Arvi Grotenfelt and
neo-Kantian philosophy of history
Lauri Kallio*
Univ. of Turku, Finland
Abstract
The paper
discusses Arvi Grotenfelt's (1863–1941), professor of philosophy in Helsinki
1905–29, reading of Heinrich Rickert's (1863–1936) philosophy of history.
Rickert was one of the key figures of the so-called south-west German
neo-Kantianism. In the center of attention of the south-west neo-Kantians was
the topic that Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) himself had omitted: how to
philosophically establish the humanities and the social sciences and separate
them from the natural sciences? Rickert's philosophy of history was essentially
an attempt to ground the historical knowledge in a strictly transcendental
philosophy in the Kantian sense. His argumentation relied on his concept of
value (Wert). Grotenfelt did not share Rickert's definition of values.
According to his view, the fundamental foundation of our judgements of value is
beyond scientific reasoning. I will also argue that Grotenfelt's standpoint has
a general affinity to Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) philosophy of world view
(Weltanschauung).
Keywords
Arvi
Grotenfelt, Heinrich Rickert, Neo-Kantianism, philosophy of history, philosophy
of values, Wilhelm Dilthey.
Abstrakti
Teksti
käsittelee vuosina 1905–29 Helsingin yliopiston filosofian professorina
toimineen Arvi Grotenfeltin (1863–1941) tulkintaa Heinrich Rickertin
(1863–1936) historianfilosofiasta. Rickert oli yksi uuskantilaisuuden niin
sanotun lounaissaksalaisen koulukunnan pääedustajista. Uuskantilaisuuden
lounaissaksalaisen koulukunnan mielenkiinnon kohteena oli aihe, jonka Immanuel
Kant (1724–1804) itse oli sivuuttanut: humanististen tieteiden ja
yhteiskuntatieteiden filosofinen perusta sekä niiden eroavuus luonnontieteistä.
Rickertin historianfilosofia oli pohjimmiltaan yritys perustaa historiallinen
tieto kantilaisen transsendentaalifilosofian pohjalle. Rickertin argumentaatio
rakentui hänen arvon (Wert) käsitteelleen. Grotenfelt ei omaksunut Rickertin
määritelmää arvolle. Hänen näkemyksensä mukaan arvojen viimekätinen perusta ei
ole tieteellinen kysymys. Osoitan myös, että Grotenfeltin kannalla on tiettyä
yhtenevyyttä Wilhelm Diltheyn (1833–1911) maailmankuvan (Weltanschauung)
filosofian kanssa.
Asiasanat
Arvi
Grotenfelt, arvofilosofia, Heinrich Rickert, historianfilosofia,
uuskantilaisuus, Wilhelm Dilthey.
Introduction:
Grotenfelt and neo-Kantianism
Arvi (also Arvid) Grotenfelt (1863–1941), professor of
philosophy in Helsinki 1905–29 and the chairman of the Philosophical Society of
Finland 1905–36, made pioneering work in the philosophy of history in Finland.
He was also the first to publish extensive commentaries on the history of
philosophy in Finnish (Niiniluoto 2000, p. 181). His focus was particularly on
the classic German philosophy.
Grotenfelt's standpoint in the philosophy of history
was heavily influenced by the so-called south-west German neo-Kantianism, whose
key-figures were Wilhelm Windelband (1848–1915) and his student Heinrich
Rickert (1863–1936). In his main works on the subject Grotenfelt commented
especially on the latter's views of history as a science. Grotenfelt was a
frequent visitor to Germany, and he met both Rickert and Windelband in person
at the mid-1890s (Luukanen 1988, p. 111).
In the center of attention of the south-west
neo-Kantians was the topic that Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) himself had omitted:
how to philosophically establish the humanities (‘Geisteswissenschaften’) and
the social sciences and separate them from the natural sciences (Hösle 2013, p.
232; cf. Rickert 1899, p. 12)?[1]
Rickert's neo-Kantian philosophy of history was essentially an attempt to
ground the historical knowledge in a strictly transcendental philosophy in the
Kantian sense (Schnädelbach 1984, pp. 56–7).
Worth noting is that although Grotenfelt shared the
same interests as the south-west neo-Kantians, he was open-minded about the
more positivist currents of thought of the time (Väyrynen 2017, p. 308).[2]
Grotenfelt had studied in Wilhelm Wundt's (1832–1920) famous laboratory of
experimental psychology in the 1880s. Probably (at least partly) due to
non-philosophical and non-academic reasons (e.g. the political situation in
Finland) (Luukanen 1988, pp. 105–6), Grotenfelt decided to leave the more
positivist approach behind and focus on the philosophy of history.
In this paper I address Grotenfelt's reading of Rickert's
magnum opus Die Grenzen der
naturwissenschaftlichen Begriffsbildung
(The Limits of
Concept-Formation in Natural Science (1896, 1902)) in his work Die Wertschätzung in der Geschichte
(1903).[3] Later
Grotenfelt also published a review of Rickert's work (1905b). Worth noting is
that Rickert published five editions of his work, and the subsequent editions
did not include only minor revisions: he rewrote entire chapters and took the critique
of the previous editions into account. Grotenfelt addressed Limits right after the publication of
the second volume of the first edition in 1902.
History
as a science
Already in the preface of his work Wertschätzung Grotenfelt adheres to
several of Rickert's key principles. Rickert's main concern is the possibility
of history as a science (Beiser 2011, p. 399).
In what follows, I will, like Grotenfelt, focus on
Rickert's criteria for the scientific status of history. Within the limits of
this paper, I cannot discuss Rickert's answer to the question, why the history
must have a scientific status in the first place. Concerning this fundamental
question, I make two introductory remarks. First, Rickert's philosophy of
history in the 1902 version of the Limits stems from Windelband's famous
Strasbourg lecture (1894). (Later both Windelband's and Rickert's views
changed, but for Grotenfelt's interpretation of Rickert, the Strasbourg lecture
is the central point of reference.) In his lecture Windelband gave no
straightforward explanation for the scientific status of history. But he saw no
reason to deny it. He argues that the methods of the natural and the historical
sciences are of equal value to the quest for knowledge (Windelband 1894, pp.
12, 19).
Second, Windelband's definition of the scientific
methodology arises from the Kantian framework (Windelband 1894, p. 7; Beiser
2011, pp. 380, 383). Given the increase of historical knowledge over the course
of the 1800s, Windelband complements Kant's definition of science, which is
essentially limited to the natural sciences and mathematics.[4]
Rickert's argument for the science of history
challenges both naturalism and historicism (Rickert 1902, pp. 21, 331–2,
612–3). He opposes historicism (as represented e.g. by Leopold von Ranke
(1795–1886)) because it involves the danger of relativism (Beiser 2011, p.
405). Rickert believes that science can attain eternal and necessary truths.
Accepting historicism would eventually challenge this; all thought would be
historically limited (Beiser 2011, pp. 395–6). Thus, for Rickert, securing
history as a science means limiting it.
Grotenfelt (1903, pp. III, 44, 138–9) maintains
against Rankean historicism that although historians strive for objectivity,
their judgements concerning history are always subjective to some extent.[5] E.g. a
historian has to choose the events during an era which he or she regards as
essential. The main task of Grotenfelt's work of 1903 is to define the extent
of subjectivity in historical appreciations (‘Wertschätzung’) (Grotenfelt
1905a, p. III). As an example of a historical appreciation, Grotenfelt presents
a historian of philosophy, whose world view is positivistic (Grotenfelt 1903,
p. 193; Luukanen 1988, p. 114). Such a historian does not regard the era of
speculative idealism as important due to his or her own philosophical
standpoint.
Furthermore, Grotenfelt (1903, pp. 20–1) denies that
there could be a historic event, which is not comparable to any other event.
Or, a that kind of an event would be describable, Grotenfelt maintains, neither
in art nor in science. Such a description would require e.g. vocabulary (cf.
Rickert 1902, pp. 338–40). But a vocabulary is universal in its essence; the
words acquire their meaning through their relationship to other words.
Following Rickert, Grotenfelt (1903, p. 19; 1905b, p.
61; Rickert 1899, p. 43; Suolahti 1947, p. 279) emphasizes the scientific
status of history. Contrary to Ranke, who had argued that history resembles
more art than science, because it addresses individual
things (Beiser 2011, p. 400), Grotenfelt stresses that also science can deal
with unique and individual events (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 7, 20, 24; cf. Rickert
1902, pp. 339–41). Yet, the uniqueness he has in mind is relative uniqueness,
or uniqueness which can be studied with ordinary scientific methods (Luukanen
1988, p. 118).
This brings us to naturalism. Grotenfelt seems to
share Rickert's understanding of naturalism according to which naturalism
features the positivist principle that the methods of natural sciences are the
only scientific methods (Beiser 2011, p. 405). Grotenfelt (1903, p. 4) states
that the task of history is not to find universal laws and thus rejects this
principle. But he also stresses that a historian should strive for
generalizations whenever they are well justified (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 31–2). A
historian should also never address historical events as isolated, because a
historical event is significant only because it contributes to a certain
historical development (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 9–10; cf. Rickert 1902, p. 307).
On the other hand, Grotenfelt agrees with Windelband's
and Rickert's attempt to diminish the tension between humanities and natural
sciences (e.g. Grotenfelt 1903, p. 57; Rickert 1902, pp. 659–60; Bambach 1995,
p. 30). Grotenfelt argues with Rickert that historical phenomena can also be
investigated with the methods of natural sciences (Rickert 1902, pp. 29,
320–1). Yet the natural sciences cannot grasp all sides of history (Grotenfelt
1903, p. 9; Rickert 1902, pp. 249–51, 363; 1899, pp. 18–9). As already the
title of Rickert's work suggests, there are limits for the concept formation in
the natural sciences.
But how do the historical sciences actually differ
from the natural sciences? Rickert's answer to this question can be introduced
by explaining his critique of Wilhelm Dilthey's (1833–1911) well-known concept
‘Geisteswissenschaften’, which included both the humanities and the social
sciences. Following Windelband, he was discontented with it. Dilthey was an
inspirational opponent of neo-Kantianism not only because he was heavily
influenced by Kant but also because like neo-Kantians, he waged a two-front war
against positivism and German idealism (Hösle 2013, p. 234).
Rickert had many reasons for abandoning Dilthey's
concept of ‘Geisteswissenschaften’.[6] First,
he contributed to the so-called epistemological turn in the
philosophy of history (Schnädelbach 1984, pp. 50–1). Like the epistemological
turn in other branches of philosophy, it was essentially a countermove against
Hegelianism. For Rickert, Dilthey's concept of ‘Geisteswissenschaften’ is a
remnant of Hegelianism: it is too metaphysical. Rickert himself grounds the
historical sciences without any material reference to their objects (Rickert
1902, pp. 28–9; Schnädelbach 1984, p. 129; Bambach 1995, p. 103). His
standpoint is decidedly Kantian: the focus is on our way to approach the
objects and not on the objects themselves.
According to Rickert, the difference in our epistemic
interests constitutes the difference between the natural and the historical
sciences: “The generalizing interest is
characteristic of the natural sciences, whereas the individualizing interest is
characteristic of the historical sciences” (Beiser 2011, p. 400).[7] That is
to say that in the historical sciences the focus is on the uniqueness of events
or things, whereas the natural sciences attempt to find the general principles,
which apply to all particulars. As mentioned above, the same phenomena can be
addressed both in natural and in historical sciences. But the different
sciences aim to answer different questions.
Rickert admits
that his theory is a simplification: for example, in reality, the historical
sciences feature also generalizing interest (Beiser 2011, p. 401). Grotenfelt
emphasizes this point. He highlights the fact that historical sciences have
benefitted greatly from the recent development of sociology (Grotenfelt 1903,
pp. 4, 26).
Yet there is also a substantial disagreement between
Grotenfelt and Rickert. According to Grotenfelt, Rickert argues eventually for
a purely logical distinction between the sciences. Grotenfelt (1905b, p. 62)
appreciates this attempt, but problematizes the way Rickert imposes this
distinction on the actual practice of historical sciences. It is legitimate to
say, for example, that some natural objects are the objects of the natural
sciences alone (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 25–6). The best counterargument against
Rickert's theory is yet the case of sociology. Sociology and history are so
tied up to each other that classifying them into different classes of science
contradicts the coherence of scientific work (Grotenfelt 1903, p. 27).
Grotenfelt's point is that in reality it is impossible to distinguish the
epistemic interests within the scientific practice. In most fields of science,
the different epistemic interests interpenetrate (‘sich durchdringen’) to each other.
Rickert (1902, pp. 308, 480–1) admits that science
rarely operates neither with pure individual nor with pure universal concepts.
This is why Rickert prefers the terms relative universal and relative
individual concept (cf. Grotenfelt 1903, p. 36). That is to say that also the
universal concepts in natural and historical sciences differ. The former are
'class concepts' (‘Gattungsbegriff’), whereas the latter are 'wholes' (‘Ganze’)
(Rickert 1902, pp. 393–4). Rickert (1899, p. 58; 1902, pp. 308, 636) emphasizes
that the difference between the concept formation in the natural and in the
historical sciences is permanent.
Grotenfelt (1905b, pp. 63–4) disagrees with this
claim. He points out that it is not exceptional for a historian to classify and
explain events similarly to a natural scientist. On the other hand, Grotenfelt
argues that it is also legitimate for a natural scientist to foreground
singular events. E.g. examining the human evolution as unique series of events
belongs to the realm of the natural sciences (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 24–25).
Examination of the unique human evolution does not have to lead any universal
truths about the evolution in general. I do not find Grotenfelt's line of
reasoning very clear. However, the point that he wants to make is that the
different epistemic interests intermingle within a certain branch of science.
Rickert (1899, p. 40), on the contrary, stresses that the uniqueness of an
event is not of equal value in the natural and in the historical sciences.
Grotenfelt (1903, p. 27) concludes that, unlike
Rickert, he embraces the material division of sciences. He refers to Ernst
Bernheim's (1850–1942) definition: history is the study of the development of
human being as a social being (Grotenfelt 1903, p. 5). Since Grotenfelt
repeatedly emphasizes the interconnectedness of sociology and history, one
asks, what actually constitutes the difference between the two disciplines in
his view? In his answer Grotenfelt (1903, p. 28) points out that the objects of
the historical study are not immediately present. They are rather reconstructed
on the basis of (always to some extent) incomplete material. On the contrary, in
sociology as well as in natural sciences the objects are present. This is why
the historical science can never become a nomological science (‘Gesetzeswissenschaft’) like sociology, which discovers the regularities of
social life.
For Grotenfelt, the scientific character of history is
thus not due to its ability to demonstrate laws or regularities. In order to be
scientific, the emphasis must be placed on careful study of particular facts
(Grotenfelt 1903, p. 31). Historical documents are rarely wholly objective
descriptions of an event, and scepticism concerning the historical knowledge
can be rejected only through cautious source criticism, Grotenfelt (1903, pp.
29–30) concludes. Thus, the objectivity of history, eventually a weak
objectivity, is grounded on empiricism.
Eventually, Grotenfelt understands history as a basic
science. Its task is to produce elementary information, which can be used in
further studies in other fields of science. His theory has affinity to Rickert
here: Grotenfelt also insists that limiting historical study is a precondition
for its scientific status.
Grotenfelt's attitude towards the study of history is
best described as practical, whereas Rickert's approach is more theoretical.
Grotenfelt's practical approach to the problems of philosophy of history stems
from his conviction that writing (or documenting) and studying history are
inseparable (Luukanen 1988, p. 116; Suolahti 1947, pp.
271, 286). This basic principle is though not clearly worded in Grotenfelt's
writings. Generally speaking, this principle explains the vagueness of his
position, which shall be exemplified in the following chapters.
Grotenfelt is not particularly concerned with the
borders between different fields of science, but encourages historians to use
all the tools available in order to enrich the knowledge of the past.
Grotenfelt's standpoint mediates between different modes of explanation for
example. Grotenfelt, a former student of Wundt, believes that psychology can in
part elucidate the motives behind human actions of the past (Grotenfelt 1903,
pp. 50–1; Väyrynen 2015, pp. 313–4; Luukanen 1988, p. 124). Wundt's name
surfaces as Grotenfelt stresses historian's right to speculate, to use his or
her ability to fantasise, “[…] under the strict control of critical thinking”
(Grotenfelt 1905b, p. 65). By contrast, in Rickert's model the ability to
fantasise is restricted to clarification of the subject matter (Rickert 1899,
p. 44; Grotenfelt 1905b, p. 64). Grotenfelt maintains that the abilities to
understand and fantasise are not that distinct at all. His definition of a
proper historical study allows for imaginary elements, which though have to be
verified as well as possible (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 51, 53, 55–6).
Grotenfelt's studies with Wundt might also explain,
why he does not address Dilthey at all, although he extensively discusses German
figures of the time. Wundt's experimental psychology was distinct from
Dilthey's descriptive psychology, or psychology of ‘Verstehen’ (Väyrynen
2015, p. 317; Rickert 1902, p. 150). Generally speaking, understanding
psychology essentially as a natural science is common to both neo-Kantians and
Grotenfelt (Beiser 2011, pp. 380, 401).
From a historical point of view, Grotenfelt's
statements concerning the interrelatedness of history and sociology are
noteworthy. Namely, Grotenfelt's early career was closely related to the
arrival of sociology in the University of Helsinki by Edvard
Westermarck (1862–1939), internationally the most renowned Finnish philosopher
of the time.[8] In his Wertschätzung Grotenfelt engages into theoretical discussion of the
prehistory of sociology, which Westermarck had avoided (Luukanen 1988, p. 122).
Like Westermarck, Grotenfelt understands sociology in a positivistic way. On
the other hand, he explains the difference between sociology and history in the
Rickertian way, since the difference is due to the different epistemic
interests and not due to the objects of study (Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 71–2;
Luukanen 1988, p. 124).
Philosophy
of values
As explained in the previous chapter, Rickert
identifies the historical sciences with their individualizing interest. Yet,
one asks how do we actually define an event or a thing as essential and unique?
Rickert answers that we do this on the basis of our values (Beiser 2011, p.
404; Rickert 1902, pp. 372, 379–80). The concept of value (‘Wert’) is the key
concept of his neo-Kantian philosophy.[9] Rickert addresses the
objectivity of values in the second part of his work Limits, which is at the center of Grotenfelt's attention.
Within the limits of this paper, Rickert's extensive
theory of values cannot be discussed in length. In order to introduce it, I
denote some of its basic features. First, values are to be separated from
facts. According to Rickert, facts and values are ontologically different:
facts ‘exist’ but values ‘have validity’ (Schnädelbach 1984, p. 131; Bambach
1995, p. 101). Another essential distinction is the distinction between
‘objects which are valuable’ and ‘the act of valuing’. That is to say that
values are to be separated from the objects, which are regarded as valuable.
Thirdly, the concept of value is a truly Kantian
element in Rickert's thinking: values direct our experience of the world. It is
illustrative that Rickert does not claim that the natural sciences would be a
value-free enterprise. The natural sciences are also dependent on the act of
valuing, because their attempt to construct a system of knowledge has to be
seen as valuable by the subject (Rickert 1902, pp. 663–64). Thus, there is no reason
to claim that the natural sciences provide ‘more objective’ knowledge than the
historical sciences. Besides, even the material of science is dependent on the
subject: precondition for a scientific study are the facts (‘Tatsache’), which
are regarded as true, or attached to truth value (‘Wahrheitswert’), by the
subject (Rickert 1902, pp. 664–65). “[…] [T]he recognition of truth value is
the logical precondition of any science”,
Rickert (1902, p. 671) concludes.
Apropos of Rickert's fear of relativism (mentioned in
the previous chapter), the crucial question concerns the historicity of values.
Different cultures have different values, and even within a specific culture
values change over the course of time. How the values can serve as the basis
for the objective knowledge?
My understanding of Rickert's answer to this dilemma
at the turn of the century is as follows. Rickert strictly denies
value-relativism and argues for a non-relativistic theory of values (Rickert
1902, pp. 389–91). He though admits that some values are historically
dependent. Rickert terms these values cultural values (‘Kulturwerten’) (Rickert 1899, p. 47). But, Rickert stresses, even the cultural values
are directed by more general values, which are to be found in the
transcendental discourse (Rickert 1902, p. 701). To conclude: the expression of
cultural values is historical, but their ground is transcendental.[10]
Grotenfelt does not address the transcendental realm
of values in his 1903 work (cf. next chapter): his focus is on the role of values
in historical sciences. Grotenfelt explains that according to Rickert a
historian, who studies the historical information, distinguishes between
essential and inessential on the basis of cultural values. Rickert believes
that a historian can empirically observe these values (Rickert 1902, pp.
638–9). The cultural values are normative social values, which are accepted by
all members of the society; the totality of these values constitute a culture
for Rickert, Grotenfelt explains (1903, pp. 186–9; Rickert 1902, pp. 577–8).
Essential for achieving historical objectivity is the
distinction between the values themselves and having a relationship to values
(Rickert 1902, p. 364; Grotenfelt 1903, p. 186). For example, a historian can
note that bravery was important for the ancient Romans without having to judge
whether bravery is valuable or not. That is to say that the primary task of a
historian is to distinguish between essential and inessential instead of
separating between valuable and non-valuable as such (Grotenfelt 1903, p. 188).
The task of distinguishing between the essential from
the inessential can be completed wholly empirically and objectively, Rickert
claims (Grotenfelt 1903, p. 190). For example, two historians from politically
opposed communities could disagree whether bravery is valuable or not. But they
must agree that the ancient Romans regarded bravery as valuable, because it can
be empirically verified. Claiming that bravery was an essential characteristic
of the ancient Rome is thus objectively valid.
The arguments above are sufficient to guarantee the
objectivity of historical knowledge. It is, of course, possible to demand that
a historian must consider more fundamental questions (like the question whether
history entails constant progress or not) too. Rickert's concept of the
cultural values provides also a paradigm for that. A historian is bound by the
cultural values of his or her time. The objectivity of historian's work can be
recognized only by a community. Historian's work is always meant for a certain
audience and it has to conform to the values of that community (Grotenfelt
1903, p. 188). On the basis of these values it is possible to produce, for
example, a view of the world history (Rickert 1902, p. 701).
The key question of Grotenfelt's commentary on Rickert
is whether the objectivity of history can actually be achieved this way.
Grotenfelt (1903, p. 186) agrees with Rickert's principle of the cultural
values as the basis of historical sciences. In my view, Rickert's focus on the
culture explains Grotenfelt's interest in his work. Yet, Grotenfelt claims,
Rickert's concept of the normative social cultural value is too indefinite in
order to be empirically verified (Grotenfelt 1903, p. 191).
Grotenfelt argues that commonly accepted cultural
values determine rather areas like science or religion but not the society in
its entirety. For example, a certain aesthetical value can be very important to
the artists but irrelevant for the rest of the society. Yet, even within a
certain area of societal life there are no such commonly accepted values as
Rickert suggests. There is, for example, a commonly accepted narrative of the
history of Western philosophy. But this narrative is only very superficial
(Grotenfelt 1903, pp. 192–3). In order to provide a detailed account, there are
no commonly accepted values to be found, which could be empirically verified.
As concerns e.g. political history, Grotenfelt
reflects on the possibility that the cultural values could be defined as ‘an
average’ of the values of people in a certain point of time. But this is
impossible too, Grotenfelt maintains (1903, p. 194), because most of the people
have only a very vague understanding of their values. Different kind of example
of this superficiality is the statement that the welfare of a nation improved
during an era. Verifying this statement requires a proper definition of
welfare. Yet, it is almost impossible for a historian to follow just the
definition of the time. In reality, Grotenfelt concludes, historian's own
concept of true welfare gets mixed with the historical definition in order to
produce a meaningful account of the past.
Grotenfelt further points out (1903, pp. 190–1) that
besides events, whose importance is unquestionable, there are cases, whose importance
is widely contested among the historians. For example, a cultural historian can
regard an event as important whereas an economic historian considers it as
irrelevant. That is to say that unlike Rickert suggests there are disagreements
about whether an event is important and not just disagreements about whether an
event is valuable. Accordingly, there is no basis for the concept of culture in
Rickert's sense.
Eventually Grotenfelt (1903, p. 195; Luukanen 1988, p.
116) points out that even if it would be possible, a historian should not
describe an era solely with respect to the values of that particular era.
Namely, that kind of description would not be meaningful for the
contemporaries. A historian should take both the present and the past cultural
values into account. For example, as concerns the Middle ages, a historian
should address the fact that certain developments of that time led to the
formation of some modern states. In short, every particular description of
history is not separate from our overall conception of history (Grotenfelt
1903, p. 194).
The main task of Grotenfelt's 1903 work was to define
the extent of subjectivity in historical appreciations. He concludes that there
is always a subjective element in all historical appreciations (Luukanen 1988,
p. 119; Suolahti 1947, p. 281). Though often this element is almost invisible;
there are commonly accepted explanations of many historical events.
Principles
of the historical appreciations
According to the traditional reading of Grotenfelt (e.g. Niiniluoto), his stance
to the philosophical controversies of his time was cautious and moderate. As we
have seen, his attempt to mediate between different positions lead to a certain
relativism: eventually he ascribed only a relative objectivity to the
historical sciences. Grotenfelt himself was probably somewhat disappointed with
this result: in his next major work, Geschichtliche
Wertmassstäbe in der Geschichtsphilosophie bei den Historikern und im
Volksbewusstsein (1905a), which was originally meant to be the third
subdivision of the 1903 work, he approached historical appreciations from a
different angle.
In his earlier work Grotenfelt did not address the
principles, which serve as the ground for our historical appreciations. These
principles, as Grotenfelt indicates (1905a, p. III), touch upon the fundamental
questions of the general theory of value and ethics. Yet, in the preface of his
work he explains (1905a, pp. III–IV) that he cannot exhaustively discuss the
theory of value. He gives no explanation, why he almost completely ignores the
neo-Kantians, while he comments extensively on Kant. He mentions Rickert, who
was in the center of attention in the earlier work, only in one paragraph.[11]
So, there is no explicit account of Grotenfelt's view
of the core Rickert's philosophy of history, or his idea of the transcendental
realm of values. For the most part, Wertmassstäbe
merely describes and contrasts different views. At the end of the book,
Grotenfelt (1905a, p. 179) finally outlines his own standpoint. This paragraph
is, as I read it, interesting in the face of a passage at the end of his review
of Rickert's Limits. In this passage
Grotenfelt (1905b, p. 66) explains that besides methodological questions of the
historical sciences, Rickert's argumentation for values touch upon more general
philosophical questions. Then he favorably outlines Rickert's Kantian
worldview: For Rickert, a historical paradigm as well as ethics (‘sittliches
Wirken’) and religion are possible only when the world is not conceived as
wholly rational and metaphysical (Rickert 1902, pp. 652, 739); the highest
ethical value is the dutiful (‘pflichtgemäß’) will; the highest duty for human
being is the duty to develop his or her individuality; the assertion of this
kind of a will necessitates though a belief on the objective authority of the
good.
In Wertmassstäbe
Grotenfelt declares (1905a, pp. 179–180) that the fundamental foundation of
our judgements of value is beyond scientific reasoning. It is common to explain
the values on the basis of final ends (‘Endzweck’), but the highest final end
has to be accepted as such, with no justification. The highest final end is a
matter of belief.
Grotenfelt himself sees the development of spiritual
individuality, or personality, as the final end. The principles of historical
appreciations are possible only if the higher spiritual life is regarded as a
value in itself. Or, only the higher spiritual life – not “[…] a mere
methodological study of the historical concept-formation” – can provide the
guiding ideas for a complete presentation of history (Grotenfelt 1905a, pp.
180–1).
Since Grotenfelt asserts that we cannot have a clear
definition of the highest values, he also rejects that the progress of history
could be objectively demonstrated. Grotenfelt does not reject the idea that
e.g. higher values could in some sense realize over the course of history. But
he thinks (Grotenfelt 1905a, pp. 187, 189) that this cannot belong to the
proper definition of historical development. E.g. Kant errs as he insists the
historical development to bring forth higher ethical values in individuals
(Grotenfelt 1905a, pp. 67, 187–8; Kant 1917, pp. 331–33). The realization of
higher, absolute values is always only partial and cannot be expressed in a
conceptual form (Grotenfelt 1905a, p. 189).
These Grotenfelt's statements, condensed into few
words, are vague and superficial. Yet they make it evident that Grotenfelt
conceives values differently from Rickert. The latter does not ascribe
rationality sovereignty over all areas of philosophy, but he definitely
believes that reason has authority over historical knowledge. The former argues
that the judgements of history are always dependent on our general conception
of history. And that conception is dependent on our metaphysical and ethical
commitments, which are not grounded on theoretical paradigm but on practical
beliefs (‘Lebensüberzeugung’). Grotenfelt (1905a, p. 183) withdraws from
Rickert's attempt to rationalize the principles of historical judgements and
stresses that there is always an irrational remnant in our thinking.
As mentioned above, Grotenfelt does not refer to
Rickert by name. Given that he has Rickert in mind as he criticizes ‘mere
methodological studies’, it is fair to point out that in the last main
paragraph of his Limits, comprising
roughly 100 pages, Rickert addresses exactly metaphysical commitments and
paradigms. He does not formulate any systematic standpoint (Rickert 1902, p.
10), but he (1902, p. 14) states that formulating a more complete world-view is
a further task for philosopher. Rickert has thus more to offer (unlike
Grotenfelt possibly implies) than ‘a mere methodological study’.
What is decisive concerning the philosophical
questions at stake in this paper is that the distance between Grotenfelt and
the project of the south-west German neo-Kantianism is obvious. Namely, the
southwesterners argued precisely that the problems of historicism, relativism,
subjectivism and so on do not find their solution in any metaphysical paradigm.[12] On the
contrary, these problems originate from problematic metaphysical commitments,
which are revealed in a critical or, – to use Rickert's term (1902, p. 10) –
logical study.
Furthermore, Grotenfelt's reference to the practical
beliefs reminds Dilthey's theory of world-view (‘Weltanschauung’). It is
essentially an attempt to synthetize knowledge and relate “[…] all experience
of the world to the subjective life-conditions of the individual” (Bambach
1995, p. 26). In my view, Grotenfelt's emphasis on ‘practical beliefs’ has a
general affinity to Dilthey, which explains his separation from Rickert,
because the concept of world-view inspired – among other things – Rickert's
exhaustive criticism of Dilthey.[13]
One has to be careful here however. Like Dilthey also
Rickert operates with the concept of world-view (e.g. Rickert 1910, p. 2).[14] So, it
is not the concept of world-view that separates Dilthey from Rickert but his
definition of it. In short, Rickert argues that the means for acquiring a
world-view are scientific, theoretical and logical (Rickert 1910, pp. 8–10,
33–4). Dilthey (and Grotenfelt) consider scientific tools alone as insufficient
for the task: grasping the world as a whole is always dependent on individual
experience of the world. Dilthey stresses that human intellect is steered by
emotiveness and will (Staiti 2013, p. 797).
There is also another general affinity between
Dilthey's and Grotenfelt's standpoints. Namely, both Dilthey and Grotenfelt
agree that values are of primary importance for the historical sciences
(Bambach 1995, p. 119). They just do not share Rickert's exclusively
transcendental definition of values.
It is fair to point out that as concerns the
philosophy of world-view, the most pivotal of Dilthey's works appeared after
1905 (Scholtz 2015, pp. 456–7), that is after Grotenfelt's main works on the
philosophy of history. Yet, Dilthey was one of the key figures in the
philosophical discussion, which is central to Grotenfelt. Thus, Grotenfelt errs
in ignoring Dilthey. It remains unclear, why Grotenfelt does not refer to
Dilthey (Väyrynen 2015, p. 317), while he constantly refers to other authors.
For Grotenfelt, the question of history became more
than a mere question of the limits between academic disciplines. Rickert
widened – especially during the postwar era – his discussion of the philosophy
of history too (Bambach 1995, pp. 84–5). But he was not doubtful about his
initial principle that the questions concerning historical knowledge were
essentially scientific questions; “[…] every problem of a universal world view
[…] is transformed for us into a problem of logic and of epistemology” (Rickert
1902, p. 13). Rickert did not disagree with Dilthey (or Grotenfelt) on the
demand that philosophy should tackle the world as a whole. But he does adhere
to the primacy of theoretical reason: our “[…] prejudices, personal emotions
and practical goals [should not] co-determine
and even provide justification for our philosophical claims” (Staiti 2013, pp.
800–1).
Conclusion
At the time of its emergence Kant's critical
philosophy did not gain such a strong foothold in Finland as G.W.F. Hegel's
(1770–1831) idealism later, although several important scholars (like F.M. Franzén
(1772–1847) and G.I. Hartman (1776–1809)) studied and advocated Kant's philosophy.[15]
Grotenfelt was the most important Finnish contributor to the neo-Kantian
philosophy of his time, but describing him as a neo-Kantian is somewhat
misleading. Namely, in neo-Kantianism neither in its early nor in its later
phase preserving Kant's philosophy as such was not essential. Moreover, Rickert
and other neo-Kantians were interested in developing Kant's philosophy further.
Grotenfelt, on the contrary, embraced both Kant's metaphysics and his ethics.
Yet he was critical of both Kant's own philosophy of history and the south-west
German neo-Kantian alternative.
As concerns the more specific questions of the history
as a science, Grotenfelt agreed with Rickert on many principles, e.g. the
importance of cultural history and anti-naturalism. But regarding Rickert's
extensive anti-metaphysical reading of Kant and his theory of values,
Grotenfelt clearly distanced himself from his German colleague.
Grotenfelt's standpoint was neo-Kantian but not in the
common sense of the word: he associated himself with neither of the two schools
of neo-Kantianism. I would propose the hypothesis that whereas the neo-Kantians
were primarily interested in epistemology on the basis of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason and Dilthey
departed from Kant's Critique of
Judgement, the Finnish professor got his inspiration from Kant's Critique of Practical Reason. For
Grotenfelt, metaphysics cannot be separated from ethics. He described his
standpoint as ‘ethical idealism’ (Niiniluoto 2000, p.
181).
On the other hand, Grotenfelt often refrains from
proclaiming his own views. His overall view of Rickert is not clearly worded,
and his views of the key questions of the philosophy of history lack, to say
the least, clarity. It is also unfortunate that Rickert never fulfilled his
promise to review Grotenfelt's work of 1903 (Luukanen 1988, p. 121). If
Grotenfelt's criticism influenced the later versions of Rickert's Limits, a question worth considering, is
a matter of another study.
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