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Editorial CTK 1

Merced a la gentileza de quienes colaboraron en el número cero de *Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy*, podemos presentar ahora el número uno de una revista cuyas secciones y contenidos irán quedando cinceladas por sus auténticos protagonistas, que no son otros que quienes publican en sus páginas y sus lectores.

Queremos manifestar aquí nuestra gratitud a todos cuantos hicieron posible -con ese número cero- nuestra carta de presentación publicada en noviembre de 2014, entre los que cabría destacar la nutrida representación del excelente y dinámico *Grupo de Estudios Kantianos* (GEK) de la Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina), fundado por Mario Caimi y coordinado en la actualidad por Hernán Pringe.

En esta empresa colectiva me corresponde agradecer su colaboración en primer lugar a María Julia Bertomeu (Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas / Universidad de La Plata, Argentina), que me acompañó desde un principio en el lanzamiento de la revista, e igualmente a Catalina González (Universidad de Los Andes, Colombia), Eduardo Molina (Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Chile) y Efraín Lazos (Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM, México), por haber aceptado officar como editores asociados.

Aquí debe consignarse igualmente el nombre de Faviola Rivera (IIF-UNAM) que suscribió las primeras convocatorias para reclutar a los miembros del Consejo Editorial (29) y del Consejo Asesor (32) en compañía de María Julia Bertomeu y de mí mismo. Resulta ocioso resaltar la extraordinaria dedicación de Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Universidad Complutense de Madrid) como Secretaria de Redacción, cuya coordinación en las tareas editoriales, realizada durante su estancia de año sabático en el IFS-CSIC, ha sido vital para la elaboración de los dos primeros números de *CTK*

Con posterioridad a la formación del amplio equipo editor, algunos miembros del Consejo Editorial han ido asumiendo tareas concretas, como es el caso de la coordinación de la sección “Crítica de libros”, en la que *Con-Textos Kantianos* cuenta con la inestimable colaboración de Ileana Beade (Universidad Nacional de Rosario, Argentina), Antonino Falduto (Universidad de Halle, Alemania), Marceline Morais (Cépeg Saint Laurent, Montréal, Canada), Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College, Estados Unidos), Cinara Nahra (UFRN, Brasil) y Margit Ruffing (Universidad de Mainz, Alemania). Asimismo, Ana-Carolina Gutiérrez-Xivillé (Philipps-Universität Marburg, Alemania / Universidad de Barcelona, España) será la editora de la *Newsletter* de la revista.

Como cabe apreciar, este proyecto va materializándose paulatinamente gracias a una especie de “micromecenazgo” de índole académica y que se traduce en una mancomunada asunción de tareas. Valgan como ejemplos adicionales de esta “microfinanciación colectiva” el logo de nuestra cabecera diseñado por Armando Menéndez, la matriz de maquetación y la cubierta elaboradas por Nuria Roca o el mantenimiento de la página *web* que sigue realizando Javier Davó.

Las colaboraciones contenidas en este número continúan testimoniando una vocación internacional que atiende a la riqueza lingüística del estudio actual de Kant, sin perder de vista su proyección iberoamericana, dado que en el conjunto de las secciones (Entrevistas, Artículos, Notas y Discusiones, Textos de Kant, Documentos, Crítica de Libros y *Newsletter*) se recogen textos en alemán, español, francés, inglés, italiano y portugués.

Las secciones de la revista han visto incrementado su número con la denominada “Documentos”, en la que aparecerán textos breves de estudiosos de Kant inéditos o ya agotados en castellano. Asimismo, dejamos abierta la inclusión en futuros números de la sección “Dossier”, en la que tendrán cabida ponencias presentadas en Congresos que cuenten con alguna unidad temática. Como es natural, la presencia en nuestros índices de estas secciones secundarias dependerá de los materiales que los autores tengan a bien hacernos llegar. El próximo número tendrá carácter monográfico, como ocurrirá con todos los números pares, reservando los impares para números misceláneos.

La llamada a la participación en el primer monográfico se encuentra accesible desde el mes de abril en la *web* (<http://con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/index>) de *Con-Textos Kantianos* y ha sido difundida igualmente por distintas sociedades kantianas, como la NAKS, la *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani* o la SEKLE, así como por la *Red Española de Filosofía*. Hemos de agradecer, finalmente, su generosa disponibilidad a todos los colegas que han colaborado con nosotros para poner en marcha el proceso de *peer review* de los trabajos remitidos a la revista y ya forman parte de nuestro incipiente banco de evaluadores.

Berlín, Junio de 2015
Roberto R. Aramayo
Editor Principal de *CTK*



Editorial Word CTK 1

Thanks to the gentle collaboration of the authors that took part in issue 0 of *Contextos kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy*, it is possible to launch now the issue 1 of a journal, whose sections and contents will be shaped by the rightful main characters of the journal: its authors and readers.

I wish to specially thank all the colleagues that allowed introducing this new journal with the issue 0. Among them, CTK editorial ought to highlight the contribution of the excellent and very active *Grupo de Estudios Kantianos* (GEK) of the University of Buenos Aires (Argentina), founded by Mario Caimi and currently coordinated by Hernán Pringe.

I ought to specially thank the always friendly encouragement of María Julia Bertomeu (Scientific Research National Council/University of La Plata, Argentina), one of the associated editors, who supported me from the initial launching of the journal. This special thanks must be sincerely extended to Catalina González (University of Los Andes, Colombia), Eduardo Molina (University Alberto Hurtado, Chile) and Efraín Lazos (UNAM Institute for Philosophical Research, México), who generously accepted to be also Associated Editors of the journal.

I would like to mention also here Faviola Rivera (IIF-UNAM), who signed with María Julia Bertomeu and me the first *call for papers* for selecting the members of CTK Editorial Board (29) and Advisor Board (32). *Last but not least*, I would like to specially highlight the impressive enthusiasm of Nuria Sánchez Madrid (University Complutense of Madrid, Spain), CTK Executive Secretary. She coordinates the mailing and the layout tasks of the journal, which she undertook during a sabbatical stay at the IFS-CSIC. Her contribution has been essential for preparing the first two issues of *CTK*.

After setting up the wide Editorial Team, some members of the Editorial Board began taking over concrete tasks, as the coordination of the journal's book reviews section. Here *Con-Textos Kantianos* counts on the outstanding cooperation of a remarkable international group of Kant scholars, composed by Ileana Beade (National University of Rosario, Argentina), Antonino Falduto (University of Halle, Germany), Marceline Morais (Cépeg Saint Laurent, Montréal, Canada), Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College, United States), Cinara Nahra (UFRN, Brasil) and Margit Ruffing (University of Mainz, Germany).

I thank all of them for their commitment with the journal. Finally, I thank Ana-Carolina Gutiérrez-Xivillé (Philipps-University Marburg, Germany/University of Barcelona, Spain), the youngest member of the editorial team, for her excellent work for preparing the *CTK Newsletter*, which will be out with each miscellaneous issue of the journal.

As it is obvious, this publishing project gets coming progressively true thanks to a sort of “academic crowd patronage”, which shaped the above mentioned fruitful distribution of tasks. At the core of our “crowd founding”, I shall mention Armando Menéndez, who designed our logo header, Nuria Roca, who developed the layout womb and cover page, and Javier Davó, who continues being our webmaster.

The contributions of this issue bear witness of the international commitment of the journal, which takes care of the linguistic richness of the current Kant studies, without neglecting its Latin American scope. In fact, the sections of the current issue (Interviews, Articles, Notes and Discussions, Kant’s Texts, Documents, Book Reviews and Newsletter) contain texts in German, Spanish, French, English, Italian and Portuguese.

In this issue appears a new section, called “Documents”, which aims at publishing short texts authored by outstanding Kant scholars, not previously published or not more available in Spanish. Next issues could contain also a new section, called “Dossier”, which will gather different papers focused on a common subject and discussed at Kant-related Congresses or Workshops. Naturally, the appearance in our next tables of contents of all these sections will depend on the contribution of authors. Next issue will be monographic, as all pair issues, while odd issues will be miscellaneous.

The *call for papers* of the first monographic it is available from April 2015 at *Contextos kantianos* website and it was also kindly spread with the help of different international Kant Societies, as the *NAKS*, the *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani* or the *SEKLE*. Also the *Red Española de Filosofía* helped us to make the CFP circulate. Finally, I have to thank particularly all the colleagues who collaborated with us from 2014 for launching the peer review process of the papers submitted to the journal. They are already part of our starting valuable evaluators’ bank.

Berlin, June 2015
Roberto R. Aramayo
CTK Editor-in-chief



Intervista con Claudio La Rocca

(Univ. di Genova; Presidente de la *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani* e direttore della rivista *Studi Kantiani*)

Interview with Claudio La Rocca

(Univ. of Genoa; President of the *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani* and Editor of the Journal *Studi Kantiani*)

NURIA SÁNCHEZ MADRID*

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

- 1) Caro professore La Rocca, innanzitutto vorrei cominciare questa intervista facendo cenno alla sua ricerca kantiana. Dagli anni '80 i suoi lavori hanno cercato di delineare i punti di contatto tra l'approccio kantiano all'*Aufklärung* e alcuni problemi precipui della filosofia nel secolo XXI, come la comprensione di sé e le forme odierne della riflessione. A suo avviso, quale sarebbe il tipo di modello di normatività e razionalità, ispirato dalla proposta critica kantiana, più appropriato per apprendere il nostro tempo con concetti?

La domanda è ampia e complessa, com'è ovvio, ma cerco di rispondere per alcuni aspetti essenziali. Parto dal presupposto, non certo universalmente condiviso, che l'Illuminismo sia un progetto incompiuto, per usare i termini che Habermas riferiva alla Modernità, e meritevole di compimento, una impresa complicata e con molte sfaccettature, rispetto al

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quale il modello kantiano – storicamente uno fra molti – può offrire un’alternativa a diversi equivoci. Il primo equivoco è l’idea, che risale alla sfortunata (perché troppo fortunata) *Dialektik der Aufklärung* di Adorno e Horkheimer, secondo cui il portato principale dell’Illuminismo sarebbe la promozione della ragione strumentale, con la sua conseguente logica del dominio sulla natura e sull’uomo. Concepire l’Illuminismo (che è un fenomeno, dicevo, vario e articolato) come il «sole della *ratio* calcolante, ai cui gelidi raggi matura la messe della nuova barbarie», e farlo anche – e talora soprattutto – in riferimento a Kant, è un grave errore storico e teorico allo stesso tempo, ed è stato un regalo alle stesse forze che i due autori volevano contrastare. Credo si possa mostrare che il modo di concepire l’Illuminismo da parte di Kant contiene una delle critiche più radicali e fondate alla ragione strumentale che siano state formulate, se lo si legge con attenzione e nel contesto della sua visione della ragione. Lo si può far vedere anche partendo da dettagli: ho ricordato in qualche occasione che il *sapere aude* oraziano che Kant elegge a motto dell’Illuminismo non si riferisce nelle sue intenzioni affatto all’espansione imperiosa della conoscenza, tant’è che in suo appunto postumo Kant lo traduce con le parole “sii saggio”: il *sapere* vuole rimandare alla *sapientia*, alla saggezza, che è il riferimento agli scopi essenziali della ragione umana (non la loro “conoscenza”). In altri termini, Kant persegue, nel suo modello di Illuminismo, la ricerca precisamente di una razionalità non strumentale, la cui cifra di fondo è quella di una ragione che sia «pubblica», anzitutto, ossia non subordinata ad altro che al suo libero gioco intersoggettivo, dunque libera da ogni scopo prefissato: una ragione che – per questo motivo – può presentarsi come universale. La chiave di questa razionalità resta in fondo l’istanza di universalità dell’imperativo categorico, che non a caso nella sua cosiddetta “formula dell’umanità” coincide con la sospensione di ogni possibilità di ridurre l’uomo in quanto essere razionale, ossia precisamente in quanto titolare della stessa ragione come possibilità di porre fini, a strumento d’altro. La razionalità è lo spazio in cui ogni commisurazione mezzi-fini può e deve a sua volta essere valutata e acquisire senso, e che dunque non può contenere alcun fine predeterminato. Il carattere formale dell’imperativo garantisce questo e richiede allo stesso tempo che le procedure razionali si traducano in una razionalità concreta e contestuale: la saggezza come qualcosa che sta al di là del sapere (e della stessa *dottrina* della saggezza) su cui insiste Kant, credo alluda a questo. Questo tipo di razionalità è – contro le accuse di possibile “eurocentrismo” – radicalmente non “autoritaria”, in un senso su cui ha insistito molto bene Onora O’ Neill,

usando anche formulazioni sinteticamente efficaci: la ragione non è una serie di «algoritmi trascendenti», che ci diano assiomi formali per risolvere problemi. Non riconosce autorità esterne a se stessa, ma neppure “autorità interne” nel senso di punti di partenza assodati, come assiomi. Mantiene, aggiungerei, una natura teleologica in un senso peculiarissimo. Non nel senso di un sistema teleologico chiuso: i fini che Kant in qualche modo fa emergere sono tutti per così dire “fini senza contenuto”. Si pensi a quelli delineati nella *Metafisica dei costumi*: perfezionamento di sé e felicità altrui – il primo non può non essere individualmente incarnato, il secondo non può non confrontarsi con i progetti altrui di felicità, che già di per sé è per Kant un concetto indeterminabile. Tuttavia, la possibilità del libero dispiegarsi della ragione di ognuno prevede delle condizioni fattuali – il che vuol dire: politiche – molto precise: la fondazione di una *bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (uno stato di diritto) e di un «tutto cosmopolitico». L’immagine di Kant vecchio pensatore, “guardiano dell’apriori”, che prescrive regole a tutto e a tutti, è un’idea da cui liberarsi se ci si vuol appropriare e riappropriare della sua eredità. Senza neppure la necessità di dirsi kantiani.

Sono convinto che molte distorsioni nel pensiero del XX secolo e molte derive storiche siano dovute all’incomprensione e dal rifiuto del nucleo del pensiero illuminista, presente in autori anche molto lontani tra di loro, dal nostro Benedetto Croce, a Isaiah Berlin (che parlò dell’«Intelletto che congela e che distorce»), a Martin Heidegger, che pur avendo scritto cose notevoli su Kant non ha mai neanche sfiorato l’idea di critica e il senso dell’imperativo, fino persino ad Hannah Arendt, che ha visto l’«astratta nudità dell’essere nient’altro-che-uomo» come un rischio e un pericolo, invece che come fonte di diritti, che vedeva perdersi nell’«uomo generico». Rileggere davvero Kant può aiutare a dissipare fumi ed ombre che emergono da molti argomenti di critica all’Illuminismo, anche profondi e intelligenti, che però precipitano talvolta in un senso comune fatto di malintesi.

Più in generale, il progetto critico inteso come analisi della logica *peculiare* delle diverse forme di discorso, con la distinzione tra discorso scientifico, valutazione etica, giudizio estetico, fede religiosa, e anche tra forme diverse di discorso conoscitivo (fisica e biologia, psicologia, antropologia), che eviti sovrapposizioni ed “imperialismi” di una forma sull’altra, credo resti da perseguire, al di là delle forme in cui è stato svolto, perché molti riduzionismi che restringono la razionalità ad una sua unica forma sono ancora una fonte di equivoci filosofici, ma anche di problemi attuali per così dire di comprensione di

aspetti della nostra cultura, con conseguenze sui rapporti tra uomini e modi di vivere. Qualche volta Kant ha insistito sul fatto che in determinati ambiti – sostanzialmente la metafisica nelle sue implicazioni religiose, e dunque la stessa fede – ciò che è decisivo è il cambiamento di “tono” delle nostre asserzioni, ossia della cogenza e del senso che loro attribuiamo, nel contesto di altri discorsi. Che una “proposizione” nel linguaggio religioso non sia una asserzione cognitiva, che una asserzione cognitiva (o un articolo di fede) non possa essere fonte di prescrizione etica, che una legittimazione politica abbia qualche correlazione con il discorso etico ma non ne segua la medesima logica, tutto questo è ancora lontano da essere riconosciuto largamente come sarebbe necessario, eppure Kant ha tentato di farcelo comprendere già molti anni fa. Credo anche che molti discorsi che girano un po’ a vuoto su relativismo e antirelativismo possano giovare di simili distinzioni.

- 2) Parecchi dei suoi lavori si sono incentrati sull’antropologia, l’etica, la logica e la psicologia di Kant, con speciale attenzione all’arco disegnato, da un lato, dai pregiudizi, i giudizi provvisori, i principi regolativi e l’inconscio e, dall’altro, dalla coscienza morale e i suoi gradi di certezza, la *Gesinnung* e la convinzione religiosa. L’enumerazione di queste questioni sembra comporre un arcipelago di temi tra i quali si può riscontrare un filo rosso rappresentato dalle forme dell’autocoscienza in Kant. Considera che l’attenzione alla specificità del metodo critico kantiano come esercizio di autoriflessione determinerà lo sviluppo della ricerca sul pensiero kantiano nei prossimi decenni? Quali sarebbero i principali benefici teorici di una tale linea di ricerca?

Non so se si possano fare previsioni sullo sviluppo delle linee di ricerca del futuro. Sono abbastanza convinto tuttavia del fatto che nella ricerca su Kant possono interagire in modo utile, e lo faranno in futuro, due direttrici: quella inevitabile e probabilmente inesauribile, che riguarda l’interpretazione, lo sviluppo, il ripensamento dei grandi temi del suo pensiero (il trascendentale, la critica della ragione, la fondazione e l’analisi della moralità, le questioni di teoria dell’arte e del bello, ma anche questioni metafisologiche circa la stessa natura del pensiero filosofico), che comprende naturalmente la discussione circa i suoi esiti (proprio in Italia è emersa la parola d’ordine del *Good-bye Kant!*); e, allo stesso tempo, un’altra direttrice che può rendere più dettagliato e articolato il quadro delle tematiche che

sono coinvolte nel pensiero di Kant, ma anche contribuire a modificarne l'immagine, inserendo elementi di "inquietudine" nelle visioni più tradizionali. Paradossalmente, dopo più di due secoli, vi sono aspetti del pensiero di Kant che meritano e aspettano ancora di essere illuminati. Le tematiche cui lei fa riferimento sicuramente convergono nel cercare di disegnare (di ricostruire) una immagine più duttile e meno standardizzata delle forme dell'autocoscienza in Kant, mostrando che non si gioca tutto solo sulla appercezione trascendentale o, in ambito morale, sulla coscienza della legge, ma che queste istanze stesse possono assumere un senso ed un ruolo più precisi. Non si tratta di mettere in luce temi "minori", ma di leggere i temi di fondo sulla base delle complicazioni e articolazioni di estremo interesse che il contesto teorico reale in cui Kant li pensa contiene. Così, per fare l'esempio dell'attività cognitiva inconscia, di cui mi sono occupato, il sottolinearne presenza, portata e ruolo può condurre a leggere l'"Io penso che deve poter accompagnare tutte le mie rappresentazioni" in un modo meno schematico e più attento alla sua specificità. Il Kant un po' classico delle certezze e delle fondazioni acquista complessità e presa teorica, senza perdere il suo impianto. Non trascurare ad esempio il fatto che, in ambito morale, la certezza della legge si accompagna alla strutturale opacità e fallibilità del giudizio morale, su cui Kant ha insistito moltissimo, può aiutare a rileggere la *Gesinnung* in modo diverso, non identificandola con la semplice "intenzione" cosciente del soggetto morale e dunque con i "buoni propositi". Molte di queste analisi possono far riferimento, con le dovute cautele, ai materiali del *Nachlass* e alle *Vorlesungen*, ancora da esplorare, che coprono un arco tematico naturalmente più vasto di quello rappresentato dalla opere a stampa (per Kant, come per molti autori, va fatta una distinzione tra le strategie di pubblicazione e l'effettivo lavoro teorico: questi materiali consentono di precisare l'effettivo orizzonte di quest'ultimo). Per menzionare l'ambito "logico" che lei ricordava, tematiche come i giudizi provvisori o la teoria dei *Merkmale*, di estremo interesse di per sé, possono anche modificare l'idea, diffusa in autori importantissimi, da Husserl a Eco, di un Kant occupato solo dalla teoria dell'apriori e disinteressato alle dinamiche della conoscenza empirica. La teoria kantiana della conoscenza empirica è assai più articolata, moderna e stimolante di quella dei suoi predecessori empiristi. Molte correzioni storiografiche sono ancora da fare: la tematica dei *vorläufige Urteile* da sola dimostra che l'idea di Gadamer di una *Aufklärung* segnata dal «pregiudizio contro i pregiudizi» non ha fondamento; né si può dimenticare che autorevoli kantisti ancora pochi anni fa scrivevano

che Kant *non poteva* avere una teoria di rappresentazioni inconscie; in un recente e ottimo libro di filosofia della mente si legge che «il concetto di inconscio compare negli ultimi decenni dell'Ottocento», e chi va più indietro spesso ricorda solo Leibniz...

Credo infine che resterà in futuro, in forme ora non prevedibili, l'esigenza del confronto teorico con modelli kantiani: le strade del pensiero filosofico non sono lineari, e la necessità di rileggere assunti kantiani si ripresenta a ondate periodicamente, e questo avverrà anche in futuro. Penso ad esempi come la ripresa di problematiche kantiane in McDowell, la ridiscussione del Kant etico nel costruttivismo, ma anche l'esigenza dell'ermeneutica filosofica di confrontarsi più da vicino con le sue radici fenomenologiche, e quindi anche trascendentali.

- 3) Quali sono le linee internazionali di studio kantiano e i ricercatori, italiani e stranieri, che hanno orientato di più i suoi lavori dal periodo della sua formazione filosofica fino al presente?

Nel periodo della mia formazione ha avuto un ruolo importante la ricerca filosofica e la tradizione di studi kantiani italiana: quella dell'università di Pisa, dove ho studiato, e non solo. La ricerca kantiana italiana è stata tra le prime a mettere l'accento sulle potenzialità che le tematiche della *Kritik der Urteilskraft* rivestivano per una interpretazione del pensiero critico attenta ai suoi aspetti più stimolanti. A Pisa si possono ricordare due figure, Luigi Scaravelli e Francesco Barone (solo il secondo è stato docente negli anni in cui mi formavo), molto diverse, ma che convergevano nell'attenzione teorica, non "scolastica" o solo storiografica verso Kant, e che, per semplificare, indicavano l'uno aspetti e stimoli non esauriti della terza *Critica* e l'altro la necessità di non considerare obsoleta e di ripensare la tematica trascendentale. Questi impulsi erano proseguiti e approfonditi da Silvestro Marcucci in particolare per la tematica della teleologia nel suo senso epistemologico, e da Massimo Barale – che è stato mio relatore di tesi (non ancora su Kant) e poi *Doktorvater* – per la questione del metodo trascendentale e della fondazione del filosofare. A lui devo moltissimi stimoli ma in particolare l'esperienza, ancora prima che l'idea, che Kant possa essere un autore attraverso il quale fare filosofia e non solo da "studiare". Ma un altro autore che ha contribuito ad un approccio non "antiquario" a Kant,

attento al presente, e di nuovo ad una rilettura, seppure assai diversa, del trascendentale, era, fuori da Pisa, Emilio Garroni, il quale, muovendo dall'estetica e dal suo ripensamento come filosofia non settoriale, aveva offerto delle interpretazioni della *Urteilkraft* estremamente stimolanti, con cui era necessario confrontarsi (una discussione epistolare tra lui e Marucci sul principio del Giudizio del 1979-80 è un importante documento di quanto allora era al centro dell'attenzione). Su questo aveva richiamato la mia attenzione anche un altro, allora più giovane, studioso di Pisa, Leonardo Amoroso, autore di un libro in sostanza convergente con gli esiti di Garroni. Prima di Hogebe in Germania, Garroni aveva messo l'accento sulla possibilità di una fondazione kantiana della semiotica (un tema su cui mi ero concentrato nel libro sulla *Urteilkraft* del 1990), e introdotto – prima ad esempio di Hannah Ginsborg – il tema degli aspetti cognitivi dell'estetica in Kant. Quando me ne sono occupato da vicino, non sono mai arrivato a condividere l'idea di fondo di Garroni di un carattere “estetico” (seppure in un senso ampio) del principio della *Urteilkraft*: per via di questo dissenso di fondo, pur nell'ambito di convergenze importanti, Garroni in una sua intervista parlò simpaticamente di me come di un «un caso» per lui «leggermente, come dire?, angustiante». Ma in genere in Italia, è questo che vorrei sottolineare, si era creato lo spazio (si può pensare ad autori come Mathieu, Morpurgo-Tagliabue) per una lettura di Kant non convenzionale e guidata da interessi teorici, uno spazio nel quale ci si poteva muovere e da cui poi si poteva agevolmente muoversi allargando l'orizzonte di formazione fuori dal nostro paese. Per me sono stati importati gli anni di ricerca in Germania, a Mainz, prima e dopo la tesi di dottorato, con il sostegno del DAAD e della *Humboldt-Stiftung*, e in quella Università in particolare le figure di Gerhard Funke e Rudolf Malter. Il primo, a lungo presidente della *Kant-Gesellschaft* e condirettore delle «Kant-Studien», non era mai stato un “kantista” in senso stretto, ma era un fenomenologo interessato a preservare l'eredità kantiana, così come sullo sfondo della prosecuzione della filosofia trascendentale nella fenomenologia si muoveva a Pisa Massimo Barale. Malter, allora direttore delle «Kant-Studien» con Gerhard Funke e Joachim Kopper, era un notevole studioso di Kant, e dai suoi seminari estremamente analitici ho imparato molto riguardo alla lettura dei testi. Seppure in modi diversi, nel mio interesse per la questione del metodo in Kant hanno finito per convergere l'accento dato alla questione da Barale in rapporto alla deduzione trascendentale, la sua particolare valorizzazione della *transzendente Methodenlehre* della prima *Critica* nel libro *Kant e il*

metodo della filosofia da un lato, e il primato teorico del metodo che Funke ritrovava anche in Husserl.

Questo per quanto riguarda gli anni della mia formazione. Naturalmente la comunità degli studiosi kantiani è così vasta e l'ambito del pensiero kantiano così complesso per chi se ne occupi al lungo che gli impulsi poi non possono che diventare numerosi. Se devo ricordarne altri, sicuramente sono stati importanti i lavori di Dieter Henrich, di cui seguii un seminario a Napoli all'Istituto Italiano degli studi Filosofici, in cui, come diceva allora scherzando, cercava di delineare "la terza edizione della deduzione trascendentale delle categorie". Henrich, al di là della sua visione dell'autocoscienza che non ho mai condiviso, mostrava come da un lato ci fosse ancora moltissimo da comprendere nell'impianto kantiano, dall'altro come si potesse dialogare filosoficamente con esso senza timore di sentirsi "attardati" – anche la sua opera di confronto e dialogo con la cultura filosofica anglosassone di impianto analitico e la riscoperta che avveniva al suo interno del tema della autoriflessività (con autori come Chisholm, Castañeda, Shoemaker...) è stata importante per il mio interesse per l'autocoscienza. Oggi, dopo il "conceptual turn" e l'esplosione della filosofia della mente, e lo "sdoganamento" di Kant nell'ambito della filosofia analitica (la sua riammissione tra gli autori con i quali è lecito confrontarsi), è forse difficile percepire come ancora negli anni '80 considerare queste tematiche come degne di approfondimento trovasse ostacoli in un contesto segnato dal dominio del "linguistic turn", dall'ermeneutica, dal pensiero post-metafisico, da una tradizione analitica che frenava bruscamente dopo Hume: tutte posizioni che convergevano nel ritenere obsolete e fuorvianti le tematiche dell'autoriflessione. Per il versante storico dell'interpretazione di Kant, il lavoro di Norbert Hinske (con forti legami con la tradizioni italiani di studi storici su Kant, a cominciare da Giorgio Tonelli) mi ha sempre più convinto del ruolo illuminante indispensabile del confronto di Kant con i suoi immediati e più vicini predecessori, la *Schulphilosophie* tedesca. In tempi più recenti, ho trovato molto stimolanti, come ricordavo prima, molte posizioni di Onora O'Neill circa il carattere della razionalità in Kant, una razionalità che non si fondi su principi pre-stabiliti, ma su forme procedurali, sul "metodo" di soddisfare condizioni per la *costruzione* di intersoggettività.

- 4) Nel 2013 la rivista *Studi Kantiani* ha celebrato i suoi primi 25 anni di percorso. Secondo il suo parere, quale sarebbe il bilancio di questo progetto, riconosciuto ormai internazionalmente come luogo di incontro tra gli studiosi di Kant a livello internazionale?

Credo che il bilancio di «Studi kantiani», il cui merito va anzitutto e principalmente al suo fondatore, Silvestro Marcucci, sia molto positivo. Va ricordato che quando è apparso il primo numero, nel 1988, non esisteva nessun'altra rivista specialistica dedicata a Kant oltre le «Kant-Studien». Mantenere in vita una rivista a stampa in quegli anni non era facile e il circuito di internet non esisteva. Ora il numero di riviste specialistiche kantiane ha raggiunto la decina, ma il fatto che pur nell'ampio e importante contesto anglosassone, un'altra rivista del genere, la «Kantian Review», sia nata soltanto dieci anni dopo la fondazione di «Studi kantiani», nel 1998, dà la misura della portata dell'impegno di allora. Basti questo a far comprendere come il progetto fosse tanto coraggioso quanto lungimirante. L'intento era quello di offrire uno spazio di discussione e di visibilità alla ricerca kantiana italiana, per valorizzarne e concentrarne per così dire gli sforzi, ma anche di porla più decisamente in relazione con quella internazionale. Ricordo che «Studi kantiani» fin dall'inizio ha previsto la pubblicazione di contributi in cinque lingue: oltre che ovviamente l'italiano, il francese, l'inglese, lo spagnolo, il tedesco. La *Kant-Forschung* aveva e ha ancora la necessità di superare confini nazionali e culturali, e la sua indiscutibile espansione negli ultimi venti anni è il frutto anche di questa sempre maggiore permeabilità di confini che tuttavia va, credo, ancora intensificata. Per «Studi kantiani» questo si manifesta anche nel tentativo di dar conto, nelle recensioni, di lavori che appaiono in più lingue. Con l'espansione della produzione internazionale su Kant questo compito è allo stesso tempo più necessario e più difficile. Nell'*Editoriale* nel numero 2013 abbiamo cercato di indicare anche ulteriori linee di sviluppo: maggiore spazio a momenti di confronto e discussione, a contributi anche più direttamente teorici (abbiamo pubblicato in quella occasione due interviste a John Searle e Robert Brandom), mantenendo attenzione al lavoro di analisi e discussione che si svolge attraverso le recensioni (la loro possibile ampiezza, per consentire approfondimenti autentici, è una scelta da tempo della Direzione), con un lavoro da un lato più vasto (affiancando recensioni informative più brevi), dall'altro necessariamente più selettivo. Nei numeri in preparazione (2015 e 2016) introduciamo per la prima volta anche fascicoli parzialmente monografici, basati su *call for papers*: per il

2015 su “Kant e la biologia” (una tematica che vuole sottolineare un interesse attuale e ricordare insieme il lavoro su questi temi del fondatore, Silvestro Marcucci), per il 2016, con il contributo di *guest editors* (Sorin Baiasu e Ruhi Demiray), su “The Ethical and the Juridical in Kant”.

- 5) La ricerca kantiana svolta in lingua italiana è difficilmente scindibile dalla figura del professore e grande studioso delle varie dimensioni della teleologia e del metodo scientifico di Kant, Silvestro Marcucci. Quali sono i principali progetti accademici e le iniziative intraprese dalla Fondazione “Silvestro Marcucci”, con sede a Lucca, come il “Premio ‘Silvestro Marcucci’ per Tesi di Dottorato” concesso in collaborazione con l’*Accademia Lucchese di Scienze, Lettere e Arti*?

Ho appena ricordato il ruolo di Marcucci per la rivista, è notissimo anche quello di fondatore della *Società Italiana di Studi Kantiani*. La Fondazione è attiva su scala locale, con iniziative culturali di tipo diverso, non solo filosofico, e su scala internazionale, con altre iniziative tra le quali vanno ricordate oltre appunto al premio internazionale per tesi di Dottorato di tema kantiano, la partecipazione insieme alla *Kant-Gesellschaft* al *Kant-Nachwuchspreis*, conferito in coincidenza con le edizioni dell’*Internationaler Kant-Kongress* (con questa formula di collaborazione per la prima volta a Pisa – con cerimonia di premiazione a Lucca, città di Marcucci – nel 2010) e la cura della collana di studi filosofici “Zetetica”, presso le Edizioni ETS, nella quale è apparsa recentemente, tra l’altro, l’edizione italiana di *The Sources of Normativity* di Christine Korsgaard. Naturalmente la filosofia e la tradizione kantiana rappresentano un aspetto importante degli interessi della Fondazione, che però si è data come si diceva uno scopo più ampio di promozione culturale e ha già agito in campi diversi. E’ da ricordare anche la Biblioteca della Fondazione, nella bellissima villa di Quiesa/Massarosa, il cui catalogo è ora accessibile online, e che contiene in primo luogo, ma non solo, il lascito di libri e altri documenti scientifici di Marcucci.

- 6) Con la prospettiva che concedono i quattro anni trascorsi dalla celebrazione del *XI. Internationaler Kant-Kongress* di Pisa, sotto il titolo di “Kant und die Philosophie in weltbürgerlicher Absicht”, quali ritiene che sarebbero i principali contributi che questo incontro internazionale ha donato alla ricerca kantiana in lingua italiana e internazionale, i cui *Atti* sono stati pubblicati recentemente dalla casa editrice Walter de Gruyter?

Il contributo principale è stato quello consueto, ma diventato sempre più centrale, di consentire l'incontro di una comunità di ricerca di ampiezza e di qualità ormai impressionanti: credo siano rari, nell'ambito delle scienze umane, congressi di queste dimensioni, con quasi quattrocento relatori, che abbiano un focus tematico così definito, riferito ad un unico autore. Il vicino *Kant-Kongress* di Vienna di quest'anno ne darà certamente un altro esempio. Questa ampiezza e ciò che essa comporta è un dato ormai evidente, ma credo non sia inopportuno sottolinearlo, perché non mancano tuttora studiosi e colleghi che ritengono e sostengono che su Kant “sia stato detto tutto” e scoraggiano perfino progetti di ricerca di giovani in questo campo: bastano i fatti, appunto, a smentire questa idea, per altro curiosa. Al di là degli aspetti quantitativi, ormai credo irreversibili (per il congresso di Pisa ci siamo trovati con quasi 700 contributi da selezionare), i contenuti del congresso hanno mostrato un momento di particolare vivacità delle più diverse forme di studio e “uso” del pensiero kantiano. Credo che l'ambito in cui si registra la maggiore ripresa di interesse teorico e di conseguenza anche di lavoro esegetico su Kant sia negli ultimi anni quello morale, e anche qui il dato quantitativo (il numero di contributi su tematiche etiche nel Congresso è stato il maggiore rispetto ad altre prospettive) è semplicemente la spia di un interesse di fondo e più radicato. Ma un dato culturale di base è, credo, il fatto che nei confronti del pensiero kantiano siano cadute barriere pregiudiziali, come accennavo anche prima, che in decenni passati ne ostacolavano la circolazione in alcuni contesti filosofici. Naturalmente siamo lontani da formule che sarebbero oggi poco significative e utili come lo «zurück zu Kant!» – semplicemente Kant è tornato ad essere un serbatoio di modelli di pensiero con cui è inevitabile confrontarsi, per la sua duttilità e ampiezza, indipendentemente dagli esiti della riflessione filosofica di ognuno. Nel Congresso pisano si è fatto anche il tentativo di riportare l'attenzione, da un lato, sul *Weltbegriff* kantiano di filosofia, che, per uno dei paradossi della storia del pensiero, nonostante l'enfasi di Kant su di esso, era rimasto fuori dallo sguardo di molti; dall'altro,

di portare l'attenzione sulla tematica metafilosofica in quanto tale, ossia sulla questione circa la natura del pensiero filosofico, circa il suo ruolo e i suoi compiti, che quel concetto kantiano della filosofia come ciò che «interessa necessariamente ognuno» può contribuire a riproporre, in un momento storico dove la filosofia ha assunto connotati molto specialistici, spesso giustificati, e allo stesso tempo si trova di nuovo sfidata dal riproporsi di prospettive scientiste, non nuove, anzi ricorrenti, ma rinvigorite da successi veri e apparenti delle neuroscienze, che ne mettono in questione radicalmente il senso. Questo aspetto – per il quale si era tentato di coinvolgere non solo studiosi di Kant – mi sembra almeno parzialmente riuscito nel lavoro testimoniato dagli Atti: non è facile condurre studiosi diversi su riflessioni comuni, ma mi sembra che i *Plenarvorträge* abbiano sviluppato in un certa misura un lavoro convergente sul concetto di filosofia in e oltre Kant, e che la sezione tematica su *Kants Begriff der Philosophie*, dedicata al *Leitmotiv* del Congresso, con quasi trenta contributi, abbia offerto approfondimenti importanti. Per il resto, quasi cinquemila pagine di atti testimoniano che su Kant c'è da dire ancora molto e probabilmente l'estensione anche geografica della ricerca, coinvolgendo più culture filosofiche, non potrà che rinforzare questo percorso. Non ho statistiche precise per questo congresso e i passati, ma il numero di nazionalità coinvolte è stato notevolissimo.

- 7) Da alcuni anni la comunità scientifica dell'America latina —specie nel Brasile, nell'Argentina, nella Colombia e nel Cile— ha mostrato un'eccezionale capacità di ricerca, riguardante tanto la produzione scientifica come l'organizzazione di eventi accademici incentrati sul pensiero di Kant. Anche in Asia sono riscontrabili importanti contributi agli studi kantiani. Steven Palmquist (Hong Kong Baptist University) organizzò nel 2009 un congresso internazionale e pubblicò nel 2010 il volume *Cultivating Personhood: Kant and Asian Philosophy* (W. De Gruyter). Per un altro canto, il gruppo di ricerca *Kant in Turkey*, coordinato da Lucas Thorpe, svolge un importante ruolo per lo sviluppo dello studio di Kant in quel paese. Per ultimo, paesi dell'Europa dell'Est come la Polonia e la Russia mostrano una dinamicità crescente che ha allargato significativamente le coordinate dei centri rilevanti negli studi kantiani. A suo avviso, come influisce questo ampliamento dei

centri di attività kantiana sul lavoro svolto nell'Europa? Assistiamo a una vera e propria globalizzazione dei *Kantian Studies*?

Questa domanda si ricollega a quanto dicevamo a proposito del Kant-Kongress del 2010. Tutte le iniziative che lei ricorda e altre – non posso non ricordare esplicitamente il lavoro della SEKLE, l'associazione kantiana con maggiore respiro internazionale già per sua "struttura genetica", per così dire, che mi sembra svolga e svolgerà un ruolo importantissimo, ma anche il grande lavoro della *Sociedade Kant Brasileira* – sono utili e benvenute. Credo sia necessario che ci si liberi di un certo "provincialismo" europeo-statunitense. Non è ovviamente una questione solo di estensione territoriale, e di ampliamento quantitativo. C'è già ora, da un lato, un problema di "eccesso" di produzione scientifica che deriva anzitutto dall'estendersi dell'interesse e semplicemente del numero di persone ed enti dedicati a questo tipo di ricerca; dall'altro, però, vi sono più cose ... non tra il cielo e la terra, ma sulla Terra di quante la nostra filosofia sospetti, e sicuramente un certo tipo di ricerca e di tradizione filosofica non è ancora presente in ogni parte e cultura del mondo, nonostante la "globalizzazione" anche degli studi kantiani cui lei accenna. Credo che noi vediamo le cose ancora con prospettive legate alla cultura "occidentale", ma penso alle tematiche di cui parlavamo all'inizio dell'intervista, e a quanto è connesso profondamente con il pensiero di Kant, ossia la questione dell'Illuminismo, o lo stesso cosmopolitismo politico, che per molte aree del mondo non rappresentano una tematica culturalmente "neutrale" e secondaria. Come accennavo, penso che il modello kantiano di Illuminismo sia particolarmente duttile e assai poco etnocentrico, insomma difficilmente piegabile ad imperialismi culturali, ma mi chiedo che prospettive ci sono per una diffusione di tematiche del pensiero kantiano che non riguardi solo una cerchia di specialisti e che forme questo potrà prendere. Che peso potrà assumere in certi contesti in futuro un pensatore per il quale religione e autorità politica possono «rivendicare rispetto sincero» soltanto se loro concesso da una ragione che riconosce «ciò che ha saputo resistere al suo esame libero e pubblico»? Che ruolo potrà avere un pensatore che riteneva che sulla libertà di critica «si basa addirittura l'esistenza della ragione», ragione il cui decreto «altro non è che l'accordo di liberi cittadini»? Non sono parole disperse in qualche scritto marginale, ma che stanno al centro della *Critica della ragion pura*. I secoli passati non cancellano il loro effetto dirompente, se usciamo dalla prospettiva di una cultura "occidentale". Una vera globalizzazione degli studi kantiani non può non connettersi, in

modo difficile da prevedere, con un processo culturale non accademico e che non coinvolga solo studiosi – e in questo senso un vero processo globale è lontano dal realizzarsi e coinvolgerà anche cose più grandi di quelle che riguardano noi kantisti. Questo non significa che ogni iniziativa di disseminazione e approfondimento del lavoro filosofico su e intorno a Kant non sia utile e significativa. Penso anzi, ritornando al nostro ambito più ristretto di studiosi, che sia assolutamente da favorire, e su questo non si è stati forse ancora abbastanza attivi. Chissà quando avremo un *Internationaler Kant-Kongress* in Asia o in Africa. Ma prima o poi dovrà essere possibile, e quando avverrà sarà un buon segno. D'altra parte, c'è e ci sarà da imparare da prospettive più globali e molteplici. In modo analogo a quanto avviene, ad esempio, in scritti di Amartya Sen (penso al recente *L'idea di giustizia*), nei quali la tradizione europea viene intrecciata con portati del pensiero indiano o "orientale".

- 8) L'Italia è uno dei paesi con una maggiore dispersione di ricercatori in tutto il mondo. Molti studiosi italiani attivi all'estero confermano l'ottima preparazione accademica offerta dall'Italia e sono un esempio di mobilità internazionale, ma sono anche il sintomo di una mancanza progressiva di opportunità negli atenei nazionali. Potrebbe tentare di elaborare un'analisi delle cause di questo fenomeno, specialmente caratteristico della ricerca in Italia?

Al di là del fatto positivo che molti ricercatori italiani cercano e trovano apprezzamento e lavoro all'estero, il problema è che in troppi casi si tratta di una scelta obbligata. La mancanza di opportunità in Italia è un fenomeno triste che meriterebbe un discorso lungo. Ma forse si può ridurre a pochi elementi essenziali. L'Italia spende da sempre pochissimo per l'istruzione e nello specifico per l'Università: i dati OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, in Italia la chiamiamo OCSE) del 2013 indicavano una spesa in rapporto al PIL (prodotto interno lordo) inferiore del 63% rispetto alla media europea, e tra le peggiori d'Europa (di meno solo Ungheria e Repubblica Slovacca). In questo quadro già drammatico si è scelto di ridurre il reclutamento di nuovi docenti universitari in modo significativo. La crisi economica mondiale non c'entra nulla: i dati OECD mostrano che dal 2008 (inizio della crisi economica mondiale) al 2010 su 30 paesi l'Italia è la seconda nazione, dopo l'Ungheria, per la riduzione delle spese per l'Università,

mentre alcune nazioni, nonostante la crisi, la spesa per istruzione e ricerca l'hanno aumentata. Né ha senso parlare di un eccesso di docenti: il rapporto studenti/docenti è ampiamente inferiore alla media OECD e siamo per questo fattore tra i peggiori dei paesi appartenenti a tale organizzazione. Eppure ecco cosa è successo: nel 2008 c'è stata una legge che prevedeva il blocco del *turn over* (l'impossibilità di assumere docenti per sostituirne altri che andavano in pensione) fino al 2012 per la gran parte delle università (poche potevano assumere per un 50%); tuttora vige una legge che limita fortissimamente fino al 2018 la possibilità di utilizzare risorse liberate per nuove assunzioni. Senza entrare in dettagli, si può sottolineare che dal 2008 ad oggi il numero dei docenti attivi nelle università italiane è diminuito di quasi 10.000 unità; ma quel che è peggio le normative vigenti rendono assai difficile seguire per le assunzioni criteri didattici o culturali, poiché le possibilità di reclutamento sono legate a complicate variabili finanziarie che coinvolgono intere università, rette da una *governance* sempre più verticistica. In questo contesto, di generale riduzione dei finanziamenti e di difficoltà di reclutamento, la filosofia resta spesso schiacciata: non ha un ruolo forte nei contesti accademici e soprattutto non lo ha in una università sempre più condizionata da visioni aziendaliste, dove ciò che conta è ciò che si può *contare*: non soltanto ciò che è misurabile in termini quantitativi, ma ciò che sembra poter dare un risultato direttamente economico. Questo è un secondo aspetto, che si unisce a quello della costante riduzione di fondi che si è avuto in Italia, ed è un aspetto che non riguarda solo l'Italia: l'asservimento dell'Università ad una distorta concezione di *accountability*, che viaggia su meccanismi di *evaluation*. Si dice che il mondo accademico deve "rendere conto" all'esterno delle sue attività, e a chi lo finanzia: ma coloro cui si rende effettivamente conto, attraverso indicatori numerici che servono a "decisori" per decidere su cose di cui non capiscono nulla, non sono i cittadini o gli studenti, ma le lobby economiche e i governi che le incarnano. In Italia abbiamo una classe politica purtroppo tra le peggiori d'Europa, e non solo, che ha sviluppato un progetto di appropriazione dell'Università nello stesso momento in cui la metteva sempre di più in difficoltà, aiutata da vere e proprie campagne di denigrazione nei mass media. L'Italia è (ancora una volta) in fondo alle classifiche europee per numero di laureati, ma si legge sulla stampa che ne abbiamo troppi, e che laurearsi è inutile. Se si guardano i dati sul numero di pubblicazioni, sul numero di pubblicazioni per ricercatore, sul loro numero in rapporto alle risorse impiegate, sulle citazioni (dati che se hanno senso lo hanno per grandi aggregazioni)

l'Italia rivaleggia con i primi 6-7 paesi del mondo; eppure il nostro giovane Presidente del Consiglio ha detto recentemente in televisione che “sono venti anni che ci diciamo che l'Università fa schifo”. Insomma, è triste dirlo, ma abbiamo in Italia una commistione tra una tendenza che è internazionale alla aziendalizzazione dell'Università (ricordo l'importante appello “They have chosen ignorance” che sottolinea le politiche distruttive della ricerca a livello europeo) e la colpevole e spesso voluta disattenzione della classe politica italiana verso istruzione e università, che è diventata una sciagurata caratteristica di questo paese.

In questo contesto, come dicevo, la filosofia (come in gran parte le “humanities”) è particolarmente debole, accademicamente e culturalmente, perché strutturalmente lontana dalla possibilità di essere immediatamente monetizzabile. Cito spesso una bella frase dello studioso di Cambridge Stefan Collini, secondo cui «there is obviously something wrong in our public discourse if the only acceptable justification for spending money is that it contributes to making more money». Che qualcosa “serva” per il pensiero critico, per il progresso civile, per favorire anche la discussione pubblica, per promuovere diritti, giustizia, sembra stia diventando un dettaglio.

I giovani (e ormai anche non giovanissimi) ricercatori italiani sono vittima di questa situazione, e fra questi i filosofi sono in particolare difficoltà. Si deve dare loro forzatamente il consiglio di guardare oltre l'orizzonte nazionale, e anche oltre quello europeo, ed è quello che molti stanno facendo. Ma non è per tutti una scelta facile, e soprattutto non è più una scelta quando diventa una strada quasi obbligata, che va al di là della necessità e dell'interesse di svolgere esperienze di ricerca e insegnamento all'estero. Di questo la ricerca e la società italiana pagherà – in termini culturali, di progresso civile, ma alla fine non solo – il conto. C'è una frase molto citata, alla quale credo si ispiri anche l'*Open letter* “They have chosen ignorance” che ricordavo prima, pronunciata dall'ex-rettore di Harvard Derek Bok: “If you think education is expensive, try ignorance”. Bene, la classe politica italiana questo esperimento lo sta facendo, sistematicamente, da tempo, e credo che i risultati si vedano già e sempre più si vedranno. E' un peccato che nel tessuto sociale e anche nel mondo accademico le resistenze contro di ciò siano tutto sommato molto poche.

- 9) Negli ultimi anni sono aumentate le riviste internazionali di studi kantiani fondate in aree come la latinoamericana, sia di lingua portoghese che spagnola, tra le quali la più recente è *Con-textos kantianos*. Quali obiettivi ritiene che periodici simili dovrebbero prefiggersi?

Nell'*Editoriale* del numero 2013 di «Studi kantiani» ricordavamo le riviste kantiane esistenti, e mi permetto di ricordarle di nuovo con le loro date di nascita: oltre «Kant-Studien» (1896) e «Studi kantiani» (1988), la «Kantian Review», gli «Studia Kantiana» brasiliani (entrambe 1988), la rivista giapponese «Nihon Kantkenkyu» (2000); «Kant E-prints», online, edita in Brasile (2002), il «Kant Yearbook» (Lussemburgo/Germania) (2009); «Kant Studies Online» (2011), e appunto «Estudos Kantianos», Marília, Brasile (2013) e infine il vostro «Con-Textos Kantianos (International Journal of Philosophy)». Sono dieci, e per chi pensa che una rivista sia solo un contenitore sarebbero troppe. In questa logica, che è quella dei *ranking* e dei *rating*, delle classifiche, degli indicatori – dispiace ritornare sul tema, ma il tema è invasivo – bastano poche riviste, “internazionali”, possibilmente in inglese, indicizzate, magari anche (perché no?) solo una. Io credo che una rivista sia un luogo di aggregazione, di proposta culturale, legata ad un contesto, la cui sola presenza cambia un ambiente di ricerca, senza che ciò ne limiti la portata internazionale. Alcune idee di “internazionalizzazione” sono paradossali, perché conducono alla scomparsa delle realtà nazionali e dunque anche dell’ “*inter-*”. Premetto questo perché credo che il proliferare di riviste specialistiche su Kant, oltre che rispecchiare quella notevolissima espansione e “globalizzazione” della ricerca che si diceva, non possa che essere un fattore positivo. Nello specifico, le riviste di lingua portoghese e questa di lingua spagnola riflettono un dato di fatto, testimoniato dalla notevolissima attività della ricerca brasiliana e lusitana (ricordo il *Kant-Kongress* del 2005, il Trilaterale a Lisbona del 2009) e quella sudamericana ed europea in lingua spagnola (ricordo i congressi SEKLE di Bogotà e Madrid). Trovo importante anche che l’internazionalità significhi plurilinguismo e non monolinguisimo, e il fatto che «Con-Textos Kantianos» intenda pubblicare in spagnolo, portoghese, tedesco, francese, inglese e italiano è assolutamente da salutare. Se si tiene conto poi che lo spagnolo è la lingua più parlata al mondo dopo il cinese, e del livello davvero notevole della ricerca in questa lingua (il congresso SEKLE di Bogotà mi ha definitivamente convinto di questo), credo che la mancanza di una rivista che facesse riferimento a quest’area linguistico-culturale fosse davvero un paradosso. Penso che la

funzione principale delle riviste in lingua portoghese e spagnola sia di far uscire la ricerca kantiana da un paradossale provincialismo anglo-tedesco: naturalmente la lingua inglese è indispensabile, quella tedesca è la lingua di Kant, e il livello degli studi tedeschi e anglosassoni resta altissimo; ma l'attenzione nell'universo del kantismo è ancora asimmetrica, e con il tempo le cose possono cambiare. Naturalmente non si tratta però di favorire soltanto il dialogo tra aree linguistico-culturali, ma anche di creare spazi di ricerca specifici, motivazioni, occasioni, anche "interne", e le potenzialità dell'ambito linguistico spagnolo sono, ripeto, a mio avviso, enormi.

- 10) Le Società accademiche dedite allo sviluppo dello studio e espansione della conoscenza del pensiero e delle opere di Kant si sono moltiplicate negli ultimi anni. Tutte mantengono un rapporto stretto con la *Kant-Gesellschaft* che presiede attualmente il prof. Bernd Dörflinger (Università di Trier), ma forse sarebbe anche utile incoraggiare la celebrazione di incontri federali tra di esse, per dirla così, attuando così il progetto di un "congresso di società" integrato da esse. Cosa ne pensa sulla proposta di intensificare i rapporti tra questi spazi di ricerca, ispirata dai principi del diritto cosmopolitico kantiano?

In effetti un incontro tra le varie Società kantiane non si è mai svolto, nonostante tanti rapporti bidirezionali e multidirezionali. Potrebbe essere una buona idea promuovere un incontro tra i rappresentanti di tutte le società kantiane esistenti, magari anche con l'obiettivo di cercare un qualche coordinamento. Vi sono esperienze di collaborazione a più voci, come i congressi multilaterali che si sono andati sviluppando dal "trilaterale" italo-lusitano-brasiliano iniziato a Verona-Padova e proseguito a Lisbona, e poi diventato multilaterale con il coinvolgimento della *Kant-Gesellschaft*, della ricerca spagnola e ibero-americana, e recentemente della *North American Kant Society*. Devo dire che per quanto riguarda i congressi la situazione dell'espansione della ricerca kantiana può creare, a differenza delle riviste, un eccesso o un sovraffollamento. Se vi è spazio per una moltiplicazione di lavori e di studiosi che si occupano di Kant, il tempo invece impone dei limiti. Forse una strada in questo ambito è andare verso una sempre maggiore specializzazione tematica, non pensando solo a convegni che abbraccino molteplici aspetti, ma ad incontri con un focus molto preciso. Al contempo, si potrebbe allargare, appunto,

l'intreccio tra ambiti nazionali e società, ma perseguendo anche questa impostazione. Resterebbero i grandi momenti di incontro collettivo e ad ampio spettro come l'*Internationaler Kant-Kongress*, ma si potrebbe avviare un lavoro di collaborazione al contempo più trasversale (tra più paesi) e più “microscopico” – con possibilità forse di discussioni anche più fruttuose.



La téléologie critique et ses paradigmes scientifiques.

Sur la méthode de l'Histoire selon Kant

The Critical Teleology and Its Scientific Paradigms.

On Kant's Historical Method

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Résumé

Les textes de Kant sur l'histoire sont souvent traités comme secondaires par les philosophes qui travaillent sur les systèmes de pensée, tandis que certains interprètes les qualifient de « quatrième critique ». La thèse défendue ici est que l'intervention de la critique kantienne dans le champ des pratiques et des réflexions historiques constitue un tournant décisif. Au moment où l'idée de progrès s'affirme contre les deux paradigmes dominants de l'histoire locale et de la théodicée chrétienne, était nécessaire un traitement critique de la notion même de progrès qui soit à la hauteur du défi scientifique : établir la légitimité d'une science historique, pour autant qu'elle soit possible. Trois modèles de sciences constituent l'horizon de scientificité que l'histoire doit viser même si elle ne doit jamais l'atteindre : l'astronomie, la physique et la biologie. La téléologie est au cœur de cette entreprise, elle en est l'instrument. Elle est au cœur de l'entreprise parce qu'elle est par ailleurs aussi la science de la vie interne des organismes. C'est donc à partir de la téléologie, de l'opposition entre son usage « dogmatique » dans les sciences naturelles, « critique » dans la science historique, que nous entreprenons ici de cerner la question de la « science de l'histoire » chez Kant.

Mots clés

Philosophie de l'histoire; Sciences ; Astronomie ; Physique ; Biologie ; Téléologie

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Abstract

Kant's texts on history are often considered as minor or subsidiary by the interpreters concerned with philosophical systems whereas some of them qualify these writings as a "fourth critique". The present paper defends the thesis that Kant's critical intervention on the field of the historical reflections and practices of the 18th Century represents a decisive scientific turn. Whilst the idea of progress asserts itself against the two dominant paradigms of local history and Christian theodicy a critique of the notion of progress itself was necessary in order to establish the legitimacy of a science of history, provided that this would be possible. The scientific ideal which history had to aim at was constituted by three established models: astronomy, physics, and biology. The core and the instrument of this enterprise is the teleology. It is in the middle of the challenge because it is also the science of the living organisms. The difference between its "dogmatic" use in the natural sciences and the "critical" use in the historical science is therefore the anchor from which we can try to define Kant's understanding of science in historical matters.

Keywords

Philosophy of history; Sciences; Astronomy; Physics; Biology; Teleology

La « forme historique », dit Kant, « n'a aucun fondement dans la raison¹ » ; c'est bien pourquoi on ne peut tirer aucune vérité rationnelle de la simple observation des faits historiques. Les connaissances historiques sont donc accumulées « sans système² ». L'impression de désordre et d'irrationalité qu'offre le monde tient au fait que notre entendement est impuissant à opérer la « liaison de la diversité selon des concepts » qui est selon la *Logique*³ le fondement d'une connaissance scientifique.

Kant dira dans la neuvième proposition de l'essai *Idée d'une histoire universelle d'un point de vue cosmopolitique* qu'il ne s'agit certes pas de supprimer l'étude empirique de l'histoire et qu'une « tête philosophique doit au demeurant posséder une grande érudition historique⁴ ». Pourtant, une telle connaissance ne saurait orienter notre pratique dans l'histoire à venir et à faire, ni même nous permettre de porter un jugement général sur le cours de l'histoire passée. Quant à fonder l'idée de progrès sur l'observation du spectacle du monde, c'est se condamner à y trouver, du fait de la folie humaine, une « réfutation constante » de cette quête.

¹ *Logik-Nachlaß*, AA 16, Nr. 2225.

² *Ibid.*, Nr. 2229.

³ *Ibid.*, Nr. 2708.

⁴ « Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht », in: W, IX, 50.

La tentative qu'entreprend Kant pour fonder une philosophie de l'histoire fait encore écho en 1784 au traumatisme de la dévastation de l'Europe par la Guerre de Trente Ans. Elle a donc pour enjeu de surmonter la vision baroque du monde qui en découle. Il est frappant qu'en 1793 encore, au début du *Traité Pour une paix perpétuelle* Kant rappelle – de façon plaisante – cet arrière-plan historique en évoquant l'enseigne d'une auberge située en face d'un cimetière et dénommée « Zum ewigen Frieden ». La blague a valeur d'archétype ; on la retrouve au fronton de tous les bistrotts qui font face à un cimetière ou à une prison : « Ici c'est mieux qu'en face. » Il établit ainsi une relation entre le chaos de la Guerre de Trente Ans et les interminables guerres de coalition qui dévastent l'Europe après la Révolution française. Ce n'est toutefois pas à proprement parler sous cet aspect historique que nous voulons ici aborder les textes de Kant sur l'histoire, mais sous l'aspect de la rupture épistémologique qu'ils veulent justement affirmer avec ce qu'on peut appeler l'Ancien régime philosophique⁵.

1.

Kant, incontestablement, rompt avec le courant dominant du 18^e siècle, tel que l'exprime Montesquieu. L'historiographie philosophique, par l'étude en quelque sorte « empirique » des civilisations, doit selon Montesquieu dégager l'histoire et la politique de l'emprise de la théologie et de la morale religieuse. « Cet ouvrage », dit-il de l'*Esprit des Lois*, « a pour objet les lois, les coutumes et les divers usages de tous les peuples de la terre⁶. » Montesquieu voulait ainsi « faire de la politique une science », fonder une véritable physique sociale en accord avec l'esprit de la physique nouvelle en partant des faits et en dégagant des lois⁷. La religion ne peut tenir lieu de science à l'histoire, la morale non plus ; ainsi la vertu « n'est point une vertu morale, ni une vertu chrétienne, c'est la vertu politique⁸ ». Montesquieu se refuse expressément à juger de ce qui est par ce qui doit être, c'est-à-dire, selon ses propres termes, à tirer ses principes de ses préjugés et non « de la

⁵ Sur la signification proprement politique de cette appellation voir mon livre (1996; réed. 2003), et des articles complémentaires (1996a ; 1996b et 1998).

⁶ Montesquieu (1951, p. 1137, *Défense de l'Esprit des lois*, Seconde partie, Idée générale).

⁷ Cf. Althusser (1969, p. 14sq.).

⁸ Montesquieu (1951, p. 227, Avertissement).

nature des choses⁹ ». Montesquieu, dit Althusser, « fut le premier à proposer un principe positif d'explication universelle de l'histoire¹⁰ ».

Comme le rappelle Cassirer,

« en physique, la connaissance avait déjà franchi depuis la Renaissance le pas décisif, la *nuova scienza* de Galilée avait réclamé et obtenu sa dignité propre et son indépendance comme pensée scientifique. Comme Kant, toute la philosophie des Lumières pouvait donc considérer la physique mathématique comme un 'fait' dont on pouvait évidemment débattre des conditions de possibilité mais dont la réalité s'imposait sans conteste ni réserve. Pour l'histoire en revanche, il restait encore tout un travail à accomplir; il n'était pas question de s'appuyer sur l'existence *de facto* d'une science comparable, par son degré de certitude et la fermeté de ses raisons, à la physique mathématique. Il fallait au contraire, en un seul et même mouvement de pensée, conquérir le monde de l'histoire et le fonder, l'assurer en cours de conquête». ¹¹

La question sera donc d'abord de savoir si l'histoire est une science au sens rigoureux que Kant réserve à ce terme, c'est-à-dire une science sur le modèle de la physique. A cette question Kant répond par la négative. Or, si elle n'est pas une science, elle relève, selon la préface à la seconde édition de la *Critique de la raison pure*, de la métaphysique et, selon la formule célèbre, là où on limite le savoir, c'est pour faire place à la foi. S'il en est ainsi le philosophe peut remettre le *Conflit des facultés* dans sa poche et la faculté de philosophie n'a plus qu'à se soumettre à la domination sans partage de la faculté de théologie. Le problème est d'autant plus aigu que, comme le rappelle également Cassirer, c'est la théologie qui a su aux 17^e et 18^e siècles prendre en compte l'histoire. D'un côté, l'exégèse s'est affranchie du dogme de l'inspiration verbale et lancée dans l'histoire critique des livres bibliques, interrogeant le contenu de vérité de la Bible. De l'autre Bossuet propose dans son *Discours sur l'histoire universelle* une interprétation religieuse universelle de l'histoire. De plus l'idée de progrès est elle-même d'origine religieuse, judéo-chrétienne ; elle est étrangère à la pensée antique, notamment grecque, qui est dominée par une conception cyclique du temps (sauf par certains aspects chez les Sophistes et les Epicuriens). Dans la tradition judéo-chrétienne elle fonde l'histoire du Salut et la conception d'un destin unique de l'individu ou de l'Humanité. Fonder l'histoire

⁹ Montesquieu (1951, p. 229, Préface).

¹⁰ Althusser (1969, p. 52).

¹¹ Cassirer (1966, p. 209).

impliquait donc la sécularisation de l'histoire du Salut. Certes, il faut s'entendre ici sur le terme de sécularisation ; car Kant refuse tout autant le « chiliasme théologique » que sa simple transcription en un « chiliasme philosophique »¹². Le cadre d'interprétation religieux peut tout au plus être hérité comme « Idée ». Par Idée il faut entendre que l'histoire universelle, son but ultime et l'idée même de progrès relèvent de ce qui est pensable, mais non connaissable.

«Tout factum est objet dans le phénomène (des sens); en revanche ce qui ne peut être représenté que par la raison pure, ce qui doit être compté au nombre des Idées, auxquelles nul objet ne peut être donné dans l'expérience comme adéquat, ainsi une constitution juridique parfaite entre les hommes, c'est la chose en soi elle-même».¹³

L'Idée d'une constitution civile parfaite qui prend la relève de la *Civitas Dei* est donc une chose en soi ou une Idée transcendantale. Kant est sur ce point d'accord avec Rousseau, le scepticisme et le désabusement mis à part : l'histoire relève du domaine moral-pratique et non physique, du devoir-être et non de l'être :

«Le droit politique est encore à naître, et il est à présumer qu'il ne naîtra jamais. [...] Le seul moderne en état de créer cette grande et inutile science eût été l'illustre Montesquieu. Mais il n'eût garde de traiter de principes du droit politique; il se contente de traiter du droit positif des gouvernements établis; et rien au monde n'est plus différent que ces deux études. Celui pourtant qui veut juger sainement des gouvernements tels qu'ils existent est obligé de les réunir toutes deux: il faut savoir ce qui doit être pour bien juger de ce qui est».¹⁴

Toute la question consiste dès lors à déterminer comment, et sous quelle forme, le devoir-être intervient dans la connaissance de l'être, en l'occurrence l'histoire effective. La façon dont s'articule ici l'ordre de la raison pure et celui des phénomènes est différent de la connaissance physique.

«La raison pure contient donc, non pas, à la vérité, dans son usage spéculatif, mais dans un certain usage pratique, c'est-à-dire dans l'usage moral, des principes de la *possibilité de l'expérience*, à savoir d'actions qui, conformément aux principes moraux, pourraient être trouvées dans l'histoire de l'homme».¹⁵

¹² Cf. Crampe-Casnabet (1996, p. 136).

¹³ *Metaphysik der Sitten. Rechtslehre (Métaphysique des moeurs, Doctrine du droit)*, W, VII, 497.

¹⁴ Rousseau (1966, Livre V, p. 600).

¹⁵ „Die reine Vernunft enthält also, zwar nicht in ihrem spekulativen, aber doch in einem gewissen praktischen, nämlich dem moralischen Gebrauche, *Prinzipien der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung*, nämlich

Dans ce « pourraient » réside toute la différence, qui fait que la relation des principes et du donné ne peut être constitutive, comme en physique. Connaissance de la nature et philosophie pratique sont l'une et l'autre fondées sur des principes *a priori* ; mais dans la connaissance de la nature la philosophie « théorique » est « complétée » par des données physiques, tandis que la philosophie pratique est tirée uniquement de principes *a priori*. La raison morale ne peut donc en tant que telle fonder une *connaissance* de l'histoire¹⁶.

Au début du *Conflit* Kant ironise d'ailleurs sur l'« histoire *a priori* » :

« Comment est possible une histoire *a priori*? – Réponse : Si le devin fait et organise lui-même les événements qu'à l'avance il prédit ». ¹⁷

La raison morale-pratique peut seulement, en tant qu'impératif catégorique, orienter l'action des hommes; mais elle ne saurait constituer ni l'histoire, ni sa connaissance. Pour que ce soit le cas il faudrait que les hommes soient capables de comprendre et de suivre la loi morale. Il faudrait aussi que le simple respect de la loi suffise à transformer le monde en un monde rationnel et moral. Or, l'homme est fait d'un bois si nouveau (*Idée d'une histoire universelle d'un point de vue cosmopolitique*, 6^e proposition) – une image qui vient de saint Augustin et de Luther et que Kant reprendra dans *La religion dans les limites de la simple raison* – qu'on ne peut guère attendre d'effet en droite ligne de la loi morale, d'effet qui fonde le droit sur la droiture. L'homme, comme Herder l'avait déjà souligné, n'est ni totalement bon, ni totalement méchant; il est un mélange de bien et de mal¹⁸. Le progrès, comme Herder l'avait aussi bien vu, n'est pas linéaire et sa connaissance n'est jamais univoque. L'histoire offre plutôt le spectacle du désordre, voire du chaos. Pour Herder, seule la foi permet de garantir une unité supérieure.

Kant prend donc le parti d'admettre que la théorie ne coïncide *jamais* complètement avec l'expérience, *même dans les sciences exactes ou physiques* – ce qui lui permet de

solcher Handlungen, die den sittlichen Vorschriften gemäß in der Geschichte des Menschen anzutreffen sein könnten.“ (*Critique de la Raison pure*, Théorie transcendantale de la méthode, Chap. II, section 4 : « De l'idéal du Souverain bien », A 807, W IV, 678 ; trad. fr. par A. Tremesaygues et B. Pacaud, Paris, PUF 1971, p. 544).

¹⁶ C'est pourquoi Riedel a raison de dire: « Le paradoxe méthodologique de la philosophie kantienne de l'histoire réside en ce que pour sa fondation elle ne fait aucun usage direct du principe moral de la raison pratique », « Einleitung », in Riedel (1985, p. 12).

¹⁷ « Wie ist aber eine Geschichte *a priori* möglich? - Antwort: Wenn der Wahrsager die Begebenheiten selber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum Voraus verkündigt. » (*Der Streit der Fakultäten*, W IX, 351; trad. fr. par J. Gibelin: *Le Conflit des facultés*, Paris, Vrin 1955, p. 94).

¹⁸ Cf. *Conflit des facultés*, 2^e section, IV, W IX, 356 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 99.

contester qu'il faille en tirer des conséquences catastrophistes. Ainsi l'écart entre une théorie mathématique et une expérience déterminée prouve que la théorie est insuffisante, mais par défaut et non par excès, c'est-à-dire « qu'il n'y a pas assez de théorie¹⁹ ». Raisonner autrement conduit selon lui à abandonner le canon de la raison, c'est-à-dire à renoncer à la logique transcendantale, donc à se priver de toute perspective systématique, à accepter le morcellement et le désordre de l'expérience et à réduire les diverses disciplines scientifiques à de simples collections de faits dont il n'est guère possible de tirer, dans le meilleur des cas, que des recettes pragmatiques.

Vis-à-vis de l'historiographie Kant ne laisse d'en souligner les limites – qu'il connaît d'autant mieux qu'il se place, comme on l'a dit, d'emblée au point de vue scientifique de son époque (et on a tort à cet égard de souligner toujours la pensée morale de Kant en négligeant la somme de données scientifiques sur lesquelles il s'appuie). Sa conclusion, telle qu'il la rappelle dans la deuxième section du *Conflit des facultés* (IV), est sans appel: « On ne peut immédiatement résoudre le problème du progrès par l'expérience.²⁰ »

Vis-à-vis de la théologie Kant « joue le jeu » ; au début des *Conjectures sur les débuts de l'histoire humaine* il argumente sur le même terrain que Herder dans *Une autre philosophie de l'histoire* et dans les *Idées*, c'est-à-dire sur le terrain de la véracité de la tradition biblique. Mais s'il le fait, c'est pour conférer à cette dernière un autre statut que chez Herder, pour qui elle restait la référence en dernier recours. Kant en fait une reconstruction idéale, une « Idée » comme « fil directeur », un pur instrument méthodique de la téléologie, qu'il qualifie même de « voyage d'agrément » se servant de la Bible comme boussole (une métaphore scientifique peut-être pas si innocente qu'il peut paraître, sans parler bien entendu de la désinvolture délibérée avec laquelle est traité le texte biblique).

Ce fonctionnement heuristique de l'Idée constitue l'originalité de la théorie kantienne de l'histoire. Il articule l'histoire selon la morale et l'histoire factuelle sans faire de la téléologie, héritière de la théologie, le fondement de la théorie de l'histoire, comme c'est le cas chez Herder. Kant en renverse le statut et la définit au contraire dans la *Critique*

¹⁹ « daß nicht genug Theorie da war » (*Über den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis*, W IX 127) ; cf. Philonenko (1968, p. 23).

²⁰ W IX, 355 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 98.

de la faculté de juger comme la propédeutique de la théologie²¹. De la sorte va pouvoir être accomplie jusqu'à un certain point la liaison du rationnel et du donné qui, selon le modèle de la physique, rend seule possible la connaissance de l'expérience. Cette liaison va être de nature particulière.

2.

La quête de Kant n'est pas foncièrement différente de celle de Herder. Comme lui il souligne l'importance de l'histoire empirique mais aussi la nécessité de la dépasser pour (re)fonder l'idée d'un progrès général. Comme chez Herder la téléologie se voit confier la tâche de surmonter la coupure entre théorie et pratique – mais une téléologie indépendante de la théologie. Elle va assumer la fonction législatrice qui est celle du jugement dans tous les ordres dans lesquels il s'exerce – fonction médiatrice entre les concepts et l'intuition dans la connaissance physique, entre la théorie et la pratique dans l'ordre pratique²². Dans cet ordre le jugement téléologique va prendre en charge la mission suprême de la philosophie en mettant en relation les faits et les fins ultimes de la raison humaine (*teleologia rationis humanae* – telle est en effet la définition de la philosophie dans l'Architectonique de la Raison pure²³). Il permet de penser le monde sensible en référence au monde intelligible, sans pour autant confondre ces deux ordres. Le refus d'une telle confusion s'exprime entre autres à la fin de l'essai « Sur l'usage des principes téléologiques en philosophie » :

«Il fallait démontrer encore spécialement la possibilité d'une validité objective de tels concepts apriori par rapport au domaine empirique, pour qu'ils ne soient pas considérés ou comme étant sans signification ou comme issus de l'expérience».²⁴

Là où le jugement constitutif est impuissant, la tâche du jugement téléologique consiste à dépasser la connaissance purement accidentelle et désordonnée par une « histoire systématique », en ramenant les faits incohérents à certains principes

²¹ *Critique de la faculté de juger*, « Méthodologie du jugement téléologique », § 85, W VIII, 566, trad. fr. par A. Philonenko, Paris, Vrin 1965, p. 250.

²² Cf. *Über den Gemeinspruch...*, W IX, 127.

²³ *Critique de la Raison pure*, W IV, 700 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 562.

²⁴ « Sur l'emploi des principes téléologiques dans la philosophie », W VIII, 170 ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, in : Kant : *La Philosophie de l'histoire*, Paris, Aubier-Montaigne 1947, p. 210sq.

ordonnateurs, car « un système ne peut être construit par la simple collection de faits²⁵ ». Si elle n'en est pas l'accomplissement, qui ne serait atteint que par une construction déductive, la téléologie se veut le premier pas vers une « science historique » (*historische Wissenschaft*) qui serait une « science rationnelle » (*Vernunftwissenschaft*). C'est sans doute pourquoi Kant, malgré la nécessité de mettre en œuvre un type de jugement spécifique, ne perd jamais de vue le modèle physico-mathématique et ne manque pas de le faire valoir dès que l'occasion s'en présente. De même qu'un Kepler et un Newton ont pu démontrer, l'un, le mécanisme rigoureux des corps célestes et l'autre celui des corps terrestres, l'histoire attend son Newton ou son Kepler.

Trois modèles de sciences constituent l'horizon de scientificité que l'histoire doit viser même si elle ne doit jamais l'atteindre : l'astronomie, la physique et la biologie. La métaphore de l'astronomie, qu'il doit du reste peut-être à... Buffon²⁶, se trouve au moins à deux endroits décisifs : dans l'introduction de l'*Idée d'une histoire universelle d'un point de vue cosmopolitique*²⁷ et dans le *Conflit des facultés*.

L'introduction à l'*Idée d'une histoire universelle* est le passage le plus connu : c'est là que Kant invoque Newton et Kepler. Le passage du *Conflit* n'est pas moins suggestif puisqu'il reprend à son compte le principe de la révolution copernicienne :

«Peut-être aussi que si le cours des choses humaines nous paraît si insensé, cela tient au mauvais choix du point de vue sous lequel nous le considérons. Les planètes, vues de la terre, tantôt vont en arrière, tantôt s'arrêtent et tantôt vont en avant. Mais si notre point de vue est pris du soleil, ce que seule la raison peut faire, leur course s'effectue régulièrement d'après l'hypothèse de Copernic. Il plaît toutefois à quelques-uns, qui ne sont pas d'ailleurs des sots, de s'en tenir obstinément à leur façon d'expliquer les phénomènes et au point de vue une fois adopté ; quand bien même ils s'embarrasseraient jusqu'à l'absurde dans les cycles et les épicycles de Tycho. – Le malheur est précisément que nous ne puissions pas nous placer à ce point de vue quand il s'agit de prévoir des actions libres. Car ce serait celui de la Providence, qui est au-delà de toute sagesse humaine [...]».²⁸

En 1784, dans *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, c'est le paradigme de la physique qui prédomine. Il régit l'équilibre des forces de la sociabilité et

²⁵ *Logik-Nachlaß*, Nr. 2233.

²⁶ Ce qui reflète le contexte de dialogue épistémologique dans lequel s'accomplit le « tournant historique ».

²⁷ « *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* », W IX, 34 ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, op. cit., p. 61.

²⁸ *Conflit des facultés*, W IX, 355 ; trad. Fr., op. cit., p. 98sq.

de l'asocialité et l'idée que le droit est l'équilibre entre un maximum de liberté et un maximum de contrainte. Il en va de même à propos de la guerre :

«La nature a donc utilisé [...] l'incompatibilité des hommes et même l'incompatibilité entre grandes sociétés et corps politiques auxquels se prête cette sorte de créatures, comme un moyen pour forger au sein de leur inévitable antagonisme un état de calme et de sécurité. Ainsi, par le moyen des guerres, des préparatifs excessifs et incessants en vue des guerres et de la misère qui s'ensuit intérieurement pour chaque Etat, même en temps de paix, la nature, dans des tentatives d'abord imparfaites, puis finalement, après bien des ruines, bien des naufrages, après même un épuisement intérieur radical de leurs forces, pousse les Etats à faire ce que la raison aurait aussi bien pu leur apprendre sans qu'il leur en coûtât d'aussi tristes épreuves, c'est-à-dire à sortir de l'état anarchique de sauvagerie pour entrer dans une société des nations. [...] Toutes les guerres sont de ce fait autant de tentatives (non pas bien entendu dans l'intention des hommes, mais dans celle de la nature) pour réaliser de nouvelles relations entre les Etats, et, par leur destruction, ou du moins par leur démembrement général, pour former de nouveaux corps ; ceux-ci à leur tour, soit dans leurs rapports internes, soit dans leurs relations mutuelles, ne peuvent se maintenir, et par conséquent doivent subir d'autres révolutions analogues. Un jour enfin, en partie par l'établissement le plus adéquat de la constitution civile sur le plan intérieur, en partie sur le plan extérieur par une convention et une législation communes, un état de choses s'établira qui, telle une communauté civile universelle, pourra se maintenir par lui-même, comme un automate».²⁹

Ce passage est important à plus d'un égard. D'abord parce qu'il véhicule encore le regard baroque sur le monde de ruines provoquées par la folie humaine. Pour surmonter la vision baroque du monde – ce qui est l'enjeu de la philosophie kantienne de l'histoire – il substitue expressément et avec insistance le modèle mécanique au modèle organiciste qui dominait la conception chrétienne de l'histoire. Et il le fait de telle sorte que le simple mécanisme des relations entre les Etats est désormais de nature à *ré-organiser* (au sens fort) et à *constituer* (au sens fort également) des corps politiques. Il ne fait guère de doute que c'est cette prétention que les Romantiques récuseront en déniaut aux constructions politiques mécaniques la faculté de se substituer à une constitution organique issue de l'histoire. Enfin, on y reviendra plus loin, le paradigme mécanique, s'il est à la hauteur de cette ambition, confirme l'alliance de Copernic et de Newton proclamée dans l'introduction, et les révolutions politiques sont du même coup conçues comme des révolutions astronomiques.

²⁹ « Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht », septième proposition, W IX, 42sq. ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, op. cit., p. 69sq.

Il en résulte au demeurant une singulière conception de la Providence – une conception fort peu chrétienne et bien plutôt stoïcienne ainsi que l’a montré Reinhard Brandt³⁰. Brandt relève même des parentés avec le matérialisme d’Épicure et notamment avec la conception de la chute des atomes, que Kant discute d’ailleurs dans la septième proposition de l’*Idee d’une histoire universelle* et à laquelle Marx consacra sa thèse de doctorat. Kant se demande :

«Est-ce d’un concours épicurien des causes efficientes qu’il nous faut attendre que les Etats, comme les atomes de la matière, essaient, en s’entrechoquant au hasard, toute sortes de structures qu’un nouveau choc détruira à leur tour, jusqu’à ce qu’enfin, un jour, par hasard, l’une d’elles réussisse à se conserver dans sa forme (heureux hasard dont on n’imagine pas sans peine la réussite) ?».³¹

En 1795, dans *Zum ewigen Frieden*, il reprend expressément le problème posé par la 6^e proposition: « Ordonner une foule d’êtres raisonnables qui réclament tous d’un commun accord des lois générales en vue de leur conservation, chacun d’eux ayant d’ailleurs une tendance secrète à s’en excepter. » Kant n’hésite pas à dire qu’« un pareil problème doit (*muß*) pouvoir se résoudre car il ne requiert pas l’amélioration morale des hommes.³² »

Cette adhésion à l’évolution historique acquiert ici la valeur de l’affirmation d’une logique, car tel est le sens fort de nécessité du verbe *müssen*. Mais on connaît bien sûr la restriction que Kant apporte, dans la septième proposition de 1784, à cette réduction potentielle du politique à une légalité physique ; elle peut sans doute expliquer la civilisation, mais elle ne peut fonder la moralité : « Nous sommes civilisés au point d’en être accablés pour ce qui est de l’urbanité et des bienséances sociales de tout ordre. Mais quant à nous tenir déjà pour *moralisés*, il s’en faut encore de beaucoup³³. » Kant n’est donc pas prêt à assimiler, comme Leibniz dans les *Nouveaux Essais* ou comme Wolff, la mathématique et la science juridique ; la *Critique de la raison pure* est du reste claire sur ce point:

³⁰ Brandt (2007, p. 196).

³¹ « Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht », septième proposition, W IX, 43 ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, op. cit., p. 70.

³² *Zum ewigen Frieden*, W, IX, 224.

³³ « Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht », septième proposition, W IX, 44 ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, op. cit., p. 72.

«La philosophie fourmille de définitions défectueuses, surtout de définitions qui contiennent bien, réellement, certains éléments de la définition sans les contenir tous encore. [...] Dans la mathématique, la définition a rapport à l'esse, dans la philosophie au *melius esse*. Il est beau, mais souvent très difficile d'y arriver. Les juristes cherchent encore une définition pour leur concept de droit»³⁴.

Il s'ensuit que le problème du droit ne peut être résolu de façon satisfaisante d'un pur point de vue scientifique ; il requiert la raison pure pratique et la référence au devoir. En ce point le risque est grand, du même coup, de retomber dans la lecture moraliste et massivement normative qui a longtemps fait florès et qu'il reste extrêmement difficile de surmonter.

Kant appelle aussi l' « histoire systématique » histoire morale³⁵. Certes, il ne faut pas entendre par là simplement une histoire des mœurs, au sens des historiens de l'époque immédiatement antérieure, de Voltaire³⁶ ou de Montesquieu. Mais ce qu'il faut entendre, ce n'est pas non plus une histoire sur laquelle la morale, l'impératif catégorique, le devoir auraient la prétention d'étendre une poigne de fer. C'est bien plutôt une histoire dont l'enjeu est *la mise en relation du matériau historique avec la morale* (une sorte de « métaphysique des mœurs » dans le domaine historique). Cette mise en relation est la tâche du jugement réfléchissant, dont le mode de fonctionnement rompt avec l'usage dogmatique de la téléologie en utilisant la morale (l'Idée) pour interroger (rétrospectivement) des séquences d'événements historiques et tenter de rendre plausible le système de cette séquence de séquences qu'est l'histoire universelle (ou « cosmopolitique »). Ce faisant *ni* la morale, *ni* la téléologie ne sont fondamentales ; elles remplacent *ensemble* de façon *critique*, par leur tension, le fondement cosmo-théologique traditionnel.

3.

Pour bien comprendre ce qu'il faut entendre par « critique », il suffit de penser à la façon dont Leibniz « récupère » la cosmothéologie précritique : la monade est à la fois libre (historique) et déterminée ; elle est libre au sens où elle n'a besoin que de soi pour son développement, mais elle est déterminée dans la mesure où ce dernier s'inscrit dans

³⁴ *Critique de la Raison pure*, W, IV, 625 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 503. Cf. Philonenko (1968, p. 34).

³⁵ « *Sittengeschichte* » (*Conflit des facultés*, 2^e section, W IX, 351 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 94).

³⁶ *Essai sur les mœurs et l'esprit des nations et sur les principaux faits de l'histoire depuis Charlemagne jusqu'à Louis XIII* (1756), *Essai sur l'Histoire générale et sur les Mœurs et l'Esprit* (1764). En 1769, Voltaire fera de sa *Philosophie de l'histoire* (1765) le « Discours préliminaire » de l'*Essai*.

l'harmonie préétablie d'un ordre général. Kant réproche cette confusion des genres entre pratique et physique (déterminisme), physique et métaphysique (parce que et comme si) : la monade est libre mais tout se passe « comme si » elle était déterminée. Pour lui, ou bien elle est déterminée (et l'on est dans l'ordre physique du parce que), ou bien elle est libre et tout « se passe comme si » – on est alors dans la métaphysique, ou bien précisément dans l'ordre de l'histoire. Kant, comme le dit Philonenko, a compris « qu'il doit édifier la théorie de l'histoire sur le comme si³⁷ », et c'est bien ce qui fait toute l'exigence de cette entreprise car elle est appelée à remplacer de façon critique la métaphysique, ou du moins la métaphysique est appelée à se réaliser en elle.

Kant refuse que cette historicisation critique de la métaphysique se fasse sur le mode vulgaire des téléologies du 18^e, qui prennent seulement la relève de la théologie en substituant à l'autorité de la Révélation l'argument physico-théologique, ou sur le mode de cette autre forme de téléologisme dogmatique qui se développe dans les spéculations scientifiques. L'essai « Sur l'usage des principes téléologiques en philosophie » est à ce titre dirigé tout autant contre Herder que contre l'usage dogmatique de la téléologie dans les sciences. La téléologie herderienne cumule aux yeux de Kant ces deux défauts dans une sorte d'anthropo-théologie. Kant renouvelle ce refus farouche du dogmatisme de la finalité dans le § 63 de la *Critique de la faculté de juger*. Dans la *Lettre aux amis de Lessing* de Mendelssohn un Groenlandais, se promenant sur la banquise avec un missionnaire, s'exclame : « Ah ! Si l'aurore est belle, combien plus beau doit être Celui qui l'a faite ! » Le Groenlandais, rappelle Philonenko³⁸, c'est pour l'homme des Lumières ce qu'est proverbialement le Belge pour le Français, le Frison pour l'Allemand, l'Acadien pour le Québécois – un *Untermensch*, un imbécile. L'argument physico-théologique est donc imbécile. Kant dans le § 63 de la *Critique de la faculté de juger* « évoque le limon déposé sur les terres et qui en accroît la fertilité. Il n'y a en cela aucune finalité de sens dogmatique : c'est un effet de la nature que l'homme utilise³⁹ ». L'herbe n'est pas plus faite pour le mouton que le mouton pour être mangé par l'homme qui serait fait pour être mangé par le lion, fait pour être chassé par l'homme, etc. Raisonner ainsi conduirait, dit Kant au § 67, à affirmer que « les insectes qui infestent les habits, les poils et les lits de

³⁷ Philonenko (1986, p. 16).

³⁸ Philonenko (1986, p. 34).

³⁹ Ibid.

l'homme constituant, par une sage disposition de la nature, un aiguillon pour la propreté, en soi un point bien important déjà pour la conservation de la santé⁴⁰ ». En outre,

«Supposer une structure finale du monde déterminée par des solutions déjà préparées, c'est figer tout mouvement, évacuer les notions de réussite et d'échec et finalement nier la temporalité, source de progrès et d'adaptations»⁴¹.

Il s'ensuit que « la finalité relative, bien qu'elle donne hypothétiquement des indications, n'autorise aucun jugement téléologique absolu⁴² ».

Dans le *Conflit des facultés* (2^e section, V) Kant reprendra cette idée en soulignant que l'étude de l'histoire empirique ne fournit que des signes (*Geschichtszeichen*⁴³). Il faut donc parvenir à fonder la convergence de la nature et de la raison, montrer que les fins de la nature et les fins de la liberté concordent sans retomber dans le dogmatisme métaphysique, c'est-à-dire sans que la théologie ou le finalisme naturel envahissent la philosophie de l'histoire, comme c'est le cas chez Herder, qui cumule ces deux défauts. Le traité de 1791 sur les progrès faits par la métaphysique depuis Leibniz et Wolff consacre une section à la critique de la finalité dogmatique, et il est intéressant de remarquer que dans cette section Kant se réfère à Epicure, le penseur du hasard, et qu'il voit une fois de plus en lui – fût-ce ponctuellement – pour s'opposer à la « métaphysique de la nature »⁴⁴. Le progrès ne consiste pas plus – malgré le caractère captieux et ambigu des déclarations de Kant sur le « plan de la nature » ou de la « Providence » – en un « choix » intentionnel, délibéré, de la Nature qui reviendrait à une nécessité, à un déterminisme, qu'en une substitution consciente et voulue par les hommes des moyens de la culture – la moralité et le droit au déterminisme naturel. Kant se garde de substituer au désordre de la matière historique une *Naturphilosophie* et de surestimer l'idée de garantie naturelle ; lorsqu'on lit les déclarations qui parlent de cette dernière, par exemple dans *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte*, on doit toujours conserver à l'esprit que cette « garantie » n'a pas valeur de fondement mais qu'elle est établie par le jugement réfléchissant et que sa validité reste

⁴⁰ *Critique de la faculté de juger*, § 67, W VIII, 492.

⁴¹ Philonenko (1986, p. 34).

⁴² « [...] so folgt, daß die relative Zweckmäßigkeit, ob sie gleich hypothetisch auf Naturzwecke Anzeige gibt, dennoch zu keinem absoluten Urtheile berechtige. » (*Critique de la faculté de juger*, § 63, W VIII, 479).

⁴³ *Conflit des facultés*, 2^e section, W IX, 357.

⁴⁴ *Preisschrift : Welches sind die wirklichen Fortschritte der Metaphysik seit Leibniz' und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland*, W V, 630sq.

dans les limites heuristiques de ce dernier. A l'inverse, il est vrai que « comme une pure téléologie pratique, c'est-à-dire une morale, est destinée à réaliser ses fins dans l'univers, elle ne pourra négliger la possibilité de ces fins dans cet univers [...], la téléologie naturelle⁴⁵ ». Ni, ni. Il faut se garder par cette double exclusion de toute confusion entre l'ordre physique et l'ordre moral, entre l'objectif et le subjectif. « Nous n'observons pas dans la nature des fins intentionnelles comme telles » ; c'est seulement « en réfléchissant sur ses produits [que] nous ajoutons par la pensée ce concept comme fil conducteur pour le jugement⁴⁶ ». On ne peut que – mais on peut – dégager des régularités séquentielles. Dans sa période précritique, espérant sans doute y trouver une science mathématique sur laquelle fonder l'histoire, Kant s'est intéressé à l'avènement de la statistique et à sa capacité à fournir à tout le moins des indices de régularités, donc de légalité (voir notamment la quatrième considération dans la seconde partie de *l'Unique fondement possible d'une démonstration de l'existence de Dieu* en 1763⁴⁷). L'idéal n'a pas disparu ; il a changé de statut⁴⁸.

Il ne faut pas confondre l'objectif et le subjectif : pour qu'il y ait fin *de* la nature, il faut qu'il y ait un rapport de cause à effet et que l'idée de l'effet soit déjà présente dans la causalité « comme condition fondamentale pour la possibilité de l'effet⁴⁹ ». A cette seule condition, c'est-à-dire lorsque la chose se comporte vis-à-vis d'elle-même à la fois comme cause et comme effet, on peut parler de finalité objective ou naturelle. Dans tous les autres cas, tout se passe « comme si » une finalité existait mais elle est introduite par le sujet et ne se présente dans la nature elle-même que sous forme de finalité relative. En fait nous ne rencontrons la finalité naturelle de façon indéniable que chez les êtres organisés (réponse de Kant à la monade leibnizienne) qui, précisément, s'organisent eux-mêmes et chez lesquels la causalité peut être conçue aussi bien de façon « descendante » – série de causes efficientes et d'effets – que de façon « ascendante » – « liaison finale », *nexus finalis* ;

⁴⁵ « Sur l'emploi des principes téléologiques dans la philosophie », W VIII, 170 ; trad. fr. par S. Piobetta, p. 208sq.

⁴⁶ *Critique de la faculté de juger*, § 75 - W, VIII, 515).

⁴⁷ W II, 676sq.

⁴⁸ On peut déceler ce changement de statut dans la critique des inutiles énumérations et calculs (« Aufzählung » et « Berechnung ») à la fin du chap. 5 de la 2ème section du *Conflit* (W IX, 357 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 100).

⁴⁹ *Critique de la faculté de juger*, § 63, W, VIII, 477.

c'est-à-dire que la liaison des parties est telle que chaque partie semble déterminée par le tout et qu'à l'inverse le tout n'est possible que par la liaison des parties. On parle alors de finalité intérieure⁵⁰.

«Un produit organisé de la nature est un produit où tout est fin et moyen réciproquement; en lui rien d'inutile, sans but, ou dû à un aveugle mécanisme naturel».⁵¹

C'est en ce point qu'intervient le modèle de la science biologique. Les « germes » (*Keime*) et les dispositions innées « programment » en quelque sorte la finalité intérieure des individus selon une légalité supra-individuelle. Kant n'est pas le seul à s'y référer à son époque ; on trouve ce modèle notamment chez Isaak Iselin. C'est ce même modèle qui est affirmé dès les deux premiers paragraphes d'*Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte*. L'articulation avec le modèle dynamique de la physique se fait dans la proposition 4, où Kant expose qu'il y a en l'homme à la fois les germes du Bien et des germes de discorde. Mais il est encore plus intéressant de retrouver ce modèle dans l'*Opus postumum*, où même les révolutions *politiques* sont ainsi comprises – en sorte que placée *sous la double égide du modèle astronomique et du modèle biologique* elles redeviennent des révolutions au sens naturel et cyclique.

«Les êtres organisés forment sur terre, du point de vue de leurs fins, un tout qui, *a priori*, conserve ses espèces et celles de ses rejetons comme autant d'existences issues du même germe (d'un même œuf couvé en somme) et ayant besoin les unes des autres. Cela vaut aussi des révolutions de la nature qui ont engendré la nouvelle espèce à laquelle appartient l'homme».⁵²

4.

Il ne faut pas pour autant confondre les modèles scientifiques et leur usage téléologique, pas plus que la finalité dans l'ordre de la nature et l'usage de la notion de finalité dans l'interprétation de l'histoire. A cause de sa généralité le jugement réfléchissant « ne peut reposer uniquement sur des raisons empiriques ; il doit se former sur quelque principe *a priori*, ne serait-il que régulateur et même si ces fins se trouvaient uniquement dans l'idée

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, § 65.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, § 66, W VIII, 488.

⁵² « Die organisirte Geschöpfe machen auf der Erde ein Ganzes nach Zwecken aus, welches *a priori* als aus einem Keim (gleichsam bebrütetem Ey) entsprossen wechselseitig einander bedürftend seine und seiner Geburten Species erhält. Auch Revolutionen der Natur die neue Species wozu der Mensch gehört hervorbrachten. » (Akademie-Ausgabe, *op. cit.*, t. 22: *Opus postumum*, p. 241sq.)

de celui qui juge et nulle part dans une cause efficiente⁵³ ». Il remonte de l'observation de faits particuliers à ce principe général – lequel n'est que régulateur et ne saurait donc se substituer à la connaissance des causes efficientes :

«Il va de soi que ce principe n'est pas pour le jugement déterminant mais pour le jugement réfléchissant, qu'il est régulateur et non constitutif; il nous fournit un fil conducteur pour considérer les objets de la nature par rapport à un principe de détermination déjà donné, suivant un nouvel ordre de lois et d'élargir ainsi la science de la nature d'après un autre principe, celui des causes finales, sans dommage toutefois pour celui du mécanisme de la causalité»⁵⁴.

L'explication causaliste des phénomènes doit être poussée aussi loin que possible parce qu'elle seule est en mesure de constituer des connaissances; mais là où cette explication ne suffit pas, on peut et même on doit lui superposer le jugement de finalité, sans toutefois le confondre avec une connaissance à proprement parler. Le § 74 de la *Critique de la faculté de juger* oppose en ce sens l'usage dogmatique et l'usage critique :

«Nous procédons avec un concept d'une manière purement critique lorsque nous le considérons seulement en relation à notre faculté de connaître, donc aux conditions subjectives pour le penser, sans entreprendre de décider quoi que ce soit à propos de son objet. Le procédé dogmatique, avec un concept, est donc celui qui fait loi pour la faculté de juger déterminante, le procédé critique celui qui fait loi pour la faculté de juger réfléchissante».⁵⁵

Il en va de même en histoire. L'idée d'une histoire philosophique (ou « systématique ») n'est donc en rien un ersatz de théologie coupant court aux insuffisances de l'historiographie empirique – ce qui est pour Kant de la métaphysique, et qui plus est « de la métaphysique très dogmatique⁵⁶ » Elle est tout le contraire : elle s'appuie sur l'histoire empirique et ses progrès scientifiques; mais comme ceux-ci ne suffisent toujours pas à permettre une vision globale qui ne sera sans doute jamais possible, elle les soumet à un traitement critique à la lumière des fins de la Raison morale-pratique sans pour autant

⁵³ *Critique de la faculté de juger*, W VIII, 488.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, § 67, W, VIII, 492).

⁵⁵ « Wir verfahren mit [einem Begriffe] bloß kritisch, wenn wir ihn nur in Beziehung auf unser Erkenntnisvermögen, mithin auf die subjektiven Bedingungen, ihn zu denken, betrachten, ohne es zu unternehmen, über sein Objekt etwas zu entscheiden. Das dogmatische Verfahren mit einem Begriffe ist also dasjenige, welches für die bestimmende, das kritische das, welches bloß für die reflektierende Urteilskraft gesetzmäßig ist » (*Ibid.*, W, VIII, 510sq).

⁵⁶ « Compte rendu de Herder: *Idées en vue d'une philosophie de l'histoire de l'humanité* » (*Rezensionen von Herders Ideen*, 1785), W X, 792).

conférer à cette dernière un statut fondamental qui la transformerait en « néo-théologie ». On pourrait dire que le reproche que Kant adresse à Herder, c'est d'avoir clos avoir trop de confiance, c'est-à-dire de foi et par conséquent de façon théologique, le conflit entre l'empirique et le moral. Herder a en fait bâti toute sa tentative de critique et de dépassement des philosophies pessimistes et optimistes de l'histoire sur un court-circuit qui est chez Kant tout l'enjeu du jugement réfléchissant. Car ce dernier réclame seulement l'autorisation d'intervenir là où « il n'y a pas assez de théorie », étant entendu que, ce faisant,

«ce ne sont pas les fins de la nature, fondées uniquement sur des preuves tirées de l'expérience, mais une fin déterminée a priori par la raison pure pratique (dans l'Idée du Bien suprême), qui doit suppléer au défaut et aux insuffisances de la théorie. C'est un droit, ou plutôt un besoin analogue, de partir d'un principe téléologique là où la théorie nous abandonne, que j'ai essayé de justifier dans un petit essai sur les races humaines»⁵⁷.

« Critique » signifie donc que, dans l'usage qu'il fait de la téléologie, Kant, en lui refusant tout statut fondamental, met entre parenthèses les catégories de début et de fin en tant que catégories objectives et les remplace par la tension entre des « conjectures » et une « Idée ». A la fin de sa recension des *Idées* de Herder il précise que le philosophe ne verra dans la fin de l'Histoire qu'« une idée très utile du but vers lequel nous devons orienter nos efforts conformément à la Providence⁵⁸ ».

Cette mise entre parenthèses d'un commencement et d'une fin transforme la *prima philosophia* et la téléologie dogmatique qui en avait pris la relève en ce qu'on peut appeler une dynamique (au sens propre, dont Kant ne cesse de jouer dans ses écrits téléologiques sur l'histoire : un jeu de forces – même si on ne peut le réduire à une approche strictement physique qui permettrait de le connaître comme on connaît la connexion des phénomènes de la nature). Dans son essai sur le concept de race humaine (1785) Kant oppose la « description naturelle », statique, et « l'histoire naturelle » qui s'attache aux évolutions, lesquelles peuvent cependant à leur tour être considérées d'un point de vue déterministe (succession causale des phénomènes) ou comme « histoire pragmatique » (*pragmatische Geschichte*), c'est-à-dire comme développement d'une finalité. Il s'agit d'une des désignations d'une théorie globale de l'histoire susceptible de rendre compte du mouvement sans être déterministe ni dogmatiquement finaliste – une théorie qui surmonte

⁵⁷ « Sur l'emploi des principes téléologiques dans la philosophie », W VIII, 139 ; trad. fr., op. cit., p. 175sq.

⁵⁸ « Compte rendu de Herder », W X, 806.

l'abîme entre une approche transcendantale impossible et l'effectivité déroutante de l'histoire en actes.

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Sobre o aperfeiçoamento moral como destino da espécie humana

On Moral Perfection as Destiny of the Human Species

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Resumo

O objetivo deste artigo é discutir a idéia de aprimoramento moral em Kant. Mostramos que o aprimoramento moral se relaciona a idéia de agir por dever e que enquanto indivíduos tudo o que podemos fazer é agir moralmente e nos aprimorar moralmente, contribuindo assim para o aprimoramento moral da espécie. Este aprimoramento requer não apenas que trabalhemos pelo nosso próprio aperfeiçoamento, mas também, que trabalhemos pela felicidade dos outros. Porém por mais que trabalhemos pela felicidade dos outros, a realização do bem perfeito no mundo (*consummatum*), ou seja, a felicidade para os virtuosos, não depende inteiramente de nós e de nossos esforços individuais e como espécie. O destino humano então é o de nos aperfeiçoamos moralmente enquanto indivíduos, contribuindo desta forma para a mudança do caráter da espécie, nos tornando uma espécie não apenas capaz de moralidade, mas efetivamente moral, realizando o soberano bem (*supremum*) ao mesmo tempo que esperamos que todos estes seres morais sejam felizes, ou seja, que se efetive o soberano bem perfeito (*consummatum*).

Palavras chave

Kant; aperfeiçoamento moral; soberano bem (*supremum*); soberano bem (*consummatum*)

Abstract

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The main of this article is to discuss the idea of moral enhancement in Kant. We will show that moral enhancement is related do idea of *acting from duty* and as individuals all that we can do is to act morally and enhance ourselves morally, contributing for the moral enhancement of the human species. To achieve the moral enhancement of the human species, however, it is necessary not only to work for our enhancement, but also to work for the happiness of others. But even if we work for other's happiness, the accomplishment of the highest good (*consummatum*), I mean, the happiness for the virtuous, does not depend entirely on us and our efforts as individuals or as species. Human destiny ,then, is to morally improve ourselves as individuals, contributing this way to change the character of the species, becoming not only a species capable of morality but *de facto* moral, achieving the highest good (*supremum*), while hoping for the happiness of the virtuous, i.e., hoping for the accomplishment of the highest good (*consummatum*).

Keywords

Kant; Moral Enhancement; Highest Good (*supremum*); Highest Good (*consummatum*)

1. Introdução

Em vários momentos de sua obra Kant discute a espécie humana, sua destinação e seu aperfeiçoamento do ponto de vista moral. Na *Antropologia* (AA 07 322) ele sugere que uma boa caracterização do ser humano no sistema da natureza viva seria a de que «o ser humano tem um caráter que ele mesmo cria para si enquanto é capaz de se aperfeiçoar segundo os fins que ele mesmo assume», e a seguir sugere que «o homem se faz um animal racional na medida em que realiza o aperfeiçoamento mediante cultura progressiva, ainda que com muito sacrifício da alegria de viver».

Na *Crítica do Juízo* (AA 05 392) Kant nos esclarece o que ele entende por cultura. Afirma que cultura é a produção da aptidão de um ser racional para fins desejados em geral. É por isso, diz ele, que só a cultura pode ser o fim último ao qual se atribui à natureza a respeito do ser humano, e não, salienta Kant, a sua própria felicidade na terra. Aqui nos chama a atenção Kant sobre a importância da cultura da disciplina, que é negativa e consiste na libertação da vontade em relação ao despotismo dos desejos.

Em *Sobre a Pedagogia* (AA 09 441) Kant clarifica o tema da disciplina. Logo após afirmar que «a espécie humana é obrigada a extrair de si mesma, pouco a pouco, com suas próprias forças, todas as qualidades naturais que pertencem à humanidade, sendo que uma geração educa a outra», Kant reafirma que a disciplina é que impede o homem de desviar-

se de seu destino, de desviar-se da humanidade, através de suas inclinações animais. Adiante (AA 09 443) ele nos diz que o homem só se torna um verdadeiro homem pela educação. Kant (AA 09 444) chega a afirmar que o grande segredo da perfeição da natureza humana se esconde no próprio problema da educação, e aposta no aperfeiçoamento da espécie humana a través das gerações, sugerindo que

«talvez a educação se torne sempre melhor e cada uma das gerações futuras dê um passo a mais em direção ao aperfeiçoamento da humanidade». Entusiasmado nos diz Kant que “é entusiasmante pensar que a natureza humana será sempre melhor desenvolvida e aprimorada pela educação, e que isto abre a perspectiva para uma futura felicidade da espécie humana».

Observe-se que aqui Kant resgata a felicidade como fazendo parte daquilo a que nós humanos estamos destinados. Enquanto a felicidade humana não é o fim último humano, como Kant salienta em vários momentos de sua obra, a felicidade como um fim subordinado à moralidade se mostra possível, exatamente como Kant já previra na noção de soberano bem (*consummatum*), ou seja, o soberano bem perfeito. Este desenvolvimento, porém, rumo a nossa destinação, só pode acontecer através dos tempos, através das sucessivas gerações que aprendem e por sua vez transmitem às próximas gerações aquilo que acumularam. Para Kant em *Sobre a Pedagogia* (AA 09 446):

«Cada geração, de posse dos conhecimentos das gerações precedentes, está sempre melhor aparelhada para exercer uma educação que desenvolva todas as disposições naturais na justa proporção e de conformidade com a finalidade daquelas, e assim, guie toda a espécie humana a seu destino».

Qual é, entretanto o destino maior da espécie humana, que se realiza através das sucessivas gerações, que aprendem e deixam seu legado para as próximas e como ele se realiza no homem.¹

2. A espécie humana e seu destino

¹Tomamos como base para a elaboração deste artigo a *Antropologia de um ponto de vista pragmático* (Anth AA 07) a *Crítica da Faculdade do Juízo* (KU AA 05) e *Sobre a Pedagogia* (Päd AA 09). Não trabalhamos diretamente com a literatura secundária aqui, mas é importante mencionar, para que se entenda a discussão aqui desenvolvida sobre o aperfeiçoamento moral em Kant, nas suas diversas perspectivas, os artigos de autores como Alex Cohen, Chris Suprenant, Felicitas Munzer, Gerard Lebrun, Johannes Giesinger, Pauline Kleingeld, Paul Formosa, cujas obras mais relevantes para esta discussão estão citadas na bibliografia.

Diz-nos Kant na *Antropologia* (AA 07 324) que diferentemente de todos os outros animais, aonde cada indivíduo alcança sua plena destinação, entre nós humanos apenas a espécie o alcança, de modo que o avanço do gênero humano até sua destinação se dá mediante o progresso em uma série imensa de gerações. Mas porque Kant seria tão cético em relação a possibilidade de que este aprimoramento completo seja atingido individualmente e não apenas pela espécie?

Uma das razões é justamente o pouco tempo de vida que têm os seres humanos individualmente. Afirma Kant explicitamente (AA07 326):

«O impulso à ciência como uma cultura que enobrece a humanidade, não tem, no todo da espécie, proporção alguma com a duração da vida. Quando o douto avançou na cultura até o ponto de ampliar por si mesma o campo dela, é ceifado pela morte, seu lugar é ocupado por um discípulo que ainda está aprendendo o bê-á-bá, discípulo que pouco antes do fim da vida e depois de ter dado um passo adiante, cede por sua vez o lugar a um outro. Que massa de conhecimentos, que invenção de novos métodos não teria legado um Arquimedes, um Newton ou um Lavoisier com seus esforços e talentos, se tivessem sido favorecidos pela natureza com uma idade que perdurasse um século sem diminuição da força vital?».

Uma afirmação semelhante aparece na *Ideia de uma História Universal de um ponto de vista cosmopolita* (AA 08 19) quando na segunda proposição afirma Kant que no homem (como única criatura racional sobre a terra) as disposições naturais que visam o uso da sua razão devem desenvolver-se integralmente só na espécie e não no indivíduo. A razão disto, afirma Kant na sequência, é que a razão precisa de exercício e aprendizagem para avançar de um estágio de conhecimento para outro, e assim sendo cada homem teria de viver um tempo incomensuravelmente longo para aprender como deveria usar com perfeição todas suas disposições naturais, e se a natureza estabeleceu um breve espaço de tempo para nossas vidas é necessário uma série incontável de gerações, das quais uma transmite as outras o seu conhecimento, para que seu germe, inscrito na nossa espécie, alcance o estágio de desenvolvimento adequado a sua intenção. Aqui Kant reconhece que é enigmático que tantas gerações trabalhem para que apenas as gerações futuras desenvolvam totalmente suas capacidades, especialmente a da razão, mas isso é necessário para que nossas disposições naturais se desenvolvam a um nível de perfeição, ou seja, é necessário que assim seja para que a razão se desenvolva plenamente. Diz-nos Kant na terceira proposição da *Ideia* (AA 08 20):

«Causa sempre surpresa que as velhas gerações se empenhem aparentemente nas suas ocupações trabalhosas só em vista das futuras, para lhes preparar um estágio a partir do qual possa elevar ainda mais o edifício que a natureza tem como intento; e que só as últimas gerações terão a sorte de habitar na mansão em que uma longa série dos seus antepassados (talvez, decerto, sem intenção sua) trabalhou, sem no entanto poderem partilhar da felicidade que prepararam. Embora isto seja muito enigmático, é ao mesmo tempo necessário, se alguma vez se conjecturar que uma espécie animal deve ter razão e, como classe de seres racionais, sujeitos à morte no seu conjunto, chegará todavia à perfeição do desenvolvimento das suas disposições».

Assim é que nossa finitude torna praticamente impossível desenvolver as nossas disposições individualmente ao nível da perfeição. Mas a nossa finitude individual, que não permite um desenvolvimento da nossa racionalidade a nível da perfeição, não é empecilho para que este desenvolvimento se realize ao nível da espécie, pois esta se perpetua. Assim, por mais que nos aperfeiçoemos cognitivamente e moralmente individualmente (e Kant exige que trabalhem para este aprimoramento) é só a espécie, no seu desenvolvimento ao longo das gerações, que atingirá a perfeição, especialmente a perfeição moral. Mas o que seria a perfeição moral?

3. Da Perfeição e do Aperfeiçoamento Moral

Entre os seres racionais terráqueos, para Kant única e exclusivamente a espécie humana, o fim colocado pela própria natureza é atingir o bem e propagar o bem. Um dos aspectos do aprimoramento moral, no desenvolvimento do bem através dos tempos, é justamente o aprendizado do rechaço do egoísmo. Diz-nos Kant (AA07325) que o ser humano está destinado por sua razão a se cultivar, civilizar e moralizar por meio das artes e das ciências e destinado a se tornar ativamente digno da humanidade na luta com os obstáculos dados por sua natureza rude. Com o aumento da cultura (que como vimos, pode ser o fim último ao qual se atribui à natureza a respeito do ser humano e que envolve educação, disciplina e instrução) também os homens percebem cada vez mais os males que causam uns aos outros pelo egoísmo (AA 07 329). É o egoísmo prático, ou moral, aquele que Kant parece estar se insurgindo aqui². Egoísta moral, nos diz Kant (AA07130) é aquele

² Na Antropologia (AA 07 129) Kant classifica três tipos de egoísmo. O egoísmo lógico, o egoísmo estético e o egoísta moral. O egoísta lógico acha desnecessário examinar seu juízo também pelo dos outros, como se desnecessário fosse o *criterium veritatis externum*. O egoísta estético é aquele ao qual o próprio gosto basta, se isolando em seu juízo e aplaudindo a si mesmo e o egoísta moral é o eudaimonista, que coloca sua própria

que reduz todos os fins a si mesmo, que não vê utilidade senão naquilo que lhe serve e que como eudemonista coloca na própria felicidade, e não na representação do dever, o fundamento de determinação supremo de sua vontade.

Assim é que o aprimoramento moral se relaciona necessariamente como não poderia deixar de ser, a ideia de agir por dever, tomando como princípio de nossas ações a lei moral. Diz-nos Kant na *Metafísica dos Costumes* (TL AA 06 387) quando escreve sobre nossa própria perfeição como um fim que é também um dever, que o cultivo da moralidade em nós mesmos é a maior perfeição moral do homem, no sentido de agirmos “por dever”, e não estarmos apenas em conformidade com a lei moral, já que nós seres humanos temos de cultivar nossa vontade até a mais pura disposição virtuosa, na qual obedecemos a lei “pelo dever”. Afirma também Kant na *Crítica do Juízo* (KU AA 05 422) que se deve haver um fim terminal que a razão tem de indicar este não pode ser outro senão o homem (qualquer ser racional do mundo) sob leis morais. Segue Kant (KU AA 05 423) afirmando que as leis morais têm como característica peculiar o fato de prescreverem incondicionalmente à razão algo como um fim. Por isso a existência de uma tal razão, que pode ser a lei suprema, a existência de seres racionais sob leis morais, pode por isso ser pensada como fim terminal da existência do mundo.

Observe-se que a destinação da razão, escreve Kant na GMS (AA 04 396) é a de produzir uma boa vontade. Diz-nos Kant que pode ser que esta vontade não seja o único bem nem o bem completo, mas ela, contudo necessariamente o bem supremo (*das hochste Gut*), condição da qual depende todo outro bem, e mesmo todo merecimento à felicidade. Kant sugere aqui na FMC que a boa vontade (*guter Wille*) é o bem supremo incondicional (*supremum*). Uma vontade boa porém, nada mais é do que uma vontade que age moralmente, ou seja, que age determinada apenas por aquilo que a razão pura prática determina, o que significa, em outras palavras, que um ser como é o homem, age de boa vontade quando ele age racionalmente, ou seja, quando age movido pela lei moral. A efetivação, então, do bem supremo incondicional, que é um fim terminal, para nós, seres racionais do planeta terra, nada mais é do que o agir moral. Se todos os homens agissem de boa vontade, ou seja, agissem moralmente sempre, teríamos alcançado o bem supremo

felicidade acima do dever. Ao egoísmo, diz Kant, se opõem o pluralismo, isto é o modo de pensar que consiste em não se considerar nem em proceder como se o mundo inteiro estivesse encerrado no próprio eu, mas como um simples cidadão do mundo.

incondicionado, aquele fim que não é condicionado por nenhum outro, embora não seja ainda o fim perfeito, porque o fim perfeito pressupõe que a moralidade seja acompanhada pela felicidade.

Porém, na GMS (AA 04 394) Kant levanta a possibilidade de que talvez não existam ações morais, ações realizadas pela mera representação do dever. Assim sendo, se existe a possibilidade de que nenhuma ação no mundo seja efetivamente moral, não há como Kant afirmar que o soberano bem incondicional (*supremum*) necessariamente se realizará. O que há, segundo Kant, é a necessidade prática de trabalhar para a realização do soberano bem (KpV, AA 05 125). Uma necessidade da razão pura prática que é fundada sobre um dever, aquele de tomar alguma coisa (o soberano bem) como objeto de minha vontade para trabalhar por todas as minhas forças para realizá-lo (KpV AA 05 126). Este dever se funda sobre a lei moral. Esta afirmação da *Crítica da Razão Prática* parece estar em consonância com o que diz Kant na KU (AA 05 423) que a lei moral nos determina a priori o bem supremo, como fim terminal. Esta determinação a priori do bem supremo, entretanto, no que concerne aos indivíduos, não pode ser nada mais do que a determinação da obrigação que temos de trabalhar pela sua existência, e não a obrigação de que o bem supremo se realize, já que esta efetivação depende do conjunto dos indivíduos e da espécie como um todo, ou seja efetivar o bem incondicionado significa que em algum momento da história todos nós estaríamos agindo moralmente, ou seja, teríamos mudado o caráter da espécie, teríamos nos aprimorado a ponto de termos transformados a nós humanos, de animais dotados da faculdade da razão (*animal racionabile*) em animais racionais (*animal rationale*) (AA 07 322).

Se um dia nos tornarmos animais racionais agiremos todos moralmente, tomando como máxima de nossa ação o imperativo categórico. Neste momento poderemos dizer que a espécie terá mudado o seu caráter e teremos então, como espécie, nos aprimorado moralmente, realizando o soberano bem incondicionado. A chegada a este ponto, porém depende fundamentalmente de um fator, qual seja, o aperfeiçoamento de nós próprios, desenvolvendo nossas disposições morais e realizando, através de nossa capacidade de nos colocar fins, o fim incondicionado que é a efetivação do bem e da moralidade no mundo. Afirma Kant (AA 09 446):

«O homem deve antes de tudo desenvolver as suas disposições para o bem; a Providência não as colocou nele prontas; são simples disposições sem a marca distintiva da moral. Tornar-se melhor, educar-se, e se formos maus, produzir em si a moralidade: eis o dever do homem».

Cumpriríamos assim parte de nosso destino, como espécie, de cada vez mais agir tomando como máxima da ação princípios racionais e cada vez menos tomando como princípio da ação as determinações sensíveis. Teríamos nos aprimorado moralmente pelo desenvolvimento livre e autônomo das nossas disposições a través do permanente exercício da razão através dos tempos e na transmissão de conhecimento de uma geração para outra através da educação.

4. O Soberano bem perfeito

Como já observamos a noção de felicidade, que não pode servir como princípio determinante de nossas ações, nunca foi entretanto abandonada por Kant, tendo um papel importante em todo seu sistema prático. Isso fica claro em vários momentos de sua obra especialmente em dois, na doutrina das virtudes, quando Kant estabelece dois fins que são ao mesmo tempo deveres, procurar a perfeição própria e a felicidade dos outros, e quando ele estabelece o conceito de soberano bem na *Crítica da Razão Prática*. O soberano bem em Kant, pode ter dois sentidos, significando supremo (*supremum*) ou perfeito (*consummatum*), que chamei aqui de bem supremo incondicionado e bem supremo perfeito³ (KpV AA 05 110) Enquanto podemos atingir o soberano bem incondicionado (*supremum*) nos tornando como espécie, morais, através da nossa liberdade, agindo virtuosamente ou seja, moralmente (por dever), o soberano bem perfeito (*consummatum*) segundo Kant, requer não apenas que a espécie humana venha a se tornar efetivamente moral, mas requer também, que a moralidade seja acompanhada pela felicidade, ou seja, que aqueles que agem moralmente, e que portanto merecem a felicidade, efetivamente o sejam. Porém, para Kant (KU AA 05 424) não podemos pensar estas duas condições do fim terminal que nos é determinado pela lei moral como ligadas na natureza, e por isso

³ Adverte-nos Kant que o conceito de soberano bem contém em si uma ambiguidade que, se não prestarmos atenção, pode causar inúmeras controvérsias desnecessárias. O soberano bem pode significar tanto supremo (*supremum*) quanto completo (*consummatum*). No primeiro sentido ele é tomado como sendo uma condição que é ela própria incondicionada, isto é, não subordinada a nenhuma outra condição (*originarium*), e no segundo como um todo que não é parte de um todo do mesmo tipo (*perfectissimum*).

temos de admitir um autor do mundo para que se realize o soberano bem perfeito (*consummatum*), conforme a moralidade exige.

Aqui a espécie humana se depara com um limite. Ainda que um dia venhamos como espécie atingir um estado de moralidade, ainda que todos nós venhamos a agir sempre moralmente, ainda assim não poderíamos garantir que seremos felizes, porque enquanto que ser moral é ser livre, bastando para ser moral que sigamos o que determina a razão pura, ou seja, que escolhamos seguir as determinações da razão pura, a exigência de que a felicidade acompanhe a moralidade não depende inteiramente de nossas escolhas, e sim da organização cósmica do universo, incluindo nisto um autor do mundo, que deve permitir a harmonia das ordens da natureza e da razão. A esperança de que assim seja, entretanto, não exime a humanidade da obrigação de fazer tudo que estiver a seu alcance para que este fim se realize, e muito menos da obrigação de seguir sempre a lei moral.

Assim, enquanto indivíduos tudo o que podemos fazer é agir moralmente e nos aprimorar moralmente, contribuindo assim para o aprimoramento moral da espécie. Este aprimoramento requer não apenas que trabalhemos pelo nosso próprio aperfeiçoamento, mas também, que trabalhemos pela felicidade dos outros. No que se refere à felicidade Kant já nos adverte de que a perseguimos naturalmente, mas isto não basta. Ao estabelecer a promoção da felicidade dos outros como sendo um fim que é ao mesmo tempo um dever, Kant nos lembra de que temos a obrigação de fazer a nossa parte para que esta finalidade se efetive, e é por isso que temos o dever indireto de ajudar os outros, ou seja, não temos o dever de ajudar a todos sempre e na mesma proporção mas temos o dever de ser benevolentes e com isso contribuimos para a promoção dessa felicidade.

Assim é que se cada um de nós se aprimorar pessoalmente poderemos atingir o bem supremo incondicionado, a moralidade no mundo. Ao obedecermos ao dever de trabalhar pela felicidade dos outros, sendo benevolentes mas respeitando a liberdade alheia, contribuimos para a consecução também do soberano bem em seu segundo sentido, enquanto perfeição, o soberano bem perfeito, ou total (*consummatum*). Aqui, no entanto, esbarramos nos nossos limites. Por mais trabalhemos pela felicidade dos outros, a realização do bem perfeito no mundo, ou seja, a felicidade para os virtuosos, não depende inteiramente de nós e de nossos esforços individuais e como espécie. Podemos agir moralmente, podemos ajudar os outros a realizar seus fins compatíveis com a moralidade, e assim serem felizes, mas não podemos nunca garantir que aqueles que merecem a

felicidade a obterão, porque por mais que tenhamos modificado o caráter da espécie humana nos tornando efetivamente morais e concretizado o soberano bem incondicionado, a ligação da moralidade com o segundo termo do soberano bem perfeito, ou seja, com a felicidade, e não apenas com o merecimento da felicidade, não está garantida na natureza, e não depende apenas de nossos esforços.

Eis aí então o nosso destino: nos aperfeiçoar moralmente enquanto indivíduos e contribuir desta forma para a mudança do caráter da espécie, nos tornando uma espécie não apenas capaz de moralidade, mas efetivamente moral, realizando o soberano bem (*supremum*) ao mesmo tempo que esperamos que todos estes seres morais sejam felizes, ou seja, que se efetive o soberano bem perfeito (*consummatum*). É isso o que nós, os *homo sapiens*, devemos fazer, e é isso o que nos é permitido esperar.

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**Kant's Prudential Theory of Religion:
The Necessity of Historical Faith for Moral Empowerment**

*La teoría prudencial de la religión en Kant:
La necesidad de la fe histórica para el empoderamiento moral*

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Abstract

Given his emphasis on deontological ethics, Kant is rarely regarded as a friend of prudence. For example, he is often interpreted as an opponent of so-called “historical faiths” (i.e., empirical religious traditions). What typically goes unnoticed is that in explaining the legitimate (indeed, indispensable) role of historical faiths in the moral development of the human race, Kant appeals explicitly to their prudential status. A careful examination of Kant’s main references to prudence demonstrates that the prudential status of historical faith is the key to understanding both its limitations (as merely the *vehicle* of true religion, not its essential core) and its real value (as a *necessary* means of moral empowerment). The wise person adopts some form of historical faith, because to abandon any and all prudential appeals to a faith-based vehicle for morality would render the goal of living a good life virtually impossible for embodied beings to achieve.

Keywords

Immanuel Kant; Historical Faith; Prudence; Moral Religion; *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*

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Resumen

Dado su énfasis en la ética deontológica, Kant es considerado raramente un amigo de la prudencia. Por ejemplo, con frecuencia es interpretado como opositor de la llamada “fe histórica” (por ejemplo, tradiciones religiosas empíricas). Lo que típicamente pasa inadvertido es que al explicar la función legítima (en realidad, indispensable) de la fe histórica en el desarrollo de la especie humana, Kant apela explícitamente a su estatus prudencial. Un examen cuidadoso de las principales referencias de Kant a la prudencia demuestra que el estatus prudencial de la fe histórica es la clave para comprender tanto sus limitaciones (como mero *vehículo* de la religión, no su núcleo esencial) como su valor real (como medio *necesario* del empoderamiento moral). La persona sabia adopta alguna forma de fe histórica, habida cuenta de que abandonar todo recurso prudencial a un vehículo para la moralidad basado en la fe volvería el objetivo de vivir una vida buena virtualmente imposible de alcanzar para seres encarnados.

Palabras clave

Immanuel Kant; fe histórica; prudencia; religión moral; *Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*

1. Was Kant Opposed To Prudential Reasoning?

Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy is widely regarded as leaving little (if any) room for a legitimate influence on moral decision-making from any source other than what he calls the “moral law”. Because so much of his ethical writing focuses on constructing rational arguments that appeal to the pure form of this law (i.e., the “categorical imperative”) and encourages moral agents to disregard the consequences of their actions, few scholars would turn to Kant’s writings for insight into prudence. Indeed, portrayals of Kant’s moral theory (especially by those who seek to discredit it) sometimes go so far as to claim that Kant was positively opposed to prudential reasoning as such, leaving it no legitimate role. While he does refer on several occasions to the “rules of prudence”, such interpreters take this heading as little more than a negative place holder, indicating why the maxims that many people would regard as constituting wise ethical advice are actually of no use to moral and/or political reasoning.¹

¹For typical examples of such a caricature, see Beiner 1983, 63-71, and Davie 1973, 57. A more recent example is McGaughey 2013, who claims that Kant’s “methodological skepticism” (154) causes him to “reject” forms of prudential reasoning, such as a belief in “special acts of grace”, that aim to supplement bare moral reasoning. For brief responses to McGaughey’s misreading of Palmquist 2010 on this specific issue, see notes 7 and 10, below. Contrary to McGaughey’s caricature of my position, I do not equate Kantian religion with “*historical* religion based on particular revelation” (155); rather, as clarified in the present

A closer look at Kant's references to prudence (*Klugheit*) reveals that he actually assigns to it a very important role: one that at least complements, and possibly (in some pragmatic contexts) even supersedes, the role of pure moral deliberation. In what follows, I shall begin (in §2) by sketching the role Kant assigns to prudence in his three *Critiques*; I shall then argue (in §3) that his theory of "historical faith" (i.e., adherence to an empirical religious tradition), as defended in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason*, is one of the key contexts (and possibly the most important one) where reason *must* acknowledge its need for a prudential supplement, to shed light on the path to wisdom. I shall therefore conclude (in §4) that, although several recent studies of Kantian prudence have likewise sought to rehabilitate the notion as a powerful tool that complements Kant's ethical formalism, these studies have missed an essential feature of Kant's theory by focusing (almost without exception) on the role of prudence in *politics*.²

2. How To Avoid Milking a Ram: Prudence in Kant's Three *Critiques*

Kant's first use of "*Klugheit*" in his *Critique of Pure Reason* is rarely recognized as such by English readers, because translators have used words other than "prudence" in this context. In A58/B82 Kant opines that persons who know the proper question to ask in a given context possess "sagacity" (as Pluhar and Kemp Smith translate it or "cleverness" (according to the Cambridge Edition, while those who *lack* this skill put themselves into an

article, the form of necessity I claim Kant ascribes to the elements of Christian doctrines, or to those of any other historical faith for that matter, is entirely subjective and *prudential*.

²See Nelson 2004, 305-8, for references to several critics of Kant's theory of prudence in the political realm who view it as inferior to "Aristotelian *phronesis*, Confucian propriety, or hermeneutic tact" (306); Nelson also cites several passages where Kant does seem to cast *political* prudence in a largely negative light. Whereas Nelson grants "that Kant mostly used *Klugheit* in the...sense" of "instrumental rationality", he argues that he also allows "an important role" for prudence in the sense of "context-sensitive judgment" (307). Properly understood, Kant's negative assessments of prudence relate only to those who "seek to *ground* morality in conditional reasoning" (308, emphasis added) rather than in the categorical imperative. Whereas Nelson focuses on Kant's *political* philosophy in his attempt to revive Kant's notion of prudence, I shall focus on the role of prudence in Kant's theory of *religion*. But in both cases, "prudence is...secondary to morality...yet *essential*", functioning as "a cultivated ability to participate with others in public life with a view towards the interests of others and the general welfare" (310). Whereas Nelson is mostly right to claim that Kant merely "hints" at this position (314)—indeed, "Kant did not articulate this ethics of prudence in his moral writings. He presupposed it"—we shall see that in *Religion* (which Nelson never cites) it comes to the fore. For a helpful analysis of the differences between Aristotelian "flourishing" and Kantian prudence, see Hill 1999, especially 166-74. And for references to several other recent scholars who share Nelson's focus on politics, see note 5, below.

embarrassing situation:³ they may mislead “the incautious listener” to attempt what will inevitably amount to “absurd answers”, thus causing both parties to appear equally foolish. He then compares such a situation (A58/B82-83 to “the ridiculous spectacle where (as the ancients said) one person milks the ram [*den Bock melkt*] while the other holds a sieve underneath.” One party in this comic scene foolishly fails to realize that “rams” (i.e., ill-formed questions) can give no “milk” (i.e., insightful answers), while the other naively awaits an answer while holding a receptacle (i.e., a mind that has not gone through the discipline of critique) that would not be able to hold the milk (i.e., appreciate the wisdom) even if it were somehow to be produced. Once we recognize that Kant poses this well-known, humorous metaphor in a context where he is admonishing us to be prudent, it takes the form of a riddle. Who *is* the foolish questioner that Kant portrays as using a “sieve” to collect the “milk” of insight from the animal of philosophy? And who is the foolish *answerer* that we are to think of as attempting to extract such insight-milk from a “ram” rather than from a ewe? Holding these questions in abeyance as we examine some of Kant’s other key references to prudence over the 12 years that followed, we shall return to this question at the close of this article.

The first explicit mention of “prudence” in (the English translations of) the first *Critique* comes in the first edition’s version of the chapter on Phenomena and Noumena, where Kant explains why the previous chapter has not included a thorough account of the schematized version of each of the twelve categories he had presented earlier. He claims to have employed

«a not unimportant rule of prudence: viz., not to venture immediately upon defining [a concept], and not to attempt or allege to attain completeness or precision in determining a concept, if one can make do with anyone or another of its characteristics» (A241).

In other words, prudence excuses us from exploring each and every potential application that some theory may have, if exploring a sampling of key applications suffices to justify the theory’s usefulness.

³ Unless otherwise noted (as here), all translations from the three *Critiques* and from Kant’s *Religion* are to Werner S. Pluhar’s translations, as follows: *Critique of Judgment* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); *Critique of Pure Reason* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996); *Critique of Practical Reason* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002); and *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2009). References to Kant’s works will normally be included in the main text, citing the Berlin Academy Edition volume and page numbers, except in the case of *Critique of Pure Reason*, for which the standard A/B referencing system will be used to refer to the pagination of the original A and B editions, respectively. Quotations from *Religion* will be based on my revised translation, as found in Palmquist 2015.

Kant's next use of the term comes in the second part of the Transcendental Dialectic, where he considers how best to respond to the four Antinomies of Pure Reason that threaten to cast doubt on reason's reliability. Kant begins his overall solution to the Antinomies by observing (A485/B513) that "we act prudently if at the outset we leave aside the supposed bases for answering them, and consider first of all what we would gain if the answer fell to the one side, and what if it fell to the opposite side." That is, when pure reason offers us two plausible options, it is not only acceptable but *advisable* to make our selection based on which option produces the best results. However, in discussing how to respond to the limits placed by the *Critique* on our knowledge of the three metaphysical ideas of reason (i.e., God, freedom, and immortality), Kant warns his reader against the temptation to employ illusory methods in the service of the good; because so many well-meaning religious people employ arguments and justifications that entail dishonesty (A749-50/B777-8), we end up with the ironic result that "this cause [of upholding these rational ideas] has perhaps more upright and righteous opponents than defenders." So Kant allows us to use prudent tactics, as long as we do not compromise our moral integrity in the process. A *merely* prudential reason for belief risks dishonesty, so if someone is genuinely uncertain regarding God's existence, then Kant would rather have the person be an honest skeptic than a dishonest believer. As is well known, Kant thinks the proper way out of this impasse (given that theoretical reason necessarily fails in its attempt to demonstrate that God exists) is to ground our certainty in *moral* reason.

Kant's first technical *definition* of prudence comes in the "Canon" chapter of the first *Critique's* Doctrine of Method (A800/B828):

«in the doctrine of prudence, the entire business of reason consists in taking all the purposes assigned to us by our inclinations and uniting them in the one purpose, *happiness*, and in harmonizing the means for attaining this happiness. Consequently, reason can here supply none but *pragmatic* laws of free conduct that is aimed at attaining the purposes commended to us by the senses, and hence can supply no laws that are pure, i.e., determined completely a priori».

Prudence cannot play any constitutive role in moral decision-making because, as Kant here reminds us, its laws are never pure and a priori, as genuine moral laws must be. Nevertheless, this passage clarifies that we are allowed to *consider* prudential reasons, especially when it comes to harmonizing our various efforts to reach the highest good

(which Kant views as the synthesis of virtue, or moral goodness, with happiness). Significantly, the Canon is entitled “On the Ultimate Purpose of the Pure Use of Our Reason” (A797/B825): even though prudence can play no direct role in the attainment of goodness as such (i.e., in *defining* virtue), it can and should play a role in attaining the *ultimate purpose* of being good, which is to harmonize goodness with happiness. A pragmatic maxim that helps us attain this ultimate purpose is called a “rule of prudence” (A806/B834; cf. *CPrR* 5:22-26); such a rule “advises [us] what we must do if we want to partake of happiness” and

«is based on empirical principles; for in no other way than by means of experience can I know either what inclinations there are that want to be satisfied, or what the natural causes are that can bring about the satisfaction of those inclinations».

Turning to the *Critique of Practical Reason*, we find that Kant is far more cautious about prudence in moral contexts. Following a rule of prudence is *reprehensible* if doing so causes a person to disobey the moral law (5:35): one’s duty must always take precedence over the desire for happiness. He thus reminds us (5:36): “The maxim of self-love (prudence) merely *counsels*; the law of morality *commands*.” But for this very reason, knowing how to be genuinely prudent is actually far more difficult than knowing how to be good: “the commonest and most unpracticed understanding” (5:36) instinctively knows how to be good in specific circumstances, even though such a person may have no “worldly prudence” when it comes to promoting the happiness required for the *highest* good in human society as a whole. To clarify his theory of prudence, Kant repeatedly compares it with the contrasting theories defended by two ancient Greek philosophical schools, the Epicureans and the Stoics (5:111; cf. 126-7): “To the former, *prudence* was tantamount to morality; to the latter, who selected a higher designation for virtue, *morality* alone was true wisdom.” For Kant, by contrast, true wisdom entails applying prudence as a *necessary supplement* to virtue, so that we can somehow attain both virtue and happiness simultaneously.

In the long (unpublished) Introduction to his *Critique of Judgment* (1790), Kant refines his previous position, clarifying that these pragmatic “rules of prudence” are a species of “*technical imperatives*” or “*imperatives of art*” (20:200n): they “command under the condition of an *actual* and even subjectively necessary purpose,...[namely] one’s own happiness”. In the shorter (published) Introduction (5:172) he adds that such rules

«must be included only in theoretical philosophy, as corollaries. For they concern nothing but the possibility of things according to concepts of nature; and this includes not only the means we find in nature for producing them, but even the will (as power of desire and hence as a natural power), as far as it can be determined, in conformity with the mentioned rules, by natural incentives».

Kant's crucial point here is easily missed: rules of prudence form a *bridge* between the theoretical and the practical, such a bridge being precisely the focus of the third *Critique* and (as I have argued elsewhere) of Kant's *Religion*.⁴ To be prudent is to consider how one's will (i.e., one's free volition) can be used to satisfy the natural *requirements* associated with one's embodiment (i.e., one's natural inclinations), yet without contravening the moral law. As such, prudence holds the status of being a "subjectively *necessary* purpose" (emphasis added).

Toward the end of the third *Critique* (in §91 of the methodological Appendix on moral teleology), Kant adds an important caveat that provides a natural segue to his subsequent discussion of prudence within religion (5:470):

«But assent in matters of faith is an assent from a pure practical point of view, i.e., it is a moral faith that proves nothing for theoretical pure rational cognition, but only for pure practical cognition that aims at [our] complying with [our] duties; it does not at all expand our speculation, nor our practical rules of prudence governed by the principle of self-love».

This is a crucial text, if we wish to understand the role of *historical* faith in Kant's explicitly religious writings, for in the foregoing passage Kant is referring only to the more limited phenomenon of "moral faith". Although he does not say so at this point, what we shall find as we now turn our attention to the role of prudence within religion, is that Kant uses the term "historical faith" to refer to a broad set of prudent means of putting moral faith into practice, and that a wise person *must* employ some such non-moral means in order to complement the purity of moral faith; for historical faith offers a form of theoretical cognition that, as Kant explicitly states in the passage quoted above, is inherently beyond the reach of pure moral faith.

3. Historical Faith as a Prudent Necessity in Kant's *Religion*

⁴ I first argued for this status in Palmquist 1986; revised and reprinted as Chapter III of Palmquist 1993. For my most detailed defense of this claim, see Palmquist 2015.

Among the several recent studies of Kantian prudence, I know of none that acknowledges how his theory reaches its highest expression in *Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason* (1793/1794);⁵ yet only in this work does he give full expression to his view that prudence is, in at least one sense, essential to the successful implementation of his ethical theory in the real world—i.e., to the project of bridging the theoretical and the practical standpoints. For in *Religion* Kant argues that our moral efforts inevitably fail on their own, due to the corrupting influence of what he calls “radical evil” on all human decision-making. Because we are all beset with the tendency (or “propensity”) to shape moral maxims in a way that gives priority to our self-interest, attending to the demands of the moral law only as (at best) a secondary consideration, we have the almost irresistible

⁵For example, Kain 2001 draws his interpretation primarily from Kant’s *Groundwork* and *Metaphysics of Morals*. In the former work, Kant provides helpful descriptions of prudence as “skill in the choice of means to one’s own greatest well-being” and “the sagacity to combine all [one’s] purposes for his own lasting advantage” (4:416). Most studies of Kantian prudence focus on its application to Kant’s *political* theory (see note 2). In the course of arguing that Kant’s theory of prudence provides a decisive response to critics of John Rawls’ (Kantian) political theory, Taylor (2005, 606) points out that an important “task of Kantian prudential reasoning is to unite or integrate the inclinations into a single scheme of happiness.” The process is “closer to gardening than to mechanics” (607). But Taylor, like Nelson before him (see note 2) and Flikschuh 2011 after him, focuses almost entirely on the *political* implications of Kantian prudence; though he does make a few passing references to *Religion*, he never cites the passages where Kant actually *mentions* prudence.

Unlike Nelson or Taylor (whose work she does not cite), Flikschuh clearly recognizes that the role of religion in Kant’s system of practical faith is crucial; yet she, too, makes no explicit references to prudence in *Religion* itself and focuses instead on its political implications, suggesting (109) we should “understand the role of prudence in Kant’s political morality as a form of transcendently oriented practical faith.” As we shall see, this suggestion becomes all the more plausible when we see how prudence functions in Kant’s theory of religion. For, after making a helpful distinction (111) between “mundane prudence” (“a practical response to insufficient factual information”) and “existential prudence” (a practical response “to theoretical unknowability in the metaphysical sense”), Flikschuh opines that “Kant nowhere explicitly discusses the requirements of existential prudence” (114). Yet those requirements, as we shall see, are to be found in *Religion*, precisely because (as Flikschuh rightly acknowledges) Kantian “practical faith” absolutely requires “faith in God, due to “our own inscrutability: ... we cannot know ourselves” (73). Flikschuh closes her essay by raising the tantalizing prospect, “whether, in the absence of [“Reinhold’s and Fichte’s important interventions” in the history of Kant interpretation]..., a less radically humanistic Kantianism might have survived” (74). An affirmative reply is suggested by the evidence amassed in Palmquist 2015, that the single major influence on Kant’s decision to write a second edition of *Religion* (the only book other than the first *Critique* that Kant published in a significantly revised edition) was his desire to respond to the feedback to the first edition that had been offered by the influential German theologian, G.C. Storr.

That the once common caricature of Kant the prude (i.e., the *enemy* of prudence) is quickly fading among Kantian ethical theorists is evidenced by the fact that Taylor quotes passages from Paul Guyer, Henry Allison, and Allen Wood that show their respective (and quite accurate) understandings of prudence as a much-needed (happiness-producing) *balance* to the formalism of the moral law (Taylor 2005, 608-9). Of these three influential Kant-scholars, the one whose work offers the most thorough account of Kantian prudence is Wood 1999; see especially pp.65-70. As Wood emphasizes (352n): “The essence of prudential reason [as opposed to instrumental reason] is that happiness has a rational claim on us distinct from and superior to that of any arbitrarily chosen end.” Wood offers a lengthy discussion of the ethical status of historical faith in Kant; however, he never mentions Kant’s explicit application of prudence to historical faith in *Religion*.

temptation to deceive ourselves regarding the status of our own moral character (see e.g., 6:20). The proper task of religion is to empower us to overcome this universal propensity to evil by *influencing how we motivate ourselves to act*. Without recounting all the details of Kant's argument here, let it suffice merely to note that the key for Kant is for us to call upon an archetypal idea of moral perfection that resides within each human person, then to band together with other, similarly good-hearted people to form a community whose purpose is to encourage each other to aim at the highest possible moral goal, *holiness*. Although we will inevitably fail to achieve the community's transcendent goal of holiness, aiming at this essentially religious ideal is the best (if not the only) way that an individual human being can become *virtuous*.⁶

While empowering human beings to be virtuous is the proper moral goal of all true religion, Kant repeatedly argues that this is not the sum-total of what makes religion actually work;⁷ rather, the *means* for achieving religion's moral goal are bound to be non-moral, historically-conditioned features that arise out of our embodied nature. Kant explicitly rejects the view that our bodies are to be blamed for radical evil; in *Religion* he clearly and repeatedly insists that evil is a defect of the *will*. Thus there is no contradiction for Kant to argue that the proper solution to "this weakness of ours" (6:43; see also 6:29, 59n, 103, 169, 191) is to take refuge in some historical (embodied) religious tradition. With this in mind, he distinguishes between what is essentially religious (and therefore universally true, by virtue of its grounding in moral reason) and the complement of some historical religious tradition that must inevitably accompany it (though the latter by its very nature is contingent and ever-changing). Interpreters of *Religion* have typically assumed

⁶ For a more detailed summary of Kant's argument in *Religion*, see Palmquist 2009. And for an interpretation and defense of those details, see Part Three of Palmquist 2000.

⁷ See Palmquist 1992, revised and reprinted as Chapter VI of Palmquist 2000. That article/chapter concludes by demonstrating that Kant's goal in *Religion* is actually to *raise* morality to the level of religion, not vice versa. The nuanced, essentially perspectival character of my position on Kantian religion is ignored by McGaughey 2013, who constructs a straw man by imputing an absurd set of interpretive positions to me in support of his allegation that I have misrepresented Kant. He claims, for example, that I interpret "Kantian religion" to be entirely *empirical*, whereas he claims Kantian religion is entirely *pure*; this, together with the ten other diametrical oppositions, most of them equally facile, that McGaughey displays in tabular form to enhance the impression of an alleged dichotomy, portrays the options for Kant-interpreters as a specter that is no less ridiculous than that of holding a sieve while milking a ram! Fortunately, the straw man that McGaughey sets up bears virtually no resemblance to the interpretation of Kantian religion that I actually defend in Palmquist 2010 or anywhere else. Not surprisingly, McGaughey's one-sided polemic contains very few quotations from Palmquist 2010 or from any of my other previous publications, and the quotes that do appear are all taken out of context.

that Kant, as a child of the Enlightenment, *must* be disparaging the various historical religious traditions that he mentions throughout the book (see e.g., note 7), just as it is easy to read Kant's ethical writings as if he is disparaging prudence in general. However, if we take Kant at his word, this was not his intention.⁸ What I shall demonstrate in the remainder of this article, by focusing on the passages in *Religion* that explicitly mention prudence, is that Kant's distinction between pure (moral) religion and impure (historical) faith is a two-edged sword: it not only seeks to protect religious believers from the delusion of assuming that they can please God without becoming good; it also conveys wise counsel to all who recognize the need to be good; for we can hardly expect to succeed in actually *becoming* good without engaging in certain non-moral activities that are properly called "prudent".

Kant uses forms of the root word, "*Klug*", a total of 12 times in *Religion*, twice in each of the first three Pieces and six times in the Fourth Piece. He also *alludes* to the notion on numerous other occasions by employing a variety of metaphors that vividly portray the relationship between the moral core of religion and its prudent means of application. In the second Preface, for example, he explains that the two "*Versuch(en)*" ("experiment(s)") that he conducts throughout the book relate to each other as "concentric" spheres "of faith" (6:12): identifying the inner sphere with moral faith and the outer sphere with historical faith entails that the latter serves a prudential role in relation to the former. The same holds true for Kant's frequent references to the inner "seed" or "kernel" of religion in its relation to the outer "husk" or "shell": the latter perform a necessary function, even though they are of only secondary (i.e., prudential) importance to the former. A growing ear of corn *needs* the husk in order to mature into an edible vegetable, even though we typically throw away the husk as if it were useless, once the kernels are

⁸ For example, in the Preface to his 1797 book, *Conflict of the Faculties*, p.8 (German pagination), Kant writes: "Since...I make no *appraisal* of Christianity, I cannot be guilty of *disparaging* it. In fact, it is only natural religion that I appraise." Many readers of Kant's *Religion* question the accuracy of this claim. However, if we keep in mind that by "Christianity", he is referring to the historical religious tradition that goes by this name, then what he means is that his focus in *Religion* was on insisting that, in order to maximize its prudential purpose, the doctrines of faith must serve as morally empowering aids to the religion of bare reason. Kant clearly does point out many examples of how Christian doctrines, symbols, and rituals may be interpreted as non-moral, and hence as lacking in prudence; his claim in this *Conflict* passage is that he did not thereby intend to be assessing their historical truth, as legitimate features of the tradition (for appraising *that* is the job of the biblical theologian, not of the philosopher). Rather, he was merely assessing their *prudential value*, as vehicles for moral faith. McGaughey 2013 completely ignores this crucial nuance in my reading of Kant, assuming that I take Kant to be referring always and only to historical religion *per se*, rather than to historical faith as *empowered* by moral religion (see notes 1, 7, and 10).

ripe enough to eat.⁹ Elsewhere Kant uses metaphors such as “vehicle” (“*Vehikel*” [6:106]) and “channel” (“*Leitmittel*” [6:115]) to describe the necessary function that the historical elements of a religious tradition fulfill in *conveying* to us the content of moral faith. And, of course, the clothing metaphor that pervades the entire book, starting with the title, also stresses the distinction between the “bare” (“*blossen*”) body of moral religion and the various types of historical faith that “cloak” (e.g., 6:83) it in ways that can be either wise or foolhardy. However, for the remainder of this article, my focus will be limited to Kant’s explicit uses of the term “prudence”.

Although Kant’s two references to prudence in the First Piece of *Religion* are both closely connected to his theory of radical evil, they are not as negative as might at first appear. The first occurs as a side-comment in a footnote added in the second edition: “the self-torment of a repentant sinner [...] is very ambiguous and is usually only an inward reproach for having violated the rule of prudence” (6:23n). Here prudence is presented ambivalently, as a good tool that is easily used in the service of evil: all too often a religious person experiences great psychological pain during repentance, not out of a sincere conviction that a change of lifestyle is required, but only as a show, prompted by a secret disappointment at having been foolish enough to have been caught in the act of some wrongdoing. This illustrates a general theme that runs throughout the First Piece, even though Kant never uses the word “prudence” when discussing it: we often try to keep our actions consistent with the demands of the moral law, not out of respect for the moral law, but for prudential reasons; in such cases, Kant says (6:37), “the empirical character is good, but the intelligible character is still as evil as ever.” This is the essence of what Kant calls “the *disingenuousness* [...] of the human heart” (6:29) and is one of the three sources of the “*innate* guilt” (6:38) that he claims every human being has. But such disingenuousness (and the accompanying guilt) is not *caused* by our need to be prudent; rather, prudence arises as a *response* to the threefold evil (frailty, disingenuousness, and perversity) that is presented to us by the human situation.

⁹For further discussion of the concentric circles metaphor, see Palmquist 2015, §0.4. Without portraying it as Kant’s position on the matter, Green 1988 (127) aptly expresses the difference between Kant’s special type of pragmatic necessity and the stricter, moral type of necessity: “prudence is prior to morality in the order of learning. If we were not already, as a part of our first nature, prudential creatures [cf. Kantian “animality”], we could not later, as a part of our second nature [cf. Kantian “personality”], become moral creatures.” After setting out an economic model for a theory of prudence, Green offers a conclusion that accords well with Kant’s prudential theory of religion (141): prudence is “the non moral seed...which, when planted in brutish soil, enables a moral education to take root and without which it may not. But prudence...is not a brutish capacity. It is rather a central part of any education that aims at moral maturity.”

When recounting examples of the “long melancholy litany of charges against humanity” that easily come to mind when we examine the empirical character of human beings in their social interactions, Kant’s first example cites the “secret falsity even in the most intimate friendship” that leads us to include “moderation of trust in reciprocal openness by even the best friends” as part of “the universal maxim of prudence” (6:33). A quick reading of this second reference to prudence might give the impression that Kant is depicting prudence as *contributing* to radical evil. But on closer inspection, this is not what he says. Rather, his argument assumes that radical evil makes us untrustworthy in our interpersonal relationships; an implied premise is that if we were perfectly good (i.e., holy, as opposed to being creatures of virtue), then we could tell our friends all of our deepest, darkest secrets and not worry about having our trust abused; but because we are not holy, and must struggle merely to be virtuous, *prudence is necessary*—even to the point of being a “*universal maxim*”. Indeed, Kant elsewhere defends this maxim in detail, warning friends not to share personal details about themselves that could be used against them, should the friendship someday cease (Kant 1979, 200-209).

Kant begins the Second Piece with some reflections on where the ancient Greek Stoics went wrong, and his next reference to prudence appears in this context (6:58):

«Natural inclinations, *considered in themselves*, are *good*, i.e., irreprehensible; and not only is it futile, but it would also be harmful and censurable, to want to eradicate them. Rather, one must only tame them, so that they do not themselves wear one another out but instead can be brought to consonance in a whole called happiness. The reason...that accomplishes this is called *prudence*. Only the moral-unlawful is in itself evil, absolutely reprehensible, and must be eradicated; but the reason that teaches this...alone deserves the name of *wisdom*...».

Far from disparaging the body, Kant shows himself here to be deeply aware of the significance of human embodiment. Although our inclinations contribute to the process whereby the will is led to give priority to the principle of self-love over the demands of the moral law (this being Kant’s definition of radical evil), the proper solution is to eradicate not the inclinations, but the foolish will that refuses to tame them. Clearly, Kant is here implying that the Epicurean is no better off than the Stoic: the former lets the inclinations run wild; the latter tries to eradicate them. The wise person (i.e., the person who combines genuine virtue with prudence), by contrast, recognizes that both solutions suffer from a weakness of will whose only effective solution is to find prudential ways of allowing our

inclinations to exist in consonance with each other and with the moral law.

A passage reminiscent of Kant's first use of "*Klugheit*" in the first *Critique*, some 12 years earlier, appears in a footnote added to his discussion of the "second difficulty" that arises out of any attempt to believe that evil can be overcome by divine grace.¹⁰ In discussing certain "children's questions" Kant observes that, even if clear answers could be given, "the questioner would still not understand how to make them prudent [*Kluges*]" (6:69n). Among such theological questions, he says, is "whether the punishments of hell will be finite or eternal punishments." Our interest here is not with the question as such, but with Kant's emphasis on how to make the question prudent. Kant's point is that asking and/or attempting to answer such speculative questions, like trying to collect a ram's milk with a sieve, leaves us unable to *do* anything with any attempt at an answer, even if we could determine what the supposedly "correct" answer should be. Here again, therefore, Kant is not downplaying the role of prudential considerations in religion, as traditional interpreters such as McGaughey assume, but is raising it to the level of a factor that determines whether or not a given question is even worth asking.

Kant's first reference to prudence in the Third Piece (6:121) comes in a paraphrased quote from 1 Corinthians 13:11, where Kant uses "*Klug*" to stand in place of three Greek verbs used in that verse:

«As long as he (the human genus) "was a child, he was prudent"¹¹ as a child" and knew how to associate with ordinances—which had been imposed on him without his collaboration—presumably scholarship as well, and indeed even a philosophy subservient to the church: "But now that he becomes a man, he puts away what is childish».

The original biblical passage points out that nobody blames a young child (*νηπιος*) for speaking (*ελαλουν*), thinking (*εφρονον*), or reasoning (*ελογιζομην*) in child-like ways, but admonishes readers to beware not to import child-like principles into their adult situation.

¹⁰ The second difficulty is the theological problem often known as "eternal security": can a person be assured that he or she really is *called by God*? And if called, is such a state guaranteed to be permanent? For a discussion of this and the other two difficulties, see Palmquist 2010. In his misconstrual of my interpretation of Kantian religion (see notes 1 and 7, above), McGaughey 2010 portrays the argument of Palmquist 2010 as if I read *Religion* as a defense of Christianity *as such*, and as promoting a form of the doctrine of divine grace that is exclusively and necessarily Christian. What I actually read Kant as arguing, by contrast, is that pure moral religion *leaves a space* for divine grace, telling us nothing about *whether or not* such grace actually occurs, but requiring any historical faith that affirms a doctrine of grace (whether it be Christian or otherwise) to *interpret* it in a particular way (i.e., as not contradicting moral religion, and preferably as *empowering* the believer to be more fully moral).

¹¹ Pluhar uses "astute" for "*Klug*" here, and for "*kluge*" at 6:188n, where Kant expresses reservations about using the phrase "freedom of thought", even though "prudent men" sometimes use it.

Kant gives the passage a moral interpretation by applying the same distinction to the whole human race: he compares the child's admirably prudent character to the tendency among underdeveloped (i.e., pre-Enlightenment) human cultures to focus their religious understandings on "ordinances", "scholarship", and "a philosophy subservient to the church." Kant is comparing the religion of bare reason to the biblical author's adult human being, who always seeks to speak, think, and reason in a spirit of love, rather than merely following rules blindly. Note, however, that he is also implicitly assuming that childlike faith has a *proper role to play* in the historical development of the human race, just as it does for human individuals. Here we see, in the form of a simple, biblically-inspired metaphor, Kant's theory of historical faith in a nutshell: its prudential value is to serve as a good and useful channel for the transmission of goodness to the human race for as long as we find ourselves unable to follow the dictates of bare reason merely for their own sake.¹²

A few pages later (6:126), referring to the Ten Commandments, Kant points out that in the Jewish tradition,

«both reward and punishment were intended to affect even the progeny, which had taken no practical part in those deeds or misdeeds, which in a political structure can indeed be a prudential means [*Klugheitsmittel*] for providing oneself with compliance, but in an ethical one would be contrary to all equity».

Even though prudence has no proper place in ethical decision-making as such, "prudential means"—such as the belief that one's children may suffer as a result of one's wrongdoings—can serve a legitimate role in motivating good behavior. Believing that God will punish "the children for the sin of the parents to the third and fourth generation" (Ex. 20:5; Deut. 5:9) will not make a person more virtuous; but it may well persuade a person to act in a manner that is at least legally correct (i.e., in compliance with the Ten Commandments, in this case). Kant assigns the same function to *all* the myths, rituals, and symbols that arise within historical religious traditions.

In the first of the four main references to prudence in the Fourth Piece (toward the

¹² Once we recognize that the "weakness" Kant mentions at various points in *Religion* (see references cited above) refers to our embodiment as human beings, it seems plausible to assume that Kant's position is that we will probably *never* come to the stage of human history when the need for the prudent vehicle of historical religious traditions totally ceases. Kant explicitly calls attention to this nuance of his theory in a footnote added in the second edition to a first edition footnote. Having pointed out that all historical faith must be treated as if it *can cease*, he adds (6:135n): "Not that it will cease (for it may perhaps always be useful and needed as a vehicle), but that it can cease; whereby is only meant the inward firmness of the pure moral faith."

end of Part One, Section One)¹³, Kant considers the likely inferences drawn by a rationally-minded person who is ruled “by self-interest—by the god of this world” (6:161); once such a person considers the possibility of a future life, he or she might easily come to the realization that kindness is actually preferable to mean actions that are technically justified. The person who acts with calculated kindness

«proceeds indeed, as regards the incentive of such beneficent actions, more *prudently* than *morally*, yet nonetheless in accordance with the moral law, at least according to its letter, and he may hope that this too may not remain unrequited to him».

Jesus, by contrast, portrayed genuinely godly behavior (i.e., holiness) as not being motivated by any desire for reward (6:162). Prudence, therefore, is not a *bad* thing, for it can lead a perverse person to do things that are at least legally good; its shortcoming is simply that it is not the *best* option, for it allows our motives to remain impure if treated as an end in itself (as Kant thought Judaism does).

A few pages later, in a section entitled “The Christian Religion as a Scholarly Religion”, Kant observes that “the first proliferators of Christ’s teaching” proceeded “prudently” by adopting a procedure that would “procure for it access among their people”: they taught “that every Christian must be a Jew whose Messiah has come” (6:165-6). Kant refers to this teaching as “faith”, clearly taking it as a typical example of what he often calls “historical faith”; in calling the procedure *prudent*, he is not implying that it is mistaken, but only that it must not be “taken to be a component of the religion itself, holding for all times and peoples”. In other words, the teachings and practices of particular historical religious traditions may be not only acceptable, but wise, provided their adherents do not claim too much for them. Kant thus goes on to exemplify how such a religious teaching might be interpreted in a way that transforms the prudence of rationally-grounded historical faith into the foolishness of an irrational demand for *knowledge*: the claim that Jesus’ teaching requires a person to become Jewish “does not well cohere with “the fact that Jesus also taught that a person “is actually not bound to any law of Judaism

¹³ One of the other two references in the Fourth Piece has already been mentioned (see note 11). The other one (in Part Two, §4, on “Conscience”) warns against *false* prudence (6:189): Kant points out “the utmost danger and unsafety with the supposed prudential means, to circumvent in a crafty way the detrimental consequences that might arise for me from not confessing and, by siding with both parties, to ruin one’s standing with both.” The warning here is against the danger of trying to “play it safe” by affirming a confession of faith even when one has serious doubts as to whether it is legitimate. As such, even here Kant is not discrediting genuine prudence; rather, he is implicitly affirming its value, if understood with proper (i.e., *moral*) limitations.

(as statutory)” (6:166);for according to the former claim, a believer “nevertheless would have to accept faithfully the entire Holy Book of this people as a revelation that is divine, given to all human beings.”

The next paragraph concludes Section Two (and Part One) of the Fourth Piece by distinguishing between “the first founders of [Christian] *congregations*” and “the founders of the *church*” (6:167): the former, quite legitimately, “found it necessary to entangle with [Jesus’ message] the history of Judaism, which was a prudent action in view of their situation at that time—though perhaps only for that situation”; the latter, by contrast, mistakenly “took up these episodic means of recommendation among the essential articles of faith and augmented them...with interpretations that held inherent legal power from councils or were authenticated through scholarship.” Such a dependence on historical facts that are subject to change, and therefore not universally communicable, “cannot be avoided as long as we seek religion not within us but outside us.” Kant’s point here is twofold. First, bare reason provides us with an ideal picture of what being religious entails, and of why people should take advantage of this inward source of moral empowerment. Second, because we are embodied, historical beings, we inevitably end up appealing to symbols, beliefs, and/or rituals that have only a prudential value. We *need* such non-ultimate, subjective aids, as noted above, because of our “weakness” as embodied beings; prudence becomes wisdom, however, only if we recognize that all such prudential means are just that: non-ultimate aids to empower us to do what, in an ideal world, we would do out of a pure sense of moral motivation.

The final reference to prudence in *Religion* comes in Part Two of the Fourth Piece, §3 (entitled “On Priestery as a Governance in the Pseudoservice of the Good Principle”),in a lengthy paragraph that is worth quoting in full (6:182):

«It is, therefore, not only to act prudently to start from this [rational] faith and to let the historical faith that harmonizes therewith follow it, but it is also one’s duty to make [the former] the supreme condition under which alone we can hope to come to partake of whatever wholeness a historical faith might promise us; namely we can hope this in such a manner that we can or may let the historical faith count as universally binding only according to the interpretation given to it by the pure religious faith (because this faith contains universally valid doctrine), whereas the moral-faithful person is yet also open to the historical faith insofar as he finds it conducive to the animation of his pure religious conviction [*Gesinnung*]. In this way alone does this historical faith have a pure moral worth...».

Here Kant confirms his position on both prudence in general and historical religion in particular (as an example of prudence): we can and even should make good use of *some such* non-essential means, provided we remember that they *are means* to a higher end.

Kant's theory of the prudential value of historical religion has important implications for the issue of religious pluralism in this age of globalization: it requires us to recognize that, given the multiplicity of religious traditions, each carries an equal *potential* (at least in principle, though not necessarily in practice) to serve as a prudent means of empowering people to be good. What is abundantly clear in the above passage is that, if any aspect of a person's historical faith should *cease* to be "conducive to the animation of his pure religious conviction", as Kant puts it in the previously-quoted passage, then we are justified in laying it aside as a tradition that is now empty, inasmuch as it no longer carries with it "a pure moral worth". Looking around the world at the abundance of choices we have for possible religious and/or pseudo-religious beliefs and practices, we as citizens of the twenty-first century should acknowledge Kant's position to be perhaps even more relevant to us today than it was to the people of eighteenth-century Europe.

4. Concluding Reflections on the Role of Prudence in Kant's System

Having now explored Kant's view of the role of prudence in religion, let us return to the riddle Kant presented in his very first use of *Klugheit* in the first *Critique*. Although Kant may not have intended such an application, the metaphorical scenario of one person milking a male animal while a co-worker holds a sieve underneath can aptly elucidate the defects he saw in both sides of the ancient debate between the Stoics and Epicureans over the question: "What is the highest good?" The Epicurean is the presumptuous questioner who, like the imprudent man who holds a sieve under an animal that he takes to be female, fails to realize that, *even if the animal being milked were female* (i.e., even if a life of pleasure-seeking could be called "good"), his container (i.e., his inward conviction) could not hold the desired product (because it lacks genuine virtue). For the Epicurean foolishly believes that happiness *is* the highest good; should other people (such as the person milking the animal overhead) actually offer the desired product, the milk of genuine, morally-grounded contentment would flow straight through the Epicurean's un-virtuous sieve, for the Epicurean has no legitimate means of *preserving* (i.e., no *worthiness to*

receive) the deep satisfaction that Epicureans believe will come from fulfilling one's inclinations. Likewise, the Stoic is the trusting but duped answerer, who fails to realize that the "ram" of pure, unaided virtue *cannot produce* the "milk" of happiness, and whose moral theory therefore provides no container (i.e., no adequate conception of the highest good) to catch the milk, even if the ram could produce it. In other words, both of these classical positions lack prudence, but in different ways.

The all-too-common way of viewing Kant's moral theory, as a deontological rejection of any general doctrine of prudence (as if we could be good without the specific supplements provided by an appeal to *some* historical faith), so that his philosophy of religion relies instead on nothing but the postulates of practical reason (i.e., God and immortality, as defended in the second *Critique*), tends to make Kant look like the gullible dairy worker who faithfully sits on his stool holding a large and well-constructed bucket, hoping that *God on High* will pour milk down from heaven! It is no wonder that so few readers have been persuaded by Kant's philosophy of religion, when it is interpreted in this traditional way, whereby religion has to be reduced to a formalistic moral theory in order to be meaningful. In stark contrast to that black-and-white reading of Kant (see notes 7 and 10), our foregoing examination of Kant's theory of the prudential role of historical faith in transmitting moral religion to human communities demonstrates that, unlike the foolish approaches of the Stoics and Epicureans (or, we might add, of the deontologists and constructivists among Kant-interpreters), genuine Kantian wisdom welcomes the person who aims to be *virtuous* (i.e., the one who is willing to live the kind of good life that *would* serve as a suitable container) to walk the nuanced path of *prudence* (i.e., to find the genuine doe of a worthy historical faith that supplements pure rational religion in a way that produces *justified* happiness). Because our attempts to be good are all bound to be imperfect as a result of radical evil, Kant wisely argues in *Religion* that the prudent person should "milk" a "doe" that belongs to a reliable "dairy": that is, we are most likely to succeed (in seeking the highest good) when we associate ourselves with amorally-grounded historical faith.

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L'horizon transcendantal du droit selon Kant

The transcendental horizon of Right in Kant

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« Une Constitution juridique parfaite parmi les hommes, voilà la chose en soi elle-même », I. Kant, *Doctrine du droit*, Conclusion.

Résumé

La procédure judiciaire a fourni à Kant le modèle méthodologique de sa révolution critique. Soumettant le droit au tribunal de la raison, il ne s'attache pas, comme le font encore les juristes de son temps, à la question essentialiste *Quid jus ?*, mais, en posant, comme au sein du prétoire, la question *Quid juris ?*, il s'interroge sur les conditions de possibilité et de validité des catégories et des concepts du droit. Loin d'être « déduite » métaphysiquement d'une puissance transcendante, la juridicité procède, selon la « déduction transcendantale », de l'horizon pur où s'inscrivent les exigences *a priori* qui lui accordent le statut d'« Idée de la raison » : statut sublime qui la rend inaccessible et irréalisable. Le droit ne serait-il pas de ce monde ? A tout le moins serait-il aujourd'hui nécessaire, dans une perspective critique, de réviser la notion de « transcendantal » et de restructurer la raison.

Mots clefs

Criticisme ; déduction transcendantale ; exigence *a priori* ; Idée de la raison ; Idée pure ; jurisprudence ; méthode ; *Quid jus ?* ; *Quid juris ?*

Abstract

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Kant has found the pattern of his critical philosophy in the jurisdictional process. In the *Rightslehre* (1796), he uses his critical method and, to answer to the question *Quid juris?*, he examines the categories and concepts of law (in occidental thought, but without interrogation upon the British Common Law). He explains that, before the critical Court of reason, the “transcendental deduction” discovers the rational and pure *Idea* which is the *a priori* principle of law. But as all the “Ideas of reason”, this sublime Idea of law does not belong to our world. Then, it is necessary today to revise the notion of “transcendental” and to transform the structures of our reason.

Key words

Criticism ; Transcendental Deduction ; *A priori* Necessity ; Idea of Reason ; Pure Idea ; Jurisprudence ; Methode ; *Quid jus?* ; *Quid juris?*

Les relations entre Kant et les juristes de son temps ont été difficiles en raison du climat d’ambivalence et de suspicion dans lequel elles se sont déroulées. Kant, au soir de sa carrière, a tiré, dans *Le conflit des Facultés*, l’enseignement philosophique de ces rapports houleux. En effet, si la question du droit ne semble pas être pour le philosophe une question primordiale, elle est bel et bien au cœur de sa réflexion ; et même à un double titre car il convient d’en distinguer la dimension épistémologique et l’aspect philosophico-théorique. D’une part, quelles qu’aient été les relations conflictuelles, vécues et pensées, entre la philosophie et le droit, le clivage n’a rien d’absolu : c’est l’activité des jurisconsultes, et notamment la procédure judiciaire, qui ont fourni à Kant le modèle méthodologique de sa démarche criticiste et qui sont demeurés, tout au long du grand œuvre, le canevas sur lequel le philosophe, en posant la question *Quid juris?* a exploré, d’un pas jusqu’alors inédit, le champ théorique aussi bien que le champ pratique de la pensée. D’autre part, la méthode étant la clef d’un engagement heuristique, Kant, après les trois grandes *Critiques*, a voulu mettre la théorie juridique à l’épreuve de la rationalité critique afin de dégager les arcanes philosophiques dont elle est le développement : ce fut, en 1796, sa *Rechtslehre*.

*La Doctrine du droit*¹ est un ouvrage généralement considéré comme mineur et souvent décrié. Il n’en offre pas moins une investigation philosophique audacieuse en sa nouveauté. Il pose en effet la question fondamentale de la *fondation* d’un univers juridique dont, depuis des siècles, l’existence humaine n’a pu faire l’économie. Le point de vue

¹ Le texte se trouve au tome III des *Œuvres complètes*, Gallimard, p. 449 – 650 ; AA 06 : 201-374.

méthodologique et le point de vue doctrinal ont donc une assise commune que, au cœur même de la question-clef *Quid juris?* recèlent à la fois la problématique générale du criticisme et la réponse à l'interrogation jusqu'alors sans fond, et évidemment sans réponse, que résume l'impressionnante et indéchiffrable question *Quid jus?*

En ces quelques pages, nous voudrions, en un premier point, explorer dans la lettre même des textes et en historien de la philosophie, le double cheminement qu'a suivi Kant. En un second point, nous demanderons, cette fois en philosophe du droit, quel peut être, par-delà le retentissement qu'eut en son temps la recherche conduite par Kant, l'éclairage qu'apportent ses analyses sur l'univers juridique. Enfin, une ultime interrogation nous conduira à projeter les conclusions de Kant à l'époque actuelle et à juger de leur pertinence.

1. Répudier les théories «vermoulues»

La pensée de Kant a toujours été multidimensionnelle ; mais, singulièrement, dès avant 1770, elle s'est attachée, dans des leçons et des séminaires, aux questions juridiques. Les *Reflexionen* ainsi que de nombreux fragments des *Loose Blättern* témoignent de l'intérêt que portait le philosophe à l'univers conceptuel et architectural du droit. Cependant, Kant est assez avare de confidences sur son propre cursus intellectuel en ce domaine. Nous savons seulement que, à travers les juristes de son siècle, il aimait – non sans une certaine coquetterie – se référer au *Corpus juris civilis*. Surtout, il n'ignorait nullement le vaste mouvement jusnaturaliste qui s'était développé en Europe depuis Grotius et Pufendorf. Ainsi connaissait-il le traité d'Achenwall – le *Jus naturae* paru en 1750 – qui faisait alors autorité dans le monde germanique ; il en avait recopié divers paragraphes et avait annoté l'exemplaire qu'il possédait dans sa bibliothèque². Kant avait aussi rédigé une recension du livre que Hufeland avait consacré au droit naturel et publié à Leipzig en 1785 : *Versuch über den Grundsatz des Naturrecht*. Le courant des juristes leibnizo-wolffiens l'intéressait et, tout ensemble, l'agaçait, éveillant en lui réticences et questions. Il n'est pas exact de dire qu'il voulait, au fil de ses lectures, traiter du droit « en moraliste »³ ; il apparaît bien plutôt, dès ses premières « réflexions », qu'il est à la recherche d'une théorisation du droit

² *Reflexionen*, AA 19 : 326-342.

³ Cf. Introduction de Fernand Alquié à la *Métaphysique des mœurs*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, tome III, p.445.

différente de celle véhiculée par le pas hypothético-déductif d'une tradition longue et dogmatique.

La pensée allemande, telle que la révèle l'enseignement universitaire à l'époque de Kant, est fortement spéculative. Aux yeux du philosophe qui, au début de son interrogation sur le droit, ne distingue pas clairement l'aspect théorique et doctrinal de la discipline juridique et l'aspect pratique de la jurisprudence, est frappé par le fait que la pensée du droit, le plus souvent inspirée par les systèmes de Leibniz et de Wolff, fait culminer en ses développements la rationalité déductive et démonstrative dont Grotius, au XVII^e siècle, avait fait le fer de lance de la pensée du droit. Or, à ses yeux, ce type de pensée est, au même titre que la vieille métaphysique, totalement obsolète et « vermoulu » ; partant, il est insusceptible de mettre en évidence les principes d'intelligibilité qui confèrent leur sens et leur valeur aux catégories et aux concepts du droit. Kant s'applique donc à forger un *autre* mode d'investigation.

La tâche était à la fois difficile et grandiose. Aussi est-ce seulement au terme de sa carrière que le philosophe fut en mesure d'écrire sa « doctrine » (*Lehre*) du droit. Cependant, durant presque deux décennies, il avait scruté à la fois la méthode de travail des jurisconsultes et examiné le contenu substantiel des théories qu'ils proposaient. Son dessein était de rectifier la problématique à laquelle, depuis Platon, avait répondu l'effort des philosophes pour comprendre la nature du domaine juridique : il s'agissait moins pour lui d'exprimer *ce qu'est le droit* d'un point de vue essentialiste que de montrer par une analyse épistémologique *ce qui est de droit* et à quelles conditions.

Le regard alors porté par Kant sur les ouvrages des juristes de son siècle tels que Thomasius⁴, Heineccius⁵ ou Achenwall⁶ est lucide et sans concessions. Ces magistrats se prennent, estime-t-il, pour des « professeurs » qui, tous, sont soumis à l'influence de Leibniz et de Wolff. Certes, Kant admet qu'ils introduisent de l'ordre dans les lourdes compilations des *Institutes* et que leur mathématisme d'inspiration leibnizienne fait pièce à

⁴ Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) avait fait paraître en 1694 son *Ethique pratique*

⁵ Johann-Gottlieb Heineccius (1681-1741) disait couloir atteindre la certitude dans la jurisprudence en mettant en œuvre une « méthode axiomatique » plus simple même que la logique wolffienne dont elle s'inspirerait.

⁶ G. Achenwall (1719-1772) avait fait paraître en 1750 un *Jus naturae* qui connut de nombreuses rééditions. Kant le cite à plusieurs reprises : cf. Notamment, voir note 1 - *Reflexionen*, AA 19 : 326-342.

l'éclectisme des opinions et des coutumes. Mais la volonté rationaliste intransigeante qui, par exemple chez Achenwall, commande leur manière de raisonner, les incline vers le systématisme et le dogmatisme métaphysique⁷. Si l'architecture formaliste et synthétiste de leurs traités a le mérite d'aider à la compréhension des longues chaînes de droit, elle a le tort d'étouffer les requêtes mouvantes d'un humanisme concret et vivant.

Kant, certainement influencé par la réflexion pragmatique de J.J.Moser⁸ et de K.F.Hommel⁹ en Allemagne, et par celle de J.B.Vico¹⁰ en Italie, mais éloigné de l'anti-wolffisme offensif et virulent qui sévissait à Berlin et à Königsberg, entreprit donc d'ouvrir une voie nouvelle. Dans la page célèbre de la *Critique de la raison pure* qui contient la quintessence de la décision criticiste, il tira la leçon – d'abord principalement méthodologique – qu'il avait retenue de sa lecture du *Contrat social* de Rousseau. Sans distinguer encore avec netteté les points de vue de la pratique et de la théorie, il entendit expliquer que, au tribunal de la raison, il ne faut pas, pour trancher un litige entre des parties adverses, ou de manière plus ambitieuse, pour élaborer la connaissance du droit, déduire les conséquences d'un principe. La « déduction » juridictionnelle existe bien mais elle est inassimilable à une déduction logico-mathématique. De même, la théorisation du droit ne résulte pas d'un processus qui déduit les conséquences métaphysiques d'une postulation première. Lors même, estime Kant, que, depuis Grotius, la plupart des jurisconsultes modernes se sont trompés en dessinant, selon les voies d'une logique causale, l'architectonique de leur systématization du droit, ils ont cependant, pense-t-il, le mérite d'avoir mis en œuvre une méthode de travail qui, dans l'examen des litiges, sait distinguer les questions *Quid facti?* et *Quid juris?* Or, rechercher les conditions qui rendent un jugement possible et valide, voilà la démarche qui fournit la clef de la révolution épistémologique appelée à bouleverser l'approche du monde juridique. Comme

⁷ Tel est le reproche virulent que le Suisse Jean-Pierre de Crouzas (1683-1749) faisait dans ses *Observations critiques sur l'abrégé de la logique de Monsieur Wolff*, Leipzig, 1744.)

⁸ Johan Jacob Moser (1701-1785 est l'auteur d'un ouvrage *Le Maître et le serviteur* (1759) qui connut un grand succès politique en Allemagne.)

⁹ Karl Ferdinand Hommel (1722-1781), professeur de droit renommé à Leipzig, était criminaliste. On l'a parfois considéré comme un précurseur de Beccaria.

¹⁰ Giovanni Batista Vico (1668-1744), juriste napolitain, avait consacré divers travaux à la théorie juridique avant de se rendre célèbre par la *Scienza nuova*.

cette révolution est aussi un engagement philosophique, elle inaugure la nouvelle silhouette de ce qui deviendra bientôt la « philosophie du droit ».

Ce point est évidemment de prime importance. En effet, l'erreur méthodologique des théories du XVIII^e siècle, si brillantes qu'elles aient été, s'est doublée, selon Kant, de la méprise philosophique profonde qu'ils ont commise dans le sillage de la déthéologisation et de la désacralisation du droit tracé par Grotius et Pufendorf. Substituer les axiomes du rationalisme moderne, comme l'a fait Thomasius¹¹, au principe d'autorité métaphysique ou théologique voulu par les juristes romains et les canonistes médiévaux a été, assurément, pense Kant, une démarche nécessaire ; mais elle n'est pas satisfaisante. Le nouveau jusnaturalisme qui fonde la fonction normative des règles de droit dans la norme méta-juridique suprême du *jus naturae* conduit à une conception utopique et fautive de l'univers juridique. Aussi bien s'impose le réexamen de la thématique et des instruments conceptuels dont, leurs ouvrages eussent-ils été magistraux, se sont servis les juristes modernes. C'est à ce prix que sera rendue pertinente, avec la rectification du schéma fondamental du droit, la mutation de son intelligibilité.

La boucle est tout près, désormais, d'être bouclée. Mais, au terme d'un long parcours, il n'a fallu rien de moins que la révolution « critique » par laquelle Kant a bouleversé la problématique fondamentale du droit et apporté une réponse inédite à la question primordiale de sa fondation.

2. Assigner le droit au tribunal critique de la raison

Kant n'est pas juriste ; il n'a ni voulu ni prétendu l'être. Mais si la *Rechtslehre* qu'il publie en décembre 1796 à l'âge de 72 ans a été reçue par l'intelligentsia comme l'ouvrage d'un vieillard fatigué, elle n'en constitue pas moins le témoignage fort de la place que, considéré du point de vue¹² théorique (dans les codes, les compilations et la doctrine) ou du point de vue pratique (lors de la mise en mouvement du droit par le magistrat dans le

¹¹ Christian Thomasius avait publié en 1705 un ouvrage intitulé *Fondation du droit naturel et du droit des gens*. La démarche adoptée par ce juriste est celle qui a particulièrement frappé Kant .

¹² On sait l'importance qu'attache Kant, dans toute son œuvre, à la notion de 'point de vue'. Cf. *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs*, troisième section : « Le concept d'un monde intelligible n'est qu'un point de vue que la raison se voit obligée d'adopter en dehors des phénomènes, afin de se concevoir elle-même comme pratique », Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, tome II, p.330, AA 04 : 458.

prétoire), le droit occupe dans son gigantesque opus philosophique en attestant les puissances de la raison critique.

En tournant le dos aux « philosophies d'école », les chemins de la réflexion kantienne sur les codes et sur la jurisprudence prennent leur point de départ dans une problématique inédite qui, en assignant le droit au tribunal de la raison comme le veut la démarche critique¹³, doit en examiner le contenu et la légitimité. Elle revient à chercher en quoi et comment le corpus juridique – le droit positif, bien entendu, et quelle qu'en soit la texture complexe et noueuse – puise en sa fondation même les conditions de sa possibilité et de sa validité : tâche non pas elle-même juridique mais éminemment philosophique qui est en quête d'« une méta-physique du droit »¹⁴, c'est-à-dire de ce qui, dans la positivité des règles juridiques fait et justifie leur légitimité. Le « système issu de la raison »¹⁵ que veut élaborer Kant refuse ce qui est facile, aléatoire ou incertain. Parce qu'il est la recherche du bien-fondé de l'appareil juridique en général, il ne sera ni une description ou une analyse empirique du droit positif ni un discours sur l'idéal. Aux antipodes de la « philosophie populaire » que souhaitent Mendelsohn et Garve, il sera une théorie *pure* du droit strict¹⁶.

La mise en oeuvre du projet heuristique dont l'objectif est de déplacer la rationalité spéculative vers la normativité de la raison pratique obéit, dans l'orthodoxie critique, à un impératif méthodologique : le philosophe doit s'attacher aussi bien à la *question de fait* dont la visée est informative et objective (elle commande la recherche de ce qui est ou a été) qu'à la *question de droit* dont la visée est justificative et fondationnelle (elle s'enquiert de ce qui doit être ou aurait dû être). Le lecteur de Kant pouvait donc s'attendre à ce que le philosophe construise sa « doctrine » en deux moments respectivement voués à l'examen de sa double interrogation. Or, si l'ouvrage de Kant comporte bien en effet deux parties, elles sont vouées respectivement, selon un autre dualisme, aux deux champs juridiques que l'on désigne, conformément à la tradition romaniste, comme étant ceux du « droit privé » (*Privatrecht*) et du « droit public » (*Offentlichesrecht*). La méprise serait de considérer

¹³ Rappelons ici que cette démarche est celle-là même que les jurisconsultes mettent en oeuvre dans le prétoire lors de l'examen d'une « espèce ».

¹⁴ *Doctrine du droit*, Préface, p.449 ; AA 06 : 205.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, Préface, p. 449 ; AA 06 : 205.

¹⁶ Dans l'investigation kantienne, le « droit strict » exclut le « droit large » comme l'équité ou le droit de nécessité en quoi la contrainte n'a pas de place, *Doctrine du droit*, p. 483 ; AA 06 : 233.

qu'en ce dualisme se reflète la dichotomie méthodologique de l'interrogation critique. En procédant à l'examen des deux volets de l'édifice juridique, Kant retrouve bien la *summa divisio* qu'utilisent les juristes de son siècle mais son originalité est de montrer, au fil de ses investigations, comment s'articulent subtilement les deux figures du questionnement criticiste.

Que connote donc le concept de *droit privé* ?

La réponse, de prime abord, peut paraître simple, claire et sans équivoque : le pilier autour duquel se construit l'architecture du droit privé est le concept de « propriété ». Mais, pour le décrypter, Kant en appelle à un regard dont les deux visées criticistes s'articulent et se complètent.

Le problème du mien et du tien (*meum juris*) concerne la possession d'un objet extérieur. Kant procède d'abord à « l'exposition » du concept de possession. Ce concept, rappelle-t-il, ne connote ni simple détention ni propriété : la possession se définit par l'usage – définition tout à fait classique. Mais Kant introduit une distinction totalement étrangère au juriste, doctrinaire ou praticien, entre la « possession sensible » qui s'attache à une chose située dans l'espace et le temps (le champ que je peux labourer, le livre dont je peux me servir...) et la « possession intelligible ou nouménale » qu'établit la déduction transcendantale en mettant en lumière les conditions qui rendent le droit de possession possible, qui le fondent et le légitiment¹⁷. Nous sommes en ce point loin du droit des juristes et même loin de la vulgate doctrinale généralement reçue.

C'est qu'en vérité, nous sommes ici plongés au cœur de la démarche criticiste en laquelle la doctrine kantienne s'éloigne radicalement des thèses jusnaturalistes de Thomasiaus, Nettelblatt ou Achenwall qui pensaient le droit par référence à l'archétype transcendant d'un droit naturel inhérent au sujet¹⁸. Selon Kant, la « déduction » transcendantale, corrélée à l'« exposition » du droit, vient la compléter et l'approfondir. D'ores et déjà, se déchiffre la double signification de l'analyse criticiste.

D'abord, la distinction de la possession sensible et de la possession intelligible signifie qu'il est impensable, donc impossible, qu'une chose ne soit à personne ; la *res*

¹⁷ *Doctrine du droit*, § 1, p. 494-495 ; AA 06 : 245.

¹⁸ Cf. Thomasiaus, *Fundamenta juris naturae et gentium*, 1705. Daries, *Institutiones jurisprudentiae naturalis*, 1740. Nettelblatt, *Systema elementaris jurisprudentiae naturalis*, 1748. Achenwall, *Prolegomena jurisnaturalis et jus naturae*, 1781.

nullius est un concept creux¹⁹. Néanmoins, son impossibilité dévoile le « postulat de la raison pratique », c'est-à-dire la « loi permissive » ou la « présupposition *a priori* de la raison pratique » d'après laquelle « tout objet de mon arbitre » est un mien possible.

Ensuite, il apparaît que la nature juridique de la possession ne réside ni dans l'aspect matériel de la chose possédée ni dans l'aspect physique du fait de posséder²⁰. La possession dans le phénomène ne se suffit pas à elle-même. C'est dire que la possession implique la nécessaire liaison de l'objet possédé et du sujet possédant. Or cette liaison, loin d'être empirique, est la condition *sine qua non* qui rend possible (c'est-à-dire pensable) toute possession : sa nécessité est *a priori* et transcendantale. Comme telle, elle indique le niveau auquel se situe le droit de possession : il se présente comme « un pur concept rationnel de l'arbitre sous les lois de la liberté »²¹. Telle est l'exigence juridique principielle de la raison pratique, exigence qui est la condition d'intelligibilité de tout le droit privé.

Une telle exigence ne relève en aucun cas du sujet empirique mais toujours du sujet fondamentalement transcendantal (lequel, évidemment, n'a rien de subjectif). Donc, le droit de possession, en tant qu'il est l'idéal-type du droit privé, dépasse tout individualisme et n'a de sens que dans l'intersubjectivité universelle. Seulement, il n'est, à ce niveau, qu'un « droit provisoire » et non un « droit péremptoire »²². Comme tel, il n'est encore qu'une « présomption juridique »²³. En son exemplarité, il enseigne que, de manière générale, le droit privé est privé de l'effectivité qui s'attache à la juridicité du droit positif. Certes, il s'impose à chacun comme l'obligation de ne pas faire usage de l'objet que tout autre possède²⁴ et cette obligation porte en elle-même, *a priori*, sa propre garantie. Mais comme, dans la sphère d'effectivité où se déploie le droit, son observance ne va pas de soi,

¹⁹ *Doctrine du droit*, § 2, p. 495 ; AA 06 : 246, p.120.

²⁰ Dans les *Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs*, Kant déclarait dans le même esprit, mutatis mutandis, que la valeur morale d'une action ne dépend ni de sa teneur propre (son contenu) ni du but qu'elle recherche ni même de sa réussite.

²¹ *Doctrine du droit*, § 5, p. 499 ; AA 06 : 249.

²² *Ibid.*, § 9, p. 509 ; AA 06: 217, p. 509.

²³ *Ibid.*, § 9, p. 509 ; AA 06: 217.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, § 8, p. 508 ; AA 06: 508.

il est nécessaire qu' « une volonté collective et universelle (*Kollektivallgemeine*) » vienne, par une loi de contrainte, en assurer la l'effectivité et la sécurité.

En ces analyses – dont les juristes n'approuveraient probablement pas toujours la facture technique – l'originalité de Kant est de montrer que le droit privé est à la fois promesse juridique et carence juridique. Selon Kant, le « droit réel » (*jus in re*) et le « droit personnel » (la possession de l'arbitre d'un autre) et même cette catégorie insolite qu'invente le philosophe en l'appelant « le droit personnel selon une modalité réelle » ne se rapportent qu'à une virtualité juridique qui se caractérise comme du « droit naturel / rationnel ». Tous les concepts juridiques du droit privé statutaire, tels que l'occupation, la spécification, la donation, l'hérédité ... ne sont intelligibles qu'en vertu du principe formel de possibilité, lequel, présupposé²⁵, n'a rien du principe transcendant invoqué par les jusnaturalistes. Le transcendantal n'est pas transcendant. Le principe fondateur du droit privé est en effet « un besoin de la raison », c'est-à-dire une exigence rationnelle pure et *a priori* qui ne se rapporte pas à l'individualité de *l'homo phaenomenon* mais à *l'homo noumenon*, c'est-à-dire à l'humanité de l'homme dans son universalité²⁶. Cette exigence pure, d'ordre transcendantal, a une vocation rectrice et régulatrice. Rien de tel n'a jamais transparu dans les ouvrages des jurisconsultes : la cathédrale juridique qu'ils ont dessinée selon une géographie intellectuelle, aux yeux de Kant, mutilée, ressemble, tant son déductivisme est dogmatique, à la tête de la fable de Phèdre : elle est belle, mais elle n'a pas d'âme²⁷.

La révolution criticiste de la doctrine du droit est accomplie. Du moins ne l'est-elle encore qu'à demi. En effet, si, selon Kant, le droit privé, en sa nature rationnelle, ne demeure qu'une promesse, il faut, pour que celle-ci se réalise effectivement, que la sanction de la loi publique vienne la consacrer et l'avaliser. Accomplir cette « révolution » - copernicienne si l'on veut ou galiléenne – c'est montrer philosophiquement que le « droit naturel » invoqué généralement en sa posture métaphysique transcendante comme la plus profonde racine du droit, n'en est ni la source ni le modèle ou le paradigme. Mais, dans la démarche kantienne, la critique prend un autre tour et bien plus important. Pour que le

²⁵ *Doctrine du droit*, § 7, p. 506 ; AA 06 : 254.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, § 35, p. 558 ; AA 06: 295.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Introduction, p . 478 ; AA 06: 230.

droit privé, de « provisoire » devienne « péremptoire »²⁸, il doit être subsumé par le droit public étatique qui relève, lui aussi, comme nous allons le voir, d'une logique transcendantale.

Que connote le concept de *droit public* ?

S'interroger sur le concept de droit public, des deux points de vue politique et cosmopolitique que distingue Kant²⁹, n'est pas un questionnement nouveau. Mais la manière de conduire cette interrogation prend, dans l'écriture de Kant, un tour spécifique et inédit.

Dans le cadre auquel accède la démarche critique, la fondation transcendantale du droit privé éclaire la signification naturelle/rationnelle de tous ses concepts ; mais ceux-ci demeurent des virtualités juridiques privées de la garantie et de l'effectivité que, seul, le droit public peut leur conférer. Il est donc de première importance de saisir non pas seulement, comme l'a fait une longue tradition, ce que sont les « pouvoirs » de l'Etat et comment ils se manifestent³⁰, mais de capter, dans le droit public, en deçà de sa quiddité, ce qui fait sa juridicité et sa légitimité. A cette immense question, Kant répond par l'analyse du « contrat », qu'il définit comme l'acte juridique qui conditionne le passage, « impératif » et « nécessaire », de « l'état de nature » à « l'état civil »³¹.

On pourrait penser que cette problématique, formulée de longue date par Kant³², n'a rien de bien original. Le philosophème du contrat, dont la spécificité avait été pressentie par les Monarchomaques protestants du XVI^e siècle, est devenu, deux siècles plus tard, comme le dit Vaughan, un « lieu commun » porté par une vague puissante. Hobbes et surtout Rousseau, mais aussi Locke, Pufendorf, Burlamaqui, alors célèbres, l'ont abordée avec soin. Kant connaît bien ces auteurs. Mais, s'écartant de l'idée du *pactum societatis* analysée par la plupart d'entre eux comme la source de la société civile et de son

²⁸ *Ibid.*, § 15, p. 519 ; AA 06 : 264.

²⁹ Dans la synopsis du droit que dessine Kant, les deux perspectives sont nettement distinguées dans les deux sections consacrées à l'étude du droit public.

³⁰ *Doctrine du droit*, § 46 à 49, p. 578 – 584 ; AA 06 : 314-318, ainsi que la longue « remarque » qui fait suite à cet examen.

³¹ *Doctrine du droit*, § 42, Pléiade, tome III, p. 573 ; AA 06 : 307.

³² Cf. *Reflexionen 1773-1775* ; *Idée d'une histoire universelle d'un point de vue cosmopolitique*, 1784 ; *Théorie et Praxis*, 1793.

droit, il s'interroge sur le *pactum unionis civilis* qui n'en est pas l'origine mais la condition³³. Il prend ainsi largement ses distances avec ses devanciers et, écartant l'idée du *fondement* traditionnel mais « insondable » du droit public³⁴, il préfère en rechercher la *fondation*, qui n'en est pas la source mais la condition d'existence. Dans la quête logique de ce principe fondateur, le philosophe élève la pensée à une altitude jamais atteinte.

Lorsqu'il étudie le contrat comme principe de la société civile, Kant s'applique d'abord à une critique de Hobbes. En 1793, dans *Théorie et pratique*, il a insisté sur les déficiences de la théorie du contrat qu'exposait le *Léviathan*. Hobbes, déclare-t-il, s'est trompé : son erreur est profonde à cause de la postulation individualiste et mécaniciste de sa philosophie. Il a ainsi confondu les notions de « société » et de « société civile » ou politique, confusion d'où est sortie une seconde méprise par laquelle il a assimilé le contrat social à un contrat ordinaire aux termes duquel une « affaire » est traitée comme un calcul téléologique d'intérêts. Loin de ce pas réductionniste, Kant recherche au contraire la nature spécifique du contrat social dont il laisse entendre d'emblée que la vocation est de permettre, sous une Constitution civile, la mutation de la liberté. L'état civil, dit-il, exprime, conformément à l'impératif de la raison pratique, l'exigence pure et *a priori* d'une Constitution civile (*Verfassung*) habilitée à fixer par des lois publiques les rapports possibles d'hommes libres pourtant soumis à des lois de contrainte. L'idée, assurément, peut paraître difficile. Mais Kant a expliqué à plusieurs reprises que des lois de contrainte, loin de s'opposer à la liberté, sont au contraire ce qui fait obstacle à tout ce qui fait obstacle à la liberté.

Toute difficulté à cet égard étant ainsi levée, Kant peut étudier les lois juridiques *a priori* nécessaires³⁵ que sont, dans la *civitas*, les « trois pouvoirs » (*trias politica*) : le souverain, l'exécutif et le judiciaire. La démarche, après les analyses de Hobbes, Pufendorf, Locke, Montesquieu ou Rousseau, peut paraître tout à fait classique. Mais du point de vue réflexif-philosophique adopté par Kant, ces trois pouvoirs représentent les trois propositions d'un raisonnement de la raison pratique : la majeure contient la loi d'une *volonté* ; la mineure contient l'*ordre* de se conduire d'après la loi (c'est-à-dire la

³³ Cf. *Théorie et pratique*, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, tome III, p. 279 ; AA 08 : 297.

³⁴ « Une telle idée ne saurait donner lieu qu'à des ratiocinations tout à fait vides », *Doctrine du droit*, Remarque A, p. 585 ; AA 06 : 319.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, § 45, p. 578 ; AA 06 : 313.

subsumption sous la majeure) ; la conclusion, qui réside dans la *sentence*, contient ce qui est « de droit » dans l'espèce dont il s'agit. Il en résulte que tous les concepts qui sont afférents à ces trois pouvoirs sont portés par la condition formelle et *sine qua non* que constitue le *pactum unionis civilis*. Autrement dit, le droit statutaire (ou positif) répond à « l'Etat selon l'Idée » (*in der Idee*) tel qu'on conçoit qu'en toutes ses formulations, il doit être (*Sollen*). Quelle que soit donc la « réalité pratique indubitable » du contrat générateur de la société civile, celui-ci procède d'une « simple Idée de la raison »³⁶.

Aussi bien le contrat social n'a-t-il rien à voir selon Kant avec un pacte « primitif » qu'il faudrait situer en une hypothétique proto-histoire. C'est seulement « en Idée » qu'il a un sens et à ce niveau seulement qu'il puise les raisons de son efficence possible. On peut, bien sûr, l'appeler si l'on veut *contractus originarius* mais ce caractère « originaire » ne signifie pas qu'il est un fait premier. Il connote au contraire, chez un peuple, la connexion (ou le *nexus*) de toutes les volontés particulières qui s'érigent de la sorte en une volonté commune³⁷. Kant semble en cela bien proche de Rousseau dont il est un lecteur avisé. Mais il lui apparaît que Rousseau est resté en chemin : faute d'un outillage conceptuel suffisant, il n'a pas su dire que cette connexion est « une simple Idée de la raison »³⁸, qu'elle exprime un principe *a priori*, qu'elle appartient à la raison pure et qu'à ce titre, elle possède un statut *transcendental*. C'est pourtant là l'essentiel. Le contrat qui fait naître la société civile ou Etat en quoi, par la tâche propre aux trois pouvoirs, se déploie le droit statutaire (*willkürliches Recht*), est donc inséparable de la légalité *pure et a priori* qui est intrinsèque à tout acte de la pensée juridique. Le dire « originaire », c'est le reconnaître non pas comme « primitif » mais comme *principliel* ; c'est en saluer l'aspect *normateur*. L'Idée pure du contrat, précise Kant, « sert de fil conducteur (*norma*) à toute unification effective visant la chose publique (sur le plan interne³⁹) »⁴⁰.

Le langage de Kant est à coup sûr étranger et peu compréhensible aux juristes publicistes. Rousseau, sans doute, eût compris ; mais il n'était pas juriste et – nous l'avons

³⁶ *Ibid.*, § 44, Remarque p. 577 ; AA 06 : 313.

³⁷ *Doctrine du droit*, § 47, p. 581 ; AA 06 : 315.

³⁸ *Théorie et pratique*, II, Corollaire, Pléiade tome III, p. 279 ; AA 06 : 297.

³⁹ Le droit public comporte aussi une dimension cosmopolitique à laquelle se rapportent assez brièvement les analyses suivantes de la *Doctrine du droit*. Le pas du questionnement et le résultat philosophique de l'analyse aboutissent aux mêmes conclusions.

⁴⁰ *Doctrine du droit*, § 45, p. 578 ; AA 06 : 313.

dit – il s’est arrêté en chemin. Même les plus philosophes d’entre les jurisconsultes tels que Montesquieu, Vattel ou Hufeland, ignorent la dimension transcendante que la pensée critique inscrit au fronton de l’architecture juridique. Ainsi s’explique en grande part l’âpreté du « conflit des facultés ». En revanche, pour le philosophe, l’enseignement est riche et significatif. A l’ontologie méta-juridique de la tradition jusnaturaliste à laquelle, avec une conscience plus ou moins claire de cette appartenance, se rapportent les certitudes dogmatiques des jurisconsultes de son temps, Kant substitue la perspective transcendante d’un normativisme qui est, jusque dans le républicanisme du droit international, un humanisme juridique *non-métaphysique*. Même « un peuple de démons » (à condition qu’il ait l’intelligence) saurait résoudre le problème de la Constitution civile des points de vue politique et cosmopolitique⁴¹. La *Doctrine du droit* assume ainsi pleinement la révolution criticiste : en sa topique transcendante, la raison pure pratique impose impérativement à l’univers juridique l’horizon d’idéalité et de « pure rigueur » qu’exige la liberté nouménale sans quoi aucune catégorie, aucun concept, aucune règle de droit n’auraient de sens, de valeur et d’effectivité.

La congruence des analyses du droit privé et du droit public proposées par Kant atteste la parfaite cohérence de sa pensée. Dans son obligatorité, le droit - qu’il commande, autorise ou habilite - impose « un devoir saint » qui est « sacré ». Sa fondation rigoriste est inflexible, et sa puissance est capable d’en hausser la pensée même au niveau de la pureté transcendante *a priori*. Celle-ci seule permet de comprendre pourquoi l’obéissance à la loi étant un impératif absolu, toute violation du contrat est non seulement, du point de vue de la logique formelle, une illégalité et une contradiction mais, du point de vue juridique, un défi aux *dictamina* de la raison.

Seulement, si Kant, par le regard critique qu’il porte sur l’univers du droit, peut assimiler la Constitution juridique parfaite à la chose en soi⁴², la puissance de sa démarche en est aussi la faiblesse : quelle que soit l’altitude de ses exigences transcendantes, le *pactum unionis civilis* qui rend possible et valide le dispositif juridique de l’Etat, ne l’inscrit cependant que dans les « limites de la simple raison ».

⁴¹ Cf. *Projet de paix perpétuelle*, p. 333- 392 ; AA 08 : 343- 386.

⁴² *Doctrine du droit, Remarques explicatives, Conclusion*, p. 649 ; AA 06 : 371.

3. L'impossibilité d'échapper aux limites de la simple raison

L'originalité de Kant est, comme nous venons de le voir, de s'interroger sur la « fondation » du droit plutôt que sur ses fondements, qu'il répute d'ailleurs « insondables du point de vue pratique ». Son questionnement, que résume la formule *Quid juris ?*, est, par soi seul et déjà, une réponse au souci de « pureté » qui hante de part en part sa démarche critique. Refusant d'inscrire le droit dans l'ordre phénoménal où se manifestent les mobiles psychologiques que sont les inclinations et les justifications sociologiques que sont les intérêts⁴³, Kant considère que le système du droit, dans son entier, relève catégoriquement et inconditionnellement de l'ordre nouménal. C'est en ce lieu transcendantal précisément que résident à la fois la force et les limites de la raison pratique qui l'inspire.

Les analyses qui précèdent convergent pour montrer que l'Idée du droit, par la pureté transcendantale *a priori* qu'elle tient de sa rationalité, est la clef de voûte de l'édifice juridique et le principe régulateur (mais non pas constitutif) du fonctionnement de son dispositif. Cette thèse nouvelle s'insère dans la perspective criticiste d'où sont écartées définitivement les théories essentialistes qui se sont essouffées en recherchant la quiddité du droit, aussi bien que les déclarations empiristes assimilant peu ou prou le droit à la force ou à l'intérêt ; comme telle, elle doit permettre, selon Kant, de donner enfin la définition du concept du droit que les juristes, nonobstant leurs efforts, n'ont jamais pu trouver jusqu'alors⁴⁴.

L'impossibilité, jamais surmontée, d'accéder à la définition du droit provient sans doute de la multivalence et de la malléabilité des appareils juridiques, donc, du vertige sémantique qui entoure le terme même de droit. Mais cette difficulté, sur laquelle Kant ne s'attarde pas, ne lui apparaît pas comme un accident de l'histoire ; et il y a en elle quelque chose d'infiniment plus important. Cette difficulté est en tout cas assez grave pour qu'il faille lever l'amphibologie qui, depuis toujours, rôde dans la sphère juridique. C'est d'ailleurs pourquoi le philosophe, ayant assigné le droit au tribunal de la raison en donnant

⁴³ Dans ce rejet, Kant vise particulièrement les prises de position philosophiques de Hume et de Bentham.

⁴⁴ *Critique de la raison pure*, seconde édition de 1787, Pléiade, tome I, p. 1311, note : « Les juristes cherchent encore une définition pour le concept du droit ».

congé à la question *Quid jus ?*, lui a substitué la question critique *Quid juris ?* Dans la démarche qui s'en est suivie, le droit s'est profilé comme ce qui a intrinsèquement vocation à réaliser dans le monde sensible la coexistence d'êtres raisonnables. S'il en est ainsi, c'est que la contrainte légale se dévoile comme son critère premier : la juridicité est en effet l'exigence inconditionnelle par laquelle le droit lie la possibilité de son existence à la loi universelle de la liberté et le caractérise comme besoin d'ordre. Le droit obéit donc à un « besoin de la raison » : fiction heuristique de premier plan, ce « besoin » traduit l'*Idée régulatrice* d'après laquelle l'ordre juridique n'est concevable qu'en vertu de l'exigence impérative qui oriente toujours et universellement la raison vers la liberté.

Le droit se détermine ainsi comme le devoir-être inconditionnel qui, dans l'appareil du droit positif, fonde la synthèse du conditionnel. *Eo ipso*, la doctrine du droit réfute aussi bien le constructivisme que la facticité historique empirique. Par sa dimension pratique, l'ordre juridique échappe à toute théorisation spéculative. Sa pensabilité et sa légitimité sont transcendentalelement fondées : ce pourquoi, indépendamment de leur contenu, c'est-à-dire formellement, les maximes juridiques possèdent un caractère d'obligatorité. La loi du droit est de la sorte le postulat même de la raison pratique : le droit répond au principe non pas constitutif mais *régulateur* sans lequel la destination de l'humanité ne serait pas même pensable. L'Idée du droit fait donc bien de lui un devoir. C'est sa règle d'or. Assumer ce devoir, c'est-à-dire tenter la réalisation de son Idée pure n'est rien de moins qu'opérer la synthèse qui, unissant l'Idéalité de la liberté à la naturalité de l'homme, tend à l'accomplissement de son humanité. Le droit est ainsi appelé à insérer la légalité de l'ordre dans le désordre des comportements humains : tâche sublime en sa dimension nouménale. Le droit ne trouve sa vérité que sur l'horizon transcendantal.

Mais l'Idée du droit, par sa « pureté » même, s'avère – comme toute Idée de la raison – inaccessible à l'homme et irréalisable.

Assurément, Kant voit juste lorsqu'il pense que ce n'est pas en regardant le Ciel pour y trouver les lumières transcendentes et surnaturelles que l'on peut comprendre la juridicité du droit. Il voit juste encore quand il dit que ce n'est pas non plus en assimilant le droit à la morale ou à la philanthropie⁴⁵ (c'est-à-dire en voyant dans l'organisation de la

⁴⁵ « Cette Idée de la raison qu'est une communauté générale ... de tous les peuples de la Terre qui peuvent nouer entre eux des rapports actifs, n'est pas quelque chose de philanthropique (éthique) mais c'est un principe juridique », *Doctrine du droit*, § 62, p. 625 ; AA 06 : 352.

République le chemin qui conduit au règne des fins) que l'on atteindra les arcanes du droit. Dans un cas comme dans l'autre, il n'y a que la vaine rêverie des utopies. L'horizon intelligible du droit intime à son concept la perfection d'un modèle critique qui, par son prestige inaltérable, doit servir de règle et de fil conducteur à la sphère juridique (*Rechtsschnur*), en ce qui concerne son organisation comme en ce qui se rapporte à son fonctionnement.

L'illusion, toutefois, consiste à croire que la perfection nouménale pure de l'Idée du droit peut s'objectiver dans le monde phénoménal ou dans l'expérience vécue. La perspective normative-transcendantale dessinée par Kant est inassimilable à un rêve de métaphysicien. Qu'il y soit question de l'ordre que requiert l'espace public de la République ou, à une autre échelle, de la paix du monde, elle est l'indication de « la fin ultime » du droit et, comme telle, elle s'inscrit dans « les limites de la simple raison »⁴⁶. Or, pour l'homme raisonnable, ces bornes sont infranchissables.

Ce n'est nullement là un constat d'échec, une prise de position attentiste ou un aveu de désespérance, mais tout au contraire une certitude. Les concepts du droit privé et du droit public jusqu'en sa figure cosmopolitique, en assurant l'armature catégoriale du monde juridique, relèvent tous des « principes de réflexion » contenus en son Idée. Il serait vain de rechercher la juridicité du droit dans ses effets ou dans son utilité. La question n'est pas de savoir si le droit privé réalise la compatibilité des libertés, si le droit public établit l'ordre de la communauté civile, si le droit cosmopolitique rendra quelque jour la paix effective entre les nations ... Le problème est de reconnaître dans les principes de réflexion de la raison – dont il faut répéter qu'ils ne peuvent se phénoménaliser et qu'ils ne sont pas non plus des principes constitutifs - des principes avant tout régulateurs. Voilà la réponse à la question *Quid juris?* Elle permet de discerner la signification ultime de tous les concepts du droit : si, en eux, la rationalité du normatif ne se laisse pas connaître (*erkennen*) mais seulement penser (*denken*), elle est l'indication de la maxime la plus magnanime et la plus prégnante du monde juridique : *il faut agir comme si ce qui, peut-être, ne sera jamais, devait être*. Une telle maxime a quelque chose de « sacré » ; à travers l'Idée pure du droit, elle est comme la lumière d'un phare qui, en diffusant les requêtes pures de la législation pratique de la raison, arrache l'homme à la terre et l'enlève jusqu'à la « chose en soi ». Sous cette lumière diamantine, les réquisitions de la raison pratique, en

⁴⁶ *Doctrine du droit*, Conclusion, p. 629 ; AA 06 : 355.

leur caractère intangible, servent de guide et de compas. Pour le monde du droit, elles dessinent l'horizon d'attente des esprits et, comme telles, elles en dévoilent le noyau de vérité.

La logique du droit ne fait qu'un avec la légalité de la pensée pure. C'est en elle que l'appareil juridique puise sa fondation philosophique première et trouve sa justification *a priori*. La juridicité appartient donc à la sublimité de la raison pure pratique. Telle est sa noblesse. Néanmoins, on ne saurait oublier que cette sublime raison a « besoin de *supposer* ce qui lui est intelligible »⁴⁷. Telles en sont les limites. Dans l'intervalle de cette grandeur sublime et de ces limites infranchissables se situe le lieu de l'autorité normatrice du droit.

En récusant la viabilité des chemins d'un idéalisme pétri du besoin de l'absolu, Kant avait raison : les absolus n'appartiennent pas au monde des hommes et renvoient philosophiquement à des croyances mortes. Cependant, de même que Rousseau s'était arrêté en chemin sur la voie où sont inscrits les réquisits d'une pensée transcendante, de même Kant, en pensant la pensée du droit, a sous-estimé l'importance de la dynamique et des métamorphoses qui font du domaine juridique l'arène d'un combat jamais achevé parce qu'il est inachevable. C'est assurément là une déception philosophique. Néanmoins, ce n'est nullement là l'effondrement d'une espérance. En effet, un geste de reprise réflexive-critique devrait permettre, tout en conservant le cadre non-métaphysique de la démarche kantienne, de tracer la route d'un *autre* humanisme juridique, renouvelé et rénové, dont la notion d'inter-relationnalité, à peine effleurée par Kant, serait la clef⁴⁸. En cette perspective post-kantienne, ce n'est pas la complexité structurelle du droit de notre temps qui est en question ; mais il apparaît aujourd'hui que, au-delà des antinomies et des apories auxquelles se heurtait la *Doctrine du droit* à la fin du XVIIIe siècle, la pensée du droit ne peut plus trouver véritablement ce qui la fonde et l'avalise dans une raison seulement monologique qui, sans sortir d'elle-même et dans les limites qui sont les siennes, ordonne, comme le pense Kant, l'auto-production de ses normes. L'honneur de l'homme n'est pas de pouvoir dire « Je », mais, en suivant le chemin que trace un cogito pluriel, de se tourner, dans tous ses rapports, vers l'horizon commun et universel des

⁴⁷ *Qu'est-ce que s'orienter dans la pensée ?* Pléiade, tome II, p. 534 note et p. 536 ; AA 08 : 138-139.

⁴⁸ Nous renvoyons en ce point à notre ouvrage *Re-penser la pensée du droit* (2007, p. 131-180).

esprits, là où peuvent se déployer, dans et par le dialogue, la délibération et l'argumentation. C'est dire qu'il est devenu impossible de couper l'horizon transcendantal des contextes mouvants du temps présent. Il convient par conséquent de repenser et de réactualiser la doctrine du droit : pour la problématique du *Quid juris ?*, il faut un nouveau point d'ancrage. Sur son horizon transcendantal, le droit a besoin d'une âme qui, au lieu d'être narcissique, s'ouvre à l'altérité et à l'échange. Un post-kantisme viable est à ce prix.

Il ne faut certes pas s'étonner si, de Hegel à Windelband ou de Scheler à Weber, un flot ironique et lourdement polémique a déferlé contre la doctrine du droit de Kant. Kelsen lui-même, qui confiait avoir trouvé son inspiration dans la philosophie kantienne, a pris ses distances de telle sorte que sa *Reine Rechtslehre* transporte la *Rechtslehre* de Kant dans un contexte épistémologique plus que philosophique-critique où l'horizon transcendantal de l'Idée pure du droit s'estompe au profit d'une « hypothèse logico-transcendantale » à partir de laquelle le maître autrichien déclarait « aller au-delà de la pensée de Kant »⁴⁹. Plus près de nous, on ironise encore sur les exigences inhérentes à l'idéalité transcendantale qui, inaccessible, signifie en définitive que le droit n'est pas de ce monde. Une certaine pensée contemporaine, marquée par le souci empirico-technique souligné par Heidegger, met l'accent sur l'aspect instrumental des règles juridiques qui régissent la propriété, la famille, la fiscalité, la justice, les modes électoraux, les relations internationales ... Ou bien encore, avec des accents différents, K.O. Apel ou J. Habermas insistent sur la dimension « communicationnelle » qui fait des règles de droit une « éthique appliquée »...

Kant, bien sûr, ne se reconnaîtrait pas dans la mouvance de ces thèses. Il reste qu'une relecture de sa doctrine juridique s'impose: cette relecture, sans être, selon une mode contemporaine, une critique du criticisme et l'accès à une pensée « post-critique », doit permettre de repenser et de réévaluer la postulation fondamentale de la doctrine kantienne. L'ampleur de cette tâche est considérable : par-delà l'axiomatisation et la formalisation du droit auxquelles s'est appliquée la doctrine kantienne, il n'y faut rien de moins que la rénovation de la notion de transcendantal et la restructuration de la raison. Sur son horizon d'attente, le droit a besoin d'une âme qui, au lieu d'être narcissique, ouvre les *a priori* de sa quête logique et de ses compétences catégoriales à l'altérité et à l'échange. Un post-kantisme viable est au prix de cette nouvelle radicalisation de la pensée. Ce n'est rien de moins qu'une « transformation de la philosophie ».

⁴⁹ Lettre de Hans Kelsen à Renato Treves du 3 août 1933.

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**Normatividade e valor moral:
sobre a necessidade do sentimento moral em Kant**

*Moral Normativity:
on the Necessity of Moral Feeling in Kant*

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“Na realidade, os homens sentem, não sem motivo, o fardo da sua existência, embora a causa dele sejam eles próprios”. (Kant, EaD, AA 08: 332)

Resumo

Um dos problemas mais obscuros nas éticas universalistas, de modo geral, e na ética kantiana, de modo particular consiste na justificação de um princípio válido objetivamente a partir da articulação entre a questão da epistemologia e da motivação moral. A partir disso, nosso propósito neste paper consiste em tentar elucidar de que modo o sentimento de respeito conecta figuras como a razão prática, valor moral e autonomia, tanto de uma perspectiva histórica como hermenêutica dos textos kantianos.

Palavras-chave

sentimento moral; valor; razão prática; normatividade; pluralismo moral.

Abstract

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One of the most obscure problems in universalists ethics, in general, and in Kantian ethics, in particular, consists in a justification of a objectively valid principle from the connection between the question of the epistemology and the moral motivation. From this, our purpose in this paper is to try to clarify how the feeling of respect connects figures as practical reason, moral value and autonomy, both from a historical perspective as hermeneutics of Kantian texts.

Key words

Moral Feeling; Value; Practical Reason; Normativity; Moral Pluralism.

Podemos dizer que um dos maiores desafios das éticas universalistas, incluindo, portanto, a ética kantiana, consiste em mostrar como elas podem se efetivar a partir do pressuposto natural de que os homens estão propensos, em primeiro lugar, a dar maior importância para a satisfação dos seus desejos e necessidades; ou ainda, na própria felicidade.

No debate contemporâneo, Williams, criticando o projeto de Nagel, afirma que a moral impessoal exige demais do sujeito na medida em que tem que negar aspectos importantes da sua existência¹. Um dos argumentos centrais para a defesa das éticas universalistas consiste justamente em chamar a atenção para o fato de que não são apenas os nossos desejos que nos importam enquanto sujeitos, mas também outros interesses e objetivos que não se esgotam na satisfação das inclinações, para utilizarmos as palavras de Kant².

Obviamente que esta crítica ao paradigma kantiano surge devido à rejeição por parte de Kant da felicidade como o fundamento da ética, embora a sua busca constitua um dever indireto. Ademais, se esta não pode ser o fundamento da ética, o mero agir moral não garante, ou mesmo promete uma futura vida feliz.

Assim, se nós sempre estaremos sob a disciplina da razão prática sendo impossível, portanto, sermos “plenamente” virtuosos ou dignos, de fato, da felicidade e ademais, como

¹Nagel responde: “afinal de contas, supõe-se que essas morais universalistas respondem a algo muito importante em nós. Elas não se impõem de fora, mas refletem nossa própria disposição de ver a nós mesmos, bem como nossa necessidade de aceitar a nós mesmos de fora. Sem essa aceitação, estaremos alienados de nossas vidas num sentido (muito) importante”. Cf. Nagel, 2004, p. 330.

² Nesta direção vários filósofos e pensadores contemporâneos, mesmo de tradições completamente divergentes, tais como Robert Nozick e Amartya Sen, criticam a ideia, sustentada pelo utilitarismo clássico de Jeremy Bentham de que o principal objetivo do homem consiste na busca pelo prazer na satisfação dos próprios desejos. Cf. Nozick, R., *State, Anarchy and Utopia*, New York: Basic Books, 1977 and Sen, A., *Development as Freedom*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

não podemos agir esperando recompensas em um mundo futuro, pois isto já tornaria o móbil fundado em heteronomia, a “aridez” permanece.

Com efeito, não obstante Kant tenha visto muito cedo, ou melhor, “descoberto” no critério da universalização o conteúdo do moralmente bom, faltava ainda elucidar como é possível justificar a questão da execução de tal ideia no âmbito da práxis humana. Na solução deste problema, parece-nos que a pista para responder a esta questão passa pela figura do sentimento moral entendido como o único sentimento autoproduzido pela razão pura prática, a saber, o respeito pela lei moral.

Antes de abordar a solução kantiana acerca do sentimento moral e sua relação com a consciência a priori da lei moral, vou me deter na análise de passagens de alguns manuscritos do período pré-crítico e dos últimos textos kantianos no intuito de investigar como aparece a figura do sentimento moral, como ela se desenvolve no período crítico e se há (ou não) a manutenção da concepção kantiana nos textos tardios em relação ao período crítico.

A hipótese a ser investigada neste *paper* é tentar defender, contra as interpretações intelectualistas da ética kantiana, que o sentimento moral desempenha uma função sistematicamente fundamental no todo da construção do seu sistema prático-moral e que, pelo seu caráter híbrido, desperta não apenas a dificuldade, mas a relutância em integrá-lo no projeto da filosofia crítica-transcendental. Embora em vários momentos do corpus kantiano a figura do sentimento moral esteja vinculada a outras noções, como: os sentimentos do belo, do sublime, do amor e às sensações de prazer e de desprazer, é fundamental “limpar o terreno”, por assim dizer. Caso contrário, corre-se o risco de ou ter que abandonar tal tese acerca da necessária vinculação deste sentimento na arquitetura da filosofia prático-moral kantiana, ou torná-la tão obscura e incoerente do ponto de vista interno do seu projeto.

1. A incerteza sobre a origem da moral.

Em um texto de 1763, cujo título é “Investigação sobre a evidência dos princípios da teologia natural e da moral”, Kant conclui o mesmo em um tom de incerteza sobre o fundamento da evidência dos primeiros princípios da moral:

«Daí é de notar que, se deve ser possível alcançar o maior grau de evidência filosófica nos primeiros fundamentos da moralidade, os supremos conceitos fundamentais da obrigação devem, antes de tudo, ser mais seguramente determinados, em vista do que a deficiência da filosofia prática é ainda maior que a da especulativa, devendo ser decidido, antes de tudo, se tão-somente o poder de conhecimento ou o sentimento (o fundamento primeiro, interno do poder de desejar) estabelece os primeiros princípios da filosofia prática» (Kant, AA 01: 99)³.

Apesar da oscilação e da incerteza quanto à fonte dos princípios primeiros da moralidade, a saber, se ela se baseia na razão ou no sentimento, Kant parece ter claro o caráter normativo da sua filosofia prática, pois, segundo o texto, a moralidade trata sobre obrigações que contém uma necessidade imediata com respeito a fins possível apenas por princípios formais de determinação da vontade.

Todavia, apesar do elogio manifesto a “Hutcheson e outros pelas belas observações por meio do sentimento moral” e, ademais, da simpatia explícita pela solução da questão acerca de um “sentimento irresolúvel” (unauflösliches Gefühl) do bem, não encontramos uma proposta de um final feliz para a pergunta sobre a evidência dos princípios da moral neste escrito, tal como é enunciado no título do segundo parágrafo do texto, em que lemos que “ os primeiros fundamentos da moral, em sua presente feição, ainda não são suscetíveis de toda a evidência exigida”⁴.

Em outro texto do período anterior à *Grundlegung* e à *KpV* datado de 1775, em *Eine Vorlesung über Ethik*, Kant aponta para o que vem depois a se fundamentar como a teoria crítica da moral a partir da explicitação de que o sentimento moral consiste no único sentimento autoproduzido pela razão que tem como função sistemática servir de fundamento de determinação subjetivo da vontade. De fato, já neste texto “o sentimento irresolúvel” é designado como o fundamento do interesse que o agente pode tomar pela efetivação de máximas morais: o móbil moral!

Com efeito, nas Aulas sobre Ética, ela já aparece no contexto justamente da solução do problema da motivação moral, em que Kant parece estar delineando a distinção entre as duas tarefas necessárias para solução do problema da fundamentação da ética, quais sejam:

³ Kant, I. Werke in Sechs Bänden. Herausgegeben von Wilhelm Weischedel. Wiesbaden: Insel Verlag, 2011. Investigação sobre a evidência dos princípios da teologia natural e da moral. Tradução: Luciano Codato. São Paulo: Editora da Unesp, 2005. Doravante utilizarei as siglas usuais para citar as obras de Kant: Crítica da Razão Prática (KpV), Crítica da Razão Pura (KrV), Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes (GMS), Metafísica dos Costumes (MS).

⁴ Op. cit, A 96.

a justificação do princípio de avaliação ou judicação moral e a do princípio de execução moral. Se restam dúvidas acerca da função e do lugar do sentimento moral na arquitetura da filosofia prática kantiana a partir dos escritos do período crítico, em especial a *Grundlegung* e a *KpV*, em um texto tardio de 1794, cujo título é “O fim de todas as coisas”⁵, Kant, novamente, deixa claro que esta figura ocupa um lugar sistematicamente central e necessário na sua fundamentação da ética.

2. O sentimento moral no período tardio.

Antes de tratar deste ponto que nos interessa em especial, cabe lembrar que no opúsculo “*O fim de todas as coisas*” o centro da argumentação se volta à antiga pergunta (tanto para Kant, como em termos da história da filosofia), a saber, acerca do fim último da razão, tal como aparece no Cânone da primeira *Crítica*, ou do fim último de todas as coisas, conforme o próprio título deste escrito. Tal questão envolve segundo Kant, “o sublime terrível, em parte pela sua obscuridade, em que a imaginação costuma agir com maior poder do que na claridade da luz” (Kant, VI, A 496)⁶.

Tendo em vista que o objetivo deste *paper* não consiste na interpretação kantiana do problema do sumo bem como resposta à questão sobre o fim último, mas mostrar como a figura do sentimento moral consegue articular os problemas fundamentais para a justificação de um princípio moral universalmente válido, surge a pergunta sobre o significado deste no contexto da década de 90.

⁵ Kant, VI, *Das Ende Aller Dinge*. “O fim de todas as coisas”. In: A paz perpétua e outros opúsculos. Trad. de Artur Morão. Lisboa, Ed. 70, 1988.

⁶ Cf. Passagem onde nota-se tanto o ceticismo e a desconfiança de Kant em relação à cultura humana e uso da racionalidade por parte dos seres humanos, mas também a esperança dele de que tal projeto da moralização seja possível: “Naturalmente, com os progressos do gênero humano, a cultura dos talentos, da destreza e do gosto (com a sua consequência, a opulência) leva a melhor sobre o desenvolvimento da moralidade; e semelhante estado é justamente o mais gravoso e o mais perigoso, tanto para os bons costumes como para o bem-estar físico, porque as necessidades crescem muito mais depressa do que os meios para as satisfazer. Mas a disposição moral da humanidade, que [como a horaciana poena pede claud] vai sempre atrás dela claudicando, há-de um dia (como é de esperar sob a orientação de um sábio governador do mundo) ultrapassar a humanidade que, na sua corrida apressada, se perde e muitas vezes tropeça; deve, pois, nutrir-se a esperança, mesmo após a demonstração experimental da superioridade da moralidade da nossa época em comparação com todas as anteriores, de que o Juízo Final terá lugar mais com o passamento de Elias do que com uma descida aos infernos, semelhante à da facção de Coret, e trará consigo o fim de todas as coisas na Terra. Só que esta fé heróica na virtude não parece ter, subjectivamente, uma influência tão poderosa e universal sobre os espíritos para os levar à conversão, como a fé numa aparição acompanhada de terror, que se concebe como antecipando as últimas coisas” (Kant, VI, A 506).

Embora não encontremos propriamente ocorrências da expressão “sentimento moral” neste opúsculo, Kant faz referência, em alguns trechos, a outras figuras, as quais ou foram utilizadas como sinônimas nos textos anteriores, ou se referem à mesma constelação teórica, como por exemplo: o sentimento de “respeito”, a figura do móbil moral, “motivos desinteressados”, fundamento de determinação subjetivo da vontade, representação e cumprimento do dever, etc.

O ponto problemático deste escrito e que pode gerar problemas hermenêuticos quanto à figura do respeito enquanto único sentimento autoproduzido pela razão prática pura é que Kant o descreve como vinculado ao sentimento de amor. Ao fazer um elogio explícito ao Cristianismo devido à constituição moral que infunde a sua doutrina, Kant menciona a possível ligação entre o respeito e o amor:

«O respeito é, sem dúvida, o que vem em primeiro lugar, porque sem ele também não existe amor verdadeiro algum, embora sem amor se possa, no entanto, nutrir grande consideração por alguém. Mas quando não se trata apenas da representação do dever, mas do cumprimento do dever, quando se inquire o fundamento subjetivo das ações do qual, se for possível prevê-lo, se deve esperar primeiro o que o homem fará e não apenas o fundamento objetivo, isto é, o que ele deve fazer; o amor será então, enquanto livre acolhimento da vontade de outrem submetido às suas máximas, um complemento indispensável da imperfeição da natureza humana (para tomar necessário o que a razão prescreve mediante a lei): pois o que alguém não faz de bom grado fá-lo de modo tão mesquinho e também com pretextos sofisticos sobre o mandamento do dever que, sem a participação do amor, não se poderia contar muito com este enquanto móbil» (Kant, VI, A 518/ 519).

Algumas considerações sobre esta passagem devem ser feitas. Em primeiro lugar, a discussão neste texto e, portanto, nesta passagem, centra-se sobre o fim último de todas as coisas e àquilo que pode ser utilizado como ferramenta pedagógica para o cultivo e aperfeiçoamento moral do homem. Logo, ao utilizar a analogia do respeito e do amor cristão, Kant acaba por trazer à tona a imagem do homem honesto e da noção de virtude neste contexto, tendo em vista que aquele que age moralmente já está em um determinado estágio do desenvolvimento da própria personalidade moral. Ou seja, este não cumpre o dever moral com propósitos mesquinhos ou sob pretextos sofisticos, como afirma Kant neste trecho.

Além disso, se Kant sustenta que “o respeito é, sem duvida, o que vem em primeiro lugar” e logo a seguir, então, “o amor será então, enquanto livre acolhimento da vontade de outrem submetido às suas máximas, um complemento indispensável da imperfeição da

natureza humana (...) enquanto móbil”, fica claro que ele não está afirmando a identidade entre o respeito e o amor. Todavia, se o ponto de partida for a doutrina cristã e a constituição moral por ela fundada, tal sentimento tem que ser considerado como um complemento indispensável. Ora, haja vista que, como lemos na famosa nota de rodapé em que Kant responde à crítica de Schiller no escrito da *Religião*, e que aqui ele repete quase nos mesmos termos, o amor parece constituir o estado de ânimo ou de temperamento natural do homem virtuoso, tal constituição estética do agente é sempre, para seres imperfeitos como nós, um ideal.

Por outro lado, para a justificação da ética e das condições de possibilidade para a efetivação da consciência moral, tal sentimento, o amor, não desempenha nenhuma função constitutiva. Com efeito, se o respeito vem em primeiro lugar, parece-nos que a preocupação kantiana é a de que se diferenciem os terrenos da argumentação, garantindo, assim, a separação entre a esfera da justificação moral e a argumentação posterior sobre os postulados do uso prático da razão em vinculação com a discussão sobre a realidade do seu objeto necessário, a saber, o sumo bem.

Com isso, parece-nos que Kant mantém os resultados da *KpV* em que o respeito, e não o amor, não é concebido como um mero complemento indispensável, mas, mais que isso, trata-se do único sentimento adequado às exigências da racionalidade prática na medida em que ele consiste na própria consciência moral considerada sob a perspectiva subjetiva; vale dizer, trata-se do respeito pela própria capacidade autolegisladora racional, que na afetividade, reconhece o seu valor como agente capaz de tomar interesse pela moralidade.

Cabe destacar, por último, que enquanto ideal, a figura do amor cumpre uma função pedagógica importante na medida em que fortifica os corações humanos na busca do bem e da tolerância, este sentimento não pode ser confundido com o sentimento moral na medida em que o tipo de reflexão que o homem honesto pode fazer a partir do auto ajuizamento em seu próprio foro e exame internos pressupõe já a cultura da razão e o interesse do agente na sua formação. Assim, também “é um sinal de autenticidade da ação virtuosa (...) o coração alegre no seguimento de seu dever (não a comodidade em reconhecimento à mesma)”, ou ainda a “firme resolução de fazê-lo melhor no futuro, encorajada pelos bons

resultados, (...) pode fazer nascer uma intenção alegre no ânimo“ (Kant, *Religion*, IV, B 10/11- nota).

Mas embora Kant reconheça, com Schiller, que o móbil moral, isto é, o sentimento moral, possa estar vinculado a sentimentos “atrativos e agrados da vida”, de modo que “pode ser até aconselhável ligar essa perspectiva de um alegre gozo da vida” ao respeito: “isto somente para manter o equilíbrio dos aliciamentos que o vício em contrapartida não tem necessidade de dissimular e não para pôr aí, sequer em sua mínima parte quando se trata do dever, a verdadeira e própria força motriz” (Kant, *Religion*, IV, A 158).

Com efeito, é de extrema importância a determinação do lugar sistemático desta reflexão sobre a constituição estética do agente virtuoso, tendo em vista que a possível confusão entre os domínios da reflexão e da determinação prático-moral resultaria fatal para a justificação dos princípios morais. Ou seja, se sustentamos que o cumprimento do imperativo categórico pode se realizar sem que seja necessário um imperativo ou dever moral, então estaríamos de acordo com Schiller⁷ no que diz respeito à tese de que há uma harmonia entre razão e sensibilidade no ser racional humano.

3. Normatividade moral e razão prática.

Como sabemos, a tese de Kant é bem conhecida acerca do ceticismo a respeito da solidariedade e do altruísmo humano, pois embora sejamos constituídos naturalmente pela disposição para o bem, esta encontra a resistência de outras “forças” que podem impedir a sua eficácia, a saber, a propensão ao mal. Por isso, voltamos à questão inicial colocada: como se articulam as tarefas da justificação e da aplicação do princípio moral?

Minha primeira suposição é a de que nós não precisamos assumir premissas metafísicas fortes como a realidade noumênica de um “eu inteligível” independente do “eu empírico” para justificar a tese kantiana a respeito da legitimidade do princípio da universalização como o critério da moralidade.

⁷ - Sobre a posição de Schiller a respeito do vínculo entre as figuras da virtude e das inclinações, ver: Schiller, F. “Über Anmut und Würdig” (“Sobre Graça e Dignidade”). Werke in drei Bänden, München, Band II, 1981.

A segunda é a de que Kant precisa mostrar que e como tal critério, a saber, a racionalidade prática em seu aspecto formal, é a fonte do valor moral. A hipótese deste paper é a de que esta tarefa (*Aufgabe*) tem dois passos:

- O primeiro consiste na solução de um problema de epistemologia moral e só é solucionado com a figura do fato da razão enquanto a consciência que um agente tem do que ele deve fazer não hipoteticamente, mas necessariamente, isto é, a consciência da lei moral enquanto um imperativo categórico por parte de todo ser racional humano;
- O segundo consiste em mostrar como tal consciência moral se efetiva no nível da sensibilidade humana com a figura do sentimento moral entendido como o único sentimento que é autoproduzido a priori pela razão prática pura.

A partir destes dois passos, parece-nos que Kant consegue garantir, simultaneamente, o pluralismo moral, tendo em vista que o princípio da universalização é um critério normativo de avaliação de máximas, bem como a necessidade ou exigência do respeito em relação às liberdades, tanto do sujeito como dos outros agentes.

Em relação à primeira suposição, o problema gira em torno da justificação kantiana sobre a ontologia e a epistemologia moral. Em outros termos, nós precisamos responder à pergunta sobre “quem é o sujeito moral” na concepção de Kant e, além disso, como ele fundamenta a tese sobre a “consciência moral”, a saber, a afirmação de que todo ser racional humano tem consciência do moralmente bom, não apenas empiricamente, mas também, e, sobretudo, de um modo a priori ou necessário.

Esta é uma das questões mais difíceis de resolver “dentro” e fora da filosofia kantiana, de modo que um caminho promissor consiste em assumir a tese da KrV de que tudo aquilo que “existe” pode ser objeto de um possível conhecimento⁸. Logo, Kant não precisa sustentar a realidade de um eu noumênico (supra-sensível), de modo que o ponto de partida da justificação do princípio moral é o próprio sujeito empírico na medida em que ele é capaz de agir a partir da representação de regras⁹. Ou seja, Kant não assume uma dupla

⁸ Cf. a este respeito o debate entre realistas, construtivistas e pragmatistas, tema este que será tratado em outra oportunidade.

⁹ Este foi, aliás, o ponto de partida dos escritos “críticos” da moralidade, ou seja, a *GMS* e a *KpV*.

ontologia com a distinção entre as duas perspectivas que o homem pode representar a si mesmo, como racional e sensível; trata-se, como afirma Kant, de uma distinção epistemológica entre diferentes pontos de vista que o mesmo sujeito pode considerar a si mesmo¹⁰.

Assim, se a suposição de que o ponto de partida do argumento de Kant consiste em assumir que a justificação da validade da consciência da lei moral enquanto um imperativo categórico baseia-se na consciência empírica do agente no momento em que ele ajuíza sobre o conteúdo de suas máximas, então nós não precisamos nos comprometer com a sustentação de teses metafísicas inflacionadas.

Com efeito, a passagem do §6 da segunda *Crítica* pode ser uma pista promissora de interpretação, pois nesta Kant pretende mostrar, em analogia com a filosofia teórica, como nós podemos compreender a necessidade com que se impõe a consciência moral no momento em que o sujeito avalia as suas máximas.

A pergunta (*die Frage*) neste parágrafo da Anotação do § 6 trata sobre “onde começa o nosso conhecimento do incondicionalmente prático, se pela liberdade ou pela lei prática”? Kant afirma que o conhecimento moral não pode começar pela liberdade “porque seu primeiro conceito é negativo, nem podemos inferi-la da experiência, pois a experiência só nos dá a conhecer a lei dos fenômenos, por conseguinte, o mecanismo da natureza o exato oposto da liberdade”.

Mas se, por um lado, o argumento em defesa de que a distinção entre os dois pontos de vista é, na verdade, epistêmica - portanto, não se faz necessário assumir entidades noumênicas-, por outro, Kant argumenta em favor de um tipo de consciência necessária, ou seja, não-contingente:

«é a lei moral, da qual nos tornamos imediatamente conscientes (tão logo projetamos para nós máximas da vontade) que se oferece primeiramente a nós e que, na medida em que a razão a apresenta como um fundamento de determinante sem nenhuma condição sensível preponderante, antes, totalmente independente delas, conduz diretamente ao conceito de liberdade» (*KpV*, IV, A 29/30).

¹⁰ Ver, por exemplo, as seguintes passagens: *GMS*, 412; *KpV*, Ak 8 (note), Ak 10.

O argumento consiste na tese de que os agentes, ao avaliarem as suas máximas, numa situação de conflito moral, reconhecem necessariamente o que deve ser feito, vale dizer, a consciência moral, se impõe ou se apresenta originariamente (*ursprüngliche*), como um **fato não somente empírico, mas a priori** ou independentemente de possíveis fatores empíricos que possam vir a “obscurer” a exigência da racionalidade prática, de modo que se eu reconheço algo como bom, estou reivindicando “isto que considero bom” como algo bom não só para mim, mas para todo e qualquer sujeito dotado de certas disposições como a razão e a sensibilidade.

Com efeito, a premissa fundamental da ética kantiana é a de que a consciência moral se impõe a priori ou de modo necessário e constitui uma forma de autocompreensão, que não se confunde com nenhuma intuição intelectual, por um lado, e também, por outro, não pode ser resumida na mera consciência empírica de deveres morais. Assim, a consciência que o sujeito tem do que ele deve fazer em uma determinada situação pressupõe não apenas a autoconsciência prática da própria liberdade (*Willkür*), mas também o reconhecimento de si como um sujeito prático autoreflexivo (*Autonomie*).

Em suma, o agente que reconhece que deve fazer X ou que é moralmente necessário algo em uma determinada situação, aprova imediata e originariamente a validade da moralidade; logo, parece descabida ou sem sentido a pergunta, neste momento, como posso saber que tal consciência é real ou não; ou ainda, que além da consciência da necessidade de fazer X ainda preciso de algum tipo de intuição ou garantia teórica de que tal representação não é uma fantasia da imaginação. Isso significa, então que antes da tematização do conteúdo do princípio moral entendido como o imperativo categórico, nós temos que pressupor que todo ser racional humano reconhece originariamente, isto é, a priori, deveres morais, os quais não se confundem com as normas jurídicas, regras e padrões sociais de uma determinada sociedade ou cultura.

Mas aqui nós entramos em outro problema, a saber, a justificação kantiana da tese de que o valor moral baseia-se na razão prática. Ou seja, afinal de contas: por que eu devo agir pela exigência normativa da racionalidade prática entendida a partir do critério da universalização? Embora seja a fonte de debates e diferentes interpretações, parece-nos que este não é meramente um problema de motivação e psicologia moral, mas de justificação e filosofia moral.

4. Respeito, valor e pluralismo moral.

Podemos reconstruir o argumento kantiano partindo da caracterização geral da vontade enquanto capacidade prática ou disposição para agir de acordo com a representação de regras, tal como aparece nas primeiras duas Seções da GMS e nos parágrafos iniciais da *KpV*.

Se estas regras são representadas como boas apenas subjetivamente, ou seja, consideradas válidas apenas para a ‘minha’ vontade, então o fundamento de determinação do arbítrio consiste na expectativa das sensações de prazer decorrentes da realização de algum objeto apetecido. Portanto, tais máximas não podem pretender ter validade universal, ou seja, serem consideradas como boas moralmente.

Todavia, tendo em vista que o bom não se confunde nem com o útil, nem com o agradável, máximas erguem a pretensão de serem consideradas como morais se elas podem ser consideradas como válidas para todo ser racional em geral a partir do critério da universalizabilidade dos princípios subjetivos da vontade.

A partir disso, surgem duas perguntas, quais sejam: 1) como eu posso saber se a máxima que “eu” considero como boa pode ser avaliada como válida para “nós” ou “todos”?, 2) como é possível que um ser como o homem pode querer agir de acordo com tais máximas morais abdicando da pretensão em satisfazer as suas inclinações e interesses particulares?

Com relação ao primeiro ponto, é importante lembrar que não há como definir, a priori, o que pode ser dito como uma máxima moral. Ou seja, Kant não pretende determinar, a partir do critério da universalizabilidade das máximas da vontade, um conjunto de ‘verdades’ ou ‘normas’ morais, as quais poderiam ser concebidas consensualmente como boas para guiar as ações.

De fato, a ética kantiana não define o que exatamente deve ser considerado como moralmente bom. Assim, na medida em que o imperativo categórico não designa um conjunto de regras, mas um critério para a avaliação de regras, cabendo ao agente avaliar à luz do critério formal de racionalidade prática o que ele deve fazer, de modo que “a coisa

certa a ser feita” implica o reconhecimento recíproco do outro como digno de respeito em sua autonomia e liberdade.

Não obstante, como bem aponta Korsgaard¹¹, a ética kantiana foi lida por muito tempo, desde Hegel e Schopenhauer até fins do séc XIX, a partir de uma visão realista tradicional, segundo a qual o princípio moral consiste em uma verdade moral autoevidente, de modo que as ações corretas seriam aquelas que estivessem em acordo com tal verdade.

Mas se não este não parece ser o caminho hermenêutico mais promissor do projeto crítico kantiano, um dos passos da resposta de Kant consiste na tese de que se nós sustentamos certas crenças morais, então elas não devem se fundamentar no costume ou nas preferências subjetivas –úteis ou agradáveis-, nem mesmo em ideias teológicas, mas na própria razão prática, entendida enquanto uma faculdade que delibera não apenas sobre meios, mas também, e sobretudo, sobre fins.

De fato, tal valor axiológico consiste na legitimidade da razão prática enquanto faculdade-guia da vida moral do agente, ao invés de outros candidatos possíveis para preencher tal lugar sistemático enquanto núcleo de justificação moral, como, por exemplo, o prazer, a compaixão, a utilidade, etc.

O ponto parece ser o de que grande parte das críticas feitas à fundamentação da moralidade kantiana desencadearia também problemas para outros modelos de justificação em ética, de modo que o problema não se resume apenas na justificação deste ou daquele critério, mas também de escolha de um valor axiológico razoável para tal defesa filosófica.

O segundo passo da resposta consiste na tentativa de assegurar o pluralismo moral, já que não está pré-determinado quais máximas podem ser dignas de terem valor moral. Esta questão tem sido, ao que nos parece, a fonte de profundos mal-entendidos da ética

¹¹ Korsgaard, C. “Realism and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy”. In: *Journal of Philosophical Research: Philosophy Documentation Center*, 2003. No debate contemporâneo, muitos teóricos, entre eles, Putnam, Sen, Nagel, Hare, Habermas, Korsgaard rejeitam a tese de que para a pretensão de validade objetiva de juízos de valor depende de que eles possam ser inseridos em um conjunto de proposições descritivas. Com efeito, se por um lado, eles neguem a ideia de que “a solução” para o problema da justificação da moral depende da sustentação de uma posição realista tradicional, por outro, a partir de diferentes perspectivas, eles pretendem oferecer argumentos para recusar o ceticismo moral reivindicando a necessidade de disputar racionalmente sobre questões valorativas.

kantiana. Com efeito, o cético inevitavelmente ficará profundamente frustrado tendo em vista que, segundo Kant, não há uma única resposta a esta pergunta tendo em vista que se trata de um critério “aberto”, o qual, por um lado, exige que as ações sejam praticadas por respeito ao critério da universalizabilidade das máximas da vontade e, por outro, garante o pluralismo moral:

«Finalmente, o egoísta moral é aquele que reduz todos os fins a si mesmo, que não vê utilidade senão naquilo que lhe serve, e também como eudemonista coloca simplesmente na utilidade e na própria felicidade, e não na representação do dever, o fundamento-de-determinação supremo de sua vontade. Pois como cada ser humano forma conceitos diferentes sobre aquilo que considera fazer parte da felicidade, é precisamente o egoísmo que leva a não ter pedra de toque alguma do genuíno conceito do dever, que, como tal, tem de ser inteiramente um princípio de validade universal. – Todos os eudemonistas são, por isso, egoístas práticos. Ao egoísmo pode ser oposto apenas o pluralismo, isto é, o modo de pensar que consiste em não se considerar nem em proceder como se o mundo inteiro estivesse encerrado em seu próprio eu, mas como um simples cidadão do mundo» (Kant, *Anthropologie*, VI, BA 8).

Se nos voltarmos ao sentido originário do princípio de universalização, vemos que este não deve ser entendido como uma verdade moral ou como o conteúdo verdadeiro da ética, mas sim no sentido de que ele indica um critério negativo, ou ainda, um conceito-limite que serve para “testar”, mediante o ajuizamento racional, a possibilidade de coexistência de diferentes concepções de bem, ou seja, a possibilidade da máxima que ‘eu’ julgo ser boa, pode, virtualmente, ser considerada como boa para a vontade de todo ser racional em geral.

Um das discussões contemporâneas mais acirradas têm sido justamente a de mostrar como justificar a pretensão de validade moral dos princípios práticos a partir da perspectiva interna com a perspectiva externa. Com efeito, uma das críticas dirigidas ao argumento kantiano é a impossibilidade de escapar de um solipsismo moral, de modo que ao invés desta figura responsável pela avaliação moral estar localizada na perspectiva do ‘eu’ descontextualizado ou ‘ele’ (a partir de lugar nenhum), esta deve assumir o ponto de vista do ‘nós’¹².

¹² Cf. Forst, Rainer. *Contextos da Justiça. Filosofia política para além de liberalismo e comunitarismo*. Tradução de Denilson Luis Werle. São Paulo:Boitempo, 2010.

Por último, o último e terceiro passo da resposta àquelas duas questões remete ao problema da relação entre os problemas da justificação e da motivação moral e sua relação necessária com as figuras do fato da razão e do sentimento de respeito pela lei. Como já tratei desta relação em outras ocasiões¹³, vale chamar a atenção para uma diferenciação que é introduzida na *GMS* e retomada na *KpV*, a saber, a capacidade humana de ter interesse e de tomar interesse.

Com efeito, além da capacidade de ter interesses e agir de acordo com a representação de regras capazes de promovê-los mediante os imperativos hipotéticos ou de acordo com a famosa racionalidade instrumental, Kant tenta mostrar, com a figura do sentimento de respeito, que nós, enquanto seres humanos racionais, somos capazes também de tomar interesse por algo que supostamente deve nos importar enquanto agentes, a saber, a moralidade; ou ainda, nós e o outro considerados não apenas como um meio mas também e ao mesmo tempo como fins em si mesmos.

Logo, como a relação entre a representação daquilo que eu devo fazer, porque é a coisa certa a ser feita, e a determinação da vontade humana, em fazer isto que é reconhecido a priori como bom, é contingente, isto é, a consciência moral não determina imediata e necessariamente as ações humanas, então Kant tem que mostrar como “eu” posso querer agir com base em tal regra?

Embora tenhamos visto no início do texto que Kant aborda amplamente a figura do respeito e do sentimento moral, podemos dizer que é na *GMS* e na *KpV* que encontramos o ‘locus’ central acerca desta problemática, pois em uma nota da Segunda Seção da *GMS* lemos que

«Chama-se interesse a dependência em que uma vontade contingentemente determinável se encontra em face dos princípios da razão. Este interesse só tem pois lugar numa vontade dependente que não é por si mesma em todo o tempo conforme à razão; na vontade divina não se pode conceber nenhum interesse. Mas a vontade humana também pode tomar interesse por qualquer coisa sem por isso agir por interesse. O primeiro significa o interesse

¹³ Chagas, F. C. “Respeto, Sentimento Moral e Facto de Razão”, Pelotas: NEPFil Online, 104 p., 2013; “O fato de razão e o sentimento moral enquanto disposição do ânimo”, *Studia Kantiana* (Rio do Janeiro), v. Dez., n. 11, 2011

prático na ação, o segundo o interesse patológico no objeto da ação» (Kant, GMS, IV, BA 38).

A partir desta passagem, parece claro que da distinção entre ‘ter interesse’ e ‘tomar interesse’ por aquilo que é reconhecido como algo valoroso, emerge inevitavelmente as figuras da autonomia e do respeito, tendo em vista que se, por um lado, o respeito consiste na representação do valor de nós mesmos enquanto sujeitos capazes de autodeterminação moral, por outro, tal valor implica no reconhecimento do outro como alguém que reivindica necessariamente o respeito, considerado tanto como coautor, mas também destinatário da moralidade.

Assim, ao contrário do que muitos imputam a Kant, a saber, de que ele estaria defendendo a ideia de que a consciência moral é o conhecimento de uma verdade moral que serviria para resolver todo e qualquer conflito moral, a resposta que parece estar mais próxima do texto kantiano é a de que não há tais verdades morais reais e independentes do agente, mas que a consciência do que “eu devo fazer” em uma determinada situação é um “conhecimento prático”, o qual envolve um conjunto de elementos necessários para a sua efetivação, entre eles: a capacidade para tomar interesse pela moralidade, reconhecer a si mesmo e o outro como um sujeito autônomo e digno de respeito, além, é claro, da disposição para dar razões sobre as próprias escolhas.

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**The Sublime, Ugliness and Contemporary Art:
A Kantian Perspective**

*Lo sublime, la fealdad y el arte contemporáneo:
una perspectiva kantiana*

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is twofold. First, to explain the distinction between Kant's notions of the sublime and ugliness, and to answer an important question that has been left unnoticed in contemporary studies, namely why it is the case that even though both sublime and ugliness are contrapurposive for the power of judgment, occasioning the feeling of displeasure, yet that after all we should feel pleasure in the former, while not in the latter. Second, to apply my interpretation of the sublime and ugliness to contemporary art, and to resolve certain issues that have been raised in accounting for the possibility of artistic sublimity. I argue that an experience of a genuine artistic sublimity is an uncommon occurrence. I propose that the value of contemporary art can be best explained by referring to Kant's notion of ugliness and his theory of aesthetic ideas.

Key words

Sublime; Ugliness; Contrapurposiveness; Free Disharmony; Contemporary art; Aesthetic ideas

Resumen

La intención de este trabajo es doble. En primer lugar, pretendo explicar la distinción entre las nociones kantianas de lo sublime y de lo feo, así como responder a una importante pregunta que ha

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pasado desapercibida para los estudios actuales, a saber, por qué, a pesar de que tanto lo sublime como lo feo son contrarios a fin para la facultad de juzgar, es decir, a pesar de que ambos ocasionan un sentimiento de disgusto, sólo debemos sentir placer en el primero, pero no en el último. En segundo lugar, intentaré aplicar mi interpretación de lo sublime y lo feo al arte contemporáneo, de la misma manera que resolver algunas cuestiones que han sido planteadas al explicar la posibilidad de la sublimidad artística. Argumento que una experiencia de sublimidad artística genuina es un acontecimiento insólito. Propongo que el valor del arte contemporáneo puede explicarse mejor si se refiere a la noción kantiana de lo feo y a su teoría de las ideas estéticas.

Palabras clave

sublime; fealdad; contrafinalidad; desarmonía final; arte contemporáneo; ideas estéticas

1.

It is without a doubt characteristic for contemporary art scene that it can no longer be described as beautiful. Many writers have thus turned to Kant's notion of the *sublime* (*Erhabene*) in order to explain the aesthetic value of contemporary works of art (Crowther 1997). *Prima facie*, this is not surprising considering how Kant explains the sublime, namely, as an experience of displeasure caused by the perceptual and imaginative incomprehensibility of the object, yet which we overcome by turning to the faculty of reason and its ideas (such as ideas of freedom, morality, humanity etc.). Such an explanation of the sublime presumably fits well with the distinctive character of contemporary art, namely, being one of initial displeasure due to the discomforting perceptual features of the art work, yet also one of indirect pleasure derived from the value of ideas communicated by an art work. Examples that have been described as sublime include Damien Hirst's terrifying and unsettling sculpture of a dead tiger shark in a vitrine preserved in formaldehyde, entitled *The Physical Impossibility of Death in the Mind of Someone Living* (1991), or Jenny Saville's disturbing photograph depicting the artist's obese naked body squeezed onto glass in *Closed Contact A* (2002).

«However, the application of Kant's notion of sublime to contemporary artistic production faces two main problems, which must be resolved before the subsumption of contemporary art under the aesthetic of the Kantian sublime can be legitimized».¹

First, the connection between Kantian sublime and the aesthetic value of contemporary art depends on the assumption that Kant's theory of the sublime allows for the possibility of artistic sublimity, which however is not as straightforward as one might think. There is in fact a major disagreement among Kant's scholars regarding the possibility of the sublime in art. This disagreement is mainly due to different interpretations of Kant's theory of the sublime. Those who argue that no sublimity in art can be encountered emphasize the perceptual criteria of the sublime, namely, that sublime can be occasioned only by objects that are overwhelming in size and power, producing thereby a feeling of phenomenal insignificance in us. Since art works do not have such properties - they have defined limits and we do not find them threatening in any way, they do not have the capacity to produce the sublime (Guyer 1996, p. 264; Brady 2013, pp. 119-146). On the other hand, those who argue for the possibility of artistic sublimity interpret the sublime primarily as a mental activity, which does not necessarily require the presence of external objects (i.e. objects of great size and power). This view depends on Kant's claim that: "true sublimity must be sought only in the mind of one who judges, not in the object of nature" (5:256, p. 139).² Presumably, this implies that ideas of reason, especially moral ideas are sufficient to incite the sublime. Since ideas of reason can be expressed through an art work (as suggested by Kant in his theory of art and aesthetic ideas), thus art works can elicit sublime (Crowther

¹ For a more detailed explanation of the connection between the sublime and Damien Hirst's art see: Brooks (1995, pp. 55-67).

² References to Immanuel Kant are given in the text to the volume and page number of the standard German edition of his collected works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (KGS). References to the *Critique of Pure Reason* (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) are to the standard A and B pagination of the first and second editions. References are also given, after a comma, to the English translation of *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*), ed. Paul Guyer, trans. Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews (Cambridge University Press, 2000), which includes the *First Introduction* (*Erste Einleitung in die Kritik der Urteilskraft*, KGS 20). In the case of *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (KGS 7) I refer to Robert B. Loudon's translation *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). In the case of *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime* (*Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*, KGS 2) I refer to Paul Guyer's translation, ed. Patrick Frierson and Paul Guyer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

1989, pp. 152-174; Pillow pp. 67-116, Wicks 1995, pp.189-193; Clewis 2009, pp. 117-125; Myskya pp. 253-262).

The second problem refers to the relation between the sublime and ugliness (*Häßlichkeit*), both depending on the feeling of displeasure. Considering that many examples of art works that have been described as sublime have also been judged by some as ugly or even disgusting, it is reasonable to ask the question as to how we can distinguish between the sublime and the ugly. In fact, the similarity between the sublime and ugliness is suggested by Kant in §23, where he writes that even though a judgment of the sublime is similar to a judgment of the beautiful (*Schönheit*) in that it is a disinterested judgment, which pleases independently of determinate concepts and with a universal validity, a judgment of the sublime is also similar to a judgment of ugliness in that it depends on the feeling of displeasure, because it:

«appear[s] in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination» (5:245, p. 129).

Indeed, if we take a closer look at Kant's notion of the sublime and ugliness we notice that both involve an element of perceptual and imaginative struggle. In the case of the sublime this struggle is caused by the perception of objects of great size and powers that occasion the idea of limitlessness in us, such as shapeless mountain masses, massive glaciers, dark and raging sea, erupting volcanos, devastating hurricanes, etc. Kant explains that imagination's ability to comprehend the sensible manifold is limited, thus it happens in the direct perception of such vast and powerful objects that imagination fails to successfully comprehend the sensible manifold and present it as a unified whole. This failure of the imagination produces the feeling of displeasure.

But also experience of ugliness involves an element of frustration in grasping rich yet, chaotic and disintegrated structure of the object. Consider for example certain kind of animals that we usually judge as ugly, such as the monstrous looking and repulsive *angler fish*, with its exceptionally large mouth, long, sharp teeth and a shiny lure coming out of its head. Or, for example, the utterly disturbing appearance of an animal called naked mole rat, with its large front teeth, sealed lips behind the teeth and pink, wrinkled, almost completely hairless skin. We judge such animals ugly because we find arrangement of their features discomfoting and offensive to our perception, as if composed from incongruent

elements. The displeasure at seeing such animals is accompanied with the feeling of incorrectness due to a combination of features that ought not to be combined in such a way. The perceptual features of an ugly object are too obtrusive and chaotic which makes it difficult for our cognitive abilities to process and to find a resolution for it.

To use Kant's terminology, both sublime and ugly objects appear to be *subjectively contrapurposive* for the power of judgment (i.e. they fail to agree with the need of the power of judgment to find harmony and order in the world), thereby producing the feeling of displeasure. But what is distinctive for the sublime, in comparison to ugliness, is that such contrapurposiveness reveals a subjective purposive relationship between imagination and *reason*, which results in the feeling of pleasure.

Kant's explanation of the sublime raises the question as to why is it the case that even though both sublime and ugly objects are disordered and ill-adapted to our cognitive abilities, producing thereby the feeling of displeasure, yet that such displeasure in the sublime evokes the faculty of reason, resulting in a positive aesthetic response, while in ugliness no such appeal to reason occurs and judgment ends in a feeling of displeasure alone?

Unfortunately, Kant does not offer an answer to this question. The same can be said about the contemporary discussions, which are primarily concerned with clarifying the distinction between the sublime and beauty, and little attention is given to Kant's notion of the sublime in contrast to ugliness. This is not surprising considering that ugliness in Kant's aesthetics is itself considered a problematic aesthetic notion, if at all epistemologically possible, and therefore no separate discussion on clarifying the distinction between the sublimity and ugliness seems to be required.³

³ Among Kant's scholar there is a major disagreement as to whether judgments of ugliness can be accommodated into the Kantian aesthetic picture. There are two main objections to the idea that pure judgments of ugliness are possible. The first objection was made by David Shier (1998), who claimed that accommodation of the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's argument for the universal validity of judgments of taste. In short, Shier argues that, according to Kant's argument, the state of mind on which judgments of taste depend can be nothing else but the free harmony of cognitive powers. But free harmony produces pleasure. But this means that that the universal state of mind of judgments of taste can only be the state of mind that produces pleasure. Consequently, judgments of taste are judgments of the beautiful alone. The second objection was made by Guyer (2005, p. 145-147), who claimed that the state of mind required for judgments of ugliness is inconsistent with Kant's epistemological theory. His argument is based on the premise that according to Kant's theory a conceptual harmony between imagination and understanding is required not only for cognition, but in order to have an experience of the

This indeed is the view of Herman Parret (2011, p. 30) who argues that ugliness is something that comes over and above the sublime “as radically unconceivable and ungraspable by our representational faculties and our imagination.” An exception to such views is an account given by Theodore Gracyk (1986). According to his position both sublime and ugliness are aesthetic responses to formless objects (i.e. objects that we are unable to perceive as a unified whole), yet that displeasure of formlessness in the sublime, but not in the ugly is eventually resolved by the appeal to the ideas of reason, resulting in the feeling of pleasure: “judgments of sublimity are a method of compensating for formlessness [...] cases where no such compensation occurs are simply judged as cases of ugliness” (1986, p. 52). Gracyk’s explanation of ugliness as being part of the sublime experience is not satisfactory, since it fails to give a clear explanation as to why in particular the contrapurposefulness of the sublime resorts to reason while no such invocation of reason occurs in judgments of ugliness. Furthermore, it follows from his account that sublimity appears to consist of a temporal sequence of two separate feelings, displeasure of ugliness and pleasure of reason, while Kant presented the feeling of the sublime as a rather single and complex feeling, identified with the feeling of respect.

Even though Kant does not offer a clear distinction between ugliness and sublimity, his analysis of the notion of the sublime in comparison to beauty nevertheless indicates that he considered sublimity to be a theoretically and phenomenologically different aesthetic concept than ugliness. This is the thesis that I will argue for in the rest of this paper. By examining Kant’s notion of the sublime in contrast to ugliness, I will address the main issues that have been raised regarding the possibility of the sublime in art. I argue against the view of contemporary art being one of the sublime in the Kantian sense, and instead propose that the distinctive aesthetic value of contemporary art can be better explained by employing *Kant’s notion of ugliness in connection with his theory of aesthetic ideas*.

2.

object in the first place. The possibility of a state mind of sheer disharmony, required for judgments of ugliness, is therefore epistemologically precluded. In response to these problems, numerous different solutions have been proposed in order to accommodate pure judgments of ugliness into Kant’s aesthetics. See: Wenzel (1999, pp. 416-42); Hudson (1991, pp. 87-103); McConnell (2008, pp. 205-228), Cohen (2013, pp. 199-209); Kuplen (2013, pp. 102-143).

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant puts forward a view that a beautiful object exhibits subjective purposiveness. In short, an object is subjectively purposive if it occasions in us the state of mind of free harmony between imagination and understanding, the two faculties of the mind that are responsible for our ordinary ability to cognize object. While the imagination synthesizes the sensible manifold, the understanding on the other hand, unifies the manifold under the concept of the object. Kant explains this procedure of bringing sensible manifold to concepts (i.e. to attain the harmony between the imagination and understanding) with his notion of the power of judgment, defined as the: “faculty for the subsumption of the particular under the general” (20:201, p. 8). Both ordinary cognition and perception of a beautiful object satisfy the need of the power of judgment to attain the harmony between cognitive powers, the difference being that in the latter case no concept is applied to the sensible manifold (i.e. free harmony) and thus the judgment results in a feeling of pleasure alone.

On the other hand, Kant also distinguishes a state of mind of *free disharmony* between imagination and understanding. For example, he writes:

«For in the power of judgment understanding and imagination are considered in relation to each other, and [...] one can also consider this relation of two faculties of cognition merely subjectively, insofar as one helps or hinders the other in the very same representation and thereby affects the state of mind» (20:223, p. 25).

We come across to the same idea in his *Anthropology*, where he states:

«The judging of an object through taste is a judgment about the harmony or discord of freedom, in the play of the power of imagination and the lawfulness of the understanding» (Anth 7:241, p. 137).

When cognitive powers are in a disharmony (i.e. conflict between the sensible manifold apprehended by the imagination and the unifying principle of the understanding) then the object is found contrapurposive for the power of judgment. In other words, the object fails to agree with the need of the power of judgment to find harmony in the world. The dissatisfaction of this need produces the feeling of displeasure. Even though Kant does not explicitly say so, there is reason to assume that such a disharmonious state of mind is one that grounds judgments of ugliness. After all, when he defines *common sense* as the subjective principle of taste and as a universally communicable aesthetic feeling, the feeling is not merely that of pleasure, but also that of displeasure: “They must thus have a

subjective principle, which determines what pleases or displeases only through feeling and not through concepts, but yet with universal validity” (5:238, p. 122).

While in the case of beauty, mutual correspondence of cognitive powers prolong the process of their play, and accordingly, it prolongs aesthetic attention (when we are delighted by an object, we want to remain in this state of mind), in the case of ugliness, the mutual hindrance or frustration between the cognitive powers obstructs their free play, thereby causing us to withdraw attention or to turn away from an ugly object. We do not like to look (seeing a picture of a naked mole rat makes me cover my eyes) or hear (discomforting sounds makes me cover my ears) displeasing objects: “displeasure is that representation that contains the ground for determining the state of the representations to their own opposite (hindering or getting rid of them)” (5:220, p. 105).

But, according to Kant also sublime objects exhibit subjective contrapurposiveness (5:245, p. 129). This is so because of the distinctive character of sublime objects, namely being one of exhibiting certain kind of greatness, either in *size* or in *power*. When the object is overwhelming in size, then the experience is called *mathematically sublime*. For example, the enormous structure of the pyramids in Egypt or the immense Himalayan Mountain massif are typical mathematically sublime objects since they are too vast and difficult for us to perceive them all at once. But when the object is overwhelming in physical power, thereby occasioning in us the feeling of danger, then the experience is called *dynamically sublime*. Erupting volcanos, devastating hurricanes, extreme ocean storms are typical dynamically sublime objects because their physical power is too great for us to resist. One can notice that what both types of sublime objects have in common is the ability to endanger, in one way or another, the phenomenal side of our being. Objects overwhelming in size endanger our sensible cognition (the object is too vast for our imagination to comprehend it) and objects overwhelming in physical power threaten our physical existence. In both case the perceptual and imaginative failure evokes in us the idea of limitlessness of the object (the limitlessness of size in the mathematical sublime and limitlessness of the destructive and devastating power of nature in the dynamical sublime).

This idea of limitlessness of the object is evoked in us due to the limited capacity of our imagination. Namely, according to Kant’s theory of the threefold synthesis, ordinary

cognition is performed by the means of two faculties, the imagination and the understanding. The power of imagination performs two kinds of acts: (i) the apprehension or gathering together the manifold of intuition, and (ii) the reproduction or keeping in mind the apprehended sense impressions. While apprehension can go on infinitely, the comprehension or synthesis of reproduction, on the other hand, is limited.⁴ Thus, it happens in the perception of a particularly vast object that

«comprehension becomes ever more difficult the further apprehension advances, and soon reaches its maximum, namely the aesthetically greatest basic measure for the estimation of magnitude. For when apprehension has gone so far that the partial representations of the intuition of the senses that were apprehended first already begin to fade in the imagination as the latter proceeds on to the apprehension of further ones, then it loses on one side as much as it gains on the other, and there is in the comprehension a greatest point beyond which it cannot go» (5:252, p. 135).

In other words, the sheer size (or power) of the object, say of the impressive Himalayan mountains, prevents the imagination from successfully reproducing or keeping in mind the succession of apprehended sense impressions (we cannot comprehend in one intuition all the parts and details of the vast mountain) and therefore imagination fails to present the sensible manifold as a coherent and unified whole. It is suggested accordingly that it is only certain kinds of objects, that is, objects that exceed the imagination's capacity for comprehension (such as objects of great size and power), that can occasion the experience of the sublime: "the sublime [...] is to be found in a formless object insofar as limitlessness is represented in it" (5:244, p. 128).

Kant writes, that perceiving an object as formless or limitless refers to an *aesthetic* estimation of the size (or power) of the object, rather than to a *logical or conceptual* estimation. That is, the object appears to be formless "in mere intuition (measured by eye)" (5:251, p. 134). In other words, the *Himalayan Mountains* appear limitless merely in a direct perception, as its size strikes our eyes, but not in a logical estimation of its size, since we can always measure it by choosing an appropriate unit. The same can be said for objects that are typical examples of formlessness such as the starry sky. Even though it is perceptually impossible to comprehend the size of the starry sky, a logical calculation of its

⁴ I take it that acts of apprehension and comprehension are identical to acts of the synthesis of apprehension and synthesis of reproduction that Kant distinguishes in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. This identification has also been suggested by Kirk Pillow (2003, p. 74).

size is nevertheless possible. Similar is the case of the dynamically sublime objects. We can always measure the power of natural objects, say, the magnitude of an earthquake on the Richter scale, or the strength of the hurricane on the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane scale. Thus nothing, as Kant concludes: “can be given in nature, however great it may be judged to be by us, which could not, considered in another relation, be diminished down to the infinitely small” (5:250, p. 134).

In a logical estimation of the size (or the power) of the object the imagination and understanding stand in a harmonious relation. The imagination successfully synthesizes the sensible manifold as determined by the numerical concepts of the understanding. However, in aesthetic estimation of the size (or power) of the object (i.e. in direct perception) we have no numerical concepts of the understanding on which to rely on. Nonetheless, there is still a demand for the imagination to synthesize the sensible manifold and present it as a unified whole. This demand is given to the imagination by the *faculty of reason*:

«the mind hears in itself the voice of reason, which requires totality for all given magnitudes, even for those that can never be entirely apprehended although they are (in the sensible representation) judged as entirely given, hence comprehension in one intuition, and it demands a presentation for all members of a progressively increasing numerical series, and does not exempt from this requirement even the infinite (space and past time), but rather makes it unavoidable for us to think of it (in the judgment of common reason) as given entirely (in its totality)» (5:254, p. 138).

But because imagination’s ability to comprehend the sensible manifold is limited (it can comprehend only a limited degree of apprehend elements), it happens in the perception of vast and powerful objects that imagination fails to successfully comprehend the sensible manifold and present it as a unified whole. Thus, the failure of the imagination to synthesize the sensible manifold in one intuition is a failure of satisfying the faculty of reason. It is the disharmony between imagination and reason that produces the displeasure felt in the sublime. On the other hand, the fact that imagination fails to satisfy the task given to it by reason (i.e. to sensibly present the rational idea of the infinite size and power) indicates the existence of the supersensible faculty of the mind (i.e. the faculty of reason): “But even to be able to think the given infinite without contradiction requires a faculty in the human mind that is itself supersensible” (5:254, p. 138). The awareness of

the existence of such a supersensible faculty of the mind produces in us the feeling of intense pleasure:

«What is excessive for the imagination (to which it is driven in the apprehension of the intuition) is as it were an abyss, in which it fears to lose itself, yet for reason's idea of the supersensible to produce such an effort of the imagination is not excessive but lawful, hence it is precisely as attractive as it was repulsive for mere sensibility» (5:258, p. 141-142).

Kant identifies the concurring experience of displeasure and pleasure in the sublime with the feeling of respect: “The feeling of the inadequacy of our capacity for the attainment of an idea that is a law for us is respect” (5:257, p. 140). The sublime is a feeling of inadequacy of our physical and sensible nature, yet at the same time a recognition of the value of reason and our ability to think beyond the sensibly given. In the mathematically sublime, we value the theoretical part of our reason, the idea of the absolute unity “which has that very infinity under itself as a unit against which everything in nature is small” (5:261, p. 145). In the dynamically sublime we value the practical part of our reason, the elevating idea of our moral freedom and the ability “to soar above certain obstacles of sensibility by means of moral principles” (5: 271, p. 153). The sight of an erupting volcano arouses in us the feeling of terror and fear due to our inability to control the physical force of nature. The feeling of fear leads us to the negative feeling value realization that as physical beings we are imperfect, helpless and subjected to merciless forces of nature. But it is this realization that also awakens in us the idea of a moral supremacy over nature, namely, that in spite of our physical vulnerability we stand morally firm against the greatest power of nature. Our ability to think of ourselves as morally independent of nature and thereby able to surpass our fears of mortality, sickness, and other negative aspects tied to our physical nature, produces in us a feeling of respect for ourselves as rational and moral beings.

One can see that in contrast to beauty and ugliness, sublimity is not attributed to the object itself, but rather to the power of our mind.⁵ The feeling of the sublime is the feeling

⁵The fact that sublimity is attributed to subjects rather than objects does not exclude the importance of the object for the sublime, as it has been suggested by some of Kant's commentators. For example Clewis (2010, p. 167-68) argues that what occasion the experience of the sublime is the rational ideas. However, if it is merely rational ideas that invoke the sublime, then it is difficult to explain the source of the feeling of displeasure in the sublime. The object is required for the experience of perceptual and imaginative failure

of the recognition of the supremacy of our reason over our sensible nature and accordingly it is a feeling of respect

«for our own vocation, which we show to an object in nature through a certain subreption (substitution of a respect for the object instead of for the idea of humanity in our subject), which as it were makes intuitable the superiority of the rational vocation of our cognitive faculty over the greatest faculty of sensibility» (5:257, p. 141).

That is, the feeling of pleasure in the sublime reveals the purposiveness of the *subject* for the faculty of theoretical and practical reason and its supersensible ideas of infinity and freedom respectively. This contrasts with the feeling of pleasure in the beautiful object, which reveals the purposiveness of the *object* for our cognitive abilities (of imagination and understanding). The distinction between the two ways that purposiveness can be exhibited is mentioned by Kant in the following:

«The susceptibility to a pleasure from reflection on the form of things (of nature as well as art), however, indicates not only a purposiveness of objects in relation to the reflecting power of judgment, in accordance with the concept of nature, in the subject, but also, conversely, one of the subject, due to the concept of freedom, with regard to the objects, concerning their form or even their lack of form» (5:192, p. 78).

While beauty reveals the objects purposiveness for our cognitive abilities, the sublime, on the other hand, reveals the purposiveness of the subject for the faculty of reason. However, it is not merely the subjective purposiveness of the judging subject that the sublime reveals. Recall that the awareness of the idea of the supersensible is necessitated by the imagination's inability to satisfy the task of the faculty of reason, that is, to present the rational idea of infinity (infinite size and power). As Kant explains, we feel frustrated in our inability to comprehend the size (or power) of the given object, precisely because we have an idea of a totality for 'all given magnitudes.' Since this idea cannot be empirically encountered (otherwise we would be able to perceptually grasp it), this indicates that we must have a supersensible faculty of the mind from which the idea of infinity arises. Accordingly, it is the disagreement between the imagination and faculty of reason that reveals the presence of reason and which brings with it the feeling of pleasure:

based on which the ideas of reason are revealed. The essential role of the object for the sublime is also emphasized by Deligiorgi (2014).

«The feeling of the sublime is thus a feeling of displeasure from the inadequacy of the imagination [...] and a pleasure that is there by aroused at the same time from the correspondence of this very judgment of the inadequacy of the greatest sensible faculty in comparison with ideas of reason» (5:257, p. 141).

The faculty of reason is present in the feeling of displeasure (in fact, it is precisely because of its presence that imagination reveals itself as inadequate); it is merely that this displeasure reveals its existence: “imagination and reason produce subjective purposiveness through their conflict” (5:258, p. 142). The very act of disagreement between imagination and reason is an act of their agreement. Thus, the sublime does not merely reveal the purposiveness of the judging subject, but also his contraproposiveness.

One can see that the feeling of displeasure and pleasure in the sublime are intrinsically connected. They have the same source and one cannot separate them. The feeling of the sublime is not an independent feeling of pain and positive pleasure, but rather pleasure is present in displeasure. That is, the same contraproposiveness that gives rise to displeasure also gives rise to the feeling of pleasure. Kant explains the feeling of the sublime as a “vibration, i.e., to a rapidly alternating repulsion from and attraction to one and the same object (5:258, p. 141-142), that is, as an alternation from the feeling of lost on one hand and the feeling of gain on the other. Experience of the sublime is an experience of a negative pleasure (5:245, p. 129).

On the other hand, displeasure of ugliness is the result of disharmony between the imagination and the faculty of understanding. In this relation, there is no failure of the imagination, rather it is the case that sensible manifold successfully apprehended by the imagination conflicts with the understanding and its need to introduce order and unity in our experience of the world. Thus, in judgments of ugliness it is the form (combination of sensible manifold) of the object that is contraproposive for the power of judgment. After all, Kant writes that the subject of a judgment of taste is the form of the object. But if it is the form of the object that causes contraproposiveness, then this implies that imagination must have been able to successfully comprehend the form of an ugly object and it is the form itself, that is, the comprehended sensible manifold that disagrees with the understanding. What we perceive as displeasing is the relationship between the imagination and understanding as generated by the particular form of the object. In other words, ugliness is the result of the failure of the object to accord with our cognitive

abilities. This is clearly evident in our experience of ugliness. When we find an object ugly, we tend to ascribe the cause of the feeling of displeasure not to our inability to comprehend the object, but rather to the object itself and its failure to accord with us and our aesthetic sense. We react to such an object by turning away from it.

But the subject of the sublime reflection is a “formless and non purposive object” (5:280, p. 161). Sublime objects are too great in size (or the power) for the imagination to comprehend all the parts of the object into a unified whole. Hence, there is no determinate form to be judged as purposive. As Derrida (1987, p. 131) nicely puts it, the sublime “cannot inhabit any sensible form.” And if the sublime cannot inhabit any sensible form, then *a fortiori* the sublime cannot reveal anything about the object itself. The feeling of displeasure in the sublime resides in the subject’s inadequacy to grasp the sensible manifold and in his realizations that as a phenomenal being he is limited. Such an explanation is hinted by Kant in the following passage:

«For the beautiful in nature we must seek a ground outside ourselves, but for the sublime merely one in ourselves and in the way of thinking that introduces sublimity into the representation of the former» (5:246, p. 130).

The sublime does not reveal anything about phenomenal nature but rather it forces us to resort to ourselves, to the noumenal side of our nature. The sublime reveals something about the judging subject, namely that as a phenomenal being he is insignificant in comparison to nature, yet that he also possess a faculty of the mind that is independent of nature and according to which the nature itself is considered as embarrassingly small. The sublime compels us to look for the purposiveness in the same place from which its contrapurposiveness is derived, that is, in us, rather than from outside us, as ugliness does. Because ugliness is not experienced as the indicator of our own cognitive limitations, there is also no need to resort to the faculty of reason in order to compensate for feelings of inadequacy by appealing to the idea of our rational and moral supremacy.

To conclude, ugliness and sublime are theoretically and phenomenologically distinct aesthetic categories. The cause of the displeasure in the sublime and ugliness is different. It is the awareness of the inadequacy of our sensible cognition that we experience as displeasing in the sublime, while displeasure of ugliness is the result of the inadequacy of the object to agree with our cognitive faculties. While disharmony in ugliness reveals

contrapurposiveness of the object, disharmony in the sublime reveals *contrapurposiveness of the subject*, which on the other hand reveals the value of reason and our ability to think beyond the sensibly given.

Furthermore, both ugliness and the sublime have their own phenomenological feeling tonalities. An object can be more or less ugly, depending on the degree of disharmony between the imagination and understanding. For example, the *African Marabou Stork* is less displeasing than the *Angler fish*, since the perceptual features in the latter seem more chaotically invasive and obtrusive than in the former. Likewise, an object can be more or less sublime depending on the object's size or physical power. That is, the feeling of respect for our own supersensible faculty of reason is much greater when encountering the immenseness of the *Grand Canyon* in Arizona than its less famous and smaller cousin of the *Black Canyon* in Nevada. Even though Kant does not write about the degrees of sublimity, this idea is implied in the following passage:

«that which, without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of the sublime, may to be sure appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were doing violence to our imagination, but is nevertheless judged all the more sublime for that» (5:245, p. 129).

The greater the object's size or its physical power, the more difficult it is for our imagination to aesthetically comprehend the object and accordingly the more sublime our experience of the object is.

Also both ugliness and the sublime have their own opposites. While opposite of ugliness is the beautiful, the paradigmatic negative aesthetic concept that stands in opposition to the sublime is the *ridiculousness*.⁶ As Kant writes, "Nothing is so opposed to the beautiful as the disgusting, just as nothing sinks more deeply beneath the sublime than the ridiculous" (Beob 2:233, p. 40). Kant does not write about the concept of ridiculousness in the third *Critique*, but I believe that his explanation of sublimity can give us some insight into the nature of the ridiculousness. In short, my view is that the experience of the ridiculous, as well as the sublime, resides in the subject's recognition of its own division between two extremes, that is, between the finite, phenomenal and

⁶ This has also been noted, but not further developed by Christian Strub (1989, p. 423).

sensuous side, and the infinite, noumenal and rational side of our being. The difference is that in the experience of the sublime, it is the rational side, that is, the reason, that dominates, the recognition of which is experienced through a feeling of respect and awe. In the experience of the ridiculous, however, it is the finite, the sensuous and the smallness of a human character that dominate and which result in the underwhelming feeling of insignificance and nonsense. In both cases, an appeal to the faculty of reason is made. While the sublime agrees with the faculty of reason, the ridiculous on the other hand rejects and contradicts it. The sublime celebrates the victory of the noumena and of the infinite, while the ridiculous mourns its fall. What we find displeasing in the ridiculousness is the recognition of the abandonment of the noumenal subjectivity that the faculty of reason imposes on us in our reflection on the world. In light of such imposition, the sensuous and the phenomenal necessary look insignificant and disappointing. However, precisely for the same reason that the ridiculous displeases us, it also threatens us, because the abandonment of reason anticipates the end of the purpose and meaning in life. It is this latter moment, the recognition of purposelessness inherent in the abandonment of reason that in the end prevails and evokes laughter. The laughter inherent in the ridiculous, I believe, is a defense mechanism against the thread of purposelessness that the loss of reason invokes.

3.

As pointed *out* in the preceding discussion, an object is judged sublime if it evokes the idea of the supersensible in us (idea of infinity in the case of the mathematical sublimity and idea of moral freedom in the case of the dynamical *sublimity*), yet that this idea can only be awakened in us by the means of the failure of the imagination and the accompanying feeling of displeasure. The question is whether art works can satisfy this criterion of the sublime. That is, is there a possibility of the artistic sublime?

Before proceeding with answering this question it is, however, necessary to refine the distinction between *artistic sublimity* and *artistic representation of sublimity*. This distinction is implicit in Kant's statement that: "A beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; the beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing" (5:311, p. 189). In other words, an art work can present beautiful subject matter, without itself being beautiful. Only if the artistic representation is itself beautiful, can we say that we have genuine artistic beauty.

Similar is the case of artistic sublimity. It is only when the artistic representation (of a sublime or non-sublime) thing is itself sublime, can we say that we have genuine artistic sublimity. Artistic sublimity is not the result of the sublimity of the subject matter, but rather of the artistic representation itself (i.e. of the structure and organization of the subject matter).⁷

While there are many artworks, in particular typical for romanticism of 19th century, depicting sublime objects, they are not example of genuine artistic sublimity. For example, Albert Bierstadt's painting entitled *A Storm in the Rocky Mountains, Mt. Rosalie* (1866) depicts a stormy sky above the mountain range, a scenery that we would ordinarily find sublime. In this case, the painting merely imitates a naturally sublime object, the subject matter of the work, but without itself (as an artistic representation) being sublime. One might argue that even though the art work itself is not sublime, the subject matter can nevertheless provoke the experience of the sublime, for example through imagining ourselves being amidst of that sublime scenery and "perceiving it as if it were natural" (Clewis 2010, p. 169). Thus, an art work can after all occasion the experience of the sublime. I think, however, that it is unlikely that we can experience perceptual and imaginative failure merely by imagining of looking at a naturally sublime object. Rather what I believe it happens in such case is that we recognize the sublimity of the scenery depicted in the painting (we recognize it because we have experienced sublime feelings when we actually were amidst of a similar scenery), but without the accompanying feeling of the sublimity. That is, the sublimity of the scenery lingers in the painting, yet the feeling of the sublime is suspended.⁸

Many writers consider works created by artists such as Mark Rothko, Barnett Newman, Yves Klein and Frank Stella as exemplary instances of genuine artistic sublimity (Abaci 2008, pp. 246-247; Clewis 2010, p. 169). This is because their art works do not merely imitate the sublime, but rather they themselves "present or evoke the sublime" (Clewis 2010, p. 169). Presumably, such works of art present the sublime by intentionally using specific combination of colors, texture, shapes and lights in order to create the impression of formlessness and limitlessness in the viewer, thereby disrupting our

⁷ A similar distinction is noted by Abaci (2008, pp. 246-247).

⁸ See Abaci (2008, p. 247) who also argues against the possibility of such works of art occasioning the feeling of the sublime.

perceptual and imaginative resources and pushing us to the world of ideas. For example, Yves Klein's painting *La Vague* (1957) exhibits a unique color of blue that triggers its association with the limitlessness of the sea and thereby produces a sense of infinite space. Another example is Anish Kapoor's 150 meters long installation *Marsyas* (2002). The overwhelming vastness of this piece, which allows the viewer to experience the weight of the material, and the giant blood-red rings that is reminiscent of an open mouth swallowing its surroundings, evokes a feeling of fear and terror, thereby inducing the experience the sublime.

If artistic sublimity is possible then it must be looked for in cases such as this, where the artistic representation itself, rather than the subject matter, is perceptually challenging for the viewer. The question is whether artistic representation itself can occasion genuine experience of the sublime?

There is reason to doubt that this can be the case. My reasoning is the following. According to Kant, the feeling of sublime is evoked by the mere apprehension of the size or the power of the object. Yet, art works are objects that are intentionally produced for a certain purpose and in judging the value of an art work this purpose must be taken into account (what it ought to be). Even more, as Kant claims, not only that art works and artifacts cannot be judged without taking into account the concept of a purpose, but that they cannot even be *perceived* independently of the concept of a purpose:

«[T]he fact that they are regarded as a work of art is already enough to require one to admit that one relates their shape to some sort of intention and to a determinate purpose. Hence there is also no immediate satisfaction at all in their intuition» (5:236, p.120).

In other words, one's perception of the size (or the power) of an art work is immediately related to the concept of a purpose. But if this is the case, then it follows that one cannot perceive the object as a mere magnitude.⁹ But if the object cannot be perceived as a mere

⁹Clewis (2009, p. 120) argues that even though art works are made with a certain purpose, this purpose can be abstracted from the mere form of the object and thus we are able to reflect on the mere magnitude of the object. However, as I pointed out this possibility is precluded by Kant's claim that the concept of the purpose not merely determines our judgments of the work, but also our perception of it. Accordingly, we cannot perceive the form of the object independently as to how this form is conceptualized. There is thus no possibility that one can abstract the concept of a purpose and have the perception of the mere magnitude of the object.

magnitude, then it can also not give rise to the idea of limitlessness, hence it cannot lead to the experience of the supersensible and of the sublime. Recall, Kant claims that we judge an object as sublime in an aesthetic estimation of the magnitude (that is, in a direct perception). But in the case of art works and artifacts, the perception of the magnitude is mediated by the concept of a purpose; thus not in a direct perception. As we approach such works of art we immediately conceive them in light of the concept of the purpose, and this means considering their magnitude in light of the artist's intentions. Rather than being overwhelmed by the size or the power of an art work, we appreciate the creative force that produced it and its beauty (or ugliness).¹⁰

The idea that intentionally produced objects cannot occasion the experience of the sublime is additionally supported by the distinction Kant makes between the aesthetic experience of the disorder that devastations of nature leave behind, and the disorder that is produced by the human will, such as the disorder that the devastations of war leave behind. While Kant describes the experience of the former as sublime (5:261, p. 144), the latter he calls ugly (5:312, p. 190). Since one cannot perceptually distinguish the disorder of nature from the disorder of war, then their distinct aesthetic value must be due to the fact that one carries with it the concept of a purpose, while the other does not.

On the other hand, there are some art works that express rational ideas without the preceding experience of a perceptual failure. According to some writers, such works of art deserve to be called sublime. As Robert Clewis (2010, p. 167), one of the proponents of such a view writes:

«The ideas of reason, especially moral ideas, incite the experience of the sublime. We can become explicitly aware of these ideas in response to art. Artworks can express moral ideas and move us to reflect imaginatively on these ideas».

¹⁰A similar argument against artistic sublimity has been given by Abaci (2008). He argues that if one must take into account the concept of the purpose in judging the value of an art work and if judgments of the sublime are aesthetic judgments (i.e. product of the free play of faculties), then it follows that art works cannot give an experience of pure sublimity. At best, they can leave open the possibility of impure judgments of the artistic sublime. According to my position, however, the restriction of the concept of the purpose precludes even the possibility of impure judgments of the sublime. If there is no perceptual and imaginative failure, then one cannot have an experience of both pure and impure sublimity.

The object does not need to strictly speaking cause perceptual failure to be able to express rational ideas; rather it is sufficient that it merely serves as a “stimulus for the mental movement” (Clewis 2010, p. 168).

It is true that an object does not need to cause perceptual failure in order to express rational ideas. In his explanation of the beautiful art, Kant alludes to this idea when he writes that “The poet ventures to make sensible rational ideas of invisible beings, the kingdom of the blessed, the kingdom of hell, eternity, creation, etc.” (5:314, p. 192). He gives an example of Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws expressing the rational idea of a heavenly being. However, there is a substantive difference between the *expression of rational ideas* and *being aware of such rational components in ourselves*. That is, an object can express rational ideas, such as an idea of the king of heaven, but without necessarily eliciting in us the awareness of such heavenly component in ourselves. It is the latter, not the former that makes an experience sublime. Consider for example how Kant describes the experience of the supersensible in the following two passages:

«[Sublime objects] elevate the strength of our soul above its usual level, and allow us to discover within ourselves a capacity for resistance of quite another kind, which gives us the courage to measure ourselves against the apparent all-powerfulness of nature» (5:261, p.144-145).

«[S]ublimity is not contained in anything in nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of being superior to nature within us and thus also to nature outside us (insofar as it influences us)» (5:264, p. 147).

The sublime is an awareness of our rational and moral superiority over the physical and sensible nature within and outside us. A work of art might indeed express such an idea, but such communication does not necessarily result in eliciting the awareness of such superiority in us. Consider for example a movie *Caffè De Flore*, by Jean Marc Vallee (2012) which tells two different love stories taking place in a different time and place. One is a story of a young single mother with a disabled son taking place in 1960 in Paris, and the other is a story of a recently divorced man in a present day Montreal. The two stories are connected together through the idea of reincarnation and the existence of past lives. The movie is a beautiful and touching expression of a rational idea of the immortality of

the soul, which is thought-provoking, but which does not necessarily making us aware of any immortal component in ourselves.

To conclude, in order to experience the sublime, one must first experience the feeling of displeasure due to the perceptual and imaginative failure, because only this failure can reveal the presence of our rational faculty of the mind and its supersensible ideas. An art work can express these ideas, that is, it can sensibly present how these ideas might look like, but it cannot betray their existence.

4.

The sublime is intimately connected with the faculty of reason and its ideas (freedom, god, immortality), and as such is particularly suggestive for the expression of ideas that celebrate the rational and moral side of our being, such as the life-affirming ideas of compassion, peace, virtue, gentleness, courage, altruism, etc. Yet, what is distinctive for contemporary art works, especially of the kind that goes by the name ‘abject’ art is, that they express (and aim to express) ideas that are opposite to rational ideas, namely, ideas of mortality, transience of life, inescapability of death, absurdity, alienation, dehumanization, destruction etc., all of them emphasizing the tragic confinement of our sensible and physical being. Thus, the concept of the sublime cannot be applied to such works of art. But if such works of art cannot be subsumed under the notion of aesthetic of the sublime, then how can the concurrence of displeasure and pleasure, distinctive for such works of art, be explained? I argue that this phenomenon can be *explained* by referring to Kant’s notion of ugliness and his theory of aesthetic ideas.

In short, Kant explains an aesthetic idea as a sensible representation of two kinds of indeterminate concepts. On one hand, invisible beings, hell, eternity, god, freedom, mortality, etc., are *rational ideas (ideas of reason)*. What is distinctive for them is that they can be thought, but not empirically encountered. For example, while one can think of the idea of heaven or hell, one cannot sensibly intuit such ideas. On the other hand, love, fame, envy, death, etc. are abstract and emotion concepts which can be experienced, yet they cannot be directly represented. For example, one can experience an emotion of jealousy, but one does not know how this emotion itself looks like. In other words, one does not have a determinate schema for such an idea (in comparison to the schema of, say, a table).

What is distinctive for both kinds of concepts is that their sensible representation, that is, an aesthetic idea, cannot be governed by any determinate rules. And this means that an aesthetic idea is a representation of imagination in its free play: “the aesthetic idea can be called an inexponible representation of the imagination (in its free play)” (5:343, p.218). In other words, an aesthetic idea exhibits free harmony between imagination and understanding (i.e. beauty).

Because aesthetic ideas are sensible representations of concepts that cannot be directly represented (there is no image of the idea of hell or of a heavenly being), they can be merely symbolic or metaphorical representations. Kant calls such metaphorical representations *aesthetic attributes* and describes them as

«forms which do not constitute the presentation of a given concept itself, but, as supplementary representations of the imagination, express only the implications connected with it and its affinity with others» (5:315, p. 193).

Kant gives an example of an image of a Jupiter’s eagle with the lightning in its claws being an aesthetic attribute of the idea of the king of heaven. The image of a Jupiter's eagle is not a logical attribute of the king of heaven, that is, it is not part of the concept of the king of heaven. When we think of the idea of king of heaven, we do not have in mind an image of an eagle. Rather, the image of a Jupiter's eagle only expresses certain associations connected with the idea we have of the king of heaven (in terms of representing power, strength, freedom, being above the material world, etc.). It is the collection of such aesthetic attributes (set of associations or thoughts) that constitute an aesthetic idea.

Kant’s theory of aesthetic ideas shows that an object can be beautiful (i.e. occasion free harmony between cognitive powers) not merely by its perceptual features alone, but by the combination thoughts and ideas as well (i.e. aesthetic attributes). But if an art work can be aesthetically valuable because of the aesthetic idea it communicates to the audience, then this suggests that one and the same object can have both perceptual beauty (or ugliness) and beauty (or ugliness) of an aesthetic idea. Recall that an aesthetic idea is a combination of aesthetic attributes (i.e. set of associations between different concepts) and as such is not identical with the perceptual form of an art work. While perceptual form, say of an image of an Jupiter's eagle is constituted by the image of an eagle, particular patches

of colours, shadows and lines, an aesthetic idea, on the other hand, is constituted by set of associations or thoughts that are prompted by the perceptual form. Aesthetic ideas, as Kant writes, are “inner intuition of the imagination” (5:343, p. 219) that are provoked by the visual image of an art work.

The distinction between perceptual beauty (and ugliness) and beauty (or ugliness) of an aesthetic idea can explain how it is possible that we find an art work aesthetically displeasing, yet aesthetically valuable at the same time. Namely, what we find displeasing in such an art work is its perceptual form, but what we find pleasing is the aesthetic idea that the work communicates. So while displeasure of perceptual form of an art work causes us to withdraw our attention from the work, the pleasure of aesthetic idea nevertheless holds our attention. We appreciate the communication of aesthetic ideas, because they give us an intimation of the world of ideas and state of affairs that lie beyond sensory experience. An aesthetic idea gives us an opportunity to intuit and apprehend that which cannot ever be fully presented by sensory experience alone. For instance, while the idea of a heavenly being does not have an empirical intuition (no image of a heavenly being), it can be nevertheless sensibly presented through the depiction of a Jupiter’s eagle. By connecting the idea of a heavenly being with the image of a Jupiter’s eagle we might gain a different perspective on this idea, for example, what the idea of a heavenly being might look like, which can consequently contribute to a richer understanding of this idea. Such a view is implied in Kant’s claim that concepts without intuition are empty (A51/B75). He refers to empirical concepts which need to be connected to empirical intuition in order to make sense of experience. Without empirical intuition, empirical concepts are mere words, without any substantive meaning. But the same can be said about indeterminate concepts, such as the concept of a heavenly being. Only by connecting indeterminate concepts with sensible intuition (by the means of aesthetic attributes) can we truly say that we understand what indeterminate concepts mean.

The value of an art work in spite of the feeling of displeasure it occasions is nicely illustrated by Jenny Saville’s photograph entitled *Closed Contact* (1995). The photograph presents the viewer with a discomfiting image of the artist’s obese naked body squeezed onto glass. The artist distorts the body to the extreme by pushing around the excess of flesh almost to the point of being unrecognizable. The flesh of the body is reduced to a mere

volume, designating that what is excessive, undesirable and invasive for our perception, thereby elevating the feeling of displeasure almost to the point of the disgust. Nonetheless, even though the artistic representation of the body is itself disordered and displeasing, it can still be expressive and thoughtful. The distorted image of a female body might symbolically represent the destruction of the female body as invented by the patriarchal discourses of Western society. The expression of this idea is stimulating, thought-provoking and for this reason aesthetically significant, even though it is perceived with displeasure.

There is an appealing side to ugliness, because it allows for the imagination to be highly effective and expressive of ideas that cannot be represented otherwise. Its constitutive element is disorder and as such it is particularly suggestive for the expression of ideas that celebrate such disorder. It is related to ideas of alienation, estrangement, dehumanization, destruction, degeneration, disconcertion, absurdity, and with emotions evoking terror, horror, anxiety and fear, and which dominate the contemporary artistic production. The association of ugliness with such ideas and feelings can be explained by referring to Kant's notion of the reflective power of judgment and the *a priori* principle of purposiveness. Kant discusses this principle mainly in relation to its use in empirical concept acquisition, but in addition, he suggests that there is a connection between this principle and judgments of taste. For example, in one of many passages supporting this connection, he writes:

«The self-sufficient beauty of nature reveals to us a technique of nature, which makes it possible to represent it as a system in accordance with laws the principle of which we do not encounter anywhere in our entire faculty of understanding, namely that of a purposiveness with respect to the use of the power of judgment in regard to appearances» (5:246, p. 129-30).

The idea seems to be that judgments of taste depend on the principle of purposiveness of nature, which represents nature as a system in which all phenomena are related to each other and therefore amenable to our cognitive abilities. This principle is necessary for cognition (empirical concept acquisition) but also for finding an object beautiful (or ugly). I do not want to go into any details of legitimizing the connection between the principle of purposiveness and judgments of taste, which has already been pointed out by several of Kant's scholars (Ginsborg 1990, pp 66-68; Mathews 2010, pp. 63-79; Baz 2005, pp. 1-32;

Kuplen 2013: pp. 124-134). Here I just want to point out how this connection can explain the association of ugliness with certain ideas.

In short, Kant claims that the principle of purposiveness amounts to a certain way of seeing the world, that is, for preferring one way of organizing sensible manifold, to another. This preference for organizing sensible manifold in a certain way, more particularly, in a way that represents nature as a system, is reflected in our cognition, but also occasionally in the feeling of pleasure in finding an object beautiful. For example, in preferring certain combinations (such as the spiral structure of petals in a rose) and disliking others (such as the disorganized aftermath of a storm or tornado). The principle is an idea about how the world is supposed to be, how we expect it to be, so that it allows our understanding to cognize it, and it is an idea that holds only for us, as cognitive beings. The principle determines us, and our need to see the world in a specific way:

«this transcendental concept of a purposiveness of nature [...] represents the unique way in which we must proceed in reflection on the objects of nature with the aim of a thoroughly interconnected experience, consequently it is a subjective principle (maxim) of the power of judgment» (5:184, p. 71).

According to this explanation, the feeling of pleasure is a result of the confirmation or satisfaction of the principle of purposiveness. We appreciate forms that are in accordance with the principle of purposiveness, and that reassures us that the world is indeed such as we expect it to be, namely, amenable to our cognitive abilities. Accordingly, the experience of aesthetic pleasure (beauty) is a sign of the familiarity with the world, of feeling at home in the world. This explains why we experience beauty associated with positive feeling value ideas, such as innocence, joyfulness, virtue, hope, optimism, etc.

On the other hand, feeling of displeasure is a result of the dissatisfaction of our expectation that the world is amenable to our cognitive abilities. The inability to know the world occasions the state of estrangement between us, our mental structure, and the world. James Phillips (2011, p. 395) nicely puts this idea by saying: “The displeasure of ugliness is the displeasure of the thought that the world might not want us to know it.” When our expectations of order and our need of organizing the world in a specific way are violated, we do not merely experience displeasure, but also a sense of loss of control over the organization of experience, and this can occasion feelings of fear, anxiety, horror and a

sense of estrangement, powerlessness, absurdity, mortality, disorientation etc. Ugliness can be a valuable experience, because it is the unique way through which these ideas and emotions themselves, for which there is no adequate sense intuition, can be sensibly represented.

To conclude, in spite of the feeling of displeasure it produces, artistic ugliness can be a valuable experience because it is a unique way through which certain ideas, concepts and emotions, for which we do not have a full empirical counterpart, can be expressed. Ugliness brings forth negative aesthetic ideas, which are uncomfortable, yet are part of our experience of the world and ourselves and therefore worthwhile attending to. Even though perceived with displeasure, ugliness affords an unfamiliar and unexpected perspective on the phenomenal world and an intimation of the world of ideas.

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An Interpretation of Rawls' "Kantian Interpretation"

Una interpretación de la "interpretación kantiana" de Rawls

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Abstract

Calling Kant a liberal philosopher requires important qualifications. Much like his theoretical philosophy, his political transcendentalism was and remains a great enterprise of navigating between the extremes of liberalism and conservatism, of balancing the "empirical" and the "pure" in human society, as well as in human mind. Of all the attempts to enlist Kant among the classics of liberalism, John Rawls' is the most impressive and thorough. However, it is hardly a success. The reason for this lies in a profound difference in their answering the fundamental (and therefore vague) question "What is Man?". This paper is an attempt to revise the debate about the extent of Rawls' Kantianism and to compare the meanings of basic concepts of what could be called "pure political anthropology" in Kant and in Rawls.

Key words

Rawls; Kant; "Kantian interpretation"; Political Anthropology; Autonomy; Rationality vs. Reasonability; Freedom vs. Liberty; Categorical Imperative; Humanity; Liberalism.

Resumen

Considerar a Kant un filósofo liberal requiere de importantes matices. Como su filosofía teórica, su transcendentalismo político fue y sigue siendo una gran empresa de navegación entre los

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extremos del liberalismo y del conservadurismo, del equilibrio de lo "empírico" y de lo "puro" en la sociedad humana, como en ocurre en el caso de nuestra mente. Entre todos los intentos realizados para incluir a Kant entre los clásicos del liberalismo, John Rawls es el más impresionante y minucioso. Sin embargo, difícilmente alcanza éxito en su pretensión. La razón para ello reside en una profunda diferencia en su modo de responder a la pregunta fundamental (y, por ello, vaga) "¿Qué es el hombre?". Este artículo es un intento de someter a revisión el debate sobre el alcance del kantismo de Rawls y de comparar los significados de conceptos básicos acerca de lo que podría llamarse "antropología política pura" en Kant y en Rawls.

Palabras clave

Rawls; Kant; "interpretación kantiana"; antropología política; autonomía; racionalidad vs. razonabilidad; libertad vs. independencia; imperativo categórico; humanidad; liberalismo.

Coherent political philosophies begin with what a human being is, proceed to examine what it can/cannot be, and aim at what it ought and/or ought not to become. Classics were not ashamed to embrace this approach: Plato deliberately mixes anthropology with theory of state, Hobbes meticulously develops one to proceed to the other, and Kant's famous question "what is man?" can easily be given a political turn. Contemporary political philosophies are often careful to avoid this grand question at all, because normative modes it implies can be, and some have proven to be, speculative and oppressive. Rawls is exceptional, among other things, in his readiness to systematically address this question - that is why in *A Theory of Justice* the explanation of anthropological presuppositions of his theory occupies far more pages than "theory of justice as fairness" proper.

The normative approach, however dangerous, is unavoidable, because political philosophies cannot afford being purely descriptive, they also have to prescribe aims and means for the development (or conservation) of humanity, they have to guide us, irrespective of our belief in the very possibility of such guidance. Some contemporary political philosophies feature anthropological presuppositions that are implicit, assumed, unquestioned and might even prove conflicting. Kant's philosophy is prime example of the opposite. It provides us with detailed explication of "pure" mechanisms that are taken to be essential to a human being (Kant even goes further than that, claiming that he has a scheme for any being endowed with reason), and his "empirical" anthropology, although it received much less attention both from him and his readers¹, augments the normative part with recognizable descriptive image of what an actual human being is. Kant's political

¹ Until recently: cf. (Louden 2000, 2011)

philosophy is a recipe for (potentially) aligning the latter to the former, for straightening out the “crooked timber of humanity” - or at least indefinitely trying to².

To current liberal standards this might seem unabashed universalism, so much of contemporary interpretation of Kant’s political philosophy consist in rounding this edge, which, it seems, cannot be done without altering the very essence of Kant’s thought. It is to illustrate this point that I suggest to examine Rawls’ “Kantian interpretation” of *A Theory of Justice*, because its formulas include - and dramatically alter - some of Kant’s most basic notions: autonomy, freedom, rationality, ends, means, and so on.

1. Rawls

No one has done more to reinvigorate Kantian ideas in contemporary political philosophy than John Rawls, and his account of Kant is among most detailed and sympathetic. Despite early doubts (Nagel 1973, Levine 1974, Johnson 1974, 1977, Hicks 1974, Pogge 1981), it came to be accepted by many that “Kantian interpretation” of Rawls’ theory of justice generally succeeds in its purpose (Darwall 1976, Rawls 1980, DeLue 1980, Tampio 2007, Taylor 2011). I would like to, first, restate these early doubts mentioned, second, advance them further, taking into account some of Rawls’ more recent texts. The focus, however, remains on *A Theory of Justice*, because the assessment of Rawls’ later modifications requires a separate effort, which has to proceed from solid conclusions regarding the original theory.

Let us begin by collecting Rawls’ definitions of basic terms used in his “Kantian interpretation” to incorporate Kant’s arguments into the new theory. Any of these terms could be the starting point, and Rawls chooses **autonomy**: “Kant held, I believe, that a person is acting autonomously when the principles of his action are chosen by him as the most adequate possible expression of his nature as a free and equal rational being” (Rawls 1999³, p. 222). Rawls’ definition relies on **freedom** and rationality, and while his brief

² Questioning the extent of Kant’s liberalism is far beyond the scope of this paper, but a preliminary attempt can be found in (Chaly 2014), albeit in Russian. The argument in that paper proceeds by emphasizing limits of Kant’s anthropological and, therefore, political optimism ascribed to him, for example, by Howard Williams (Williams 1983, 1992), and relies on Robert Louden’s analysis of Kant’s anthropology (Louden 2000, 2011).

³ The references are to the edition of *A Theory of Justice*, revised in 1999.

treatment of freedom in *A Theory of Justice* as will's ability to act despite natural constraints seems in line with Kant, his definition of rationality does not.

Rawls takes on **rationality** first in §25 "The Rationality of the Parties", and then in more detail in Chapter VII, "Goodness as Rationality" (§§60-68). His first definition is markedly instrumental: "The concept of rationality invoked here ... is the standard one familiar in social theory", where parties attempt "to win for themselves the highest index of primary social goods, since this enables them to promote their conception of the good most effectively whatever it turns out to be (Rawls 1999, p. 124, 125).

His second attempt defines rationality in a wider sense, which means including the answer to the question - what goods it is rational to want. The answer relies on notions of "desire of certain things as prerequisites for carrying out ... plans of life", preference for "wider share of liberty and opportunity and of wealth and income", and, most importantly, "self-respect and a sure confidence in the sense of one own's worth" (Rawls 1999, p. 348).

As rationality in broader sense seems to be the ability to form and maintain a "good" plan of life, its definition is due. Defining a **life plan**, Rawls writes, that "... a person may be regarded as a human life lived according to a plan. [...] [A]n individual says who he is by describing his purposes and causes, what he intends to do in his life" (Rawls 1999, p. 358). Also,

«[...] a rational plan of life establishes the basic point of view from which all judgments of value relating to a particular person are to be made and finally rendered consistent. Indeed, with certain qualifications (§83) we can think of a person as being happy when he is in the way of a successful execution (more or less) of a rational plan of life drawn up under (more or less) favorable conditions, and he is reasonably confident that his plan can be carried through (Rawls 1999, p. 359)».

An **end** can be explained as something that serves as a primary good for the fulfillment of a rational life plan (such are "for example, life, liberty and one's own welfare" from §83), an **interest** as something that leads to an end. Importantly, none of these is fixed:

«as free persons they [members of a well-ordered society] do not think of themselves as inevitably bound to, or as identical with, the pursuit of any particular array of fundamental interests that they may have at any given time; instead, they conceive of themselves as

capable of revising and altering these final ends and they give priority to preserving their liberty in this regard (Rawls 1975, p. 95)».

Now let us see how these notions work together in Rawls' formulations of **categorical imperative** (CI). He writes that CI is "a principle of conduct that applies to a person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational being" (Rawls 1999, p. 222), that "the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society men's desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves" (Rawls 1999, p. 156), and that "the original position may be viewed, then, as a procedural interpretation of Kant's conception of autonomy and the categorical imperative within the framework of an empirical theory" (Rawls 1999, p. 226). Rawls also writes at length in "Kantian interpretation":

«The principles of justice are also analogous to categorical imperatives. For by a categorical imperative Kant understands a principle of conduct that applies to a person in virtue of his nature as a free and equal rational being. The validity of the principle does not presuppose that one has a particular desire or aim. Whereas a hypothetical imperative by contrast does assume this: it directs us to take certain steps as effective means to achieve a specific end. Whether the desire is for a particular thing, or whether it is for something more general, such as certain kinds of agreeable feelings or pleasures, the corresponding imperative is hypothetical. Its applicability depends upon one's having an aim which one need not have as a condition of being a rational human individual. The argument for the two principles of justice does not assume that the parties have particular ends, but only that they desire certain primary goods. These are things that it is rational to want whatever else one wants. Thus given human nature, wanting them is part of being rational; and while each is presumed to have some conception of the good, nothing is known about his final ends. The preference for primary goods is derived, then, from only the most general assumptions about rationality and the conditions of human life. To act from the principles of justice is to act from categorical imperatives in the sense that they apply to us whatever in particular our aims are. This simply reflects the fact that no such contingencies appear as premises in their derivation (Rawls 1999, p. 222-223)».

Thus, Rawls develops the following chain of definitions: autonomy is the combination of freedom and rationality; rationality is the urge to win for oneself the highest index of primary social goods, necessary to maintain a freely chosen plan of life;

plan of life forms the essence of a person, and its execution results in happiness and self-esteem. A plan of life includes ends, such as life, liberty and welfare⁴, as well as interests that are instrumental to these ends. Rawls, on one hand, admits that people are free to choose their ends, which should mean that transcendent ends are legitimate; on the other hand, even the "veil of ignorance" does not provide space for public discussion or bargaining about such ends.

2. The Critics

Some of the definitions in this chain came under criticism. In his 1974 article Andrew Levine argues, that Rawls' "Kantian interpretation rests on a systematic confusion of an anthropological understanding of Kant's notion of rational agency (replete with contingent assumptions about human nature) and Kant's own non anthropological understanding" (Levine, 1974, p. 48). Analyzing Rawls' original position, which is intended to free our choice of basic principles of justice from what Kant would call "empirical" or heteronomous interests and inclinations, Levine shows, that the kind of considerations we do take in account in original position are not what Kant would call "pure". Levine states that Rawls tries to frame Hobbesian egoistic rationality in Kantian universalist terms, which leads to incoherence. Levine then argues that instrumental rationality, effectively employed by Rawls, is empirical and therefore heteronomous in Kant's sense, and suggests that, in order to account for autonomy, a different notion of reasonableness has to be introduced, which would fall in the domain of Kantian "Vernunft". He concludes that in Rawlsian original position "we express our nature as bundles of appetites for primary goods endowed with a capacity for instrumental rationality; not as bearers of pure practical reason" (Levine 1974, p. 57). In his subsequent works Rawls attempts to elaborate the distinction between rationality and reasonableness, which, as we'll see, again falls short of complying with Kantian standards.

Oliver Johnson takes similar stance in his 1974 paper. He argues that Rawls and Kant advance different and irreconcilable models of human being, which make key notions and principles of Kantian moral philosophy - i.e. CI, autonomy, rationality - unusable in Rawls' theory. Johnson notes that individuals under "veil of ignorance" are still motivated

⁴ It is worth noting that "life, liberty and estate" is Locke's formula for property (cf. *Second Treatise*, §§87, 123), so, perhaps, one way to sum up the difference between Lockean classical liberalism and Rawlsian egalitarian liberalism is to compare "estate" to "welfare".

by what Kant would call heteronomous interests, that Rawls' notion of CI is in fact equivalent to Kant's notion of "counsels of prudence", which is a specific kind of hypothetical imperative, and that, he thinks most importantly, that Rawls' notion of rationality is opposite to Kant's.

Johnson's claims are contended by Stephen Darwall (Darwall 1976), who writes that the "Kantian interpretation" successfully develops moral foundations for Rawls' political theory, providing deep explanation and justification for the choice of principles in the original position. His main argument is that, although decisions in the original position are made in view of individual interests so could be considered heteronomous, later decisions to adhere to principles of justice in ordinary life are autonomous in Kantian sense. Still, as Johnson responds (1976), his argument regarding the original position stands.

3. Criticism revisited

The issues raised by the critics are essentially anthropological, they touch upon Kant's ultimate question of human nature, of what it means to be autonomous, to be rational and reasonable, to pursue interests and ends, etc. While Rawls centers his interpretation on autonomy, Levine, Johnson and Darwall turn towards rational agency. There's a good reason for this, because, as we've seen, Rawls defines autonomy through freedom and rationality, and of these two the latter receives the most attention from him. But the analysis of Rawls' definition of rationality done above reveals that a life plan is an even more basic notion, and it is in turn defined with mentioning of happiness. From §83 "Happiness and Dominant Ends" we learn that happiness is self-contained and self-sufficient, it comes as the result of one's success (or of belief into such success - this possibility was later addressed by Nozick's "experience machine" argument) in implementing one's life plan. So the ultimate good becomes for Rawls, at least in this important line of arguments, the same as for Aristotle, not Kant.

On this basis one might state that Rawls' understanding of human nature has more in common with the tradition of virtue ethics than with Kantian anthropology of autonomous agents capable of moral self-legislation and striving for the "kingdom of ends". There's nothing transcendental in a Rawlsian person, even in the original position all its substance

boils down to "what he intends to do in his life", meaning empirical life, finite and imperfect. Grand ideals and great aspirations fit neither "original position" nor later public life. Rawls is very clear about his reasons for the exclusion of anything grand, ultimate and universal from his political anthropology:

«[Reformation] introduces into people's conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise. This element forces either mortal conflict moderated only by circumstance and exhaustion, or equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought. Except on the basis of these last, firmly founded and publicly recognized, no reasonable political conception of justice is possible. Political liberalism starts by taking to heart the absolute depth of that irreconcilable latent conflict» ("Political Liberalism", 1993, p. xxviii).

But for Kant being a person means above all operating ideas and aiming at ends that are beyond the empirical, that, while ever remaining problematic, have precisely those universal pretensions, which Rawls' liberalism finds dangerous. And it ought to be done not only privately, but also publically, politically. Rawls views grand ideas and final ends as the source of trouble that has to be contained; Kant views them as the main source of hope for humankind's future (the other source being "Nature" that indirectly supports our moral striving). Perhaps both are right, but one view has to prevail.

To illustrate Kant's universalism I shall not quote him at length, but only rely on his formulas of categorical imperative. The first "Formula of the Universal Law" contains the word "universal" ("allgemeines"), also present in its acquired name (Universalisierungsformel), it obliges us to evaluate our maxims from the point of view of a general reasonable being, which is not subject to personal empirical interests, but only to duty of promoting reasonability as such. In view of this Rawls' notion of "mutual disinterestedness", experienced by agents in original position, appears awkward - Kantian agents are profoundly, transcendently interested in each other's essential feature, i.e. reason as the end in itself, which happens to be common to all of them (and not empty, as Rawls says about final ends in the original position). Of course, precisely this is emphasized by the second "Humanity Formula". This formula is naturally the most popular in liberal philosophy, because on the surface it seems to prescribe treating individuals as ends. Robert Nozick gives a notable example of such reading of Kant: in *Anarchy, State and Utopia* he writes that "side constraints upon action reflect the underlying Kantian principle that individuals are ends and not merely means; they may not

be sacrificed or used for the achieving of other ends without their consent. Individuals are inviolable” (Nozick 1974, p. 30-31). Although later in the book Nozick does quote the “Humanity Formula” in its entirety, the word “humanity” is lost in this important paraphrase. It is humanity in individuals that Kant literally proclaims an end, not individuals *per se* (although, of course, humanity consists of individuals). The danger here is to replace the humans as bearers of reason by humans as persons having empirical interests and inclinations mixed with some moral sentiments, emotions, which we would call “humanity” as an attitude. This would deeply distort the spirit of Kantian philosophy.

It seems that Rawls also treats the second formula of CI rather loosely, when he writes that “the principles of justice manifest in the basic structure of society men’s desire to treat one another not as means only but as ends in themselves” (Rawls 1999, p. 156). When Rawls in *A Theory of Justice* speaks of “humanity”, he uses the word in the sense of certain attitude, moral character (see Rawls 1999, p. 428-9), not in the sense of humankind (which is discussed at p. 459). But it is worth noting that “Menschheit” of the second formula is frequently used by Kant throughout his writings in contexts where it could mean either humankind or the moral attitude of humanity - or, likely, is intended to mean both as being inseparable (for instance, extensively throughout *Anthropology* and *The Conflict of the Faculties*), - whereas the moral attitude of humanity is defined in *Metaphysics of Morals* as “Menschlichkeit” (MS, AA 6: 456-7). Kant also uses the word “Humanität” when he speaks specifically of the attitude (cf. A, AA 7: 282), and “Menschenrace” and “Menschengattung” when he speaks of humankind (as in *Bestimmung des Begriffs einer Menschenrace*)⁵.

This is not to say that treatments of the second formula by Rawls and Nozick are incorrect, it is only to note that they are biased towards individualism that is not quite Kantian in spirit. Allen Wood reminds that “Kantian ethics is grounded on the dignity of rational nature. It requires not only respect for individual rights and the equal worth of

⁵ The “problem of humanity” is addressed in detail in (Dean 2006). Although Richard Dean is defending the view that “humanity” is in fact primarily a moral attitude, he does admit that there’s a problem with this term. Indeed, the use of the same word “humanity” to translate two different Kantian terms gives rise to danger of misunderstandings akin to those well familiar in case of “Objekt” and “Gegenstand”. The “problem of humanity” is aggravated by the fact that it is rooted in “Problem der Menschheit”, to which there also seems to be no clear solution: for example, Karl Vorländer makes accent on “Menschheit” as “community of millions of reasonable beings” (Vorländer 1924, 298), whereas Rudolf Eisler opposes “Menschheit” to “Tierheit” as mode of conduct (Eisler 1930, 352). Having neither capabilities nor intentions to propose a solution, I can only point at the fact that the term “Menschheit” of the second formula cannot be treated casually without risk of distorting Kant’s meaning (whatever it might be).

human beings, but also the idea of a cosmopolitan community in which the ends of all rational beings must form a unity to be pursued collectively" (Wood, 1999). These observations lead to the conclusion that the deep breach between universalism clearly admitted by Kant's philosophy and liberal particularism of Rawls' theory seems to exist despite Rawls' attempts to downplay it. Of course, this is far from saying that Kant, the theorist of personal intellectual liberty and of perpetual peace, with his universalism paved the way to *polemos*, to what Rawls called "mortal conflict" and Carl Schmitt dwelled upon as political enmity. No doubt, there's plenty of individualism in Kant's philosophy to counterbalance universalism, but this balancing does make it harder to pigeonhole him as a liberal philosopher.

Here an objection can be and has been⁶ raised: can we conceive of a "pure" person, devoid of all "empirical" (and hence individual) features? Isn't having empirical interests part of being human, or even a rational being in general? Is there anything to discuss behind the "veil of ignorance" for Kantian transcendental subjects? Can we even use the plural "subjects" to denote this abstraction? While contemplating on this question, we could mix behind the "veil of ignorance" soon-to-be human beings and non-human rational beings and make them discuss the principles of justice being unaware of their future species. We might expect that in order for this discussion to happen at all, these species have to share some minimal conceptual features, among which has to be something like "belonging to the single unified spatio-temporal world" (in P.F. Strawson's terms⁷), and in this world, as Rawls notes, they have to experience scarcity of resources, i.e. be under condition where justice is necessary. Now these features both of the subject and of the world would qualify as empirical in Kant - it is contingent that our reason is limited (and often misguided and subjugated) by sensibility, and it is contingent that we do not inhabit the "kingdom of ends". If we get rid of these features, the very idea of original position seems to become empty as well.

Does this mean that Rawls' thought experiment only works for heteronomous beings, so there's nothing Kantian in his theory? Maybe not. We can probably further generalize it and imagine rational beings that would decide upon protecting their rationality, morality

⁶ Cf. Nozick 1974, p. 228.

⁷ See his "Bounds of Sense" (1966) and, more generally, "Individuals" (1959) for detailed arguments, which seem to become highly relevant here. Also relevant is Strawson's "Social Morality and Individual Ideal" (1961), where the notion of a life plan plays a central part and pluralism of ends is defended.

and autonomy (which are, of course, inseparable for Kantian beings) against possible claims of empirical inclinations that will later in various contingent proportions become part of their nature(s). This would certainly mean treating not only humanity, but also any other form of reasonable being, as an end in itself.

However, this would also mean severely modifying Rawls' theory in important respects, which he probably wouldn't have accepted. One of the ways to introduce this modification would be to expand the meaning of rationality, or, more precisely, subjugate rationality to a higher faculty. This "going transcendental" would bring back into the theory universalism Rawls was careful to avoid. If we expand the notion of rationality, people would not be at liberty while choosing ends (as in Rawls 1975), because the ends would be imposed by universal faculty of reason⁸. Autonomy would mean adhering to these ends, it would ensure freedom in a peculiar sense of being determined by ends, thus making freedom very different and at times even conflicting with what is commonly understood as liberty. Liberty, both negative and positive, would be relegated to the empirical choice of means to pursue ends in individual life, and also to choice of needs and inclinations one embraces and structures as interests. A reasonable (in Kantian, not Rawlsian, sense) as well as rational plan of life would then be if not strictly centered around, then at least loosely attracted towards ends that are transcendental, so might have universal pretensions of the character that political liberalism tries to avoid. Finally, categorical imperative, or a "CI-procedure", would work behind the "veil of ignorance" not to establish positive rules for constructing a just society, but to merely set something like negative, conservative "side constraints" protecting the "pure" from the "empirical", reason from instrumental rationality, universal from the particular, freedom from liberty. This is a sketch of an interpretation quite different from the one suggested in *A Theory of Justice*.

However, there are hints at the possibility of such interpretation in Rawls. For example, it does not suffice for the notion of "rational life plan" to mean a contingent assortment of personal empirical interests and aims (resembling Plato's "democratic man"), for "even rational plans of life which determine what things are good for human beings, the values of human life so to speak, are themselves constrained by the principles of justice" (Rawls, 1999, p. 348). So Rawls is not certain whether there's something

⁸ Here one has to stress that these ends cannot be enforced politically – "paternalism is the greatest despotism imaginable" (TP, AA 8: 291).

beyond what instrumental rationality wants, which counters its claims and serves as constraints ("justice" in broader sense), or these constraints are part of rational wants because, on deliberation, we notice that they serve our other empirical interests. Should Rawls choose the latter and embrace reason as mere "slave of the passions", he would justly be called utilitarian, Humean or Hobbesian; should he pursue the former, seemingly more Kantian, option, then his interpretation would have to be modified significantly.

It seems that Rawls is at least inclined towards the Kantian strategy, for in his later works (1980, 1993) he continuously turns to explaining the difference between being rational and being reasonable:

«Fair terms of cooperation articulate an idea of reciprocity and mutuality: all who cooperate must benefit, or share in common burdens, in some appropriate fashion as judged by a suitable benchmark of comparison. This element in social cooperation I call the *Reasonable*. The other element corresponds to the *Rational*: it expresses a conception of each participant's rational advantage what, as individuals, they are trying to advance» (Rawls 1980, 528)

«We tend to use "reasonable" to mean being fair-minded, judicious, and able to see other points of view, and so forth; while "rational" has more the sense of being logical, or acting for one's own good, or one's interests. In my own work, and in this discussion, the reasonable involves fair terms of cooperation; while the rational involves furthering the good or advantage of oneself, or of each person cooperating» (Rawls, 1993, p. 54).

But is this notion of "reasonability" Kantian enough? Being cooperative and fair-minded is a viable strategy in non-zero-sum games to advance one's interests that are again heteronomous (it is often rational to be reasonable). To establish autonomy, "reasonable" would have to mean more than that. Indeed, Rawls himself admits that Kant's use of the word "vernünftig" is "worlds away from "rational" in the narrow sense. It's a deep question (which I leave aside here) whether Kant's conception of reason includes far more than reason" (Rawls 2000, 164-65).

Another question can be raised: doesn't adherence to the demands of practical reason even in Kantian sense serve, upon yet another round of deliberation, to advance one's empirical interests? Don't we stick to them out of hope to someday find ourselves happy amidst the "kingdom of ends", following the line of reasoning (or, rather, "rationing") famously expressed in Pascal's Wager? This is a difficult question. However, there's one important respect, in which these interests seem to differ from the ones stemming directly from inclinations: they are not agent-specific, personal differences are irrelevant to them,

they are transcendental in Kantian sense, they are not subject to justice in Rawlsian sense because they're not subject to conflict. So, perhaps, we could call these interests transcendental ends, which we have to treat as essential in every reasonable being, including ourselves.

All this brings to the conclusion that Rawls himself formulates regarding Kantianism of *A Theory of Justice*: "... the adjective 'Kantian' expresses analogy and not identity; it means roughly that a doctrine sufficiently resembles Kant's in enough fundamental respects so that it is far closer to his view than to the other traditional moral conceptions that are appropriate for use as benchmarks of comparison" (Rawls, 1980, p. 517). The suggestion of this paper is basically to omit the word "fundamental" – also because it doesn't fit liberal vocabulary well – and end the sentence with "respects".

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The Systematical Role of Kant's *Opus postumum* “Exhibition” of Concepts and the Defense of Transcendental Philosophy

*La función sistemática del “Opus Postumum” de Kant.
“Exhibición” de conceptos y la defensa de la filosofía
trascendental*

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Abstract

Kant's admission of a “gap” in the philosophical system of criticism, which his unpublished project of the “Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics” would have been meant to fill, has been the object of controversy among scholars. This article reconsiders the problem by connecting the manuscripts with the operation of “exhibition” of concepts, which already had a systematic role in the 1780s, concluding that the new project was intended to provide not a reform, but a necessary complement of previous works. In the final section Kant's new awareness of this problem in the 1790s is connected to the contemporary reception of criticism (Garve, Reinhold, Maimon, Beck, Schulze, Tiedemann, Fichte). This context provides more evidence supporting the main argument of the article about the inner development of Kant's thought.

Key words

Opus postumum; Physics; “Exhibition”; System of Transcendental Idealism

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Resumen

La admisión de Kant de un “hiato” en el sistema filosófico del criticismo, que su proyecto inédito “Transición de los Principios metafísicos de la ciencia natural a la física” pretendería cubrir, ha sido objeto de controversia para los estudiosos. Este artículo reconsidera este problema conectando estos manuscritos con la operación de “exhibición” de conceptos, que ya cuenta con una función sistemática en los años '80, concluyendo que el nuevo proyecto tenía la intención de proveer no una reforma, sino un complemento necesario de obras previas. En la sección final, la nueva conciencia de Kant acerca de este problema en los años '90 se vincula a la recepción contemporánea del criticismo (Garve, Reinhold, Maimon, Beck, Schulze, Tiedemann, Fichte). Este contexto provee mayor evidencia y apoyo para el principal argumento del artículo acerca del desarrollo interno del pensamiento de Kant.

Palabras clave

Opus postumum; Física; “Exhibición”; Sistema del Idealismo Trascendental

1. *The Opus postumum and the “gap” in Kant's system: a critical survey.*

Kant's manuscripts on the *Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics* (*Übergang von den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik*, 1796-1803) provide a most precious source for the understanding of Kant's late thought, whose philosophical relevance has been acknowledged by a large number of scholars, yet the systematical role of the unfinished work in the context of Kant's criticism is very debated. According to Kant's statements, in two letters of 1798, the new work would have to fill a «gap» (*Lücke*) in the system of critical philosophy.¹ But it is difficult to say what exactly this gap was, and whether its discovery involves any retrospective relevance for the understanding of Kant's published works. The several drafts of the «Elementary system of moving forces», as well as the astonishing «proofs» of the existence of the «World-Matter» – which together form the most developed part of the manuscripts – may well answer to open issues in Kant's foundation of empirical physics, but do not seem, at first glance, to have any essential connection with the problems of transcendental philosophy. Indeed, in the *Preface* to the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant had written that the critical task was completed

¹ Letter to Christian Garve, 21 September 1798, Br, AA 12: 257.08-11; to Johann Kiesewetter, 19 October 1798, AA 12: 258.19-26.

(KU, AA 5: 179.19). Hence his later enthusiasm about the unfinished work has been widely underestimated in the interpretation of transcendental philosophy.

On the contrary, according to a growing number of distinguished Kantian scholars, Kant had good reasons for connecting his new project with the core of transcendental philosophy.² At the beginning of this historiographical tradition Vittorio Mathieu and Burkhard Tuschling insisted on the radical *transcendental* turn in the *Opus postumum*, arguing that Kant essentially gave up some of the tenets of his previous writings about physics in order to leave room for his new remarkable doctrines: according to Mathieu, Kant gave up the solution to the problem of the multiplicity of empirical laws presented in the third *Critique*, which was grounded on the weak idea of the subjective («as if») principle of the conformity of nature to laws, and he looked in the *Opus postumum* for a «completely new principle», that is a whole supplement to the transcendental doctrine of determinant judgment;³ according to Tuschling, Kant was not satisfied with the dynamical explanation of matter of the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* (*Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*)⁴ and therefore sketched a new «transcendental dynamics», ending up, around year 1799, with a complete transformation of criticism in a kind of speculative idealism.⁵ In the light of these pioneering works Michael Friedman and Eckart Förster readdressed the question and agreed that the *Transition* was devoted to open questions of the critical framework, while keeping the most of Kant's previous results: Friedman considers as the main function of the new projected work that of connecting “top-down” determinate judgment and “bottom-up” reflective judgment, whose principles

² For a recent account see Hall, Bryan: *The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy Through the Opus Postumum*, London 2014. For the history of interpretations see Basile, Giovanni Pietro: *Kants Opus postumum und seine Rezeption*, Berlin-Boston 2013.

³ Mathieu, Vittorio: *L'opus postumum di Kant*, Napoli 1991, 48. See also the groundbreaking book of the same author: *La filosofia trascendentale e l'«Opus postumum» di Kant*, Torino 1958.

⁴ I will use the standard english translation of this title, although a more correct translation would be *Metaphysical Principles of Natural Science*, since Kant openly intended to provide a complement to mathematical physics, thinking of Newton's “mathematical” principles as an exemplary model of the latter (MAN, AA 04: 478.21ff.).

⁵ Tuschling, Burkhardt: *Metaphysische und transzendente Dynamik in Kants opus postumum*, Berlin-New York 1971 and – for a more radical emphasis on the “revolution” in Kant's late thought – *Übergang: von der Revision zur Revolutionierung und Selbst-Aufhebung des Systems des transzendentalen Idealismus in Kants Opus postumum*, in H.F. Fulda, J. Stolzenberg (hrsg.), *Architektur und System in der Philosophie Kants*, Hamburg 2001, 129-170.

were laid down respectively in the first *Critique* and the *Metaphysical Foundations*, on the one hand, and in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* on the other hand.⁶ Given this general framework Förster tried to focus on the exact problem faced by Kant in his last manuscripts. Förster's claim can be articulated in two main steps: 1) the «exhibition» (*Darstellung*) of concepts, that is the operation of providing examples *in concreto* for the categories, which was one of the main issues of the MAN, constituted at the same time a substantial «supplement» to the transcendental deduction, thereby contributing to the proof of the objective validity of the categories; 2) Kant's treatment of the issue in the MAN suffered from severe problems, which were addressed in the immediately successive manuscript reflections, and the recognition of these problems eventually led Kant to the awareness of the systematical «gap», during the early phase of work on the *Transition* project. In particular, these problems affected the dynamical construction of the concept of body, which according to Förster provided the main contribution of the metaphysics of bodily nature to the exhibition of concepts. Therefore – this is Förster's striking conclusion – the transcendental deduction itself, this core doctrine of transcendental idealism, would require the *Transition* in order to be completed.⁷

I think that Förster detected the crucial point of the systematical issue – the concept of exhibition and its connection with the foundation of physics – thus paving the way to a correct understanding of the highly technical problems lying beneath the problem of the “gap”. However I disagree with two major points of Förster's reconstruction. First, I do not think that the “gap” in Kant's system regarded the transcendental *deduction* and its proof of the objective validity of the categories. The deduction's aim, in fact, was to *prove* the possibility of the empirical reference of categories, by means of which the latter get «sense and meaning», and the abstract argument was already supplemented by the schematism doctrine, which grounds the possibility to apply discursive logical forms in the synthesis of single empirical intuitions.⁸ The exhibition of concepts, on this background, was simply devoted to give examples *in concreto*, in order to show how categories are applied to

⁶ Friedman, Michael: *Kant and the Exact Sciences*, Cambridge Mass. 1992, 242-264.

⁷ Förster, Eckart: *Kant's Final Synthesis. An Essay on the 'Opus postumum'*, Cambridge Mass. 2000, 56-61, 72.

⁸See Friedman, Michael: “Matter and Motion in the *Metaphysical Foundations* and the First *Critique*: the Empirical Concept of Matter and the Categories”, in E. Watkins (ed.), *Kant and the Sciences*, Oxford 2001, 53-69, in part. 56-59.

different kinds of concrete objects, thus providing a useful service for general metaphysics (MAN, AA 04: 472f.; in particular, in the MAN, it turns out that this application always requires some reference to bodies and is fruitful only in physics). Second, I contend that the *construction* of matter was never the objective of the MAN, which more modestly provided *principles for* this construction, leaving the task of its realization to mathematical physics. And here we find, in a different theoretical place, the open problems of the dynamical theory of matter which led to the new systematical “bridge” of the *Opus postumum*, whose building eventually needed the employment of new transcendental arguments: to sum up, it was not the proof of the objective validity of the categories, but rather the operation of their exhibition, that needed a theoretical supplement, and even a transcendental one.

I will elaborate in § 2 on this connection between “exhibition” and the *Transition* manuscripts, thereby proposing an original view of the exact open problem that Kant was dealing with and of how it connects with the complex argumentative machinery of the *Metaphysical Foundations*. Since the whole of this reconstruction draws from the inner, rather subtle, and often implicit problems of Kant’s systematical thinking, one may wonder why he suddenly decided to face such intricacies in his old age, though aware of lacking the energies for a substantive reform of his work. I will suggest in § 3 that Kant’s awareness of this open problem in his system could have well been fostered by contemporary discussions on his new transcendental philosophy. As it is well known, indeed, many distinguished thinkers, both followers and opponents, agreed in different ways that Kant’s criticism was not able to fulfill its main objectives and had to be either rejected or perfected. These discussions probably urged Kant, after much hesitation, to project a full-fledged reply, in order to show how transcendental philosophy in its original formulation –with the add-on of a more detailed connection to empirical physics, provided by the *Transition*– was well capable of conducting to a realistic account of the empirical world without any flaw.⁹

⁹According to Westphal the main task of Kant’s late writings on physics was a «transcendental proof of realism» (Westphal, Kenneth: *Kant’s Transcendental Proof of Realism*, Cambridge 2004). I find Westphal’s original reconstruction of the systematical role and open problems of the MAN as both correct and thought provoking, although I find his concept of a realism «sans phrase» untenable in the framework of Transcendental Aesthetics.

2. The problem of “exhibition”: from the *Metaphysical Foundations* to the *Opus postumum*.

Kant's statements of 1798 about the “gap” raise a basic question, without giving any answer: how could a *transition to physics* give any contribution, not just to natural philosophy, but even to the conclusion of critical philosophy itself? We find an interesting suggestion in the biographical account by Reinhold Jachmann, which contains a valuable testimony on Kant's views about the *Übergang* project. According to Jachmann, Kant claimed that the new work would be «der Schlußstein seines ganzen Lehrgebäude [...] und die Haltbarkeit und reelle Anwendbarkeit seiner Philosophie vollgültig dokumentieren sollte».¹⁰ Although the book by Jachmann is not always a reliable source of historical information, with its emphasis on the *applicability* it actually points out a correct connection between transcendental philosophy and physics. As the original title of the unpublished project suggests – *Übergang von den Metaphysischen Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik* – a first systematical “bridge” between transcendental philosophy and physics was provided by the “metaphysics of bodily nature” exposed in the *Metaphysical Foundations* of 1786. Kant stressed the theoretical relevance of this new work for transcendental philosophy in a striking page of the *Preface* to this work (MAN, AA 04: 478.03-20):

«Es ist auch in der That sehr merkwürdig (kann aber hier nicht ausführlich vor Augen gelegt werden), daß die allgemeine Metaphysik in allen Fällen, wo sie Beispiele (Anschauungen) bedarf, um ihren reinen Verstandesbegriffen Bedeutung zu verschaffen, diese jederzeit aus der allgemeinen Körperlehre, mithin von der Form und den Principien der äußeren Anschauung hernehmen müsse und, wenn diese nicht vollendet darliegen, unter lauter sinnleeren Begriffen unstät und schwankend herumtappe. Daher die bekannten Streitigkeiten, wenigstens die Dunkelheit in den Fragen über die Möglichkeit eines Widerstreits der Realitäten, die der intensiven Größe u. a. m., bei welchen der Verstand nur durch Beispiele aus der körperlichen Natur belehrt wird, welches die Bedingungen sind, unter denen jene Begriffe allein objective Realität, d. i. Bedeutung und Wahrheit, haben können. Und so thut eine abgesonderte Metaphysik der körperlichen Natur der allgemeinen vortreffliche und unentbehrliche Dienste, indem sie Beispiele (Fälle in Concreto) herbeischafft, die Begriffe und Lehrsätze der letzteren (eigentlich der Transscendentalphilosophie) zu realisiren, d. i. einer bloßen Gedankenform Sinn und Bedeutung unterzulegen».

¹⁰ Jachmann, Reinhold Bernhard: *Immanuel Kant geschildert in Briefen an einen Freund*, Königsberg 1804 (repr. Bruxelles 1968), Dritter Brief, 17-18.

According to these lines – whose content is further developed in the new *General Note on the System of Principles* included in the second edition of the *Critique* (KrV, AA 03: 200-202) – metaphysics of bodily nature is a necessary condition for the sensible «exhibition» (*Darstellung*) of the concepts of intellect (for this concept see also KU, AA 05: 342f.). The *Critique* has sufficiently shown that these concepts *must* be referred to sensible intuition, and that they *can* indeed be applied to our sensible intuition (through schematism); but transcendental philosophy could not provide the actual exhibition of the concepts, by means of examples *in concreto*, because it could not give a purely intellectual explanation (*verständlich machen*) of the possibility of a thing. According to the *Preface* of the MAN, in order to give a corresponding intuition to the categories it is not sufficient that we refer to the empirical intuitions, but we need the contribution of the metaphysics of bodily nature: without this last step the concepts of transcendental philosophy would remain without any reference to actual empirical things, and therefore devoid of any «Bedeutung, d.i. Beziehung aufs Objekt» (KrV AA 03: 205.14-23).¹¹ Now, it is not immediately clear why this exhibition cannot be achieved by simple empirical intuition and should require also a new part of metaphysical science. Nonetheless this is exactly what Kant means in the quoted page and we can actually retrace the development of this claim throughout the whole machinery of the work.

First, let us consider the necessary role of metaphysics in the demonstration of the possibility of a body, which is of an impenetrable extended thing. In order to give an explanation of the physical filling of space, and thereby provide a physical meaning to the concepts of conflict and intensive magnitude, Kant demonstrates in the *Dynamics* chapter the necessity of two fundamental forces, repulsive and attractive force, whose interplay generates an «anzugebende Quantität Materie» (MAN, AA 04: 508, 31-32), i.e. a certain degree of density, in every given place of physical space. This sort of dynamical theory of matter had been a main feature of Kant's natural philosophy since the pre-critical years, and it is very similar indeed to the one presented in the *Monadologia physica* of 1756. Nonetheless, in the frame of critical philosophy, there is at least one major difference

¹¹ On empirical intuition as a condition of the possibility of the thing compare, e.g., KrV, AA 03: 207.29-33; 473.05-18. For a detailed analysis of the concept of exhibition of concepts and its different aims compared to the transcendental deduction and the schematism see Pecere, Paolo: *La filosofia della natura in Kant*, Bari 2009, 185-202.

compared to the older theory, which is of great importance for our problem: metaphysics is not anymore sufficient in order to provide a construction of the body. Kant makes clear that from the combination of the original attractive force with the original repulsive force «*müßte* [...] die Einschränkung der letzteren, mithin die Möglichkeit eines in einem bestimmten Grade erfüllten Raumes abgeleitet werden können, und so würde der dynamische Begriff der Materie als des Beweglichen, das seinen Raum (in bestimmtem Grade) erfüllt, construiert werden»; but this task, which would require a law of the ratio of both forces, is now presented as a «reine mathematische Aufgabe [...] die *nicht mehr für die Metaphysik gehört*» (MAN, AA 04: 517.18-26; 32-33. Italics are mine). Moreover, Kant's mathematical hypothesis on this law of forces, which led in the *Monadologia physica* to a demonstration of the volume of particles (MoPh, AA 02: 484f.), is very prudently presented now as a «kleine Vorerinnerung zum Behufe des Versuchs einer solchen vielleicht möglichen Konstruktion» (MAN, AA 04: 518.33-34). Kant is trying to carefully separate the metaphysical truth – matter requires the action of two fundamental forces – from the mathematical hypothesis on the law of forces, which he no longer considers to be certain. Therefore he insists, in the *Allgemeine Anmerkung zur Dynamik*, that in metaphysics «der Begriff der Materie wird auf lauter bewegende Kräfte zurückgeführt», in particular the two fundamental repulsive and attractive forces, but that «von dieser ihrer Verknüpfung und Folgen können wir allenfalls noch wohl a priori urtheilen, welche Verhältnisse derselben untereinander man sich, ohne sich selbst zu widersprechen, denken könne, aber sich darum doch nicht anmaßen, eine derselben als wirklich anzunehmen» (MAN, AA 04: 524.26-27, 34-37). Kant concludes that, according to the new metaphysical dynamics, «uns alle Mittel abgehen, diesen Begriff der Materie zu construiren und, was wir allgemein dachten, in der Anschauung als möglich darzustellen» (MAN, AA 04: 525.10-12).

This conclusion clearly draws a gap between the principles of pure physics and the exhibition of the actual object of outer sense, i.e. material substance. In fact, this is precisely what Kant made clear in the *Preface*, where he wrote that the new metaphysical principles are «Principien der Construction der Begriffe, welche zur Möglichkeit der Materie überhaupt gehören» (MAN, AA 04: 472.03-04): these principles are *necessary* but *not sufficient* for the construction of the concept of matter, which requires moreover quantitative details as well as data of experience (MAN, AA 04: 534.15-18), and therefore

has to be accomplished by experimental physics. From the systematical point of view, this means that the new principles, though certainly required for exhibiting examples *in concreto* of the metaphysical concepts, are not sufficient in themselves to present these examples.

The most important confirmation of this conclusion regards the concept of material substance. *Theorem 4* of *Dynamics* shows that matter is infinitely divisible as well as space, and that therefore, being an object of outer intuition, it is nothing in itself. This phenomenalist solution to the problem of infinite divisibility is turned against monadism, who allowed of empty spaces between point-like monads (according to Kant's own theory in the *Monadologia physica*). Kant holds now that every part of the physical *continuum* contains material substance (MAN, AA 04: 503f.), which is now similar to a continuous fluid.¹² On the other hand, in the *Mechanics* chapter, Kant assumes that material substance, as separated in coherent parts (bodies), has a determinate extensive magnitude and provides an *a priori* theory about its quantitative estimate (AA 04: 537f.). We can then wonder why the transition from the material *continuum* of *Dynamics* to the discrete body of *Mechanics* cannot be made by means of simple empirical intuition.

The answer is to be found starting from the large *General Note to Dynamics*, which joins the *Dynamics* and *Mechanics* chapter, and precisely addresses those physical concepts that pure metaphysics was not able to introduce. The first two concepts under discussion are the concept of body itself and that of a particular force of cohesion that – as commonly happened in Newtonian physics – could be introduced in order to explain the body's figure (MAN, AA 04: 525f.). The hypothesis of a *purely intuitive* origin of the concept of body is here considered as a fault of *mechanical natural philosophy*, that «vom altern Demokrit an bis auf Cartesen» (MAN, AA 04: 533:2f.) feigns filled space and void in order to explain phenomena such as the variable density of matter. Even though Kant recognizes that this method could allow of an intuitive construction of matter, he sharply criticizes it because of its being grounded on a «leeren Begriff (der absoluten Undurchdringlichkeit)» which allows too much freedom of imagination in the field of philosophy (MAN, AA 04: 525.14). This same defect affects the *empirical intuition* of the body, which is of course not empty and is indeed the starting point of pure physics, but

¹² On this transition to a new concept of matter see Friedman, Michael: *Kant's Construction of Nature. A Reading of the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, Cambridge 2013, 130-154.

cannot explain by itself the possibility of bodies if not by surreptitiously introducing the non-empirical concept of the «solid», as an absolutely filled extension (MAN, AA 04:497.30-33, with reference to «Lambert und andere»¹³).

Generally speaking, both Cartesian mechanism and empirical deduction of the body share the conception of impenetrability as an intrinsic (not relative) property of bodies, that is as a purely *logical* determination, rather than as a *real* determination grounded on a measurable conflict of magnitudes (a mistake that is in Kant's view is also shared by Leibnizian philosophy of nature, though the latter constitutes the fundamental historical origin of Kant's anti-mechanistic dynamism). Contrary to these views, *dynamical natural philosophy* is preferred because it «der Experimentalphilosophie weit angemessener und beförderlicher ist, indem sie geradezu darauf leitet, die den Materien eigene bewegende Kräfte und deren Gesetze auszufinden» (MAN, AA 04: 533.21-24). Indeed, the explanation of the filling of space as a dynamical property is presented not only as *heuristically* more suitable, but (following *Dynamics's* theorems 1 and 5) as an *a priori*, *demonstrative* result of metaphysics (MAN, AA 04: 534.31-36).

In the light of these developments we can see that Kant's new metaphysics of bodily nature could not anymore rely on any purely rational or merely empirical deduction of body as the material substance, yet could offer a conclusive account of the possibility of the construction of the body, as it was the case with the old monadological metaphysics of Kant. This problematic situation remained latent and unnoticed in the intricacy of the new work, where it is made clear only in the lengthy *General Note to Dynamics*, but did worry Kant in the following years. In fact, not only was an *a priori* construction of body as the material substance beyond the boundary of his metaphysics of bodily nature (as Schelling and Hegel correctly recognized, considering this as a fault of Kant's metaphysical dynamism¹⁴); moreover, even the *hypothetical* deduction of the finite degree of density—given the boundary of matter which makes possible the interplay of attractive (penetrating)

¹³ See Lambert, Johann Heinrich: *Anlage zur Architektonik, oder Theorie des Einfachen und Ersten in der philosophischen und mathematischen Erkenntnis*, Riga 1771, Bd. I, § 88, 68, where «absolute density» is attributed to the solid body. About the origin of this concept Lambert himself referred to Locke in a letter to Kant (Br, AA 10: 66; see Locke's *Essay*, II, 4). Another reference of Kant's criticism was quite certainly Euler, in whose natural philosophy—contrary to Kant's theory—an (absolute) impenetrability is the foundation of moving force.

¹⁴Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm: «Allgemeine Deduction des dynamischen Prozesses oder der Kategorien der Physik», §§ 30f., in: *Zeitschrift für speculative Physik*, I.1-2. Jena-Leipzig 1800, now in *Werke*, Bd. 8, Stuttgart 2004, 318-20. Hegel, Georg Friedrich: *Wissenschaft der Logik*, Berlin 1832², I.III.C.c., *Anmerkung*. In: *Gesammelte Werke*, 1968f., Bd. 21, Hamburg, 167f.

and repulsive (surface) force – appeared to Kant as subject to a logical circularity, since both forces are proportional to the same dynamical factor of intensive filling.¹⁵ On the whole, pure physics had provided principles for the exhibition of concepts, but this foundation was not complete and needed supplementary work.

The metaphysical issue of material substance overlaps with an inquiry into the conceptual and methodological foundations of empirical physics, and here is exactly where many recent scholars usually place the “gap” crossed by the *Transition*. It would separate the general principles of determinant judgment and the multiplicity of empirical laws as a field of investigation for reflective judgment. This is generally correct, but does not explain as such the connection of the gap with the tenability of the whole critical system. The aesthetic principle of the conformity of nature to laws, introduced in the third *Critique* in order to ground our expectation to find a system of empirical laws, still leaves undetermined *how* to connect the concepts of metaphysics with their dynamical exhibition in empirical physics. This is precisely the main problem of the *Transition* manuscripts. In the writings of the years 1786-1796 Kant was already looking for a new representation of the conflict of realities, grounded on the joint consideration of moving forces and the concept of ether or caloric. The work on the «Elementary System of Moving Force», started in 1796, concerned the basic concepts which were instrumental for this research, such as body, density, cohesion, rigidity, and ether. Lacking a dynamical theory of conflict, Kant tried to systematically organize all the concepts involved in such a theory according to the guiding thread of categories, connecting them with «a priori thought» moving forces (OP, AA 21: 289f.). Next to this classification, the new proofs of the existence of world-matter were connected to the project of a new «schematism of the faculty of judgment» (OP, AA 22: 263; 21: 363; 168; 174), since they were intended to provide an omnipresent and «all-moving» World-matter as the substratum for the hypothetical, yet a priori anticipation of moving forces.¹⁶

¹⁵ See letter to J.S. Beck of 16(17) October 1792 and Kant’s preliminary notes (Br, AA 11: 375-377; 361-365).

¹⁶On the “ether-proofs” see: Guyer, Paul: «Kant’s Ether Deduction and the Possibility of Experience», in: Funke, Gerhardt (hrsg.), *Akten der siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Bonn 1991, 119-132. Mathieu, Vittorio: *L’opus postumum* cit., 117-133. Friedman, Michael: *Kant and the Exact Sciences* cit., 290-341. Förster, Eckart: *Kant’s Final Synthesis* cit., 82-101. Emundts, Dina: *Kants Übergangskonzeption im Opus postumum*, Berlin 2004. Pecere, Paolo: «Space, Aether and the Possibility of Physics in Kant’s Late Thought», in: Pecere, Paolo-Cellucci, Carlo (eds.), *Demonstrative and Non-Demonstrative Reasoning in Mathematics and Natural Science*, Cassino 2006, 237-306.

Kant's recognition that this whole new enquiry was connected with the problem of exhibition appears in the sheets 'A-Z' (1799), where the fundamental question finally appears: «how is physics as a science possible?». In sheet 'G', Kant discusses the *a priori* anticipation of moving forces which is necessary in order to represent the physical object, as different from the perceptual object (the theory of «indirect appearance»), and there he writes:

«Der Gegenstand einer indirecten Anschauung ist die Sache selbst d.i. ein solcher den wir nur in so fern aus der Anschauung herausheben als wir sie selbst hineingelegt haben d.i. in so fern unser eigenes Erkenntnisproduct ist.

Wir würden nämlich kein Bewustseyn von einem harten oder weichen, warmen oder kalten usw. Körper als einem solchen haben wenn wir nicht vorher uns den Begriff von diesen bewegenden Kräften der Materie (der Anziehung und Abstoßung oder der diesen untergeordneten der Ausdehnung oder des Zusammenhängen) gemacht hätten und nun sagen könnten daß eine oder die andere derselben unter diesen Begriff gehöre. – Also sind *a priori* Begriffe als für das empirische Erkenntnis gegeben die darum doch nicht empirische Begriffe sind zum Behuf der Erfahrung [...] und nur dadurch daß wir den Gegenstand der empirischen Anschauung (der Wahrnehmung) selber machten und für die Empfindungswerkzeuge durch Zusammensetzung selber in uns hervobrächten *und so ein Sinnenobject für die Erfahrung nach allgemeinen Principien derselben darstellten*» (OP, AA 22: 340.30-341.16, my italics).

In page 2 of the same sheet Kant concludes:

«Wir können aus unseren Sinnenvorstellungen nichts anders ausheben als was wir für die empirische Vorstellung unserer selbst hineingelegt haben mit dem Bewustseyn seiner Darstellung d.i. durch den Verstand (*intellectus exhibit phaenomena sensuum*) und diese Darstellung macht aus einem Aggregat der Wahrnehmungen ein System nach den formalen Bedingungen der Anschauung und ihrer Coexistenz im Subjekt ein Erkenntnis des äußeren Sinnenobjects als Erscheinung zum Behuf der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung» (OP, AA 22: 343.09-16).

In the light of this new conception of exhibition Kant can write on the margin: «nur das System ist die Sache selbst» (OP, AA 22: 343.07). The new theory of physics, grounded on the idea of an *a priori* determination of any physical object according to a system of moving forces (actually properties which must be later reduced to forces), provides a new justification of the exhibition of concepts of the intellect. The exhibition is not achieved by simple intuition of outer senses, but by the whole (intellectual and schematical) determination of the physical object, whose basic concepts and method are provided by the

Übergang. And this, in my view, is the essential contribution that the «transition to physics» had to give to transcendental philosophy.

Lest we do not think that this rarely mentioned and unfinished conclusion of the whole “exhibition” doctrine constitutes a merely historical curiosity, we can consider how the problematic of a dynamical construction of matter was taken up by Neokantian philosophers, notably by the Marburg school grounded by the work of Hermann Cohen. One of the main features of Cohen’s critical reading of Kant was the denial that empirical intuition can provide by itself the concept of matter, and the bold statement that a consequent philosophical criticism must involve a pure construction of matter (as well as of space and time).¹⁷ This construction, according to Cohen and his followers Natorp and Cassirer, does not happen in the abstract realm of speculative metaphysics, but is to be found in the concrete, historical development of physical science. This historical reform of the concept of *a priori* knowledge led the philosophers of the Marburg school to the problem of how to justify the validity of pure concepts – such as substance – by referring to the ever changing forms of the latter’s applications in empirical science of nature. Their overall approach to this problem was grounded on the claim that historical evidence allows to read off an idealistic and constructive tendency in the development of natural science. For instance, the primacy of a dynamical and mathematical understanding of matter in physics was detected in several groundbreaking theories of post-Newtonian physics, such as the energetic theory of late XIX century, the electromagnetic theory of matter and the relativistic field theory.¹⁸ Although these authors did not recognize the importance of the *Opus postumum* for the understanding of Kant’s philosophy of natural science, their philosophy of natural science, their struggle to extract some stable logical elements from

¹⁷ Cohen, Hermann: *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, Berlin 1871 (= *Werke*, Hildesheim-Zürich-New York 1987–, Bd. 3/1), 49.

¹⁸ For Cohen’s confrontation with contemporary physics see the three editions of his *Einleitung mit kritischem Nachtrag zu F.A. Lange*, “Geschichte des Materialismus”, Iserlohn-Leipzig 1896, 1902², 1914³. Energetics and electromagnetic theory of matter receive particular attention in Natorp, Paul: *Die logischen Grundlagen der exakten Wissenschaften*, Leipzig-Berlin 1910 and Cassirer, Ernst: *Substanzbegriff und Funktionbegriff. Untersuchungen über die Grundlagen der Erkenntnisstheorie*, Berlin 1910. In the 1920s, Cassirer started emphasizing the epistemological meaning of relativistic field theory, with particular reference to the work of Hermann Weyl. E.g. see Cassirer, Ernst: *Philosophie der symbolischen Formen*, III, *Phänomenologie der Erkenntnis*, Berlin 1929, in *Gesammelte Werke*, Bd. 13, 541, 548f. For the connection of Kant’s interpretation and the understanding of contemporary physics in the Marburg School see Pecere, Paolo: «Il “platonismo” e il problema della conoscenza scientifica da Cohen a Cassirer», in: Chiaradonna, Riccardo (a cura di), *Il platonismo e le scienze*, Roma 2012, 193-216, in part. footnotes n. 1 and 19 for an appraisal of the *Opus postumum* in this context.

the cauldron of empirical concepts of physics, as well as their particular attention to a dynamical interpretation of matter and ether, as a way to deduce the representation of the body from concepts of mathematical physics, actually takes up in the light of XIX and XX century mathematical physics the open problems faced by Kant himself in his last manuscripts within the framework of late XVIII century Newtonian natural science.¹⁹

3. *Connecting the Transition to the defense of transcendental philosophy: a look at the context.*

The present reconstruction of the systematical role of the *Transition* project, grounded on the intrinsic importance of the exhibition of concepts, may sound a little scholastic, since it builds on inner, open problems of Kant's writings, by abstracting so far from the actual defense of his philosophy in the years of criticism. I will try to show, now, that Kant's new reflections on the technical problem of exhibition could have been stimulated by the polemical context of the interpretation of transcendental philosophy in the years of criticism. From this point of view, indeed, the problem of providing examples *in concreto* –or «meaning» – to ontological concepts appears as a possible source of Kant's increased awareness of the crucial importance of his new work around the year 1798, which corresponds to the transcendental turn in the manuscripts.

As a first source of the problem we can consider the well known charge of idealism, which Kant had to challenge since the publication of the *Critique*. In order to contrast the Garve-Feder review he had tried in several places to reconcile transcendental idealism with common realistic views, stressing the difference between transcendental ideality and empirical reality of the forms of intuition (and therefore of *phaenomena*), in contrast with the material idealism attributed to Berkeley. The very idea that only external intuition, and physics, can objectively realize the pure concepts of metaphysics, presented in the *Metaphysical Foundations*, appears as a consequent development of this general point of view. Although Kant publicly refused to connect these charges of idealism or skepticism with open problems of his works, in the early 1790s he also composed several manuscript attempts at building a new refutation of material idealism. The awareness of this problem

¹⁹ Kant's own original and critical appraisal of Newton's physics was also connected to his search for a theory of matter as a continuum. See Pecere, Paolo: «Kant's Newtonianism: A reappraisal», in: *Estudos Kantianos*, 2.2, 2014, 162-171.

runs parallel to the conception of the new work, which was already in the process of elaboration by 1795.²⁰

Yet the most worrying ‘idealistic’ interpretations could come from the followers, rather than from the critics. The only pure rational treatment of the traditional concepts of metaphysics in the frame of criticism, as Kant made clear in several occasions, had to be found in moral philosophy; nonetheless the problematic concept of the thing in itself—whose treatment in the *Critique* could easily lead to doubts – continued to suggest a possible esoteric noumenal knowledge, and therefore the need for an integration of Kant’s original transcendental philosophy. In a note to the *Preface* of the MAN Kant already replied to one of the first followers who asked for a deeper treatment of noumena, Johann Schulz (MAN, AA 04: 474-476). In the second edition of the *Critique*, then, Kant was very careful to avoid possible misunderstandings of his idealism: he stressed the “negative” aspect of the thing in itself, as a pure thought-object; he tried to contrast material idealism with a new *Refutation* which did not involve any reference to the thing in itself; and again he referred to the crucial role of empirical intuition of matter in order to give objective meaning to any metaphysical thinking (KrV, AA 03: 193.06-12).

But the issue was far from closed; on the contrary, it was beginning to gain a major role in the discussions on criticism. Karl Leonhard Reinhold, whose influent *Briefe über die kantische Philosophie* appeared in 1786-87, while defending Kantian philosophy considered possible, and necessary, a further foundation of the basic concepts of the *Critique*, first of all representation. Kant tried to discredit this idea in his essay *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie* (1788), insisting on the necessity and validity of the transcendental deduction in its actual form. In 1789 Kant also received, by his follower Markus Herz, a first draft of Maimon’s *Versuch zur Transzendentalphilosophie*, which contained the claim that only a speculative foundation of criticism could avoid the latter’s skeptical overturn. Since the author was still not known Kant contented himself by dismissing this idea in private form and even expressed sincere appreciation of Maimon as the one among its critics who best understood his own theoretical problems (Br, AA 11: 48f.). Kant appeared open to recognize that criticism did have some problems, insofar as these problems were to be solved without a substantial

²⁰ These include the so called *Kiesewetter Aufsätze* (Refl. 6311-6316), AA 18: 607-623. In a letter of June 8, 1795, Kiesewetter noted that the work on the *Transition* project had been communicated to him by Kant in the same year (Br, AA 12: 23).

reform of his philosophy. Yet Reinhold's exposition and interpretation became very popular, and in 1792 they became the main object of Gottlob Schulze's attack to criticism in his *Aenesidemus*. Schulze, by advancing the famous objection of the inconsistency of the concept of the thing in itself, concluded that critical philosophy was not able to establish nothing certain neither about the existence (or non-existence) of things-in-itself, nor about the limits of human knowledge.²¹ Such a statement, as it were, sets the stage for the extensive discussions on transcendental philosophy which took place in the next years: the idea that the *Critique* could not, or at least was *not sufficient to* ground a new philosophy, and thus eradicate both dogmatic metaphysics and skepticism, became a spread view among followers as well as opponents of criticism.

Though aware of these opposite tendencies of skeptical meta-criticism and speculative developments, Kant did not show much preoccupation in the early 1790s. In 1794, answering to Johann Sigismund Beck, who projected a refutation of *Aenesidemus* by means of a new treatment of pure synthesis as preceding the representation of objects, he commented evasively that a representation with no reference is a nonsense, which would be as much as a private and incommunicable feeling, and that anyway he had no more energy to work on such «einfache dünne Fäden unseres Erkenntnisvermögens».²² Beck was not satisfied and in the third and final volume of his *Erläuternder Auszug aus den kritischen Schriften des Herrn Prof. Kant* (1793-96), the *Einzig-möglicher Standpunct, aus welchem die kritische Philosophie beurtheilt werden muß* (1796), he insisted on the need of a deeper foundation of criticism by means of an examination of the «original» act of representing. He did not – or did not want to – catch Kant's point about the lack of meaning of philosophical investigations. Indeed, Kant's was thinking to his own procedure for establishing the objective reference of the concepts of the intellect by means of intuitive examples, i.e. exhibition, whose treatment lay hidden in the intricacies of the *Metaphysical Foundations* and as such was not suited to satisfy the philosophical community. In 1794, as Kant was trying to convince his follower Beck to abtain from useless speculations, the

²¹ [Schulze, Gottlob]: *Aenesidemus, oder die Fundamente der von dem Herrn Professor Reinhold in Jena gelieferten Elementar-Philosophie: Nebst einer Verteidigung des Skeptizismus gegen die Anmassungen der Vernunftkritik*, [s.l.] 1792, 24.

²² Letter to J.S. Beck of 1 April 1794 (Br, AA 11: 514-516).

charge of idealism was repeated in Tiedemann's *Thäetet*.²³ Quite significantly, "Thäetet"'s name will appear, together with "Aenesidemus", in the latest sheets of the *Opus postumum*, in what appears as a list of possible critical objectives of the new work (OP, AA 22: 20.26).

Most interesting, in order to connect these questions with the *Transition* project, are the *public* documents of Kant's renewed involvement with the problem of objective meaning of concepts in the years 1798-99, again stimulated by a new interpretation of transcendental philosophy: Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* of 1794. Fichte had struggled with the problem of a subjectivistic interpretation of criticism since his reading of Hume and the "neo-Humian" charges in the writings of Jacobi, Platner, Schulze, Maimon. He correctly saw a common point in the critical writings of Kant's opponents, and his early work can be seen as an effort to reply to these critics by taking Kant's parts.²⁴ Nonetheless his attempt to rebuild criticism on a firmer foundation eventually appeared to Kant – who had at least some first hand knowledge of the *Wissenschaftslehre* – as itself dangerously grounded on a formalistic view of criticism. After declaring his perplexities in a letter to Johann Heinrich Tiefunk of 5 April 1798 (Br, AA 12: 240f.), Kant finally decided to openly state his dissent in the *Declaration* on the *Wissenschaftslehre* of 7 August 1799. There he lamented the absurdity of the idea of developing transcendental philosophy through a reflection grounded on pure form and no *material* of knowledge – which is in fact «bloße Logik» (Br, AA 12: 370.17).

Again these were mere "negative" reproaches: Kant's way of avoiding the risk that the concepts of transcendental philosophy remain «mere forms of thought» was still connected with the old work on the physical exhibition; but that work was now being revised. Indeed, a look at contemporary manuscripts of the *Opus postumum* shows that Kant now recognized the importance of the new work for supplementing the "formalistic" idea of critical philosophy as mere propedeutic. In sheet 'B Übergang', for instance, he writes: «diese Übergang ist nichtblos Propädeutic, denn das ist ein schwankender Begriff und betrifft nur das Subjective der Erkenntnis» (OP, AA 22: 240.25f.). And in a Draft of *Introduction* to the new work he insists on the «completeness of the system» of knowledge

²³ Tiedemann, Dietrich: *Thäetet, oder über das menschliche Wissen: ein Beitrag zur Vernunftkritik*, Frankfurt a.M. 1794. See e.g. KgS XXII, 19-20.

²⁴ For this point see Beiser, Friedrich: *German Idealism. The Struggle against Subjectivism, 1781-1801*, Cambridge Mass. 2002, 223ff.

of nature, articulated in the «three degrees» of metaphysics of nature, physiology and physics, where the latter two are to be connected by the new “Transition” (OP, AA 21: 361.04-19). In sheet ‘Übergang u[sw]’, opening a new draft of *Introduction*, he comes back to criticism of the *Wissenschaftslehre*, as a circular enterprise that «von der Materie derselben (den Objekten der Erkenntnis) abstrahirt» (OP, AA 21: 207.23f.). According to the standard dating, these sheets were written approximately in the same year as the ones – quoted and discussed in § II – that regard the new transcendental theory of physical knowledge and its consequence for the doctrine of exhibition: *completing* the system of critical philosophy and *contrasting* Fichte’s formalism are evidently two sides of the same problem.

An analogous move appears in *Konvolut I* (1800-1803), where Kant, considering the idea of the «system of transcendental idealism» challenges the Spinozist development of the problem by Schelling and Lichtenberg (OP, AA 21: 87.29-30). Spinozism had notably been a major worry for Kant, who had to reply to Jacobi’s charges and at the same time recognizes, in metaphysical lectures, that Spinozism is the consequent form of «transcendental realism» (e.g. AA 29: 977-8; 28: 732; 29: 1008-9). In the very sparse and fragmentary reflections of *Konvolut I*, which contain his last philosophical writings, Kant argues that transcendental idealism is a condition of empirical realism, in that it catches in its own way the true (transcendental-idealistic) idea of spinozism:

«Wir können keine Gegenstände weder in uns noch als ausser uns befindlich erkennen als nur so daß wir die *actus* des Erkennens nach gewissen Gesetzen in uns selbst hineinlegen. Der Geist des Menschen ist Spinozens Gott (was das Formale aller Sinnengegenstände betrifft) und der Transcendentale Idealism ist Realism in absoluter Bedeutung» (OP, AA 21: 99).

Here, trying to interpret in his critical way spinozism – which he considers throughout the critical years as the most exemplar kind of transcendental realism – Kant evidently presupposes his recent work on the foundations of physics: first, the proofs of the existence of the World-matter, which is conceived as a substrate of moving forces and a phenomenal analogous of the transcendental ideal of the *Critique*, that «liegt in den Vorstellungsvermögen des Subjekts» (OP, AA 21: 574.29); second, the consequent, new view of knowledge as grounded on «self-affection» of the subject and the anticipation of the indirect phenomenon, which can be considered as a development of the “exhibition”

doctrine which we have examined.²⁵ His new epistemology of physics, which has reshaped the task of exhibition, plays now a crucial role for the reconsideration of transcendental philosophy as a whole. This feedback from the new enquiry on physics to transcendental philosophy is finally recognized in *Konvolut I*, where Kant writes of a «Übergang von der Physik zur Transzendentalphilosophie» (OP, AA 21: 17.21).

4. Conclusion.

Let me resume the two threads of my argument. As we have seen, the task of the “exhibition” of concepts connected transcendental philosophy to physics, and different open problems of the MAN determined the systematical importance of the *Transition* project. On the other hand, in the years 1798-1799, we have found growing evidence of Kant’s concern with attacks to critical philosophy, whose common point was the *Critique*’s inadequacy to fully justify the reference to real objects (in space) as well as the exact meaning of the thing in itself, in order to refute material idealism and, at the same time, to ground a new natural philosophy. Both skeptical overturn and dogmatic developments of transcendental idealism shared this view, whose direct rejection, in Kant’s original philosophy, required a full treatment of “exhibition” as well as a more subtle distinction of the concepts of objectivity.

Such a treatment can be found in the *Transition* manuscripts. Besides elaborating on the “exhibition” and the schematic anticipation of physical objects, Kant repeatedly insists on characterizing the thing in itself as the «thinkable» (*cogitabile*), defined by contrast with the «real (*dabile*)» (OP, AA 21: 24.1), as the «*ens rationis*», by contrast with proper objects (OP, AA 22:27.25; 31.4), as the idea of an «*ens per se*» (OP, AA 22: 26.28) which is actually the correlate of phenomena (OP, AA 22: 412.19) or a different way of considering phenomena («*respectus*», OP, AA 22:26.29, 44.22).²⁶ On the whole Kant sharply distinguishes between three moments of objectivity: (1) *phenomenon* as intuitive datum, (2) *sense-object* as the result of intellectual synthesis (in the case of matter, by

²⁵ On “self-affection” and “indirect phenomenon” see Pecere, Paolo: *La filosofia della natura in Kant* cit., 775-785.

²⁶ I thank an anonymous referee for suggesting the relevance of these definitions in the present context, as possible ways of reacting to Reinhold, Schulze and Maimon.

means of the systematical anticipation of moving forces), and (3) *thing in itself* as the merely negative representation of a non-sensible objectivity.²⁷

The importance of grounding the process of objective determination had an indirect, yet crucial role for perfecting Kant's original views on metaphysics. On the one hand, Kant's late writings on metaphysics and physics – from the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* to the *Opus postumum* – make clear that the realization of metaphysical concepts needs a full foundation of the empirical synthesis in natural science. On the other hand, this full path of theoretical philosophy has to be completed, in order to contrast the domain of objective knowledge with the field of the moral ideas of reason, which forms the background of Kant's exploration of the pure rational side of autonomy and reshaping of the traditional ideas of metaphysics. Indeed, given the new findings in his work on the *Transition*, Kant finally felt free, in *Konvolut I*, to sketch a new systematical exposition of the ideas of «World, Man and God». From this point of view we can credit Jachmann's account and understand why the unpublished *Transition*, focusing on the «real applicability» of his philosophy, may have appeared to Kant as a fundamental and missing piece for the full understanding of his philosophy. Unaware of this work, indeed, the followers of transcendental idealism were heading toward radically different developments.

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²⁷ For a most clear articulation of the three meanings of objectivity see for instance sheet ‘F’, OP, AA 22: 336. Similar reflections on the thing in itself are repeated in the ‘Beylage’ sheets, together with explicit references to “Aenesidemus” and “Thaetet” (see e.g. OP, AA 22: 20, 23f., 28f., 31).

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Genealogy and Critique in Kant's Organic History of Reason*

Genealogía y crítica en la historia orgánica de la razón de Kant

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Abstract

Although scholarly attention has been mostly paid to the many connections existing between Kant and the *exact* sciences, the landscape of Kant studies has begun to noticeably change during the last decade, with many new pieces devoted to a consideration of Kant's relation to the life sciences of his day. It is in this vein, for example, that investigators have begun to discuss the importance of Kant's essays on race for the development of Anthropology as an emerging field. The bulk of the contributions to this recent trend, however, have focused on Kant's remarks on organic life in the *Critique of Judgment*, such that Kant's "theory of biology" is now seen to be firmly located in that text. Amidst such consolidation, there are a few pieces that have begun to address Kant's appeal to organic vocabulary within the context of his theory of cognition, though these too remain dominated by the interpretive template set by the third *Critique*. My own strategy in this essay will be different. Kant did indeed borrow from the life sciences for his model of the mind, but in a manner that would reject a naturalized account. His preference for epigenesis as a theory of organic generation needs to be carefully distinguished, therefore, from the use he would make of it when discussing a metaphysical portrait of reason.

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Key words

Kant; Generation; Epigenesis; Generic Preformation; Reason; Natural History

Resumen

Aunque la atención académica se ha ocupado en mayor medida de las numerosas conexiones existentes entre Kant y las ciencias *exactas*, el horizonte de los estudios kantianos ha comenzado a cambiar notablemente durante la última década, de la mano de muchas nuevas contribuciones dedicadas a considerar la importancia de Kant para las ciencias de la vida de su tiempo. En esta línea, por ejemplo, algunos investigadores han comenzado a discutir la importancia de los ensayos de Kant sobre la raza para el desarrollo de la Antropología como un campo emergente. La mayoría de las contribuciones de esta tendencia reciente, sin embargo, se han centrado en las observaciones de Kant sobre la vida orgánica en la *Crítica del Juicio*, de modo que la “teoría de la biología” de Kant es localizada ahora claramente en aquel texto. En esta línea dominante, pocos trabajos han optado por plantear el uso que Kant realiza del vocabulario orgánico dentro del contexto de su teoría del conocimiento, al permanecer demasiado dominados por la plantilla interpretativa impuesta por la tercera *Crítica*. Mi estrategia en este ensayo será diferente. Kant efectivamente tomó en préstamo de las ciencias de la vida su modelo de la mente, pero rechazando su reducción naturalista. Su preferencia por la epigénesis como una teoría de la organización orgánica precisa distinguirse cuidadosamente del uso que hace de ella cuando está en discusión un retrato metafísico de la razón.

Palabras clave

Kant; generación; epigénesis; preformación genérica; razón; historia natural

While Kant has long been seen as an uncompromising moralist and a committed transcendental idealist, in the past two decades he has been introduced to a new generation of students as an anthropologist, as a physical geographer, and even as a theorist of race. This change has much to do with the recent addition of Kant's lectures on Physical Geography and Anthropology to the edited collections of Kant's works. These textual additions to Kant's corpus and, in their wake, the re-characterization of Kant as something of an eighteenth-century naturalist, have raised all manner of questions for scholars seeking to connect the careful edifice that is the critical system with the wide-ranging discussions now known to have been taking place across the rest of Kant's work. Paul Menzer raised this question already in 1911 in *Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte*, answering then (and in essential anticipation of the view held by the

majority of subsequent Kant scholars) that it was necessary to view Kant's forays into natural history as a set of discussions requiring sharp delineation from his epistemology and ethics, for these were discussions running on "parallel tracks," as he would put it, and their impact on the critical system, if any, was merely metaphorical.¹

The first inroads against this policy would be made by researchers investigating the centrality of natural historical considerations in Kant's early social and political essays, essays such as *Idea for a Universal History of Mankind* (1784) wherein Kant's prominent application of teleology to history signaled the continued adoption of a methodological device first used by him in his account *Of the Different Races of Human Beings* in 1775. Similar connections were made between Kant's support for Basedow's attempts to reform educational practices in the mid 1770s and the increasing attention paid by Kant to *Bildung*, in all its various instantiations, as he sought throughout the 1780s and '90s to sort out just what was meant when referring to the formation of character and indeed to the vocation of humankind as a whole.² As an increasingly comprehensive view of Kant's position came to show, his well-regarded works on ethics and governance simply could not be meaningfully separated from his views on education and history. But these latter views had in turn come out of works in the 1770s, works that had been saturated by natural historical terms: were these now to be also taken into consideration when approaching Kant's position on moral and political life? For many researchers today, the answer is an unqualified yes.³

¹ Paul Menzer, *Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1911), 404–445. For a more recent version of this view see Günter Zöllner, who regards Kant's critical doctrines and his anthropological works to be in a "mutually supplementary relation," see "Kant's Political Anthropology," *Kant Jahrbuch* 3 (2011): 131–161.

² Kant used Basedow's *Methodenbuch* as a textbook when lecturing on pedagogy during the winter semester of 1776–1777. A good sense of Kant's commitment to Basedow's school during this period emerges from his letter exchanges regarding it, see esp. 10:191–195. There have been a number of commentators in recent years interested in connecting Kant's early views of education and his developing approach to character. On this see especially Felicitas Munzel, *Kant's Conception of Moral Character. The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology, and Reflective Judgement* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1998), *Kant's Conception of Pedagogy* (Chicago: Northwestern University Press, 2012) and also Robert Loudén's "Not a Slow Reform, but a Swift Revolution: Kant and Basedow on the Need to Reform Education," in *Kant and Education*, edited by K. Roth and C. Suprenant (London: Routledge, 2012), and Loudén's *Kant's Human Being* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), esp. ch. 11.

³ On this see especially Pauline Kleingeld, *Kant and Cosmopolitanism. The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). Robert Bernasconi has done the most work to investigate Kant's published essays on the natural history of race in terms of their implications for the ethical program developed during the 1780s and '90s. See especially, R. Bernasconi, "Will the Real Kant Please Stand Up. The Challenge of Enlightenment Racism to the Study of the History of Philosophy," *Radical*

In *Kant's Organicism* I proceeded in very much the same vein so far as I investigated the connection between Kant's theory of cognition and his interest in debates regarding biological generation and development that were taking place at the time. Many of the earliest studies of Kant and the life sciences had emerged from the field of intellectual history, as historians of science sought to make sense of the biological vocabulary scattered among Kant's works. As interest in Kant and the life sciences grew in the field of philosophy, these investigations, like their forerunners, focused primarily on Kant's remarks on organic life in the *Critique of Judgment*, so that Kant's so-called "theory of biology" is now seen to be firmly located in that text. Amidst such consolidation, there were commentators who addressed Kant's appeal to biological vocabulary within the context of his theory of cognition, though the majority of these also remained dominated by the interpretive template set by Kant's discussions in the third *Critique*. My own strategy in *Kant's Organicism* was different. Kant did indeed borrow from the life sciences for his model of the mind, but in a manner that would reject a naturalized account. His preference for epigenesis as a theory for understanding biological generation had to be carefully distinguished, therefore, from the use he made of the theory when discussing a metaphysical portrait of reason. This meant, so far as my investigation was concerned, starting at the beginning of Kant's career and working up to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as opposed to returning to it with the insights yielded by 1790.

The task of *Kant's Organicism* is thus to open up a new perspective on Kant, to broaden both the scope and the intellectual resources available for philosophers who are working on this period. The starting point for the book was the enormous transition occurring in the life sciences between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries regarding the proper aim of natural history (ch. 1). And the pivotal figure here was Georges Buffon since it was he who finally managed to wrest natural history from the province of the taxonomists. Under Buffon's hand, natural history became devoted instead to a description of the history of nature, and it advanced a new method of inquiry altogether (ch. 2). Investigations should be filled with the content of experience, Buffon argued, but they must be led by a speculative gaze. This was all big news in the 1750s, and it certainly reached the ears of Kant. In a chapter called "Kant and the Problem of Origin" I describe the manner in which Kant was especially interested in questions of origin, in cosmological

Philosophy 117 (2003): 13-19, and "Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism," in *Philosophers on Race*, edited by T. Lott and J. Ward (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2002): 145-166.

origin—Buffon too opened his natural history with an account of this—but in theories of biological origin as well (ch. 3). Few scholars have noted that Kant owned an exceedingly rare German translation of Maupertuis’ *Versuch von der Bildung der Körper*, or that he mirrored his physical geography course on the first two volumes of Buffon’s *Allgemeine Historie der Natur* (1752, trans. A. G.Kästner). These turned out to be important facts actually, for they made sense of the seeming digressions one finds in the *Only Possible Proof* essay of 1763, and they certainly provided a different set of coordinates for understanding Kant’s approach to the topography of space in 1768 (in *Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space*). With the historical context in place, I began to make the case for Kant’s appeal to epigenesis as a model for cognition, emphasizing the epistemic context within which Kant became interested in epigenesis for thinking about the “original acquisition” of concepts (ch. 4), since only attention to this context could make sense of the continued appeal that epigenesis would have for Kant throughout the 1770s (ch. 5). Here I also outlined the difficulties Kant faced once Tetens published his account of cognition, an approach relying on the “*Evolution durch Epigenesis*” of the soul. For it was by reading Tetens that Kant became clear regarding his own anti-nativism. I closed the book with a rereading of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and of the Transcendental Deduction in particular. This account began with the Architectonic, taking it to be the “*Bauplan*” for the whole, and went on to show the interpretive possibilities opened up by attention to the organic vocabularies in play throughout the *Critique*.

Now that I’ve laid the project out as a rough whole, I want to focus on some of the details of my investigation in the hope that these remarks will bring us to the points raised by my respondents. We can begin with a reminder regarding the central task facing generation theorists during the 17th and 18th centuries, for it was one not unrelated to those philosophers interested in accounting for the uniformity of experience. In each case the conceptual, as much as the practical problem, was to understand the origin of form, a form that could be realized with fidelity across numberless generations of individuals in the biological realm, in much the same manner that concepts could be applied across all manner of experience.

For generation theorists, the specific problem was to explain the origin of a principle of order or of some other explanation of the means by which formal organization

occurred within the complex system of the embryo. For Maupertuis and Buffon, the problem of form required recourse to supernatural agency. Maupertuis argued that particles had been initially endowed with intelligence by God in order to accomplish the task, and Buffon similarly took the internal moulds of the organism to have been set by God at the creation. Even with crutches like these, however, the problem of form remained unresolved so far as their critics were concerned. Having a mould was one thing, they argued, explaining the precise manner by which the particles were organized by a supposed penetrating force in concert with this mould was something else altogether. On this point no critic was more vociferous than the Swiss physiologist, Albrecht von Haller. As Haller put it, "Mr. Buffon needs a force which has foresight, which can make a choice, which has a goal, which, against all the laws of blind combination, always and unfailingly brings about the same end."⁴ "In brief," he concluded, "what is the cause which arranges the human body in such a way that an eye is never attached to the knee, an ear is never connected to the hand, a toe never wanders to the neck, or a finger is never placed on the extremity of the foot"?⁵ Indeed it was on the basis of precisely such difficulties that Kant took the prospects for any genuine advance in the life sciences to be gloomy. Celestial mechanics, with all their mathematical complexity, still provided a perfectly knowable basis for understanding cosmological construction. Organic construction, by contrast, could not be grasped through mechanical laws, which made it a field of investigation that was simply closed off from examination so far as Kant was concerned.

Despite this, Kant kept abreast of the embryological debates occurring in the life sciences in the 1760s. Remarking that "it would be absurd to regard the initial generation of a plant or an animal as a mechanical effect incidentally arising from the universal laws of nature," Kant took time in a 1763 piece to consider in turn the top two competing theories of generation. The first was preexistence theory, according to which each individual being was formed at the time of creation. Such a view, as Kant understood it,

⁴ Haller's prefaces are available in English translation. See "Reflections on the Theory of Generation of Mr. Buffon," trans. Phillip R. Sloan, in *From Natural History to the History of Nature*, p. 322.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 320. These were of course the identical grounds upon which Caspar Friedrich Wolff attacked Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb*, since force, as Wolff saw it, was an entirely different biological entity than the intelligent guidance which Blumenbach had mapped on to it. An account of Wolff's continued critique of Blumenbach is in Shirley Roe's, *Matter, Life, and Generation: Eighteenth-Century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

demanded that “each individual member of the plant and animal kingdoms is directly formed by God, and thus of supernatural origin, with only the reproduction (*Fortpflanzung*), that is, only the transition from time to time to the unfolding (*Auswicklung*) [of individuals] being entrusted to a natural law” (BDG, AA 02: 114). The second theory Kant considered appealed to God’s original agency when producing species lines—a type of generic preformation guaranteeing the reproduction of kinds—but argued for the subsequent generation of individuals according to natural means.⁶ Is it possible, Kant asked when introducing this option, that “some individual members of the plant and animal kingdoms, whose origin is indeed directly divine, nonetheless possess the capacity, which we cannot understand, to actually generate (*erzeugen*) their own kind in accordance with a regular law of nature, and not merely to unfold (*auszuwickeln*) them?” (BDG, AA 02: 114). In this account, form was again supernaturally conceived, but while this generically maintained the stability of the species lines, the subsequent work of generating individuals actively belonged to nature.

Kant went on to rehearse positions that would seem to be examples of this, all the while critical of the specific attempts made in each case to provide a *mechanical* description of the natural means by which individuals would be subsequently generated.⁷

«It is utterly unintelligible to us that a tree should be able, in virtue of an internal mechanical constitution, to form and process its sap in such a way that there should arise in the bud or the seed something containing a tree like itself in miniature, or something from which such a tree could develop. The internal forms proposed by *Buffon*, and the elements of organic matter which, in the opinion of *Maupertuis*, join together as their memories dictate and in accordance with the laws of desire

⁶ A helpful discussion of Kant’s attempt to synthesize preexistence theory and epigenesis in this section is in Mark Fisher, “Kant’s Explanatory Natural History: Generation and Classification of Organisms in Kant’s Natural Philosophy,” in *Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology*, ed. Philippe Huneman, North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy, vol. 8 (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 101–121.

⁷ Paul Menzer takes Kant—wrongly, in my view—to have Caspar Wolff’s position in mind in the opening lines of this passage. See Menzer, *Kants Lehre von der Entwicklung in Natur und Geschichte* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1911), 104. That said, in Herder’s notes from Kant’s lectures on metaphysics during the same period as the 1763 piece it is clear that, without naming them, Kant could have understood that the specific difficulty facing Haller and Wolff was the lack of any decisive evidence in favor of one position versus the other. As Herder recorded him, “*Die Physikalischenbeobachtungenzeigen, daß der Körperzuerstgebildetwurde, anderedaßsieberi der Schöpfunggebildetsei*” (V-Met/Herder, AA 28:889). In his notes Herder went on to report that the main conceptual difficulty facing the life sciences was twofold, at least so far as Kant understood their attempt to discern the processes of generation, namely, the conception of freedom on the one hand, and its generation in the world (*die Zeugung seines gleichen im Raum*) on the other.

and aversion, are either as incomprehensible as the thing itself, or they are entirely arbitrary inventions» (BDG, AA 02:115).

But while Kant rejected such accounts as “utterly unintelligible” and “entirely arbitrary inventions,” he was equally resistant to the first hypothesis and its recourse to a supernatural origin for every individual member of a species.

What Kant wanted was something different, a means of avoiding a supernatural solution even if all of the mechanical accounts of individual generation had so far failed. Indeed, as Kant wryly observed, an adequate mechanical explanation of fermenting yeast had yet to be found, but that had hardly led people to suggest supernatural grounds for its existence; the case of plants and animals should be no different. Unless one was willing to rely on God's constant creation, Kant concluded, “there must be granted to the initial divine organization of plants and animals a capacity, not merely to develop (*Auswicklung*) their kind thereafter in accordance with a natural law, but truly to generate (*erzeugen*) their kind” (BDG, AA 02: 115). This position followed the others in appealing to divine artifice in the initial creation of forms, but unlike Maupertuis or Buffon, Kant wanted to emphasize the need to conceive of an individual's subsequent capacity for self-organization: for *erzeugen* as opposed to mere *auswickeln*.⁸ The position that would later be cautiously endorsed by Kant in 1790—a position explicitly identified by him in the *Critique of Judgement* as one in line with Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb*—proposed just such a non-mechanical generation of individuals. In this instance generation took place according to an internalized plan for their species as a whole, a plan that was therefore only “generic” for the species line but which nonetheless afforded to nature the power of all subsequent generation of individuals; it was on this basis that Kant was thus able to identify “generic preformation” with epigenesis (KU, AA 05: 424).⁹

⁸ In spite of this, Kant simply could not include organic generation as an example of natural laws at work for unlike the demonstrable laws guiding cosmological construction, the structure of plants and animals appeared to be unconstrained or contingent while still being oriented somehow toward particular ends. In Kant's words, “Große kunst und eine zufällige Vereinbarung durch freie Wahl gewissen Absichten gemäß ist daselbst augenscheinlich und wird zugleich der Grund eines besondern Naturgesetzes, welches zur künstlichen Naturordnung gehört. Der Bau der Pflanzen und Thiere zeigt eine solche Anstalt, wozu die allgemeine und nothwendige Naturegesetze unzulänglich sind” (BDG, AA 02:114).

⁹ Kant liked the theory in 1790 for much the same reasons he had liked its outlines in 1763: epigenesis reduced an appeal to supernatural agency to a bare minimum, since it relied on God for only the original construction of the forms that the species lines would take, and it balanced a mechanical account of nutrition and growth with a teleological explanation of the organism's purposive development. And Kant singled out

In Kant's consideration of Maupertuis and Buffon in the 1763 piece he did not use the term epigenesis. In 1769, however, Kant introduced an explicit discussion of biological epigenesis into his course on metaphysics. Kant always used A. G. Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* as the basis for this course, and the topics concerning the soul ranged from discussions of human understanding to mind-body interaction and the afterlife.¹⁰ In a section devoted to the origin of the soul, Baumgarten had rehearsed the reigning theories of organic generation: preexistence, spontaneous generation—Baumgarten's example here was infusoria—creation *ex nihilo*, and finally, “concreationism,” according to which the soul was produced through some sort of transfer accomplished by the parents, a position derived from Aristotle's treatment of the matter.

Blumenbach's notion of a *Bildungstrieb* for praise, precisely because it seemed to offer empirical evidence of the theory of generic preformation itself. Nonetheless, Kant's tone of caution regarding the life sciences was unchanged. However convincing our intuitions regarding nature's organic capacities might be, however promising the advances made by the life sciences might seem, the operating principles of the organism would simply never be revealed in an empirical investigation. Although much has been made of Kant's endorsement of Blumenbach and of questions regarding Blumenbach's influence on Kant in his discussion of epigenesis, one should not forget that, whatever influence might be claimed, Blumenbach in fact transgressed a clear boundary set by Kant between thinking about nature as purposive and claiming that nature was in fact purposive. Robert J. Richards emphasizes this difference between Kant and Blumenbach in “Kant and Blumenbach on the *Bildungstrieb*: A Historical Misunderstanding,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biology and Biomedical Science* 31 (2000): 11–32. See also Richards's *The Romantic Conception of Life: Science and Philosophy in the Age of Goethe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), chap. 5., pp. 216–237. As Timothy Lenoir describes Blumenbach's position, “The *Bildungstrieb* was not a blind mechanical force of expansion which produced structure by being opposed in some way; it was not a chemical force of ‘fermentation,’ nor was it a soul superimposed on matter. Rather the *Bildungstrieb* was conceived as a teleological agent which had its antecedents ultimately in the inorganic realm but which was an emergent vital force.” See Lenoir's “Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology,” *Isis* 71 (1980): 83. It was precisely this interpenetration of form and force—something Kant explicitly liked about Blumenbach's theory—that caused Caspar Wolff, the first author to describe vegetative growth and reproduction as a form of epigenesis, to complain about Blumenbach's position. For Wolff, force simply could not by definition also be responsible for form. See Wolff, “Von der eigenthümlichen und wesentlichen Kraft der vegetabilischen sowohl als auch der animalischen Substanz,” in *Zwo Abhandlungen über die Nutritionskraft welche von der Kayserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaft in St. Petersburg den Preis getheilt haben*. St. Petersburg: Kayserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1789.

¹⁰ A reprint of Baumgarten's text is included in the academy volume devoted to the notes Kant made in his own copy of the text. See HN, AA 17:5–226. All of Kant's notes made within Baumgarten's text are identified in terms of their location and arranged according to their supposed chronology, such that, for example, Kant's various remarks on §§770–775, “Origo Animae Huminae,” can be traced throughout Kant's career. Since Kant taught this text every year, determining the chronological sequence of any notes made for a given section is necessarily imprecise in that it can rely only upon placement, ink color, and so on. The academy edition's two volumes devoted to Kant's notes on metaphysics (vols. 17 and 18)—including numerous pieces written on so-called loose sheets—follow Erich Adickes's dating system, a system explained by Adickes at the start of the volumes devoted to Kant's notes, marginalia, and assorted *Nachlaß* (HN, AA 14:lx–lxi). Adickes's system is almost always followed by the Cambridge edition of Kant's notes, though the editors often suggest longer possible time frames for a given text. Translations are here taken from the Cambridge edition wherever possible. See *Immanuel Kant: Notes and Fragments*, trans. Paul Guyer, Curtis Bowman, and Fred Rauscher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

When preparing his own notes for this section, Kant wrote out the questions that would be addressed in his lecture: Was the soul a pure spirit before birth? Had it lived on the earth before? Did it live in two worlds—the pneumatic and the mechanical—at once? The questions were accompanied by a quick list of the various theories of generation, with Kant noting that the central division was between supernatural approaches to the question of origin and a naturalistic account, an account Kant described as an “*epigenesis psychologica*” (HN, AA 17: 416).¹¹ In later years, Kant would use this section of Baumgarten’s text to discuss the properties of the soul and would invariably dismiss the possibility of its epigenesis.¹² In 1769, however, Kant’s commentary focused on the physical aspect of generation, identifying epigenesis with a theory of blending that was in line with what he knew of Maupertuis’s and Buffon’s use of heredity as a basis for their arguments against preexistence theory.

The next time Kant came to add notes to this section in 1772, epigenesis was again considered in terms of its biological claims, with Kant now explicitly linking the theory to the desired account of species generation he had first sketched in 1763. In his words,

«The question is whether nature is formed organically (epigenesis), or only mechanically and chemically. It seems that nature does have spirit, given that in the generation of each individual there is a unity and connection of parts. And is there not also such a spirit, an animating essence, in animals and plants. In this vein one would have to assume an animating Spirit, operating within an original chaos, in order to explain differences between animals which can now only reproduce themselves» (HN, AA 17: 591).

¹¹ Kant’s elaboration of the epigenesist alternative can be compared to the relatively brief remarks—at least so far as Herder recorded them—when discussing this section of *Metaphysica* in 1762–1763, see V-Met/Herder, AA 28:889.

¹² Discussing the same passage in Baumgarten thirty-three years later, for example, Kant continued to use the term “epigenesis” in contrast to the preexistence theory of origin, but in place of his concern with the physical process of blending—in fact, in place of any consideration of biological generation at all—Kant focused on the Aristotelian-derived account of “concreationism” in Baumgarten’s text, rejecting this option on principle, given the soul’s nature as simple substance. In language deliberately borrowed from chemical analyses, Kant here characterized the soul as either an “educt”—a thing that preexisted its new form—or as a “product,” something newly produced via epigenesis. The latter theory was completely impossible, according to Kant, because a non composite substance like the soul could not be expected to transfer a part of itself to its offspring (V Met/Dohna, AA 28:684—these comments are taken from student lecture notes, “Metaphysics Dohna,” from Kant’s metaphysics course in 1792–1793). Kant made additional notes for this passage, rejecting the soul’s epigenesis because of its immateriality (HN, AA 18:190) and its immortality (HN, AA 17:672, HN, AA 18:429). Kant also considered the epigenesis of the soul separately in terms of a potential transfer of good or bad character (VARGV, AA 23:106–107).

This two-step model is the same as that proposed in Kant's 1763 piece, so far as an initially divine organization—out of an “original chaos”—is then followed by the organic capacity for reproduction within the divinely delineated species lines. What these two sets of comments demonstrate for our purposes however, (comments dated by Erich Adickes as having been written in 1769 and 1772, respectively), is that during a period of crucial formation with respect to the development of Kant's system of transcendental idealism, Kant was actively aware of the epigenesis alternative to preexistence theories of generation.

Now before going any further, I want to first just briefly rehearse three interrelated characterizations of epigenesis that are especially important for understanding the use Kant would make of the theory for his own purposes. The *first* characterization comes from the seventeenth century English physician William Harvey. Harvey was interested in distinguishing the radical transformations taking place during ‘metamorphosis’ from the more gradual series of transformations that occurred during ‘epigenesis’. In the latter case, Harvey tracked the manner by which a chick embryo developed, describing the process as the embryo's sequential transition from an initially homogeneous state to one that was increasingly heterogeneous with respect to its parts. The *second*, though related, characterization of epigenesis concentrated on the capacity of organic structures to be self-organizing during their development, growth, and repair. Although this capacity was oftentimes linked to theories of spontaneous generation and vitalism, there was in fact no consensus position regarding the nature of either the origin or the self-organisation of organisms. In the early decades of the eighteenth century the vitalist Peter Stahl, for example, attributed formation to an anima but distinguished his mechanistic conception from Leibniz's entelechy. In the 1760s, Casper Wolff understood epigenetic growth in terms of an organism's transition from liquid secretions to solidified parts, a vegetative process that was driven in some manner by a life force or *visessentialis*. And by the 1780s, as we have just seen, epigenesis had come to be identified with Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb*. It was this characterization of epigenesis that appeared in the *Critique of Judgement*, and it understood epigenesis as a theory regarding the generic preformation of form or species types in nature.

These separate though related characterizations of epigenesis were applied differently by Kant depending upon whether he was thinking about cognition or biological organisms. But although Kant's comments in 1790 demonstrate an underlying continuity in his thoughts regarding biological organisms since the 1760s, they do not in fact add anything to our understanding of what he meant by the epigenesis of reason. To really understand the distinctive role played by epigenesis for Kant's theory of cognition, therefore, we need to detach "generic preformation" from the first two characterizations of epigenesis that were in play for Kant.

In order to discover the internal grounds for this detachment we need to consider the specific epistemic context within which Kant's work on cognition began: his overriding desire to reorient, and thereby protect, metaphysics from the Humean challenge. By 1765, Kant understood that any significant rehabilitation and defense of metaphysics would require its complete reformulation. Though initially conceived in terms of overcoming the problem of 'subreptive axioms,' Kant soon realized that the real task was instead to provide an account of cognition that could avoid scepticism without recourse to innatism. This is the epistemic context within which Kant began to formalise his theoretical programme in the 1760s, and it was against the backdrop provided by his first real attempt at such a theory, his *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770, that Kant became ready to identify his own position with epigenesis as a position against the preformation system he took to be endorsed by Leibniz.¹³ Thus it was at precisely this point that epigenesis provided 'a theory by which to work' for Kant. This was not epigenesis as generic preformation; *that* theory relied on supernatural forms to keep the species lines intact and was thus akin, for Kant, to both the 'mysticism' of Plato and the 'preformationism' of Leibniz. In 1770, Kant wasn't entirely sure what to use as a replacement with respect to accounting for the problem of form, but he was sure about one thing: innatism had to be rejected as much as did his previous reliance on the model of cognition that had been provided by Locke (e.g., HN, AA 17: 352). In their stead, Kant proposed the original generation of intellectual concepts, referring to them in the *Inaugural Dissertation* as produced by an "original acquisition" by attention to the workings of the mind (MSI, AA 02: 395).

¹³ I lay out the case for this in *Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), chapter 4.

So far I've described Kant's use of epigenesis when discussing Baumgarten, but more significant for our purposes now is the set of notes Kant composed shortly after finishing his *Dissertation*. For in these notes, Kant explicitly connected theories of generation to systems of reason and to claims regarding the origin of ideas in particular. Distinguishing empiricists from rationalists, Kant identified his own position with the most radical possibility of all. As he sketched it, "Crusius explains the real principle of reason on the basis of the *systemate praeformationis* (from subjective *principiis*); Locke on the basis of *influx physico* like *Aristotele*; Plato and Malebranche, from *intuit intellectuali*; we, on the basis of *epigenesis* from the use of the natural laws of reason" (HN, AA 17: 492). It was epigenesis, therefore, that Kant identified with the theory of "original acquisition" for explaining the generation of sensitive and intellectual concepts from the mind's own laws in the *Dissertation*. While it cannot be said for certain that Kant took epigenesis as his model when first drawing up his account of the origin of knowledge in 1770—though the evidence from 1769 certainly suggests this—it is certain that in the months following the *Dissertation's* completion the connection had been made. The primary textual resources for proving this stem primarily from the 1770s—the so-called 'silent decade'—and they are gathered from Kant's letters, his lectures, his notes, and the marginal notations he made alongside the textbooks he used for his classes (e.g., HN, AA 17: 492, cf. HN, AA 17: 554, 18: 8, 18: 12, 18: 273–75). Many scholars have relied on these materials for making sense of Kant's theoretical programme during these years, but rereading this material with an eye to Kant's frequent appeal to biological vocabulary when describing cognition is what finally reveals the importance of epigenesis for the developing system.

Let us pause now and consider the status of the biological model for Kant. There have been a number of writers over the years to worry about what this particular model might have meant given that Kant urged epistemic caution regarding the various speculative hypotheses coming out of the life sciences at that time. The immediate problem is to ask then how it is that Kant—who was ready to dismiss the claims being made by generation theorists in the 1760s as not only uncertain, but unlikely—could nonetheless have been ready to repeatedly identify his own developing theory of cognition with epigenesis during the 1770s? It is certainly not the case that Kant took himself to be investigating an empirical claim about our physical brains (hence Kant's well-known

dismissal of the nativism to be found in Tetens' psychological account, e.g., HN, AA 18: 23). So what was Kant up to when he identified his own position as epigenetic?

Here it is critically important to remember the epistemic context within which Kant's investigation was operating, and the significance, therefore, of the fact that he typically juxtaposed his own epigenetic theory with the 'preformation' system proposed by Leibniz and Crusius, on the one hand, and the 'physical influx' position advanced by sensationalists like Locke, on the other. For once we remember that this is indeed the context within which epigenesis became an interesting third option between innatism and empiricism for Kant, we can begin to make sense of what Kant meant by the "epigenesis of Reason" (KrV, B167). Kant left the 1760s determined to reorient metaphysics by way of attention to a new theory of mind. Central to this was Kant's sense that scepticism could only be avoided so long as the theories under attack by Hume—those held by the innatists and the empiricists in their various stripes—were also avoided. This story regarding Kant's intellectual development—Kant's negotiation between rationalism and empiricism—is of course standard fare in any undergraduate course on the history of Modern philosophy, and it is so because in outline, at least, it fits: it makes sense of Kant's work in the 1760s and 70s to formulate an epistemological programme, and it makes both the goals and the achievement of transcendental idealism all the more clear. Reading Kant's notes during the 1770s, it thus makes sense to see that even despite the seeming intrusion of biological vocabulary amidst the worries over logical subordination or the tasks allocated to the various faculties, Kant is consistent whenever it comes to the cast of characters he is up against: Plato, Leibniz, and sometimes Malebranche, grouped together by Kant as mystics, preformationists, supporters of involution, and believers in intellectual intuition; Aristotle, Locke, and Crusius on the other side, supporting 'physical influx' or *generatio aequivoca*; and Kant's own position in the middle, as an epigenesist. The 'real principle of reason', as Kant put it during this period, rests "on the basis of epigenesis from the use of the natural laws of reason" (HN, AA 17: 492).

In the *Dissertation*, Kant relied on the mental laws for logical subordination as the basis for this generative work, while also leaving the origin of these laws unspecified. In the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant relied on these laws again, with the Metaphysical Deduction serving as the updated version of the older account's description of the 'real

use' or means by which concepts could be generated. In the first *Critique* Kant explained therefore that the logical table of judgment served as the metaphysical 'clue' for understanding the origin of the intellectual concepts because the latter were in fact those same judgments, only applied now to sensible intuitions. Having already announced the isomorphic connection between the forms of judgment and the categories of experience, by 1781 Kant was also ready to be specific regarding the question of origin here as well. Like all the heterogeneous faculties which together made-up the so-called "transcendental apparatus," logic too had its origin in Reason. Experience relied on the concepts and thereby the table of judgments to provide that constancy of form required for coherency in the field of appearances, but the constancy of the form-giving concepts themselves was itself dependent upon Reason. Kant was clear when it came to the hierarchy of the faculties. He was clear that the understanding, for all its spectacular success when it comes to the construction of a coherent field of appearances, was nonetheless dependent upon Reason. To be specific, that the understanding was 'dependent' upon Reason in two significant ways: Reason provided the principles which can alone unify and guide empirical investigations, but Reason was also taken by Kant to encompass the understanding and to thus serve as its seat.¹⁴ Indeed, Kant's account of transcendental affinity was the key to understanding the precise manner by which an epigenetic Reason was ultimately necessary for the success of the Transcendental Deduction.¹⁵ And as for

¹⁴ Kant would subsequently point to reason as the birthplace of the moral law as well. Thus in the *Groundwork*, for example, Kant would explain that "it is here that she has to show her purity as the authoress of her own laws—not as the mouthpiece of laws whispered to her by some implanted sense," but also not as having received them from experience, which "would foist into the place of morality some misbegotten mongrel patched up from the limbs of a varied ancestry and looking like anything you please, only not like virtue" (GMS, AA 04:425–426). Morality would instead have to be born from out of pure reason itself, for only that kind of pedigree could ensure its sovereignty over the will on the basis of birthright alone. This account of reason's role in giving birth to individual morality ran parallel to its work to achieve the moral advancement of the species as a whole. Perfect moral advancement would culminate in the creation of a "kingdom of ends," according to Kant, and bring with it the completion of the history of reason. This was an idea of moral perfection born out of reason itself, an idea that lay invisibly within humanity as something whose conception was "self-developing" (*sich entwickelnden*) and whose existence needed to be understood as a "self-fertilizing germ" (*besamenden Keim*) of goodness in the species as a whole (MS, AA 06:122). It was just this aspect of Kant's philosophy that would earn harsh criticisms from Hegel, however, since he took Kant's notion of pure reason to be impotent, something capable of supplying only an empty notion of unity, that is, one that had never been lifted out of intellect by the intellectual intuition of itself. On the basis of such sterility, as Hegel saw it, Kant could never explain how practical reason "is nonetheless supposed to become constitutive again, to give birth out of itself and give itself content." See Hegel's *Faith and Knowledge*, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 80.

¹⁵ I defend this claim at length in *Kant's Organicism*, op. cit., chapter 7.

Reason? Reason, as Kant identified it in both the Transcendental Deduction (KrV, B167) and the Architectonic (KrV, A765/B793), was itself epigenetic or 'self-born.'

This might sound radical, but before we get distracted by that, let's focus on the main point. Kant had a specific epistemic goal, the avoidance of skepticism and the achievement, thereby, of some kind of experiential certainty in the physical (if not the biological) sciences. Transcendental idealism, with empirical realism as its special yield, accomplished precisely that. But it did so on the basis of a story that was being told about the formative control enjoyed by the mind in the case of experience. The transcendental conditions for the possibility of experience relied on the central faculties—reason, understanding, judgement—and their accomplishment of particular tasks. Now Kantians, on the whole, are not prepared to entertain questions regarding the ontological status of these mental faculties. Most will, moreover, emphatically reject a nativist reading of the faculties, even if they feel less confident in rejecting a supernatural origin altogether, given the kinds of passing remarks one finds in the *Religion*. The safest interpretive route, most feel therefore, is to just stick with Kant's agnosticism on the point. In my own view, it is important to identify Kant here as a metaphysician in order to explicitly distance him from the consequences of identifying him as a nativist. And it is in light of this that we must understand the epigenesis of reason to be *metaphysically real* in order to make it clear that Kant was not providing a biological account of the brain. But there is more to this assessment than a simple contrast. Kant takes the mind to be whole. As in Harvey's model, however, this original unity becomes increasingly heterogeneous, as logically distinct faculties emerge or become realized in the face of the various cognitive tasks required of it. As for Reason itself, the word Kant uses for describing it is in a class of its own within his works: spontaneity. There is neither textual conflict nor indeed controversy regarding spontaneity as a basic definition of Reason, for Kant was clear in the *Critique of Practical Reason* regarding the ontological identity between reason in either its theoretical or practical guise.¹⁶ Reason, as Kant saw it, both generates and determines

¹⁶ Kant was clear regarding their identity: "practical reason has the same cognitive faculty for its foundation as the speculative, so far as they are both pure reason" (KpV, AA 05:90; cf. MS, AA 06:382). But he was also delighted by the manner in which their investigation had proceeded in identical ways. As he summarized his findings in the analytic of practical reason, "Here I wish to call attention, if I may, to one thing, namely, that every step which one takes with pure reason, even in the practical field where one does not take subtle speculation into account, so neatly and naturally dovetails with all parts of the *Critique of Pure* (theoretical) *Reason* that it is as if each step had been carefully thought out merely to establish this

itself, and it is only as such that it could ground both the certainty of cognition within the sensible realm and our duties and character in the moral realm.

Kant was fully prepared to emphasize this aspect of Reason, by employing vocabulary borrowed from the language of organic growth and development when discussing it, and by describing reason's development from infancy to adulthood as an organic course of formation as a case of the "sheer self-development of reason." Rehearsing this, Kant explained,

«Systems seem to be formed in the manner of lowly organisms, through a *generatio aequivoca* from the mere confluence of assembled concepts, at first imperfect, and only gradually attaining to completeness, although they have one and all had their schema, as the original germ, in the sheer self-development of reason. Hence, not only is each system articulated in accordance with an idea, but they are one and all organically united in a system of human knowledge, as members of one whole, and so as admitting of an architectonic of all human knowledge» (KrV, A835/B863).

What this history of reason demonstrated for Kant was that all attempts at metaphysics had been "organically united," that they were connected by virtue of their common origin in the germ of reason, and that they had been differentiated only as part of reason's own path of self-development. The history of reason thus provided its investigators with a genuine natural history, for each of its varieties could be traced in their entirety to their point of origin, a common descent that had been easy to overlook given the enormous modifications taking place in the history of the species as a whole. As varieties of reason, the systems of metaphysics functioned organically, like "members of one whole," so Kant could be precise when describing the manner by which reason had grown into a unified system. As he defined this organic growth, "The whole is thus an organized unity (*articulation*), and not an aggregate (*coacervatio*). It may grow from within (*per intussusceptionem*), but not by external addition (*per appositionem*). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which is not by the addition of a new member, but by the rendering of each member, without change of proportion, stronger and more effective for its purposes" (KrV, A833/B862).¹⁷ Kant believed that the connection between the parts of

connection" (KpV, AA 05:106). It was precisely because of this that Kant felt confident in pursuing the strategy he had followed in the first *Critique* with respect to identifying the table of judgments as the genealogical basis of both the categories and the ideas of reason; in this case, with respect to the genetic grounds upon which he could identify causality and freedom (KpV, AA 05:55–57, 5:65–67, 5:68–70).

¹⁷Medieval philosophers described the work that Aristotle had attributed to the "nutritive soul" as a process of absorption, which they termed "intussusception." This term was later taken up by René Réaumur in 1709

the system could be likened to the organic interworking of the organs in an animal body because the unity of the system, like the unity of an organism, determined not only the exact number and placement of its members but the end toward which they aimed. In each of these cases this was an end that had been reflexively defined from the start; in the case of reason it had been contained within the system as an idea of its completion from the very first moment of its self-conception. The end of the history of reason, that is, its idea of itself as a fully developed whole, was originally present within reason—present as an “original germ in the sheer self-development of reason”—a germ or idea that both set the goal for reason's completion and somehow also grounded the possibility of its actual achievement.¹⁸

to describe the processes of shell formation in “De la formation et de l'accroissement des coquilles des animaux tant terrestres qu'aquatiques, soit de mer soit de rivière,” *Mémoires de la Académie Royale des Sciences*, 1709: 364–400, esp. 366, 370. Bourguet took the term from Réaumur but insisted on the interiority of intussusception (71) in contrast to the kind of external, mechanical accretion occurring in crystals or shell formation. Buffon used the term “intus-susception” in line with Bourguet's account of an internal absorption or assimilation (e.g., *History of Animals*, chap. 3, “Of Nutrition and Growth”), as did Kant when arguing in the above citation that systems may “grow from within (*per intussusceptionem*), but not by external addition (*per appositionem*)” (KrV, A833/B861). The appearance of “intussusception” after Kant shows its meaning to have changed again, in this case via Schelling, who used it in his philosophy of nature to identify the universal tendency of attraction in nature. See *First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature* (1799), trans. K. Peterson (Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), 7. A brief review of Bourguet's position is in J. Roger, *The Life Sciences in Eighteenth-Century French Thought*, trans. Robert Ellrich (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997), 300–303. For a fuller treatment see François Duchesneau, “Louis Bourguet et le modèle des corps organiques,” in *Antonio Vallisneri: L'edizione del testo scientifico d'età moderna*, ed. M. T. Monti (Florence: Leo Olschki, 2003), 3–31. Thomas Hankins describes Buffon's “popularization” of Bourguet's main tenets in *Science and the Enlightenment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 128–129.

¹⁸ Kant made the same point in the *Metaphysics of Morals*: “Since, considered objectively, there can be only one human reason, there cannot be many philosophies; in other words, there can be only one true system of philosophy from principles, in however many different and even conflicting ways one has philosophized about one and the same proposition”; only by paying attention to that fact, according to Kant, would it be possible to demonstrate the “unity of the true principle which unifies the whole of philosophy into one system” (MS, AA 06:207). In *Religion Within the Bounds of Reason Alone* Kant also described the historical self-development of religion in a manner that was indebted to his description of reason. For example, “we must have a principle of unity if we are to count as modifications of one and the same church the succession of different forms of faith which replace one another . . . for this purpose, therefore, we can deal only with the history of the church which from the beginning bore with it the germ and the principles of the objective unity of the true and universal religious faith to which it is gradually being brought nearer” (MS, AA 06:125). This point would be mirrored in the social and political sphere once Kant took up the history of civil constitutions in his essay *Perpetual Peace*, a history whose epochal determinations were unified throughout, as Kant saw it, by the unfolding of reason's concept of right (ZeF, AA 08:350)—a point that Kant repeated in terms of the “evolution of a constitution” in both the *Conflict of the Faculties* (SF, AA 07:87, see also 07:91) and the *Metaphysics of Morals* (MS, AA 06:340). In his *Philosophy of Art* Schelling mirrored, therefore, Kant's account of philosophy's organic development across history, in Schelling's words: “There is only one philosophy and one science of philosophy. What one calls different philosophical sciences are mere presentations of the one, undivided whole of philosophy under different ideal determinations. . . . The relationship between the individual parts in the closed and organic whole of philosophy resembles that

It is in light of all this that I am hesitant to say that epigenesis functioned merely as an analogy or had only metaphorical value for Kant. For after reviewing all the evidence surrounding Kant's use of epigenesis in cognition, he seems, in the end, to have thought of Reason as something that was in fact spontaneous and free, a self-born activity that was both cause and effect of itself. Despite the radicality of Kant's claim, it is easy to see that only such a claim could guarantee both morals and certainty against the threat of skepticism so far as Kant understood the stakes of Hume's challenge.



between the various figures in a perfectly constructed poetic work, where every figure, by being a part of the whole, as a perfect reflex of that whole is actually absolute and independent in its own turn.” See Schelling's, *The Philosophy of Art*, trans. D. Stott (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 281–282.

Bringing Biology Back In: The Unresolved Issue of “Epigenesis” in Kant¹

Recuperar la biología: la “epigénesis” como cuestión por resolver en Kant

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Abstract

Epigenesis has become a far more exciting issue in Kant studies recently, especially with the publication of Jennifer Mensch’s *Kant’ Organicism*. In my commentary, I propose to clarify my own position on epigenesis relative to that of Mensch by once again considering the discourse of epigenesis in the wider eighteenth century. In order to situate more precisely what Kant made of it in his own thought, I distinguish the metaphysical use Kant made of epigenesis from his rejection of its aptness as a theory for life science. In that light, I raise questions about the scope and authority of philosophy *vis à vis* natural science.

Key words

Jennifer Mensch; Immanuel Kant; Epigenesis; Preformation; Origins of Pure Reason

Resumen

1. This essay is based on a larger composition, entitled “Epigenesis in Kant: Recent Reconsiderations,” which is to appear in a special issue of *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*.

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La epigénesis se ha convertido en unas de las cuestiones más interesantes del estudio reciente de Kant, especialmente a raíz de la publicación del libro de Jennifer Mensch *Kant's Organicism*. Con mi comentario, me propongo esclarecer mi propia posición acerca de la epigénesis frente a la de Mensch, considerando de nuevo el discurso de la epigénesis en el espectro amplio del siglo XVIII. Para situar con mayor precisión el uso que Kant hizo de este concepto en su propio pensamiento, distingo el uso metafísico que realizó de la epigénesis de su rechazo con respecto a su idoneidad teórica para las ciencias de la vida. Desde esa perspectiva, planteo preguntas acerca del alcance y autoridad de la filosofía frente a la ciencia natural.

Palabras clave

Jennifer Mensch; Immanuel Kant; epigénesis; preformación; orígenes de la razón pura

There are only two ways in which we can account for a *necessary* agreement of experience with the concepts of its objects: either experience makes these concepts possible or these concepts make experience possible. The former supposition does not hold ... There remains, therefore, only the second supposition – a system, as it were, of the *epigenesis* of pure reason – namely, that the categories contain, on the side of the understanding, the grounds of the possibility of all experience in general. (Kant, 1787)

I am thrilled to see a number of scholars now trying to bring biology back in to Kant studies. Many decades ago, Phillip Sloan and Timothy Lenoir made pioneering efforts.² Now a new generation has added enormous brio to this endeavor. They are represented in an important anthology, *Understanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology*, edited by my young French colleague, Philippe Huneman, published notably under the auspices of the North American Kant Society.³ His own monograph, *Métaphysique et biologie*, is a major contribution.⁴ And still more recently, Jennifer Mensch has added a provocative new study, *Kant's Organicism*.⁵ In the wake of this new

2. Phillip Sloan, "Buffon, German Biology and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species," *British Journal for the History of Science* 12 (1979), pp. 109-153; Timothy Lenoir, "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," *Isis* 71 (1980), 77-108, *The Strategy of Life: Teleology and Mechanism in Nineteenth-Century Biology*. (1982; 2nd ed, Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 1989).

3. Philippe Huneman, ed., *Understanding Purpose: Collected Essays on Kant and Philosophy of Biology*. (University of Rochester Press/North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy, 2007).

4. Huneman, *Métaphysique et biologie: Kant et la construction du concept d'organisme* (Paris: Kimé, 2008).

5. Jennifer Mensch, *Kant's Organicism: Epigenesis and the Development of the Critical Philosophy* (Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press, 2013). All further references to this work will be parenthetical.

body of work, it is impossible to leave the life sciences out of an account of the development of Kant's thought.

The problem is how to incorporate them without stumbling upon serious incongruities. Kant thought a lot about the life sciences, but that was not always salutary – for the coherence of his own system or for the constitution of those sciences themselves. It has been no easy matter to establish what the proper relations between natural science and philosophy should be in the modern intellectual world. We face a central question about the warrant and scope of philosophy of science. Is its task to *prescribe* or to *elucidate* scientific practice? Locke, famously but perhaps somewhat disingenuously, claimed that philosophy should serve strictly as “underlabourer” to the natural sciences.⁶ Kant, I believe, intended philosophy to be *law-giver* for them, and that tradition has carried forward through Neo-Kantianism to Carnap, Hempel and Popper in more recent times, to come even more recently to be challenged flamboyantly by Kuhn and Feyerabend, and more subtly by Quine and Sellars. The core of contemporary philosophical naturalism lies, in my view, in deflating the claims of philosophy to epistemic sovereignty over natural science.⁷

Today, in response to Jennifer Mensch's new intervention, I would like to explore some issues for the philosophy of science that arise out of Kant's vexed relation with the life sciences of his time, drawing on the in-itself quite vexed notion of *epigenesis* in the eighteenth century. Before turning explicitly to the notion of epigenesis, let me elaborate on Kant in terms of three entanglements in the web between philosophy and science. First, Kant was of course a philosopher, and one of the most important founders of philosophy of science in the technical sense. But, second, Kant took himself as well to be a *scientist*. To be sure, the very term “scientist” had not yet been invented, but the German term

6. Locke, “Epistle to the Reader,” *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1689; Indianapolis: Hackett, 1996), 3.

7. This one-sentence gesture should be taken as a place-holder for more careful discussions both of Kant's philosophy of science and of the developments in philosophy of science in more recent times in my other works, especially re: Kant, “‘This inscrutable *principle* of an original *organization*’: Epigenesis and ‘Looseness of Fit’ in Kant's Philosophy of Science,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 34, (2003), 73-109; “Teleology Then and Now: The Question of Kant's Relevance for Contemporary Controversies over Function in Biology,” *Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences* 37 (2006), 748-770; and, re: recent philosophy of science, *A Nice Derangement of Epistemes: Post-Positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 2004).

Naturforscher was in common use and carried most of the relevant features, and Kant was thoroughly engaged in that pursuit, as Erich Adickes long ago established.⁸ I take it that what a *Naturforscher* of the eighteenth century proposed to offer to the research community for appraisal were concrete, empirical knowledge-claims about the natural world. Historically and philosophically, I suggest, we must distinguish the self-constitution of such a research community and its operating principles from any meta-level consideration of the ultimate warrant or definitiveness of its claims. In this sense, Kant took himself to be not only a philosopher of science, concerned with the latter questions, but also an actual participant scientist, someone who offered concrete empirical hypotheses about the natural world, and more specifically, about the life world.

Thanks to the work especially of Jennifer Mensch, we need to add a third, rather remarkable thread to this skein of relations between natural science and philosophy in Kant, namely his appropriation of concepts from empirical science for use in the construction of the system of his critical philosophy. The preeminent instance of this is at B167 of the *Critique of Pure Reason* which evokes an “epigenesis of pure reason.”⁹ Epigenesis is the crucial concept for Mensch, and it will be central in what follows. But equally salient, as Mensch uses to considerable effect, is the sustained analogy Kant offered, in the closing sections of the Transcendental Dialectic of the first *Critique*, between the systematicity of reason and the organicity of life forms.¹⁰ Epigenesis and organicism are somewhat distinct, conceptually, but they proved equally central to the emergent life sciences of the eighteenth century and, as Mensch now alerts us, to Kant’s metaphysical adventures with pure reason.

In *Kant’s Organicism*, Mensch argues that Kant was attracted by the crucial importance of *self-formation* in embryology, yet “the epigenesis of reason ... was far more radical than the one Kant was willing to accord natural organisms.” (15) Indeed, while

8. Many years ago, the great Kant scholar Erich Adickes brought together years of his own research in a two-volume study entitled *Kant als Naturforscher* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1924). Most Kant scholars have heard of this work. Some may indeed have read it. Few, in any, take it to be of any interpretive salience for us. By contrast, I think his work is crucial for not only historical but contemporary questions concerning the proper role of philosophy of science.

9. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B167.

10. Ibid, “Architectonic of Pure Reason,” A832-36/B860-64.

Kant *never* believed that epigenesis could succeed as empirical life science, paradoxically it *could* be used to explain the self-constitution of reason and the warrant for knowledge. That is the essential argument of Mensch's work: "Kant embraced epigenesis as the model for understanding the *metaphysical* generation of reason and the categories alike." (fn 283, p. 214) "The very basis of Kant's long-standing attraction to epigenesis was its ability to position the mind's independence from both sense and God as suppliers of mental form." (fn 283, pp. 214-15) That is, Mensch is arguing, in contrast to other interpreters, that *more* than a metaphor was involved in Kant's use of epigenesis, yet as an explanatory principle it had traction *not* in empirical science but in *metaphysics*, specifically as an account of the *autonomy* of reason, its independence from the physical order.

I will return to these points about Kant's transcendental – indeed, metaphysical – thinking shortly. But, first, what about the life sciences themselves? Mensch writes: "Kant was consistent ... in rejecting positive discussions of epigenesis as a phenomenon of nature." That is, "while Kant seems to have thought it was reasonable to choose from organic models of generation when describing the epigenesis of reason, he would never have suggested that such a model was definitively at work in the actual generation of natural organisms." He "did not believe we could make anything like an identical claim regarding the laws by which an actual organic being might work." (141) Kant took that to be an impossible endeavor. "He was pessimistic regarding any possibility of progress in generation theory ... [E]mbryogenesis ... simply exceeded the limits of our claims to knowledge of such things." (53) That is, "the operating principles of the organism would simply never be revealed in an empirical investigation." (144)

In my terms, what Mensch demonstrates is that Kant arrogated a biological theory from its own precinct as empirical science, where he pronounced it theoretically unjustified, for a *metaphysical* theory of pure reason, where he took it to be not only justified but indispensable. Indeed, he came to allege that the very biological formulation he annexed had all along been parasitic on reason's own self conception, thus working by illicit analogy, or, in his terms, "subreption." As Mensch puts it, "when reason saw organic activity in nature, according to Kant, what it was really looking at was itself." (144) This is subreption, all right, but, I suggest, it obviates in principle the very project of life science. Thus, I part company sharply with Mensch about the fruitfulness of Kant's

approach for the life sciences, and I will return to that in my concluding remarks. Here, I wish to suggest that redescribing this “analogical” inference from organic life to mind (as in the *Transcendental Dialectic*) into an inference about organisms from human purposiveness (as in Kant’s third Critique) looks rather like a bald misrepresentation, on Kant’s part, of the historical development of his own thinking. Let us reconsider the notion of epigenesis in the scientific world of the eighteenth century from which Mensch and I concur that Kant annexed it.

1. Epigenesis in the Eighteenth Century.

There is remarkably little consensus about exactly what *epigenesis* signified in 18th-century discourse generally. Modern usage set out from William Harvey’s 1651 text, *On Generation*, in which he characterized as epigenesis the characteristic of an organism that “all its parts are not fashioned simultaneously, but emerge in their due succession and order... For the formative faculty ... acquires and prepares its own material for itself.”¹¹ First, Harvey’s concept stressed *sequential emergence*, and second, it stressed *self-organization*. Spontaneity and systematicity were thus central features. What is ambiguous in this formulation is the nature of the “formative faculty.” Is it a causal force, a supervening soul, or a teleological heuristic? What ontological status does it have? How does it emerge? What preconditions in the material environment are sufficient or necessary? Can such an approach be assimilated to materialist and to mechanist models of science or is it irreducibly vitalist, indeed animist? Crucially, Harvey’s mid-18th-century successors, Maupertuis and Buffon, believed that epigenesis could be assimilated to a materialist approach to science and that it *utilized* mechanisms, even if it could not be *reduced* to mechanism. What they certainly upheld was that epigenesis arose *out of matter*, that it was a *materialism*, however “vital.”¹² That ontological ground will be important when we come to Kant’s maneuvers with the concept and to Mensch’s reconstruction of these as conjuring an autochthony of reason.

11. William Harvey, *On generation*. (1651; Reprint: Ann Arbor: Edwards, 1943), 366.

12. For this sophisticated, “vital” materialism, see Peter Hanns Reill, *Vitalizing Nature in the Enlightenment* (Berkeley/LA: University of California Press, 2005).

Mensch establishes the prominence of Buffon in Kant's study of embryology. There is considerable controversy over whether Buffon should even be considered an epigenesist, for many interpreters find not a little "preformation" in his theory. Nonetheless I think there are grounds for taking him for an epigenesist. Certainly in his time he was lambasted as a materialist, an "Epicurean," for locating the whole process of embryogenesis *within* the natural order.¹³ We need to consider that epigenesis and preformation were not merely embryological theories but connected as well with larger ontological and physico-theological considerations in that age. In particular, I want to stress the materialism and naturalism in the strand of epigenesis in the tradition of Buffon as something that Kant could never affirm.

Buffon's *moule intérieure* was a hypothetical reformulation of Harvey's formative faculty, theorizing a principle of design that set in motion determinate mechanisms of organic development. Buffon invoked an analogy between his "microforce" and Newton's gravity, as an empirically demonstrable *effect*, even without a full explanation of its *instantiating causal force*.¹⁴ That became a consistent practice among all subsequent theorists of epigenesis in the 18th century. Ironically enough, Albrecht von Haller's pathbreaking work on irritability and sensibility (1751) offered a paradigmatic elaboration of this very methodology, even though he found it unacceptable when called upon in support of epigenesis.¹⁵ Caspar Friedrich Wolff, in the most important reformulation of epigenesis in the mid-18th century, elaborated on all these elements. He conceived *vis essentialis* as a Newtonian force which induced, through certain chemical processes, the

13. Thierry Hoquet, *Buffon: histoire naturelle et philosophie* (Paris: Champion, 2005).

14. On Newtonian analogy in epigenesis, see: A.E. Gaissinovich, "Le rôle du Newtonianisme dans la renaissance des idées épigénétiques en embryologie du XVIII^e siècle." In *Actes du XI^e Congrès International d'Histoire des Sciences* (1968) Vol. 5, 105-110; T.S. Hall, "On Biological Analogs of Newtonian Paradigms," *Philosophy of Science* 35 (1968), 6-27.

15. Haller, *A Dissertation on the Sensible and Irritable Parts of Animals*, in Shirley Roe, ed., *The Natural Philosophy of Albrecht von Haller* (NY: Arno, 1981), 651-691. See: Shirley Roe, "The Development of Albrecht von Haller's Views on Embriology," *Journal of the History of Biology* 8 (1975), 167-190, Roe, *Matter, Life and Generation: Eighteenth-century Embryology and the Haller-Wolff Debate*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Amor Cherni ...

production of organic matter out of inorganic matter in regular and empirically demonstrable patterns.¹⁶

From the beginning, Kant proved acutely sensitive to this whole constellation of concerns in both its methodological and its metaphysical aspects. Already in his *One Possible Basis for a Demonstration of the Existence of God* (1763), Kant addressed the new twist toward epigenesis introduced by Maupertuis and Buffon, declaring it far-fetched and doomed as a scientific theory, since it ascribed far too much power to mere matter, which Kant dismissed as “hylozoism.”¹⁷ I believe he found persuasive the strong rebuttal developed by Haller (and his ally, Bonnet) in the 1760s in response first to Maupertuis and Buffon and then, more fundamentally, to Caspar Friedrich Wolff. As Günter Zöller characterizes the Bonnet-Haller reformulation, “preformationism is primarily a theory concerning the generation of distinct parts (organs) in the growing embryo. It maintains that growth is *quantitative* growth of preexisting parts... no qualitative embryological growth or formation of new parts.”¹⁸ The historical issue for interpreters of Kant, such as Mensch and myself, concerned with the history of science, not just philosophy, is whether this revision dissolves any difference between preformation and the “*generic* preformation” that became Kant’s preferred sense of epigenesis by 1790. Certainly for the empirical scientists involved, there was still some contest within embryology between

16. C. F. Wolff, *Theorie von der Generation in zwei Abhandlungen erklärt und bewiesen* (1764). *Theoria generationis* (1759), ed and intro: Robert Herrlinger. (Reprint: Stuttgart: G Fischer, 1966). See: Shirley Roe, “Rationalism and embryology: Caspar Friedrich Wolff’s theory of epigenesis.” *Journal of the History of Biology* 12 (1979), 1-43; R. Mocek, “Caspar Friedrich Wolffs Epigenesis-Konzept – ein Problem im Wandel der Zeit,” *Biologisches Zentralblatt* 114 (1995), 179-190.

17. Kant, *Der einzig mögliche Beweisgrund zu einer Demonstration des Daseins Gottes* (1763), AA:2, 63-164. Epigenesis as an empirical scientific theory had *no* prospect of realization for Kant, because he held firm to the conviction that “one is incapable of rendering distinct the natural causes which bring the humblest plant into existence.” [AA:2:138] Thus, for Kant, the hypotheses of Buffon and of Maupertuis were *not* scientific but only fanciful or metaphysical, i.e., *ganz willkürlich erdacht*. Kant allowed no prospect, notwithstanding the purported superiority of the scientific *motivation* of their enterprise, of any real scientific *method* or evidentially warranted *explanation*. What was it that made these hypotheses appear irredeemably fanciful to Kant? The answer is *hylozoism*. Kant insisted that the ancient hypothesis of Epicurus and Lucretius of “blind chance” in the “swerve of atoms” to account for motion was an “absurdity and deliberate blindness.” [AA:2:125] But it was just as important to deny the modern reassertion of such ideas associated with “Spinozism.” Spinoza’s God was tantamount to atheism: “Possessing neither cognition nor choice, it would be a blindly necessary ground of other things and even of other minds, and it would differ from the eternal fate postulated by some ancient philosophers in nothing except that it had been more intelligently described.” [AA:2:89]

18. Günter Zöller, “Kant on the Generation of Metaphysical Knowledge.” In *Kant: Analysen – Probleme – Kritik*, ed. H. Oberer and G. Seel. Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 1988, 71-90, citing 79.

preformation and epigenesis. I want to stress the issue of an extra-material intervention in preformation, which epigenesis on the line from Buffon to C. F. Wolff to J. G. Herder abjured, but which Kant clung to. In that sense, “generic preformation” is *preformation* first and foremost, and epigenesis is constrained by it, that is, by transcendent interventions (at creation, not at each instance of reproduction). That was the whole point of Kant’s theory of *Keime* and *Anlagen*, as he made pointedly clear in his critique of Herder.¹⁹

When Kant turned to questions of life science in his first essay on race, 1775/77, he clearly believed that he could *advance* the field by formulating the *mechanism* of adaptation and variation – the great weakness of earlier preformation theories. He also affirmed the *genealogical* principle of “natural history” in its Buffonian formulation, which Haller and other German life scientists, deeply aligned with Linnaeus, could not bring themselves to accept.²⁰ Here, I think we need to take Kant’s pretensions as a *Naturforscher* quite seriously. That is, Kant believed he could improve on the three greatest life scientists of his day – Linnaeus, Haller and Buffon – from his armchair. In his first essay on race, Kant articulated the term *Anlagen* to signify “‘conditions of a certain development ... in so far as the latter only concerns the size and the *relation* of parts’ ... [as] opposed to *germs* (*‘Keime’*), which are conditions for the development of new parts.”²¹ That is, the role of *Anlagen* could be construed in a quasi-mechanistic fashion; the essential *metaphysical* principle guaranteeing species difference (and persistence) was assigned to *Keime*.

I find thoroughly disingenuous Kant’s account of his theory of *Keime* and *Anlagen* as “merely advancing an ‘idea’ intended for ‘useful academic instruction,’ a mere preparatory exercise contributing to an enlarged ‘pragmatic knowledge of the world,’” as Mensch receives it. (99) She herself notes: “According to Kant, *the only way to explain environmental adaptation* was to suppose the preexistence within species lines of ‘germs’ for new parts and ‘natural dispositions’ for proportional changes to existing parts.” (11, my italics) That was a *scientific* hypothesis, and Kant reacted fiercely in the 1780s to

19. Kant, *Recensionen von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Theil 1. 2.* (AA:8, 43-66), 62-63.

20. Kant, “Von den verschiedenen Races der Menschen,” AA:2:429-443.

21. *Ibid.*, 434.

defend it as such. As his controversies with Herder and above all Forster betoken, Kant defended what he regarded a *scientific* claim, not just a pedagogical gambit. We can only make sense of Kant's response to Forster in this light.²² Kant still insisted on the scientific validity of his theory of *Keime* and *Anlagen* up through his third *Critique* and beyond.

In any event, by the time he published the first *Critique* in 1781, Kant considered himself sufficiently adept in the theory of generation to offer a telling analogy to his theory of knowledge.

«I understand under the “Analytic of Concepts” ... the still little investigated dissection of the capacity of the understanding itself, in order thereby that we search into the possibility of *a priori* concepts, seeking them out in the understanding alone, *as their source of birth* ... We will therefore *follow the pure concepts up to their first germs and capacities [Keimen und Anlagen] in the human understanding, in which they lie predisposed, until they finally, on the occasion of experience, develop* and through exactly the same understanding are displayed in their purity, freed from their attending empirical conditions».²³

This analogy of 1781, as Phillip Sloan has established, is crucial to any assessment of the more famous analogy of 1787 to epigenesis.²⁴ How are we to construe this language? Is it preformationist or epigenetic? Is it metaphorical or metaphysical? The concepts lie “predisposed” in the understanding; they are not produced, they are occasioned. Here there is room, I think, for disagreement. I am inclined to side with Sloan, against Mensch, that this is preponderantly a preformationist analogy. The crucial absence of the term epigenesis (especially in contrast to 1787) seems important to me.

Even more important, and directly connected to the *metaphysical* issues that are Mensch's primary concern, Kant meant to suggest something else in the analogy that would be central to his thinking throughout. Just as *Keime* and *Anlagen* were inaccessible

22. Kant, “Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie,” AA:8, 157–84. See my “History of Philosophy vs. History of Science: Blindness and Insight of Vantage Points on the Kant-Forster Controversy,” in *Klopffechtereien - Missverständnisse - Widersprüche?*, ed. Rainer Godel and Gideon Stiening (Paderhorn: Fink, 2011; actually 2012), 225-244.

23. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A66.

24. Sloan, “Performing the Categories: Kant and Eighteenth-Century Generation Theory,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40 (2002): 229–53.

to ultimate derivation except as *dogmatic* metaphysics (“a science for gods, not men,” as Kant put it to Forster in 1789), so too the concepts of the understanding were simply givens behind which we could not seek.²⁵ The clearest formulation is in the revised version (1787) of the first *Critique*:

«This peculiarity of our understanding, that it can produce a priori unity of apperception solely by means of the categories, and only such and so many, is as little capable of further explanation as why we have just these and no other functions of judgment, or why space and time are the only forms of our possible intuition».²⁶

If we can agree that Kant was insisting that reason could not be naturalized, to borrow the language of Hilary Putnam, it is not clear how firmly he wished to press an *ontological generation* of reason.²⁷ His concern, I suggest, was with the *autonomy*, not autochthony of reason -- above all denying its emergence from matter (or experience).

Mensch suggests that long before 1781 Kant had become convinced of the centrality of *epigenesis* for his transcendental argument. The crucial evidence, for Mensch, is a note dated to the mid-1770s: *Reflexion 4275*. It reads: “Crusius explains the real principles of reason according to the *systemate praeformationis* (from subjective *principiis*), Locke according to *influxu physico* like Aristotle, Plato and Malebranche according to *intuitu intellectuali*, we according to *epigenesis* from the use of natural laws of reason...”²⁸ What Mensch finds crucial is Kant’s repeated conceptualization of alternative positions from the history of philosophy in situating his own project. These positions could be formulated in terms of a “mystical” intellectual intuition of the concepts (Plato, Malebranche – and Leibniz), an empirical inference to the concepts (Aristotle, Locke), and a third option, the self-constitution of the concepts, which Kant associated with *epigenesis*, and took for his own. Notably, Kant inserted into this schema in *Reflexion 4275* yet another option: the recourse to *praeformation* in the argument from

25. Kant, “Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie,” AA:8, 157–84, ...

26. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B145-6.

27. Hilary Putnam, “Why Reason Cannot be Naturalized,” in Putnam, *Realism and Reason: Philosophical Papers*, Vol 3 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 229-247.

28. Kant, *Reflexion 4275*, (AA:17:491-2).

Crusius. Starting with Crusius and the analogy of preformation rendered plausible the introduction of epigenesis for his own position.

What was at stake in this *Reflexion*, Mensch suggests, is the question of the *origin* of pure concepts. Mensch offers us a genesis story for reason, hence a thoroughly *metaphysical* Kant, and she calls this story “from original acquisition to the epigenesis of knowledge.” (80ff) Many Kant scholars have thought that the critical Kant was concerned strictly with the *epistemological* or *procedural nature* of the concepts – that is, their argumentative force in the space of reasons. But Mensch suggests that Kant was concerned to ground this force in a far more ontological conception of the nature of reason, namely its self-constitution. Her argument is that he achieved confidence in the *epigenetic* constitution of reason by the mid 1770s, when he established that “the concepts of the understanding express all the *actus* of the powers of the mind...” (Kant’s words, cited 91) That is, the set of logically possible judgments exhaustively entailed the set of categories; which “classify themselves by their own nature,” as Kant explained in his 1772 letter to Herz.²⁹ The problem that remained for Kant was not the self-constitution of the concepts (or reason through them), but rather their applicability to the matter in sensory intuition: “Kant was still clear regarding the epigenetic origin of concepts, concepts whose source lay ‘in the nature of the soul,’ but he had yet to discover a basis for connecting these to sensible objects,” Mensch writes. (90) That is, Kant had no problem with “the generation of concepts from innate laws,” but only with establishing their authoritative applicability to sense intuition. (88)

I confess that I have never been comfortable with Kant’s notion of “original acquisition” as a theory of the *source* of reason, and even were I to go along with Mensch’s replacement of “original acquisition” with “epigenesis of knowledge,” I would still be tempted to cite a Kant passage that is usually very bitter in my mouth, for its condescension toward Johann Gottfried Herder, but that seems quite apposite, here: is this not “to explain that which one does not comprehend by that which one comprehends even less?”³⁰ Should Mensch be right about Kant’s metaphysical adventure with reason, here, I

29. Kant to Herz, 1772, (AA;10:132).

30. Kant, *Recensionen von J. G. Herders Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Theil 1. 2.* (AA:8, 43-66), citing 53-4.

would still be left with two problems. First, there is the *historical* problem of why Kant did not employ this crucial phrase, “epigenesis of pure reason,” already in 1781. We need to ask why the epigenesis analogy did not appear until 1787 if it was full-formed in Kant’s mind already in the silent decade. Second, there is the *metaphysical* problem of how to ground the reality of reason. I will make no effort to resolve this second conundrum. I will be satisfied to consider two less lofty matters: first, what did Kant have in mind in 1787 when he *did* employ the phrase at B167 of the first *Critique*, and second, how did he carry that notion forward into the third *Critique* and his discussion of the very possibility of life science?

2. The *Critique of Pure Reason* B167

Let us consider the famous passage at B167 in the 1787 version of the first *Critique*. The argument of §27 of the Transcendental Deduction in B (which includes the passage at B167) is an elaboration of the argument of §36 of the *Prolegomena* (1783). Both arguments offered a purportedly disjunctive judgment: either experience generates the categories or the categories generate experience. In both arguments, Kant stipulated that we *already knew* that the categories had to be *a priori*. Therefore, only the second option was really available. In the *Prolegomena* Kant called the first simply “self-contradictory.” In the B Deduction, however, he brought it into analogy with *generatio aequivoca* – spontaneous generation – already an exploded idea in the natural science of the day.

The fundamental analogy structure at B167 invokes the disjunction: *either spontaneous generation or epigenesis*. *Preformation* is introduced as a misguided endeavor to insert a third, intermediate position. Kant had added a footnote to the passage in §36 of the *Prolegomena*: “Crusius alone thought of a compromise: that a spirit who can neither err nor deceive implanted these laws in us originally.” In the B Deduction, this afterthought was elaborated at length and in the main text (but without mentioning Crusius):

«A middle course may be proposed between the two above mentioned, namely, that the categories are neither *self-thought* first principles *a priori* of our knowledge nor derived from experience, but subjective dispositions [*Anlagen*] of thought, implanted in us from the first

moment of our existence, and so ordered by our Creator that their employment is in complete harmony with the laws of nature in accordance with which experience proceeds – a kind of *preformation-system* of pure reason». ³¹

Kant's whole point against the intermediate position of Crusius was that we need a stronger bond between the categories and experience if we are to take seriously the *necessity* that is the essence of transcendental grounding. *Spontaneity* of the categories was not sufficient for Kant's transcendental deduction; he also needed their *constitutive sovereignty* over experience. The core of Mensch's interpretation is: for Kant that bond could only be achieved if concepts were *self-formed*, not endowed, even by God. "Only ... appealing neither to experience nor to God but only to itself, could [reason] serve as the true ground of experience." (139) "Only once intellectual concepts and the ideas of reason could be traced back to their birthplace in reason, only after reason could itself be identified as 'self-born' and containing the 'germs of its self-development,' only then could knowledge be secured and the dogmatist and the skeptic alike refuted." (139) To emphasize this *metaphysical* impulse at the close of Kant's B-version of the Transcendental Deduction is the most provocative claim in Mensch's study, from the vantage of orthodox Kant-interpretation. It raises two crucial issues. First, is that what Kant was in fact doing in the key passage? And, second, could such a project accomplish its aim? I am persuaded that Mensch offers a better case for an affirmative answer to the first question than we have had before. As to the second issue, I simply do not know. I will hasten accordingly to my own concern, namely with Kant's pursuit of epigenesis in the life sciences in his third *Critique*.

3. The Place of *Epigenesis* in Life Science.

Günter Zöllner makes the point that Kant distinguished in his *Reflexionen* between an *epigenesis psychologica* and an *epigenesis intellectualis*, and it was really the latter, the origin of the categories, that was at issue at B167. ³² This is altogether correct, yet what concerns me here is not the origin of the *categories* or of the *soul* but rather the way in which Kant conceived of epigenesis of *bodies* as a concern of *empirical science*. In his

31. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B167.

32. Günter Zöllner, "Kant on the Generation of Metaphysical Knowledge," 80–84.

Metaphysics Lectures, Kant made the point succinctly: “The system of epigenesis does not explain the origin of the human body, but says far more that we don’t know a thing about it.”³³ My point in referring to these *Metaphysics Lectures* is that Kant was hardly endorsing epigenesis. Kant made clear what he took to be the essential problem with epigenesis. In terms of the educt/product distinction, it was *too* spontaneous, ascribing too much generative power to mere matter.³⁴ That is, the metaphysical issue with epigenesis was hylozoism, or “spontaneous generation.”³⁵

Kant’s treatment of biology was always subsidiary to larger systematic concerns of the “critical philosophy” as a whole. As a philosopher of science he supported the *methodological program* of seeking reduction to mechanical explanation even in life science. However, he argued that just here the methodological program would come up against an insuperable *epistemological* stumbling block –in the limitations of human reasoning, not in the “order of nature” itself. Driven to admit that it was impossible for man to see organisms other than as “natural purposes,” Kant held that this necessity lay in *our* limitation, not *their* nature. This is the famous argument of Kant’s *Critique of Teleological Judgment* in the third *Critique*, and his resolution was that in order to make organic forms intelligible at all we had to have recourse to the *analogy* of purpose or design. “The concept of a thing as in itself a natural purpose is ... no constitutive concept of understanding or of reason, but it can serve as a regulative concept for the reflective judgment, to guide our investigation about objects of this kind by a distant analogy with

33. Kant, *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, AA:29, 761.

34. Kant *Vorlesungen über Metaphysik*, AA:28, 684; AA:29, 760–61.

35. Kant denied that we could think of nature as alive (hylozoism): “the possibility of living matter cannot even be thought; its concept involves a contradiction, because lifelessness, *inertia*, constitutes the essential character of matter.” (Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, §73:242.) He elaborated: “life means the capacity of a substance to determine itself to act from an internal principle, of a finite substance to determine itself to change, and of a material substance to determine itself to motion or rest as change of its state.” (Kant, *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science*, p. 105). Kant took Maupertuis to be an exemplary “hylozoist.” I suggest that Maupertuis was the early Kant’s paradigmatic instance of a modern hylozoist. Kant’s *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* treats him in exactly that context: “*Hylozoism* invests everything with life, while *materialism*, when carefully considered, deprives everything of life. Maupertuis ascribes the lowest degree of life to the organic particles of nourishment consumed by animals; other philosophers regard such particles as nothing but dead masses, merely serving to magnify the power of the levers of animal machines.” [AA:2:330] See: Zammito, “Kant’s Early Views on Epigenesis: The Role of Maupertuis,” in *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. Justin E. Smith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 317-354. There is some contention about whether this is a fitting characterization of Maupertuis. That is a matter for debate, but not, I think, that Kant took him for one. Here, I do not believe that Mensch has understood my position correctly. See Mensch, *Kant’s Organicism*, 181, n124.

our own causality...”³⁶ Technically, Kant had to deny that teleology could *explain* anything in phenomenal nature. It was even less than an empirical *conjecture*. Teleology merely offered an *analogy* of some *heuristic* (primarily restrictive) methodological utility. Moreover, it was an *inept* analogy. What an organism could do was “infinitely beyond the reach of art,” Kant wrote in *Critique of Judgment* §64.³⁷ And he developed this realization more extensively in §65. “We say of nature and its faculty in organized products far too little if we describe it as an *analogon of art*, for this suggests an artificer (a rational being) external to it.”³⁸ Kant recognized that organisms organized themselves. Yet, as Hannah Ginsborg puts it, “the question remains of how we can even coherently *regard* something both as a purpose and as natural.”³⁹ The “appeal to analogy does not overcome the difficulty,” she continues.⁴⁰ Kant himself admitted it: “Strictly speaking, ... the organization of nature has nothing analogous to any causality known to us,” that is, “*intrinsic natural perfection*, as possessed by those things that are possible only as *natural purposes* and that are hence called organized beings, is not conceivable or explicable on any analogy to any known physical ability, i.e., ability of nature, not even – since we belong to nature in the broadest sense – on a precisely fitting analogy to human art.”⁴¹

That implied drastic epistemological inaccessibility. All organic form had to be fundamentally distinguished from mere matter. “Organization” demanded separate creation. Eternal *inscrutability* was preferable to any “speculative” science.⁴² In the third *Critique* Kant would twice insist that no human would ever achieve a *mechanist* (he meant, as well, a *materialist*) account of so much as a “blade of grass.”⁴³ Kant remained adamant that the *ultimate* origin of “organization” required a *metaphysical*, not a physical, account:

36. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, AA:5:375.

37. *Ibid.*, AA:5:371.

38. *Ibid.*, 374.

39. Hannah Ginsborg, “Kant on Understanding Organisms.” In Eric Watkins (ed.), *Kant and the Sciences*, Oxford & NY: Oxford University Press, 2001, 236.

40. *Ibid.*, 238.

41. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, AA:V:375.

42. *Ibid.* 424. See my “‘This inscrutable principle...’”(above, note 6).

43. *Ibid.*, 378.

“How this stock [of *Keime*] arose, is an assignment which lies entirely beyond the borders of humanly possible *natural philosophy*, within which I believe I must contain myself,” Kant wrote in 1788.⁴⁴ Environmental material factors could be occasions, but not direct causes of changes that could be inherited through generation. What Kant was arguing was that biology could *never* be an empirical science; it was, as Clark Zumbach has discerned, a *transcendent* science, and in that measure, not a *natural science* at all.⁴⁵ The philosophical problem, Kant insisted, allowed only one solution: a transcendent creator. In Kant’s words, “Nature is no longer estimated as it appears like art, but rather in so far as it actually *is* art, though superhuman art.”⁴⁶ This conjecture of a Nature-for-God came to formulation via the analogy of purposiveness.

Kant postulated that we must think of organisms on the analogy of an intelligent creation, and that when we do so we face alternatives that can best be grasped *in terms drawn from metaphysics* (i.e., the obverse of the analogy at B167). The categories Kant offered were: *occasionalism* and *pretabilism*.⁴⁷ He dismissed occasionalism as curtly as he had dismissed spontaneous generation (though, of course, for different reasons), and in turning to “pretabilism” he distinguished two subsets: *individual preformation*, which he identified with the “theory of evolution” (i.e., encapsulation) and termed an “educt,” and *generic preformation*, which Kant suggested was the proper sense of *epigenesis*. That is, while a “product,” epigenesis “still performed in accordance with the internally purposive predispositions that were imparted to its stock.”⁴⁸ What attracted him to epigenesis, Kant averred succinctly, was that it entailed “the least possible application of the supernatural” in scientific theory.⁴⁹ The crucial point is that, even as he was prepared to admit *epigenesis*, Kant set stark limits upon it: ultimately this was still strictly “generic preformation,” i.e., it, too, required the prior intervention of a *transcendent* causality. In

44. Kant, “Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie,” AA:2:179.

45. Clark Zumbach, *The transcendent science: Kant’s conception of biological methodology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1984).

46. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, AA:5:311.

47. Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, AA:5:422.

48. *Ibid.*, 423.

49. *Ibid.*, 424.

short, intrinsic purposiveness, as the empirical capacity for epigenetic self-formation, never proved viable for Kant as a theoretical concept in life science. It was only a heuristic analogy.

I submit that Kant's language of *Keime* and *Anlagen* and his acceptance of the idea of a *Lebenskraft* as exemplified by Blumenbach's *Bildungstrieb* committed him to a conception of life science entailing the *objective actuality* [*Wirklichkeit*] of forces which could not be reduced to those he admitted in his "Newtonian" order of physics. With epigenesis, the "order of nature" became greater than the order of Kant's version of physics, and the paradigm for science necessarily exceeded the "Newtonian" constraints Kant wished to impose upon it. Epigenesis incites a fundamental erosion of Kant's boundary between the constitutive and the regulative, between the transcendental and the empirical: a naturalism beyond anything Kant could countenance, though his own thought carried him there. Of course, Kant's escape was to suggest an epistemological evasion of this unpalatable ontological prospect. Kant transposed his metaphysical problem into an epistemological constraint: "nature [i.e, the *order of nature* as a system] can only be understood as meaningful if we take it at large to be designed."⁵⁰ By formulating this as a *heuristic for inquiry*, not an *ontology of nature*, Kant preserved the "purity" of his critical philosophy from "dogmatism." In Kantian terms, there was a subjective necessity – a "need of reason" – for this move, but no objective basis evident in the matter at hand (the order of nature).

4. Concluding Contentious Remarks.

In light of the foregoing, I am not disposed to think, as Jennifer Mensch and many others do, that Kant can serve as a significant resource for current philosophy of science, and *a fortiori* not for philosophy of biology. Peter McLaughlin makes the claim that sciences ought to define for themselves what constitute appropriate projects and practices, and that it is the role of philosophy simply to assess the "metaphysical cost." He writes: "The self-understanding of an empirical science, biology ... is for biologists to decide. A

50. R. E. Butts, "Teleology and scientific method in Kant's Critique of Judgment," *Nous* 24 (1990), 1-16, citing 5.

philosopher can only analyze the metaphysical costs of the various options.”⁵¹ I endorse this naturalist stance. No less than Kant, a naturalist is concerned with the “limits of human understanding,” but those limits apply across the board in empirical science; biology is not uniquely disqualified. That is, *all* natural science must be taken to be empirical in the radical sense of contingency and fallible approximation; biology does not warrant special targeting. To characterize their object of inquiry, empirical biologists must consider processes of intrinsic dynamism. *Organism* has long been their master-concept for such inquiry; *function* is a more recent term for such processes. If biologists not only do but must use concepts of *self-organization*, then that seems an essential feature of their science. If biology must conceptualize self-organization as actual in the world, Kant’s regulative versus constitutive distinction is pointless in practice.

While Kant continues to attract attention in current philosophy of biology, I see Kant more as an impediment than as a facilitator for that important pursuit. Kant set a hard and fast boundary marker between attainable science and speculative metaphysics. But did he mark the boundary properly? Need we halt there? Have we halted there? Intrinsic purposiveness -- what Kant discerned but then “domesticated” into the language of intentional action -- is the starting point of actual biological science and perhaps ultimately of a naturalist philosophy of mind. What if, against Kant and from a naturalist stance, *self-organization* simply betokens – that is, can be intersubjectively discerned to possess, empirically, as ineliminable features of the actual natural world -- such propensities of systemic, open-ended dynamism? What if for empirical judgment humans are *first* such organisms, and *consequently* capable of judging? For empirical-biological science and its knowledge claims, humans would be products of nature, their process of judging would be an instance and extension of that process of self-organization already actual in other organisms. Kant’s characterization of reason would not be just a metaphor: reason parallels organismic form because it *is* an expression of organismic self-regulation. In short, my view is that Kant was by far not organicist *enough!*

51. Peter McLaughlin, *What Functions Explain: Functional Explanation and Self-Reproducing Systems* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 190.



Metaphor or Method.
Jennifer Mensch's Organicist Kant Interpretation in Context¹

Metáfora o método.
Contextualizando la interpretación organicista de Kant de
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Abstract

In her recent study, *Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), Jennifer Mensch employs the technical term "organicism" to designate both Kant's thinking about organisms and his thinking about other matters—chiefly among those transcendental cognition—in terms of his thinking about organisms. The article places Mensch's organicist reading of Kant into the wider context of recent and current work on Kant as a natural historian (*Naturforscher*) and its repercussion for understanding the critical core of Kant's philosophy. To that end, the article addresses the methodological function of conceptual metaphors in general and of biological metaphors in particular in Kant. The article proceeds in three steps, first focusing on an alleged anthropological turn in recent work on Kant, then addressing the distinction between schematism and symbolism in Kant's critical epistemology and concluding with a consideration of the possibilities and limitations inherent in an organicist reading of Kant.

¹ The print version of my contribution to the book panel on Jennifer Mensch's *Kant's Organicism* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), arranged by the North American Kant Society at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, in Philadelphia in December 2014, was written during my tenure as Visiting Professor at Università Ca' Foscari Venezia and Venice International University during the spring of 2015.

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Key words

Kant; Organicism; Epigenesis; Critical Epistemology; Natural History

Resumen

En su reciente estudio, *Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013), Jennifer Mensch emplea el término técnico “organicismo” para designar tanto la reflexión de Kant sobre los organismos como su pensamiento sobre otras cuestiones, especialmente la relativa al conocimiento trascendental, donde emplea los términos de su reflexión orgánica. El artículo sitúa la lectura organicista de Mensch en el contexto amplio de trabajos recientes y actuales sobre Kant como historiador natural (*Naturforscher*) y su repercusión para la comprensión del núcleo crítico de la filosofía de Kant. Con ese fin, el artículo plantea la función metodológica que tienen en Kant las metáforas conceptuales en general y de las metáforas biológicas en particular. El artículo procede en tres pasos, centrándose primero en el giro pretendidamente antropológico sostenido en recientes trabajos sobre Kant, y discutiendo después la distinción entre esquematismo y simbolismo en la epistemología crítica de Kant, para concluir con una consideración sobre las posibilidades y limitaciones inherentes a la lectura organicista de Kant.

Palabras clave

Kant; organicismo; epigénesis; epistemología crítica; historia natural

“I am not concerned with the evolution of concept like Tetens [...] nor with their analysis like Lambert, but only with their objective validity”²

Having previously had the occasion to address and assess the details and the merits of Jennifer Mensch’s fine study on Kant’s “organicism”³ – as she terms both Kant’s thinking about organisms and his thinking about other matters in terms of organisms – I would like to take the occasion of the book panel of the North American Kant Society for offering some more general remarks and reflections on the book in the wider context of recent and current work on Kant as a natural historian (*Naturforscher*)⁴ and its repercussion for

² AA 18:23 (Refl. 4900).

³ *Kant's Organicism. Epigenesis and the Development of Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2013).

understanding the critical core of Kant's philosophy. To that end, I will be concerned with the methodological function of conceptual metaphors in general and of biological metaphors in particular in Kant. I will proceed in three steps, first focusing on an alleged anthropological turn in recent work on Kant, then addressing the distinction between schematism and symbolism in Kant's critical epistemology and concluding, quite briefly though, with a consideration of the possibilities and limitations inherent in an organicist reading of Kant.

1. The Other Kant.

The past few decades have seen a substantial increase in the quality and quantity of scholarly and philosophical work devoted to Kant worldwide. First, the Anglophone world emerged out of its narrow and monoglot focus on the first half of the first *Critique* and the first two sections of the *Foundation for the Metaphysics of Morals*, discovering and exploring the wider scope and deeper grasp of Kant's critical *theoretical* philosophy – an extension and expansion soon followed by similar forays into Kant's critical aesthetics and his mature moral philosophy, including ethics and the philosophy of right. Further fields of emerging Kant studies have included the philosophy of history and political philosophy.

The material basis for much of this renaissance or rather *naissance* of philosophical work on Kant in the Anglophone world has been the comprehensive editorial project of the Collected Works of Immanuel Kant, the so-called Cambridge Edition, under the general editorship of Paul Guyer and Allen Wood. The more than a dozen voluminous volumes of the Edition have made available to the English-language reader virtually the entire Kant in modern translations that supply introductions, factual and linguistic notes as well as bibliographical information. The Kant so prepared and propagated comprises the extensive pre-critical writings as well as the critical works, the printed works as well as the correspondence, and the literary remains (*Nachlaß*) as well as the lecture transcripts (*Vorlesungsnachschriften*), the latter sorts of texts in substantial selections – not to mention the *Opus postumum* in an edition that surpasses the work's current presentation in the Academy Edition, which itself is in the process of being revised, redone and rearranged.

⁴ The pioneering work for the consideration of Kant as a natural historian is Erich Adickes, *Kant als Naturforscher*. 2 vols. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1924/25).

To be sure, the worldwide editorial work on Kant undertaken over the past couple of decades is as much a reflection of the widened view and the wider work on the Kantian *corpus*, as it itself has played a causal role in shaping and directing that global development. Moreover, the spread of the new editions (many of them issued as separate study texts, in addition to their incorporation into the large edition) and of the recent work based on them, which has gone well beyond their more narrow home bases – chiefly Germany and the U.S.A. – is as much due to the global connectedness of philosophical work, as it has strengthened those connections between Europe and North America, between North and South America (especially Brazil) and between Europe together with North America and East Asia (especially China).⁵

But the editorial expansion of Kant's works and the associated extension in scholarship on Kant, to be found worldwide, has not only increased and enlarged the general acquaintance with Kant's work. The texts by Kant previously either unknown, hardly studied or little appreciated have brought into view aspects, sides and dimensions of Kant's philosophical work hitherto invisible and therefore effectively inexistent. For one, Kant's canonical texts, chiefly the three *Critiques*, have been placed into the wider context of the publications and the unpublished materials surrounding them by way of earlier preparation and further articulation. Moreover, the acquaintance with published and unpublished works by Kant that are contemporaneous with the critical canon has introduced a broadened view of Kant's *oeuvre* that is not limited to its critical core but indicative and representative of Kant's wider role and larger effect as a public intellectual and an academic teacher of considerable renown and substantial reputation.

Most importantly, though, the sheer scope and the intellectual import of the further texts by Kant that have come to the fore and have received attention and scrutiny worldwide in recent years have managed to modify and revise the received image of Kant. Behind, next to or ahead of Kant the critical philosopher, the transcendental idealist, the moral rigorist and the aesthetic formalist, there has emerged another, differently oriented

⁵ For evidence of international scholarly cooperation in research on Kant's lectures, see *Kant's Lectures*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Robert Loudon and Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter) and *Reading Kant's Lectures*, ed. Robert Clewis (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter).

and alternatively ambicionado Kant, whose primary concern is not with principles and prescriptions, with norms and rules, with pure reason and a priori conditions but with the factual circumstances of human existence in the natural and cultural world – in a word, with Kant the natural and cultural human historian or with Kant the anthropologist. In fact the very term for the disciplinary treatment of human beings as such, "anthropology," owes its introduction into modern academia to Kant and his innovative treatment of this subject matter, which he developed over decades in a popular public lecture course.⁶

To be sure, the existence of an entire anthropological *oeuvre* in Kant had long been known and even appreciated. The published textbook of his long-standing lecture course on the subject had been included among his major works, and scholars had taken note of Kant's scattered contributions to contemporary debates in physical and cultural anthropology, such as the pathology of bipedality and the institution of stable human sub species ("races").⁷ Still the anthropological works had seemed marginal rather than major, accidental rather than essential and circumstantial rather than central in the context of Kant's overall philosophical project, with its well-established focus on synthetic cognitions a priori of various kinds and in distinct domains. The very designation given by Kant to his published anthropology ("in a pragmatic regard")⁸ seemed to indicate the decisive disciplinary difference between the prudential aims and orientation of worldly anthropology and the genuinely practical, i.e., moral focus of the specifically critical treatment of law and ethics in Kant's practical philosophy.

Still there have been readers and interpreters of Kant who have sought to mine the other, specifically anthropological Kant not for purposes of supplementation and completion only but with the intent of confronting the critical Kant with an altogether alternative and radically revised Kant – one perceived to be more compatible with contemporary as well as current sensibilities and standards of a naturalist, realist or common-sensualist persuasion, from which the official, critical Kant is said to have diverged to his own disadvantage and at his own detriment. Such a reassessment of the

⁶ See AA 25.

⁷ See AA 2:421-425, 2:427-443, 8:89-106 and 8:157-184.

⁸ See AA 7:117-122.

critical Kant in light of the anthropological Kant– of the critic of reason in light of the natural historian, of the supranaturalist in light of the naturalist – has been most prominent and quite controversial in moral matters. To those scholars it has seemed that Kant’s anthropological *oeuvre* effectuates a metacritical correction of the seeming severity and sustained single-mindedness of Kant’s critical scrutiny of human life under the norms and forms reason, in particular in the latter’s guise as practical reason or will.

Anthropologically geared rereadings of Kant in general and of Kantian moral philosophy in particular typically portray themselves as correctives or counterweights to the perceived onesidedness and imbalance of Kant’s core positions in philosophy. Against the latter’s focus on form, they tend to maintain the indispensable import of the material, against its apriorism, they stress empirical factors and features, against its necessitarianism and universalism, they insist on contingent conditions, and against its orientation toward the normative, they stress the natural. On those readings Kant appears less as a solitary revolutionary who completely changed the course of (Western) philosophy, and more as a congenial contemporary, akin to the likes of Tetens and Lambert in the German Enlightenment and A. Smith and D. Hume in the Scottish Enlightenment. The Kant so created is less monumental and more human, but also less radical and more moderate – perhaps a reflection of a current age and a contemporary culture such as ours that seeks the ordinary and praises the average.

In a larger perspective that takes into view the extended history of the reception and effective history of Kant’s philosophy and the spread and development of scholarship on Kant, the anthropological Kant of recent vintage comes to stand in a long line of adaptations and assimilations that again and again have sought to integrate Kant’s work into current concerns – from the anti-Hegelianism and scientism of the neo-Kantians through the traditionalism of the ontological or metaphysical Kant interpretation to the analytic reconstructionism of the 1960s and the claims on Kant made in the name of more recent philosophical fashions such as the philosophy of mind. In each case, the Kant so retrieved and reconstructed was made to match a prevailing philosophical culture and its specific standards. To be sure, in all these cases the attempted appropriations and actualizations could claim evidence and support for their readings and rewritings in Kant

himself. Yet the plural positions so developed out of Kant also indicate that none of them quite captured Kant completely and comprehensively.

The same seems to hold for the anthropological Kant and for Kant the natural historian of current concern. By focusing on the natural at the expense of the normative and on the factual at the expense of the principled, the naturalists and culturalists among Kant's recent readers risk losing sight of the normative core and the critical center of Kant's enterprise. In particular, reading Kant primarily as an anthropologist and a natural historian detracts and deflects from the non-empirical dimension of the critical philosophy, which – while not transcendent in the deficient sense exposed and eliminated by Kant himself – maintains the non-empirical basis of experience and, most importantly, the non-empirical character of the freedom involved in rational volition.

Moreover, the recent readings that feature Kant the anthropologist and natural historian tend to disturb, if not distort the overall structure and the precise proportions of Kant's philosophy in its entirety, as designed and developed by Kant in response to reason's own purposive structure. The dimension of application so stressed by the anthropological apologists of Kant risks reducing Kant's non-empirical double theory of nature and freedom ("pure philosophy")⁹ to preliminaries for an empirically enriched account of situated subjectivity. In the process, the practical tends to collapse into the pragmatic and the categorical into the conditional. Most importantly, though, the narrow focus on actual application and empirical instantiation obscures the intended import of Kant's critical account of nature and freedom, which is not the empirically or culturally given, but the domain of principles governing nature and freedom under the guise of the a priori forms of nature and the a priori norms of freedom – what Kant termed their "metaphysical first principles" (*metaphysische Anfangsgründe*).¹⁰

The applicative dimension of Kant's philosophical project that emerges from its critical core therefore is not an anthropology, however practically portioned, but a "metaphysics of morals" (*Metaphysik der Sitten*) which operates under a general – and to

⁹*Critique of Pure Reason*, A 848/B 878.

¹⁰ See AA 4:465-479, 6:203-209 and 6:373-378.

that extent anthropological – premise, viz., human social coexistence on a finite earth surface, and proceeds to subject human freedom, in its two manifestations as the outer freedom of choice and the inner freedom of conviction, to rational rules of (juridical) law and ethics. In a remarkable development in recent research, concurrent with– but also contrary to – the naturalizing notions governing a good deal of wider work on Kant, there has been an upsurge of interest precisely in Kant’s critical theory of law and right, including the latter’s development out of natural law (*ius naturale*), as documented in a fascinating understudied text from 1784, the transcript of Kant’s lecture course on natural law (*Naturrecht Feyerabend*),¹¹ which currently is being translated in no less than four languages (English, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese), in addition to having become the object of scholarly scrutiny and philosophical analysis.¹² The Kant to come out of that body of work (and the related recent research initiatives on Kant’s published philosophy of law and right in the late *Metaphysics of Morals*)¹³ is likely to be neither the austere assessor of pure reason nor the empirically embedded historian of human nature but the astute analyst of the juridical principles governing political society and its purposive development.

Placed against the background of recent scholarship on Kant and into the wider context of the latter’s anthropological *ambitus*, Jennifer Mensch’s study on Kant’s organicism stands out for its judicious reliance on historical materials in the interest of enhancing our understanding of Kant’s critical philosophy. The particular angle of Mensch’s investigation is the development of Kant’s thinking about living organism in response to contemporary controversies and their competing conceptions regarding the phenomenon of organic life. The focus of Mensch’s work is on Kant’s own, original

¹¹AA 27:1317-1394.

¹² See Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, *Kants Einleitung in die Rechtslehre von 1784. Immanuel Kants Rechtsbegriff in der Moralvorlesung "Mrongovius II" und der Naturrechtsvorlesung "Feyerabend" von 1784 sowie in der "Metaphysik der Sitten" von 1797* (Göttingen: Universitätsverlag, 2012). See also Günter Zöller, "'Without Hope and Fear'. Kant's *Naturrecht Feyerabend* on Bindingness and Obligation," forthcoming in *Reading Kant's Lectures*, ed. Robert Clewis (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter) and id., "'Allgemeine Freiheit.' Kants *Naturrecht Feyerabend* über Wille, Recht und Gesetz," forthcoming in *Zum Verhältnis von Recht und Ethik in Kants praktischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger, Dieter Hüning and Günter Kruck (Hildesheim: Olms).

¹³ See *Kants "Tugendlehre." A Comprehensive Commentary*, ed. Andreas Trampotta, Oliver Sensen and Jens Timmermann (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2013).

position in the ongoing debates on the natural history of animal life. Most importantly, though, Mensch's study aims at elucidating the import of Kant's "organicism" for the methodological and doctrinal (re-)orientation of his epistemology (and moral philosophy).

The scholarly value of Mensch's work and its approach to Kant lies both in the amount of detail devoted to the emerging views of Kant and his predecessors and in the sustained focus on the guiding role of Kant's views in natural history for the formulation of key features of his critical theoretical philosophy. Rather than relating Kant's emerging biological thought to the third *Critique* and its critical theory of organic life, Mensch brings Kant's views on organism to bear already on the development of his critical epistemology. Particularly note worthy is the detailed treatment of two important material sources for Kant's emerging views on organisms and the latter's repercussions on transcendental philosophy, viz., the work of Buffon and Tetens.

Yet rather than to continue seeking out the good and praising it with regard to Mensch's book, I propose to turn to Kant himself and to draw on him for matters of methodology that, on my view, deserve more detailed discussion than they have received within the close confines of Mensch's book. These concerns regard the very status and function of organicist concepts in Kant's critical epistemology, as chiefly exemplified in Kant's (and Mensch's) recourse to epigeneticism in general and the "epigenesis of pure reason"¹⁴ in particular. My concern will be not be with the doctrinal specifics of the analogies drawn by Kant (and explored by Mensch) between natural history and transcendental critique. Instead I will focus on the possibilities and limits of conceptual metaphors in Kant's account of cognition. In addition, I propose to explore the implications of Kant's mature account of purposiveness in nature, provided in the third *Critique*'s second part, the "Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment," for an organicist reading of Kant's epistemology. My remarks are meant to further enhance the reliance on natural history in general and on theories of generation in particular found in Kant and followed by Mensch.

2. Conceptual Metaphors and Analogical Thinking.

¹⁴*Critique of Pure Reason*, B 167 (in the original emphasis).

Given the towering originality of Kant's mature thinking, which characterizes his theoretical philosophy no less than his practical philosophy and his aesthetics no less than his natural philosophy, it should come as no surprise that Kant draws on metaphors in a concerted effort to lend intelligibility and acceptability to his novel conceptions and innovative doctrines. Accordingly, Kant's use of metaphorical language is not limited to the occasional poetic license he might take with figurative speech. Rather his recourse to metaphorical language is sustained and strategic. It serves the pronounced purpose of introducing novel ways of philosophical thinking by drawing on concepts and doctrines outside of philosophy that then are made to serve for introducing, illustrating and illuminating Kant's philosophical innovations.

In order to be suitable for their propaedeutic philosophical purpose, the established conceptions and received views drawn upon by Kant often are chosen with an eye to their own original and innovative status, even if the latter is a historical rather than a current matter. In particular, Kant tends to draw on theoretical innovations and scientific discoveries in an effort to lend intelligibility and interest to his own challenges to received wisdom and established beliefs. A crucial case in point is Kant's use of the Copernican turn in theoretical astronomy to introduce his analogous innovation in theoretical philosophy.

But Kant's resorting to conceptually metaphorical discourse is not limited to the successful transmission and diffusion of his novel positions and propositions. The reliance on metaphorically recast concepts serves to articulate Kant's novel notions even prior to their outward presentation to a readership. Antecedent to their didactic deployment, Kant's conceptual metaphors function as heuristic devices that aid and facilitate the very formation and formulation of original insights and novel ways of thinking by Kant.

Accordingly, conceptual metaphors are not auxiliary and supplementary but fundamental and essential to Kant's philosophical thinking. To be sure, the radical reliance on metaphorically employed concepts does not make Kant's thinking metaphorical in a relativist and reductive sense. Drawing on metaphors to articulate one's thinking is as little a case of metaphorical thinking as drawing on a given language to express one's thoughts constitutes the derivation of thought from language (glossomorphism).

The relationship involved in Kant's pervasive practice of conceptual metaphors is not one of dependence but of reliance. Kant's philosophical thinking is not driven by conceptual metaphors, as though the very shape and direction of his thoughts were controlled and determined by metaphors and, for that matter, by language. Rather Kant deliberately and purposively draws on conceptual metaphors, which he pointedly places into the service of his thinking for the latter's articulation to himself as well as to others. A chief case in point is the use of biological conceptions of generation, especially the notion of epigenesis, to articulate novel matters of transcendental philosophy ("epigenesis of pure reason"), as explored in detail in Mensch's book.

For Kant the philosopher of spontaneity and freedom, it is not language, much less metaphorical language, that speaks – as it would for Heidegger the philosopher of thrownness and fallenness. Rather it is the philosopher who speaks, intent on being clear and making himself clear to others and employing language, both ordinary and figurative, to achieve such clarity. On Kant's account, language, including metaphorical language, does not exceed its speakers but serves them and their purposes of expression and communication. In particular, for Kant, language is subordinated to thought as the latter's medium and vehicle.¹⁵

Similarly, for Kant, the logical device of analogy – of thinking in analogies or of analogical thinking – is to be put to epistemological use.¹⁶ The identical proportion between non-identical items in two different domains allows to detect or describe a set of proportionally related items from one domain by means of the identical proportionate relation between items of another domain. In cases where one such domain is more established, familiar or known and the other one less so, the proportional relationship from the former domain may be used to identify the same such relationship in the latter domain. In the process, the second domain is described by analogy with the first domain.

¹⁵ On the semiotic context of Kant's account of language, see AA 7:191-194.

¹⁶ On the logical status and epistemological function of analogy in Kant, see AA 4:357f. and 5:464 note. On the overall analogy between reason and nature in Kant, see Angela Breitenbach, *Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur* (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2009).

Establishing and presenting an analogy between two domains that possess different epistemic status thus allows to draw on relational features of the epistemically more disclosed and discerned domain in order to capture and conceptualize relevantly similar relational properties in the epistemically more obscure domain. Carrying out the analogy takes the form of transferring (Greek *metapherein*) conceptual qualifications of a relational kind from the one domain to the other domain. The metaphor involved is not so much a particular term or item but the entire procedure of assimilating the relevant proportions in the two domains to each other. The procedural transfer results in the indirect characterization of a relationship in one domain by means of the relevantly similar relationship in the other domain, the basic dissimilarity across domains between the *relata* involved notwithstanding.

While Kant does not offer a full fledged account of metaphors and even less so of conceptual metaphors in philosophy, he offers important considerations for the specific need of analogical thinking in philosophy.¹⁷ Moreover, Kant's justification of conceptual metaphors and analogical thinking in philosophy is explicitly based on his critical account of cognition. In particular, Kant relates his reliance on conceptual metaphors to the critical distinction between sensibility and understanding as the distinct but complimentary sources of objectively valid theoretical cognition ("knowledge," *Wissen*).

According to Kant, the duality that gives rise to analogical thinking and to the use of metaphors in philosophy is a foundational feature of the human cognitive constitution. Unlike cognitively perfect beings that would be equipped with an intuitive intellect and its intellectual intuition, humans are not able to grasp things instantaneously in their entirety. Rather human cognition is based on a discursive intellect that refers to a multitude of things by means of a universal, termed "common concept" (*conceptus communis*, *Allgemeinbegriff*),¹⁸ which apply to possibly infinitely many objects and therefore are not sufficient to single out any particular object for conceptual determination. In order to cognitively grasp particulars, concepts are in need of being presented with individual items situated in space and time.

¹⁷ See AA 5:351-353.

¹⁸ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 133f. note .

On Kant's account, the direct mode in which objects can be given to a discursive intellect incapable of grasping them on its own and by itself is through "intuition" (*Anschauung*). The specific point at which, for the critical Kant, figurative thinking becomes constitutive for cognition is the need for a mediation between what is sensible and intuitable, on the one hand, and what is intellectual ("intelligible") and conceptual, on the other hand. According to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the required transition from concepts to intuitions, along with the needed mediation between the intellectual and the sensual, is carried out by "images" (*Bilder*) and "schemata" (*Schemata*), the latter term being derived from the Greek word for "figure" (*schema*).¹⁹ For Kant such devices, while originally distinct from concepts, serve to render concepts concrete and to lend reality – more precisely, "objective reality" (*objektive Realität*) – to what otherwise might remain mere forms.²⁰ On Kant's account, only sensorily based mediating devices are able to "realize" (*realisieren*) conceptual forms, which otherwise remain "empty" (*leer*).²¹

In the *Critique of Pure Reason* the distinction between image and schema as alternative modes of rendering empirical concepts sensible and intuitive is merely preparatory, though, for another type of concept and its mode of instantiation, viz., the "pure concepts of the understanding" or the categories, as Kant terms them with reverential reference to Aristotle.²² As concepts that ground and steer the move from possible appearances given in intuition to possible objects entertained in thought, the categories are forms-in-waiting and essentially in need of a further factor beyond their control that is to provide them with the conditions for their engagement. But since the concepts in need of being saturated are not specific empirical or mathematical concepts (such as 'dog' or 'five')

¹⁹ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 137-147/B 176-187.

²⁰ On Kant's systematic account of objective reference, see Günter Zöllner, *Theoretische Gegenstandsbeziehung. . Zur systematischen Bedeutung der Termini "objektive Realität" und "objektive Gültigkeit" in der "Kritik der reinen Vernunft"* (Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1984).

²¹ On the relation between possibly empty concepts and possibly blind intuitions in Kant, see Günter Zöllner, "Of Empty Thoughts and Blind Intuitions. Kant's Answer to McDowell/Sobre pensamentos vazios e intuições cegas. A resposta de Kant a McDowell," in *Trans/Form/Ação. Revista de Filosofia da Universidade Estadual Paulista*, 33 (2010), 65-96 and "Not Seeing and Seeing Nothing. Kant On the Twin Conditions of Objective Reference", *Kant e-Prints*. Campinas, Series 2, vol. 8, n. 2 (2013), 1-21.

²² See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 81/B 107.

but general categorial forms, such as 'cause and effect,' their figurative rendering – schematization – cannot occur by particular instances but only can take place in general terms, viz., by means of correlating specific patterns of intuitions to specific categorial forms.

In addition to advocating the boundedness of the categorial understanding to time conditions, the *Critique of Pure Reason* also addresses the wider scope of the intellect in its guise as reason (*Vernunft*), which extends beyond the confines of time (and space). While the sought-after extension of reason beyond the natural order cannot fulfill the stringent requirements for objectively valid theoretical cognition, Kant considers the reach of reason beyond what it is able to grasp an integral part, even an essential feature of reason as such. For Kant, the critically contained domain of naturally limited, conditioned existence is not all there is, but indicated indirectly and negatively – more precisely, limitatively – a wider space that is specific to reason both in the latter's theoretical and practical use. The prime concepts for thinking this supra-sensible open space or world are the "concepts of reason" (*Vernunftbegriffe*) or the "ideas" (*Ideen*).²³

Unlike the concepts of the understanding (categories), which require and receive their realization through sensible intuitions given in the shape of temporal figurations (transcendental schemata), the ideas – in principle and on purpose – elude sensory realization, aiming as they do by definition at the supersensory. Yet in order for ideas not to aim at the void and to remain empty, there needs be, on Kant's account, if not an outright realization by means of schemata, then at least a functional equivalent of such form of validation. According to Kant, the required quasi-realization and pseudo-schematization of ideas involves indirect instruments and an analogical apparatus. The chief strategy advocated by Kant consists in drawing on the natural world and its objects in order to conceive of the supra-natural order and its occupants on the basis of relevant proportionate similarities or analogies.²⁴

²³ On the systematic status and the essential function of theoretical ideas in Kant, see Günter Zöller, "Der negative und der positive Nutzen der Ideen. Kant über die Grenzbestimmung der reinen Vernunft," in *Über den Nutzen von Illusionen. Die regulativen Ideen in Kants theoretischer Philosophie*, ed. Bernd Dörflinger and Günter Kruck (Hildesheim/New York: Olms, 2011), 13-27.

²⁴ See AA 5:351-353.

Kant envisions the supplementation of the schematism of the categories by means of the symbolism of the ideas. While the categories have at their disposal direct intuitional counterparts in their schemata, there is no direct intuitional correlate for ideas. As a matter of principle, there can be no intuition – whether a priori or posteriori, whether formal or material – that could match and meet the supra-sensible origin and reference of ideas. But on Kant's view of the matter, it is possible and, moreover, indispensable to rely on categorial concepts, or their contentual specifications as empirical concepts, in order to provide ideas with at least an indirect intuitional warrant.

The procedure Kant envisions for rendering ideas quasi-intuitive involves the transfer – again a reminiscence of the literal meaning of the Greek-based word "metaphor" – of relations among things or items in the natural world to items in the supra-sensible order of things. Typically, the relation between two items, a and b, from among the categorial order of nature is established as being identical with the relation between two entirely different items, c and d, in the order of ideas. In such an analogical set-up, the natural-world properties drawn upon for the determination of supranatural-world properties – such as the sensible intuitions involved in empirical concepts – do not render and realize the ideas directly or schematically but only indirectly or symbolically. The thinking in ideas and about the putative objects of ideas is informed or configured by relational features taken over from categorial cognitions and their object domain.²⁵

3. Metaphors Mixed and Mitigated.

Considered in the light of the indispensable methodological function that metaphors exercise in Kant's philosophy in general, the dual focus of Mensch's book on Kant's thinking about organisms and his thinking in terms of organisms takes on exegetical urgency and interpretive importance. Construing Kant's account of knowledge in general and of transcendental knowledge in particular on the basis of his account of organic life, is apt to track Kant's own investigative procedure for lending intelligibility and impact to his novel views about the necessary conditions of a priori cognitions regarding possible objects of experience. But Kant's careful consideration of the role of the metaphorical

²⁵ For Kant's exemplary account of aesthetic symbolism, see AA 5:353f.

method and its analogical mode of operation also indicates the limitations for the methodic use of metaphors in philosophy. To begin, the choice of the metaphors drawn upon for purposes of philosophical presentation and persuasion is limited by the state of art regarding the chosen metaphorical vehicle and hence subject to review and even retraction.

Generally speaking, the philosophical use of metaphors in Kant is opportunistic and circumstantial rather than universal and necessary. For Kant philosophical metaphors are devices and means rather than definitive and final. Moreover, given the inherent limitations of any analogy, no given philosophical metaphor is without alternatives and safe from revision and replacement. In fact, for strategic reasons, Kant has seen fit to have his metaphors multiplied and mixed, so that they may capture, by way of analogy, not only what eludes direct, immediate rendition but also the indirect, mediated rendition provided by a single metaphor and its limited analogical scope. On Kant's methodological outlook, philosophically used metaphors are meant to complement each other, with each one stressing and addressing a different dimension of the complex state of affairs in need of analogical presentation.

In the case of transcendental cognition – cognition regarding the very possibility of synthetic cognitions a priori – Kant's mixing of metaphors is clearly manifest and well motivated. In addition to drawing on organicist concepts, such as "generation," "preformation," and "epigenesis," Kant resorts to legal metaphor and their underlying juridical concepts, most famously "deduction,"²⁶ but also "acquisition," specifically "original acquisition" or "*acquisitio originaria*."²⁷ Furthermore, he draws on architectonic metaphors by evoking the building-like unity of plural cognitions in a stable structure,²⁸ not to mention the pervasive reference to paths and ways (methods) in pursuit of knowledge and science.²⁹

²⁶ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 84/B 116.

²⁷ See AA 6:268-270.

²⁸ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 707/B 735.

²⁹ See *Critique of Pure Reason*, B VII-XV.

Kant's purpose in mixing metaphors is to avoid a one-sided presentation and ensuing perception of the complex constitution – another metaphor– of transcendental cognition. In particular, Kant can be seen to avoid a generally geneticist image of this type of cognition, which would risk downplaying or even eclipsing the logico-epistemic features involved, such as the making of claims, the providing of justification and the asserting of validity, all them best rendered – on Kant's consideration – in juridico-political imagery. Accordingly, Kant's organicism in transcendental epistemology is strategically curtailed and systematically rivaled and by a juridicism (*sit venia verbo*) that is as prevalent and philosophically motivated as the sustained recourse to conceptual metaphors drawn from the natural history of living organisms.

The utility and functionality of organic metaphors in transcendental philosophy is further mitigated by Kant's own critical assessment of the possibilities of scientific cognition (*Wissen, Wissenschaft*) regarding living organisms.³⁰ As Kant turns to a systematic investigation of the forms and types of purposiveness, undertaken in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, his own earlier engagement in debates in natural history undergoes a critical assessment and methodological reflection that also affects the scope and significance of organicist metaphors in philosophy.

In particular, in the "Critique of the Power of Teleological Judgment" Kant denies that there can ever be a science of (organic) life, famously ruling out, on principal grounds, a Newton of the grass leave.³¹ He accordingly relegates epigeneticism to an explanatory hypothesis (*Lehrbegriff, System*) favored over other systems but without ultimate explanatory potential.³² Moreover, he dislikens natural teleology, especially the phenomenon of natural ends (*Naturzwecke*), to practical purposiveness, in fact to any known kind of final constitution, thus rejecting vitalism in the theory of living organisms.³³ Most importantly, he places the duality of mechanism and organism in the account of

³⁰ For Kant's restrictive conception of natural science, see AA 4:468-471.

³¹ See AA 5:400. See also Günter Zöller, "Eine 'Wissenschaft für Götter.' Die Lebenswissenschaften aus der Sicht Kants," *Deutsches Jahrbuch Philosophie* 3 (2011), 877-892.

³² See AA 5:423.

³³ See AA 5:375 and 394f.

living beings under the limiting condition of transcendental idealism, leaving open the hidden (noumenal) identity of the two types of causality apparently involved.³⁴ As a consequence, he maintains the maxim of joining mechanism and organism in investigating organic life forms and their functioning, stressing that the organization of living beings is always in need of mechanism for realizing the functional cooperation between parts and whole.³⁵

For an organicist reading of Kant's first *Critique* such as the one proposed and pursued by Mensch in her fine study, Kant's subsequent development of a specifically critical account of thinking about organisms and organization suggests a substantial supplement that might take the form a second book from her on Kant's critically considered organicism



³⁴ See AA 5:414f.

³⁵ See AA 5:410-415.

**Sobre la ilusión poética y la poética de la ilusión
(Esbozo de un discurso “Sobre las ficciones poéticas”)¹**

[AA 15: 22, 903-935]

IMMANUEL KANT

Nota preliminar, traducción y notas de

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Los usos y costumbres de la universidad alemana de la época prescribían que los candidatos a desempeñar una plaza de profesor universitario escribieran dos disertaciones y que las defendieran públicamente respondiendo a las objeciones planteadas por un tribunal. Así sucedió en febrero de 1777, cuando Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld se presentó a la cátedra de Poética de la Universidad de Königsberg, vacante desde el 1776. Kreutzfeld presentó un único trabajo, con el título *Dissertatio philologico-poetica de principiis fictionum generalioribus*, dividido en dos secciones. Entre los *opponentes* a esta segunda parte se encontraba Immanuel Kant, profesor de Lógica y Metafísica de esta misma universidad. Tal es el origen del texto que aquí presentamos en traducción castellana, que es, en efecto, el discurso que Kant preparó para este momento puntual: un texto, pues, “ocasional”, no pensado para la imprenta y redactado con premura sobre el ejemplar de la

¹ Acepto el título propuesto por Ribeiro dos Santos (2014: 293 ss.: “Que título dar ao texto?”). Además de un interesante estudio, el mismo Ribeiro dos Santos ofrece una panorámica sobre el origen, las ediciones y las traducciones de este texto kantiano.

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disertación de Kreutzfeld. Esta circunstancia explica en parte las dificultades a las que se ve enfrentado el traductor, pues el latín de Kant no siempre es correcto.²

La segunda dificultad del texto tiene que ver con su temática. La *dissertatio* de Kreutzfeld ofrece ocasión para que Kant (no siempre haciendo justicia al texto del candidato o tomándolo en ocasiones como un simple pretexto) reflexione sobre las ilusiones, las apariencias, las ficciones y los engaños.³ Y aquí, justamente, se encuentra la segunda dificultad a la que debe enfrentarse el traductor, pues como bien apunta Ribeiro dos Santos, el vocabulario sobre estas cuestiones “é fluido e deslizante, se não mesmo indeterminado, ambíguo e confuso” (2014: 297). En las notas intento dar alguna indicación a este respecto.

En la primera parte de su escrito, a la que Kant sólo se refiere de pasada, Kreutzfeld defiende que en todos los pueblos se encuentran narraciones poéticas, a las que llama *fictions*: tanto las “personificaciones poéticas” cuanto cualquier opinión poética en la medida en que se conforma de acuerdo con una verdad relativa y aparente, no objetiva o absoluta. Kreutzfeld analiza entonces las causas internas de la gestación de estas *fictions*, que, según él, residen en la misma naturaleza humana, o sea, en la propensión de la mente humana (primitiva) a caer en el error. Se explicaría así, por la propensión natural de la mente humana a caer en los mismos errores, la sorprendente coincidencia entre las *fictions* de diferentes pueblos y diferentes épocas. En los hombres primitivos domina la sensibilidad. Por eso los sentidos son los primeros educadores de la mente humana y por esto, también, la primera fuente de las invenciones poéticas debe situarse en el dominio de la sensibilidad: poesía e impresiones sensibles van de la mano.

En la segunda parte de su disertación, Kreutzfeld señala una segunda fuente de las *fictions* poéticas: las ilusiones y los engaños de los sentidos. Muchos mitos, dice, han

² Debo reconocer con sinceridad que no he podido consultar la primera edición de este texto kantiano, publicada en 1910 por Arthur Warda (*Eine lateinische Rede Imm. Kants als außerordentlichen Opponenten gegenüber Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld*. Mitgeteilt von Arthur Warda. En *Altpreußische Monatsschrift* 47/4, 1910, pp. 663-670), que transcribe fielmente, esto es, conservando todos los errores e imprecisiones, el texto de Kant, sino que he acudido directamente a la edición corregida y enmendada que Erich Adickes preparó para la *Akademie-Ausgabe*

³ Sobre la relación de estas cuestiones con otros textos posteriores de Kant, cfr. R. Brandt, W. Stark, “Einleitung”, *Kants Vorlesungen. Band II: Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*. Bearbeitet von Reinhardt Brandt und Werner Stark, Akad. Ausg. 25.1. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997, pp. XXXII y ss.: “Erkenntnis: Selbstbewußtsein; Betrug und Illusion; der Ideenbegriff; Vitalsinn und Tastsinn”.

nacido de ilusiones (por ejemplo, ópticas) y estas ilusiones proporcionan a los poetas imágenes para adornar sus versos. Esta segunda sección es en gran parte un catálogo de errores y engaños de los sentidos, o más bien del juicio sobre lo que se siente: los psicólogos, explica Kreutzfeld, saben bien que estas falacias no tienen su origen tanto en un “vicio de los sentidos” cuanto en un “juicio inoportuno y precipitado” (AA 907). Tales falacias están en la raíz de las ficciones poéticas. Kreutzfeld, sin embargo, no se limita a los poetas, sino que critica también a los “metafísicos” y a los “psicólogos”. Aunque en principio podrían parecer contrapuestas, “especulación contemplativa” y “ficción poética” acaban por coincidir (AA 913). Kreutzfeld comienza ejemplificando con el “principio de la coincidencia de los opuestos” de Giordano Bruno, de acuerdo con el cual “efectos contrarios derivan de una y la misma causa y causas opuestas producen uno y el mismo efecto”; la misma “precipitación del juicio” engaña a materialistas como Lucrecio (AA 915). De igual o parecido modo, “la teogonía de los griegos y la cosmogonía no son sino expresión simbólica y alegórica de las potencias y de los elementos del mundo” (AA 914). Y algo más adelante, tras citar el verso 364 de la *Teogonía* de Hesiodo (“pues son tres mil las Oceánides de finos tobillos que, muy repartidas...”), explica que, aunque en la realidad la naturaleza de las cosas es siempre la misma y siempre es estable en sí misma, “por la variedad de sus efectos y poderes, así como de los fenómenos, fue revestida y descrita con imágenes poéticas” (AA 915). En el mismo error caen filósofos como Pitágoras, en la medida en que confunden la cosa con los “símbolos, jeroglíficos y nombres” que la dicen (AA 927-928). Algo parecido les sucedió a los egipcios, que convirtieron a ciertos animales “en jeroglíficos vivos de los dioses, una especie de teología viva y ambulante”; y a los estoicos, “que confundieron el numen supremo del *Demiurgo* con el mismo mundo, obra suya, como si fuera su parte” (AA 929).

En la “Conclusio”, Kreutzfeld afirma no haber querido “elaborar una *hermenéutica* completa de las ficciones”, sino “investigar tanto la razón como el método” de los errores de la mente humana: “si el nombre no fuera excesivamente ambicioso podría llamarse a esto una *metafísica* de la mitología” (AA 933). A Kant, en efecto, tal empeño le pareció demasiado ambicioso, y muy poco riguroso. Y no es muy temerario aventurar que precisamente el proceso de poner de manifiesto esta doble circunstancia le ayudó a elaborar con precisión y comedimiento el vocabulario y los conceptos de los que posteriormente se servirá. Dado el carácter y la naturaleza de este escrito, resulta

exagerado referirse a él como una *aesthetica in nuce* (por decirlo tomando la expresión prestada de Johann G. Hamann), pero no lo es hablar de fases previas de la elaboración de las palabras con las que Kant reflexionará sobre cuestiones estéticas, en esos años en los que maduraba su gran proyecto crítico.

A la hora de elaborar la presente nota previa, la traducción y las notas a pie de página he consultado las siguientes ediciones del texto de Kant:

Eine bisher unbekannte lateinische Rede Kants über Sinnestäuschung und poetische Fiktion. Übersetzt und erklärt von Bernh. Adolf Schmidt. En *Kant-Studien* 16, 1911, pp. 5-21.

Entwurf zu einer Opponenten-Rede. Reflexionen zur Anthropologie (nr. 1525), en *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, Berlin/Leipzig: Walter de Gruyter, 1923, pp. 903-935 (Akad. Ausg. XV.2).⁴

Concerning Sensory Illusion and Poetic Fiction. Introduction. Translation and Notes by Ralf Meerbote. En *Kant's Latin Writings. Translations, Commentaries, and Notes.* Lewis White Beck in collaboration with Mary J. Gregor, Ralf Meerbote, John A. Reuscher. New York: Peter Lang, 1998, pp. 191-216.

Immanuel Kant / Johann Gottlieb Kreutzfeld, *Inganno e illusione. Un confronto accademico.* A cura de Maria Teresa Catena. Napoli: Guida Editore, 1998.⁵

Immanuel Kant. <Sull'illusione poetica>, en Oscar Meo, *Kantiana minora vel rariora*, Genova: Il Melangolo, 2000, pp. 113-132.

Immanuel Kant. *Sobre a ilusão poética e a poética da ilusão (Esboço de um discurso de arguição "Sobre as ficções poéticas").* Apresentação, Tradução e Notas por Leonel Ribeiro dos Santos, *Estudos Kantianos* 2/2, 2014, pp. 291-313.

⁴ En nota a pie de página Adickes recoge la "sectio II" del texto de Kreutzfeld, que cito indicando la paginación de la AA.

⁵ Incluye una traducción al italiano del texto de Kreutzfeld. Catena menciona una traducción al ruso a cargo de L. Stolovitsch publicada en 1985 en el número 10 de la revista *Kantovsky Sbornik*. Mi desconocimiento de esta lengua me ha impedido consultar esta edición.

**Sobre la ilusión poética y la poética de la ilusión
(Esbozo de un discurso “Sobre las ficciones poéticas”)⁶**

[AA 15: 22, 903-935]

IMMANUEL KANT

¡Nobilísimo, ilustrísimo, excelentísimo, doctísimo varón,
doctor en Filosofía, profesor público ordinario de poética,
relator prestigiosísimo

defensor de esta Disertación!

¡Y usted, nobilísimo valedor, preclaro, docto,
queridísimo amigo!⁷

¡Disputadores ambos honorabilísimos!

Resulta sorprendente, casi increíble, la proclividad de la mente humana por las vanas ilusiones⁸ y las imágenes ficticias de las cosas,⁹ al extremo de que no sólo se deja

⁶ Acepto el título propuesto por Ribeiro dos Santos (2014: 293 ss.: “Que título dar ao texto?”). Además de un interesante estudio, el mismo Ribeiro dos Santos ofrece una panorámica sobre el origen, las ediciones y las traducciones de este texto kantiano.

⁷ Kant se dirige a Christian Jakob Kraus, que en este acto académico actuó como *respondens*, esto es, como “valedor” o “abogado defensor” de Kreutzfeld. Sobre este personaje, cfr. F. Milkowski, “Kraus, Christian Jacob”, en *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 12, 1979, pp. 681-682.

⁸ *Vana ludibria*: podría traducirse también por “vanas jugadas” o, incluso, por “vanas jugarretas”. A lo largo de todo el texto, Kant “juega” con los sentidos pasivo y activo del verbo *ludor*: desde cierto punto de vista, “jugamos” con las apariencias; desde otro, sin embargo, estas “nos la juegan” o “pueden jugarlosla”. De acuerdo con Kant, Kreutzfeld pasa por alto esta fundamental distinción, en la medida al menos en que identifica ilusión y engaño, impidiéndose de este modo comprender el sentido positivo de las apariencias, no sólo “engañosas”, sino también -algunas de ellas, por ejemplo, las poéticas- “ilusionantes”. Kreutzfeld, en efecto, dentro de una línea más o menos platónica, considera que todas las fantasías poéticas son siempre y necesariamente fuente de falsedad, nunca de verdad. Kant es mucho más sutil: de que la poesía no sea ciencia no se sigue con necesidad y automáticamente que toda poesía sea falaz y engañosa: un fraude perpetrado con la intención consciente y voluntaria de tergiversar. De acuerdo con Kant, la mente humana juega con las ficciones poéticas dejándose engañar; ahora bien, dejarse engañar es ya saber del engaño y saber del engaño es en cierto modo una forma de verdad.

engañar fácilmente, sino [905] incluso voluntariamente y con alegría. De aquí aquel conocido proverbio: “el mundo quiere ser engañado”, al que los hacedores de fraudes añaden: “luego engañémosle”. Concedo con gusto que el artificio de engañar a la incauta multitud para obtener ganancias, que la execrable sed de oro¹⁰ que enseñó a los charlatanes, a los demagogos e incluso no pocas veces a los hierofantes, son del todo ajenos al ingenio de los poetas, cuyos corazones raras veces son movidos por el deseo de oro, y de los que dice Horacio: “no hay que temer que el ánimo del poeta sea avaro, ama a su verso, no es otro su afán”.¹¹

[906] Pero hay sin embargo un género de engaño¹² que ciertamente no conlleva ganancias, pero que tampoco carece de gloria, el cual acaricia los oídos y mueve y regocija al ánimo mediante imágenes ficticias de las cosas, y al que los poetas dirigen sus obras.

Puesto que esta disertación versa exclusivamente sobre los artificios para engañar a los sentidos en tanto que están al servicio de los poetas, no será inadecuado que indique previamente algo sobre este género de engaño jocoso y sin mala intención.

Hay, en efecto, algunas imágenes de las cosas con las que la mente juega sin que estas se la jueguen, mediante las cuales el artista no conduce a los incautos al error, sino que solo pone ante los ojos la verdad adornada y revestida con los ropajes de la apariencia, la cual no oscurece su hábito interior [907] y no engaña a los inexpertos y a los crédulos con adornos e imposturas, sino que, sirviéndose de la luminosidad de los sentidos, recubre la imagen árida y seca de la verdad con el colorido de los sentidos.

Si en tales imágenes de las cosas hay algo que vulgarmente se dice que engaña, esto debería ser llamado más bien ilusión.¹³ La imagen que engaña desaparece tan pronto como

⁹ O “apariencias ficticias de las cosas” (*fictas rerum species*). Las dificultades que Oscar Meo (*ad loc.*) señala para traducir al italiano los términos que utiliza Kant para indicar las ilusiones también se le presentan al traductor al castellano: *species*, en la medida en que aparece especificada por *rerum*, parece indicar las “apariciones sensibles” a las que no corresponde nada real; *apparentia* parece apuntar a una cualidad más abstracta y general. Los deslizamientos semánticos son sin embargo constantes y uno no sabe muy bien si Kant está pensando en *Schein* o en *Erscheinung* o si todavía está gestando la distinción precisa entre estos dos conceptos.

¹⁰ Kant cita sin mencionarlo a Virgilio, *Eneida* III, 57: “auri sacra fames”

¹¹ “... vatis avarus / non temere est animus, versus amat, hoc studet unum” (*Epist.* II, 1, 119-120).

¹² *Genus fallendi*. En realidad, sin embargo, la poesía no engaña o, en todo caso, engaña solo placentera y accidentalmente y, en esta medida, no engaña en sentido estricto.

se sabe de su vanidad y carácter ilusorio; aquella con la que se juega, por el contrario, puesto que no es sino verdad fenoménica, persiste incluso cuando ha sido realmente desentrañada, a la par que mantiene al espíritu en un agradable movimiento haciendo que, por así decirlo, fluctúe en los confines entre error y verdad, halagándolo sobremanera, puesto que lo hace consciente de su sagacidad frente a las seducciones de las apariencias. La imagen que engaña, disgusta; aquella con la que se juega, place muchísimo y deleita.¹⁴ De este modo, el prestidigitador que hace juegos de naipes me atrae al principio, puesto que trata de sorprenderme fraudulentamente y pone a prueba mi perspicacia frente a su superchería [908]. Ahora bien, tan pronto como descubro el fraude, lo desdeño y, si lo repite, experimento fastidio; me repugna¹⁵ si, por el contrario, me queda oculto el fraude a la par que no creo en él, me encuentro a la vez admirado e indignado por haber sido vencido por las astucias de un impostor.

En las ilusiones ópticas, por el contrario, percibo muy bien la apariencia y estoy advertido contra el error, mas siempre, sin embargo, me deleito. Pues en tales artificios la imagen, precisamente, deleita porque no engaña, sino porque induce al error con fuerza, pero en vano.¹⁶ Así pues, las apariencias de las cosas, en tanto que engañan, producen tedio; en tanto que jugamos con ellas, satisfacción. Y tal es la diferencia entre las vulgares falacias de los sentidos y las ilusiones familiares a los poetas.

[909] En cualquier caso, la presente disertación desea derivar todos los placeres y exquisiteces del arte poético a partir de aquella fuente impura, y acepta que la mente es propensa a las vanas ilusiones hasta el extremo de que podría creerse que el corazón siente tanta más alegría cuanto más es engañado por la vanidad de las imágenes. Ahora bien, si en

¹³ *Illusio* (*Täuschung*, *Illusion*). Schmidt traduce por *spielender Schein* (imagen o apariencia juguetona o con la que se juega). Kreutzfeld no comprende que la poesía es, en efecto, *spielender Schein* y, por tanto, como apuntaba en la nota anterior, que no es engaño en sentido estricto (*Betrug*, *dolus*, *fraus*). Para la distinción entre *species quae fallit* e *illusio*, Meerbote (*ad loc.*) remite a la carta de Johann Heinrich Lambert a Kant del 13 de octubre de 1770 (AA X, pp. 103-111).

¹⁴ La ilusión, por tanto, persiste aun cuando se sepa que es, en efecto, ilusión, esto es, que en su raíz no hay nada real. Diferente es el caso del engaño, que desaparece de manera radical y definitiva una vez que el truco ha sido descubierto. Puede decirse de otra manera: en la ilusión podemos entrar y salir a voluntad; una vez que hemos sido “desengañados” no cabe, por el contrario, volver a engañarse.

¹⁵ Se trata de una referencia oculta a Horacio, *Ars* 188: “incredulus odi”

¹⁶ Las ilusiones ópticas (al igual que en otro sentido las ilusiones transcendentales) son naturales; las ilusiones poéticas, por el contrario, son artificiales.

lo que hace al tan celebrado artificio de los poetas así sucediese, me parece que el discípulo de Apolo debería callar tal arcano para no perjudicar a su arte descubriéndolo ante el vulgo y para, descubierto el engaño, no alejar indignados a los admiradores de la poesía antes capturados por su encanto.

Ciertamente, hay otra una manera de engañar a los sentidos gracias a la cual el arte poético parece llevarse la palma frente a todas las demás, y por ello incluso debe ser alabado por el filósofo, pues promueve el dominio de la mente sobre el innoble vulgo de los sentidos y en cierta medida lo prepara para obedecer a las leyes de la sabiduría.

[910] Pues tanta es la fuerza indómita de los sentidos, y tan débil el poder de la razón -la cual, ciertamente, quiere lo recto mas sólo puede imponerlo con dificultad-, que si no es posible agarrarla abiertamente, mejor entonces engatusarla con la astucia. Y esto acontece acostumbrando al ánimo a los estímulos de las letras y las artes elegantes, liberándolo así paulatinamente de los brutos deseos como de un amo agreste y furioso. El arte poético, y por esto puede ser llamado con cierto derecho un fraude piadoso,¹⁷ sirve a este propósito en no poca medida; por ello, el arte poético también se cuenta entre las artes nobles y liberales, esto es, las que promueven la libertad del ánimo, en la medida en que, apaciguando los sentidos, se la juegan a su propia avidez, y porque hace tanto más receptivos a los preceptos de la sabiduría a aquellos que han sido atraídos por su belleza y han depuesto su rudeza.¹⁸

[911] Ahora bien, ni el momento ni el lugar piden exponer lo que yo pienso sobre estas cuestiones, sino qué afirma su disertación acerca de la naturaleza de la poesía, en tanto que brota del seno de los sentidos humanos. Así pues, me limitaré a examinar aquellos puntos de esta disertación, por lo demás docta y elegante, que me han suscitado dudas, y solicito con el debido respeto que se me conceda la libertad de la que es lícito servirse en un combate lúdico, así como la licencia para atacar cualquier punto.

¹⁷ *Pia fraus*. Oscar Meo (*ad loc.*) considera que se trata de una expresión proverbial y remite a Ovidio, *Metamorfosis* IX, 711. Es tentador, sin embargo, pensar en la “noble mentira” de Platón, *República* 414 c., a menos en la medida en que Kant, como en algunas ocasiones Platón, concede a la poesía un valor instrumental.

¹⁸ Kreutzfeld ha cometido dos errores: por una parte, no distinguir entre la ilusión poética y los vulgares engaños de los sentidos; por otra, considerar que los sentidos son por naturaleza engañadores. Como consecuencia de todo ello, no consigue captar la función (instrumentalmente) educadora que tiene la poesía y, en general, las bellas artes.

I

Dado que a propósito de la presente materia podemos prescindir tranquilamente de la rigidez de los silogismos, argumentaré siguiendo un discurso libre [912]. Comenzaré con un examen general de su trabajo, antes de entrar en cuestiones específicas.

En primer lugar, en el título de su disertación veo colgada hiedra,¹⁹ pero en el mismo texto no consigo encontrar vino en venta. Su escrito se titula: “disertación filológico-poética”. Ahora bien, cualquier tratado poético necesariamente debe estar escrito en verso; así pues, una investigación sobre la Poesía no puede ser llamada poética, del mismo modo que no llamaremos escrito filosófico a una historia de la filosofía, ni tratado matemático a un encomio de la matemática. Pues el predicado, que ha sido tomado de un arte o de una ciencia, no indica el objeto, sino el modo en el que lo exponemos. Un tratado filológico-poético sería aquel que, como el famoso poema de Horacio sobre el arte poético, estuviera compuesto en verso y al mismo tiempo ilustrado con muchas notas filológicas.

[913] II

Procedo a la segunda observación general.

Debo censurar al excelentísimo autor de la disertación el haberse inmiscuido en terreno ajeno, pues aunque a lo largo de toda su disertación debería haber salido a escena como poeta, de repente actúa como filósofo. En efecto, esta misma disertación podría servir muy bien, según lo prescrito, para obtener una plaza de profesor de metafísica, con sólo modificar un poco el título, llamándola: “Disertación sobre las falacias de los sentidos y su influencia en las artes y en el conocimiento vulgar de los hombres”. De un modo ciertamente hábil y agudo el autor, de la página 3 a la 8, expone de manera general las falacias de los sentidos y acto seguido las vanas ilusiones de la mente de las que surgen: augurios, magia, astrología, politeísmo, la mezcolanza de las hipótesis filosóficas y otras muchas cosas; añade entonces aún los números pitagóricos, [914] la cábala, los Barbara y

¹⁹ En las puertas de las tabernas había colgada hiedra, planta dedicada a Baco.

Celarent de los lógicos.²⁰ Pero a propósito de todo esto puede decirse con Horacio: “pero este no es su lugar”.²¹

Los ejemplos poéticos, que, ciertamente, flotan extraños en el amplio mar,²² también podría acomodarlos a su fin un filósofo que por lo demás ignorara por completo, como los más ignorantes, qué se requiere para escribir elegante poesía.

Presumo, pues, que con tan sonoro título el autor de la disertación, mediante esta disimulada *metábasis eis állo génos*, desea ofrecer *ipso facto* un ejemplo de artificio para engañar a los sentidos.

Supongamos que el autor de la disertación, actuando como filósofo, viera defraudadas sus esperanzas: esto, sin embargo, en nada menoscabaría su honor en tanto que poeta [915] (probaría, ciertamente, que es un mal psicólogo, pero un excelentísimo poeta); verá usted, pues, que no ha presentado un texto para obtener una plaza de profesor de poética.

III

Procedo a mi tercer argumento general.

Después de establecer que las falacias de los sentidos constituyen la parte más importante del arte poético, el autor de la docta disertación compara repetidamente al poeta con el filósofo; sostiene que la suerte de ambos en este peligroso terreno es muy semejante, mientras que en realidad sus ejemplos demuestran que es completamente opuesta. Pues mientras que el poeta engaña excelentemente con la vana apariencia de los sentidos, el filósofo es engañado por ello vergonzosamente. Allí donde el poeta alcanza la corona de laureles, el filósofo cosecha la mayoría de las veces infamia, [916] y aquello que concede

²⁰ Como acertadamente señala Ribeiro dos Santos (2014: 298), Kant acusa a Kreutzfeld de generalización abusiva: el análisis de este último, en efecto, no sólo carece de esa finura y sutileza que permite distinguir entre las ilusiones poéticas y los vulgares engaños de los sentidos, sino que mete en un mismo saco cosas muy diversas. Como consecuencia de todo ello no consigue captar la especificidad de las ilusiones poéticas

²¹ “Sed nunc non erat his locus” (*Ars* 19)

²² Alusión a Virgilio, *Aen.* I, 18: “quae tamen rara nan in gurgite vasto”.

alabanzas al uno, al otro da oprobio. Con esta comparación el autor ha cometido dos errores: en primer lugar, se contradice a sí mismo comparando aquello que según su propio testimonio es opuesto; a continuación, cuando alaba a los poetas (p. 2)²³ y censura a los filósofos (pp. 8²⁴ y 10²⁵) comete injusticia contra una de las partes. Por lo que se refiere a lo primero, el filósofo es engañado por los sentidos en la medida en que no es filósofo, mientras que el poeta, por el contrario, engaña con los juegos de los sentidos precisamente en tanto que es poeta. ¿Dónde queda, pues, la similitud entre suertes tan diversas? Aquí no hay una relación de semejanza, sino de oposición. Por lo que se refiere a lo otro, a la injusticia que comete contra el filósofo, esto me parece que debe ser tanto más censurado cuanto que en esta disertación el mismo autor ha llevado a su propio terreno los riachuelos de los filósofos.

IV

El cuarto argumento general se dirige contra una afirmación del autor que se encuentra por todas las páginas de la disertación y que constituye su eje: [917] que el poeta utiliza las falacias de los sentidos como los adornos más prominentes de los poemas. Tanto la recta razón cuanto gran cantidad de importantes ejemplos contradicen abiertamente esta afirmación. En lo que hace a lo primero, las falacias de los sentidos de las que el poeta puede servirse deberían tomarse de las habituales y generalmente presentes, según la ley de

²³ En la página 2 [906] de su disertación escribe Kreutzfeld: “Todos los poetas, en ocasiones por error, más a menudo intencionalmente, toman de los engaños de los sentidos las imágenes más brillantes y los máximos ornamentos del discurso”.

²⁴ En la página 8 [913-914], Kreutzfeld acusa a algunos “metafísicos” de concluir la identidad total entre cosas a partir de lo que es una mera analogía, es decir, de hacer pasar por “especulación contemplativa” lo que en realidad es “ficción poética”. Como señalaba en la “nota introductoria”, ejemplifica con Giordano Bruno y con Lucrecio en tanto que “materialista”. Kreutzfeld cita *De rerum natura* III, 445-446: “Praeterea gigni pariter cum corpore et una / crescere sentimus pariterque senescere mentem” (“Por otra parte, sentimos que la mente es engendrada a la par que el cuerpo, y también que crece y envejece con él”): de la analogía parcial entre cuerpo y alma (pues ambos nacen y crecen en común), Lucrecio, engañado según Kreutzfeld por los sentidos, concluye que el alma es mortal y material, esto es, “en nada diferente del cuerpo”.

²⁵ En la página 10 [916] Kreutzfeld señala que los “psicólogos” caen a menudo en otro engaño de los sentidos, a saber, cuando consideran que algo internamente idéntico es diferente por mor de ciertas diferencia externas. Ejemplifica con la distinción entre *animus* y *anima*; más adelante, dirá Kant a este respecto: “Sin embargo, si esta distinción es un error, no puede atribuirse a una vulgar falacia de los sentidos, sino que se trata más bien de una hipótesis admitida conscientemente no porque parezca que así son las cosas, sino porque parecía necesaria para explicar los fenómenos de la naturaleza humana” [925]

Horacio: “La pública materia de tu derecho privado será”.²⁶ Ahora bien, las falacias habituales de los sentidos no tienen nada de placentero; en efecto, en la medida en que se habitúa a ellas, el intelecto se libera de inmediato de las mismas, y el poeta, puesto que la falacia ha desaparecido, no puede ya halagar a la mente mediante las apariencias de las cosas, en la medida en que contienen falacias.

En lo que hace a lo otro, los ejemplos aducidos de los poetas, me parece que prueban lo contrario; bastará con mencionar aquellos que el mismo autor cita en la página 12,²⁷ de los cuales se desprende que los poetas, poetizan lo que poetizan, lo recubren con la mayor [918] luminosidad sensible posible. A tal fin, no sólo utilizan las falacias de los sentidos, sino que más bien las emplean únicamente porque la apariencia de la cosa, que debe reproducir la naturaleza con la mayor fidelidad posible, no puede prescindir de ellas. Esto se pone de manifiesto en el ejemplo de Virgilio que usted aduce, donde el poeta, para aumentar la admiración por la obra de Vulcano y para mover el ánimo mediante estímulos sensibles que toma de todas partes, nombra muchas cosas que no resultan pertinentes cuando se trata de fabricar un escudo, por ejemplo...²⁸ A partir de aquí, puede ver usted que el poeta sólo desea revestir sus pensamientos fundamentales con una gran cantidad de imágenes adherentes, entre las cuales sólo accidentalmente se encuentran las apariencias falaces, pues el poeta no puede prescindir de ellas si desea pintar una imagen viva.

²⁶ “Publica materies privati iuris erit” (*Ars* 131)

²⁷ En la página 12 [918-919] Kreuzfeld cita el poema *El Mosela* de Décimo Magno Ausonio, en el que se describen diversos paisajes atravesados por este río: en concreto los versos 194-196 “Tota natant crispis iuga motibus; et tremit absens / Pampinus, et vitreis vindemia turget in undis; / Adnumerat virides derisus navita vites” (“Montañas enteras nadan con encrespado movimiento; y, ausente aún, tiembla / el pámpano, y en olas de vidrio se hincha la uva; / engañado cuenta el marinero las verdes vides”). A continuación, sin indicar el autor, menciona dos versos, ambos de Virgilio, el primero tomado de *Bucólicas* I, 52: “*frigus opacum, pro frígida umbra*” (“*frio umbroso, por sombras frías*”); el segundo, de *Geórgicas* IV, 468: “*caligari formidae lucum, pro lucum caligine sua formidem excitare*” (“*el bosque se oscurece de espanto, por la oscuridad del bosque produce espanto*”). Finalmente, *Eneida* VIII, 429-432, esos versos en los que Virgilio canta cómo los Cíclopes forjan el escudo de Eneas: “Tris imbris torti radios, tris nubis aquosae / Addiderant, rutili tris ignis, et alitis austri; / Fulgores nunc horribíficos, sonitumque metumque / Miscebat operi, flammisque sequacibus iras”, en la traducción de A. Espinosa Pólit: “Habían ya trenzado doce radios, / tres de agua hecha granizo, tres de lluvia, / tres de fuego, otros tanto de austro alígero, / y le estaban mezclando aterradores / chispazos y retumbos, y el espanto / que vuela en pos de las furentes llamas”.

²⁸ Schmidt (*ad loc.*) sugiere que en este momento Kant citaría en voz alta los versos de la *Eneida* mencionados en la nota anterior, para así mostrar que en muchas ocasiones los poetas dan características intelectuales y morales a objetos inanimados.

[919] Paso ahora al segundo género de argumentos; examinaré en concreto algunos punto de su disertación y, con su permiso, anotaré algunos óbelos.²⁹

El párrafo 1 comienza así: ...³⁰

El autor de la disertación [920] expone en las dos partes de su obra que el ánimo humano debe ser instruido originariamente por los sentidos, y que de esta instrucción surgen al mismo tiempo las primeras incitaciones hacia el arte poético. En la primera parte afirma que los sentidos son los maestros, mientras que en esta segunda parte dice que son impostores; en ambas partes, sin embargo, afirma que son usados de manera excelente y elegantemente. ¿Cómo concuerdan ambas cosas? Si somos engañados por los sentidos, no somos instruidos por ellos. Si el conocimiento humano es adulterado por las falacias, ¿qué será el poeta, que comercia con ellas, sino un engañador?

Señalo ως εν παροδω [de pasada] que la expresión “disciplinamiento de los sentidos” que aparece en la primera parte de la disertación está usada en un sentido del todo erróneo. Pues entre los antiguos los sentidos nunca disciplinan, sino que son disciplinados en la medida en que son sometidos [921] al imperio de la mente.³¹ A este fin servían los ejercicios telestésicos, antaño tan extendidos.

Podría usted en todo caso hablar de una instrucción mediante los sentidos, en la medida en que ellos dan los primeros elementos del conocimiento. Pero dejo a un lado esta cuestión.

En el párrafo 3, el excelentísimo autor considera falacias de los sentidos muchas cosas que, creo, no deben considerarse tales: la magia, los augurios, la astrología, etc. Sólo debe considerarse falacias de los sentidos aquello que creo ver con los ojos o aprehender de algún modo con un sentido, aunque en realidad tan sólo es un error del juicio

²⁹ Kant utiliza la expresión *virgula censoria*, esto es, el signo utilizado para indicar, en los manuscritos antiguos, pasos sospechosos de estar corrompidos o ser falsos.

³⁰ “Ya hemos mostrado que la disciplina de los sentidos, de los que toda cognición humana se sirve como de los primeros guías y maestros, es la primera fuente de las ficciones; ahora pasamos a las falacias de los sentidos, un segundo principio de las fantasías” [906].

³¹ Schmidt (*ad loc.*) señala que sólo puede hablarse de *sensuum disciplina* si se entiende *sensuum* como genitivo objetivo: disciplinamiento (educación, instrucción...) de los sentidos; tal habría sido, de acuerdo con Kant, el error de Kreutzfeld: haber considerado un genitivo objetivo como uno subjetivo.

precipitado. Ahora bien, si sé con certeza que no percibo algo, sino que soy consciente de que, o bien conjeturando o bien racionando de algún modo, establezco algo sobre lo percibido, esto, aunque erróneo, no puede ser llamado falacias de los sentidos (vulgarmente es llamado ente de la razón racionante).³² Así, la superstición no consiste en ver y leer signos fatídicos en el vuelo de las aves o en la posición de los astros [922], sino que el hombre, hecho por naturaleza para vivir en común con entes inteligentes y movido por el miedo o por el deseo, está inclinado a creer erróneamente en la influencia de poderes invisibles que dirigen su destino: a esto llamamos superstición; así, supone espontáneamente que puede desvelar aquello que un genio o un demon han manifestado con signos velados, con tal de que pueda descifrar tales signos, y de que también puede relacionarse de algún modo con ellos, de donde ha surgido tanto la magia como la astrología. Los sentidos, por el contrario, en tanto que guías fieles, lejos de sumergir al hombre en estos errores, lo sacan continuamente de ellos y, mediante la experiencia, lo liberan completamente de ellos.³³

Prosigo con el párrafo 9, página 9.

[923] El excelentísimo autor considera aquí que también son falacias de los sentidos la multiplicación innecesaria de los entes y la precipitada inclinación a derivar fenómenos en cierto modo diferentes a partir de múltiples causas igualmente diferentes según el género, de donde surgiría la multitud de poderes divinos de la teogonía y la cosmología griegas. Sin embargo, originariamente esto no fueron errores vulgares surgidos de las ilusiones de los sentidos, sino invenciones intencionadas de los poetas, como atestigua Aristóteles, el cual, en la *Metafísica*, tras decir: “una naturaleza divina no puede ser envidiosa”, añade: “pero los poetas, como dice el proverbio, mienten mucho” (*Mtf.* 983 a). Los poetas, en efecto, hacen todo lo que está en sus manos para poner en movimiento a la mente y encantarla mediante la fuerza unida de las sensaciones; por ello han infundido vida a todas las partes de la naturaleza, repartiendo los fenómenos [924] bajo diferentes

³² *Entia rationis ratiocinatis*. De acuerdo con Kant, pues, Kreutzfeld no ha comprendido que el error no es de los sentidos, sino del juicio. Algunos autores ven en estas líneas un embrión de la crítica del *Schein* transcendental.

³³ Ribeiro dos Santos remite a los §§ 8-11 de la *Antropología* (AA 7, pp. 143-145).

dominios divinos: no han sido, por tanto, seducidos por otros, sino que ellos mismos han sido los fabricantes del engaño.³⁴

Pero no deseo demorarme en estas cuestiones; vayamos al párrafo 20.

El autor afirma aquí de nuevo que los filósofos, al igual que la plebe, son víctimas de las malas jugadas de los sentidos, entre las cuales incluye la distinción, tan extendida entre los antiguos, entre *anima* y *animus*. Sin embargo, si esta distinción es un error, no puede atribuirse a una vulgar falacia de los sentidos, sino que se trata más bien de una hipótesis admitida conscientemente no porque parezca que así son las cosas, sino porque parecía necesaria para explicar los fenómenos de la naturaleza humana. Y dudo de si los psicólogos, que respecto de esta dudosa cuestión se conducen de manera temeraria y audaz, deben ser llamados, como hace el autor, sobrios y cuerdos o más bien embriagados e intoxicados por el vino de la *philautia*. Ciertamente, en nuestro tiempo, el celeberrimo Unzer, en el libro *Physiologie [926] der thierischen Natur thierischer Korper*,³⁵ así como el sabio inglés Morgan, en su libro *De Natura Nervorum*, que muy pronto aparecerá en versión alemana,³⁶ recurren a la explicación en términos de una vida doble como a un ancla sagrada. Así pues, puede ver que aquí no emerge una vulgar falacia de los sentidos [927], sino una hipótesis no indigna de un filósofo (si bien errónea). Sigo con el párrafo 15, página 15.

³⁴ *Sed ipsi doli fabricatores*: los poetas no son generadores de ilusión (*illusio*) sino fabricantes conscientes y con intención de un engaño (*dolus*).

³⁵ Adickes (*ad loc.*) informa de que Kant menciona, de manera inexacta, la obra de Johann August Unzer titulada *Erste Gründe einer Physiologie der eigentliche thierischer Natur thierischer Körper* (1771). El mismo Adickes explica que, de acuerdo con Unzer, por “*eigentlichen thierischen Kräfte*” (fuerzas real, auténticamente, animales) deben entenderse las específicas fuerzas motrices que caracterizan a los animales vivientes; tales fuerzas tienen su sede en el cerebro y en los nervios y, de acuerdo con Unzer, están en condiciones de provocar movimientos que siguen su propia legalidad y que no cabe explicar ni a partir de leyes físico-mecánicas ni a partir de la influencia del alma.

³⁶ Tras señalar que ha sido incapaz de dar con una obra de este título y de este autor, Adickes (*ad loc.*) conjetura que acaso Kant pudiera estar refiriéndose a libro de Samuel Musgrave *Speculations and conjectures on the qualities of the nerves*, publicado en 1776 y traducido ese mismo año al alemán con el título *Betrachtungen über die Nerven und Nervenkrankheiten*. Adickes explica que aunque Musgrave se oponía a las consideraciones puramente materialistas de acuerdo con las cuales los fenómenos corporales podían ser suficientemente explicados en términos de causas mecánicas y químico-físicas, consideraba que todas las enfermedades del cuerpo humano lo eran de los nervios: los nervios, en efecto, son el lugar y el origen de toda fuerza vital y por eso la medicina es una ciencia autónoma e independiente que no puede reducirse ni a mecánica ni a química.

Aquí, el autor cree haber encontrado en la historia de la poesía un notable fenómeno y haber resuelto un enigma digno de Edipo, a saber, que el amor de Petrarca por Laura surgió durante un acto de adoración.³⁷ Me parece sin embargo que es vano su esfuerzo por explicar [928] la castidad, la vehemencia y la constancia de este amor a partir de su propio principio. Aquí, ciertamente, sólo se necesita un Davo, no un Edipo.³⁸ Es fácil, en efecto, distinguir entre el amor físico y el poético. El amor físico es la concupiscencia por la persona amada; del poeta, sin embargo, dice Horacio: “ama sus versos, no es otro su afán”.³⁹ El poeta busca una descripción bella del amor, que alcanza tanto mejor cuanto más alejado está de una relación cotidiana con el objeto amado. De este modo, cuando Petrarca vio por vez primera a su Laura, no quedó capturado y hechizado por su belleza, [929] sino que cuando se le presentó a su ánimo, ya conmovido por la solemne festividad, una bella figura que además murmuraba preces y oraciones religiosamente prostrada, entonces nació repentinamente en él la idea de que esto podría ser materia idónea para sus versos. Después de que, por así decirlo, le hubo sacudido esta idea, nunca intentó conseguir a Laura para sí, sino que, para poder prolongar tanto más los lamentos y los suspiros, huyó de sus abrazos, sumergiéndose en su dolor poético, esto es, ficticio y aparente, y de aquí, también, que, sin recurrir a la hipótesis de alguna falacia de los sentidos, sean suficiente y fácilmente comprensibles la castidad y la santidad, tan alabadas por autor, así como el carácter un tanto etéreo [930] del amor que respiran sus poemas. Cuando abraza una nube en lugar de a Juno, embellece a su modo, esto es, entusiásticamente, el simulacro que ya había concebido en su mente, sin preocuparse por lo demás de Laura, sino de la elegancia y el ardor de sus versos, así como de la celebridad de su nombre.

Conocerá usted la conversación de Petrarca con el Papa. Cuando en cierta ocasión este le dijo que lamentaba su dolor y que procuraría que se casase con Laura, el poeta, al principio, vaciló, pero después lo rechazó diciendo que si se casaba con Laura, sus versos perderían todo su ardor y elegancia.

³⁷ Kreutzfeld dice lo siguiente: “¿Quién no comprende que la santidad lugar donde [Petrarca] vio a Laura, y aquel tiempo místico así como la llama celestial que se habían apoderado de la que oraba fueron transferidas a Laura, de suerte que apareció a Petrarca más santa, similar a la Madre de Dios” [923], y explica a continuación que en este caso el error de los sentidos surgió al (y por) fusionar la imagen de Laura con la del lugar y el momento en el que oraba.

³⁸ Davo es un esclavo, personaje de la comedia de Terencio *Andria*: tras no comprender, o no querer comprender, una serie de alusiones de su amo, exclama: “Davos sum, non Oedipus” (v. 194).

³⁹ “versus amat, hoc studet unum” (*Epist.* II, 1, 119-120).

[931] En el matrimonio sucede lo que Lucrecio dice de la muerte: “ahora irrumpen las verdaderas palabras, cae la máscara y queda la realidad”.⁴⁰

Voy concluyendo. Si en otros muchos asuntos en los que hemos chocado el terreno en disputa quedaba fuera del alcance de los dardos, ahora debo tomar partido contra un lugar de la disertación que puede remover el estomago del lógico en tanto que filósofo. Después de haber tratado abundantemente de esas falacias de los sentidos por medio de las cuales transferimos erróneamente a los signos la fuerza y las capacidades de lo designado, el excelentísimo autor, al final del párrafo 18, prosigue: etc., etc.⁴¹

[932] ¿No deberá el autor, con tal acusación, temer la ira de las avispas que ha irritado? Pues el gremio de los lógicos es, en efecto, belicoso, al punto de no dejar impune a quien lo provoca. Y aquí, ciertamente, se les acusa erróneamente de fraude. En efecto, los lógicos no prometen fórmulas en las que habite una fuerza grande y oculta para atrapar verdades de todo género, como aquí se les ha imputado, sino que se limitan a señalar el mecanismo para la posición de los términos en los silogismos, para, al igual que hacen los gramáticos a propósito de las lenguas, poner de manifiesto lo general en el uso del intelecto, esto es, la fórmula general para designar conocimientos, totalmente al margen de la materia contenida en ellos.⁴² Lo cual, en efecto, en modo alguno resulta pertinente aquí. De que dos [933] hagan lo mismo, no se sigue que sea lo mismo. El lógico combate amistosamente con el lógico. Pero cuando irrumpe un enemigo externo, todos arremeten contra él en posición de batalla.

⁴⁰ “Tum demum verae voces voces eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res”. Kant cita incorrectamente Lucrecio III, 57-58: “nam verae voces tum demum pectore ab imo / eliciuntur et eripitur persona, manet res” (“pues entonces son sinceras las voces que brotan del fondo de su pecho; se arranca la máscara y queda la realidad”, en la traducción de Eduard Valentí Fiol). Schmidt (*ad loc.*) señala que Kant cita el mismo pasaje en su *Antropología* I, § 78 (AA VII, p. 180) en un lugar que guarda cierta similitud con el presente. Kant vuelve a mencionar estos versos de Lucrecio en el *Opus postumum* (AA XXI, p. 142), en el contexto de una explicación del término latino *persona*.


⁴¹ En los párrafos 16-18 Kreutzfeld se ocupa de los errores que surgen cuando se atribuyen a los signos características que son propias de lo designado. Tras apuntar algunas víctimas de este error, de los pitagóricos a místicos modernos como Böhme o Swedenborg, al final del párrafo 18 escribe como sigue: “De manera no muy diferente, los lógicos escolásticos más recientes han quedado fascinados por la posición de los términos silogísticos, *barbara, celarent* etc., y, ciertamente, hasta tal punto que, dejando a un lado el nexo interno de las proposiciones, atribuyen a tales, por así decirlo, tormentos del ingenio una fuerza enorme y oculta para atrapar verdades de todo tipo” [929].

⁴² Oscar Meo (*ad loc.*) remite al examen de la “lógica del uso general del intelecto” de § I de la “Introducción” a la “Lógica transcendental” de la *Crítica de la razón pura*.

Pongo fin al certamen, pues la materia ya está agotada. En primer lugar, me congratulo de todo corazón por la tarea que usted ha llevado a cabo tan felizmente. A continuación, excelentísimo señor, que se está preparando egregiamente para atender a la Esparta que ha conquistado,⁴³ le deseo que su trabajo tenga un feliz comienzo y que prosiga favorablemente. Docto en extremo en las bellas letras, lector y culto juez de poetas de diversas lenguas, tanto antiguas como más recientes, entregado al cultivo de los espléndidos ejemplos que sobre todo nos han legado los griegos: por todo ello, sólo cabe esperar que usted abra a la juventud académica un vasto campo para cultivar el ingenio, de suerte que, lejos de toda barbarie, se alíe con las Gracias sin despertar la envidia de Minerva, protectora de las ciencias y las artes más útiles. Deseando que sus esfuerzos [934] y méritos sean también remunerados con la felicidad doméstica y que el numen supremo conserve su vida y su salud, confío asimismo en su benevolencia y en su amistad.

Finalmente, me dirijo a usted, eximio valedor, pertrechado por la naturaleza con un ánimo egregio, poseedor de ricos conocimientos tanto en las bellas letras como en las útiles, merecedor de ser amado por su manera de ser y que desde hace tiempo se encuentra entre mis mejores oyentes. Le felicito de todo corazón por esta muestra de ingenio y de doctrina que usted ha dado de un modo tan digno de alabanza. Y ojalá llegue el momento en el que, de acuerdo con sus méritos, la semilla que usted ha esparcido tan infatigablemente sea recompensada con una abundante cosecha. Deseo asimismo una rápida y feliz satisfacción de las expectativas que con derecho alberga.⁴⁴ Por lo demás, pido al numen supremo que lo proteja y lo cuide.

Salud y suerte para los dos.



⁴³ Posible referencia a Cicerón, *ad Att.* IV, 6, que cita a su vez un verso del *Telefo* de Eurípides: Σπάρταν ἐλαχεῖς ταυταν κοσμεῖ (“has salvado Esparta, adórnala ahora”).

⁴⁴ Expectativas que se vieron satisfechas en 1781, cuando Kraus obtuvo la plaza de profesor de filosofía práctica en la universidad de Königsberg.

Uso posible del esquematismo kantiano para una teoría de la percepción¹

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NOTA DE LA TRADUCTORA.— En la *Fenomenología de la Percepción*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty hace una referencia un tanto sorprendente a Kant al afirmar, en un pasaje dedicado a la geometría, que la localización de los objetos en el espacio utiliza, según el filósofo de Königsberg, la motricidad del cuerpo (cf. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Fenomenología de la Percepción*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 1957, p. 424). Merleau-Ponty no ofrece ninguna cita de Kant a lo largo del pasaje, sino que remite a los lectores a dos escritos de Pierre Lachièze-Rey. El texto que se ofrece a continuación es la traducción de uno de ellos. Esperamos que permita no sólo contextualizar la afirmación de Merleau-Ponty, sino también poner de relieve la pertinencia de la obra de Lachièze-Rey para ciertos debates actuales sobre la naturaleza de la percepción en la filosofía kantiana, como por ejemplo el debate entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas o aquel acerca del papel del cuerpo propio. (Véase al respecto el artículo de Samantha Matherne, “Kantian Themes in

¹ El equipo editor de *Con-textos kantianos* y la traductora del texto al español agradecen a la revista *Les Études philosophiques* y a *Presses Universitaires de France* el permiso concedido para publicar esta traducción.

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Merleau-Ponty's Theory of Perception", de próxima aparición en *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*.)

La versión del texto que se recoge aquí fue publicada en 1937 en la revista *Les Études philosophiques* (n.º 3/4) y leída posteriormente en un congreso en Marsella en 1938. (Merleau-Ponty cita una edición impresa para la realización del congreso.) Lachière-Rey escribió después una versión ampliada, publicada en 1939 en el *Journal de psychologie normale et pathologique* e incluida en la segunda edición de su obra *Le moi, le monde et Dieu* (1950).

* * *

La percepción constituye un conjunto orgánico que pertenece a una conciencia. Este conjunto, que es un conjunto para sí, no puede sustituirse, para considerarlo como equivalente, por un conjunto que no existe sino en sí o para un espectador ajeno, conjunto cuya estructura sería biológica o física, pero no psicológica. Se debe, pues, considerar ilusoria la pretensión de haber dilucidado la estructura de la percepción al explicar o describir, de una manera por lo demás más o menos hipotética, la génesis de este conjunto con la que se lo habría reemplazado. Una explicación o una descripción de la génesis de la percepción no puede instituirse sino en el interior del espíritu.

Pero en el interior del espíritu, el asociacionismo –o cualquier otra doctrina de este tipo– es completamente incapaz de proporcionar la solución buscada porque la asociación, lejos de explicar la estructura, la supone. Y por otra parte, no se puede llegar a un resultado satisfactorio considerando la percepción como una forma autorrealizadora, como una finalidad de conjunto inmanente a sus propios términos, si dicha autorrealización y dicha finalidad se producen o actúan de alguna manera en el sujeto como extrañas a él, mediante un proceso al que éste se contenta de asistir, que no determina y del que percibe únicamente los resultados. La percepción, como estructura realizada, remite necesariamente a una estructura realizante y a principios espirituales de constitución. Ahora bien, dichas estructuras organizadoras fundamentales no pueden considerarse como puramente intelectuales; son inevitablemente solidarias con una realización intuitiva formal en la que deben traducirse y encarnarse antes de incorporarse los datos sensibles. Y

por eso no parece haber una edificación posible de la percepción sino de manera conforme al esquematismo kantiano.

No basta, en efecto, con afirmar que no puede existir una lectura empírica que se apoye en la significación, la inteligibilidad, la esencia, la modalidad existencial y la función de los términos cuyo conjunto forma el sistema de lo representado en el seno de la representación, y que todas esas determinaciones dependen de un determinante que es el espíritu mismo, según la famosa fórmula “no se encuentra en el objeto sino lo que se ha introducido en él”. Hace falta, al plantear así la necesidad de recurrir a un proceso centrífugo, aprehender también la realidad. Ahora bien, el esquematismo es el que nos proporciona aquí el instrumento indispensable porque, sea que vehicule una intención superior como en el caso de la permanencia con relación a la categoría de substancia o el de la sucesión irreversible con relación a la categoría de causalidad, sea que se confunda con dicha intención misma como cuando se trata de un concepto matemático tal como el del círculo o el del triángulo, el esquema es siempre una ley de realización intuitiva gracias a la cual se establece una continuidad entre las iniciativas originarias del espíritu y los objetos finalmente representados. Sin el esquema, el entendimiento dejaría de ser transcendental, es decir constituyente, para verse reducido a simples operaciones empíricas de abstracción y de comparación concernientes a datos cuya estructura formal y cuyas relaciones serían ininteligibles.

La terminología de Kant por lo que respecta al tema de la percepción es bastante fluctuante, tal como lo hemos mostrado en nuestro trabajo sobre el idealismo kantiano, pero la terminología importa poco aquí. Lo que se puede afirmar es que la teoría kantiana de la experiencia es exactamente una teoría de la percepción. La serie de las operaciones constituyentes en las que se afirma –y ello precisamente bajo la forma del esquematismo– la solidaridad de las intenciones categoriales y las realizaciones intuitivas está presente en el seno de toda percepción efectiva. Y si el kantismo desarrolla su tesis en el terreno de la teoría del conocimiento descomponiendo la percepción en factores cuya introducción justifica por la colaboración necesaria que aportan al conjunto del sistema, dicha teoría del conocimiento es inmediatamente transponible al terreno psicológico mediante una efectuación directa de todos los actos de construcción o de posición cuya exigencia ha formulado.

Por lo demás, no es solamente el esquematismo categorial el que pertenece a una teoría de la percepción. Más allá, por decirlo así, de este esquematismo, se puede considerar aquél que concierne a la posición respectiva del sujeto percipiente y del objeto percibido en el sistema de la experiencia. Decimos “posición” –y entendemos este término en sentido activo–, dado que es, efectivamente, así como se presentan las cosas en la perspectiva kantiana. El espacio considerado en sí mismo y tomado de manera aislada no proporcionaría sino el “fuera de mí” en el sentido de la alteridad. El yo y el fuera de mí son dos intenciones correlativas y solidarias que son las únicas que pueden dar al espacio la significación de una forma de exterioridad; e inversamente, sin la intervención del espacio, la intención de la posición correlativa del yo y del no yo, desprovista de todo instrumento de realización intuitiva, no podría encarnarse en ninguna manifestación concreta y no llegaría siquiera a la conciencia de sí.

Se ve que en una concepción tal, la percepción implica tres términos: el yo que pone, el yo puesto y el objeto situado en correlación y en interacción con él, siendo los dos últimos introducidos por el yo que pone en una misma forma de exterioridad que es el espacio. Ella aparece así como un acto indefinidamente renovable porque depende de una ley dinámica de organización, lo que, entre paréntesis, hace particularmente fácil la interpretación de la conciencia de la identidad del recuerdo, es decir, el reconocimiento. Por otra parte, para esta inserción en el espacio (y también en el tiempo), el sujeto se toma prestado él mismo a sí mismo, por así decirlo, de manera tal que su modo de existencia como yo puesto se encuentra claramente definido. Es, como diría Leibniz, *phaenomenon bene fundatum*, puesto que, cosa en sí por sus orígenes, despliega la forma espacio-temporal para manifestarse en ella, y debe, por consiguiente, aparecerse en el terreno de la percepción bajo las características de dicha forma. Y este modo de existencia, tomado así de una manera intuitiva en la constitución del sujeto, se extiende al objeto, o más exactamente, al mundo de los objetos situados al mismo nivel que él y considerados en relación con él. Por allí pueden resolverse la mayor parte de las cuestiones difíciles e irritantes que conciernen a las relaciones de la exterioridad y la alteridad, de la inferencia y la percepción directa, y por último, el problema de la creencia en la realidad del objeto del sentido externo.

Sin embargo, es al tratarse de la localización que la fecundidad del esquematismo puede ponerse especialmente de relieve.

A menudo se le ha reprochado a Kant no poder, mediante su teoría de las formas *a priori* de la sensibilidad, dar cuenta de la forma particular de los objetos y de la localización de las cualidades sensibles en el ámbito general de la percepción. Pero es fácil ver, por el contrario, que dicha teoría permite fácilmente responder al problema planteado y que ella es, incluso, la única que puede hacerlo. La mayoría de los psicólogos reconocen hoy, en efecto, que no se puede comprender la localización sino admitiendo, en el interior de la percepción, una diferencia funcional entre lo distribuido y el instrumento de la distribución, y consideran asimismo, de manera general, que el órgano de la distribución no puede ser sino el movimiento. Pero el movimiento es incapaz de prestar el servicio que se le pide si se lo considera como un movimiento en sí o como reducido al matiz cualitativo que pertenece a las sensaciones musculares. Para servir de instrumento a la localización, hace falta que encubra intrínsecamente la inmanencia de una trayectoria espacial que es la única que puede permitir pensarlo como movimiento, y de esta manera nos vemos conducidos nuevamente al esquematismo. Por otra parte, hace falta recordar que, en Kant, el espacio y el tiempo no son en absoluto, en el estado originario, espacio espacializado y tiempo temporalizado, pluralidades desplegadas *partes extra partes*, sino espacio espacializante y tiempo temporalizante, potencia o intención de desarrollar el espacio y el tiempo. Dicha intención no puede realizarse sino por medio de la motricidad del cuerpo que le sirve de instrumento. Y cuando el órgano motor es al mismo tiempo un órgano sensible, las sensaciones vienen a situarse naturalmente, a medida que son sentidas, a lo largo de la trayectoria así descrita.

Se hace entonces fácil responder a la famosa objeción de Berkeley según la cual la localización no puede ser operada por medio de una conciencia angular o de una conciencia de la dirección, dado que no existe una conciencia tal. Dicha objeción ha sido frecuentemente reproducida y considerada como decisiva. Ahora bien, ella no puede formularse sino desde el punto de vista de un empirismo que pretende obligarnos a leer una determinación geométrica en un simple dato cualitativo para poder decirnos a continuación que una lectura tal es imposible. En realidad, la dirección y la separación angular son intenciones *a priori* que pasan al estado de representadas por medio de la motricidad del

cuerpo, y la situación de toda sensación que viene a producirse entonces está determinada de antemano por dichas intenciones previas. Se dirá, quizás, que la localización se presenta a veces bajo una forma que se podría calificar de pasiva, sin haber sido precedida por ninguna intención. Pero aparte de que una aserción tal es muy discutible y de que habría que probar la ausencia de toda operación espiritual activa de orientación en el seno de dicha localización, la dificultad planteada puede recibir fácilmente una solución. En efecto, la sensación muscular, la sensación de postura o cualquier otra sensación a la que se quiera conferir el carácter de signo local ya no es aquí un absoluto: se ha visto ligada anteriormente, en otras circunstancias, a una de esas intenciones espacializantes de las que hemos hablado. Puede, pues, cumplir ahora sin dificultad el rol revelador que se le atribuye, incluso si dicha intención está actualmente ausente. Lo que hace inadmisibles cualquier teoría de los signos locales bajo cualquier forma en que se presente, lo que la conduce necesariamente a la magia natural de Reid, es que el espíritu debe interpretar en ella un signo que no ha constituido como tal. Pero aquí es completamente diferente, dado que la sensación a la que se atribuye el papel de servir de signo obtiene su privilegio del hecho de que ha acompañado a una operación activa. Recibe su luz de allí, y es, por consiguiente, del espíritu mismo que ha recibido su significación.

Por último, para que la percepción no se mantenga indeterminada, hace falta que las sensaciones no vengán a situarse a lo largo de cualquier trayectoria que el espíritu haya descrito espontánea o voluntariamente, sino que sean sentidas por él en la efectuación de una trayectoria única. Dicha condición es realizada gracias a la resistencia táctil, y solamente gracias a ella. Pero se debe subrayar que ésta no revela una forma espacial; ella no hace sino limitar lo arbitrario del espíritu en la construcción de sus formas. La curvatura, la rectitud, la desviación son diseños motores que constituyen otras tantas manifestaciones particulares del espacio espacializante. El recorrido descriptivo del contorno de un objeto lleva constantemente en sí un esquema realizador que es como una hipótesis permanente a la que la resistencia, continua o interrumpida, sentida o perdida, viene simplemente a aportar, en cada instante, confirmación o desmentido.



Antropología en sentido pragmático,
un fundado tratado práctico para la vida en sociedad

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,
a well-founded practical treatise for life in society

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Reseña: Kant, Immanuel, *Antropología en sentido pragmático*, prólogo de Reinhard Brandt, traducción de Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva, Peter Storandt, notas, tabla de correspondencias y bibliografía de Dulce María Granja, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México D. F., 2014, pp. 749. ISBN: 9786072801301

La *Antropología en sentido pragmático* es una de esas obras en las que parece más simple imaginarse a Kant como un profesor universitario, realmente presente frente a un público aún no especializado. Reinhard Brandt en el prólogo a esta nueva edición bilingüe (alemán-español) presenta a la *Antropología* como un tratado práctico que Kant ofreció a sus alumnos, dedicado a orientar su futura experiencia en el mundo. Publicada por el mismo Kant en 1798, es el producto de las lecciones de antropología y antropología pragmática que impartió entre 1772-1773 y 1795-1796 en la Albertus-Universität Königsberg. La gran variedad de temas que se tratan en esta obra, teniendo en cuenta que se gestó desde el período pre-crítico de Kant, atravesó el período crítico y su publicación es posterior incluso a la *Metafísica de las costumbres*, hacen del texto de la *Antropología* un

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material que enriquece y completa en gran medida la interpretación de la filosofía crítica kantiana en su conjunto.

La traducción a cargo de Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva y Peter Störand que ofrece esta nueva entrega de la Biblioteca Immanuel Kant está basada en el texto de la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* que establece la edición de la Academia (*Kant's Gesammelte Schriften „Akademieausgabe“*, Königlich Preußische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol VII, Berlín, 1907, pp. 117-133). No obstante, el manuscrito original de esta obra existe aún. Debido a las variantes en el proceso de las sucesivas ediciones respecto al manuscrito, los traductores de esta nueva edición española incorporaron algunas de las modificaciones que Reinhard Brandt planteó en su *Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* (1999). La “Advertencia editorial” sostiene que dichas modificaciones fueron tomadas cuando “ellas le dan mayor coherencia sintáctica, semántica, conceptual y argumentativa del texto” (p. XVII) tanto al interior de la *Antropología* como en su relación con otros textos del *corpus* kantiano.

Esta nueva edición, considerablemente más voluminosa que las existentes hasta el momento en lengua española, permite contextualizar la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* de un modo muy completo y esclarecedor. A continuación de la traducción, se presentan varias secciones destinadas a ampliar y profundizar la lectura del texto original. Algunas vuelven más permeable la letra de Kant para los lectores no especializados (como las “Notas a la traducción” y la “Cronología”), otras pueden resultar una excelente herramienta para los estudiosos del pensamiento del filósofo de Königsberg (como la “Tabla de correspondencias de traducción de términos” y el “Índice onomástico”).


En la sección denominada “Notas a la traducción” Dulce María Granja ha realizado un minucioso y a la vez amplio trabajo con dos objetivos fundamentales: “contribuir a una mejor comprensión del texto original” (p. XX) y arrojar luz sobre un Kant a menudo desconocido “fino conocedor de la psicología y la cultura de los diversos pueblos así como de la historia, las biografías, las bellas artes en general y la literatura en especial” (p. XX). De modo tal que las notas ofrecen comentarios aclaratorios, identifican citas y referencias onomásticas e intentan, en gran medida, reconstruir el contexto histórico, el ambiente literario y las alusiones biográficas correspondientes a cada uno de los numerosos ejemplos propuestos por Kant a lo largo de la obra. Las notas serán excelentes herramientas tanto

para el lector poco especializado como para el especialista, ya que colaboran a bosquejar el universo del pensador prusiano y además proponen a cada paso consultar otras obras kantianas. La lectura de la *Antropología* acompañada de las notas abre un vasto panorama al Kant intelectual de su época (conocedor de la literatura inglesa, italiana y francesa que le fue contemporánea) y a su pensamiento filosófico como sistema. Las referencias a otros textos kantianos en los que se desarrollan los mismos temas, tal vez de un modo más detallado y riguroso que en la *Antropología*, habilitan múltiples relaciones posibles entre sus grandes obras, minuciosamente redactadas, y sus lecciones, al tiempo que descubren ejemplos o explicaciones para algunos de sus oscuros desarrollos conceptuales.

Otra ventaja de esta nueva edición de la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* es que incluye una “Tabla de correspondencias de traducción de términos”. Dicha tabla presenta en paralelo siete traducciones para más de cuatrocientos términos alemanes que aparecen en esta obra kantiana. Compara las elecciones que hicieron dos traducciones italianas: la de Giovanni Vivardi (1921) y la de Pietro Chiodi (1970); dos traducciones francesas: la de Michel Foucault (1961) y la de Pierre Jalabert (1980); una traducción inglesa: la de Mary J. Gregor (1974) y dos traducciones españolas: la de José Gaos (1935) y la que se presenta en este volumen, de Dulce María Granja, Gustavo Leyva y Peter Storandt. Dicha tabla constituye una herramienta invaluable para el estudioso de la obra kantiana, quien podrá descubrir problemas terminológicos al conocer las traducciones realizadas por los especialistas a otros idiomas, así como podrá resolver o encontrar claridad para algún conflicto terminológico que se le presente a la propia lengua española al momento de traducir el idioma alemán, viendo cómo se tradujo a otras lenguas. Hubiera sido interesante que esta tabla incluyera alguna de las traducciones españolas más recientes, que en gran medida la han reemplazado a la de Gaos (1935) en las aulas universitarias. Por ejemplo, contamos con la traducción de Mario Caimi (*Antropología en sentido pragmático*, Buenos Aires, Losada, 2009) o la de Roberto Aramayo (*Antropología práctica*, Madrid, Tecnos, 1990). La riqueza de nuestra lengua española y los continuos estudios de la obra kantiana por parte de especialistas de diversos lugares del mundo nos permiten mejorar nuestras aproximaciones a los textos originales de Kant. La “Tabla de correspondencias de traducción de términos” es una prueba fehaciente de ello.

Retomando las palabras de Brandt en el “Prólogo”, parece importante remarcar que la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* es una obra orientada a la praxis social. El profesor Kant sostiene frente a sus alumnos que una Antropología es pragmática cuando encierra un conocimiento del hombre como *ciudadano del mundo*. En la Primera parte realiza un estudio sobre la facultad de conocer (Libro primero) que incluye la conciencia de sí mismo y de las propias representaciones, la sensibilidad, los cinco sentidos y el sentido interno, la imaginación, la memoria, el entendimiento, entre otros tópicos. Luego se dedica a la cuestión del sentimiento de placer y displacer (Libro segundo), donde analiza cuestiones como el placer sensible, el placer estético, el gusto. El Libro tercero se ocupa de la facultad de apetecer y en particular de las pasiones. La Segunda parte, “De la manera de conocer el interior del hombre por el exterior”, comienza con el carácter y el temperamento del hombre para llegar a lo que Kant denomina el *carácter de la especie*. La pregunta por la especie humana y su destino subyace en esta obra de manera ineludible. La *Antropología*, de hecho, concluye con el destino del género humano: la razón a la que finalmente todo conduce.

El hombre es un ser de acción, encontramos en este texto un tratado sobre cómo ser ciudadanos del mundo, partes activas del destino de la humanidad, que aún hoy nos sorprende por su vigencia. Esta nueva traducción es un valioso aporte para seguir aproximándonos al pensamiento kantiano, más aún si tenemos en cuenta la importante posición de la *Antropología* en el conjunto de la obra de Kant.



**Kant y el silencio:
la génesis de la *Deducción trascendental***

***Kant and Silence:
The Genesis of the Transcendental Deduction***

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Reseña: *Los años silenciosos de Kant: Aspectos de la génesis de la Deducción Trascendental en la década de 1770. Seguido de la traducción del Legado de Duisburg (ca. 1775) de Fernando Moledo, Prometeo, Buenos Aires, 2014, 192 pp., ISBN: 978-987-574-667-1, y La Deducción Trascendental y sus inéditos, 1772-1788, Traducido y editado por Gonzalo Serrano Escallón, Universidad Nacional de Colombia, Bogotá, 2014, 324 pp., ISBN: 978-958-761-953-9*

Como todo proyecto filosófico de gran envergadura, la empresa kantiana es el fruto de años de reflexión. Si bien esto es relativamente claro gracias a que contamos con las dos ediciones de la *Crítica*, muchas veces se olvida que durante el periodo que data de 1770, - año la publicación de la *Disertación*- a 1781, -año de publicación de la primera edición de la *Crítica*-, década que se conoce como el “periodo silencioso”, hubo cambios importantes en el pensamiento de Kant. Toda la información que poseemos sobre este intervalo de tiempo la tenemos gracias a sus apuntes, su correspondencia y sus notas de clase. Ahora bien, como lectores interesados en el proyecto crítico kantiano podemos preguntarnos, ¿para qué estudiar el pensamiento del autor en este periodo? Pregunta legítima, pues a fin de cuentas tenemos lo que Kant quería que tuviéramos: el resultado final de su empresa.

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Sin embargo, hoy sabemos que la filosofía no es simplemente un saber que *acumula* conclusiones y sistemas magníficos, sino que también es de gran valor el *proceso* que llevó a los autores a alcanzar sus objetivos. Así, una interpretación responsable y fiel del pensamiento kantiano no puede prescindir de los manuscritos y reflexiones no publicadas. Por este motivo, las obras de Fernando Moledo y Gonzalo Serrano son referencias obligatorias para el estudio en lengua española de la *Deducción Trascendental*.

Los libros *Los años silenciosos de Kant: Aspectos de la génesis de la Deducción Trascendental en la década de 1770. Seguido de la traducción del Legado de Duisburg (ca. 1775)* de Fernando Moledo y *La Deducción Trascendental y sus inéditos, 1772-1788*, traducido y editado por Gonzalo Serrano, presentan la posibilidad de estudiar la génesis y el desarrollo de uno de los pasajes más importantes de la *Crítica*, la *Deducción Trascendental* en lengua española.

El libro de Moledo consta de seis capítulos. Los capítulos 1 y 2 introducen al lector en el problema de la *Crítica*, haciendo hincapié en la pregunta que Kant formula en la *Introducción*, a saber, ¿cómo son posibles los juicios sintéticos *a priori*? Moledo aborda este problema a partir de la afirmación de los *Prolegómenos* según la cual Hume despertó a Kant de su sueño dogmático. Haciendo una lectura de pasajes importantes de la *Crítica* y los *Prolegómenos*, Moledo logra reconciliar las dos afirmaciones hechas por Kant en torno a su *despertar* del sueño dogmático, una con respecto a Hume (Ak. IV, 260), la otra con respecto al problema de las antinomias (Ak. XII, 257-258), permitiéndonos ver dicho despertar como un *proceso*. Este es el proceso mediante el cual Kant pasa de ver a la metafísica como una ciencia cuyo método es *matemático* (dogmatismo) y la comprende dentro de los límites de la *crítica*. En este punto, contrastando el pensamiento crítico con la perspectiva adoptada por Kant en la *Disertación*, Moledo nos muestra cómo empieza a definirse la postura idealista de Kant.

El capítulo 2 desarrolla esta perspectiva, a saber la adoptada en la *Disertación* y después, en la década silenciosa. Por este motivo, y en virtud de los cambios estructurales que sufre el pensamiento kantiano, señalados en los capítulos 1 y 2 del libro de Moledo, es importante estudiar los manuscritos y fuentes de este periodo, pues gran parte de las ideas innovadoras de la *Crítica* se desarrollan en él. Los capítulos 3, 4 y 5 del libro de Moledo hacen un análisis de la primera parte de la *Lógica Trascendental*, específicamente de la


Deducción Trascendental y de la *Deducción de las Categorías*. El capítulo 5 es especialmente importante, en mi opinión, pues allí Moledo muestra de manera rigurosa y clara que alrededor de 1775 estaba ya desarrollada la idea fundamental de la *Deducción*, si bien aún no estaba consolidado el proyecto de la *Crítica*. En efecto, de acuerdo a los manuscritos de Duisburg, Kant ya había comprendido que el problema de su empresa era justificar el modo en que las categorías poseían validez objetiva y que esto se solucionaba entendiéndolas como condición de posibilidad de la experiencia, pero aún no tenía una idea clara de lo que entendía por conocimiento. Por esta época, Kant seguía pensando que era posible tener un conocimiento “intuitivo” del alma. Es decir, la idea central de los paralogismos, así como gran parte del desarrollo de la *Deducción*, aún no se había gestado. La conexión es interesante, pues nos permite ver un hilo conductor en el pensamiento kantiano entre la idea de la *Disertación* del conocimiento *puro* como el conocimiento de lo *real* (en sí), y la idea del conocimiento *puro* de la *Crítica*, únicamente como *condición de posibilidad* de la experiencia. Del mismo modo, a partir de los manuscritos de Duisburg, en estos capítulos se explora el desarrollo de las categorías. A modo de conclusión, en el capítulo 6 se hace una aclaración etimológica del término *dialéctica*, a propósito de la última sección de la *Lógica Trascendental*. Esta aclaración es importante, tanto para comprender las pretensiones de Kant en esta sección, como para tomar distancia con respecto a lo que el pensamiento anterior a Kant comprendía por dialéctica. Es una conclusión interesante, que hace énfasis en lo importante que era para Kant hacer un uso adecuado y responsable de las palabras y sus significados. Esto nos permite recordar la sección primera del primer libro de la *Dialéctica Trascendental*, donde Kant nos invita a retomar el significado original que tenía la palabra *idea* (*ιδέα*) para los griegos (B 370). El libro de Moledo concluye con la traducción del *Legado de Duisburg* que, como ya se señaló, es de vital importancia para la comprensión del desarrollo de la *Deducción* a lo largo del periodo silencioso.

Por otra parte, el libro de Gonzalo Serrano contiene las traducciones de todos los fragmentos, reflexiones y argumentos importantes en torno a la *Deducción Trascendental*. El libro nos ofrece varios documentos que datan del periodo silencioso, a saber, *La carta a Herz*, *Reflexiones sobre metafísica R 4629-4634*, *El Legado de Duisburg* y el fragmento *B12 (1780)*; así como apartes relevantes de otras obras, como la *Deducción* según la primera edición de la primera *Crítica*, los párrafos dedicados a la misma en los

Prolegómenos y las *Reflexiones sobre metafísica* R 5923-5936, la *Lección de metafísica* Volckmann, las notas del «Prefacio» a los *Principios metafísicos de la ciencia natural* y la *Deducción* según la segunda edición de la *Crítica*. De este modo, el libro de Serrano realiza un recorrido detallado por cada una de las referencias obligatorias de la *Deducción*, aquellas que el mismo Kant publicó y los manuscritos, cartas y anotaciones que no llegó a sacar a la luz. El recorrido del libro de Serrano empieza con la formulación del problema, presente ya en la *Carta a Herz* y concluye con la edición final de la *Deducción* en la edición B de la *Crítica*. Tal y como lo señalaba Moledo, la referencia a estos textos es de vital importancia para entender la génesis y desarrollo de la *Deducción*. Teniendo en cuenta que, además, contamos con material del periodo 1781 a 1787, tenemos referencias que nos permiten rastrear los motivos de los cambios que hubo entre la edición A y la edición B de la *Crítica*.

El libro de Serrano, además, cuenta con los textos originales en alemán, lo que le puede permitir al lector interesado verificar los términos importantes en el idioma original. De este modo, al contar con traducciones alternativas de los pasajes de la *Deducción* en la *Crítica* y en los *Prolegómenos*, este libro es una herramienta valiosa para el estudio detallado de estos fragmentos, que ya han sido traducidos al español por Mario Caimi y Pedro Ribas, entre otros.

En conclusión, tanto el libro de Serrano, como el de Moledo son referencias necesarias para el lector interesado en la *Deducción*. El trabajo de ambos autores es impecable y realmente ayuda a la comprensión de la *Deducción*, no como un aparte específico de la *Crítica*, sino como un argumento cuya gestación llevó cerca de 15 años.



Die normative Vernunft. Essay über Kant

The Reason of Rules. Essay on Kant

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Rezension: Jean-François Kervégan, *La raison des normes. Essai sur Kant*, Vrin, Paris 2015, 192 pp. ISBN : 978-2-7116-2591-8

Kervégans Buch befasst sich mit einigen ethischen Dilemmata, durch welche Kants Auffassung der Moral oft wieder in Frage gestellt wird. In den »einführenden Bemerkungen«, die bedeutend »Les mains de Kant« [»Kants Hände«] betitelt sind, analysiert Kervégan Kants Antwort auf Benjamin Constants Schrift *Des réaction politiques* über das Recht zu lügen. Da außer den rationellen vorsehbaren Wirkungen der Handlungen auch einige unvorhersehbare Wirkungen anzunehmen sind, muss man sich nach der Normativität des Rechts richten, d. h. immer die Wahrheit sagen, so dass wir für die ethisch negativen aber unvorhersehbaren Wirkungen unserer Handlungen nicht verantwortlich gemacht werden können. Diese Erklärung, die auf einer Untersuchung über die Wirkungen der Handlungen beruht, zielt darauf ab, die gewöhnlichen Vereinfachungen zu Kants Moralphilosophie zu zerstreuen: Trotz seines scheinbaren Deontologismus ist Kant in Bezug auf die »Wirkungen der Anwendung (politischen und sozialen) der normativen Grundsätze (juridischen und ethischen)« nicht gleichgültig (Vgl. S. 18). Nur eine oberflächliche Identifizierung von Konsequentialismus und Utilitarismus und ihre irrije Opposition zum Deontologismus kann ein so reduktionistisches Bild von Kants

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Moralphilosophie anbieten. Dies führt dazu, dass ihm ein Formalismus zugeschrieben wird, der umgekehrt als die Garantie der Allgemeinheit der normativen Vernunft gilt. Die normative Natur der Vernunft steht also auch im Zentrum dieser Studie, die solche Normativität als den Hauptcharakter von Kants praktischer Philosophie darstellt. In der Tat kann das Subjekt nur durch eine universelle Vernunft die Autonomie seiner Handlungen in Bezug auf die auf die zufälligen Triebfedern erreichen. In diesem Sinne ist die Normativität der vollständigste und direkteste Ausdruck der *Freiheit*. Deswegen werden »Freiheit« und »Normativität« in den ersten zwei Kapiteln betrachtet.

Das Kapitel über die Freiheit zeichnet sich aus durch eine sehr feine Analyse der Kantschen Terminologie. Dank dieser Analyse kann man die Wichtigkeit einer systematischen Studie der Okkurrenzen von technischen Wörtern in einigen Passagen schätzen, die entscheidend für die Entwicklung von Kants Moralphilosophie sind. Der Autor zeigt, dass in der *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* die Verhältnisse zwischen den Begriffen »transzendente Freiheit« und »praktische Freiheit« keineswegs eindeutig sind. Tatsächlich entsprechen die transzendente und die praktische Freiheit in der »transzendentalen Dialektik« der positiven und der negativen Bedeutung von »Freiheit« Dagegen wird die »praktische Freiheit« im »Kanon« als durch die Erfahrung beweisbar definiert. Diese Schwankungen werden bei der zweiten *Kritik* durch die vom Autor so definierte »Fusion« zwischen der transzendentalen und der praktischen Ebene überwunden. Dadurch – glaubt Kervégan – bezieht Kant endlich Stellung zu einem Thema, das er in der ersten *Kritik* noch offen gelassen hatte. Nachdem das Moralgesetz sich als »Faktum der Vernunft« in der zweiten *Kritik* durchgesetzt hat, setzt es seine eigene praktische Bestimmung fest. Gleichzeitig bekräftigt es die Einheit der Vernunft, insofern als selbst die Noumenizität der Freiheit zumindest indirekt verstanden werden kann. Dieses indirekte Verstehen besteht in dem gnoseologischen Ansatz des in der ersten *Kritik* betrachteten spekulativen Teils der Vernunft. Es handelt sich um einen entscheidenden theoretischen Schritt, den der Autor mit tiefer philologischer Schärfe und theoretischer Kohärenz erklärt: Der Gegenstand der reinen praktischen Vernunft ist die Freiheit, die sich im menschlichen Willen ausdrückt. Jedoch scheint es, dass dieser Wille sich mit der ganzen praktischen Vernunft deckt, da er durch keine sinnliche Triebfeder bestimmt wird.

Nun wenn solche Assimilation schon in der *Grundlegung* genauso wie in der *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* zu finden war, ist sie in der *Religion* und der *Metaphysik der Sitten* explizit. Ziel der *Religion* ist tatsächlich die Lösung des Dilemmas, nach welchem der Mensch, obwohl der erste Grundsatz der Annahme seiner Handlungsmaximen immer und notwendigerweise in der freien Willkür liegt, von Natur aus nach dem Bösen strebt. Die Unterscheidung zwischen Wille und Willkür – die Kant zwischen 1793 und 1797 festsetzt – ermöglicht die endgültige Identifikation des Willens mit der praktischen Vernunft und beantwortet gleichzeitig eine wichtige anthropologische Frage. In der Tat betont der Autor, dass der Wille kein Auswählen einer Handlungsmaxime sondern der Grund dieser Auswahl ist. M. a. W. ist der Wille als praktische Vernunft der Auswahlbestimmungsgrund der Willkür (Vgl. S. 60). Infolgedessen kann lediglich die Willkür frei sein, und ihre Freiheit hängt direkt von der Übereinstimmung ihres Auswählens mit der Vernünftigkeit ab. Also kann der Autor nicht vermeiden, ein in gewissem Maße gefährliches Bild von Kant anzubieten, das von diesem Standpunkt sehr nahe an Spinoza ist. Für Kervégan scheint es möglich, Kant den Grundsatz zuzuschreiben, nach dem »„die Willkür je freier desto bestimmter“ (von dem Wille, d. h. von der praktischen Vernunft) ist« (S. 61). Unter den vielfältigen Betonungen, mit den die Freiheit bis zu diesem Punkt charakterisiert wurde, kann also die von ihrer Vernünftigkeit stammende Normativität als ein konstantes Element anerkannt werden.

In diesem Sinne – wie Kervégan zu Anfang des zweiten Kapitels unterstreicht – zeigt die Definition sowohl des Sittengesetzes als *Faktum der Vernunft* als auch ihre konstitutive Verbindung mit der Freiheit, dass die reine Vernunft nur als eine normative und schätzende Macht aufgefasst werden kann (Vgl. S. 68). Die Urteile des praktischen Teils der Vernunft sind aber andere als die des spekulativen Teils, denn bei den normativen Urteilen wird die Materie nicht unabhängig von der Form des Urteils gegeben. Die normative Vernunft bietet also kein Kriterium an, um die Vorzugswürdigkeit einer gewissen Handlung im Vergleich zu einer anderen zu etablieren. Vielmehr gibt diese Vernunft eine »Anerkennungsregel«, um die Gültigkeit oder Ungültigkeit der Handlungsprojektformen des Subjekts festzusetzen. In der zeitgenössischen Terminologie ist die normative Vernunft das »Prinzip U«, d. h. das, was das Grundgesetz der reinen praktischen Vernunft darstellt. Solches Kriterium kann nur die *Gesinnung* und nicht die *Absicht* vom Subjekt betreffen, denn es achtet auf die reine Form der Maxime unabhängig von jedem Bezug auf besondere

Ziele. Ein bloßer Blick auf die Stichwörter von Kants Moralphilosophie genügt, um die meisten Anschuldigungen von Formalismus abzulehnen, die im Lichte zeitgenössischer Perspektiven gegen Kant hervorgebracht werden. In der Tat erfordern diese zeitgenössisch-orientierten Lesungen von Kants Moralphilosophie etwas, an dem sie aufgrund ihrer methodologischen Begründung kein Interesse hat, nämlich einige bestimmte Handlungsrichtlinien, die auf den Inhalten der besonderen Handlungen beruhen. M. a. W. handelt es sich hier nicht um die *Normen* sondern die *Normativität* an sich (Vgl. S. 75).

Obwohl Kervégan die wichtigsten Etappen von Kants Moral analysiert, achtet er immer auch auf die Komplexität der Vernunft, deren Einheit er zu verteidigen versucht. Insbesondere emphatisiert er, dass, obwohl keine der moralischen Schriften von dem reflektierenden Urteil der dritten *Kritik* beeinflusst wird, die *Urteilkraft* einen wesentlichen Übergang von der theoretischen zur praktischen Vernunft ermöglicht, indem sie die Möglichkeit einer Versöhnung zwischen Natur und Freiheit etabliert. Die scheinbare Asymmetrie zwischen der Dreiheit der Geistesvermögen (die den drei Kritiken entsprechen) und der Dualität des Philosophiebereichs (theoretisch und praktisch) wird dadurch überwunden, dass die Tätigkeit jedes subjektiven Vermögens entweder direkt oder analogisch »auf das Wort „Erkenntnis“« zurückgeführt werden kann (Vgl. S. 80-81).

Diese Auffassung der Normativität gilt als der Hauptbeweis um zu zeigen, dass in der *Metaphysik der Sitten* die Unterscheidung zwischen Ethik und Recht sich nicht mehr mit der zwischen Legalität und Moralität deckt, die in der *Grundlegung* und der zweiten *Kritik* dargestellt wurde. Es handelt sich um einen wesentlichen Schritt, der von Kants Schülern oft unterbewertet wurde. Grund dafür ist, nach Kervégan, die oberflächliche wechselseitige Identifikation von *Legalität* und *Gesetzmäßigkeit*. Leider vertieft der Autor auf den folgenden Seiten nicht die problematische Natur solcher Identifikation.

Wie zur Antwort an Constant schon antizipiert, wird die Wahrhaftigkeit als eine nicht nur juristische sondern auch ethische Pflicht anerkannt. In der Tat ist jede nur auf die Wirkungen der Handlungen basierte Beurteilung aufgrund der möglichen Unvorsehbarkeit einiger ihrer Wirkungen unvollständig. Der einzige Bereich, in dem das Subjekt gänzlich verantwortlich gemacht werden kann und muss, ist der seiner *a priori* Maximen, die sein Handeln orientieren. Dies gilt nicht nur als ein entscheidender Beweis in Kants Antwort

auf Constant, sondern zeigt auch die moralische Würde, die in der *Metaphysik der Sitten* dem Recht explizit zuerkannt wird.

Kervégan widmet diesem Thema das Kapitel über die Rechtlichkeit [*Juridicité*], in dem er sehr deutlich zeigt, dass Kants lexikalische Auswahlen zentral sind, um die gemeine Zugehörigkeit von Ethik und Recht zum Bereich der Moral zu erklären. Nach diesem Standpunkt ist die Moral nicht mehr überhaupt dem Recht entgegengesetzt – wie es in der *Grundlegung* und der *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* schien, in denen die bloße Legalität des Rechts die moralische Würde der Ethik nicht erreichen konnte –, sondern umfasst selbst die juristische Pflicht. Der Unterschied zwischen Ethik und Recht besteht vielmehr in der Art der Verbindlichkeit, die innerlich für die Ethik und äußerlich für das Recht ist. Die Rechtslehre und die Tugendlehre teilen den vorschreibenden Charakter, aber im Bereich der Moralität unterscheiden sie sich voneinander insofern als die zweite einen bloß verbietenden Charakter besitzt, während die erste einen erlaubenden Charakter hat. Dieser letzte Charakter als Festsetzung des Eigentumsrechts ermöglicht den Übergang von dem Natur- zum Rechtszustand. Da die zivile Funktion des Rechts die »barmherzige Lüge« gründet, nach der »das Erworben gut erworben ist« (S. 131), wird dadurch das kosmopolitische Recht als der beste Ausdruck der Verbindung zwischen Recht und Ethik definiert. In der Tat schreibt das kosmopolitische Recht keinen obligatorischen Zweck (wie die Ethik) vor, sondern es beschränkt sich auf die Definition der äußeren Bedingungen der formellen Verhältnisse unter Menschen oder Völkern (S. 132).

Diese deutliche Unterscheidung zwischen Recht und Ethik im Bereich der Moral ist die Voraussetzung eines provokativen Paragraphen, in dem der Autor Kant als einen Vorläufer des zeitgenössischen Rechtspositivismus – trotz seiner Ablehnung der Autonomie vom positiven Recht in Bezug auf das vernünftige Recht [*droit rationnel*] – definiert. Jenseits von dieser vielleicht ein bisschen gewagten These, muss man darüber nochmals Kervégans terminologische Feinheit loben: Bei Kant wäre es besser – schreibt der Autor –, von einem vernünftigen Recht und nicht von einem natürlichen Recht zu sprechen. Dies hängt von der Unbestimmtheit von dem Bezug auf die Natur ab, worauf Hegel besondere Aufmerksamkeit fokussiert.

Das letzte Kapitel stellt die Frage nach der eigentlichen Existenz einer Philosophie der Geschichte bei Kant, die als der Anwendungsbereich einer so artikulierten moralischen

Metaphysik gelten soll. Kervégan behauptet zunächst, dass der Ausdruck »Philosophie der Geschichte« im Rahmen der Kantforschung zu präzisieren ist. Tatsächlich, wenn man die Texte analysiert, in denen Kant eine historische Perspektive anzunehmen scheint, muss man darin die zentrale Rolle der Anthropologie bemerken. Bei Kant wird das Wort »Anthropologie« oft von einem Adjektiv begleitet, das als eine Spezifizierung ihrer konstitutiv unbestimmten Bedeutung gilt. Die Anthropologie nimmt die drei kritischen Hauptfragen in Angriff und fasst sie durch die Frage nach dem Mensch und seiner Komplexität zusammen. Deswegen markiert sie die Unterscheidung zwischen zwei Bedeutungen des Begriffs »Geschichte«, denen zwei Betrachtungsarten dieses Begriffs entsprechen. Einerseits gibt es die natürliche Geschichte, die als auf die Gegenwart basierte Rekonstruktion immer inadäquat ist. Andererseits gibt es eine Geschichte der Freiheit, die eine Untersuchung nach den Anlagen der menschlichen Natur inspiriert (Vgl. S. 170). Diese zweite Bedeutung des Begriffs »Geschichte« wird durch einen heuristischen Ansatz analysiert, der Herders »Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit« in eine »philosophische Geschichte der Menschheit« transformiert. Dabei wird also die Geschichte von einem *a priori* metaphysisch-teleologischen Standpunkt in Angriff genommen: Als ob alles in der Natur in einer nicht verständlichen aber nichtsdestoweniger vernünftigen Art an der Realisierung eines Zweckes mitwirkte, der selbstverständlich nicht naturell sondern bloß moralisch (ethisch-juridisch) ist (Vgl. S. 171). Kervégan behauptet, dass diese Interpretation eine wichtige Bestätigung in den argumentativen Spannungen der 1784 veröffentlichten *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht* findet. Darin beschäftigt sich Kant mit dem Problem der Koexistenz dieser zwei Auffassungen von der Geschichte, das er erst in der Schrift *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Prinzipien in der Philosophie* und der *Kritik der Urteilskraft* lösen wird.

Der zentrale Kern der These des Autors besteht in der notwendigen Koordination zwischen Metaphysik und Anthropologie, die seiner Meinung nach jede Betrachtung der Geschichte bei Kant charakterisiert. Dadurch erreicht die Normativität der Vernunft ihren vollkommensten Ausdruck.

Die Normativität wird in diesem Buch vor allem als ein epistemologischer Grundsatz definiert, dessen juristische Bedeutung lediglich seine sichtbarste und erkennbarste Manifestation ist. Das Wesen der Vernunft besteht in ihrem Vermögen, die Regeln

festzusetzen: sowohl im bestimmenden als auch im reflektierenden Urteil, sowohl im positiven als auch im Staats- oder im kosmopolitischen Recht. Deswegen ist die Vernunft die wesentlichste Eigenschaft des Menschen. In gewissem Maße findet also die Frage nach der menschlichen Natur in der Vernunft eine erste auch wenn unzureichende Antwort. Außerdem trägt das normative Wesen der Vernunft dazu bei, diese Frage in einer direkteren Art zu formulieren.

Man kann also leicht Kervégans Leitfaden in den »Schlussbemerkungen« folgen, wenn er eine so aufgefasste Vernunft mit Hegels »Sittlichkeit« vergleicht. Solche Annäherung steht mit den von Apel und Habermas vorgeschlagenen monologischen Auffassungen der Kantschen Vernunft im Gegensatz. Obwohl Kant zwar keine kommunikative Auffassung der Vernunft zugeschrieben werden kann, gibt es zweifellos in seinem Denken Aufmerksamkeit für die »Sozialität der Vernunft« (S. 184), und Kervégan zeigt ein genaues Gespür für die entsprechenden Textstellen. Insgesamt bejaht der Autor die klassische berühmte Frage nach der Möglichkeit und der Notwendigkeit einer auf einer so artikulierten metaphysischen Struktur gegründeten Pflichtsetzung. Dies hängt wahrscheinlich gerade von der wesentlich anthropologischen Komponente der normativen Vernunft ab, die er stark betont..



Un'altra Cenerentola nell'opera kantiana?

Il destino della psicologia empirica

Another Cinderella in Kant's work?

The destiny of empirical psychology

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Il rapporto di Kant con la psicologia è un tema che non ha bisogno di particolari legittimazioni. La polemica nei confronti della psicologia come scienza – tanto per la sua componente razionale, quanto per quella empirica – ha notoriamente determinato uno dei più radicali momenti di rottura di Kant con la tradizione. Ma ciò che vale per la psicologia razionale, rispetto a cui la posizione di Kant è chiara e coerente con l'impostazione della filosofia trascendentale, non può venir affermato con uguale risolutezza nel caso della psicologia empirica, nei confronti della quale Kant ha nutrito negli anni un atteggiamento quantomeno ambivalente. Per un verso l'incertezza rispetto alla effettiva validità di uno studio 'psicologico' del soggetto, per quanto empirico; per l'altro le numerose considerazioni 'psicologiche' (teoria delle facoltà, degli affetti, della determinazione all'agire) che continuamente ritornano nei suoi scritti editi e non.

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Il libro di Frierson si propone di mostrare che la filosofia trascendentale non soltanto non preclude la possibilità di una psicologia empirica, ma che anzi ne trae di fatto un beneficio concreto. Semplificando, la questione potrebbe venir esposta in questi termini: la filosofia trascendentale assume come proprio oggetto la soggettività trascendentale, la cui peculiare ‘costituzione’ è condizione tanto della possibilità di un’esperienza stabile e condivisa, oggetto della conoscenza scientifica, quanto di una moralità universale. Si tratta di quel “punto di vista umano”, su cui ha opportunamente insistito Béatrice Longuenesse, e che rappresenta per così dire la prospettiva sul rapporto uomo-mondo della filosofia trascendentale in cui l’uomo è primariamente *soggetto*. Accanto a questa maniera di guardare alla natura umana Kant non ha però escluso del tutto la possibilità di considerare l’uomo anche come *oggetto* di riflessione, una riflessione di tipo empirico, analoga a quella che si rivolge agli altri fenomeni. L’*homo phenomenon*, in questo caso, diventa oggetto di una scienza anch’essa empirica: la natura umana viene osservata nelle sue manifestazioni sensibili che vengono registrate e ordinate secondo rapporti quanto più possibile stabili che mettono capo – come nel caso degli altri fenomeni – alla formulazione di una serie di ‘leggi’ o relazioni costanti. Si tratta precisamente di quel tipo di conoscenza che nella tradizione entro cui si è formata la filosofia kantiana veniva appunto chiamata “psicologia empirica”. Ed è proprio della natura, degli scopi e del metodo di questa scienza all’interno della filosofia kantiana che Frierson si occupa in questo lavoro, con lo scopo dichiarato di contrastare le interpretazioni di chi accusa Kant di aver assunto nella filosofia trascendentale un atteggiamento eccessivamente ingenuo rispetto alla psicologia (ad esempio Simon Blackburn, Joshua Greene, pp. 3, 260 – curiosamente Greene non è incluso nell’indice dei nomi). Queste interpretazioni, che l’Autore non esita a definire “caricaturali” (*ibidem*), riposerebbero proprio su una confusione tra la filosofia trascendentale e la psicologia empirica o, meglio, su un’interpretazione della filosofia trascendentale che non tiene conto delle importanti integrazioni rispetto alla conoscenza della natura umana che Kant presenta nella sua psicologia empirica.

Tuttavia la stessa ammissione di una ‘psicologia empirica’ kantiana non è del tutto aporetica, e già solo accordarsi su che cosa possa venir inteso come una ‘psicologia empirica’ all’interno della riflessione kantiana richiede qualche specificazione. Frierson delinea la fisionomia della psicologia empirica di Kant

attraverso il confronto con le altre forme di psicologia che gravitano intorno alla sua filosofia: quella trascendentale e quella razionale. Rispetto alla psicologia razionale la questione è risolta dallo stesso Kant con la denuncia del paralogismo su cui riposano le sue conclusioni. Più complessa è invece la questione del rapporto con la psicologia trascendentale. Il presupposto da cui muove il libro lo situa già in una prospettiva tutt'altro che indiscussa, ossia l'idea che "la filosofia trascendentale è psicologica in senso lato, poiché consiste per larga parte in una serie di 'critiche' delle diverse facoltà umane" (p. 1); laddove la differenza dalla psicologia empirica consisterebbe nel fatto che la psicologia trascendentale considera queste facoltà "dall'interno" – presentando le condizioni di possibilità della loro validità – mentre la psicologia empirica le descrive "dall'esterno" – tenendo conto delle interazioni causali tra il mondo e le capacità della mente umana quale oggetto di un'indagine empirica. Sulla legittimità di ritenere la filosofia trascendentale una "psicologia", per quanto "trascendentale", l'Autore non sembra porsi nessuna domanda, tantomeno sulla effettiva opportunità ripetutamente discussa dalla letteratura di considerare l'io penso, l'unità originaria da cui scaturisce tutta l'attività sintetica del soggetto, come il possibile oggetto di una psicologia. Appoggiandosi a questo tipo di interpretazione canonicamente ricondotta al libro di Patricia Kitcher del 1993, Frierson riconosce che tra la psicologia trascendentale e quella empirica sussistono una serie di differenze sostanziali: l'origine trascendentale e non empirica della prima; il suo carattere normativo anziché descrittivo. Cionondimeno la prima rappresenta – come per ogni scienza in generale – il presupposto della seconda, nella misura in cui la conoscenza dell'*homo phaenomenon* si serve delle medesime categorie (sostanza, causalità etc.) la cui origine e legittimità d'utilizzo sono stabilite dalla indagine trascendentale della soggettività. Come l'Autore opportunamente riconosce, considerare la mente umana, la natura umana in generale, come oggetto di una scienza empirica incontra tutti i problemi delle scienze empiriche in generale, e anzi anche qualcuno di più. Considerare la psicologia, alla stregua della fisica, come una fisiologia del senso interno significa stabilire una serie di connessioni causali tra le sue manifestazioni, tanto nel caso della conoscenza, quanto in quello dell'azione. Così il nesso tra rappresentazioni e giudizi da un lato, e quello tra rappresentazioni, sentimenti, desideri, azioni dall'altro, deve venir rintracciato su base osservativa e descritto in accordo con le leggi della fisica, una fisica della mente, riconducendo la varietà di

queste manifestazioni ad alcune 'forze' fondamentali, le facoltà, radicate in disposizioni naturali dell'animo umano. Stanti le difficoltà dell'osservazione introspettiva – un problema ben presente a Kant, che nell'*Antropologia pragmatica* denuncia la difficoltà di trattare il proprio io, ma anche gli altri, come un oggetto stabile di osservazione e, ancor peggio, di sperimentazione – e la incongruenza tra una connessione causale di tipo deterministico, come quella che si viene a istituire tra i fenomeni del senso interno, e la causalità libera, spontanea, in cui risiede ad esempio la moralità, la scienza empirica della natura umana presenta in generale i limiti di ogni approccio naturalistico. E ciò, pur tenendo conto delle precisazioni che Kant introduce nella terza *Critica* sulle differenze tra lo studio della natura umana, del fenomeno della vita in generale, rispetto agli altri fenomeni e la necessità di introdurre principi di tipo teleologico e non soltanto causal-efficienti. Come aveva efficacemente spiegato Onora O'Neill, la conoscenza empirica dei fenomeni, pur fornendo una spiegazione dei loro nessi secondo leggi, non sarà mai una conoscenza 'esauriente', nel senso che non riuscirà mai a spiegare il *fondamento* di quelle leggi, a fornirne una spiegazione ultima, a indicare la ragione per cui esse sono così e non altrimenti. E la psicologia empirica non fa eccezione tra le altre scienze empiriche: anch'essa aspira a fornire una *descrizione* dei fenomeni (interni, in questo caso) nei termini di una necessità naturale, senza potersi però interrogare sulla ragione di quella necessità. Questo limite non le impedisce, tuttavia, di porsi come una scienza, ovviamente – come rileva qui e là l'Autore – in un senso meno forte di quanto non si parli di scienza nel caso della matematica, della fisica pure e, effettivamente, della stessa filosofia trascendentale.

Questo senso 'debole' di scienza sembra essere il perno intorno a cui si articola l'intero lavoro di Frierson: la psicologia empirica può essere una scienza nella misura in cui, come le altre scienze empiriche, ci descrive dei fenomeni, li lega secondo rapporti causali e quindi li inserisce in catene di successione temporale, stabilisce i criteri di una loro prevedibilità e li concepisce come manifestazioni di 'forze' più generali, le facoltà. Così facendo questa scienza empirica dell'io descrive la maniera in cui (*fenomenologicamente*, verrebbe da dire) connettiamo tra loro le rappresentazioni dei sensi, compiamo operazioni di astrazione, ci formiamo concetti e di qui giudizi e pregiudizi, e come queste operazioni mettano capo alla conoscenza empirica (cfr. cap. III: "Kant's empirical account of human cognition", ma anche p. 197,); o, ancora, come

l'osservazione ci mostri che l'azione è determinata da un desiderio scaturito da un sentimento originato da una rappresentazione (cfr. cap. II: "Kant's empirical account of human action", in particolare pp. 67-69), e così via. Ma ciò di cui si sta parlando, in tutti questi casi, è appunto il soggetto empirico di cui, con le dovute cautele cui si è fatto cenno (introspezione, osservazione degli altri, deviazioni dalla 'normale' funzionalità delle facoltà, cui Frierson dedica gli ultimi due capitoli del libro), è possibile articolare una serie di osservazioni in una 'scienza'.

Questa scienza è una scienza empirica nel senso in cui era empirica la psicologia di Wolff, A.G. Baumgarten e Georg Friedrich Meier (grande assente non nella riflessione di Kant, ma nello studio di Frierson): essa era una conoscenza 'storica' ossia una raccolta di dati e osservazioni sistemati secondo i principi del metodo scientifico; la psicologia empirica è per quegli autori una conoscenza *a posteriori*, che descrive quel che ci è dato osservare dell'anima umana senza pretendere di spiegare (*a priori* e per via deduttiva) le *ragioni* alla base di quei fenomeni, come farà invece la psicologia razionale. Quest'ultima è appunto una conoscenza 'filosofica', e non storica: spiega e non descrive. A questo proposito, la maniera in cui Wolff tratta del problema del *commercium* psicofisico nelle sue due psicologie è assolutamente paradigmatica: nella psicologia empirica si limita a registrare la compresenza osservabile di fenomeni fisici e psichici; in quella razionale ne tenta una spiegazione *a priori*. Ma si potrebbero trovare altri numerosi esempi. Il carattere esclusivamente descrittivo del sapere storico è quello che ne determina anche il carattere *non prescrittivo*: dicendoci come stanno le cose, l'esperienza non ci insegna come le cose *devono* essere. Ciò emerge chiaramente considerando la logica naturale (strettamente imparentata alla psicologia empirica, e anche per questo l'assenza di Meier lascia quantomeno perplessi), esclusivamente descrittiva, rispetto a quella artificiale, dichiaratamente normativa. Sicché una buona parte delle preoccupazioni di Frierson per ritagliare uno spazio di legittimità alla psicologia empirica se non 'entro', quantomeno 'accanto' alla filosofia trascendentale trovano conforto in questa considerazione che certo può avere l'aria stantia delle minuzie archeologiche, ma che non per questo è inutile a riflessioni più genericamente 'sistematiche' e 'teoriche'. Si comprende pertanto senza eccessivo stupore come Kant sia in grado di fornire una spiegazione empirica della motivazione morale, che non è tuttavia in grado di cogliere quel che rende quella motivazione essenzialmente *morale*

(cap. IV: “Kant’s empirical account of moral motivation: respect for the moral law”). In questa prospettiva assume senso l’idea kantiana – di cui l’Autore dà conto – di ricomprendere la psicologia empirica all’interno di un’antropologia, come ci informa programmaticamente la stessa “Dottrina del metodo” della prima *Critica*. Occorre non dimenticare che il confronto di Kant con questa disciplina muove innanzitutto da un’esigenza didattica e che solo successivamente quel tipo di considerazioni sulla natura umana assume la forma di una conoscenza autonoma nei termini di un’antropologia *pragmatica*. L’insistenza di Frierson sulla portata *pratico-pragmatica* dell’antropologia, peculiarità che la distinguerebbe dalla psicologia empirica *tout court*, risponde per un verso al vero significato e scopo che Kant sembra aver attribuito a una scienza empirica dell’uomo: essa non ha un valore puramente speculativo, ma si rende utile nella misura in cui permette di conoscere – secondo la celebre formula – quel che l’uomo può fare di se stesso; di qui l’articolazione della antropologia in una “Didattica” e in una “Caratteristica”, parti complementari e integranti della scienza empirica della natura umana così come l’aveva fino ad allora presentata la filosofia. Anche su questo aspetto della complessa operazione di recupero della psicologia empirica da parte di Kant la ricerca ha investito ormai da svariati decenni energie considerevoli: nella direzione più di recente indicata da Norbert Hinske e Reinhard Brandt, seppur da prospettive divergenti, la ricerca in Germania, in Francia, in Spagna e in Italia, ha ricostruito minuziosamente la trama di influenze e di stimoli che hanno condotto al progetto kantiano di un’antropologia, non soltanto riconoscendo il debito di Kant nei confronti della tradizione ‘razionalistica’ tedesca e degli empiristi britannici (senza dimenticare che Kant era lettore di Krüger, di Meier, di Meiners, di Platner, per menzionare solo alcune delle sue fonti rispetto alle quali la distinzione tra razionalismo e empirismo appare infruttuosa), ma anche a un’immagine di Kant meno monolitica e forse persino meno ingenua di quella che lo chiude nella torre d’avorio della filosofia trascendentale.

Considerato in questa prospettiva della ricerca – di cui questo libro, purtroppo, non tiene realmente conto – il lavoro di Frierson rappresenta certo un contributo significativo nel valorizzare quest’altra componente della riflessione kantiana, integrazione e complemento del suo progetto di una scienza in senso forte della soggettività trascendentale.



Dignidade humana: valor absoluto e intrínseco?

Human Dignity: absolute and intrinsic value?

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Os conceitos *dignidade (Würde)* e *dignidade humana (Menschenwürde)* são empregados amplamente, nas mais diversas áreas do conhecimento, mas com muito mais frequência em áreas como a filosofia moral e política, na filosofia do direito, na bioética etc. quando se trata de justificar ou aplicar princípios, assim como fundamentar filosoficamente certos direitos e determinados deveres morais¹. Para isso, com grande frequência, recorre-se à filosofia prática de Kant. No âmbito da filosofia não há dúvidas de que Kant é uma das referências modernas mais importantes no que se refere à concepção de dignidade. Se, por um lado, a dignidade é lembrada como uma característica distintiva que indica a posição do ser humano no reino da natureza, isto é, distingue-o dos demais seres, tomando por base

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¹ O primeiro artigo da Declaração Universal dos Direitos Humanos, de 10 de dezembro de 1948, da Organização das Nações Unidas, por exemplo, proclama: “Todas as pessoas nascem livres e iguais em dignidade e direitos”. A constituição da República Alemã de 23 de maio de 1949 expressa: “A dignidade do homem é intocável. Protegê-la e respeitá-la é dever de todo o poder público”.

certas capacidades e predisposições que ele possui, por outro lado, ela impõe que se o trate de um modo condizente com sua posição e condição também no âmbito da sociedade civil. No entanto, não é tão evidente, como pode parecer à primeira vista, o que este termo significa no contexto da filosofia moral kantiana.

O livro *Kant on Human Dignity* de Oliver Sensen, professor e pesquisador na Universidade de Tulane (New Orleans) é, possivelmente, um dos mais importantes estudos dedicados ao tema da dignidade na literatura recente da *Kant-Forschung*, cuja recepção propiciou um amplo debate em torno de questões de ética normativa e questões de metaética relacionadas ao pensamento de Kant. O livro está composto de duas partes: *Parte I – Respeito pelos outros*, que está subdividida em três capítulos: 1. Conceção kantiana do valor; 2. O valor da humanidade e 3. A fórmula da humanidade de Kant. *Parte II – A concepção de Kant sobre dignidade* se divide em dois capítulos: 4. Três paradigmas sobre dignidade e 5. A concepção de dignidade humana de Kant.

Sensen parte precisamente da constatação do fato que o conceito de dignidade, tal como apresentado por Kant, é utilizado frequentemente de modo apressado, sem a devida atenção ao problema de sua justificação. Isso não é simples coincidência. O conceito de dignidade aparece por mais de cem vezes ao longo da obra de Kant, considerando-se tanto as obras sistemáticas publicadas, quanto as reflexões e notas. Por ordem quantitativa, isto é, onde as ocorrências são mais freqüentes, temos a seguinte disposição: na *Doutrina da Virtude* (21 vezes); na *Fundamentação da Metafísica dos Costumes* (17 vezes); em *A Religião nos limites da simples razão* (11 vezes) e na *Pedagogia* (10 vezes) (SENSEN, 2013, p. 177). No total, o conceito aparece em 18 escritos.

O problema fundamental que motivou o trabalho de Sensen é que o conceito de dignidade é tomado ao pé da letra como sinônimo de valor intrínseco ou de valor absoluto. Ora, se o conceito for assumido deste modo, a questão que surge aqui e que deve ser esclarecida é: 1) os seres humanos devem ser respeitados porque têm dignidade ou; 2) têm dignidade pelo fato de serem respeitados?

Como é possível perceber, na primeira alternativa a dignidade é compreendida como fundamento da exigência do respeito, algo muito difundido na compreensão comum do

tema (e que, no final das contas, é contrária à visão de Kant). A segunda alternativa aponta para uma compreensão justamente oposta à primeira: a dignidade é decorrente do mandamento de respeito, mandamento este que tem sua origem na razão. Precisamente por isso, na visão de Sensen, assumir a dignidade como valor absoluto (de acordo com a primeira alternativa acima) leva à uma dificuldade de ordem teórica que inviabiliza a proposta de fundamentação de Kant, pois ao se assumir que a dignidade seja o fundamento da exigência do respeito, se está afirmando um moral heterônoma. E isso colide frontalmente com o que Kant pretende “buscar e estabelecer” na GMS, a saber, o princípio supremo da moralidade que culminará no conceito de autonomia.

De modo bastante resumido indico aqui as principais passagens da GMS onde Kant emprega o conceito:

- a) O conceito de dignidade é relacionado ao ser racional, enquanto capaz de legislar por si mesmo; autonomia (434, 29-30)
- b) Dignidade opõe-se a preço, pois ela tem valor absoluto ao passo que o preço tem valor relativo. (434,31-34)
- c) Dignidade como valor intrínseco (435,2-4)
- d) A moralidade é a única coisa que tem dignidade, a humanidade apenas enquanto capaz dela. (435, 5-9)
- e) A legislação que determina todo o valor tem dignidade e;
- f) A autonomia é o fundamento da dignidade da natureza humana e da natureza racional (436,2-7)

O ponto que interessa a Sensen nos três capítulos da primeira parte está na compreensão sobre a relação entre dignidade e valor. Precisamente as características acima apontadas em “b” (dignidade como valor absoluto, 434,31-34) e “c” (dignidade como valor intrínseco, 435,2-4) são as que dividem as interpretações. De um lado, estão aqueles que entendem que o sentido destes termos não devem ser compreendidos *ipsis litteris*, isto é, defendem que valor intrínseco e valor absoluto não estão empregados com o sentido que estas palavras sugerem hoje (nas palavras de Sensen, na concepção *contemporânea*) e, por isso mesmo, é preciso rever todo o histórico do emprego do termo na obra de Kant e

examinar suas origens. De outro lado, estão aqueles que, como Schönecker e Wood² (2007, p. 142) entendem que o conceito de valor é indispensável para a ética kantiana e que justamente “seres dotados de razão, enquanto seres capazes de autonomia e de estabelecer fins têm um valor absoluto (dignidade)”.

Em sua interpretação Sensen assume que Kant não concebe dignidade como valor absoluto e que sua visão está muito mais relacionada com a concepção estoíca (Idem, p. 144). Neste sentido, o termo estaria muito mais próximo de sublimidade (*Erhabenheit*) e indicaria ontologicamente uma propriedade relacional de ser elevado em relação a outras coisas ou seres. Assim, conforme seu exemplo dizer “X tem dignidade” não quer dizer outra coisa que “X é elevado em relação a Y” ou ainda que “X é superior a Y”. No entanto, a leitura que se faz não é essa. O conceito como já foi demonstrado nas palavras do próprio Kant, relaciona-se com o conceito de valor cujos predicados são, como Sensen mesmo admite, “absoluto”, “intrínseco” ou “incondicional”.

A defesa de que a dignidade possua mesmo este sentido de valor e estas qualidades (absoluto, intrínseco, incondicional) é amparada, conforme o autor, numa compreensão ontológica do valor que está contida na interpretação de Kant como um *realista moral*. Para os que interpretam Kant nesta perspectiva, esta propriedade (dignidade) é um valor não-relacional e, portanto, “seres humanos simplesmente são preciosos e valiosos” (Idem, p. 311). Ele classifica esta visão como “paradigma contemporâneo de dignidade”.

Os outros dois paradigmas apresentados são chamados por ele de “arcaico” e “tradicional”. O conceito arcaico de dignidade remete para a concepção romana antiga (*dignitas*) de forte conotação política, cujo grande expoente é Cícero. Dignidade, nesta compreensão, referia-se a uma pluralidade de aspectos da vida social: descendência familiar, as vestimentas dos homens de repartição pública, as posses e finanças de alguém, entre outros aspectos. Outro sentido ainda ligado a esta compreensão é o de que a dignidade está na capacidade de transcender os meros impulsos animais no pensar e no agir. Aqui a dignidade não é inerente à pessoa, mas é conferida a ela por sua condição, posição ou função no interior da vida social e política.

² SCHÖNECKER, Dieter; WOOD, Allen. *Kants „Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Ein einführender Kommentar*. [3. Aufl.] Paderborn – München – Wien – Zurich: UTB; Schöningh, 2007.

Mas Cícero também expandiu o conceito tornando-o um atributo de *todos* os seres humanos a *todos* os seres humanos (Cf. SENSEN, p. 155). A noção *tradicional* de dignidade surge desta ampliação do conceito arcaico. Conforme Sensen, “a mesma estrutura básica pode ser encontrada de Cícero para frente até os pensadores cristãos e da Renascença: seres humanos são especiais na natureza em virtude de certas capacidades (i. é. razão, liberdade) e têm o dever de fazer um uso apropriado delas” (Idem, p. 313).

A interpretação de Sensen transcorre no sentido de demonstrar que a noção kantiana está ancorada, em geral, na concepção tradicional de dignidade, isto é, entendendo-a, todavia, como *elevação* e como *propriedade relacional*. Por isso, a dignidade é uma característica que, já desde o princípio (desde seu nascimento), eleva o homem do restante da natureza. Kant refere-se a este aspecto como “dignidade inata” na *Metafísica dos Costumes* (MS VI 420, 22-23) e também como “dignidade originária” (SF VII 73,3). O sentido fundamental da liberdade estaria justamente em realizar e preservar esta dignidade originária.

O principal argumento de Sensen é este: não é a humanidade como tal que tem um valor absoluto, mas a moralidade. Por isso, não se trata, de que um indivíduo deva respeitar os demais porque eles têm dignidade ou valor; e sim do contrário, lhes é conferido este valor, dignidade ou importância por conta de que devem ser respeitados. Kant não concebe, portanto, o valor como propriedade não-relacional. Deste modo, em sua interpretação, dignidade seria uma “especificação de ‘internamente’ como elevado” (Idem, p. 176). E complementa: “ ‘dignidade’ é usada para expressar que o valor moral é *superior em relação* à outro valor”. O autor defende, por fim, a hipótese de que o conceito de dignidade pode ser melhor esclarecido e compreendido aderindo ao paradigma tradicional.

O valor absoluto dos seres humanos é secundário e dependente do querer moralmente bom. Alguém deve respeitar os demais porque isso é ordenado pelo imperativo categórico na fórmula da humanidade. Além disso, o autor ressalta que os direitos não são fundados no valor dos seres humanos e que Kant não oferece uma especificação positiva para a idéia de valor (dignidade) como propriedade não-relacional, mas o faz apenas de modo negativo: na GMS Kant diz que aquele valor intrínseco é “*elevado sobre todo preço*”, “*não admite um equivalente*”, “*não tem meramente um valor relativo*”, mas um “valor incondicional e incomparável”. Deste modo, segundo a

interpretação do autor, os seres humanos têm dignidade, mas não como valor absoluto ou intrínseco. Esta dignidade está relacionada com a sublimidade ou elevação em relação aos demais seres da natureza “em virtude da liberdade”.

A interpretação que Sensen oferece é, sem dúvida, bastante razoável quanto à gênese e ao emprego diferenciado do termo dignidade ao longo da obra de Kant. É plausível seguir a tese de que Kant emprega o conceito de dignidade, por vezes, no sentido “arcaico” ou romano-antigo, referindo-se à condição atribuída ou conferida social, cultural e politicamente a um indivíduo, grupo ou classe social. Neste sentido, tal dignidade pode ser adquirida, mas também perdida. Deste modo, o próprio Kant, na *Doutrina do Direito* (Seção D), quando estabelece os direitos e competências do chefe de estado, refere-se claramente à “distribuição de dignidades”(VI 328,9). Plausível é também que Kant sirva-se do conceito “tradicional” de dignidade seguindo as pegadas de Cícero, entendendo-a como sublimidade ou elevação de todos os seres humanos em razão de possuírem certas capacidades como, por exemplo, razão e liberdade.

No entanto, permanece ainda polêmica, ao meu ver, a tese de que Kant não emprega o termo dignidade como sinônimo de valor intrínseco ou absoluto da pessoa e, que portanto, não a entenda como propriedade não-relacional. O autor tem razão em apontar que Kant oferece apenas algumas caracterizações em sentido negativo, como vimos antes. De fato, Kant não apresenta uma argumentação mais detalhada sobre o sentido deste termo. Por isso mesmo é que poderíamos colocar de novo a pergunta: o que diz exatamente o texto de Kant? Porque ele colocou as palavras “intrínseco”, “absoluto”, “incondicional” e “incomparável”? O fato é que elas estão no texto. Como se deve interpretá-las? Isso, ao menos, sugere que se Kant tivesse *sempre* em vista a *visão tradicional* de elevação, talvez ele pudesse ter caracterizado de outra forma e não com estas palavras. Dito de outro modo, a explicação de Sensen sobre isso não me parece plenamente convincente. A interpretação de Sensen oferece, portanto, uma hipótese razoável de leitura.

Outro aspecto, no mínimo muito discutível e controverso, para o qual o trabalho de Sensen aponta é o da interpretação de Kant como um anti-realista moral. De fato, Kant não pode ser assumido simplesmente como um realista moral porque, a rigor, não defende em momento algum aquilo que os realistas chamam de *atos morais*. Mas só isso não é

suficiente para colocá-lo já do lado dos anti-realistas como pretende Sensen, além de outros intérpretes construtivistas, tais como Korsgaard e Rauscher. Por outro lado, do fato de que para Kant a moralidade seja objetiva e não um fenômeno simplesmente subjetivo, fruto de convenções sociais, ou resultado de estados emotivos, também não se pode inferir que ele seja por conta disso um realista moral. Por isso mesmo, a obra em tela, ao mesmo tempo em que nos oferece uma leitura possível da moral kantiana, a partir do conceito de dignidade, nos oferece igualmente a possibilidade de continuar e aprofundar este debate.



La posibilidad del relativismo metaético

The Possibility of Metaethical Relativism

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Reseña: David Velleman, *Foundations for Moral Relativism*, Open Book Publishers, Cambridge, 2013, 108 pp. ISBN: 978-1-909254-44-2

En su obra más reciente *Foundations for Moral Relativism*, David Velleman reúne en cinco ensayos auto subsistentes cuestionamientos y respuestas a diversos temas que ha abordado durante más de 25 años. Los temas corren desde la agencia, la filosofía moral, la metaética, la teoría de la acción y el yo. ¿Qué resulta novedoso en este quinto libro? La respuesta: el énfasis social relativista.¹

Velleman acepta que el libro lejos de contener una teoría articulada o una monografía, engloba diversos temas a partir de un hilo conductor que es el relativismo (introducción, p. 3). Así, el relativismo puede percibirse en la construcción del yo virtual desde el avatar (capítulo II, “Virtual Selves”), en la construcción social de las acciones (capítulo III, “Doables”), en la dependencia de la moralidad de los marcos sociales de referencia (capítulo IV, “Foundations For Moral Relativism”), en la construcción de la

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¹Las otras obras son *Practical Reflection* (Princeton, 1989); *The Possibility of Practical Reason* (Oxford, 2000); *Self to Self: Selected Essays* (Cambridge, 2006); *How We Get Along* (Cambridge, 2009). En el tercer capítulo de *How We Get Along* ya se sugieren ciertas lecturas sociales relativistas en diversos aspectos.

personalidad y su valoración (capítulo V, “Sociality and Solitude”), así como en el absurdo de la vida derivado del relativismo (capítulo VI, “Life Absurd? Don’t Be Ridiculous”).

Pese al esfuerzo de Velleman por unificar la temática en torno al relativismo, son sobre todo los capítulos tercero y cuarto los que tocan directa o más explícitamente el tema del relativismo moral.² Los otros tres capítulos lo abordan de manera más bien tangencial (motivada quizá por la exigencia de unificación). El libro es más una reunión de ensayos con temáticas más o menos a fin que un intento de presentar una teoría unificada como sí lo fue su libro anterior.³ No obstante, en ocasiones resultan más iluminadores pequeños ensayos bien contruidos que tetralogías redundantes. Este es el caso de *Foundations for Moral Relativism*.

Dado que los dos capítulos mencionados (tercero y cuarto) conforman la aportación más clara al relativismo moral los dejaré para la siguiente parte. En lo que sigue haré una descripción breve de los otros tres capítulos resaltando (según mi consideración) el punto principal de cada uno y proponiendo en qué medida podrían relacionarse (indirectamente) con el relativismo.

El segundo capítulo “Virtual Selves” aborda el tema de la construcción del yo virtual, dicha construcción no dista demasiado de la construcción de nuestro yo “real”. A través del análisis de la plataforma social *Second Life* Velleman intenta distinguir entre el ejercicio de generación de un yo como hacer-creer (*make-believe*) o juego fingido (*pretended play*) del que se lleva a cabo en dicha plataforma. La diferencia crucial radica en que el avatar es un yo el cual “literalmente realiza acciones ficcionales”. (p.6) Las acciones realizadas por el avatar responden al auto-concepto creado por el usuario a través de clics del mouse. Así, un hombre maduro puede interpretar a una joven estudiante, un cuadripléjico puede correr sin problemas. Todos los agentes controlan sus acciones a través de movimientos dactilares, lo cual prueba no que el agente controla su avatar sino que es él a través de su avatar (la analogía es entre el cuerpo y el avatar). La interpretación psicológica de Velleman del yo como un auto-concepto no es nueva en su planteamiento como sí son los recursos de la teoría de la inteligencia artificial.⁴

² La mayoría de los artículos fueron publicados con anterioridad de forma independiente en diversas revistas y con otros títulos (como es el caso de los tres primeros artículos, “Bodies, Selves”, “Regarding Being Ordinary”, “A Reasonable Relativism”).

³ *How We Get Along* (Cambridge, 2009)

⁴ El tema fue abordado con precisión en “The Self as Narrator” en *Self to Self: Selected Essays* (Cambridge, 2006) y en “Acting” en *How We Get Along* (Cambridge, 2009)

¿Cómo es este planteamiento relativista? Velleman no explicita nada, pero podemos pensar que tras el señalamiento de que la construcción del yo (virtual o real) tiene propósitos sociales (p. 4), las construcciones son tan diversas como diversas son las intenciones de los usuarios (el cuadrupléjico puede correr). Sin embargo, al final Velleman considera que debe existir una restricción a propósito de la unidad entre auto-concepto y la persona (tanto el yo virtual como el yo “real” (pp.19.21).

En el quinto capítulo *Sociality and Solitude* Velleman intenta hacer dos cosas. Por un lado, intenta refinar su versión kantiana de la personalidad, pero por otro lado, intenta ofrecer un argumento de su valoración basado, no en la racionalidad sino en la naturaleza humana (argumento empírico). El auto-concepto es la forma en que las personas nos representamos no sólo el mundo (objetiva) o a nosotros (subjetiva), sino a nosotros ubicados en un mundo. Así, el auto-concepto es una auto-conciencia objetiva. Esta hipótesis puede ser validada en los planes (por la proyección futura), en la prueba de Turing, en las intenciones compartidas, así como en la soledad. Para reducir la sospecha de una sobre-intelectualización Velleman distingue entre conciencia y atención. Al final del texto Velleman ofrece formas en las que indirectamente valuamos la personalidad en términos de auto-conciencia objetiva, estas formas son el amor, la amistad y la soledad.

¿Por qué es esta propuesta relativista? Al inicio del ensayo Velleman señala que el relativismo moral parece plantear “hoyos negros morales” que amenazan con devorar nuestro mundo moral y llevarse todas nuestras distinciones. Sin embargo, al final cree que su propuesta a través de un argumento empírico favorece la interpretación de que la naturaleza humana desarrolla caminos comunes hacia la convergencia y hacia mundos más hospitalarios.

En el sexto capítulo Velleman intenta refutar la hipótesis de que el relativismo tiene como consecuencia el absurdo de la vida. Esta hipótesis se alimenta de la definición de Nagel sobre el absurdo como la colisión entre nuestras expectativas y la realidad. Velleman precisa que esta definición más bien tiene que ser entendida como contradicción dentro de nosotros mismos, como una contradicción entre nuestra seriedad con la que enfrentamos nuestras aspiraciones y lo arbitrario o abierto al cuestionamiento que son dichas aspiraciones. Velleman revisa varias formas en las que podemos entender lo arbitrario o lo abierto a cuestionamiento, señalando que son dos conceptos diferentes. Si entendemos lo arbitrario como decisión no justificada respecto de un estándar, esta definición es

compatible con estar abierta a cuestionamiento. Si entendemos arbitrario como decisión no sujeta a estándar alguno, entonces no es compatible. Velleman termina reconociendo el sentido preeminente de arbitrario como específico o idiosincrático. La colisión entre seriedad y conciencia de la peculiaridad de la vida es el contenido del absurdo.

¿Cómo se relaciona con el relativismo? Velleman afirma que la unión entre relativismo y absurdo es deudora de la definición absolutista o trascendente de Nagel. Si nuestras aspiraciones toman como objeto el absoluto la seriedad con que perseguimos dicho objeto no es ridícula, y el relativismo es absurdo. Sin embargo, si el relativista esta consciente de la pluralidad de criterios y la ausencia de absolutos, entonces su seriedad no colisionará con la arbitrariedad. Así, la cuestión sobre la especificidad de la vida no nos lleva a la ansiedad, sino a la sorpresa. Creer en el relativismo no es una cosa ridícula.

El capítulo cuarto aborda el relativismo en un sentido más general que el quinto: un relativismo social de las acciones (y no sólo moral). El relativismo de las acciones es la condición de posibilidad del relativismo moral. La tesis principal es que los diversos dominios prácticos son construidos por diversas comunidades a través de lo que es ordinario dentro de cada comunidad. Esta tesis permite girar el enfoque desde el cual se formulará el relativismo, pues el eje central de este último no será más el desacuerdo sin error (*faultless disagreement*), sino el desacuerdo sobre el desacuerdo. El desacuerdo entre las comunidades radica en lo que es posible hacer (*do-able*), no sólo teórica, sino prácticamente. De ahí que la manera en que las comunidades construyen su repertorio práctico es viviendo una forma de vida.

La metodología que ocupa Velleman es tanto la etnometodología como la llamada sociología especulativa. Ambas aproximaciones privilegian la vida cotidiana y sobre todo el carácter ordinario de las acciones como el centro de la investigación. Así, Velleman explota estos recursos para construir una teoría social de las acciones. Las acciones-concepto que figuran en las intenciones de los agentes individuales no son escogidas a partir de un dominio independiente, sino desde un trasfondo común que son los estándares ordinarios de las acciones. Actuar es realizar una descripción de la acción, y dicha descripción no parte de una invención individual del espacio ontológico de las acciones, sino de un repertorio social compartido. Los agentes hacen las cosas que se pueden hacer (*do-ables*). La cultura es este kit desde el cual los agentes construyen cadenas de acciones, es decir, los vínculos entre las cadenas están culturalmente prefabricados.

Lo que es posible hacer se refleja en una ontología compartida que se presenta como entendimiento mutuo y acción mutua (cooperación). Esta amalgama es lo que los fenomenólogos sociales (sociología especulativa), sobre todo A. Schütz, llamaban tipificación. Las acciones típicas son las acciones ordinarias, las acciones que se pueden realizar. Si tenemos un sistema compartido de tipificaciones podemos coordinar tanto el entendimiento como las acciones mutuas. Velleman apunta que esta coordinación se logra a partir de la construcción social que hace evidente la diferencia cultural y cita los ejemplos de la diferencia lingüística y la taxonomía del cuerpo. En esta última, la acción de saludar responde a lo que dentro de una comunidad consideran saludar. Así, para un Ibo nigeriano saludar (*ji-aka*) implica tomar al compañero del hombro, mientras que para un inglés implica solo tomar la muñeca. Para un Ibo tomar de la muñeca a alguien es signo de ofensa o al menos de desconfianza.

La diferencia lingüística se trasluce a través de la construcción social de los actos lingüísticos. Velleman escoge la teoría de los actos lingüísticos debido a la amplia aceptación de su universalidad, y por ende, el lugar natural para negar el relativismo social. John Searle presentaba las fuerzas ilocucionarias de los actos lingüísticos como exhaustivas (asertiva, directiva, comisiva, declarativa y expresiva) y con ello como universales. Velleman ofrece dos tipos de evidencia en contra del esquema de Searle. Por un lado, intenta mostrar que dentro de la comunidad filipina de Ilongot no existe la fuerza comisiva, pues dicha fuerza implica la culpa si falla la promesa, pero dentro de la comunidad citada no existe dicha culpa. Así, la fuerza comisiva es ausente. Por otro lado, los evidenciales gramaticales (*evidentials*) muestran la presencia de una fuerza ilocucionaria no incluida en la taxonomía de Searle. La comunidad Quechua incorpora la relación epistémica del sujeto mediante la explicitación gramatical de los finales en las palabras. Así, la forma del discurso indirecto es remplazada por la terminación “SI”.

Un ejemplo más, aunque indirecto, a favor de la construcción social de las acciones a partir de la diferencia cultural en el lenguaje es el de las máximas de la conversación y las condiciones de verdad de Paul Grice. Velleman utiliza el contraejemplo de los Malagasy para mostrar que una aserción puede ser deliberadamente no-informativa (ausencia de la máxima de cantidad) o el *kala:m* egipcio, el TUS maya, el Kizb libanés, el Vrano ruso para mostrar que una aserción no está comprometida seriamente con la verdad (ausencia de la máxima de cualidad). Los contraejemplos anteriores prueban que las prácticas sociales

afectan la individuación de los actos lingüísticos, si las prácticas son relativas, la individuación es relativa. Así, la taxonomía de las acciones está limitada culturalmente.

Pero, ¿por qué construir la ordinariidad? Velleman cree que existe una demanda implícita de entendimiento mutuo. Así como yo quiero entenderte, tú quieres entenderme, por ende, yo me hago entendible y tú te haces entendible. Esta comprensión, en la medida en que está atada a los actos lingüísticos, está relacionada con la conducta. El entendimiento mutuo se trasluce en nuestro esfuerzo mutuo por hacernos legibles conductualmente. Hacernos comprensibles es aprender el lenguaje conductual local. ¿Cómo? Actuando como ordinariamente se actúa. Un ejemplo de Velleman consiste en pisar por error a alguien en el pie, ¿es esta acción una intimidación?, ¿quizá es un coqueteo? La distinción, la comprensión y la coordinación de las acciones apuntan al trasfondo social compartido.

La demanda de una taxonomía social de las acciones es reforzada por tres teorías. La primera es la teoría de la intencionalidad compartida. En esta teoría las actividades compartidas están definidas por intenciones compartidas y éstas a su vez por el conocimiento común (la mayoría de las veces implícito). Velleman agrega que el entendimiento común supone una taxonomía social de las acciones. La segunda teoría es la de los escenarios sociales. En esta teoría la información pasada genera un esquema o script que permite predecir las acciones futuras. Velleman agrega que los escenarios sociales son conocimiento común pues tienen sus propias entradas arraigadas en el trasfondo social compartido. Una tercera es la teoría de la decisión. En esta teoría las acciones son determinadas por sus consecuencias y los casos de irracionalidad son desechados por el “principio de indiferencia racional”, es decir, el principio permite prescindir de distinciones irrelevantes entre las acciones. Velleman objeta que este principio no puede ayudarnos en la construcción social de las acciones, por lo contrario la invención de la taxonomía de las acciones altera el marco de decisión.

¿Cómo se conecta el relativismo de las acciones con el relativismo moral? Velleman finaliza haciendo el siguiente señalamiento. Una cultura no puede condenar las prácticas de otra debido a que carecen de un punto de acuerdo (no hay desacuerdo perfecto). A lo mucho puede el integrante de una cultura alegrarse de no estar dentro de otra comunidad que contraviene sus creencias. Las condenas y los juicios morales sólo

pueden surgir y ser justificados dentro de un marco social de referencia. El desacuerdo sólo es posible intra-culturalmente.

Esta conclusión nos lleva a la hipótesis del quinto capítulo: las diferentes comunidades tienen distintas moralidades. ¿Cómo entender esta afirmación? El ensayo tiene dos aproximaciones, una metaética y otra sustantiva. La primera intenta dar cuenta de manera general cómo es posible una normatividad local, la segunda ofrece la manera en cómo y por qué esto sucedería.

Una primera objeción que se enfrenta a la hipótesis metaética de Velleman es la carencia de fuerza normativa de las comunidades (*mores*). Las *mores* no son normas morales porque las primeras sólo son descripciones (etnográficas), por ejemplo la expresión, “Para un Kikuyu la circuncisión es incorrecta”, carece de fuerza normativa porque no es un enunciado de guía práctica, sino meramente un registro de hechos. Velleman cree que un relativismo normativo debe ser capaz de proporcionar la expresión normativa correcta. De ahí que el autor encuentre una analogía entre *mores*-moralidad y hechos-valores.

Dentro de la discusión de los índices esenciales existe un acuerdo en torno a la forma que precisan los enunciados normativos. Mientras que las descripciones factuales son realizadas desde la tercera persona mediante índices explícitos, los juicios de valor son realizados desde la primera persona mediante índices implícitos. Así, una expresión de hechos sería: “La circuncisión está mal *para los Mbuti*”; una expresión de valor sería: “La circuncisión está mal” (diría un Mbuti). Velleman utiliza las conclusiones de John Perry sobre los índices esenciales para abogar por la normatividad de las *mores*. Para Perry la guía práctica se condensa en los índices esenciales, es decir, los índices implícitos son directivos de nuestra conducta. Velleman concluye entonces que las normas (valores) son como los índices esenciales porque son guías implícitas.

Nuestro autor une los señalamientos anteriores al tema de la normatividad de las razones. Bajo el supuesto de que la moralidad obliga a los sujetos vinculándolos racionalmente y que esto significa que genera razones constituidas; el relativismo sostiene que si la moralidad está circunscrita a una comunidad, entonces la comunidad genera *diferentes* razones constituidas. Sin embargo, nuestra membresía a una comunidad no debe ser sólo un elemento circunstancial en el contenido de estas razones constituidas, sino un elemento constitutivo. Este rasgo separa el relativismo clásico del que propone Velleman.

Esta diferencia es más clara en el talante reduccionista que nuestro autor defiende. Una postura anti-reduccionista sostiene que no podemos explicar el contenido de las razones, a lo mucho, podemos dar definiciones elípticas: “una razón es lo que cuenta como una razón”. El relativista debe ser reduccionista porque debe explicar la relación causal entre la membresía y las razones. Sin embargo, no debe llegar al extremo de sostener que la membresía genera sus razones a través de distintos métodos (razonamiento práctico). Un relativista moderado sostiene que la misma relación en distintas comunidades genera distintas razones, es decir, la pregunta no es, “¿por qué uno está obligado por los métodos locales?”, sino, ¿cómo la misma relación es sensible entre diferentes comunidades?

A esta última pregunta Velleman responde a través de los marcos de referencia. Las razones son aquello que pesa a favor de algo (una acción, una creencia), es decir, tienen peso normativo. Las razones son aquello favorecido, la fuerza es la normatividad y la causa los marcos de referencia. Así, un relativista moderado diría que diferentes marcos de referencia generan sus propias razones a través de la *misma* fuerza normativa. Esta afirmación se explica a partir de una analogía de la fuerza normativa con la fuerza de gravedad.

En el contexto de la *tierra* podemos decir que las rocas son “pesadas”, donde pesado significa que tiende a “caer”, donde caer significa “acelerar hacia abajo”, es decir, “pesado” es un índice implícito (y por tanto directivo) y “acelerar hacia abajo” es un índice explícito.⁵ En el contexto del *espacio exterior* las rocas no son pesadas porque las rocas no tienden a acelerar hacia abajo. La conclusión: la fuerza depende de los marcos de referencia. En el caso de la normatividad de las razones, las razones son como las rocas pues tienen peso normativo, la fuerza normativa determina la dirección hacia la cual aceleran las acciones de los sujetos (su dirección de adecuación). En el contexto de los Mbuti las razones para una acción x son determinadas por su marco de referencia a través de una fuerza normativa constante, mientras que para los Kikuyu las razones para una acción son determinadas por su marco de referencia a través de la misma fuerza.

Estas indicaciones metaéticas son complementadas por un paso sustantivo que Velleman importa del capítulo anterior. La tesis metaética sostiene que las razones son

⁵ Existen tres niveles entre las descripciones factuales y las guías prácticas. 1. Descripciones explícitas, 2. Descripciones implícitas o descripción de actos-guía y 3. Guía práctica directa. Así, tenemos las descripciones factuales “Las rocas tienden a acelerar hacia abajo *en la tierra*” y “Las rocas caen *en la tierra*”; las descripciones de actos-guía “Las rocas son pesadas” y finalmente la guía práctica directa dejar caer la piedra (no es una expresión)

constituidas por los marcos de referencia de cada comunidad, es decir, la membresía tiene un carácter constitutivo. No obstante, pueden surgir las preguntas: ¿cómo constituyen las comunidades sus diferentes razones?, ¿por qué las comunidades favorecen ciertas acciones? Velleman utiliza sus resultados extraídos de la fenomenología social o sociología especulativa sobre la ordinariedad. La socialidad a diferencia de la mera proximidad exige y conduce (*drive*) a la interacción. Interactuar es entenderse mutuamente. Así, el impulso a la socialidad es un impulso al entendimiento mutuo. Para la sociología especulativa la necesidad de entendimiento mutuo es la necesidad de sub-rutinas en tiempo real para entenderse y hacerse entendible. Por principio de caridad asumimos que la otra persona se nos presenta con la intención de ser inteligible y nosotros hacia ellos, es decir, nosotros proyectamos en los otros y satisfacemos las proyecciones de ellos. Este punto de encuentro es la convergencia en las actitudes que si bien no es perfecta tampoco es excéntrica, la convergencia como punto intermedio es la ordinariedad en el actuar, pensar, y sentir.

Con la hipótesis sustantiva sobre las *mores* como el punto de convergencia en lo ordinario Velleman regresa a la discusión metaética. La única razón que tengo para evaluar algo radica en los elementos que este algo comparte con otras cosas que evaluamos dentro de una comunidad, es decir, con lo que ordinariamente creemos, sentimos y actuamos. Justificar nuestras actitudes significa mostrar que son ordinarias para nosotros. Con este señalamiento Velleman obtiene dos consecuencias, o bien nuestras justificaciones serán incompletas hasta que no ofrezcamos una respuesta generalmente aceptada, o bien aquello que ofrecemos no es una justificación, es decir, la fuerza normativa es la conducción (*drive*) hacia el entendimiento mutuo. En el caso particular de las acciones esta conducción hacia el entendimiento mutuo corresponde con el entendimiento mutuo de la *conducta*. La interpretación mutua es un fenómeno holístico (qué pensar, qué sentir, qué hacer). Pero, ¿qué sucede si un individuo quiere actuar por razones independientes del marco de referencia, es decir, tener fuertes motivos para ser no-interpretable? Velleman contesta que al apartarse de las formas colectivas de interpretación el individuo se auto-condena a la ininteligibilidad, a ser el centro de gravedad de su propio marco de referencia, y por ende, a no ser persona.

¿Cuáles son las consecuencias del relativismo moderado? Que los Kikuyu tengan una razón normativa para hacer x la tienen en virtud de vivir como Kikuyu; mientras que

los occidentales tienen una razón normativa para abominar x (y evitarla) en virtud de vivir como occidentales. Las razones se derivan de los marcos de referencia. De ahí que, preguntar por el sitio de las razones “reales” sería tan absurdo como preguntar por el peso de las rocas fuera de los marcos de referencia. Las razones independientes de los marcos de referencia son imposibles. Pero, si las razones dependen del marco de referencia, ¿no es esta postura nihilista? Velleman sugiere que el relativismo lejos de ser una invitación a la desesperación en torno la coordinación entre las comunidades, es una profesión de *humildad*. El desacuerdo y la movilidad sólo pueden ser motivados internamente por cada comunidad y dado que la naturaleza humana tiende a favorecer la socialidad (el entendimiento mutuo) tenemos la esperanza de que la convergencia global se incremente progresivamente.



Théologie et religion chez Kant.
**Compte-rendu de l'ouvrage *Kant. Théologie et religion* aux
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Kant's Theology and Religion.
A review of *Kant. Théologie et religion*, Vrin, 2013

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Les éditions Vrin ont publié en 2013 les actes du Xie Congrès de la Société d'études kantienne de langue française, sous la direction de M. Robert Theis. Le thème du congrès était : Kant, théologie et religion. L'ouvrage présente d'abord les textes des conférences plénières, puis celles des communications, réparties selon les thèmes suivants : théologie, religion, contexte et réception. Comme le note à juste titre Jean Ferrari dans sa conférence plénière, *Théologie transcendantale et religion de la raison*, les thèmes de la religion et de la théologie chez Kant ont été peu traités dans la tradition francophone et ce même si ces sujets ont préoccupé Kant jusque dans ses derniers écrits. Certains ont même avancé que sans une détermination philosophique de Dieu et du contenu de l'espérance rattachée à la religion, le système de la philosophie transcendantale ne pouvait connaître son achèvement. Sans nécessairement souscrire à cette thèse, on peut se réjouir qu'un sujet

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de cette importance pour les études kantienne fasse l'objet d'un ouvrage collectif en langue française. Comme il serait impossible toutefois de rendre compte de tous les textes que comporte cet ouvrage, nous nous limiterons à en présenter sommairement quelques uns qui se démarquent par leur qualité et l'intérêt du sujet traité.

Parmi les conférences plénières, celle de M. Ferrari, précédemment citée, a le mérite de faire un examen plutôt exhaustif du cheminent intellectuel de Kant au sujet de la théologie et de la religion. Comme il le rappelle, Kant s'est d'abord intéressé à la théologie transcendantale et c'est beaucoup plus tardivement, soit vers les années 90, qu'il aborde le thème de la religion. Par théologie transcendantale, il convient d'entendre selon lui, conformément à la tradition leibnizo-wolffienne, la *métaphysica specialis* dont l'objet est Dieu et qui constitue la fin ultime de la philosophie. Au sujet de la théologie transcendantale, M. Ferrari expose ensuite minutieusement l'évolution de la pensée de Kant de 1755 jusqu'à *l'Opus postumum*. On y constate d'abord que dès la *Nova dilucidatio*, Kant insiste sur ce qui sera plus tard au cœur de la Dialectique transcendantale de la *Critique de la raison pure*, soit la distinction entre l'ordre de la connaissance et l'ordre de l'existence, laquelle conduit à rejeter la preuve ontologique de l'existence de Dieu, l'existence n'étant pas un prédicat de l'essence. Cependant, tout au long de la période pré-critique, on observe que Kant adhère à des preuves de l'existence de Dieu qu'il dénoncera par la suite comme de simples avatars de la preuve ontologique. En 1763, dans *l'Unique argument possible pour une démonstration de l'existence de Dieu*, Kant soutient en effet que Dieu, en tant que *Realgrund* est la condition de toute possibilité. À ce titre, son existence apparaît nécessaire, comme le sont les qualités qui lui correspondent, soient l'unité, l'immutabilité, l'éternité. Dans la *Dissertation* de 1770, l'usage réel de l'entendement autorise une preuve de l'existence de Dieu à partir de la contingence des substances. Toutefois, la *Critique de la raison pure* démontrera en 1781 l'impossibilité définitive de toute preuve de l'existence de Dieu par la raison spéculative, réservant néanmoins à l'idée de Dieu, comme aux autres idées transcendantales, un usage régulateur pour la connaissance de la nature. C'est à la morale, comme l'indique Kant dans la seconde et la troisième *Critique*, que revient la tâche de fournir une preuve de l'existence de Dieu. Celui-ci doit être nécessairement postulé eu égard à la possibilité de l'objet total

et complet d'une volonté moralement déterminée: le *summum bonum* ou but final. Au sujet de ce tournant pratique de la théologie, M. Ferrari remarque que : « ...le Dieu de Kant n'est pas le Dieu des philosophes et des savants dont la métaphysique traditionnelle, au terme d'un raisonnement, prouve l'existence... » mais « ... la loi morale en nous, cette exigence à l'aune de laquelle tout doit se mesurer, ... »¹. Le texte s'intéresse ensuite à l'élaboration par Kant d'une philosophie de la religion dont il retrace les différentes étapes.

Dans la section de l'ouvrage concernant la théologie, Sophie Grapotte défend dans un texte intitulé « Le concept d'*ENS REALISSIMUM* », le caractère critique du concept de Dieu comme *ens realissimum* dans la première *Critique*, contre l'opinion d'Anneliese Maier selon laquelle ce concept serait dogmatique. Autrement dit, l'auteur veut montrer que Kant, après avoir remis en cause la prétention de la métaphysique dogmatique à connaître les choses en soi, ne retombe pas subitement dans cette même dogmatique en introduisant le concept d'*ens realissimum*. Au contraire, selon elle, celui-ci porterait de part en part l'empreinte de la critique. D'abord, Sophie Grapotte rappelle que ce que fait Kant dans la dialectique transcendantale ne consiste pas à déterminer une connaissance possible d'objets suprasensibles, comme par exemple Dieu, mais à montrer comment la raison humaine est conduite par elle-même à produire des concepts dont les objets dépassent le champ du connaissable. Il y montre en effet que la raison tend naturellement, lorsqu'elle veut opérer la détermination complète d'une chose, à penser son rapport à tous les prédicats possibles, et ce sous la forme du concept de la possibilité totale, comme substrat commun. Ensuite, par épuration, ce concept devient celui d'un être singulier totalement déterminé par cette idée, soit un Idéal. En décrivant la genèse de Dieu comme idéal, Kant reste fidèle à l'usage critique de la raison puisqu'il montre comment la raison humaine tombe naturellement dans des illusions lorsqu'elle sort des limites de l'expérience possible et prétend faussement connaître des réalités transcendantes. Dans une perspective critique, il montre ensuite que la constitution du concept d'*ensrealissimum* est une illusion dialectique qui survient à la faveur d'une confusion entre la supposition nécessaire à la possibilité des phénomènes, soit le tout de l'expérience possible, *omnitutido realitas phenomenae*, et le tout de toute réalité, la condition de toutes choses en général, soit

¹Ferrari, Jean, « Théologie transcendantale et religion de la religion », dans *Kant Théologie et religion*, dir. Robert Theis, Vrin, 2013, p.23.

l'omnitudo realitas noumenae. En outre, la conversion de *l'omnitudo realitatis* en un être dont l'existence conditionne toutes choses résulte d'une transformation de l'unité distributive de l'usage expérimental de l'entendement en une unité collective, celle d'un tout de ces réalités.

Il apparaît désormais manifeste selon Sophie Grapotte que le concept d'*ens realissimum* dans la *Critique de la raison pure* n'est pas traité dogmatiquement mais bel et bien disséqué, analysé et, de ce fait, limité par le travail de la raison critique. Ce concept n'a pas d'usage transcendant, car il ne peut s'appliquer à aucun objet d'expérience, mais seulement immanent, heuristique, s'il est appliqué à l'usage de l'entendement dans l'expérience en vue de la systémativité des connaissances. Son usage n'est pas constitutif mais seulement régulateur, car il dirige l'entendement vers la plus grande unité possible dans l'ordre de la connaissance. Il est, ainsi, un « objet dans l'idée », un schème qui sert à représenter la liaison systématique des objets de connaissance. Le concept critique de l'être suprême ne correspond pour Kant à aucun objet réel donné mais à un objet pensé, soit à une idée, qui est supposée relativement au monde sensible dont elle permet de penser l'unité. En fait, dans une perspective critique, le seul usage légitime que nous puissions faire de l'idée de l'être suprême comme *ens realissimum* demeure analogique. Les catégories de l'entendement ne peuvent lui être appliquées qu'analogiquement ou indirectement en tant qu'il est mis en relation avec le fondement des objets des sens.

La section de l'ouvrage portant sur la religion comporte plusieurs contributions intéressantes portant sur des aspects variés de la doctrine kantienne de la religion. On y trouve notamment un texte de Mai Lequan qui révèle le rôle important dévolu par Kant à l'Université comme tribunal chargé de trancher les querelles entre les théologiens et les philosophes sur les questions religieuses, et un autre fort pertinent de Robert Theis, qui souligne le rôle déterminant de l'analogie dans la philosophie religieuse de Kant. Cet article, intitulé « Le Christ comme archétype de toute moralité » suggère que si Kant emploie très peu le nom de Jésus dans ses œuvres, c'est moins par une sorte de pudeur respectueuse que parce que Jésus ou le Christ ne l'intéresse pas en tant que personne ou

individu, mais seulement en tant qu'il est l'image sensible, la représentation concrète d'un idéal, celui d'une humanité conforme à la moralité. L'auteur s'applique à montrer comment la conception kantienne de la religion et le type d'herméneutique préconisée par Kant convergent vers cette interprétation du Christ comme archétype de la moralité. Notons d'abord que la religion est introduite dans la philosophie kantienne à partir de la raison pratique. Celle-ci exige en effet que l'objet total d'une volonté déterminée par la loi morale, soit le souverain bien, soit possible. Cette possibilité, ne pouvant reposer uniquement sur nous-mêmes, êtres finis, exige, pour être achevée, l'assistance de Dieu comme postulat. Lui seul permet en effet d'accorder à celui qui s'en est rendu digne, tout le bonheur qu'il mérite. C'est ainsi, en premier lieu, grâce à l'espérance en la possibilité du souverain bien comme union proportionnée du bonheur et de la vertu, que Kant rattache la religion à la moralité sans toutefois la subordonner à la première et en maintenant intacte son autonomie. L'auteur précise qu'il existe également un autre chemin qui de la morale conduit à la religion, lequel dépassant le registre de la simple espérance, incite à regarder nos devoirs moraux comme étant, en même temps, des commandements divins. Selon R. Theis, cette quasi-identification de nos devoirs moraux à des commandements divins peut signifier deux choses : d'abord, que la notion de commandement divin permet de rendre sensible l'obligation que représente la loi morale, qui n'est pourtant qu'un devoir de l'homme envers lui-même, ensuite, que les devoirs moraux sont en eux-mêmes la manifestation concrète, accessible à la conscience, de la volonté divine, son incarnation pour la raison humaine. Cette perception des devoirs moraux comme manifestation sensible de la volonté divine invite à une interprétation des écritures qui ne doit pas viser à chercher en elles un sens caché, à découvrir, mais qui doit au contraire tenter de saisir comment elles expriment à leur façon, historique, concrète, la loi morale déjà présente dans la raison de tout être humain. En effet, si la religion est issue de la raison pratique et qu'elle en constitue le prolongement, il en résulte que l'interprétation des écritures doit toujours se faire à partir de l'interprète, de sa raison, de la loi morale qui s'y manifeste et non pas extérieurement à celle-ci, dans le texte. La foi rationnelle est déjà dans la raison et guide l'interprétation des textes qui en sont la manifestation symbolique ou sensible. Poursuivant dans cette voie, on peut constater dans *La religion dans les limites de la simple raison*, que la disposition morale au Bien, le Bon principe, qui est indestructible en l'homme et qu'il est appelé à développer contre son penchant au mal et qui s'identifie à

l'idéal d'un homme moral, agréable à Dieu, ne nous est accessible toutefois que par le truchement d'un individu concret qui incarnerait cet idéal, une personne historique, le Christ. En outre, comme le montre Robert Theis, la personne historique de Jésus manifeste en elle-même, tel un exemple, la « *religion naturelle complète* ² ». Ainsi, la personne historique de Jésus apparaît-elle nécessaire en vertu du schématisme de l'analogie qui permet à des êtres sensibles et raisonnables comme nous de nous représenter concrètement le suprasensible, en l'espèce de la loi morale et de l'idéal d'une humanité parfaite.

Enfin, la dernière partie de l'ouvrage, intitulée *Contextes et réception* est caractérisée par des textes qui soulignent l'influence de Kant sur la philosophie de la religion en général ou traitent de la réception des textes de Kant concernant la religion ou la théologie à son époque, y compris les critiques qui lui furent adressées, tandis que d'autres enfin révèlent l'importance de sa correspondance avec d'autres philosophes dans l'élaboration de sa propre conception de la religion.



²Robert Theis, « Le Christ comme archétype de toute moralité », *op.cit.*, p.283

**Spalding e il lungo cammino della “destinazione dell’uomo”
nel dibattito settecentesco tra teologia, morale e prospettiva
antropologica. Controversie e soluzioni nel segno della
Modernità**

*Spalding and the Long Path of the “Destination of Man”
in the Eighteenth-Century Discussion Between Theology,
Morals and Anthropological Point of View. Controversies and
Solutions Under the Banner of Modernity*

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Recensione: Laura Anna Macor, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen (1748-1800). Eine Begriffsgeschichte*, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 2013, 432 pp. ISBN: 978-3-7728-2615-3

Fin dal suo studio del 2008, che porta un suggestivo titolo ispirato dai *Masnadieri* di Schiller, *Il giro fangoso dell’umana destinazione. Friedrich Schiller dall’illuminismo al criticismo*, Laura Anna Macor si è concentrata su uno dei principali quesiti dell’illuminismo tedesco: la destinazione dell’uomo e la ricerca di autonomia della ragione da istanze eteronome. L’espressione chiave di questa riflessione è “Bestimmung” fin dalla sua prima accezione di “determinazione”, in cui Schiller coglie

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il senso fondamentale dell'invito kantiano a una emancipazione del soggetto che si interroga sulla propria "destinazione" e cerca di volgerlo a un progetto di crescente autonomia dell'uomo dai condizionamenti morali e politici, significativamente incarnati nelle sue opere in figure dai tratti paternalistici o autoritari. La linea lungo la quale si compie la trasformazione del concetto di "Bestimmung", passando dal significato di determinazione a quello di destinazione, è il percorso che viene seguito dal 1748 al 1800 nella recente monografia della Macor, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen. Eine Begriffsgeschichte* (2013), forte di oltre 350 pagine di intense riflessioni. Esso interessa alcuni tra i pensatori più fecondi di idee sulla scena del dibattito filosofico-antropologico del Settecento: Mendelssohn, Kant, Herder, Schiller e Fichte.

Un precedente studio dell'autrice si concentrava sulla personalità di Schiller e affrontava la sua riflessione sulla destinazione ultraterrena dell'uomo, partendo dai suoi anni di formazione presso la *Karlsschule* di Stoccarda (1773-1780) per arrivare ai *Briefe über Don Karlos* (1788), in cui Schiller rifletteva sui rischi della degenerazione di un atteggiamento sobriamente razionale in pernicioso entusiasmo, in concomitanza con un interesse ancora in nuce per Kant, di cui a quel tempo apprezzava in particolare la *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*. Macor prende invece in quest'occasione le mosse dalla genesi del concetto "Bestimmung", concentrandosi sul profilo intellettuale e sugli assunti antropologico-filosofici del pensatore che ha coniato questo termine: il teologo luterano Johann Joachim Spalding (1714-1804), autore della *Betrachtung über die Bestimmung des Menschen* del 1748. Le riedizioni della sua opera, successivamente proposta con il titolo abbreviato *Bestimmung des Menschen*, sono undici in tutto (1748¹-1794¹¹) e accompagnano gli sviluppi della riflessione sulla disposizione terrena e spirituale del soggetto umano a corrispondere al progetto divino, dall'Illuminismo al Criticismo per giungere all'Idealismo.

In questo scenario, in cui si scandiscono tutte le tappe del dibattito sulla destinazione dell'uomo sulla scorta degli autorevoli studi di Norbert Hinske (Hinske: 1985 e Hinske: 1990), Werner Schneiders (Schneiders: 1974 e Schneiders: 1985), Albrecht Beutel (Beutel: 2011) e di altri specialisti del pensiero illuminista, di cui Macor dà conto in una dettagliata ricostruzione dello stato della ricerca (pp. 23-28), si colgono alcuni fondamentali punti di oscillazione di un concetto che si allontana

progressivamente dal controllo della dottrina luterana, per la quale significava “Vorschrift” (prescrizione). La connotazione muta in modo direttamente proporzionale alla necessità di interpretare il concetto di “Bestimmung” in senso antropologico, piuttosto che religioso (Spalding, sulla scorta di Shaftesbury, pp. 79-84), in senso civile (Mendelssohn, p. 54), in senso morale e destinale (Kant, pp. 211-212), in senso collettivo, anche da un punto di vista storico (Herder, pp. 213 sgg.), in senso storico collettivo nella prima fase dell’approccio di Schiller al pensiero di Kant (1787-1790) e poi invece in un senso non più riconducibile all’alveo della *Menschheit*, perché dal 1795 Schiller si attesta sulla convinzione che il progresso dell’umanità abbia nuociuto al singolo individuo (1795-1801). Rispetto, dunque, alla sua monografia del 2008, che rivela il nucleo fondativo dell’attuale lavoro, Macor completa il cammino intorno alla centralissima riflessione sul senso e sullo scopo della vita umana tra realtà terrena e vita oltre la morte, integrandolo con una lettura delle ragioni dell’allontanamento di Schiller dalla visione kantiana di filosofia della storia riconducibile ai saggi brevi usciti nella *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, fino a giungere al declino del concetto di “Bestimmung” con Fichte. Il filosofo, una volta giunto a Jena, proietta infatti – tra il 1794 e il 1798 – in una dimensione del tutto diversa, quella del *Beruf* (professione), l’idea del compito umano (pp. 310 sgg.) Fichte riduce drasticamente i margini dell’autonomia umana, perché per lui il soggetto non ha senso se non in relazione con gli altri individui, nei quali riconosce il comune compito destinale. La traduzione del “Mensch” in “Individuum” obbliga perciò il soggetto, come rileva Macor in un passo che funge da bilancio del suo itinerario attraverso i nodi cruciali del pensiero antropologico-filosofico del ‘700 – già esplorato in un’ulteriore studio del 2011 intitolato *La fragilità della virtù. Dall’antropologia alla morale e ritorno nell’epoca di Kant* – a essere membro di una collettività senza la quale la sua funzione perde completamente valore. Non tanto riduttivo, si può constatare, è il fatto che l’uomo debba rendere conto delle proprie azioni in un contesto sociale, quanto vincolante è la prescrizione sottesa a questo pensiero (p. 314). Il bilancio che Macor trae da questa visione fichtiana della teleologia dell’individuo vincolata alla collettività coincide con il punto di transito del pensiero sull’uomo dal Criticismo all’Idealismo:

Se l’uomo scopre la propria ‘destinazione’ per l’appunto nell’assunzione di un compito che concerne tutto il genere umano (*Geschlecht*), ma ha già preso coscienza

del fatto che può far fronte a questo compito solo nel contesto di una particolare posizione (*Stand*) sociale, in cui si vota a una sola tra le proprie disposizioni e la porta possibilmente al massimo grado di perfettibilità, allora gli è concesso soltanto di occuparsi della propria professione (*Beruf*) ed esser con ciò certo di non venire meno alla propria destinazione come uomo. La destinazione dell'uomo si è risolta nella professione dell'uomo. (p. 315)

Se finora non si è ancora sufficientemente posto l'accento sul fatto che una delle condizioni basilari del dibattito illuministico provocato dallo scritto di Spalding era stata la ricerca della corrispondenza dell'uomo con il progetto divino – laddove per il teologo protestante la coscienza, esplicitandosi attraverso intime sollecitazioni, rappresentava già in sé la voce interiore della verità eterna, sufficiente a riconoscere a Dio il ruolo di garante della spiritualità umana e dello stimolo al perfezionamento, Fichte pone fine a qualsiasi tentativo di scindere la destinazione dalla professione etica dell'uomo, assegnandogli la responsabilità di difendere la propria moralità nell'ambito di uno specifico ruolo sociale. La terminologia fichtiana, improntata al principio di autorità e garante della superiore autorevolezza della categoria degli uomini dotti rispetto alle altre categorie, richiama alla mente la linea di discriminazione, sottolineata più volte nei dibattiti settecenteschi tra Thomas Abbt, Moses Mendelssohn e Immanuel Kant, tra l'uomo "responsabile" e l'uomo bisognoso di uscire dallo stato di minorità. Fichte va oltre e si appella al binomio cittadino/Stato che legittima l'identità del *Bürger* (cittadino) rispetto a quella dell'uomo bisognoso di emanciparsi.

Macor giunge a questo punto quasi al termine della propria trattazione. Dopo aver già dato ampia prova di aver colto nel contesto dei dibattiti sulla destinazione dell'uomo tutti i momenti cruciali delle tensioni tra il luteranesimo ortodosso di Goeze e Chladenius e quello esistenziale di Spalding, tra il teleologismo spirituale di Mendelssohn e il moralismo pratico di Abbt, in cui si era trovata sempre al centro della disputa l'eccessiva presenza della riflessione razionale e della filosofia pratica invocate da Spalding, la tesi relativa al ruolo di Spalding come ago della bilancia della riflessione sul perfezionamento spirituale dell'uomo si avvalorava con un ultimo indizio probatorio. Nel pieno dell'*Atheismusstreit* che travolge Fichte, costui si appella alla lezione spaldingiana sulla *Bestimmung des Menschen* (p. 319):

La familiarità con il saggio di Spalding è già evidente leggendo queste osservazioni [esposte da Fichte nel proprio trattato intitolato *Bestimmung des Menschen* del 1800, N.d.R.] e viene ulteriormente confermata grazie alla corrispondenza di struttura e genere [con il saggio di Spalding, N.d.R.]. Fichte lascia parlare un io fittizio che ragiona sul senso del proprio essere, suddivide lo sviluppo di questo pensiero in tappe che coprono successivamente la parabola ascendente verso la verità, e completa il monologo con un dialogo tra l’io e uno spirito, inserendolo nel secondo stadio del percorso. Nel testo si ritrovano ripetutamente argomenti e addirittura digressioni che sono tratti tanto dallo scritto di Spalding, quanto dai dibattiti da esso provocati. (p. 320)

Il lavoro della Macor, dunque, come enuncia il sottotitolo, non si concede divagazioni dall’obiettivo di registrare la metamorfosi del concetto della destinazione lungo il corso della seconda metà del Settecento. Questo aspetto conferisce rigore argomentativo al suo studio, che oltre che essere redatto in uno stile espositivo molto accessibile, integra le informazioni relative alla ricezione dell’opera ricostruendo ogni volta il contesto culturale della discussione tra le parti in causa. Per fornire un esempio tra gli altri, i paragrafi 15, 16 e 17 del IV capitolo rendono conto della diffusione del pensiero di Spalding nella Svizzera francese e tedesca, coinvolgendo le personalità di Sulzer, Wieland e Lavater. Con ciò la Macor ha successo nel registrare che non casuale è la diffusione del termine “Bestimmung” negli epistolari e nelle opere dei personaggi menzionati. Si tratta dunque di un concetto veicolare, che viene adattato di volta in volta alle circostanze e agli scopi teorici cui si indirizza la riflessione sulla dimensione morale dell’uomo. Non a caso, come rileva l’autrice, che propone un rapido schizzo del contenuto del *Versuch einiger Moralischen Betrachtungen über die Werke der Natur* (1750) di Sulzer, autore dell’opera fondamentale *Allgemeine Theorie der schönen Künste* (4 voll., 1771-1774), i cinque dialoghi tra due interlocutori che si dedicano a sviscerare la questione della creazione in relazione alla natura così come essa si presenta all’osservazione umana sono intrisi di riferimenti al trattato di Spalding. Tuttavia, come viene osservato, dal momento che il problema destinale include anche cose e animali, la prospettiva di Sulzer recupera una posizione che avrebbe prestatato il fianco alle dure critiche del teologo Chladenius tra il 1754 e il 1756. Costui giudicò offensiva delle dottrine della giustificazione, della predestinazione e del peccato originale la posizione di Spalding, disconoscendo a questa ogni possibilità di giustificare la probità dell’uomo

in assenza di un intervento divino. L'atto di fiducia con il quale Dio assegnerebbe all'uomo la possibilità di percorrere il cammino verso la purezza dello spirito è proprio uno dei punti più controversi nella ricezione della *Bestimmung des Menschen* da parte dei teologi dogmatici.

In conclusione si osserverà che lo studio di Macor ritorna più volte sul dualismo di "Empfinden" e "Erkennen" e sulla questione dell'immortalità dell'anima, che percorre come un filo rosso anche la letteratura del '700.

Se finora Spalding era rimasto alquanto ai margini dell'attenzione del mondo italiano per quanto riguarda il pensiero tedesco sulla morale, grazie al lavoro di Laura Anna Macor non sarà più possibile prescindere, giacché il discorso sulla *Aufklärung* dell'uomo, come dimostra Herder (p. 245), difficilmente può essere scisso da quello sul miglioramento (*Verbesserung*) della sua condizione e da quello sul suo perfezionamento (*Vervollkommnung*), nel quadro di una sua generale riflessione sulla "destinazione" in questo mondo o nella vita dopo la morte.

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Grenberg's phenomenological Kant

El Kant fenomenológico de Grenberg

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Book Review: Jeanine Grenberg, *Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience. A Phenomenological Account*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013.

In *Kant's Defense of Common Moral Experience*, Grenberg presents a phenomenological reading of Kant's account of ordinary moral experience in order to argue that Kant's practical philosophy represents an attempt to ground morality on attentive reflection upon common, felt, first-personal phenomenological experience. Grenberg makes use of Kant's mature conception of feeling in the *Metaphysics of Morals* in order to provide a phenomenological reading of the main arguments of the *Groundwork* and the second *Critique*. Grenberg warns us that the "tragedy of Kant scholarship" is that it has lost sight of the first intention of Kant's project which was to 'provide a defense of a common approach to ethics.' (p. 1). The aim of Grenberg's book is to rectify this oversight.

In part I, Grenberg claim that for Kant moral philosophy "must begin with the non philosophical and intensely personal moral task of coming to terms with a conflict at the basis of human existence" (p. 2). This is the conflict between happiness and morality, a conflict that

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is compounded by the human tendency to deceive ourselves about the true nature of moral demands by giving happiness more normative force than it really has. Moral life and moral philosophy begin when we identify, and make efforts to counteract, both the conflict and accompanying self-deceptive tendency. The moral perspective is the first-personal perspective which involves attentive reflection on one's moral experiences, through a process of self-knowledge, in order to obtain practical cognitions, that is, cognitions that are beyond the limits of theoretical reason. The job of the philosopher is just to articulate this common perspective available to all human beings more precisely. The common experience of being an obligated agent guides both the moral lives of ordinary human agents and provides the starting point for a philosophical reflection on morality. Kant, thus, provides a new method for practical philosophy, one that is phenomenological in nature and proceeds through "attentive reflection upon a common, felt, first-personal experience" (p. 9) of ourselves as agents.

Two questions, then, arise: (i) what are the salient features of these common experiences? and (ii) what is the phenomenological method that makes use of these experiences in order to make practical claims? (i) The experiences involved in the phenomenological method are not sensible experiences of *objects*, but they are 'subjective' experiences which involve 'inward' reflection of oneself as an agent, and as such they should be characterized as inherently first-personal 'phenomenological' experiences. Grenberg finds support for this reading in Kant's extensive use of practical examples presented as starting points of first-personal processes of deliberation.¹ These experiences are not merely idiosyncratic, instead they are experiences that "we all share", that is, the "universally shared aspects of our agential experience" (p. 21). Any attentive reader of Kant would agree with Grenberg that Kantian ethics is primarily a first-personal self-reflective ethics; however, the originality of Grenberg's reading consists in insisting that the appeal to common first-personal experience is mainly an appeal to *felt* experience. (ii) The phenomenological method is thus just a method of attentive reflection on this common felt first personal experience, a method that should be followed by both the ordinary person attempting to live a moral life and the philosopher seeking to ground philosophical claims about morality: "appeal to such experiences" are "part of [the philosopher's] arguments for justifying that human beings are obligated and free beings" (p. 23). In the case of ordinary agents, this means that the feeling

¹GMS AA 04: 405;GMS AA 04: 450-1; KpV AA 05:35 ff., KpV AA 05:98.

of obligation somehow guides or informs our moral decisions. Grenberg claims that moral obligation cannot be deduced from either non moral or practical claims. Instead she reads the FoR as implying that obligation is a “fact forced upon us.” The method of attentiveness consists in taking note of this fact and its implications for our understanding of ourselves as obligated and free beings. Even though this is a common universal experience, attentiveness is required because of the human tendency for self-deception. So, Grenberg claims, in somehow Aristotelian fashion, that the first moral task is the task of improving our moral perception by “becoming more subtle appreciators of the feeling-informed twists and turns of our first-personal phenomenological experiences” (p. 24). Grenberg, however, ascribes too much practical import to feeling: why should the ‘felt’ experience of the moral law forcing itself upon us be so informative? After all, the ground of obligation is not provided by the strength of the feeling, but by a universal intelligible law of reason. Ultimately whether or not the maxims of our actions have an obligatory character would depend on their justifying force, which should be established by rational reflexion alone (i.e. reflexion on the justifiability and universality of the reasons implicit in the maxim). Grenberg claims that the first moral task is to pay attention to the painful feelings that arise when the moral law thwarts our inclinations, and that attentiveness to this felt obligation provides the first step in the recognition of moral reasons for action. This might be true in some cases, perhaps cases in which agents lack extensive deliberative reflective experience or agents that possess a weak or not fully developed moral character. In contrast, a virtuous agent, someone who has spent considerable time reflecting about moral matters, and has made the moral law the supreme principles of all acts would have a clear understanding of the sort of considerations that provide legitimate justifications for action and would not need to rely on feeling to discover moral obligation. Thus, I do not find Grenberg’s account of the need to appeal to our felt experience of obligation in the case of ordinary moral agents very convincing. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, Grenberg provides a better justification of the informative nature of feeling when she explains the philosopher’s need to pay attention to felt experience.

The philosopher needs to take first-personal experience as the starting point of her reflexions on the nature of morality because the limits of theoretical knowledge “make superphenomenal topics of investigation inaccessible from a theoretical point of view” (p. 25) precluding the possibility of theoretical, third-personal knowledge of moral matters. Grenberg thus claims that the phenomenological method is the necessary route by which practical

philosophical reflections gain authority. Grenberg is well aware that her appeal to feeling will result on “traditional Kantian moral philosophers” having “a range of alarm bells ringing” (p. 29). She argues that her account does not attempt an empirical synthetic a posteriori grounding of morality or a conversion of Kant into a moral sense theorist. Kant wrote extensively against both approaches, and if Grenberg’s appeal to feeling had those implications, her account would just not be recognisably Kantian. Instead Grenberg provides a novel interpretation of the role of feeling in Kant’s practical philosophy, one that does not require that we abandon the practicality of pure reason, or the objective synthetic a priori status of moral claims. It is this novel interpretation of the role of feeling which Grenberg develops in Chapter 2 and which in my opinion constitutes the most important contribution of her book. She shows that there is space in Kant’s conception of feeling, particularly the theory of feeling developed in the late *Metaphysics of Morals*, for a felt and object-less phenomenological experience which can provide evidence of the effects of the noumenal moral law without violating the limits of reason, and without compromising the a priori status of the resulting claims. Grenberg notes that Kant appeals to experience liberally.² Here experience cannot be understood as referring to empirical generalizations obtained through induction because that would directly undermine the universality and necessity required for moral claims. Instead Kant’s appeal to experience should be understood in phenomenological terms, that is, as an irreducibly subjective and first personal felt experience of oneself as an acting agent. The most important example of an experience of this kind is presented by Kant in the second *Critique*. The Gallows Man (GM) has an experience of being categorically obligated to tell the truth even in the face of mortal threat. The obvious and immediate problem, given the limits of reason established by Kant in the first *Critique*, is: how can we have a direct experience of moral obligation, if moral obligation is understood as intelligible and noumenal, that is as something which is beyond the limits of possible experience? Grenberg solves this problem by appealing to the notion of feeling. The phenomenological experiences that are at the ground of practical philosophy are felt experiences.³ The key point is that felt experiences are not experiences of empirical objects. Grenberg relies on some passages⁴ at the beginning of the *Metaphysics of Morals* in which Kant claims that feeling, in

² *GMS* AA 04: 405/ 451/ 460; *KpV* AA 05:30.

³ *GMS* AA 04: 405/450; *KpV* AA 05: 91-92.

⁴ *MS* AA 06: 211/ 212.

contrast to sensation, is “thoroughly subjective experience in that, while it too is subjectively experienced, it does not get involved in the constructions of empirical objects of experience” (pp. 42-3). Feeling expresses simply a relation to the subject, and nothing at all in the object. The felt experience of being morally obligated and thus free should not be understood as a direct experience of suprasensible objects. Grenberg notes that Kant cannot take these felt experiences as a starting point of a transcendental argument to ground the moral law without violating the limits of reason established in the first *Critique*. The key claim is that although we cannot know the noumenal causes of these phenomenological felt experiences, we can “consider this inaccessible noumenal cause not as an object of knowledge, but as an object of wonder and mystery” (p. 47). The felt experience of moral obligation point us back mysteriously⁵ towards the experience's intelligible cause and the moral law becomes an object of wonder, that is, practical cognition, not theoretical knowledge. Grenberg avoids constructing Kant as a moral sense theorist by claiming firstly that this practical feeling is not a contingent feeling, but a “necessarily felt feeling that expresses a practical, necessitating determination of the will” “which is also truly common” (p. 58), and secondly by claiming that feeling is not what justifies the validity of the moral law: “feeling can only play an enabling instead of an evidential role in the justification of the moral law” (p. 58). The claim is that feeling helps us to get epistemic access to our rational natures which in turn is that that “will provide evidence or proof of practical cognitions” (p. 59). Feeling enables us to access the necessity implicit in our experience and whatever grounds that necessity, i.e. our rational natures, provides the evidence or proof of moral obligation. The feeling that has the required necessity and commonality to perform this enabling role is of course “the a priori, non contingent moral feeling of respect” (p. 60). By arguing that attention to moral feeling can provide us “with limited epistemic access to our noumenal rational natures” (p. 60), Grenberg opens a new possibility for the understanding of one of the most difficult aspects of Kant's practical philosophy, i.e. the relationship between the phenomenal and the noumenal, between the sensible and the intelligible. This is in an important contribution that will generate a lot of interest and debate among Kant's scholars.

⁵ Grenberg supports the appeal to mystery in the various passages in which Kant talks about the inscrutability of the moral law (e.g. *GMS* AA 04:463; *MS* AA 06: 399-400).

In Part II, Grenberg provides a detailed discussion of the role of common felt phenomenological experience in the *Groundwork*. She argues that in the *Groundwork*, Kant's attitude to the felt phenomenological experience of moral obligation is ambivalent as Kant goes 'back and forth' on the proper content of this felt experience. Ultimately, this ambivalence makes the *Groundwork* as a whole a "phenomenological failure" (p. 95). Kant starts by endorsing a "limited innocent non conflicted experience of categorical demands" (p. 76) in *Groundwork* I. However, he ends up rejecting the experience of moral obligation as a possible ground for morality in *Groundwork* II in light of the experience of the conflict between happiness and morality and the self-deceptive tendency to grant priority to the moral law. For this reason, Kant shifts the focus on *Groundwork* III and seeks to ground proof of moral obligation in our common felt experience of ourselves as active in relation to our mental representations, but ultimately this felt experience will prove to be phenomenological sterile.

According to Grenberg, in *Groundwork* I the discovery of the universal law formula is presented as the result of a person reflecting on the permissibility of lying. The common person achieves understanding of moral demands through 'attentive' reflection on her deliberative experience as exemplified by Socrates.⁶ Insofar as Socrates does not teach the person "anything new,"⁷ this reflection is pre-philosophical and pre-scientific as the common person discovers moral categorical reasons by paying close attention to the principles that are already implicit in her own experience. However this initial filtration with an innocent non conflicted experience of categorical demands proves problematic because ultimately innocence cannot protect itself and is "easily seduced."⁸ The common person must move beyond Socratic practical wisdom and take a more philosophical instruction in order to assure the 'durability' of those moral principles in face of human self-deceptive tendencies. Philosophy thus becomes necessary in order to find a firm ground of moral obligation but here we are well beyond Socratic guidance as the philosopher is now providing external "information" and "instruction"⁹ which implies that Kant has abandoned the experience of obligation as the starting point of the phenomenological method. Grenberg interprets this

⁶GMS AA 04: 404.

⁷GMS AA 04: 404.

⁸GMS AA 04: 404.

⁹GMS AA 04: 405.

story of the common person's passage from innocence to conflict as the story of the very birth of the first-personal, felt, phenomenological method. However, as Grenberg herself recognises "one might wonder, though whether we are in the territory of *felt* experience" (p. 86). The pre-philosophical reflection of the innocent agent of *Groundwork* I does not appeal to feeling and it seems to consist mainly on the exercise of judgment and intellectual reflection on the nature of her reasons for action. As mentioned above, there is no doubt that Kantian ethics is an ethics of self-reflection but what is more controversial is whether this process of self-reflection is accomplished by feeling. Grenberg attempts to get out of this difficulty by arguing that feeling becomes necessary only when we enter the territory of conflict and in these passages Kant does use the language of feeling.¹⁰ However, the fact that moral reasons can be appreciated and recognised by attentive first person deliberation through a process of judgment which is mostly intellectual constitutes a more serious objection to Grenberg's account that she herself admits. The point is that *Groundwork* I introduces the first-personal perspective of the common man, but it seems that such perspective is not the phenomenological perspective of *felt* experience. Appeal to conflict does not fully solve the problem because although there might a felt aspect to the experience of conflict, there is also considerable textual evidence to read the conflict between happiness and morality as a conflict between two ultimate principles of justification or meta-maxims.¹¹

In any case Grenberg finds the appeal to an external instructive conception of practical philosophy deeply problematic insofar as it implies the rejection of the experience of categorical obligation as the ground of morality. In *Groundwork* III, Kant shifts focus and now attempts to ground morality on the objective reality of freedom. Grenberg once more makes an original move by reading the argument for the objective reality of freedom as relying on an appeal to felt experience. Contemporary interpreters usually take the first-personal experience of freedom as the starting point of Kant's argument¹² but interpret Kant's claim that "we cannot act otherwise than *under the idea of freedom*"¹³ as requiring a rational demand that we take, assume or infer ourselves to be free. However, Grenberg points out that the passage that follows after the one just considered introduces a new starting point, one that

¹⁰GMS AA 04: 405.

¹¹ I will return to this line of objection towards the end of this article.

¹² Grenberg mentions Allison's (1990) and Korsgaard's accounts (1996a and 1996b).

¹³GMS AA 04: 458/ p. 43.

attempts to articulate a common, felt, first-personal, phenomenological experience of freedom¹⁴ (p. 111). According to Grenberg, Kant asks us to focus our attention on two distinct sorts of felt experience: the experience of being either active or passive in the formation of our representations. As feeling cannot provide knowledge of the noumenal, it would be illicit for Kant to argue that this experience somehow provides a proof of our positive freedom. Instead Kant's appeal to the experience of being active in relation to one's representations refers to the practical experience of ourselves "as simply unconstrained" (p. 114). The argument of *Groundwork* III attempts to proceed from freedom to morality by showing that attention to the felt experience of negative freedom will affirm that we are autonomous legislators of the moral law. By focusing our attention on our newly affirmed status as members of the world of understanding, we learn that we act under the laws of reason which are the will's own laws and which exemplify the concept of autonomy and, in turn, the universal principle of morality.¹⁵ Although the appeal to feeling here is somehow tenuous (p. 120), Grenberg claims that she has proved that "Kant successfully introduces a proto-phenomenological felt experience of freedom to start his argument" (p. 120) and that "the negative freedom accessed via felt experience plays a grounding or justificatory role in Kant's effort to prove ourselves obligated" (p. 121). Here feeling is supposed to play an enabling role, as it allows us to access negative freedom, and the negative freedom thus accessed, then plays an evidential role in Kant's attempt to ground morality. However, Grenberg also argues that this early attempt at phenomenological method is unsuccessful as this movement from the felt experience of negative freedom to awareness of ourselves as obligated, autonomously lawgiving agents, ultimately fails. The objection is that attentiveness to the felt experience of negative freedom does not yield the set of practical conclusions about rational agency and morality that it is required by the argument: although the felt experience of negative freedom can indicate that something in us is the source of our activity, "we cannot affirm, from the felt phenomenological perspective, that this non sensible thing is a rational cause" (p. 127). The problem is that the argument would require appeal to the theoretical claim of global causal determinism but such an appeal is ruled out by the first-personal practical nature of the

¹⁴ Kant claims that we must "inquire whether we do not take a different standpoint when by means of freedom we think of ourselves as causes efficient a priori" (*GMS AA* 04: 451/ 56) and that this change of standpoints can be made by "the commonest understanding..." through "an obscure determination of judgement which is called feeling." (*GMS AA* 04: 451/ 56).

¹⁵*GMS AA* 04: 452.

method of attentive reflection on felt experience (p. 128). If the first step in the argument cannot be granted, the argument as a whole is found wanting. Kant's refusal to accept an experience of categorical obligation as the starting point of his deduction means that the argument of the *Groundwork* as a whole is a "phenomenological failure" (p. 126). However, one might wonder whether the real problem is with the phenomenological interpretation itself. We have already noted that the textual evidence to ascribe a phenomenological method to *Groundwork* I is not very strong. In addition, Kant's rejection of reliable categorical obligation in *Groundwork* II also seems to count against the phenomenological interpretation. Finally the alleged problem with the appeal to felt experience of negative freedom is that it needs to appeal to a theoretical premise but such appeal is ruled out by the phenomenological method. This objection strikes me as circular, after all the appeal to theoretical claims can be seen as evidence of Kant's lack of commitment to such phenomenological method. It does not seem that much is gained by reading the *Groundwork* in phenomenological terms. We are told that the *Groundwork* is a failure but this is not news, as Grenberg herself notes the argument of *Groundwork* III "is the most beloved flawed argument in the history of philosophy" (p. 106). Grenberg's alleged contribution is to highlight that the failure is a failure of the phenomenological method, but the arguments to ascribe to Kant commitment to such a method are not very convincing.

In part III, Grenberg argues that the FoR of the second *Critique* represents Kant's most successful attempt to ground morality through phenomenological method. The second *Critique* operates Kant's "great reversal" (p. 141) as he now attempts to ground freedom through the experience of moral obligation. The phenomenological method is exemplified by the Gallows Man (GM) example¹⁶ which shows how attention to felt experience can successfully reveal unconditional obligation even to the conflicted agent. Grenberg finds support for the phenomenological method on a particular reading of the FoR. She argues against Allison's "standard reading" of the Fact¹⁷ which is a "paradigmatic example of how one might affirm the validity of the moral law through appeal to a common, but nonsensical, consciousness of the moral law" (p. 140) by rejecting Allison's central claim that the moral feeling of respect follows from the FoR, and is not a condition of it, but just a motivational

¹⁶ *KpV* AA 05: 30.

¹⁷ Allison (1990) Chapter 13, pp. 230-249.

aspect. After conceding that there is some textual support for Allison's claim,¹⁸ Grenberg rejects Allison's reading on the grounds that to try to prove "knowledge of the validity of morality... without appeal to sensibility demands that" we trespass the limits of reason (p. 143). The recognition of a priori practical principles must rely on receptivity, sensibility or in more Kantian terms "susceptibility to respect for the moral law."¹⁹ This is because the FoR is something that "forces itself upon us"²⁰ and the language of *force* suggest both passivity and receptivity which in turn imply our capacity for sensibility. This capacity for sensibility should not be understood as the capacity for intuition but as the capacity for receptivity in the sensible form of feeling examined by Grenberg in the first part of the book. The upshot is that the moral feeling of respect is not a consequence of the previous non felt consciousness of the FoR, but instead is part of that very consciousness: we become aware of moral obligation through the feeling of respect. Grenberg also notes that "the direct cause of the moral feeling of respect is not so much our consciousness of the validity of the moral law, but instead our rational, autonomous nature" (p. 148).²¹

The GM experience of conflict provides the phenomenological experience that will initiate practical philosophy. Grenberg argues that the conflict that the man experience is a conflict of feelings: the felt inclinations related to the desire for happiness against the moral feeling of respect which constraints those inclinations (p. 166). Attentive reflection upon this experience leads the philosopher to recognize that the GM's experience is a "felt experience of categorical necessitation of the will" (p. 169) and thus that moral feeling of respect is an a priori feeling in the sense of being a feeling with a necessary cause. Not only are human beings categorically obligated to the moral law, but they are also capable of acting as the moral law demands. Recognition of this capacity sets the basis for the deduction of freedom. Grenberg's defense of the phenomenological method depends on showing that the experience of categorical necessitation of the will has its origin on the felt experience of respect constraining our inclinations. This obligation is something that the agent "literally" feels in the felt experience of conflict, as long as he pays attention to it. In contrast, the recognition of our capacity to act as the moral law demands, that is, our freedom, is not itself directly felt,

¹⁸*KpVAA* 05: 89-90 is according to Grenberg the most important text in support of Allison's reading.

¹⁹*KpVAA* 05: 27.

²⁰*KpVAA* 05: 31/30.

²¹ Grenberg also examines and reject recent "Fichtean, first-personal readings of the Fact of Reason" (pp. 148-158).

but inferred from that feeling (p. 176). Grenberg is correct in pointing out the FoR of the second *Critique* provides Kant's most fruitful route to prove morality and freedom. As already indicated the most important contribution of the book (Chapter 2) is Grenberg's identification of a Kantian conception of feeling which can be seen as an enabling condition that can play an epistemic role in the grounding of practical cognitions. However, Grenberg goes too far in claiming that: (i) the experience of being categorically necessitated is revealed exclusively through feeling, and (ii) reading the FoR as stating that the moral law forces itself upon us through the moral feeling of respect, and thus implying that we become aware of moral obligation only through this feeling.

With respect to (i) Grenberg herself notes the difficulty of affirming that the entire GM's experience is a "*felt one*," (p. 165) particularly the second part of the example where the love of life "seems to be challenged not by other feelings but only by the man "*judg[ing]*...that he can do something because he is aware that he ought to do it" (p. 165). Grenberg argues that this objection can be quickly dismissed. Grenberg's main point is that by the phrase "the *judg[ment]* of the Gallows Man"²² Kant means "the judgment of common human understanding" which is a judgment that "operates via reliance upon "a special kind of feeling," viz., the "moral feeling of...respect"²³ (p. 165). So, the GM's judgment is the felt judgment of the common person experiencing the moral feeling of respect constraining the inclinations. Moreover, the feeling of respect thus has an epistemic role in that the common person learns, by paying attention to this interplay between contingent and necessary feelings, of the special authority of the moral law and thus the categorical character of moral reasons. He first learns that his lust is not irresistible, and that both love of life and lust are merely hypothetical determinants of his will. By paying further attention to his feelings the man discovers a new conflict, the conflict between love of life and the moral demands to tell the truth and not injure others. These demands just won't go away; they have categorical force, that is, they present themselves with more authority than the demands of self-love. Thus, Grenberg claims that the GM acquires consciousness of categorical obligation by paying attention to the affective experience of the moral feeling of respect, and thus respect plays an enabling role in confirming practical cognition of moral obligation. However, what is difficult

²²*KpV* AA 05: 30.

²³*KpV* AA 05: 91.

to accept is Grenberg's claim that the judgment of the GM is the judgment of common human understanding which relies entirely on feeling. Grenberg's reading rests on the passage quoted above²⁴ but this is just one passage and there are other important texts which suggest a more intellectual role for moral judgment: "practical universal laws ... [are] principles that contain the determining basis of the will not by their matter but merely by their form."²⁵ There are passages that suggest that the "commonest understanding" refers to an intellectual capacity for judgment as Kant says that it can "quite easily" and "without hesitation" see "what is to be done" "on the principle of the autonomy of choice," by contrast "under the presupposition of the heteronomy of the power of choice, what is to be done is difficult to see and requires acquaintance with the world."²⁶ What these passages suggest is that the conflict between happiness and morality is not only, or mainly, a conflict between two types of felt experience, i.e. the experience of contingent feelings caused by inclinations and the experience of necessary feelings caused by the moral law. Instead the conflict between happiness and morality is a conflict between ultimate principles of justification for action. In addition to the texts of the second *Critique*,²⁷ there is also support for this reading in the *Religion*, where Kant introduces the concept of *Gesinnung* to refer to the agent's moral character understood as the agent's fundamental maxim, that is, the maxim which underlies all the other maxims adopted by the agent and provides the ultimate ground and justification of his actions.²⁸ Kant makes a distinction between good and bad character stating that the person with a good character (*Gesinnung*) is the person whose fundamental maxim is to make the moral law the supreme condition of all acts, thus subordinating the demands of self-love to the demands of morality.²⁹ This suggests that moral law operates as a principle of justification, not merely as the source of affective forces (however rational the origins of those forces are taken to be). Grenberg is right in pointing out that although knowledge of Kant's moral philosophy is not necessary to become a moral agent, the common ordinary agent must at least have "some more rough-and-ready appreciation of the moral concerns for unfairness" highlighted in the first formulation of

²⁴*KpV* AA 05: 91.

²⁵*KpV* AA 05:27/ p. 40.

²⁶*KpV* AA 05: 36/ p. 54. There are many other texts, of course, in which Kant stresses the formal ground of practical laws and clearly distinguish it from the material grounds of heteronomous principles (e.g. *KpV* AA 05: 44/ 69).

²⁷ See also *KpV* AA 05: 97 where Kant clearly identifies self-love with a practical principle.

²⁸*RGV* AA 06: 21-25.

²⁹*RGV* AA 06:36.

the Categorical Imperative (pp. 26-7). So, although the ordinary moral agent might not ask himself whether he can will the maxim of his action as an universal law of nature, a person with a good *Gesinnung* is a person who is committed to act only on those maxims that can be fully justified to others (I take this to be a rough understanding of the first formulation of the moral law available to the ordinary moral agent). The important point is that the GM does not discover the obligatory character of morality only by attentively reflecting on his feelings of being painfully constrained by the demands of the moral law, but also by judging and reflecting on the normative force of the maxims of honesty and no injury. This does not mean that the route for an enabling and epistemic role for feeling is precluded, but the story about the metaphysical origins of the feeling of respect is just one *part* of the story, perhaps an important part in the philosophical story of the grounding of morality and freedom, but a story that cannot provide the whole basis for the practical deliberations of ordinary moral agents. Feeling is insufficient for ordinary practical deliberation which also requires an appeal to ultimate principles of justification for action.

With respect to (ii) we should note that awareness of moral obligation cannot be acquired only through the receptive and passive experience of the moral feeling of respect because respect is not only a passive and receptive feeling. Kant claims that “respect for the moral law is (...) the sole and also indubitable moral incentive”³⁰ and that “the [moral] incentive of the human will (...) can never be anything other than the moral law.”³¹ These passages suggest that in addition to the affective aspect of respect, there is also an intellectual aspect. This intellectual aspect involves the agent's active recognition of the moral appropriateness of an action as providing an incentive to act morally. It is part of the FoR that we are the type of beings for which the mere recognition of an action as being morally required constitutes an incentive to act morally, in the sense of something that it is worth pursuing. Grenberg's reading puts too much emphasis on the passive affective aspect of respect, but Kant also emphasises the intellectual and active aspects of the notion.

Grenberg's defense of a phenomenological and common approach to Kantian ethics is not only novel and original, but also provides a well-sustained line of argument which is based on a detailed examination of Kant's foundational ethical writings. Her book provides a

³⁰*KpV* AA 05: 78/ p. 102.

³¹*KpV* AA 05: 72/pp. 94-5.

new and refreshing take on Kant's practical philosophy and it would be of great interest to moral philosophers working inside and outside the Kantian tradition.

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**Una guida critica allo statuto critico della religione nel
criticismo kantiano**

A Critical Guide to the Critical Nature of Critical Religion

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Recensione: G.E. Michalson (Ed.), *Kant’s Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2014, 266 pp. ISBN: 9781107018525

Il titolo di questa recensione si articola consapevolmente attorno a tre sensi con cui è possibile intendere il termine “critica”: i primi due sensi sono del linguaggio ordinario, nel cui ambito “critica” può avere sia una accezione neutrale (come sinonimo di analisi, disamina), sia una accezione negativa (difficoltà, crisi); mentre il terzo ed ultimo significato di “critica” richiamato nel titolo è tecnico, e fa specifico riferimento, ovviamente, alla filosofia trascendentale.

Tutti e tre questi sensi sono applicabili alla trattazione kantiana della religione, e per questo abbiamo inteso servircene. L’interesse di Kant per tematiche di tipo religioso attraversa tutta la sua produzione, ma i confronti più diretti ed espliciti si situano nella fase

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tarda del suo pensiero. Kant affronta temi religiosi sia nel saggio *Sull'insuccesso di ogni tentativo filosofico di teodicea* (1791), sia nello scritto sulla *Fine di tutte le cose* (1794), sia nella prima parte del *Conflitto delle facoltà* (1798). Ma, soprattutto, ovviamente, nello scritto dedicato alla *Religione nei limiti della sola ragione* (1793¹ e 1794²). In questi lavori, la prospettiva del criticismo è già evidentemente maturata e dunque si tratta di trovare una collocazione alla questione religiosa nell'impianto della filosofia trascendentale. Che ruolo ha la religione, nel criticismo? La domanda non è semplice, se si considerano anche solo due fatti, tanto macroscopici quanto apparentemente contraddittori: per un verso Kant demanda esplicitamente all'ambito religioso la risposta alla terza delle domande che, notoriamente, dovrebbero riassumere l'intero progetto critico, ossia: "che cosa mi è lecito sperare?" (*Was darf ich hoffen?*). Per altro verso è proprio nel progressivo rifiuto delle possibilità che la ragione umana possa elevarsi sino agli oggetti trascendenti della metafisica – e quindi, anzitutto, a Dio – che matura il progetto critico stesso.

Una apparentemente lieve quanto decisiva differenza linguistica permette però di guadagnare un punto di vista più appropriato per affrontare il problema e, contemporaneamente, ci pare al secondo senso del termine "critico" usato nel titolo, ossia quello che più letteralmente fa riferimento a crisi: se nella modernità e con l'Illuminismo non sembra più possibile parlare di "Dio" in termini razionali, la filosofia si rivolge ai contenuti empirici della "religione" in quanto oggetto possibile di indagine. Non a caso, proprio in Kant va rinvenuto un punto di snodo decisivo nel passaggio per cui la disciplina accademica della "teologia razionale" diverrà (esplicitamente a partire da Hegel), "filosofia della religione". Il periodo è dunque decisivo, e decisivo ovviamente è il ruolo del pensiero kantiano, in cui si rivengono significative oscillazioni linguistiche: nella *Religione* si parla sia di "teologia filosofica" che di "dottrina filosofica della religione", espressione attestata anche nelle lezioni. Lo scritto kantiano deve quindi non solo governare la tradizionale dicotomia tra ambito filosofico e rivelato della teologia – Kant stesso ragiona esplicitamente in questi termini, come mostrano chiaramente entrambe le prefazioni all'opera, e cerca di gestire il binomio grazie alla coppia concettuale razionale-storico. Ma si trova a dover affrontare anche il nodo di un passaggio più ampio tra scienza che si rivolge a Dio come oggetto speculativo e sapere relativo ai fenomeni e ai vissuti concreti di tipo religioso; e questo passaggio è gestito principalmente lungo l'asse teorico-pratico.

Se quindi tutto ciò – ma persino molto altro, come diremo – rientra nello scritto kantiano sulla *Religione*, ecco che una *Guida critica* – e dunque il terzo senso della “critica” nel nostro titolo – appare non solo opportuna, ma inevitabile: non solo per orientare il lettore attraverso le difficoltà più evidenti; ma, molto di più, perché le tante tensioni contenute nel testo, e i suoi punti di equilibrio fragili, non possono che essere affrontati, inevitabilmente, da un punto di vista interpretativo, soggettivo, dunque relativo e critico. In questo senso, il volume rappresenta uno strumento certamente molto utile ed apprezzabile; ma, in ogni caso, si deve essere consapevoli che ci si trova di fronte solo ad uno degli strumenti possibili di ausilio alla lettura delle pagine kantiane. La *Guida*, dunque, costituita da diversi anche molto autorevoli contributi – secondo la recente tradizione di questi volumi pubblicati a Cambridge, nel cui elenco è significativamente Kant, e in modo particolare il Kant pratico, ad essere sinora dominante – affronta i temi principali della *Religione* secondo tagli di lettura specifici, e va concepita come uno strumento integrativo non solo, ovviamente, rispetto al testo, ma anche rispetto alla grande fortuna interpretativa e quindi alla tanta letteratura critica conosciuta dall’opera kantiana, di cui solo parzialmente si può rendere ragione in una pubblicazione tutto sommato piuttosto agile.

Il primo contributo della *Guida* è dedicato al problema del rapporto della religione razionale con le Scritture, ed è ad opera di Otfried Höffe. Queste pagine hanno parzialmente anche il ruolo di introduzione generale sia storica che sistematica, e pongono al lettore le questioni principali – di interesse e di difficoltà a contempo – presenti nell’opera kantiana. Nella prefazione alla seconda edizione dell’opera, Kant tenta di risolvere nello specifico il problema del rapporto tra religione di ragione e religione storica mediante la nota teoria dei cerchi concentrici; tuttavia, al di là delle intenzioni kantiane stesse, molteplici e rilevanti sono nel testo stesso gli sconfinamenti in entrambi i sensi. Non a caso, in uno sforzo continuo di contenere la religione storica nei limiti della ragione lo stesso Kant conclude con *Annotazioni generali* relative a temi di teologia rivelata ognuna delle quattro parti dell’opera; non a caso, sappiamo che decise consapevolmente di utilizzare la preposizione “entro” (*innerhalb*) e non “di” per il titolo; e non a caso, lo scritto si apre con una trattazione della questione del male radicale, un vero e proprio “scandalo” per la filosofia trascendentale. Sembra infatti che venga postulato un fatto empirico – e per giunta quanti altri mai irrazionale – dalla validità universale e necessaria, quindi “quasi”

apriori. Sin da subito i lettori, a partire da Goethe, non hanno compreso il senso di questa dottrina, che invece evidentemente rassicurò i censori, i quali acconsentirono alla pubblicazione in forma indipendente di questo primo saggio di quella che poi sarebbe diventata l'opera intera (e bisogna notare come l'intera vicenda editoriale – tutt'altro che priva di conseguenza sulle pagine del testo - avrebbe meritato uno spazio maggiore in questa *Guida*; così come il rapporto con il *Versuch* di Fichte, qui completamente ignorato).

Al “male radicale” sono dedicati invece ben due saggi ad opera di studiosi del calibro di Allen Wood e di Ingolf Dalferth, a conferma di come il tema susciti ancora sempre vivo interesse nei lettori kantiani. Nel testo di Wood la riconduzione della questione al retroterra protestante appare forse troppo semplicistica, mentre al contrario del tutto opportuna sembra la messa in evidenza, da parte sua, della socialità come ambito decisivo per la comprensione del problema: non a caso, aprendo la terza parte dell'opera, Kant introduce un'ulteriore novità, gravida di problemi, rispetto alla sua impostazione morale classica: ossia lo spostamento su di un piano collettivo del problema dell'obbedienza alla legge morale (per cui si teorizza quel dovere assolutamente *sui generis*, perché non adempibile in virtù delle mie sole forze, che impone la costituzione della comunità etica). Sembrerebbe quasi che comunità morale e male radicale abbiano una qualche simmetria l'uno rispetto all'altra. Seguendo analiticamente il testo, invece, Dalferth descrive anzitutto la struttura della libertà kantiana, soffermandosi poi sul retroterra antropologico radicato nella distinzione tra le tre disposizioni (animalità, umanità e personalità) e sottolineandole ambiguità, trattata da Kant stesso, dell'espressione secondo cui l'uomo sarebbe cattivo “per natura”.

Ancora con riferimento all'orizzonte della morale, Alison Hills si dedica in particolare al ruolo della *Gesinnung* e al mistero della radice della disposizione al bene, che rappresenta un'ulteriore problema leggibile in modo speculare rispetto al fondo insondabile del male radicale. Dove si fondano disposizione al bene e tendenza al male? Come concepire la loro strutturalità? Andrew Chignell analizza invece in termini analitici e formali la questione della “speranza”, evidenziandola come concetto centrale (appunto: *Was darf ich hoffen?*) della religione kantiana: si tratta, come egli sottolinea molto opportunamente, di una speranza razionale e non di un *whisful thinking*. La necessità della speranza, accanto a quella del perdono, viene poi evidenziata da Leslie Stevenson in un

contributo dedicato specificamente alla questione della grazia, altro tema apparentemente paradossale per la “lettera” kantiana rigorosa, e trattato in ben due (la prima e l’ultima) delle suddette *Annotazioni*. Altrettanto sorprendente, e altresì connesso con la questione della speranza è un’altra questione sollevata da Kant nelle *Annotazioni*, ossia quella dei miracoli, trattata nel contributo di Karl Ameriks: questi propone la (forse sin troppo) affascinante ipotesi ermeneutica per cui Kant cercherebbe di declinare il *Wunder* nei termini dell’ammirazione (*Bewunderung*).

In uno dei contributi invece maggiormente impostati su di un piano di analisi storica, piuttosto che sistematico-interpretativa, Manfred Kühn traccia una buona panoramica del dibattito teologico ed in particolare cristologico nel contesto tedesco e prussiano dell’epoca, soffermandosi soprattutto su Reimarus e Semler e accostando sia pur prudentemente Kant alla neologia. Se una sorta di “cristologia filosofica” si rinviene nella seconda parte dell’opera di Kant – quella che, al contrario della prima, fu bloccata dalla censura, perché “l’idea personificata del buon principio” viene descritta in termini rigorosamente razionali e morali (tanto che attribuirgli caratteri divini è, secondo Kant, dannoso per la nostra moralità, che non la prenderebbe più come esempio); nella terza parte si trova invece una interessantissima “ecclesiologia filosofica”, che qui però viene trattata da Nicholas Tampio nei termini – attuali, troppo attuali – della questione del pluralismo, con scarsa attenzione invece ad almeno tre problemi molto rilevanti – sia per la coerenza del sistema kantiano, sia per lo sviluppo filosofico religioso dell’epoca: il passaggio dell’orizzonte morale ad un piano intersoggettivo; il rapporto tra chiesa visibile (insufficiente, eppure necessaria) ed invisibile; e la questione di una filosofia della storia tanto necessaria quanto mai compiutamente realizzabile. Altrettanto orientato all’attualità è il contributo di Pablo Muchnik, che tenta di proporre l’impostazione kantiana orientata alla fede morale come chiave di lettura per affrontare il dibattito tra Wolterstorff e Rorty sul ruolo della religione nello spazio pubblico. Infine, i testi di G. Felicitas Munzel e di Richard Velkley tentano rispettivamente di inquadrare le principali novità apportate dalla religionesia rispetto all’impianto generale della morale kantiana, sia rispetto al suo sistema in senso più ampio, ossia in rapporto all’interesse della ragione, ai suoi fini e ai suoi confini e limiti.

Il volume possiede inoltre una breve introduzione del curatore, un indice (insieme tematico e dei nomi) ed una bibliografia, in cui, secondo l'impianto generale della *Guida*, si nota la nettaprevalenza di lavori provenienti dall'area culturale anglosassone, affiancati solo da qualche lavoro tedesco, rarissimi contributi francesi, mentre vi è la pressoché completa mancanza di studi in altre lingue. Si nota così l'assenza di alcuni contributi fondamentali sul tema della religione kantiana, come quelli di Robert Theis, Norbert Fischer, Bernd Dörflinger o Marco Maria Olivetti come l'assenza delle riprese anche autorevoli del testo kantiano nel dibattito anche recente: ad esempio quelle di Paul Ricoeur o di Jürgen Habermas. Ma impossibile, evidentemente, è contenere un testo filosofico, e la storia dei suoi effetti, nei limiti di una semplice *Guida*.





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CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
BOLETÍN INFORMATIVO / NEWSLETTER

Este boletín informativo no tiene ninguna pretensión de exhaustividad, pues la pluralidad de grupos y centros dedicados a la investigación y organización de actividades en torno al pensamiento de I. Kant es difícilmente abarcable, pero sí aspira a ofrecer un amplio panorama de Congresos, seminarios, cursos, conferencias y otras actividades similares que puedan ser del interés de estudiosos de Kant en todo el mundo. En el caso de esta primera *newsletter* publicada por la revista, se recogen actividades convocadas o realizadas durante el año 2015. En los casos en que aún resulte de utilidad a fecha de la publicación del boletín, se publicita el plazo para la propuesta de trabajos de las respectivas actividades. Con el fin de no duplicar informaciones, el boletín informativo solo se publicará en el primer número, misceláneo, de cada año. En caso de que tuviéramos noticia de alguna actividad desarrollada durante el 2015 y que no estuviera recogida en este boletín, daremos cuenta de ella en el boletín correspondiente de 2016. Quienes estén interesados en comunicar la celebración de alguna actividad o la convocatoria de algún premio a la editora de la *newsletter* de la revista, la doctora Ana-Carolina Gutiérrez-Xivillé, pueden ponerse en contacto con ella en la dirección siguiente: anacarolina.gx@gmail.com

Secciones:

- 1) **CONGRESOS**
- 2) **SEMINARIOS, *WORKSHOPS*, CURSOS Y OTROS EVENTOS**
- 3) **CONFERENCIAS INVITADAS**
- 4) ***CALLS FOR PAPERS* DE REVISTAS**
- 5) **PREMIOS**

This newsletter aims not at delivering an exhaustive view of Kantian-related events. Actually, the number of groups and centers working on Kant worldwide it is extremely difficult to manage. Anyway the newsletter attempts to furnish a wide outlook of congresses, workshops, courses, conferences and other similar events that could interest international Kant scholars. This first newsletter of *Con-textos kantianos* contains events taking place or launched in 2015. The deadline for submitting proposals to the events will be published when it is still useful for readers. For avoiding unnecessary doubling of information, the newsletter will appear only with the first miscellaneous issue of each year. Only in the case that the newsletter editor would receive information about an event or an award to be launched after the publication of 2015 newsletter, the information not included in 2015 will be added to 2016 newsletter. Organizers interested on submitting information about Kant-related events or awards to CTK newsletter editor, PhD Ana-Carolina

Gutiérrez-Xivillé, may contact her at the following e-mail address:
anacarolina.gx@gmail.com

Sections:

- 1) CONGRESSES
- 2) CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, COURSES AND OTHER MEETINGS
- 3) KEYNOTE SPEAKERS
- 4) JOURNAL CALLS FOR PAPERS
- 5) AWARDS

1) *CONGRESOS/CONGRESSES*

XII. INTERNATIONALER KANT KONGRESS: NATUR UND FREIHEIT
Lugar: Universität Wien, Universitätsring 1, 1010 Wien
Fecha: 21-25/09/2015
Der 12. Internationale Kant-Kongress in Wien ist dem Antagonismus von Natur und Freiheit gewidmet, der nicht nur zu Kants Zeiten, sondern auch in den Diskussionen von Heute höchst aktuell ist. Unklarer als für die Aufklärung im 18. Jahrhundert ist, wie sehr der Mensch nicht nur von der Natur beherrscht wird, sondern Natur ist und in welchem Maß er tatsächlich durch Freiheit handelt. Die Ressourcen des Kantischen Denkens bieten bedeutende Argumentationspotenziale für die aktuellen interdisziplinären Diskurse der Philosophie mit den Naturwissenschaften, der Medizin, Neurologie und Psychologie, mit den Rechts- und Sozialwissenschaften. Diesen Fragen ist ein Hauptaugenmerk des Kongresses 2015 in Wien gewidmet. Der Kongress berücksichtigt überdies die Themenvielfalt der Kantischen Philosophie durch Beiträge in den vorgesehenen Sektionen . Die Kongresssprachen sind Deutsch, Englisch und Französisch.
Für weitere Informationen: kant2015@univie.ac.at .

12EME CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE LA SEKLF: L'ANNEE 1784 : DROIT ET PHILOSOPHIE DE L'HISTOIRE
Lugar: Université de Mainz
Fecha: 28/09/2015 – 01/10/2015
Lettre circulaire – Appel à communications / Deadline: 15/05/2015
Comité scientifique : Lutz Baumann, Jean Ferrari, Sophie Grapotte, Dietmar Heidemann, Luc Langlois, Mai Lequan, Evanhélos Moutsopoulos, Claude Piché, Margit Ruffing, Ingeborg Schüssler, Ricardo Terra, Robert Theis.
Comité d'organisation : Roberto R. Aramayo, Lutz Baumann, Jean Ferrari, Sophie Grapotte, Mai Lequan, Margit Ruffing, Ricardo Terra.
Conférences plénières : ont accepté de présenter une conférence plénière : Gianluca Sadun Bordoni (Università di Teramo), Monique Castillo (Université de Paris 12), Bernd Dörflinger (Universität Trier), Jean Ferrari (Université de Bourgogne), Jean-Marc Ferry (Université de Nantes), Dietmar Heidemann (Université du Luxembourg), Ricardo Terra (Universidade de São Paulo).
Le XIIe congrès sera consacré à la philosophie de l'histoire et politique de Kant, et aura pour titre « L'Année 1784, Droit et philosophie de l'histoire » (renouant ainsi avec la "tradition" des <i>Années...</i>). Prendre l'année 1784 pour thème nous permettra notamment de

mettre en relief l'*Idée d'une histoire universelle au point de vue cosmopolitique* et la *Réponse à la question : Qu'est-ce que les Lumières ?*, écrits dans lesquels Kant présente sa philosophie de l'histoire, de la (cosmo-)politique et des Lumières, et qui ouvrent par conséquent un vaste horizon de la pensée moderne à partir de Kant.

Les **communications** auront une **durée maximale de trente minutes**. Comme cela a été le cas à Salvador de Bahia lors du congrès de 2013, chaque groupe thématique de communications sera suivi d'une discussion de trente minutes.

Les **titres des communications** accompagnés d'un **résumé** de cinq à dix lignes doivent parvenir jusqu'au **15 Mai 2015 au plus tard**, par voie électronique (mruffing@uni-mainz.de).

KANT ON RELIGION AND POLITICS – 2015 UKKS ANNUAL CONFERENCE

Lugar: Keele University

Fecha: 03-06/09/2015

Organizadores: UK Kant Society / NAKS

Contacto: Sorin Baiasu (s.baiasu@keele.ac.uk), Ruhi Demiray (m.r.demiray@keele.ac.uk).

Coordinador del congreso: Alberto Vanzo (alberto.vanzo@email.it).

Conferenciantes invitados: Otfried Höffe (University of Tübingen), Christopher Insole (Durham University), Allen Wood (Stanford University).

Conferenciantes plenarios: Cécile Laborde (UCL), Pablo Muchnik (Emerson College), Dieter Schönecker (University of Siegen), Kenneth Westphal (Boğaziçi University), Lea Ypi (LSE).

III CONGRESO DE LA SOCIEDAD DE ESTUDIOS KANTIANOS EN LENGUA ESPAÑOLA (SEKLE)

Lugar: México D. F.

Fecha: 5-8/09/2016

Organizadores: SEKLE, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México y Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana.

Call for Papers – Deadline: 31/12/2016

Los organizadores invitan a la comunidad filosófica a que envíen trabajos sobre la filosofía de Immanuel Kant en cualquier área. El Congreso estará organizado en torno a cuatro áreas temáticas: Filosofía teórica (metafísica, epistemología, filosofía de la ciencia y de la mente), filosofía práctica (filosofía moral, política, de la historia y del derecho), estética y filosofía de la religión. Habrá cuatro conferencias plenarias y múltiples mesas de discusión organizadas temáticamente. Además de ello, se dedicarán sesiones especiales a la presentación de obras recientes sobre Kant en español.

Los trabajos deberán ser enviados a la siguiente dirección electrónica:
tercercongresosekle@gmail.com.

Las respuestas se enviarán a los autores al 1 de mayo por el mismo medio electrónico. El trabajo propuesto debe tener una extensión máxima de 3500 palabras y estar listo para su evaluación ciega. Debe ir acompañado por un resumen de 200 palabras en un archivo independiente y por un documento, también independiente, que contenga el nombre del autor, institución de adscripción, dirección electrónica y el área temática en que se inscribe su propuesta. El Comité Organizador agradecerá a los autores que expresen si estarían interesados en participar como comentaristas independientemente de si su propio trabajo es aceptado o rechazado por el Comité Científico.

Las propuestas de obras recientes sobre Kant en español para su presentación en el congreso deberán enviarse a la misma dirección electrónica antes del 1 de enero de 2016. Deberán incluir el título de la obra, nombre del autor, año de publicación de la primera edición, editorial y número de páginas. Las respuestas se enviarán al 1 de febrero y, en caso de una opinión favorable, se solicitará un ejemplar de la obra para uso del presentador.

**2) SEMINARIOS, WORKSHOPS, CURSOS Y OTROS EVENTOS /
CONFERENCES, WORKSHOPS, COURSES AND OTHER MEETINGS**

CONFERENCE: KANT ON INTROSPECTION, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS, AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE

University of Nebraska–Lincoln
May 1-2, 2015

The Department of Philosophy at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln is happy to invite papers for the Seventh Annual Robert R. Chambers Philosophy Conference on themes related to Kant’s (and Kantian) views on introspection, self-consciousness, and self-knowledge at UNL on May 1-2, 2015.

Confirmed speakers include:

- Andrew Brook, Carleton University
- Andrew Chignell, Cornell University
- Anil Gomes, Oxford University
- Béatrice Longuenesse, New York U.
- Derk Pereboom, Cornell University
- Clinton Tolley, UCSD

LEUVEN KANT CONFERENCE

University of Leuven May 28-29, 2015

Confirmed keynote speakers:

- James Dicenso (University of Toronto) • Pauline Kleingeld (University of Groningen)
- Melissa Zinkin (Binghamton University)

The Institute of Philosophy of the University of Leuven invites submissions for the third Leuven Kant Conference. Papers are welcome on any aspect of Kant’s philosophy. The conference aims at stimulating fruitful exchanges between established scholars, young researchers, and PhD students. Presentation time will be 25 minutes + 20 minutes for discussion.

Organizers: Karin de Boer (University of Leuven), Arnaud Pelletier (Université Libre de Bruxelles), Simon Truwant (University of Leuven), Dennis Vanden Auweele (University of Leuven)

University of Leuven Institute of Philosophy Kardinaal Mercierplein 2 3000 Leuven
BELGIUM

IL CICLOPE DI KANT – SULL’ANTHROPOLOGIA TRANSCENDENTALIS

Lugar: Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sapienza Università di Roma

Villa Mirafiori – Via Carlo Fea, 2

Aula Olivetti (ex Aula XI)

Fecha: 3-4/06/2015

Organizzazione a cura di: Francesco Valerio Tommasi, Dipartimento di Filosofia – Sapienza Università di Roma. Email: fv.tommasi@gmail.com.

Il Convegno è realizzato nell’ambito del Progetto FIRB – Futuro in Ricerca 2012 dal titolo *Ens, res, realitas. Le trasformazioni del lessico dell’ontologia nella tradizione Scolastica dal Medioevo a Descartes e a Kant*

Programma:

MERCOLEDÌ 3 GIUGNO

Aula Marco Maria Olivetti (ex Aula XI)

ore 9.00

Indirizzo di saluto di Stefano Petrucciani (Direttore del Dipartimento di Filosofia, Roma Sapienza)

Moderata: Marta Fattori (Roma Sapienza)

Francesco Valerio Tommasi (Roma Sapienza), introduzione ai lavori:

Die anthropologia transcendentalis. Das Rätsel eines kantischen Paradoxons

Irene Kajon (Roma Sapienza), *Oltre il trascendentale: il nesso antropologia-religione nell’ultimo Kant*

Riccardo Pozzo (DSU - CNR), *Valenze epistemologiche dell’antropologia transcendentalis di Kant*

Clemens Schwaiger (Benediktbeuern e Roma UP Salesiana), *Kants Anti-Egoismus.*

Wurzeln und Motive

Ore 15.30

Moderata: Pierluigi Valenza (Roma Sapienza)

Alexei Krouglov (RGGU Mosca), *Die Lehre von der menschlichen Natur von Tetens als positives und negatives Beispiel für die Anthropologie Kants*

Christoph Böhr (Heiligenkreuz Vienna e Treviri), *Kants Anthropologie in Spiegelung und Gegenpiegelung bei Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz*

Jean-François Goubet (Univ. d’Artois), *Culture technique et sens de la perspective.*

La métaphore kantienne du cyclope en contexte pédagogique

Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Univ. Complutense di Madrid), „*Transzendentalis*

Anthropologie“: Beobachtungen zur oxymorischen reflektierenden Grundlage der Vernunft bei Kant

GIOVEDÌ 4 GIUGNO

Aula Marco Maria Olivetti (ex Aula XI)

Ore 9.00

Moderata: Massimo Luigi Bianchi (Roma Sapienza)

Hansmichael Hohenegger (Roma ILIESI), <i>Il problema dell'antropologia trascendentale e la divisione del lavoro intellettuale</i>
Gualtiero Lorini (Univ. di Lisbona), <i>Anthropologie und empirische Psychologie. Diskontinuität oder Entwicklung?</i>
Anselmo Aportone (Roma Tor Vergata), <i>Filosofia trascendentale e "antropologia formale"</i>
Mariannina Failla (Roma Tre), <i>La benevolenza in Kant. Per una "nuova antropologia"</i>
Ore 15.30
Modera: Francesco Valerio Tommasi (Roma Sapienza)
Robert Louden (Univ. del Southern Maine), <i>Kant's Anthropology: (Mostly) Empirical Not Transcendental</i>
Mirella Capozzi (Roma Sapienza), <i>Il contributo dell'antropologia alla logica di Kant</i>
Norbert Hinske (Univ. di Treviri e Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei), <i>Gibt es bei Kant eine transzendente Anthropologie?</i>

WORKSHOP VOM GUTEN UND SCHÖNEN UND ANGENEHMEN. DIESE UND ANDERE GEFÜHLE IN KANTS KRITIK
Lugar: Universität Wien, Institut für Philosophie, Hörsaal 2i des Instituts (NIG, 2. Stock)
Universitätsstraße 7, 1010 Wien
Fecha: 20/06/2015
Im Vorfeld des Internationalen Kant-Kongresses über Natur und Freiheit in Wien
Unter Leitung von Violetta L. Waibel.
9.15 h Eröffnung und Begrüßung: Dekanin Elisabeth Nemeth
9.30 h – 10.30 h Moderation: Herlinde Pauer-Studer
Jens Timmermann (St. Andrews und Gastprofessor Wien, SS 2015): <i>Vom Guten und Angenehen: Kants Paradoxon der Methode</i>
10.30 h – 11.30 h Moderation: Violetta L. Waibel
Birgit Recki (Hamburg und Gastprofessorin Wien, SS 2013): <i>Kant über religiöses Gefühl</i>
Kaffeepause
12.00 – 13.00 h Moderation: Birgit Recki
Philipp Schaller (Wien): <i>Was tun mit dem Nichtswürdigen? Oder, warum Kants Gefühl der Achtung vor dem moralisch Guten keinen Gegensatz hat</i>
Mittagspause
14.30 h – 15.30 h Moderation: Jens Timmermann
Max Brinnich (Wien): <i>Über den Sinn, ein angenehmes Leben zu führen. Zu Kants Begriff des Glücks</i>
15.30 h – 16. 30 h Moderation: Rudolf Langthaler
Volker Gerhardt (Berlin): <i>Kant über die Liebe</i>
Kaffeepause
17.00 h – 18.00 h Moderation: Kurt Appel
Violetta Waibel (Wien) <i>Vom Gefühl des Erhabenen zum Tragischen: Eine Lücke in Kants Ästhetik?</i>

Fingerfood (Trześniewski-Brötchen)
19.30 h Liederabend im Alten Rathaus Wien mit Han-Gyeol Lie, Klavier, Rannveig Braga-Postl, Mezzosopran, Ulrike Sych, Sopran und Paul Badura Skoda (Ehregast) Mit Werken von Schubert, Berg, Adorno und Mahler
Gemeinsames Abendessen.

4. BERLINER KANTKURS: NICK STANG, KANT'S MODAL METAPHYSICS
Lugar: HU Berlin
Inicio: 18/06/2015, 18:15h
Fin: 20/06/2015, 17:30h
Der Berliner Kantkurs ist ein regelmäßig stattfindendes Kompaktseminar, in dem international renommierte Forscherinnen und Forscher eigene neuere Arbeiten zu Kants Philosophie, ihrer philosophiegeschichtlichen Wirkung oder ihrer Rezeption in der zeitgenössischen systematischen Philosophie vorstellen. In diesem Jahr wird Nick Stang von der University of Toronto zu Gast sein und seine Interpretation von Kants Theorie der Modalität vorstellen, die er in seinem Buch "Kant's Modal Metaphysics" (Oxford: OUP, im Erscheinen) entwickelt hat. Der Berliner Kantkurs richtet sich an interessierte fortgeschrittene Studierende und Fachphilosoph/innen aus Berlin und anderen Orten. Da die Anzahl der Teilnehmer/innen begrenzt ist, ist für die Teilnahme eine Anmeldung erforderlich (Email an: kantkurs2015@gmail.com).
Weitere Informationen unter: www.kantkurs2015.de
Franz Knappik franz.knappik@hu-berlin.de

INCONTRO DEL SEMINARIO PERMANENTE IMMANUEL KANT ALL'UNIV. DI MILANO (SPIK)
Lugar: Università degli Studi di Milano, Direzione del Dipartimento di Filosofia, Sala Riunioni
Via Festa del Perdono 7, 20122 Milano
Fecha: 24/06/2015, 14:30-18:30h
Contacto: eva.oggonni@unimi.it , piero.giordanetti@unimi.it
<i>Experience and Synthesis from Kant to Herbart. The epistemological role of analysis in philosophical psychology</i>
Conferenciante: Nadia Moro (Higher School of Economics, Moscow)

WORKSHOP ON GOD AND MORAL MOTIVATION IN KANT'S PHILOSOPHY - SEMINARIO PERMANENTE IMMANUEL KANT ALL'UNIV. DI MILANO (SPIK)
Philosophy Department at Università degli Studi di Milano
Tuesday 25th and Friday 26th June in Room Malliani
June 25th, 2015: 9:30-16:00
9:30-11:00 Piero Giordanetti (Università degli Studi di Milano), TBA
11:00-11:15 coffee break
11:15-12:45 Thomas Höwing (Goethe Universität Frankfurt), Kants Begriff des moralischen Glaubens

12:45-14:30 lunch
14:30-16:00 Ina Goy (Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen), Substitution or Replacement? The Physicotheological and Ethicotheological Arguments for the Existence of God in §§85-91 of the CPJ
June 26th, 2015: 9:30-12:45
9:30-11:00 Eva Oggionni (Università degli Studi di Milano), Why is Kantian Highest Good Morally Motivating
11:00-11:15 coffee break
11:15-12:45 Federica Basaglia (Universität Konstanz), Die Freiheit und das moralisch Böse bei Kant
Info: piero.giordanetti@unimi.it ; eva.oggionni@unimi.it

POSTGRADUATE WORKSHOP KANT AND GERMAN IDEALISM
Lugar: University of Warwick, Department of Philosophy, R3.41 Ramphal Building
Coventry, United Kingdom
Fecha: 26/06/2015
Sponsor(s): British Society for the History of Philosophy, Hegel Society of Great Britain
Schedule:
Keynote speakers: Andreé Hahmann (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen), Stephen Houlgate (University of Warwick)
Organisers: Simon Wimmer
<i>Details</i>
In the contemporary literature the critique of Kant in German Idealism has again received increased attention. Especially Hegel's critique of Kant has been the subject of reconstructions in books such as Sally Sedgwick's "Hegel's Critique of Kant" or Bob Stern's "Hegel, Kant and the Structure of the Object". Our postgraduate workshop is supposed to bring together the most recent and promising research by graduate students on Kant and his reception in German Idealism. In the course of a day we will discuss Kant as well as the revived criticisms of the German Idealists. A special focus will be on the theoretical philosophy of Kant and the ways in which German Idealists challenge it.
Confirmed keynote speakers:
Prof. Stephen Houlgate (University of Warwick)
Dr. Andree Hahmann (Georg-August-Universität Göttingen)
Papers are invited from graduate students working on Kant and/or German Idealism. Possible topics include but are not limited to:
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Kant's critique of metaphysics and its return with German Idealism. • Metaphysics of Object and Subject. • Was Kant an epistemologist? Did Hegel overturn the epistemological paradigm? • The distinction between theoretical and practical reason.
Submissions should be suitable for presentation in 30 to 40 minutes (typically 3,000 to 4,500 words). Papers (or abstracts) must be prepared for blind review. If you want to present your paper at this workshop please send your paper or an abstract of no more than 500 words to kantandgermanidealism@gmail.com . The deadline for submitting your abstract or paper is the 31st of May.

Please Note: Pending a successful application for funding, we may be able to offer bursaries to cover the travel expenses for graduate speakers.

Supported by: British Society for the History of Philosophy, The Aristotelian Society, The Hegel Society of Great Britain, Warwick Philosophy Department.

A DIALOGUE BETWEEN KANT AND THE SCIENCES. EXPLORING NEW PERSPECTIVES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Lugar: Campus-Treff - Technische Universität Dortmund

Fecha: 09-11/07/2015

Schedule:

Thursday (July 9, 2015)

14:30 Brigitte Falkenburg, Silvia De Bianchi & Katharina Kraus: Opening

1. Kantian Themes in Philosophy of Science

15:00 Thomas Sturm (Barcelona) *Kant on the Role of Human Ends in Science*

16:00 Michela Massimi (Edinburgh) *Grounds and Nomological Necessity: A Kantian Spin on the Best System Analysis*

17:30 Holger Lyre (Magdeburg) *Handedness and the Substantival Nature of Space: Which Parts of Kant's Arguments Can Be Sustained?*

Friday (July 10, 2015)

2. Kant and the "Soft" Sciences: Life and Earth Sciences

10:00 Angela Breitenbach (Cambridge) *Regulative Principles in the Life Sciences*

11:30 Hein van den Berg (Amsterdam/Groningen) *Kant and the Scope of Analogy in the Life Sciences*

12:30 Silvia De Bianchi (Barcelona) *From the History of the Earth to Ethics: A Kantian Perspective*

3. Kant and the "Soft" Sciences: Themes from Psychology

15:00 Katharina Kraus (Freiburg) *Kant on Scientific Psychology: The idea of the soul as regulative principle*

16:00 Patrick R. Frierson (Walla Walla, WA) *Character in Kant's Moral Psychology: Responding to the Situationist Challenge*

4. Kant's Impact on the "Soft" and the "Hard" Sciences

17:30 David Hyder (Ottawa) *Kant's Theory of Time and its Impact on 19th Century Biology and Physics*

Saturday (July 11, 2015)

5. Kant and the "Hard" Sciences: Physics

10:00 Jonathan Everett (London) *A Kantian Account of Mathematical Modelling*

11:30 Hernán Pringe (Buenos Aires/Santiago de Chile) *Cassirer and Bohr: Leibnizian and Kantian approaches to the concept of symbol in quantum physics*

12:30 Brigitte Falkenburg (Dortmund) *From Heisenberg to Scheibe: Kant's Impact on the German "Kopenhagen" School of Quantum Mechanics*

6. Kant's Legacy in the History of Philosophy of Science

15:00 Peter McLaughlin (Heidelberg) *Science and its objects as purposive systems*

16:00 Kristina Engelhard (Köln) & Dietmar Heidemann (Luxemburg) *Kant's Legacy*

Kölner Tagung Kant im Kontext, Philosophisches Seminar - Universität Köln

Prof. Dr. Claudia Bickmann
Alter Senatssaal – Freitag 17. Juli 2015
Programm: http://dgphil.de/uploads/media/1434438446-Kant%20im%20Kontext%20Plakat_klein.pdf

"SPRACHKRITIK UND METAPHYSIK" – 2. MÜNCHNER PHILOSOPHISCHES KOLLOQUIUM IM SOMMERSEMESTER 2015
Die Vorträge finden jeweils von 18-20 Uhr c.t. in Raum M 210 im Hauptgebäude statt.
http://www.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/lehreinheiten/philosophie_2/aktuelles/phil_kolloquium_sose2015/index.html
http://www.philosophie.uni-muenchen.de/lehreinheiten/philosophie_2/aktuelles/phil_kolloquium_sose2015/mpk_plakat_ss15.pdf
24/06/2015 Dina Emundts (Universität Konstanz) <i>Kants Methode der Philosophie</i>
8/07/2015 Edward Kanterian (University of Kent) <i>Das mathematische Paradigma in der Philosophie. Ein kritischer Rundgang durch die Philosophiegeschichte</i>
15/07/2015 Eckart Förster (Johns Hopkins University Baltimore) <i>Die Idee von Philosophie als Wissenschaft</i>

SOMMERSEMINAR »RECHTSSTAATLICHKEIT: HABERMAS«
Lugar: Frankfurt/Oder
Inicio: 20/07/2015, 09:00h
Fin: 23/07/2015, 18:00h
Organizador: Europa-Universitaet Viadrina, Uniwersytet Łódzki
Im Rahmen eines aus Mitteln der Deutsch-Polnischen Wissenschaftsstiftung finanzierten Projekts „Rechtstaatlichkeit als Kernbestandteil des europäischen Denkens und der Europäischen Union im Lichte rechtsphilosophischer Ideen von Immanuel Kant, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel und Jürgen Habermas“ findet ein Sommerseminar statt (Anreisetag: 19.07.2015; Abreisetag: 24.07.2015).
Informationen über das Projekt: http://www.rechtsstaatlichkeit.eu/de .
Im Vordergrund wird Jürgen Habermas' Verständnis von Recht und demokratischem Rechtsstaat stehen, wie es in seinem Werk Faktizität und Geltung ausführlich dargelegt worden ist. Von den Teilnehmern des Sommerseminars wird erwartet, dass sie, um an dem Seminar teilnehmen und eine Begleichung der Teilnahme-, Unterkunfts- Reisekosten bekommen zu können, ein durch die Veranstalter begutachtetes Statement (im Umfang von bis zu 3 Seiten) liefern.
Einreichungen: kontakt@rechtsstaatlichkeit.eu

WAS IST EIN GUTER WILLE? – 10. SIEGENER KANT-KURS
Lugar: Universität Siegen
Inicio: 15/10/2015, 9:00h
Fin: 16/10/2015, 13:00h

Organizador: ZetKIK
Der Kurs soll dem wissenschaftlichen Nachwuchs Gelegenheit geben, sich in der Methode der kommentarischen Interpretation zu üben. Im Sinne dieses Ansatzes gibt es bei den Siegener Kant-Kursen keine Vorträge. Im Mittelpunkt steht vielmehr das gemeinsame Interpretieren und Diskutieren ausgewählter Textpassagen in kleinen Gruppen exzellenter Nachwuchsleute.
Gastdozentin: Prof. Dr. Andrea M. Esser (Universität Jena).
Um eine Teilnahme können sich fortgeschrittene Studierende vor und in der Promotionsphase sowie jüngere Postdocs bewerben. Auch Interessierte aus dem Ausland können sich gerne bewerben; sehr gute (zumindest passive) Deutschkenntnisse werden vorausgesetzt. Reisestipendien stehen zur Verfügung. Alle BewerberInnen werden gebeten, einen kurzen Lebenslauf, eine Empfehlung sowie ein Motivations schreiben einzureichen.
Bewerbungen schicken Sie bitte bis zum 11. Juli 2015 an:
Prof. Dr. Dieter Schönecker
Universität Siegen Fakultät I
Adolf-Reichwein-Str. 2 57068
Siegen Germany / Deutschland
Weitere Informationen unter www.zetik.de

NAKS MIDWESTERN STUDY GROUP
The Midwestern Study Group is pleased to announce that its next meeting will take place at Northwestern University from October 24th-25th, 2015 and will be hosted by Rachel Zuckert. The call for papers will circulate in the next edition of the NAKS newsletter. For details on the meeting, please contact the MSG program committee chair:
Corey W. Dyck at cdyck5@uwo.ca .

NAKS PACIFIC STUDY GROUP MEETING
Submission deadline (graduate students only): July 15th, 2015.
A decision will be made by early August.
The 2015 meeting of the Pacific Study Group of the North American Kant Society will be held Nov. 14-15 at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver, BC. The keynote will be delivered by Eric Watkins, and other confirmed speakers include James Messina, Rob Gressis, Hannah Ginsborg and Samantha Matherne. Eric Watkins will also be giving a colloquium talk at Simon Fraser on Nov. 13th, and conference participants are invited to attend.
One spot on the program is reserved for a current graduate student; to be considered, please submit a paper suitable for a 50-minute presentation to peter.thielke@pomona.edu .
A bloc of rooms will be available at the Pan Pacific Hotel. For more information about lodgings or logistics, please contact Dai Heide (dheide@sfu.ca).

3) *CONFERENCIAS INVITADAS / KEYNOTE SPEAKERS*

<i>Libertad, existencia y finitud de la Razón. Kant, Cassirer, Heidegger</i>
Conferenciante: Prof. Juan Manuel Navarro Cordón (UCM)

Lugar: Facultad de Filosofía de la UCM (Seminario de Doctorado del Proyecto *¿Actualidad del humanismo e inactualidad del hombre?* (FF12013-46815-P)
 Fecha: 3/06/2015

A questão da dedução transcendental na Crítica da razão pura
 Conferenciante: Prof. Paulo Licht dos Santos – (UFSCar-CNPq)
 Lugar: Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires, Avda. Alvear 1711, 3° piso.
 Fecha: 5/06/2015, 16:00h

Der freie Wille bei Kant und in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion
 Conferenciante: Christian Wenzel
 Lugar: Universität Erfurt, Philosophische Fakultät, Lehrgebäude 4, Raum D08
 Nordhäuser Straße 63, 99089 Erfurt
 Fecha: 10/06/2015, 18:15-20:00h

Kantian Constructivism and the Constitution of Rationality
 Conferenciante: Karl Schäfer (Pittsburgh)
 Lugar: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Philosophie, Neuer Senatsaal
 Ritterstraße 26, 04109 Leipzig
 Fecha: 17/06/2015, 19:00-20:30h
 Contacto: matthias.haase@uni-leipzig.de

Kant's idea of the immortality of the soul within the German debate of the time
 Conferenciante: Paola Rumore (University of Torino)
 Lugar: Universität Graz, Forum Philosophy Seminar, GEWI Sitzungszimmer
 Universitätsplatz 3, 8010 Graz
<http://campusplan.uni-graz.at/>
pranay.sanklecha@uni-graz.at
 Fecha: 17/06/2015, 16:00-17:30h

Kants Konzeption des Verstandes als ‚ursprüngliche Form‘ http://www.geisteswissenschaften.fu-berlin.de/we01/institut/termine/20150618_Institutskolloquium-Kern.ics?format=ics
 Conferenciante: Prof. Dr. Andrea Kern (Leipzig/Wiko Berlin)
 Lugar: Freie Universität Berlin, Institut für hilosophie, Vortragsraum im UG
 Habelschwerdter Allee 30, 14195 Berlin
 Fecha: 18/06/2015, 18:00 c.t.

Unvernünftiges Handeln: Kantische Perspektiven
 Conferenciante: Jens Timmermann (St. Andrews)
 Lugar: Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Institut für Philosophie, Raum A 301
 Bismarckstraße 1, 91054 Erlangen
 Fecha: 23/06/2015, 18:00-20:00h

Freiheit, Unterlassenkönnen und Verdienst: Verantwortung ohne Alternativen
 Conferenciante: Prof. Marcus Willaschek (Frankfurt/M.)

Lugar: Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, Institut für Philosophie, CAS 1.811
Norbert Wollheim Platz 1, 60629 Frankfurt am Main
http://www.uni-frankfurt.de/38093807/Campus_Westend-pdf.pdf
Fecha: 24/06/2015, 18:00h

<i>Understanding Autonomy: Form and Content of Practical Knowledge</i>
Conferenciante: Stephen Engstrom (Pittsburgh)
Lugar: Universität Leipzig, Institut für Philosophie, Neuer Senatssaal
Ritterstraße 26, 04109 Leipzig
Fecha: 15/07/2015, 19:00-20:30h
Contacto: matthias.haase@uni-leipzig.de

4) CALLS FOR PAPERS *DE REVISTAS* / JOURNALS' CALL FOR PAPERS

<i>CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS – INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY – Número 2/2015</i>
“Kant y las declinaciones de la armonía”
“Kant and the Meanings of Harmony”
“Kant e le declinazioni dell’armonia”
<i>Call for papers – Deadline: 30/09/2015</i>
<u>Español</u>
La revista <i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> solicita contribuciones para la sección monográfica de su número 2 del año 2015, que tendrá como título “Kant y las declinaciones de la armonía”. Se tomarán en consideración trabajos que se ocupen del tratamiento de la armonía en el amplio espectro de la obra de Kant, por lo que se admitirán artículos que planteen esta cuestión a la luz de la idea kantiana de sistema, de su reflexión estética y biológica, y de su pensamiento histórico y político, sin olvidar su diálogo con otros pensadores, como Leibniz y Wolff.
Los trabajos no deberán exceder los 40.000 caracteres (notas incluidas) y se eliminará de ellos toda referencia al/a los autor/es con el fin de ser evaluados según el sistema de doble ciego. Los autores comunicarán sus datos personales en un archivo de Word aparte, que tendrá el título siguiente: “ <i>Claves del título_nombre y apellidos del autor.doc</i> ”. Las contribuciones y archivos han de enviarse a las siguientes direcciones: alberto.pirni@sssup.it ; contextoskantianos@gmail.com .
El plazo para enviar las contribuciones finalizará el próximo 30 de septiembre de 2015 .
Quienes deseen recibir más información pueden contactar con Alberto Pirni (editor invitado del monográfico): alberto.pirni@sssup.it o enviar un correo a: contextoskantianos@gmail.com
<i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> pretende atender a los estudios filológico-críticos de la obra kantiana, sin descuidar los debates contemporáneos con el pensamiento kantiano. Se trata de una revista electrónica internacional, que admite trabajos en español, inglés, alemán, francés, italiano y portugués, con una clara vocación de servir como red al ámbito iberoamericano y reforzar la conexión entre los distintos grupos ya formados en diferentes países.

<p><u>English</u></p> <p>The journal <i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> is now accepting submissions for the monographic section – “Kant and the meanings of harmony”- of its 2/2015 issue. Original papers tackling the “concepts” of harmony throughout Kant’s writings are welcomed. Submission might consider Kant’s appraisal of harmony from the point of view of his idea of system, cosmology, theory of knowledge, as well as aesthetical and biological reflexions, moral and political thought, philosophy of history. Also Kant’s “theoretical dialogues” with other thinkers are more than welcomed.</p> <p>Each essay should be comprehensively contained within 40.000 characters (notes included). Papers have to be submitted without references to the author(-s) in order to be evaluated through a peer review process. Authors will convey their personal data in a different word file. Such a file could be saved as “<i>Key words of title_ author’s data.doc</i>”. Papers and files can be sent to the following addresses: alberto.pirni@sssup.it; contextoskantianos@gmail.com.</p> <p>Deadline for submission: September 30th, 2015</p> <p>For further information contact (guest editor): alberto.pirni@sssup.it; contextoskantianos@gmail.com</p> <p><i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> aims at boosting the philological and critical research on Kant studies, considering also actual discussions on Kant’s thought. It is an international and cosmopolitan inspired e-journal, which admits submissions in Spanish, English, German, French, Italian and Portuguese. The main purposes of the journal are to enhance the development of a Kant scholarship network at the Latin American scale and to tighten the links between research groups already consolidated in different countries and languages.</p>
<p><u>Italiano</u></p> <p>La rivista <i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> ha avviato l’accettazione di proposte per il numero monografico 2/2015, che sarà dedicato al tema: “Kant e le declinazioni dell’armonia”. Saranno presi in considerazione saggi originali che affrontano i “concetti” di armonia all’interno dell’intera opera kantiana. I saggi possono prendere in considerazione il concetto di armonia in Kant dal punto di vista dell’idea di sistema, la cosmologia, la teoria della conoscenza, ma anche le riflessioni estetiche e biologiche, il pensiero morale e politico, la filosofia della storia. Anche “dialoghi teorici” di Kant con altri pensatori saranno più che benvenuti.</p> <p>Ogni saggio dovrebbe contenersi entro i 40.000 caratteri (note incluse). Le proposte devono essere presentate senza riferimenti all’autore (o agli autori) per poter essere valutate attraverso un processo peer review. Gli autori potranno trasmettere i loro dati personali in un file di word separato. Tale file potrebbe essere salvato come “<i>Parole chiave del titolo_autore_dati.doc</i>”. Documenti e file possono essere inviati ai seguenti indirizzi: alberto.pirni@sssup.it; contextoskantianos@gmail.com.</p> <p>Termine di presentazione: 30 settembre 2015.</p> <p>Per ulteriori informazioni contattare il <i>guest editor</i>: alberto.pirni@sssup.it, ovvero: contextoskantianos@gmail.com.</p> <p><i>Con-Textos Kantianos</i> mira a rafforzare la ricerca filologica e critica degli studi su Kant, tenendo presenti anche le discussioni attuali sul pensiero del filosofo. Si tratta di un e-journal ispirazione internazionale e cosmopolita, che consente la pubblicazione di testi in spagnolo, inglese, tedesco, francese, italiano e portoghese. Gli scopi principali della rivista sono migliorare lo sviluppo di una rete di ricerca kantiana con particolare riferimento al livello latino-americano e stringere legami tra gruppi di ricerca già</p>

consolidati in diversi paesi e lingue.

KANT YEARBOOK 8/2016
Call for Papers – Deadline: 15/08/2015
The eighth issue's topic is "Kant and German Idealism."
All papers discussing Kant's relation to German Idealism from a historical (e.g. Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel), systematic and/or contemporary perspective are welcome. The Kant Yearbook practices double-blind review, i.e. the reviewers are not aware of the identity of a manuscript's author, and the author is not aware of the reviewers' identity. Submitted manuscripts must be anonymous; that is the authors' names and references to their work capable of identifying them are not to appear in the manuscript. Detailed instructions and author guidelines are available at:
http://kantyearbook.uni.lu/
http://philosophie.uni.lu/
For further information contact the editor or the publisher Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York (www.degruyter.com).
Paper submissions should go to: dietmar.heidemann@uni.lu .

MONIST: LAWS OF NATURE
The Monist, 100:3 July 2017
Deadline for submissions: July 31, 2016
Advisory Editor: Angela Breitenbach, Cambridge (ab355@cam.ac.uk) and Michela Massimi, Edinburgh (michela.massimi@ed.ac.uk).
Kant argued that the laws of nature were, in part, the result of our mind projecting an order onto nature. This issue of The Monist seeks to assess the prospects of such a conception of laws for contemporary debates in the philosophy of science. We invite contributions addressing questions such as: How is 'projecting an order onto nature' properly to be understood? What good can a conception of laws in these terms be for on-going debates between realist and empiricist approaches to laws of nature? Can a Kantian view shed light on the foundations of modern physics (and especially on quantum mechanics) or on contested issues concerning the nature of laws in biology; and might such a view advance current debates over the unity or disunity of science?
We encourage all intending authors to make direct contact with the Advisory Editors, Angela Breitenbach and Michela Massimi.
Submissions should not exceed 7,500 words, should be prepared for blind refereeing, and should include a brief abstract. Please also refer to the submission guidelines:
http://www.themonist.com/

5) PREMIOS /REWARDS

PREMIO KANT PARA JÓVENES INVESTIGADORES EN LENGUA ESPAÑOLA
CONVOCATORIA
1º Se concederá un premio y dos accésits (dos menciones) a artículos inéditos sobre cualquier

tema acerca del pensamiento y la filosofía de Kant.
2º Podrán participar investigadores que tengan menos de 40 años el día de la convocatoria de este Premio, o sea, el 1 de marzo de 2015.
3º Los artículos contarán con una extensión máxima de 120.000 caracteres, espacios incluidos.
4º Los originales serán enviados hasta el lunes día 11 de enero de 2016 (inclusive) a la dirección electrónica Premio.Kant.SEKLE@gmail.com , con un documento oficial (carnet o pasaporte) escaneado que atestigüe la edad del concursante.
5º Estos originales serán recogidos por el Secretario de la SEKLE. Sólo él conocerá el nombre de los autores. La evaluación de los originales se efectuará de manera anónima.
6º El Jurado estará compuesto por tres miembros nombrados por la Junta Directiva. Su composición se dará a conocer el día 12 de enero de 2016.
7º Este premio podrá quedar desierto a juicio del Jurado.
8º El premio consistirá en la entrega de 1.000 euros. Además el artículo premiado y los dos accésits o menciones serán publicados en la Revista de Estudios Kantianos de la SEKLE, haciéndose allí mención de dicho galardón.
9º Se hará entrega del premio en el marco de un congreso de la SEKLE. En esta primera edición eso tendrá lugar durante el congreso de septiembre de 2016 en México.
10º Este Premio Kant se convocará cada dos años.
México, Distrito Federal, a 1 de marzo de 2015 Gustavo Leyva Secretario de la SEKLE



Política Editorial

Este proyecto editorial sólo podrá salir adelante propiciando una nutrida participación presidida por la más absoluta pluralidad y obviando exclusiones de ningún tipo.

Se trata de una revista electrónica en torno a los estudios kantianos que tendría una periodicidad bianual y alternará los números monográficos (al cuidado de uno o dos editores invitados) con otros donde se publicarán los trabajos que obtengan informes favorables por el sistema de par ciego

El español será el idioma principal, pero también se podrán publicar trabajos en inglés, alemán, francés, italiano y portugués.

Los manuscritos deberán ser originales inéditos en cualquier idioma, que no estén bajo consideración en ningún otro lugar. Deberán remitirse por correo electrónico en Word a:

contextoskantianos@gmail.com

Preparación del Manuscrito

La extensión de los artículos no deberá exceder las 12.000 palabras, la de las discusiones 8.000 palabras las críticas de libros 4.000 palabras. En caso de que el interés y calidad del manuscrito lo aconseje, el equipo editorial podrá tomar en consideración la publicación manuscritos de una longitud mayor o menor.

Tanto los artículos como las discusiones deberán incluir un resumen en la lengua en que estén redactados y en inglés de unas 150 palabras. Igualmente deberán incluir tres o cinco palabras clave en ambas lenguas, adjuntando además el título del trabajo en inglés. El título del artículo, en la lengua en que esté redactado y en inglés, y el nombre y apellidos del autor, que estará en VERSALES, constarán en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 16, apareciendo únicamente el título en **negrita**. La vinculación institucional aparecerá en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 14. El resumen y palabras clave, en la lengua del artículo y en inglés, aparecerán en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11. Si la lengua del trabajo es el inglés, título, resumen y palabras clave aparecerán también en traducción al español.

Las reseñas llevarán un título, en la lengua en que estén redactadas y en inglés, relativo a su contenido y describirán la obra reseñada del siguiente modo: Autor, *título*, lugar, editorial, año, número de páginas.

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Estilo

Todas las contribuciones han de emplear tipo de letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 12 y espaciado 1,5 (texto y notas). Las notas deben estar numeradas consecutivamente (números volados, no entre paréntesis) y aparecer como notas a pie, usando la fuente *Times New Roman*, tamaño 10 y espaciado simple. El número de nota que remite a la información contenida en la nota a pie aparecerá directamente después del signo de puntuación que cierra la cita en el cuerpo del texto.

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Citas y referencias

Las referencias a autores y publicaciones en el cuerpo del texto aparecerán entre paréntesis, incluyendo el apellido del autor, el año de publicación de la obra y las páginas citadas. Ejemplo:

(Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Los pasajes de obras citados a lo largo de los artículos aparecerán, con justificación a la izquierda de 1,5, en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11, sin dobles comillas. Las reseñas no extraerán pasajes con justificación: en caso de que el autor desee citar extractos de la obra reseñada lo hará entre dobles comillas en el cuerpo del texto y respetando su tamaño, empleando la modalidad indicada de referencia entre paréntesis al autor, año de la publicación y página.

Las partes omitidas en citas se señalarán con tres puntos entre paréntesis cuadrados — [...]—, separados por un espacio simple de la palabra anterior y siguiente.

* Las referencias de las obras de Kant deberán hacerse según las pautas fijadas por la Edición de la Academia:

http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf

* La bibliografía se debe organizar alfabética y cronológicamente al final del texto. Si se citan varias obras del mismo autor, éstas deben ordenarse de manera cronológica, de la más reciente a la más antigua.

Ejemplos:

Libro:

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

Artículo:

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

Capítulo en una obra colectiva:

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), "Kant y la filosofía de la religión", en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón"*, Anthropos, España,

pp. 185-212.

Trabajos disponibles en la web:

Waldron, J. "The Principle of Proximity", *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp, acceso mes, día y año).





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Editorial Policy

We would like to acquaint you with a journal project that can only go forward with the greatest possible participation of Kant scholars, without exclusions of any kind.

This periodical will be a biannual electronic journal in Kantian studies, which will alternate between open-submission issues and single-topic issues coordinated by one or two editors. All submitted manuscripts would undergo peer review.

Though Spanish is the Journal's primary language, manuscripts in English, German, French, Italian, and Portuguese are also welcome.

Submissions must not have been previously published, nor should they be under consideration anywhere else in any language. Please send your manuscript as a Word attachment to the following e-mail address:

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Manuscript Preparation

Articles must not exceed 12.000 words, discussions 8.000 words, and book reviews 4.000 words (including footnotes and bibliography in all cases). Longer manuscripts could also be considered by the editorial team, if the interest and quality of the contribution justifies its acceptance.

Articles and discussions should include an abstract both in the language of the submitted paper and in English that should not exceed 150 words as well as three to five keywords, with the title also in English. The title of articles, in the language of the submitted text and in English, and the author (in SMALL CAPS) will appear in *Times New Roman* 16 and in **bold type**. The institutional affiliation will have font *Times New Roman* 14. The *abstract* and *key words*, also in the language of the submitted and in English, will have font *Times New Roman* 11. If the language of the article or discussion is English, the title, abstract and key words will be also translated into Spanish.

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For any contribution, the author should use letter type *Time New Roman* 12 and lines should be spaced 1.5 (text and notes). Notes should be numbered consecutively (superscript, no brackets) and appear as footnotes, using *Times New Roman* 10. The number of the annotation which points to the bibliographic information contained in the footnote has to appear directly after the quotation mark closing the citation.

Stress required in the text should be done through the use of *italics*, never in **bold type**.

Citations and references

References without excerpting throughout the manuscript must appear in parenthesis in the main text with the following information: author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Example:

(Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Excerpts cited throughout articles will use *Times New Roman* 11, without quotation marks and 1,5 left indented. Reviews shall not include indented excerpts, only brief citations, if necessary, with quotation marks and the reference in parenthesis of author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Omissions in citations are marked by three dots placed in square brackets which are separated from the preceding and the following word by a single space.

When citing Kant's Complete Works the usage within the *Akademie Edition* is mandatory

http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf

*Bibliography must be included at the end and organized alphabetically. Several works by the same author must be ordered chronologically beginning with the most recent one.

Examples:

Book:

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

Article:

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

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