se titula: "Sobre la lógica de la imputación en los apuntes de clase de Vigilantius". Nuevamente, el texto elegido aquí son los apuntes Vigilantius. En particular, Hruschka estudia en ese texto la lógica de la imputación, que es el enjuiciamiento de una acción. En la argumentación del autor se identifican tres momentos. En primer lugar, se presenta el concepto de *causa libera*, el cual permite distinguir cuáles son las acciones imputables. Luego, explica la diferencia entre la imputación de hecho y la imputación lógica. Finalmente, propone una interpretación del hecho de que la definición de "imputación" que Kant proporciona en *Metafísica de las costumbres* no incluya el concepto de la imputación lógica.

La tercera sección del libro se titula "Ética". En ella se abordan temas relativos a la discusión kantiana de la *Ética* de Baumgarten. Su primer capítulo, redactado por Paul Guyer, se centra al igual que los anteriores, en la *Moral Vigilantius*. Se titula "Libertad, fines y la derivación de los deberes". En él, Guyer estudia la derivación, a partir de la libertad, de los deberes positivos y negativos hacia uno mismo y hacia los otros. El problema que orienta su investigación es que algunos pasajes de esos apuntes parecen indicar que los deberes también se fundan en otros principios, además del de la libertad. La

primera parte de la argumentación de Guyer consiste en exhibir las estrategias para la derivación de los deberes. En segundo término se refiere a la posibilidad de derivar esos deberes del mero principio de la libertad. Guyer sostiene que de su exposición se sigue que la diferencia entre los deberes hacia uno mismo y los deberes hacia los otros es el resultado de una abstracción. En la vida real, prosigue Guyer, unos y otros deberes se relacionan estrechamente. El siguiente capítulo, de Lara Denis, se titula "La propia autoestima y los deberes con uno mismo". Investiga, como lo indica su título, el concepto de autoestima y su relación con los deberes con uno mismo. Para ello, la indagación se concentra en tres textos, los cuales son, a saber: la *Moral Collins*, la *Moral Vigilantius*, y la "Doctrina de la virtud", de la *Metafísica de las costumbres*. El principal objetivo de este trabajo consiste en explicar la tesis de Kant, según la cual el incumplimiento de los deberes con uno mismo constituye una violencia contra la propia humanidad. Anne Margaret Baxley, por su parte, sostiene, en "Virtud, auto-control y la autocracia de la razón práctica", que las lecciones de ética proporcionan un auxilio valioso para la comprensión de la teoría kantiana de la virtud, también desarrollada en la obra publicada de Kant. En las lecciones se hace clara la función que tiene esa doctrina en el marco general de la ética, así como su relación con otras nociones de la teoría moral. El capítulo de Jeanine Grenberg se titula "Amor". En él, la autora no se propone proporcionar una descripción exhaustiva de la concepción kantiana del amor, sino, antes bien, intenta mostrar cómo se incorpora esa concepción en la teoría moral, a pesar de que para Kant el amor no es un fundamento de la moral. El rechazo de Kant de este fundamento tiene un motivo en la consideración del amor de sí como fuente de corrupción del amor del otro. La autora recorre las clases para mostrar que en ellas el amor del otro recibe un tratamiento más detallado que en las obras publicadas del filósofo. El último capítulo tiene por título "Amor del honor, emulación y la psicología de los vicios diabólicos". Escrito por Houston Smit y Mark Timmons, también explora un aspecto del pensamiento kantiano que se encuentra más desarrollado en los apuntes de clase que en los textos publicados. En particular, los autores se concentran en investigar la psicología involucrada en el vicio. Para ello, además, exponen algunos contenidos de la doctrina kantiana de la virtud. El objetivo del artículo consiste en mostrar que hay un fundamento psicológico común en los vicios.

Como se hace evidente en esta somera recensión de los capítulos que componen el libro, éste proporciona al lector el acceso a una variedad de cuestiones relacionadas con las lecciones de Kant sobre filosofía práctica. No solamente se estudian temas diferentes, sino que a lo largo del libro encontramos una combinación de indagaciones de índole histórica y sistemática. Ciertamente, la compilación no recorre todos los temas ni todos los apuntes. Aun así, empero, facilita un acceso a esos apuntes de una profundidad conceptual destacable. El libro, en pocas palabras, es un valioso aporte para el estudio de la filosofía kantiana.



Reseña doble: *Immanuel Kant. Lecciones de Antropología. Fragmentos de estética y antropología.* Edición crítica y traducción de Manuel Sánchez, Comares, Colección Claves, Granada, 2015, 272 pp., ISBN: 978-84-9045-261-5.

## **Antropologia e estética na gênese do sistema kantiano**

### *Anthropology and Esthetics in the Genesis of the Kantian System*

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Seria certamente pouco dizer que esta seleção e tradução de textos dos *Cursos de Antropologia* traz um farto material para todos os leitores da filosofia de Immanuel Kant, especialmente aqueles que se interessam pela sua antropologia e estética: este volume organizado e traduzido por Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez constitui provavelmente um marco importante para os estudos de Kant no âmbito do mundo ibérico e latino-americano, estabelecendo um parâmetro para futuras edições dos Cursos de Lógica, de Metafísica, de Moral e mesmo para uma edição dos Cursos de Antropologia em português.

De fato, todo aquele que alguma vez pensou em traduzir alguma dessas séries de cursos, ou mesmo parte dela, deve ter certamente deparado com a questão: por que este curso e não outro? Por que não combinar uma parte mais bem desenvolvida num curso com outra seção de outro, embora tratando-se de datações distintas? E, no final, provavelmente, diante da dificuldade de selecionar e organizar tanto material, a escolha acaba recaindo sobre um curso ou, pior, sobre nenhum.

A proposta do tradutor espanhol, pesquisador da Universidade de Granada, é direta: trata-se de trazer ao público em geral uma vasta seleção dos textos referentes à estética kantiana, no momento fecundo de seu desenvolvimento nos anos 1770-80, quando

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caminha (embora nem sempre progressivamente e sem atritos) lado a lado com outras disciplinas também em vias de se formar, como ocorre especialmente com a antropologia pragmática. A leitura do livro é particularmente prazerosa, não só pela tradução, mas também porque o leitor não sente cortes abruptos, naturais numa compilação e mesmo na leitura dos textos originais dos cursos, tendo em vista o caráter inacabado deles. Aos fragmentos escolhidos são acrescentadas notas contendo passagens paralelas elucidativas, extraídas das Reflexões e dos Cursos de Lógica, Moral e Metafísica, da Correspondência, das Críticas, além de indicações de fontes e referências utilizadas por Kant.

O estudo preliminar coloca o leitor em pleno ambiente no qual surgiram as preocupações de Kant: em primeiríssimo lugar, trata-se de saber se os ensinamentos encontrados nos cursos são mesmo de Kant, ou meras repetições do ensino dogmático dos manuais que utilizava na Universidade de Königsberg. Advertindo que o recurso às Reflexões e às cartas são indispensáveis para a datação dos textos (e que estes, portanto, deve ser usados com prudência), o autor mostra consistentemente, contra a tese da “vida dupla” do professor e do pensador Kant, que as aulas apresentavam sim um conteúdo doutrinal próprio, e que, por isso, a antropologia não se constrói sobre os moldes do saber escolástico: o ensinamento mundano que nela se busca não procura encontrar os fundamentos racionais das máximas a serem seguidas na vida, mas em considerá-las segundo seu valor pragmático. Mostra-se assim o vínculo da antropologia com a filosofia moral, da prudência com a sabedoria, da formação estética com a formação ética no interior do sistema. Particularmente interessante é a longa discussão sobre o desenvolvimento do pensamento kantiano de 1770 a 1790. Aqui, embora o foco seja ainda a estética, o autor mostra o entroncamento dos temas do gosto e da sensibilidade nos problemas gnosiológicos discutidos em textos como a *Dissertação de 1770*, com sua divisão entre o sensível e o intelectual, que determinará o afastamento da estética “dogmática”. Ao longo do percurso é possível ver como a estética deixa de ter uma pretensão científica e como o gosto ganha estatuto de um *a priori* subjetivo de validade universal na *Crítica do juízo*.

Apesar das diferentes faces pelas quais ilumina o pensamento kantiano – ou até talvez por isso mesmo – não será exagerado caracterizar a concepção dessa valiosa compilação espanhola com um termo fundamental para Kant e certamente caro ao tradutor: o livro tem “espírito”. Mais ainda: talvez não seja arriscado dizer que ele tem um espírito *dogmático* – dogmático no melhor sentido da palavra, aquele, aliás, prezado também por Kant, a despeito das distâncias que pretendeu tomar em relação a ele. Pode-se discordar de uma ou outra opção de tradução (*facultad creativa* para *Dichtungsvermögen* ou *facultas fingendi*) ou de um ou outro texto esquecido pelo tradutor (a única ausência realmente lamentável é o trecho da *Antropologia Parrow* que fala da diferença entre Rafael, Corregio e Ticiano a partir de um texto de Anton Raphael Mengs), mas não se pode negar o rigor filosófico e filológico com que se desincumbiu de sua tarefa.

O livro revela um espírito dogmático também num sentido mais amplo. É que, por mais que a reflexão antropológica e estética tenda a se consolidar ao longo dos anos num afastamento progressivo em relação ao dogmatismo, ela jamais deixou de guardar as marcas deste. E isso não só no seu vocabulário técnico, na *Gründlichkeit* de seus conceitos, definições, juízos e raciocínios. Uma breve passada de olhos por algumas notas à tradução servirá para tornar nítida essa persistência do dogmatismo: apesar de criticar a teoria baumgartiana do engenho (*Witz*) e assimilar a sutileza ao Juízo, a concepção kantiana do engenho não seria alheia à de Baumgarten, nem sua teoria do entendimento sadio e do engenho natural distante da teoria de Georg Friedrich Meier (pp. 27-28). Essa revalorização do pensamento dogmático é particularmente notável na nota sobre a relação entre gênio e espírito (pp. 171-172), na qual se desenha nitidamente a influência de Leibniz, Baumgarten, Meier, Eberhard e Sulzer sobre esse tema central da *Crítica do juízo*.

É principalmente nesse ponto que a tradução e também vários artigos de Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez se tornam fecundos para a *Kant-Forschung*: se é verdade que engenho natural, espírito e gênio (noções que são indefiníveis, inapreensíveis para o entendimento) são herança do dogmatismo, a distância que separa a psicologia empírica e a antropologia pragmática não seria muito menor do que se imagina? Enquanto nas outras partes do sistema se consolida a divisão entre o racional e o empírico e, com isso, o afastamento em relação à “metafísica”, a proximidade entre a razão e o sentimento é de algum modo preservada na antropologia pragmática e na *Crítica do juízo*.

Inexplicável segundo uma regra lógica, a aplicação da regra ao caso (pelo *Mutterwitz* ou pelo *juízo*) não é já o modo como se passa de um saber meramente teórico a sua execução prática? A vivacidade de uma obra ou tirada espirituosa não é o que distingue um saber mundano de um conhecimento escolar? E com isso não se está já a um passo de supor que o *espírito* da filosofia kantiana, o espírito do criticismo, deve muito mais aos dogmáticos do que o velho espírito de meticulosidade com que Kant lhes reverencia na *Crítica da razão pura*? Enfim, a *Schulweisheit* estaria tão distante assim da *Weltweisheit*?



**Una reconstrucción del problema del juicio reflexionante a la  
luz de las *Lecciones de Antropología***

*A reconstruction of the problem of reflective judgment in the light  
of Lectures on Anthropology.*

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La cuidada edición crítica de las Lecciones de Antropología de Kant presenta al lector una extensa colección de textos inéditos de entre los años 1772 en que Kant empieza a impartir sus lecciones de Antropología hasta 1789. A éstos se añaden algunos fragmentos complementarios del legado póstumo, la correspondencia y las lecciones de lógica, metafísica y moral. De los *Mitschriften* publicados por primera vez en 1997 en la edición de la Academia aparecen recogidos en este volumen los correspondientes a los siguientes semestres: semestre de invierno de 1772/1773 (*Antropología Collins; Antropología Parow*), semestre de 1775/1776 (*Antropología Friedländer*), semestre de 1777/1778 (*Antropología Pillau*), semestre de 1781/1782 (*Antropología Menschenkunde*), semestre de invierno de 1784/1785 (*Antropología Mrongovius*) y semestre de 1788/1789 (*Antropología Busolt*). El manual que empleó Kant para dictar estas lecciones de antropología fue la *Metafísica* de Baumgarten.

La selección de los fragmentos sigue el criterio de proporcionar un análisis comparado de materiales que permitan reconstruir la formación de las tesis fundamentales de la *Crítica del Juicio*. La elección de Manuel Sánchez hace posible por lo demás, tanto explicar con éxito la conexión sistemática entre el problema del juicio reflexionante y la teoría del conocimiento sensible del Kant de 1770, como determinar las condiciones de posibilidad de la fijación de una teoría del gusto de carácter trascendental mostrando cómo el desarrollo de los problemas gnoseológicos y la evolución de su teoría de las facultades le permite elaborar su proyecto estético maduro; si bien podría, en todo caso, haber sido completado con algunos fragmentos por ejemplo de la *Antropología Dohna Wundlacken*,

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también pertinentes para el estudio de las cuestiones en torno a las cuales gravita la selección realizada.

El planteamiento de Manuel Sánchez, además de constituir un ejemplo para los que en el ámbito de la *Kantsforschung* iberoamericana quieran abordar un trabajo de investigación y traducción de alguna de las *Vorlesungen*, tiene la virtud de llevar a su máximo rendimiento la perspectiva historiográfica. Una lectura atenta del libro permite así reconstruir con mucha exactitud cuáles son las principales claves interpretativas del proyecto estético de Kant, con quién dialoga éste en cada momento, qué significado tenían algunos términos significativos en el contexto teórico en el que imparte sus lecciones y cómo les otorga una nueva carta de ciudadanía, qué relaciones existen entre el latín y el alemán académico de la época —el cual sólo hacía unos pocos años empezaba a consolidarse como lengua oficial de transmisión filosófica— o cómo algunas de sus reflexiones remiten a ciertas tesis de autores contemporáneos a él, ya sea con la intención de criticarlos, modificarlos o incorporarlos en sus propios planteamientos.

La presente edición nos permite por su parte encontrar soluciones para uno de los puntos más enigmáticos de la filosofía kantiana, como es el estatuto de la antropología. Entre los lectores familiarizados con las obras críticas de Kant, el yo suele presentarse como unidad formal que vincula las representaciones, quedando reservado su análisis para los dominios de la lógica. El estudio del yo del que pudiera ser objeto la antropología suele asimilarse a la psicología empírica incapaz de establecer una diferencia cabal entre la conciencia pura y el sentido interno que pone en conexión a los fenómenos a través del tiempo. En la primera *Crítica* la Antropología es presentada precisamente en relación con el carácter empírico o fisiológico que determina la conducta de los hombres. La Metafísica de las Costumbres es por su parte definida como la moral pura donde las condiciones empíricas pertenecientes al dominio de la antropología deben quedar al margen. Y, sin embargo, en la propia KrV, la propia psicología empírica, definida en nuestras lecciones como “doctrina natural” (p. 47) o “doctrina empírica” (p. 190) es remitida a una antropología paralela a la doctrina empírica de la naturaleza. Por otro lado, a pesar de su carácter pragmático, las tres preguntas conductoras de la filosofía crítica (correspondientes a la metafísica, la moral y la religión) son remitidas a la pregunta por el hombre. De esta forma, la truncada posibilidad de una antropología trascendental —raíz común entre Metafísica de la Naturaleza y Metafísica de las Costumbres— hace del ambiguo estatuto de esta disciplina un punto de gravedad fundamental en el estudio sistemático de Kant. La Antropología, como nos explica el editor en su estudio preliminar, se convierte en ese momento en una disciplina diferenciada de otras y adquiere un valor singular por su carácter popular o práctico.

Este carácter práctico remite a otra cuestión crucial abordada en el seno de estos textos, como es el problema de la aplicabilidad de la sabiduría moral a sus condiciones sensibles o la mediación entre los universos heteróclitos de lo sensible y lo inteligible diferenciados en la Disertación inaugural de 1770. En este contexto, se introduce por ejemplo el concepto de “belleza independiente” que orienta los fenómenos intuitivos a

partir de los conceptos de la razón. Así, la crítica del gusto fraguada en estas lecciones se resuelve justamente como *tertium quid* entre el concepto de *cognitio sensitiva* de la tradición racionalista y las críticas vertidas por la tradición empirista anglosajona.

Frente al Kant por ejemplo de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura* o del *Opus Postumum* donde las operaciones de mediación entre la intuición y el concepto son descritas a través de complejos y abstractos procesos esquemáticos, en este libro se nos descubre a un Kant mucho menos erudito, con el objetivo de establecer reglas prácticas que orienten en concreto la conducta de los hombres, más en la línea de la autoilustración de Thomasius o Gracián, preocupados por asegurarla comunicabilidad y la accesibilidad de sus tesis filosóficas y por acercar la academia a la vida bajo los ideales del *bel esprit* y la galantería. En el caso de la propia antropología, Kant señala de forma directa sus utilidades prácticas (orientar las acciones, ganarse el favor de los otros, estar satisfecho con uno mismo o proporcionar los principios subjetivos de las ciencias) (p. 110) y la distingue en razón de su carácter pragmático de la antropología escolástica del tipo de la *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise* de Ernst Platner que aborda el origen de los fenómenos desde sus causas y fundamentos (p. 188). La antropología pragmática se limita a aplicar estos principios al servicio de la prudencia con el objetivo de ganar alguna utilidad en la sociedad.

Esta vocación popular no le impide a Kant sin embargo trazar distinciones sutiles como aquella entre la diferencia lógica y la diferencia real entre sensibilidad y entendimiento (p.113); entre una fantasía trastornada irregular y una fantasía trastornada desenfadada, la diferencia entre *anima*, *animus* y *mens* (p. 48), entre *facultas formandi*, *facultas imaginandi* y *facultas praevitandi* o la división entre civilización y moralización (p.220).

Algunas de las distinciones y precisiones trazadas en esta selección de textos resultan de gran utilidad para la posterior formulación de posiciones en la época crítica pero, como el propio autor advierte en su estudio preliminar, no se trata sólo de recoger las reflexiones como anticipaciones de las obras críticas publicadas, sino de examinar el valor del que gozan las mismas en su propio contexto. No pocos intérpretes han señalado la importancia de las lecciones para el estudio de la filosofía de Kant. Dicha relevancia no debe solamente cifrarse en el carácter anticipatorio o complementario de los textos publicados y supervisados por Kant. La lectura atenta de los apuntes de las lecciones de Kant, contruidos de modo que siempre puede leerse entre líneas las tesis del autor del manual del que Kant se servía para impartir sus cursos, permite además comprender cuál es el humus filosófico y los marcos de interpretación en los que deben ser entendidos algunas de sus posiciones o conceptos claves. Por ejemplo, resulta complicado entender la diferencia establecida por Kant entre intensión y extensión en el capítulo de los principios del entendimiento puro de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura* sin haber reparado en la recepción kantiana del cálculo de fluxiones newtoniano, la definición de grado wolffiana o la distinción trazada por Baumgarten entre *claritas intensiva* y *claritas extensiva*. Dicha referencia omitida en la primera *Crítica* es sin embargo rastreable en la lectura de algunos fragmentos y apuntes de las lecciones kantianas. En el caso que nos ocupa, el editor ha

añadido oportunamente el aparato crítico necesario con remisiones a las tesis principales de la *Schulphilosophie* alemana. En esta línea destacan las referencias al texto de Meier a propósito de los tipos de demostración, de las relaciones entre lógica y estética o de la conexión entre el concepto kantiano de juicio provisional y el concepto de suspensión del juicio y las referencias a Wolff y Baumgarten en relación con el concepto de imaginación, ingenio o *facultate characteristic*.

Por su parte Manuel Sánchez ofrece un arduo trabajo que, frente a otras exposiciones demasiado apegadas a cierta vocación sistemática limitada a reproducir los sedimentos de su aportación crítica, consigue presentar las tesis de Kant en pleno movimiento, haciendo visible al lector su rico proceso de formación, sus vacilaciones y los cimios invisibles que permiten rastrear el camino por el cual nuestro filósofo llegó a pergeñar algunas de sus tesis fundamentales. Hecho que también resulta posible gracias al particular y complejo material con el que se enfrenta el autor, como son los apuntes de lecciones, y las dificultades y posibilidades que comporta todo el juego de mediaciones que supone el estudio de estos textos: mediación de un alemán antiguo con una idiosincrasia semántica y gramatical muy peculiar; mediación del propio alumno al transcribir e interpretar las palabras de Kant en sus anotaciones (algunos como Mrongovius, ni siquiera eran alemanes, aunque conocieran bien la lengua y muchos de los apuntes se reescribían en función de apuntes de otros alumnos); mediación del texto, que tras el decreto del Ministro de Instrucción y Culto era de obligada referencia para el profesor en sus clases —en este caso la obra de Baumgarten que hace de las notas de sus alumnos un auténtico palimpsesto bajo el cual siempre pueden rastrearse sus huellas— y la mediación, en fin, del que haciéndose cargo de todas estas mediaciones elige, traduce, anota, interpreta y selecciona con gran rigor filológico esta colección de textos con el fin de responder a ciertas preguntas teóricas determinadas, por ejemplo: ¿cómo surge y evoluciona el problema del juicio reflexionante de la *Crítica del Juicio*?



***Et in Arcadia ego. La armonización de la Naturaleza a la espera  
de la Libertad en la filosofía de Immanuel Kant.***

***Et in Arcadia ego. Nature's Harmonization in Anticipation of  
Freedom in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant.***

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**Reseña: Andaluz Romanillos, A.M. *Las armonías de la razón en Kant. Libertad, Sentimiento de lo bello y Teleología de la naturaleza*, Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2013, 368 pp. ISBN: 978-84-7299-971-8**

En uno de sus primeros trabajos nos retaba Clément Rosset a todos allá por el año 78 con un órdago nada más y nada menos que a 'lo real', en lo cual no podemos sino sentirnos incluidos. Ahí es nada.

En *Le réel : traite de l'idiotie* [*Lo real. Tratado de la idiotiez*] se extendía el autor galo en la explicación de una curiosa idea presentada a la sociedad de las Letras poco antes. Se guardaba allí una idea oculta tras la aparente falta de respeto hacia algo de supuesto tan digno como la entidad de todo lo existente, la entidad de lo real: dicho así –y según él– algo que no es más que 'real', algo a lo que no se caracteriza sino con ese calificativo y que no es nada aparte de esto, *es de por sí insignificante*. Es decir, que no tiene significado alguno. Lo que no tiene significado es absurdo. 'Idiota' lo llama él. La realidad es para Rosset '*effectivement idiote*'. Idiota en efecto –como consecuencia de una inferencia– e idiota efectivamente, esto es, idiota como un efecto que podemos observar o padecer. Porque, antes que significar imbécil, idiota significa simple, particular, único en su especie. Lo de único no es aquí un halago. Es '*idiotie*' lo que está ensimismado. Lo que está encerrado en sí mismo y aislado del resto de cosas. No hablamos del ser del necio, del embrutecido, que justamente lo que muestra orgulloso es una cierta seguridad en una ilusión, un exceso de significado. Éste 'idiotia' aún tiene algo que decir. Demasiado que decir. No, aquí por '*idiotia*' se quiere decir más bien el estatus refractario e impermeable a los compañeros en

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la existencia: “Lo singular es en efecto lo único antes de ser insólito, lo extraño o lo idiota (*idiotés*) [...] Decir de un objeto que es «singular» viene entonces a decir [sólo, y tan sólo] que este objeto existe, que es real”<sup>1</sup>. Viene a decir poco. Muy poco o casi nada. E incluso esto dicho, al propio objeto le resulta indiferente en su idiotez lo que de él hayamos de decir o hayamos de contar sus compañeros *en* la existencia, que somos todo aquello que lo rodea. Desconoce su relevancia.

Y un poco de eso se viene a tratar en esta reseña, del contar y del cómo se cuenta. También de lo que cuenta. Lo que tiene importancia. En el dominio de lo real, en el dominio de los objetos inertes e idiotas, lo primero que los saca un poco de su torpor es esta actitud del conteo. Que son numerados. Es como si el ejercicio primero de sociabilidad para las cosas fuera aquél de incluirlas dentro de una serie, de una secuencia, y una serie es por ello la primera narración que de esta clase singular de objetos se puede hacer. Y el número en el orden es el primer nombre que reciben como significado. Salen con esto de su ensimismamiento. “Todo fenómeno, *sin excepción*, está determinado en su causalidad por otro fenómeno [...] sólo así son concebibles”<sup>2</sup>. Se los concibe y se hace posible el concebirlos en referencia indirecta a otros. Significado dice de comunidad.

Así ya algo más determinados en tanto limitados y una vez relacionados con otros en mancomunidad ya no son tan excepcionales ni únicos. Además se libran de momento de la pesada carga de tener que ser necesariamente insólitos. Van cada uno en un sitio, y uno detrás de otro. Ese sitio en una serie se llama *tiempo* o pulso del conteo. De una cosa causa a otra, a una cosa va antes que otra, *vale ilatio* hasta aquí. Es el enlace que Kant llama de “causas eficientes (*nexus effectivus*), que denomina también de las causas ‘reales’ y que es la causalidad mecánica”, la ciega, inercial. La primera efectividad después del paso del tiempo que *no es completamente idiota*<sup>3</sup>. Se echa de ver de ello que el término de ‘lo real’ ha desplazado ligeramente su significado. Se está desperezando y atiende a sus compañeros en lo extraño. La forma general de la determinación de un objeto [*Objekt*] tiene como motivo esencial las ideas de ajuste, unidad sistemática y, como *desideratum* último y logrado la de armonía de lo diverso<sup>4</sup>. Del sentido del adjetivo ‘trascendental’ que acompaña al idealismo kantiano a la unidad en la diversidad. “La posibilidad del objeto depende de la legalidad de la naturaleza”<sup>5</sup>, y una forma de legalizarla es mediante el uso justificado de *conceptos*. Un *concepto* es un haz de significatividades universal y necesario. Implica una cierta ‘*universal comunicabilidad*’<sup>6</sup>.

La multiplicidad de lo diverso no es extraña al orden ni dentro de ella ni para nosotros. La naturaleza en sus formas particulares y la unidad de lo diverso, acaba refiriendo si seguimos lo anterior como máxima de un pensar ampliado a la idea de un organismo. Un todo orgánico. Es éste un enlace de las distintas representaciones en que emerge un nuevo significado coordinado y compartido. “¿De qué naturaleza es ese principio organizativo? Acabamos de ver que no se trata de un principio mecánico ¿Pero es un principio físico, aunque no sea mecánico? [¿Empírico aunque no quepa en la forma de una ley?][...] No podría decirse que es un principio físico, pues Kant impugna el concepto de una ‘materia animada’: la falta de vida, la *inertia* constituye el carácter

<sup>1</sup> Rosset, C. *El objeto singular*, traducción de Santiago E. Espinosa, Editorial Sexto Piso, Madrid-México D.F., 2007, p. 43

<sup>2</sup> Andaluz Romanillos, A.M. *Las armonías de la razón en Kant. Libertad, Sentimiento de lo bello y Teleología de la naturaleza*, Publicaciones Universidad Pontificia de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2013, p.103

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.* p. 38

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* p. 258

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 41

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 213 y ss.

esencial de la materia”<sup>7</sup>. No es un principio mecánico porque ‘*effectivement*’ hay un plus de significado en la comunión de las partes. Puede el enlace causal dar cuenta del agregado, en que son las partes las que hacen posible el todo; pero en un sistema es el todo el que hace posibles a las partes. El alquímico resultado es fruto de un *entendimiento arquitectónico*. Una forma de pensar, o ‘la forma del pensar’, que hila el tejido desgarrado de la realidad. Y esta forma no obra sino por ajuste del dominio de significados de cada concepto. Así, la ampliación del concepto de *causalidad* se hace efectiva en el concepto de *finalidad*. Es la insuficiencia de uno la que demanda del otro. Porque ser una cosa –por mucho que la cosa ya haya sido determinada en su concepto– no es exactamente lo mismo que ser un *fin* [*Zweck*]<sup>8</sup>. La autora del volumen que reseñamos lo deja meridianamente claro: “Kant admite dos clases de causalidad en el mundo: el enlace de las ‘causas eficientes’ [...] y el enlace de las ‘causas finales’ (*nexus finalis*), también llamadas ‘ideales’, por ser una causalidad según conceptos”<sup>9</sup>, lo cual no es –aunque lo pueda parecer– una redundancia. ‘*Fin*’ es el concepto de un objeto que lleva a gala el ser además fundamento de la causalidad del mismo. Aclárese esto. Lo que se distingue es que, a diferencia del resto de los *Objekte*, el concepto de aquél objeto que actúa de fin se encuentra al principio y al final del trayecto de éste hacia lo real. Es el concepto mismo la base de su posibilidad material, pero retroactivamente también puede ser narrado como la causa *a posteriori* de su realidad, que es por otro lado sólo contingente. El efecto precede a la causa, por así decirlo. Bajo la legalidad del juicio del teórico no existe entonces y desde luego ningún fundamento *a priori* para atribuir a las cosas de la naturaleza una referencia a fines. El *tiempo* que fluye hacia delante pondría obstáculos a este razonamiento. A saber, no hay justificación necesaria de un concepto tal como el de *finalidad*. Sin embargo, ocurre que hallamos en nuestras expediciones al reino de las determinaciones ciertos fenómenos cuya posibilidad no nos es comprensible desde la explicación que da una mecánica de pesos y medidas. Por ejemplo, el fenómeno de los seres naturales que están vivos. Esto dicho y como una medida extraordinaria –o una huída hacia delante– a uno podría ocurrírsele que una conveniente reducción científica de estos últimos casos a aquéllos nos libraría de semejante entuerto<sup>10</sup>. No nos pongamos las cosas demasiado fáciles no obstante y planteemos el dilema como verdaderamente es, *y es que el auténtico experimentum crucis es si hay acaso en la naturaleza cosas que no puedan pensarse más que como fines*<sup>11</sup>

La profesora Andaluz se expresa en este sentido señalando a este punto un justo ecuador del propósito de su trabajo: “En nuestro [anterior] libro, *La finalidad de la naturaleza en Kant. Un estudio desde la Crítica del Juicio*, nos centramos en [esta] articulación de la finalidad de la naturaleza en el problema del conocimiento y de la ciencia en Kant. Dejábamos para un momento ulterior el estudio de la finalidad de la naturaleza, en lo que concierne a su función de vincular el mundo de la razón teórica con el de la razón práctica”<sup>12</sup>. El libro del que tratamos aquí responde precisamente a este segundo momento de la investigación propuesta. Un momento necesario a la pregunta consiguiente. Es también el momento de posible tránsito entre dos legislaciones en apariencia incompatibles. La de la determinación y la de la libertad. Y la pregunta consiguiente no ha de llegar en buena lógica a las especulaciones sobre *lo sublime*. La exigencia sistemática a la que Kant se obliga tiene su *locus* en la *Crítica del discernimiento*, y es sólo una deuda para con su

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* p. 259

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* p. 297

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 38

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 308-311

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p. 297

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 26

filosofía moral. Kant tiene el deber de mostrar cómo es posible la realización de los fines morales en el mundo sensible. Rodeado *de* las cosas sensibles.

*Fin* es un género de conceptos que son fundamento de sí no sólo constitutivo sino realizativo. Pero en su especie '*fin*' es asimismo un objeto posible cuya realidad es deseada. Con el contenido del concepto deseado se incluye la existencia. Deseamos que ese objeto exista, eso es *un bien para nosotros*. Su realización<sup>13</sup>. Los fines entrañan así medios, medios que Kant llama '*técnico-prácticos*'. No es sorprendente entonces que "la reflexión sobre el fundamento de la constitución interna de los seres naturales orgánicos haga posible representarse en la naturaleza una causalidad técnica [...] En el enjuiciamiento teleológico de la naturaleza nos representamos a la naturaleza como técnica"<sup>14</sup>. Preguntamos por la *teleología* y la implicaciones de dicha pregunta nos transportan al *reino de la libertad*. De la relación conceptual a la que nos obligan los *fines naturales* "depende la posibilidad de formular la pregunta por el *fin final de la existencia del mundo*"<sup>15</sup>. La posibilidad de concebir un sentido global para un objeto descomunal como es el mundo pero que aún así nos cabe en el caletre. Sucede sin embargo que el mundo como un *sistema de fines* [*System der Zwecke*] tiene a su base más que concepto, *idea* [*Idee*]. Esto es, un sustrato suprasensible. Sería algo así como la idea que nos daría razones suficientes sobre el porqué de aquél. El porqué intencional del sistema entero<sup>16</sup>. "El concepto de '*fin final*' se refiere a *un tipo de seres* [igualmente]: a aquellos que tienen el fin de su existencia en ellos mismos, y no en otros seres naturales"<sup>17</sup>. Aquellos seres que son capaces de darse a sí mismos su propio sistema de fines. De lo macro a lo micro *vale ilatio*. El *fin final* es desear la propia existencia, cosa que valida el resto de los fines dependientes de ésta. Una existencia que no dependa de otro. Una existencia que lleve el significado de '*autoorganización*' a sus últimas consecuencias como concepto: *autonomía*. No nos valen aquellos miembros de la cadena que se deben a los planes de otro anterior o posterior conceptualmente. Esto tiene el peligroso aire de familia de la analogía de lo mecánico detrás. El *fin final* remite al *fin último*. El límite máximo y sentido de los fines. "Fin final es también la denominación con la que Kant se refiere al *objeto* de la ley moral: el sumo bien a realizar en el mundo"<sup>18</sup>. Aunque sólo sea como fundamento constitutivo. *¿Y es que hay acaso en la naturaleza cosas que no puedan pensarse más que como fines?* '*Fin último*' [*letzter Zweck*] es aquél ser capaz de independencia en este sentido no idiota respecto del concepto. Es el ser culmen de la evolución finalista. Y estamos en el dominio de lo moral ya.

Si bien el hallazgo de aquella ley moral no permite presumir de *deducción trascendental* y de realización en este sentido, pues las mismas intuiciones que sirven a aquélla no confirmarían sin incertidumbres que estamos ante un *fenómeno moral* –trampas ahora de la compatibilidad–, el peso de lo trascendental reposa a salvo en la mediación que la facultad que intercede en la operación soporta sobre sus espaldas: la *imaginación*, aún por formar los huesos del concepto es dúctil y se contorsiona. También es una facultad, y con ello necesaria y universal en sus actividades. Si "la palabra '*estética*' tiene el sentido amplio [tanto en la segunda como en la tercera Crítica] de relación de los objetos a la sensibilidad", de relación necesaria de sentido, trascendental<sup>19</sup>, no es menos cierto que *la palabra 'teórica' tiene el sentido amplio tanto en la primera como en la*

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* p. 254

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 303-304

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p. 313

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* p. 319

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* p. 322

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 325

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p. 194



*tercera Crítica de relación especulativa respecto de los objetos.* Un concepto no es menos un 'como si' [als ob] de lo que una idea lo es. Sólo cuenta entre sus haberes con el excedente de la intuición. *También aquéllas moran en Arcadia.*

Con todo, se nos advierte del paso. No se pretende “decir que la idea del hombre como fin último de la naturaleza fundamente la idea del hombre como fin final; más bien se trata de lo contrario: como hemos visto, la condición de que el hombre llegue a ser fin último es que esté dispuesto a ser fin final”<sup>20</sup>.



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<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* p. 341

## Teoría crítica de las facultades

### *The Critical Theory of Faculties*

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**Reseña: Antonino Falduto, *The faculties of the human mind and the case of moral feeling in Kant's philosophy*, Berlín/Boston, De Gruyter (Kantstudien-Ergänzungshefte), 2014, 265 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-0350002-9**

En la obra que reseñamos –versión revisada de la tesis doctoral del autor– Antonino Falduto presenta una vigorosa *reivindicación del carácter central* (y centralmente *crítico*) de la teoría kantiana de las facultades. Esta reivindicación actúa en dos frentes. Por un lado, y frente a las interpretaciones que relegan la teoría kantiana de las facultades a los márgenes del criticismo, por considerarla secundaria respecto a su núcleo trascendental-formal, defiende que dicha teoría *es* una pieza esencial del proyecto crítico de Kant y que su postergación impide entenderlo correctamente. En consecuencia, según esto, la filosofía pura de Kant *sólo* puede entenderse adecuadamente *en el contexto de su teoría de las facultades*. Pero, por otro lado, y frente a las interpretaciones que leen esta teoría desde la antropología o la psicología, Falduto defiende que también el análisis de las facultades pertenece *de suyo* al nivel discursivo de la filosofía crítica, y que la filosofía crítica es competente y autónoma (esto es, no dependiente de otras disciplinas) para tratarla. Es decir, que para comprender los conceptos relativos a las facultades de la mente<sup>1</sup> no es

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<sup>1</sup> Como es sabido, “*Gemüt*” se podría traducir al castellano entre otras opciones por “espíritu”, “ánimo”, “alma”, aunque ninguno de estos términos recoge enteramente todos los matices que tiene el término en alemán. A esta dificultad se suma además el peculiar uso que Kant hace de él, en el que muchas veces aparece como un término técnico (que remite al latín *animus* y que apunta a algo así como la disposición general del espíritu). Sobre esto, como bien señala Falduto, puede verse la respuesta a Sömmering, AA, 12,

necesario referirse a disciplinas empíricas: dichos conceptos, según Falduto, son también elementos constitutivos de un estudio de filosofía pura sobre el ser humano y su naturaleza.

Por supuesto, la realización de este proyecto hermenéutico comporta delimitar cuidadosamente los diversos niveles discursivos del pensamiento kantiano, y una gran parte de la investigación –como veremos– se dedica precisamente a deslindar estos niveles (“antropología” y “psicología” en sus diversas acepciones, “filosofía pura”, con sus diversas partes, etc.) y a ubicarlos en el lugar sistemático que les corresponde. Una vez realizada esta labor de deslindamiento de precisión, es posible, según Falduto, reconstruir una kantiana teoría de las facultades a partir de las obras publicadas en el período crítico y comprenderla como un estudio sobre la “vida mental” del sujeto humano. Junto a esta reconstrucción, y dependiendo de ella, Falduto propone también una aplicación concreta de esta propuesta interpretativa, que es al mismo tiempo una puesta a prueba de su rendimiento teórico, a saber: un análisis del sentimiento moral que permite contextualizar dicho sentimiento dentro de las actividades de la mente del sujeto humano.

La pregunta que vertebra toda la investigación –¿cómo hay que entender y qué lugar le corresponde a la doctrina de las facultades de Kant?– sólo obtiene una respuesta completa y articulada en los capítulos 3 y 4, pero ya desde el principio del estudio se empiezan a desgranar los elementos necesarios para obtenerla. En este sentido, los dos primeros capítulos del libro son preparatorios (lo cual no quiere decir necesariamente menos importantes) por cuanto que a) contextualizan y fijan los términos de la discusión tanto histórica como sistemáticamente y b) preparan el terreno para la defensa de la interpretación que se propone mediante una consideración crítica de varias lecturas contemporáneas de Kant.

El capítulo I trata de establecer orientaciones básicas sobre significado del término “facultad” [*Vermögen*] en la obra de Kant (1.1.) y en época de Kant (1.2.). Asimismo, este capítulo ilustra hasta qué punto el lugar y el papel de las facultades de la mente eran cuestiones vivamente debatidas en el ambiente intelectual germánico de la segunda mitad del siglo XVIII (1.3.). Conviene señalar que ya en esta temprana fase de la investigación empieza a despuntar uno de los desplazamientos en la historia del pensamiento que Falduto perseguirá con mayor interés, a saber, el desplazamiento por el cual la facultad de sentir [en este contexto, *Vermögen zu empfinden*, *faculty of feeling*] entra en escena y empieza a desempeñar un papel cada vez más importante en las investigaciones filosóficas sobre la

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32, nota al pie, las notas sobre las lecciones de antropología de Kant, y Caygill, H., *A Kant Dictionary*, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000, p. 210. Siguiendo una cierta tradición de los traductores de Kant al castellano, nosotros traduciríamos en principio *Gemüt* por “ánimo”, pero dado que esta reseña es una reseña sobre el libro de A. Falduto, y no sobre libro alguno de Kant, lo traduciremos en general por “mente” para reflejar la decisión del propio autor (“*mind*”). La cuestión no es en absoluto baladí, porque esta decisión tiene que ver el propósito general de la investigación de Falduto (interpretar la filosofía crítica como un estudio sobre la mente humana o la vida mental del ser humano), con su ubicación en la *Kant-Forschung* contemporánea en inglés (vid. p. 3 –especialmente la nota 5– y todo el apartado 1.4.) y en particular con aquella que se orienta hacia las ciencias cognitivas (vid. introducción al capítulo 2). Esta decisión puede producir, no obstante, ciertas dificultades.

mente. En efecto, incluso antes de estudiar lo que sucede en el propio Kant, Falduto cree que “la facultad sensitiva llega a desempeñar un papel decisivo en los análisis filosóficos de muchos autores” (p. 22) de esta época. Tras obtener una primera caracterización del concepto de “facultad” [*Vermögen*] en términos aproximadamente funcionalistas (p. 24), el capítulo se cierra con una re-construcción (y rechazo) de las interpretaciones “epigenéticas” de la filosofía crítica de Kant.

El rechazo de estas tentativas abre el camino del capítulo 2, que está dedicado precisamente a medir el alcance de algunas interpretaciones contemporáneas de Kant orientadas por el concepto (originario de las ciencias cognitivas) de “mente dotada de facultades” (p. 35). En concreto, Falduto se propone discutir con las propuestas de A. Brook (2.1.), G. Hatfield (2.2.) y, sobre todo y más extensamente, P. Kitcher (2.4.), que ha pretendido reconstruir la KrV en términos de “psicología trascendental”. La *Auseinandersetzung* con estas lecturas es ocasión para entresacar sus fuerzas y debilidades, y esbozar *en negativo* las condiciones de una interpretación adecuada de la teoría kantiana de las facultades. Una cuestión interesa especialmente a Falduto en estas discusiones: una interpretación adecuada de la teoría kantiana de las facultades tiene que ser capaz de ubicarla –con precisión y sin contradicción– dentro de la arquitectónica del pensamiento de Kant.

El capítulo 3 contiene precisamente la primera parte de una interpretación de este tipo, por cuanto se propone preparar el terreno para un análisis de la doctrina kantiana de las facultades como “una investigación crítica dedicada al ser humano que conoce, desea y siente” (p. 52). Para ello, y en primer lugar, Falduto localiza el objeto de esta doctrina (las facultades de la mente humana) y distingue sistemáticamente dos modos de investigarlo: un enfoque empírico (que alimentará el cauce fundamental de la antropología) y un enfoque “puro”, propio de la filosofía crítica. En este sentido el estudio continúa ahora una tarea que había comenzado ya en el capítulo 2 (2.3.), que se revela como absolutamente esencial para este estudio y, en nuestra opinión, también para una comprensión cabal del pensamiento de Kant en general, a saber, la tarea de distinguir los diferentes *planos discursivos* de la obra kantiana. Pues bien, la idea de Falduto en este punto es clara: “la intersección ocasional de estas dos investigaciones –la filosófica-crítica pura y la antropológica– no implica que ambas sean la misma” (p. 54). Esta tarea se despliega a su vez en varias fases: en primer lugar, Falduto desarrolla una revisión histórica de la relación entre “antropología pragmática” y “psicología empírica” (3.1.); en segundo lugar, emprende una reconstrucción del significado del proyecto kantiano de una “antropología pragmática” (3.2. y 3.3.), con especial atención a la eventual posibilidad de considerar una *anthropologia transcendentalis* dentro de la arquitectónica kantiana (3.4.); y, en tercer lugar, un análisis de los “acuerdos y desacuerdos” en el modo de proceder de la antropología pragmática y la filosofía crítica (3.5. y 3.6.) respectivamente, con especial atención a aquellos lugares de la obra de Kant donde se localizan “intersecciones” (3.7.), como por ejemplo el §7 de la *Antropología* de 1798, que se estudia con notable detenimiento (3.9.) y

junto con sus complementos en el manuscrito de Rostock (3.8.). Con esto, la investigación queda ya orientada hacia la cuestión que propiamente interesa a Falduto, a saber, la presencia y el sentido de la doctrina de las facultades en el dominio de la filosofía pura y en las obras críticas. Antes de ello, no obstante, Falduto dedicará aún parte de la investigación (3.10. y 3.11.) a perfilar ciertos aspectos del tratamiento de la sensibilidad en la *Antropología* de 1798 y a la clasificación general de las facultades en dicha obra y en el manuscrito de Rostock.

Una vez que este capítulo 3 ha separado convincentemente el estudio kantiano de las facultades del contexto psicológico-antropológico en el que hoy suele leerse, Falduto procede en el capítulo 4 a reconstituir la presencia de la doctrina de las facultades en algunas obras críticas, en concreto KrV, KpV, las dos introducciones a KU y MdS<sup>2</sup>. De hecho, la re-organización *enciclopédica* de la filosofía crítica que tiene lugar en KU (al menos según la Primera Introducción: EEKU, AA, 20, §XI) será un elemento importante para la tesis de Falduto. Es precisamente desde esta organización enciclopédica como Falduto examina, bajo una luz retrospectiva, la aparición de las distintas facultades en KrV y KpV, lo cual explica que, cuando estudia la KrV (4.2.) apenas preste atención al pliegue entendimiento-razón y se concentre en la oposición entendimiento-sensibilidad e, incluso, dentro de esta oposición, preste menos atención a la dimensión *a priori* de la sensibilidad que hay ya en esa obra (cosa que, por otro lado, el propio autor reconoce, p. 137). En efecto, lo que interesa a Falduto en esta investigación no es tanto la sensibilidad entendida como sentido [*Sinn*], sino cuanto entendida como sentimiento [*Gefühl*], y el estudio de su correspondiente dimensión *a priori* no tiene lugar en KrV, sino en KpV. A KpV precisamente están dedicadas las secciones iniciales (4.3. a 4.6.) del capítulo. Falduto quiere mostrar, en efecto, que “el sentimiento, como determinación especial de la facultad de la sensibilidad, pasa a ocupar un lugar central en el contexto del análisis crítico dedicado a la razón práctica” (p. 139), y para ello perseguirá la conexión entre razón pura y facultad de desear a través de varios textos, que incluyen el prefacio, la introducción y algunos pasajes importantes (como la “paradoja del método”) de la Analítica de KpV. En este punto, en el que despunta ya el asunto fundamental del capítulo 5 del libro, Falduto insiste solamente en que la KpV propone un análisis diferente según el cual “el sentimiento puede ser conocido *a priori*”, y ello abre las puertas “para una consideración diferente del concepto de sentimiento en el contexto de la filosofía pura” (p. 153). En efecto, este desplazamiento, junto con algunos otros desplazamientos conectados con él, arroja una nueva clasificación de las facultades en la segunda Crítica, que Falduto recompone (4.6.) para después comparar con la clasificación de las mismas tal y como aparece en la Primera

<sup>2</sup> La no inclusión de los *Prolegomena* en esta nómina puede llamar *a priori* la atención, pero es coherente con la decisión de autolimitar la investigación en este punto al estudio de “el papel que desempeña la facultad de sentir placer y displacer en el contexto de la división kantiana de las facultades” (p. 127). Sobre las posibilidades de ampliar el horizonte de la investigación relacionadas con su inclusión volveremos más adelante. Del mismo modo, la inclusión en esta nómina de la *Metaphysik der Sitten*, que en la oposición “crítica”/“metafísica” caería del lado de ésta última, se justifica porque en esta obra aparece una importante sistematización de la clasificación de las facultades en el período crítico y porque sirve de puente (véase p. 202) hacia el quinto y último capítulo de la investigación.

introducción a KU (4.7. y 4.9.) y en el Prefacio y la Introducción finalmente publicada (4.8. y 4.10.) de esta obra. En varios de estos textos (especialmente en la *Vorrede* de KU y EEKU) Falduto quiere destacar ante todo un hecho decisivo para su interpretación: tanto la presentación del argumento de la KU, como su ubicación dentro del conjunto de la filosofía crítica, como la posibilidad de su cierre sistemático<sup>3</sup> se realizan *por referencia al sistema de las facultades*. El problema que podría suponer a este respecto la Introducción publicada de KU (en el que el sistema de la filosofía *no* se organiza explícitamente de acuerdo con el sistema de las facultades) es salvado señalando la función *intermediaria* del Juicio, de modo que en esta obra “la división tripartita del proyecto crítico sigue estando basada en la clasificación tripartita de las facultades, como en la ‘Primera introducción’” (p. 186). La clasificación kantiana de las facultades se estudia por último en la Introducción general a MdS (4.11.), donde Falduto presta especial atención al análisis de las constelaciones de términos dentro de las que se encuentran y a las que dan lugar a) la facultad de sentir (*Leben, Gefühl, Lust*, etc.) y b) la facultad de desear (*Willkür, Wille*, etc.).

El trabajo de todos los capítulos anteriores (del 1 al 4) establece un marco general de interpretación de la teoría kantiana de las facultades. Como ya hemos señalado, este marco general es el que le sirve de referencia a Falduto, en el capítulo 5, para entrar a una discusión –más detallada y pormenorizada– sobre el concepto kantiano de “sentimiento moral”.

El capítulo 5 de la obra contiene en efecto una propuesta de interpretación del sentimiento moral a partir del marco teórico dibujado en el capítulo 4 y constituye, en nuestra opinión, la parte más interesante del estudio, tanto por el calado sistemático de la cuestión del respeto en sí misma –que algunos intérpretes han considerado parte de “lo más grave” del pensamiento de Kant– como por la propia propuesta, que en cierto modo “pone a prueba” el marco teórico de la interpretación general de Falduto. De acuerdo con Falduto, “el sentimiento de respeto es [...] un estado mental, es decir, una modificación en la mente del sujeto humano que se hace consciente de la ley moral” (p. 231). Además, “este estado mental es posible en virtud de la peculiar constitución mental del sujeto humano, esto es, en virtud de la constitución de la mente humana tal y como Kant la cartografía en su clasificación de las facultades mentales” (pp. 230-231). A partir de aquí se desarrolla una interesante y sugerente interpretación del sentimiento moral en general, y del respeto en particular, que propone reubicar esta problemática dentro del horizonte de la dimensión estética de la moral. Dicha interpretación cuenta ciertamente con apoyo textual en la obra de Kant. Nos gustaría, no obstante, terminar de exponer la posición de Falduto señalando algunos escollos que, en nuestra opinión, puede también encontrar en su camino.

En primer lugar, una cuestión de fondo a la que contribuye la propia terminología elegida. En efecto, aunque el acuerdo de los traductores de Kant al inglés es casi universal respecto a “*Triebfeder*”, y casi todos ellos lo traducen por “*incentive*”, y aunque esta

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<sup>3</sup> I. Kant, “Hiemit endige ich also mein ganzes kritisches Geschäft...”, KU, AA 05, 170.

traducción tenga sus virtudes, e incluso sea quizás la mejor posible, contiene también, no obstante, el peligro de hacer que nos deslicemos fuera del planteamiento kantiano. “Incentive” tiene, según el diccionario Webster, el sentido de “*something that incites o has a tendency to incite to determination or action / something (as a fear or hope of reward) that constitutes a motive or spur*”<sup>4</sup>, y de hecho, el término “incentivo” transmite la idea de una recompensa final que “tira” de la voluntad hacia ella y de esta manera se constituye en una motivación para la acción. Una vez asumido (de manera consciente o inconsciente) este marco general, la pregunta por la *motivación* de la acción moral surge naturalmente como pregunta decisiva y de hecho Falduto escribe: “el tratamiento kantiano del sentimiento moral del respeto tiene que considerarse dentro del problema más general de la motivación moral” (p. 221). A partir de ahí empieza entonces a desarrollarse la cuestión de “si el sentimiento moral realmente es el incentivo de la acción moral del hombre” (p. 225), y de hecho el apartado 5.5. está precisamente dedicado a esta cuestión<sup>5</sup>.

Pues bien, independientemente del resultado de esta última discusión (en la que el autor se inclina claramente por la tesis de que la ley moral misma es el móvil de la acción moral), nos parece que resultaría interesante discutir previamente la propia pre-comprensión del respeto en los términos en los que lo hace Falduto. Pues desde el punto de vista de la consideración sistemática del respeto y la motivación de la acción moral, se podría también defender –en un sentido muy específico– que la acción moral *no* necesita motivación, dado que la motivación (entendida específicamente como aquello *para lo que* se hace la acción) proviene en Kant siempre de los fines de la facultad inferior de desear, en definitiva, del “principio universal del amor hacia uno mismo o felicidad propia” (KpV, Libro I, cap. 1, Teorema II). Podría defenderse en efecto que lo que sucede en el análisis kantiano es más bien que todos los fines que pueden “tirar” de la voluntad son fines del “amor propio”, y la moralidad consistiría en todo caso en un “empuje” en sentido contrario que retiene e inhabilita la acción efectiva de algunos de esos incentivos<sup>6</sup>. La acción moral en Kant no se basaría por tanto en suministrar fines muy puros, ni en introducir en el mundo sensible los objetos del querer específicamente morales, sino en *re-estructurar* los fines siempre dados ya de acuerdo con un nexo sistemático distinto a su nexo natural. Dicho de otra manera, sin inclinaciones dadas no puede haber en absoluto determinación de la voluntad (pues “todo querer ha de tener también un objeto y por lo tanto una materia”, KpV, AA, 05, 34, y ese objeto proviene siempre de la facultad inferior de desear), pero para que haya efectivamente determinación de la voluntad la propia voluntad tiene que “dejarse” determinar, y en ese punto particular es donde actúa el respeto. En este sentido, podría decirse que la forma específica de existencia del respeto sería solamente la

<sup>4</sup> Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (Unabridged), 1976, entrada: “incentive”, p. 1141.

<sup>5</sup> En efecto, Falduto se plantea la discusión especializada sobre si el respeto por la ley moral o la ley moral misma es el *incentive* de la acción moral, y su tesis se puede resumir así: la ley moral es el único móvil o incentivo de la acción moral; el respeto, por el contrario, es solamente la presentación subjetiva o sensible del incentivo de la acción moral. Véase p. 231.

<sup>6</sup> Sobre esto puede verse por ejemplo S. Engstrom, Introducción a I. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, traducida por W. S. Pluhar, xlviii, nota 14 al pie.

de *eliminar* ciertos fines. La acción por deber exigiría la puesta entre paréntesis (y por tanto el *reconocimiento*) de las inclinaciones dadas, y el reconocimiento de que el agente está siempre ya inserto en una apertura volitiva al mundo, pero el supuesto “motivo moral” (el respeto) no rivaliza en pie de igualdad con las demás posibles motivaciones. En efecto, la otra cara de esta situación y que confirma el estado de cosas apuntado, es que el sentimiento de respeto constituye un “*selbstgewirktes Gefühl*” (GMS, AA, 04, 401-402, en nota) y un “mero efecto negativo” de la ley moral sobre el sentimiento (KpV, AA, 05, 72), como el propio Falduto reconoce.

Y con esto estamos tocando ya otra cuestión relativa al fondo de la interpretación que nos ocupa. Si el sentimiento moral de respeto es algo que también cabe y encaja enteramente dentro de las disposiciones espirituales o anímicas o mentales del hombre, entonces es posible (e incluso aconsejable) entender todo el proyecto crítico como un “tratado de la naturaleza humana”, al modo como lo hace Falduto, puesto que el perímetro de lo humano no se rompe por ningún lado. Pero si hacemos eso, entonces se desdibujan un poco –creemos– aquellas vetas del pensamiento kantiano en las que se “desborda” la esfera de lo humano (como la insistencia kantiana en KpV y GMS de que en principio *no se trata del hombre*, vid., por ejemplo, GMS, AA, 04, 408) y se orilla la discusión (central, por ejemplo, en la *Davoser Disputation* de 1792) acerca de si todo Kant puede o no puede encajar en el molde del “humanismo clásico”.

Nos gustaría señalar por último otro aspecto del trabajo de Falduto, que toca también el planteamiento de fondo de la investigación. En este caso no se trata de la discusión sobre el modo de interpretar un concepto kantiano en particular, ni tampoco de si la interpretación global resultante es más o menos humanista o anti-humanista, sino del modo mismo como se plantean los fundamentos de la investigación. Y en este punto creemos que puede ser interesante, para terminar, perfilar el horizonte general de la investigación de Falduto desde bases ligeramente diferentes, para esbozar así mínimamente a) cómo se recorta dicha investigación *sobre* ese horizonte, b) cómo podría prolongarse *hacia* él, e incluso c) cómo podría establecerse una discusión *frente* a él.

Podemos empezar a reconstruir ese horizonte refiriéndonos a una serie de líneas sistemáticas del pensamiento de Kant que están plegadas en la obra de Falduto y cuya contrastación con la investigación propuesta creemos que podría iluminar y reforzar algunos de sus puntos. En efecto, precisamente porque esta investigación se interesa por la *actividad* del ánimo y por el lado *subjetivo* del sistema kantiano de las facultades (pp. 133-134), podría prolongarse muy naturalmente en la dirección de estas líneas sistemáticas. Nos referimos a la cuestión de la *unidad de la razón* y la *dimensión subjetiva* de la razón. Esta línea del pensamiento kantiano atraviesa las Dialécticas de las dos primeras Críticas y va ganando densidad a lo largo del proyecto crítico hasta terminar exigiendo un tratamiento propio, en 1790, bajo la denominación de una *Kritik der Urteilskraft*. Dicha línea es también el hilo conductor del problema de la unidad de lo teórico y lo práctico, es decir, del problema de la *unidad de la razón* y, aunque la Introducción de KU establecerá



que dicho problema sólo puede plantearse completamente en términos de la pregunta por la realizabilidad del *fin final* (KU, Introducción, §IX, AA, 05, 195-196), la cuestión se deja sentir ya desde el Apéndice de la Dialéctica trascendental de KrV, y aparece siempre vinculada a la cuestión del *uso* de la razón. Con esto llegamos al punto que queríamos señalar, pues es precisamente el análisis y discusión de esta dimensión del *uso de la razón* (aunque sea polémicamente, para expulsarla del estudio) el que podría servir como centro para reconstruir de otro modo el horizonte de la lectura de Falduto.

Si se hiciese tal cosa (tomando más en cuenta la parte final de los *Prolegomena*, los §§57-60, que forman bloque con el “Apéndice” de la Dialéctica de KrV), entonces quedaría también desplegada una oposición fundamental de la teoría kantiana de las facultades: no ya la oposición entendimiento-sensibilidad (que Falduto estudia y atiende en muchos sitios, por ejemplo, p. 139), sino la oposición *entendimiento-razón*, que soporta toda la dimensión subjetiva de la razón kantiana, y que desemboca en y alimenta a KU. En efecto, precisamente porque Falduto persigue con ahínco (véase por ejemplo, pp. 133-134) el desplazamiento de un análisis de las facultades polarizado en un “polo objetivo” (conocimiento objetivo) a un análisis polarizado en un “polo subjetivo”, su reflexión podría enriquecerse enormemente incluyendo (o al menos contrastándose con) la profundización de la dimensión subjetiva de lo trascendental que se produce en KU.

Por último, se podría decir que en esta problemática del uso y la unidad de la razón está implicada también la cuestión del propio estatuto de la *Antropología* de 1798. En efecto, desde ese otro horizonte, se podría argüir que la distinción tan neta y nítida que establece Falduto entre antropología (empírica) y filosofía crítica (pura) ensombrece un poco el peculiar lugar discursivo de la *Antropología* de 1798, que parece estar, como insinuaba Foucault, en medio de lo empírico y lo trascendental y no ser ni puramente trascendental, ni meramente empírica, sino situarse en ese extraño nivel en el que se examina el *Gemüt* desde el punto de vista del “juego” en el que se constituye a sí mismo. La inclusión de la dimensión del *Gebrauch* (que solo parcialmente puede traducirse por “uso”) podría arrojar interesante luz sobre estas cuestiones.

Ahora bien, si todas estas discusiones sistemáticas pueden plantearse a raíz del trabajo de Falduto, y el trabajo de Falduto puede dar pie a ellas, es precisamente porque dicho trabajo lo permite y permite sostenerlas, es decir, porque establece (y establece vigorosamente) los puntos de referencia en las que pueden anclarse. Y ello es muy de agradecer. En efecto, algún lector podría quizás pensar que el análisis de algunas cuestiones o de algunos de los autores con los que discute la obra (como por ejemplo, A. Brook, en pp. 35-38) es muy breve y veloz, y que ello podría traducirse en un tratamiento superficial, pero en el caso de la obra de Falduto responde a la clara conciencia de los puntos que se quieren tratar y está sostenido por un amplísimo y profundo conocimiento de los textos fuente y de la bibliografía secundaria. De hecho, el estilo directo y “*to-the-point*”, y el riguroso trabajo sobre los textos, permiten disponer de un mapa y de unas tesis que interesará a muchos investigadores de la obra de Kant, y no solamente a aquellos que

se dediquen específicamente a la teoría de las facultades o a los que compartan la propuesta interpretativa del autor. En este sentido, si una buena investigación es una investigación que permite la discusión, la investigación de Falduto es un excelente trabajo, incluso para quienes propongan interpretaciones del todo diferentes.



**Critica della ragione e teoria dell'intuizione**  
*Critique of Reason and Theory of Intuition*

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**Recensione :** Anselmo Aportone, *Kant et le pouvoir réceptif. Recherches sur la conception kantienne de la sensibilité*, trad. par E. Alfano e P. Quintili, L'Harmattan, Paris, 2014, 260 pp. ISBN : 978-2-343-01973-4

In *Kant et le pouvoir réceptif*, Anselmo Aportone offre un'indagine sulla concezione kantiana della sensibilità raffinatissima, sottile, minuziosa e filologicamente impeccabile. I cinque capitoli del libro sono il frutto della rielaborazione di alcuni saggi pubblicati tra il 2002 e il 2012, cheriflettono un percorso di ricerca di ampio respiro e di lungo periodo dedicato all'approfondimento dei problemi (teorici e testuali) dell'*Estetica trascendentale* e alle prospettive teoriche aperte dalla discussione contemporanea su questo complesso testo kantiano. Come nota anche Jocelyn Benoist nella prefazione che apre il volume (pp. 7-11), Aportone non si limita a fornire un commentario o un'apologia del kantismo. Ci offre una meditazione complessiva sul problema della sensibilità e della sua funzione all'interno del pensiero kantiano, volta a mettere in luce, sulla scia di Garroni, la valenza cognitiva della dimensione estetica. Tale meditazione non cerca di adattare la filosofia critica al gusto di questo o quel pensatore contemporaneo. Al contrario, parte da Kant e sviluppa una critica dei "kantismi parziali" (p. 8) i quali, per sostenere la posizione che rivendicano, dovrebbero seguire il pensiero di Kant molto più di quanto già fanno. Parziali sono soprattutto i kantismi di Hegel, che l'autore assume come "filo conduttore" della ricerca (p. 106), e di McDowell. Questi due autori rappresentano i veri interlocutori critici del libro, ben oltre i moltissimi e illustri kantisti contemporanei, da Fichant a Longuenesse, da Graubner a Allison e Baumans, con i quali l'autore intrattiene un confronto serrato, competente e attentissimo. Nella *Scienza della logica*, infatti, Hegel presenterebbe il

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criticismo come una dottrina sostanzialmente basata su un dualismo tra intelletto e sensibilità, in cui l'intelletto, come forma vuota, verrebbe riempito da un contenuto empirico che gli proviene dall'esterno, che l'intelletto stesso sarebbe in grado di elaborare e raffinare (pp. 106-107). Per altro verso, e molto più recentemente, in *Mente e mondo* John McDowell, a cui Aportone dedica il primo capitolo del suo volume, sarebbe rimasto fedele a questa interpretazione.

Partendo da Kant, ma leggendolo a partire dal § 16 della prima *Critica* e non dall'*Estetica trascendentale*, McDowell sembra convinto di riscoprire nella filosofia critica strategie teoriche utili per comprendere la questione generale dell'intenzionalità. Kant, infatti, definisce correttamente il problema della correlazione tra pensiero e mondo. Ma la sua tesi dell'idealismo trascendentale lo limita paradossalmente a una concezione naturalista della sensibilità. Secondo tale concezione lo spazio e il tempo sarebbero forme riferite alla nostra ricettività, concernerebbero il fatto bruto che si trova al di fuori dello spazio dell'applicazione concettuale e non permetterebbero di risolvere la controversia tra chi sostiene che lo spazio dei nostri concetti debba essere giustificato in funzione dei fatti che vi si trovano all'esterno (Sellars) e chi, viceversa, pensa che la conoscenza sia possibile solo tramite la purificazione del fatto nella dimensione dei concetti (Davidson). McDowell mira, invece, a mostrare come l'intuizione, in quanto esperienza sensibile, possa già mettere in atto le capacità concettuali del soggetto conoscente. Per Aportone, sostenere questa tesi non significa necessariamente passare da Kant allo Hegel del capitolo sull'autocoscienza della *Fenomenologia dello spirito*, come fa McDowell. Per il quale, la lotta per il riconoscimento sviluppata in questo capitolo della *Fenomenologia* sarebbe da intendere come un movimento immanente alla coscienza stessa e volto al superamento della separazione tra soggetto e oggetto, al fine di incontrare nell'oggetto stesso la spontaneità che lo caratterizza e di superare il dualismo kantiano. Così, secondo McDowell, la vera idea di oggettività può essere compresa solo come parte di questa struttura, ma non come il suo abbandono in favore di una proiezione soggettiva. In termini kantiani: quando Hegel scrive che con l'autocoscienza "abbiamo compiuto un passo nella terra della verità", questo significa che "abbiamo iniziato a vedere come comprendere la conoscenza nei termini del potere unificato della spontaneità appercettiva, che non riguarda solo il soggetto, ma anche l'oggetto" (J. McDowell, *Having the world in view*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 153).

Secondo Aportone, però, il dualismo kantiano delle fonti della conoscenza non implica un idealismo soggettivo. A differenza di quanto sostiene McDowell, infatti, bisogna comprendere che ciò che Kant chiama 'intuizione', cioè ciò che è procurato dall'esperienza, non consiste nella semplice acquisizione di un dato extra-concettuale, ma è una sorta di "avvenimento o di stato in cui già vi è un contenuto concettuale" (p. 41). È una dinamica che va riscontrata in Kant stesso, la cui interpretazione dovrebbe liberarsi dell'antico pregiudizio metafisico, che continua ad agire anche McDowell e che è condizionato da Sellars e Strawson, secondo il quale le impressioni del mondo noumenale diventano, attraverso le forme a priori, il materiale spazio-temporale dell'intuizione (p. 52).

Per chiarire questa tesi generale, è necessario dimostrare come in Kant idealismo trascendentale e realismo empirico non si escludano, ma si integrino e si implicino a vicenda. Tale implicazione reciproca va messa in luce a partire da una spiegazione dettagliata dei principali nodi teorici della teoria kantiana dell'intuizione, a cui Aportone dedica i capitoli centrali del libro.

Il secondo capitolo di *Kant et le pouvoir receptif* è dedicato alla spiegazione del carattere soggettivo di spazio e tempo a partire da un'interpretazione del senso della "rivoluzione copernicana" di Kant. Aportone mostra come, secondo Kant "non esiste nessuna differenza ontologica" tra l'oggetto che appare e l'oggetto reale e, dunque, che l'idealismo trascendentale dei fenomeni e il realismo empirico sono "prospettive convergenti" (67). Sostenere che spazio e tempo sono forme dell'intuizione, infatti, non significa negare la realtà del mondo, ma riconoscere che le nostre modalità di conoscenza, nella misura in cui sono determinate in maniera specifica, sono limitate, anche se il loro dominio di applicazione, cioè la natura, non lo è. Di fatto, l'idealismo trascendentale è un realismo empirico, cioè una dottrina che prende coscienza del fatto che non possiamo conoscere altro che relazioni e ammette la realtà autonoma del loro fondamento, ossia gli oggetti sensibili che la riflessione trascendentale chiama sempre fenomeni e mai cose in sé (p. 98).

Il terzo capitolo del volume può dunque sviluppare un'ampia disamina della concezione kantiana dell'intuizione empirica, che si concentra su due elementi principali. Il primo investe la materia dell'intuizione e il suo statuto rappresentazionale. Il secondo tocca la questione classica della mediazione tra concetto e sensibilità. L'intuizione, di fatto, presenta un contenuto sensibile metabolizzato. In essa vi è una materia già sempre rappresentazionale messa disposizione dagli atti riflessivi per la sintesi concettuale e, in generale, dall'azione analitico-sintetica del soggetto cognitivo. La sensazione costituisce il primo passo della rappresentazione soltanto in una comprensione astratta, visto che la prima rappresentazione è proprio l'intuizione (p. 111). Così, ogni oggetto dell'intuizione è, nello stesso tempo, oggetto dell'intelletto. Senza le regole date dall'intelletto, non avremmo unità della coscienza. L'intuizione, in questo senso, fornisce le forme e l'intelletto le regole. Ma ciò non significa che l'estetica sia subordinata all'analitica. Né tantomeno che il percorso di Kant nella prima *Critica* consista nel passaggio da una versione puramente sensibile della conoscenza a una concezione della sensibilità funzionale all'attività dell'intelletto (p. 104). La spiegazione di questo punto implica la trattazione della relazione tra intuizione formale e forma dell'intuizione, ossia di uno dei passaggi più complessi della prima *Critica*, che l'autore sviluppa nel quarto capitolo del volume. Le forme dell'intuizione sono "il nostro modo di intuizione", o in altre parole "le condizioni originariamente inerenti al soggetto" della "ricettività della nostra sensibilità" (B 59).

Ma in che senso dovremmo considerare tali forme anche come intuizioni pure? La polemica che su questo tema ha coinvolto Longuenesse e Fichant, al di là dei dettagli esaminati con molta perizia da Aportone, pone il problema del significato dello spazio e del tempo come grandezze infinitamente date. Se per Longuenesse tale infinità ha solo un valore regolativo, per Fichant si tratta di una rappresentazione infinita e originale, data

prima di ogni sintesi dell'intelletto, che conferisce all'*Estetica* un'irriducibilità radicale e, addirittura, una priorità sistematica nel quadro complessivo della dottrina degli elementi. Nella sua proposta teorica Aportone sembra propendere per questa seconda alternativa. A suo parere, infatti, non ci sarebbero rappresentazioni immediate assolutamente date. Le intuizioni empiriche, infatti, presuppongono una sintesi cognitiva anche quando hanno una relazione immediata con il loro proprio oggetto. Allo stesso modo, le intuizioni pure presuppongono un atto sintetico di apprensione e di unificazione di una diversità molteplice (p. 183). La filosofia trascendentale di Kant, pertanto, non lascia spazio a una materia grezza o a *sense data*, ma coglie l'unità di ragione e natura a partire da una razionalità generale e, per usare un'espressione di McDowell, ampia, cioè non riducibile a una specifica determinazione soggettiva ma implicita in ogni presa di posizione del soggetto in rapporto al mondo. Si tratta di una conclusione sviluppata in tutte le sue implicazioni pratiche nel quinto e ultimo capitolo del volume, in cui Aportone, discutendo uno spettro di testi più ampio, mostra come in Kant natura e ragione debbano essere comprese come inscritte nell'unico orizzonte di una forma pura. Non c'è natura senza una ragione che la comprende. Ma, nella misura in cui può essere compresa, cioè essere integrata in una relazione, la natura è già espressione di una compenetrazione intellettuale, anche se non necessariamente concettuale.

Si potrebbe così sostenere che la ricerca di Aportone si muove nella tensione che sussiste tra 'formativo' e 'formale'. Dal punto di vista della filosofia critica non bisogna considerare la ragione soltanto come facoltà produttiva che dà una forma a una materia data extrarazionale o prerazionale. Piuttosto, ciò che può essere oggetto di conoscenza si dà già in una previa relazione razionale, ossia in una forma, che sintetizza soggetto e oggetto. Anche in questa prospettiva l'obiettivo polemico di Aportone sembra essere McDowell e in particolare il suo concetto di *Bildung*, cioè di una forza formativa che, almeno nell'accezione tedesca, struttura tanto il reale, quanto il soggetto che vi si rapporta e di cui è parte. Nella misura in cui la ragione umana è passibile di una crescita e di uno sviluppo, essa può assumere una seconda natura che muta, sviluppa e giustifica la sua posizione nel mondo. Eppure, secondo Aportone, non si tratta di una formatività comune al soggetto e al mondo, ma della forma della relazione che li integra.

Così Aportone sembra approfondire quanto afferma Dieter Henrich in un saggio del 1996 intitolato *Zwei Naturalismen auf Englisch*, in cui McDowell viene criticato, tra l'altro, per la banalità dei suoi riferimenti kantiani, considerati il riflesso di preconcetti che la ricerca su Kant avrebbe superato già da tempo. In *Having the world in view* McDowell risponde a questa critica concordando con Henrich. Egli limita il suo kantismo a uno strumento da usare contro Sellars e aggiunge che per comprendere le ragioni della sua correzione del trascendentalismo kantiano nella fenomenologia hegeliana, bisognerebbe "rendere conto della funzione svolta da Fichte" e, più in generale, della discussione che subito dopo Kant si sviluppa proprio attorno alla relazione tra sensibilità e intelletto (*Having the world in view*, p. 153, n.). Di fatto, si può contrapporre Kant a Hegel, e propendere per questo o quell'autore solo se si accetta l'interpretazione fornita da Hegel

stesso, non solo nella *Scienza della logica*, ma già nella *Differenzschrift*, secondo cui Kant, Reinhold, Fichte o Bardili, sarebbero esponenti di una filosofia della riflessione che muove da una contrapposizione assoluta tra soggetto e oggetto fatale al corretto dispiegamento della filosofia. La tesi relativa a una spontaneità della ricettività in Kant permette di acquisire gli strumenti teorici per rivedere effettivamente questo pregiudizio ermeneutico e per mostrare effettivamente come la proposta teorica di *Mente e mondo* sia in un certo senso già presente in Kant, e forse anche negli altri “filosofi della riflessione” di cui Hegel parla nel 1801, rendendo quasi inutile il ricorso a Hegel stesso, almeno nei termini sostenuti da McDowell. La valorizzazione del “potere della ricettività” in Kant consentirebbe perciò di leggere con lenti nuove l’intero corso della storia della filosofia classica tedesca non tanto per alimentare la contrapposizione tra Kant e Hegel, quanto per stabilire una continuità tra le intenzioni del primo e le istanze del secondo attraverso l’opera di altri autori su cui Aportone, in questo forse troppo hegeliano o troppo interessato a “salvare” Kant da kantismi considerati “non conseguenti”, non concentra la sua attenzione.



## La obra de Kant como un progreso hacia sí misma. La senda elíptica

### *The work of Kant as a progress to itself. The Elliptical Path*

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**Reseña:** Ameriks, Karl, *Kant's Elliptical Path*, Clarendon Press, Oxford (UK), 2012, pp. 365. ISBN: 978-0-19-969368-9.

En este libro Ameriks reúne una serie de trabajos en torno a diferentes tópicos de la obra kantiana y de su influencia posterior. No pretende una reconstrucción histórica de la compleja *Entwicklungsgeschichte* del *corpus* de Kant sino una mirada en detalle de algunos conceptos clave que han merecido especial atención por parte de algunos estudiosos en los últimos años.

El hilo conductor, pero también la clave interpretativa, de los trabajos contenidos en este volumen está en la figura de la elipse. Y esto triplemente. Primero, la elipse permite reconocer la trayectoria del pensamiento de Kant. Para empezar, este trazado supone que el alejamiento de un punto de partida inicial no constituye un cambio, pues todo alejamiento se hace sobre un mismo eje. La trazada termina atrapando a cualquier distanciamiento, pues el movimiento pivota sobre dos focos, que son las ramas teórica y práctica de la filosofía de Kant (p. 4). En el caso de Kant esto significa que los giros críticos no suponen un verdadero distanciamiento respecto de las “más profundas creencias pre-sistemáticas” de Kant (p. 1). O que, como también supone el trazado de este movimiento, todo cambio de trayectoria, toda *Unwandelung* (que es como Kant describió la clase de transformación que traía consigo la crítica), no sea otra cosa que una vuelta, un giro, con lo que la idea misma de revolución, *Revolution*, con la que Kant también describió el movimiento crítico, estaría en el fondo animada por un aliento conservador. Segundo, Ameriks también se sirve de la elipse para entender las lecturas y tendencias interpretativas de la obra kantiana. Éstas habrían

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estado marcadas a principios del siglo XX por un claro compromiso metafísico (Wundt, Heidegger); a este compromiso seguiría luego un distanciamiento, vamos a llamarlo así, antimetafísico, protagonizado por la filosofía analítica (Bennet y Strawson); por último, habría un regreso a “una nueva clase de interpretación metafísica”, que vendría determinada por la temprana lectura kantiana de Rousseau y por la Ilustración (p. 2). Tercero. El trazado de la elipse alcanza a la selección de los textos que se van a examinar. Estos textos se encuentran lejos del *corpus* más familiar, entre los dos focos de la elipse (que están dominados por la obra crítica); textos menores en punto a su tamaño, como las observaciones, las notas de cursos, las reseñas; cuando no excéntricos en punto al calendario marcado por las críticas, como los escritos tempranos, antes de la década de los 1770, y los escritos postreros de la década de 1790.

El trabajo está dividido en tres partes. La primera (I) aborda los textos precríticos, en los que se marcarán las bases de uno de los focos de la elipse, el foco práctico, apenas considerados. En la segunda parte (II), que ocupa el grueso de la obra, nos encontramos con el examen de las implicaciones de este movimiento de retorno en las tres críticas. En la tercera parte (III), en cambio, se examinará la viabilidad del trazado elíptico después de Kant.

(I). En los escritos precríticos se asiste a un compromiso con conceptos y valores de calado metafísico referidos al igualitarismo, que son de origen rousseauiano. No basta con ir más allá de las causas meramente naturales, como cuando se apela a la conciencia; hay que volver a “nuestra naturaleza racional subyacente”. La subordinación a los fenómenos y a su régimen de necesidad, lo mismo que la doctrina de la obligación moral, introducen una necesidad que no hace justicia la contingencia de una finalidad que, marcada por el bien supremo como propósito natural e irrenunciable, no puede sino postular un poder exterior suficiente, “que Kant llama Dios” (p. 7). Los trabajos que contienen la incipiente ética kantiana prefiguran una ética de la libertad y de la razón. La ética comprende a los seres humanos al mismo tiempo como agentes racionales y como seres finitos sensibles investidos de necesidad. Para Kant la doctrina moral no es sólo una doctrina del deber ser sino que también tiene que poder explicar cómo la moralidad se aviene a la condición humana que es a un tiempo racional y sensible (p. 67-8).

La solución rousseauiana de un sentimiento moral, que haría de contrapeso a un archiracionalismo y archiempirismo cientifista, es asumida sólo parcialmente por Kant. Por una parte, es claro que la moralidad no puede fiarse a una facultad racional especializada, si ello supone apartarlos del sano entendimiento común. Sin embargo, la contrapartida no puede ser el primitivismo moral. Ante todo se trata de combatir el malentendido que consiste en llevar a la razón y al entendimiento, y con ellas a esa su peculiar habilidad técnica y deductiva que ha derrotado a la superstición, hasta el centro mismo de la moralidad. Kant postulará un “inalizable sentimiento del bien” (UD<sup>1</sup> 2: 299; cit. en p. 37). Kant es consciente a finales de 1760 que tiene que ir más allá de Rousseau. Es preciso encontrar “alguna clase de medio teórico adecuado” que pueda reconciliar la libertad absoluta ya asumida con los logros empíricos de la Revolución científica (p. 45). Está en juego no sólo la justificación de la moralidad. También hay que encontrar medios para persistir en la vida moral sin ignorar nuestro interés inalienable por la satisfacción de nuestra naturaleza sensible. Pues bien, éste es, a juicio de Ameriks, el lugar que ocupa la religión. Dios debe ser usado como un mecanismo para sostener la motivación moral de los seres humanos (p. 66-7).

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<sup>1</sup>Citamos las obras de Kant de acuerdo con la *Siglenverzeichnis* estándar.

(II) En la segunda parte se trata de analizar el significado elíptico de cada una de las Críticas (que recogeremos bajo los epígrafes II.1, II.2 y II.3).

(II.1) Por lo que hace a la primera Crítica, la cuestión a discutir es la del idealismo. Ameriks propone una interpretación “moderada” del idealismo. Hay dos posiciones extremas. La que considera que Kant es un idealista que sostiene que los fenómenos son nada más que ‘meras apariencias’, resultado del encuentro de la cosa en sí misma con el sujeto. Los fenómenos serían “empíricamente ideales”, esto es, meramente subjetivos en un sentido psicológico. Por el contrario, la interpretación opuesta entiende que los fenómenos son ‘apariciencias reales’ que descubren las hechuras de los objetos físicos y que serían “empíricamente reales”. La propuesta de Ameriks consiste en atribuir a los fenómenos un estatus de ‘entre’ (*in-between*, p. 76), más que empíricamente ideales pero menos trascendentalmente reales.

En realidad, Ameriks no hace otra cosa que sostener el idealismo trascendental manteniéndolo en sus propios términos y evitando las desviaciones. El espacio y el tiempo son ítems que se distinguen de las sensaciones o sentimiento subjetivos; ahora bien, el que sean condición posibilitante del conocimiento y de la objetividad no significa que sean la contrapartida de las cosas en sí mismas (p. 80-1). Las cosas en sí mismas constituyen nada más que un “hecho negativo” (p. 80). Es decir, no se puede establecer una relación de simetría y de correspondencia necesaria entre fenómenos e idealidad trascendental, por una parte, y cosas en sí mismas y realidad trascendental, por otra. En efecto, la contraparte de la idealidad trascendental es la realidad empírica, y el hecho de que los fenómenos, por su propia condición (meramente nominal, como recuerda Kant en A 251), estén “orientados hacia cosas”, no significa sino que no son *nada más que* apariencias que se agotan en ese su aparecerse *empíricamente* y que no comparecen de otra manera. La cosa en sí haría las veces de limitación y frontera que asegura lo empírico, en lugar de ser el terreno ignoto que lo hace tambalear.

Ameriks aporta una lectura de la expresión “en sí mismo” que retoma el sentido que tiene en la filosofía práctica, concretamente en la expresión “fin en sí mismo”. A saber, como algo que *no tiene que ver con alguna verdad* referida a una cosa sino más bien *con su carácter de incondicionado* (p. 85). Pero, ¿qué significa esto? Los fenómenos son siempre fenómenos de cosas en sí mismas, pues ellos no son nada más que realidades condicionadas, siendo precisamente la idealidad trascendental esa condición que los constituye. Por el contrario, las cosas en sí mismas no se manifiestan en y como fenómenos pues son justamente lo que hay de incondicionado en su manifestarse, el límite que los habilita como tales, nunca el correlato (al menos entendido en sentido fuerte).

Otra discusión contenida en esta parte es la propuesta de una alternativa al llamado ‘giro trascendental’, atribuido a Strawson, así como a algunas de las lecturas que se han posicionado respecto al mismo. Básicamente este giro trascendental sostiene que hay estructuras necesarias de nuestra experiencia y de sus objetos que habilitan un conocimiento universal. Esta lectura entiende que son estructuras inmanentes, pues vienen demandadas por la condición misma del conocimiento científico, por su contrastada *condición* de universalidad y necesidad del conocimiento. Esta lectura es esencialmente anti-metafísica. No contempla la referencia a cualesquiera causas ontológicamente relevantes, que serían aquellas que harían *posibles los objetos* de nuestro conocimiento. Según Strawson en Kant estaría esta tentación metafísica, que es la que tiene que ser

eliminada de raíz. El problema de esta lectura es que parece prolongarse en otras que a fuerza de insistir en el realismo empírico desestiman la condición trascendental del idealismo y la necesidad de un límite absoluto, cuando no interpretan éste en términos de causalidad; tales lecturas ven en la cosa en sí misma la causa metafísica de las condiciones ideales que, en ese caso, son meramente subjetivas, empíricamente hablando (p. 104-5). La solución de Ameriks es la de una “moderación desde el principio”. A saber, primero se trata de leer en términos anti-subjetivistas el idealismo. Kant sostiene que en el realismo perceptivo de la vida ordinaria hay compromisos objetivos serios, y que el idealismo no debe entenderse por tanto en términos de subjetivismo. La solución moderada, que Ameriks llama “posición ontológica expansiva” (p. 109), pasa por reconocer que las realidades psicológicas y subjetivas sólo se encuentran en un primer nivel, que no afecta al nivel del conocimiento, que es el nivel público y objetivo de las realidades espacio-temporales (p. 107).

(II.2) En punto a la segunda Crítica está en juego, entre otras, la cuestión del humanismo (no nos referiremos a las discusiones con Sussman y Kleingeld). Se trata de si y cómo se puede entender el lugar del hombre en el mundo, es decir, cuál ha de ser el estatus del ‘punto de vista humano’. El humanismo radical sostiene que la posición de inmanencia del ser humano debe entenderse en términos subjetivos y psicológicos. El humanismo natural sostiene en cambio que los límites cognitivos están determinados por las estructuras epistémicas esenciales de la trama espacio-temporal de la que nos servimos (p. 145). En cualquier caso, el problema es saber hasta dónde la posición del hombre en el cosmos está determinada por su posición en el mismo y hasta dónde esa posición consiste en la posibilidad de trascender “nuestra situación” como seres sensibles, en cuyo caso una tal posición estaría determinada por nosotros. O dicho de otra manera, en qué queda la distinción entre dos mundos que ha venido sosteniendo desde la *Dissertatio* de 1770 hasta la *GMS*.

A juicio de Ameriks el sistema kantiano no es un humanismo que limitaría toda posible realidad al mundo en el que nos encontramos. Más bien Kant sostiene que nos encontramos en una situación asimétrica. Por una parte, la posibilidad de ser libres y el postulado de la existencia Dios supone que hay ítems que no se encuentran en absoluto en el mundo (como recuerda acertadamente el autor, debe tenerse en cuenta que ‘mundo’ es un término que remite a la cosmología antes que a las ciencias naturales, lo que nos sitúa justamente en el límite y, con ello, en el lugar del tránsito, en lugar de en una situación inmanente de cierre, que es lo que tendríamos si el mundo se entendiera físicamente). El idealismo trascendental proporciona un espacio para poder considerarnos como agentes prácticamente incondicionados. Asimismo, la razón práctica es ‘pura’ toda vez que su necesidad normativa la sitúa de alguna manera, parcialmente al menos, “en otro mundo” (p. 153). En efecto, la naturaleza de la obligación hace necesario considerar al ser humano no en las circunstancias del mundo sino en relación a los conceptos *a priori* de la razón pura (*GMS* 4:389; cit. en p. 153). Lo mismo puede decirse de la noción misma de ‘razón’. Entendida en términos instrumentales (que manejan algunos filósofos y economistas), podría parecer que la razón “en cuanto tal” no garantiza la moralidad. Pero hay que entender que la racionalidad pura no tiene que ver tanto con un origen puro cuanto con un modo de actuar por mor de la ley, esto es, conforme a principios que “son *necesariamente concernientes a y para todos los agentes en cuanto tales*” (p. 154; sub. original). Es la universalidad, entendida tanto intensiva como extensivamente (nuestro), la que garantiza la pureza y la libertad de la razón.

(II.3) En la tercera parte se abordan conceptos relativos a la filosofía de la historia. Kant considera que el desarrollo completo de la humanidad supondrá la satisfacción de la vocación

moral. Este fin no estaría truncado por un juego sin propósito, sino que habría un “fin natural”, *Naturabsicht*, que lo evitaría. En realidad, la libertad absoluta y el respecto de uno mismo constituyen fuerzas que van más allá de la naturaleza entendida en términos prudenciales o teóricos. Asimismo, vinculado a estas fuerzas está la esperanza de que hay un ser que hace posible aproximarnos al bien supremo a pesar de todas las frustraciones y fracasos que encontramos en la historia.

Ciertamente la consideración de ese movimiento de desarrollo como el despliegue de disposiciones naturales parece abocar la finalidad práctica a un camino que es comprensible en términos estrictamente teóricos (p. 208). La alternativa que propone Ameriks consiste en entender que la capacidad de pensar, sea entendida teórica o prácticamente, tanto da, permite comprender los sucesos como orientados por fines y no únicamente como respuesta a fuerzas. Esta *creencia en la libertad*, en la que reverberaría el mismísimo funcionamiento de la razón, es la que hace posible considerar la historia como un despliegue moral más que como una rutinaria prolongación de las causas naturales.

Aquí habría sin embargo lo que Ameriks llama “ambivalencia despreocupada” (p. 210). Es claro que sólo desde una perspectiva moral tiene sentido concebir un propósito de la existencia. La necesidad de la razón práctica es lo que condiciona absolutamente el propósito de la creación. Ahora bien, esto parece dejar a la historia fuera de juego, pues el respeto a la ley moral está totalmente al margen de cualesquiera contingencias empíricas (p. 219). Habría por tanto en Kant dos posiciones separadas, razón práctica e historia, que Kant parece no haber trenzado de un modo satisfactorio.

Sin embargo, esta ambivalencia sólo se da si se interpreta la moralidad se limita al aseguramiento del respecto a la ley. La moralidad también “nos llama a ser agentes racionales activos” (*idem*) cuyo propósito es trabajar en el mundo de acuerdo con aquella. Éste sería el sentido de los postulados de la razón práctica. En la primera Crítica Kant habría introducido ya por medio de las ideas la necesidad que tenemos los seres racionales de pensar una correlación en la experiencia entre la felicidad y la moralidad. Lo que importa es que estos postulados implican a los sujetos como agentes. Es decir, sería la cooperación, *Mitbestimmung*, de los seres racionales, en el modo de una creencia, lo que se estimularía gracias a aquellos. No se trata tanto de que la apelación a esta dimensión subjetiva venga requerida por la mismísima ley moral. Como señala el autor, la ley moral tiene una “objetividad especialmente fuerte” (p. 258). Está en juego más bien nuestra necesidad contingente, pero distintiva, de ser satisfechos por algo real y separado de nosotros en el mundo.

(III) La tercera parte constata las posibilidades de ampliación de la senda elíptica más allá del propio Kant. Resulta de especial interés la que Ameriks dedica al “giro trágico” en la filosofía moderna, en un camino casi inédito que iría de Kant a Nietzsche.

La tragedia puede entenderse de otro modo que como una suerte de infelicidad o de deberes en conflicto. La tragedia también puede entenderse en un sentido existencial, como una “actitud positiva” que enfrenta las dudas que puedan echarse en la cuenta del camino recorrido por la humanidad. Como anticipación de esta peculiar actitud, la filosofía de autores como Kant, pero también Lessing o Schiller, combina su visión optimista de la humanidad con una muy interesante percepción del drama que suponen las muchas tensiones que llenan el camino de la Ilustración.

Mientras que Nietzsche y algunos después de él se hicieron cargo de una comprensión irracionalista del mundo así como de una priorización de la dimensión estética, trágica e histórica de la existencia humana, en Kant podríamos reconocer ya una suerte de demarcación previa de los límites de la racionalidad que estaría precisamente en su exigencia de una teleología fundada en la creencia moral.



## OBITUARIO

### Massimo Barale, *In Memoriam* (1941-2015)

Nuria Sánchez Madrid\*

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El número 2 de *Con-textos kantianos* no podía dejar de dedicar un emocionado recuerdo al profesor Massimo Barale, cuya profunda dedicación a Kant y el pensamiento alemán clásico tanto contribuyó al florecimiento de estas investigaciones en Italia. Pertenezco al grupo de investigadores visitantes a los que el profesor Barale acogió con una gentileza y generosidad extremas en la Università degli Studi di Pisa, donde impartió docencia desde 1964 y llegó a ser profesor emérito, manifestando siempre una actitud cercana y hospitalaria en su trato con los colegas por la que no puedo sino estar por siempre agradecida. Recuerdo de manera vívida mi primera conversación con el profesor Barale, durante una estancia mía de movilidad en Pisa por abril de 2008, y la lucidez con que me señaló de inmediato qué publicaciones y lecturas de Kant podían ayudarme para continuar con buen pie una investigación sobre la Antropología de Kant recientemente emprendida. A pesar de las numerosas tareas y gestiones que ya en aquella altura comportaba la organización de lo que sería más tarde el *Kant-Kongress* de Pisa de 2010, sacó tiempo para orientarme en relación con los trabajos de Luigi Scaravelli, Silvestro Marcucci y Emilio Garroni y de otros lectores italianos que marcaron un giro insólito a nivel internacional, aunque no suficientemente subrayado a día de hoy, en la lectura de la *Crítica del Juicio*, en la encrucijada entre la estética y la epistemología. La combinación de esos escritos con mi estudio del comentario de la misma obra por el pensador franco-brasileño Gérard Lebrun determinó de manera decidida mi ocupación con la tercera *Crítica*, desembocando ese interés en una nueva traducción y edición de la *Primera Introducción de la Crítica del Juicio*, que en 2008 ya tenía entre manos y que Barale no dejó de animarme repetidamente a llevar a término. La obra publicada del profesor Barale es admirable y en sí misma

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representa una de las más lúcidas aportaciones a la investigación sobre Kant. Recordemos, a modo de ejemplo, publicaciones como *Kant e il metodo della filosofia* (Pisa, ETS, 1988), *Immagini della ragione. Logos e ratio all'alba della scienza moderna* (Pisa, ETS, 1983) o *Il Dio ragionevole. Percorsi etici e ontoteologici del primo Idealismo tedesco* (Pisa, ETS, 1992). Deberíamos hacer un esfuerzo para conceder mayor proyección a su interpretación no solo en España, sino en las coordenadas geográficas con las que solemos trabajar, cada vez más determinadas por la recepción de contribuciones anglosajonas. Massimo Barale se ocupó de emprender un fecundo diálogo del paradigma trascendental de Kant con modelos de argumentación científica y hermenéutica, desembocando en conclusiones acerca del alcance y constitución de una subjetividad coherente capaces de arrojar luz sobre un buen número de problemas a los que se enfrenta nuestro presente. Romper una lanza a favor de la filosofía trascendental como una teoría de la racionalidad atendible no era tarea fácil en los años 70 y 80, pero Massimo Barale lo consiguió. Se advierten numerosos puntos de contacto y discusión fraterna entre sus trabajos y los que a partir de los años 90 fue publicando quien es sin lugar a dudas el *Kant scholar* italiano con mayor prestigio y repercusión internacional, Claudio La Rocca, formado también en el *alma mater* pisana bajo la orientación del prof. Barale, quien fue su director de Tesina y Tesis doctoral. Precisamente en compañía de La Rocca, Barale dirigió hasta su reciente desaparición la revista *Studi Kantiani*, sin la que hoy en día la investigación kantiana internacional no habría alcanzado los mismos niveles de comunicación y cohesión. Siempre quedará en nuestro recuerdo, por su magisterio e investigación ejemplares, por su camaradería tan infrecuente allí donde reina la competitividad académica y por el delicado cuidado que siempre dedicó en su despacho de Pisa a los jóvenes profesos en el kantismo, vinieran de donde vinieran.



### ***Política Editorial***

Este proyecto editorial sólo podrá salir adelante propiciando una nutrida participación presidida por la más absoluta pluralidad y obviando exclusiones de ningún tipo.

Se trata de una revista electrónica en torno a los estudios kantianos que tendría una periodicidad bianual y alternará los números monográficos (al cuidado de uno o dos editores invitados) con otros donde se publicarán los trabajos que obtengan informes favorables por el sistema de par ciego

El español será el idioma principal, pero también se podrán publicar trabajos en inglés, alemán, francés, italiano y portugués.

Los manuscritos deberán ser originales inéditos en cualquier idioma, que no estén bajo consideración en ningún otro lugar. Deberán remitirse por correo electrónico en Word a:

[contextoskantianos@gmail.com](mailto:contextoskantianos@gmail.com)

### ***Preparación del Manuscrito***

La extensión de los artículos no deberá exceder las 12.000 palabras, la de las discusiones 8.000 palabras las críticas de libros 4.000 palabras. En caso de que el interés y calidad del manuscrito lo aconseje, el equipo editorial podrá tomar en consideración la publicación manuscritos de una longitud mayor o menor.

Tanto los artículos como las discusiones deberán incluir un resumen en la lengua en que estén redactados y en inglés de unas 150 palabras. Igualmente deberán incluir tres o cinco palabras clave en ambas lenguas, adjuntando además el título del trabajo en inglés. El título del artículo, en la lengua en que esté redactado y en inglés, y el nombre y apellidos del autor, que estará en **VERSALES**, constarán en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 16, apareciendo únicamente el título en **negrita**. La vinculación institucional aparecerá en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 14. El resumen y palabras clave, en la lengua del artículo y en inglés, aparecerán en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11. Si la lengua del trabajo es el inglés, título, resumen y palabras clave aparecerán también en traducción al español.

Las reseñas llevarán un título, en la lengua en que estén redactadas y en inglés, relativo a su contenido y describirán la obra reseñada del siguiente modo: Autor, *título*, lugar, editorial, año, número de páginas.



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En todos los casos los autores deberán adjuntar unas breves líneas curriculares (250 palabras) donde, aparte de consignar su adscripción institucional, den cuenta de sus principales publicaciones y reflejen igualmente los ámbitos temáticos cultivados, sin dejar de proporcionar una dirección de contacto electrónica. Por favor prepare el manuscrito para un referato ciego quitando toda auto-referencia.

### *Estilo*

Todas las contribuciones han de emplear tipo de letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 12 y espaciado 1,5 (texto y notas). Las notas deben estar numeradas consecutivamente (números volados, no entre paréntesis) y aparecer como notas a pie, usando la fuente *Times New Roman*, tamaño 10 y espaciado simple. El número de nota que remite a la información contenida en la nota a pie aparecerá directamente después del signo de puntuación que cierra la cita en el cuerpo del texto.

Las palabras y sintagmas que el autor considere necesario recalcar, irán en *cursiva*, nunca en **negrita**.

### *Citas y referencias*

Las referencias a autores y publicaciones en el cuerpo del texto aparecerán entre paréntesis, incluyendo el apellido del autor, el año de publicación de la obra y las páginas citadas. Ejemplo:

(Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Los pasajes de obras citados a lo largo de los artículos aparecerán, con justificación a la izquierda de 1,5, en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11, sin dobles comillas. Las reseñas no extractarán pasajes con justificación: en caso de que el autor desee citar extractos de la obra reseñada lo hará entre dobles comillas en el cuerpo del texto y respetando su tamaño, empleando la modalidad indicada de referencia entre paréntesis al autor, año de la publicación y página.

Las partes omitidas en citas se señalarán con tres puntos entre paréntesis cuadrados — [...]—, separados por un espacio simple de la palabra anterior y siguiente.

\* Las referencias de las obras de Kant deberán hacerse según las pautas fijadas por la Edición de la Academia:

[http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134\\_Instructions\\_for\\_Authors\\_en.pdf](http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf)

\* La bibliografía se debe organizar alfabética y cronológicamente al final del texto. Si se citan varias obras del mismo autor, éstas deben ordenarse de manera cronológica, de la más reciente a la más antigua.

Ejemplos:

*Libro:*

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

*Artículo:*

Parra París, L. (1987), “Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant”, *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

*Capítulo en una obra colectiva:*

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), “Kant y la filosofía de la religión”, en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

*Trabajos disponibles en la web:*

Waldron, J. “The Principle of Proximity”, *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19 [http://sr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu\\_plltwp](http://sr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp), acceso mes, día y año).

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### ***Editorial Policy***

We would like to acquaint you with a journal project that can only go forward with the greatest possible participation of Kant scholars, without exclusions of any kind.

This periodical will be a biannual electronic journal in Kantian studies, which will alternate between open-submission issues and single-topic issues coordinated by one or two editors. All submitted manuscripts would undergo peer review.

Though Spanish is the Journal's primary language, manuscripts in English, German, French, Italian, and Portuguese are also welcome.

Submissions must not have been previously published, nor should they be under consideration anywhere else in any language. Please send your manuscript as a Word attachment to the following e-mail address:

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### ***Manuscript Preparation***

Articles must not exceed 12.000 words, discussions 8.000 words, and book reviews 4.000 words (including footnotes and bibliography in all cases). Longer manuscripts could also be considered by the editorial team, if the interest and quality of the contribution justifies its acceptance.

Articles and discussions should include an abstract both in the language of the submitted paper and in English that should not exceed 150 words as well as three to five keywords, with the title also in English. The title of articles, in the language of the submitted text and in English, and the author (in SMALL CAPS) will appear in *Times New Roman* 16 and in **bold type**. The institutional affiliation will have font *Times New Roman* 14. The *abstract* and *key words*, also in the language of the submitted and in English, will have font *Times New Roman* 11. If the language of the article or discussion is English, the title, abstract and key words will be also translated into Spanish.

Book reviews should have a title both in the language of the submitted paper and in English. They should also refer to the work under review as follows: Author, *title*, place, publishing house, year, and number of pages.

Please include a brief biographical note (250 words) that includes institutional affiliation, the titles of some publications, areas of specialization, and an e-mail address. Please prepare the manuscript for blind review deleting all self-references.

### ***Style***

For any contribution, the author should use letter type *Time New Roman* 12 and lines should be spaced 1.5 (text and notes). Notes should be numbered consecutively (superscript, no brackets) and appear as footnotes, using *Times New Roman* 10. The number of the annotation which points to the

bibliographic information contained in the footnote has to appear directly after the quotation mark closing the citation.

Stress required in the text should be done through the use of *italics*, never in **bold type**.

## *Citations and references*

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Examples:

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*Article:*

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

*Chapter in a collective work:*

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), "Kant y la filosofía de la religión", en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón"*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

*Paper available in websites:*

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Waldron, J. "The Principle of Proximity", *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19 [http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu\\_plltwp](http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp), accessed month, day year).



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