

CTK

Con-Textos **K**antianos
International Journal of Philosophy



n° 9 ■ Junio 2019 ■ ISSN 2386-7655



Equipo editorial / Editorial Team

Editor Principal / Main Editor

Roberto R. Aramayo, Instituto de Filosofía, CSIC, España

Secretaria de redacción / Executive Secretary

Nuria Sánchez Madrid, UCM, España

Editores Asociados / Associated Editors

Maria Julia Bertomeu, Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas / Universidad de La Plata, Argentina

Catalina González, Universidad de Los Andes, Colombia

Eduardo Molina, Univ. Alberto Hurtado, Chile

Efraín Lazos, IIF-UNAM, México

Editores de reseñas / Book Review Editors

Pablo Muchnik, Emerson College, Estados Unidos

Margit Ruffing, Universidad de Mainz, Alemania

Ileana Beade, Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Argentina

Marceline Morais, Cégep Saint Laurent, Montréal, Canadá

Antonino Falduto, Univ. de Halle, Alemania

Cinara Nahra, UFRN, Brasil

Editora de noticias / Newsletter Editor

Ana-Carolina Gutiérrez-Xivillé, Philipps-Universität Marburg / Universidad de Barcelona, España

Consejo Editorial / Editorial Board

Juan Arana, Universidad de Sevilla, España

Rodolfo Arango, Universidad de los Andes, Colombia

Sorin Baiasu, Universidad de Keele, Reino Unido

Aylton Barbieri Durão, UFSC, Brasil

Ileana Beade, Universidad Nacional del Rosario, Argentina

Vadim Chaly, Univ. Federal Báltica I. Kant, Federación de Rusia

Angelo Cicatello, Universidad de Palermo, Italia

Alix A. Cohen, Universidad de Edimburgo, Reino Unido

Silvia Del Luján Di Sanza, Universidad de San Martín, Argentina

Francesca Fantasia, Univ. de Palermo/Univ. de Halle, Italia

Luca Fonnesu, Universidad de Pavía, Italia
Roe Fremstedal, University of Tromsø – The Arctic University of Norway, Noruega
Jesús González Fisac, Universidad de Cádiz, España
Caroline Guibet-Lafaye, CNRS, Francia
Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar, IFS-CSIC, España
Ana-Carolina Gutiérrez-Xivillé, España
Claudia Jáuregui, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Mai Lequan, Universidad de Lyon III, Francia
Reidar Maliks, Universitetet i Oslo, Noruega
Macarena Marey, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Pablo Muchnik, Emerson College, Estados Unidos
Faustino Oncina, Universidad de Valencia, España
Pablo Oyarzún, Universidad de Chile, Chile
Ricardo Parellada, UCM, España
Alice Pinheiro Walla, Trinity College Dublin, Irlanda
Hernán Pringe, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Faviola Rivera, IIF-UNAM, México
Concha Roldán, IFS-CSIC, España
Rogelio Rovira, UCM, España
Manuel Sánchez Rodríguez, Universidad de Granada, España
Konstantinos Sargentis, University of Crete, Grecia
Thomas Sturm, Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona, España
Pedro Jesús Teruel, Universidad de Valencia, España
Marcos Thisted, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
Gabriele Tomasi, Università degli Studi di Padova, Italia
Salví Turró, Universidad de Barcelona, España
Milla Vaha, Univ. of Turku, Finlandia
Astrid Wagner, TU-Berlín, Alemania
Sandra Zakutna, Univ. de Presov, Eslovaquia

Consejo Asesor / Advisory Board

Lubomir Bélas, Univ. de Presov, Eslovaquia
Juan Adolfo Bonaccini, Universidad Federal de Pernambuco, Brasil †
Reinhard Brandt, Universidad de Marburgo, Alemania
Mario Caimi, Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina
María José Callejo, UCM, España
Monique Castillo, Universidad de París XII-Créteil, Francia
Jesús Conill, Universidad de Valencia, España
Adela Cortina, Universidad de Valencia, España
Robinson dos Santos, Universidad Federal de Pelotas, Brasil
Bernd Dörflinger, Universidad de Trier, Alemania
Vicente Durán, Pontificia Universidad Javeriana de Bogotá, Colombia
Mariannina Failla, Univ. de Roma Tre, Italia
Jean Ferrari, Universidad de Bourgogne, Francia
Miguel Giusti, PUPC, Perú
Wilson Herrera, Universidad del Rosario, Colombia

Luís Eduardo Hoyos, Universidad Nacional, Colombia
Heiner Klemme, Universidad de Mainz, Alemania
Andrey Krouglov, Univ. Federal Báltica I. Kant, Federación de Rusia
Claudio La Rocca, Universidad de Genova, Italia
Salvador Mas, UNED, España
Javier Muguerza, UNED, España
Lisímaco Parra, Universidad Nacional, Colombia
Antonio Pérez Quintana, Universidad de La Laguna, España
Carlos Pereda, UNAM, México
Alessandro Pinzani, UFSC, Brasil
Pedro Ribas, UAM, España
Jacinto Rivera de Rosales, UNED, España
Begoña Román, Universidad de Barcelona, España
Margit Ruffing, Universidad de Mainz, Alemania
Sergio Sevilla, Universidad de Valencia, España
Pedro Stepanenko, IIF, UNAM, México
Ricardo Terra, USP, Brasil
Alberto Vanzo, University of Warwick, Reino Unido
María Jesús Vázquez Lobeiras, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, España
José Luís Villacañas, UCM, España



SUMARIO / TABLE OF CONTENTS

[ES / EN] «Equipo editor» / «Editorial Team»
pp. i-iii

[ES / EN] «Sumario» / «Table of contents»
pp. 1-4

[ES] «Editorial de *CTK 9*», *Roberto R. Aramayo* (Instituto de Filosofía / CSIC, España)
p. 5

[EN] «*CTK 9* Editorial Note», *Roberto R. Aramayo* (Institute of Philosophy / CSIC, Spain)
p. 6

ARTÍCULOS / ARTICLES

[FR] «La déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolégomènes* et le problème de l'idéalisme»,
Paulo R. Licht dos Santos (Universidade Federal de São Carlos/CNPq, Brésil)
pp. 7-22

[EN] «The Understanding in *Transition*: Fascicles X, XI and VII of *Opus postumum*»,
Terrence Thomson (CRMEP, Kingston University, UK)
pp. 23-48

[ES] «Fuerzas, facultades y formas a priori en Kant», *Eugenio Moya* (Universidad de Murcia, España)
pp. 49-71

[EN] «Kant's anthropological study of memory», *Héctor Luis Pacheco Acosta* (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, España)
pp. 72-96

[IT] «La necessità del gusto e il *sensus communis* kantiano. A partire da alcune recenti letture», *Federico Rampinini* (Università degli Studi di Roma "Tor Vergata", Italia)
pp. 97-122

[EN] «Freedom and Bonds in Kant», *Almudena Rivadulla Durán* (Universidad de Navarra, Spain)
pp. 123-136

[EN] «Kant's Analogy between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature», *Manja Kisner* (Ludwig Maximilian University, Germany)
pp. 137-153

[EN] «The Reddish, Iron-Rust Color of the Native Americans. Immanuel Kant's Racism in Context», *Joris van Gorkom* (Independent Researcher, Germany)
pp. 154-177

[EN] «Philosophical Grounding For the Moral Law: In Defense of Kant's *Factum der Vernunft* (Fact of Reason)», *Daniel Paul Dal Monte* (Temple University, USA)
pp. 178-195

[ES] «Lo incondicionado e irrestricto en Kant o del valor de una buena voluntad», *Yohan Molina* (Universidad Central de Venezuela, Venezuela)
pp. 196-219

[EN] « Humanity as a Duty to Oneself», *Sunday Adeniyi Fasoro* (Technical University of Berlin, Germany)
pp. 220-237

[ES] «Perdón, impunidad y el difícil concierto de deberes», *Franklin Ibáñez* (Universidad del Pacífico, Perú)
pp. 238-251

[ES] «Conocimiento y donación entre Rickert y Heidegger», *Stefano Cazzanelli* (Universidad Francisco de Vitoria, España)
pp. 252-273

[EN] «The Kantian Background to Cassirer's Political Commitment and Its Parallelisms with Kant's Republicanism and Support of the French Revolution», *Roberto R. Aramayo* (Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC, Spain)
pp. 274-292

[EN] «Animality and Rationality (On how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience could accommodate research on emotion)», *Sofia Miguens* (University of Porto, Portugal)

pp. 293-308

[IT] «Vita come scopo, scopo della vita: riflessioni sui §§ 79-84 della *Critica del Giudizio*», Luigi Imperato (Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Italia)

pp. 309-331

NOTAS Y DISCUSIONES

«Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto» /

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

«Kant, (non)-Conceptualism and Judgments of Taste»

[ES] «Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto. Introducción a una discusión», Matías Oroño (Univ. Buenos Aires, Argentina)

pp. 332-333

[ES] «Comentario al artículo “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto” de Matías Oroño», Silvia del Luján di Sanza (Univ. San Martín, Argentina)

pp. 334-343

[ES] «La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una objeción de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemann», Pedro Stepanenko (UNAM, México)

pp. 344-350

[ES] «Kant y el no conceptualismo», Luciana Martínez (Univ. de Buenos Aires/CONICET, Argentina)

pp. 351-362

[ES] «El conceptualismo de Kant: una lectura del juicio de gusto. Respuesta a mis críticos», Matías Oroño (Univ. Buenos Aires, Argentina)

pp. 363-375

CRÍTICA DE LIBROS / BOOK REVIEWS

[EN] «Epistemic and Ontological Value of the Ideas and Principles of Reason», Lara Scaglia (Univ. Autònoma de Barcelona, Spain). Review of: Meer, R., *Der transzendente Grundsatz der Vernunft. Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2018.

pp. 376-378

[ES] «¿Derivación lógica o prueba jurídica? Sobre el sentido kantiano de la Deducción Trascendental de las categorías», Alberto López López (UCM, España). Reseña de:

Schulting, D.: *Kant's deduction from apperception. An essay on the trascendental deduction of the categories*, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2019.

pp. 379-383

[ES] «¿Qué espacio deja, si es que deja alguno, la filosofía de Kant a la teología?», *Guillermo López Morlanes* (UCM, España). Reseña de: Chris L. Firestone, Nathan A. Jacobs, James H. Joiner (eds.), *Kant and the Question of Theology*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

pp. 384-388

[ES] «Interés por el desinterés en la *Crítica del juicio estético*», *Guillermo López Tirado* (UCM, España). Reseña de: Fan, D., *Die Problematik der Interessellosigkeit bei Kant. Eine Studie zur »Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft«*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2018

pp. 389-393

[ES] «Las *Lecciones de Metafísica* como clave de interpretación de la evolución del pensamiento kantiano», *Alba Jiménez Rodríguez / Alberto Morán Roa* (UCM, España). Reseña de: Courtney D. Fugate (ed.), *Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge Critical Guides, Cambridge University Press, 2018.

pp. 394-401

[ES] «Legalidad y síntesis: una apropiación sistemática de la filosofía kantiana desde la Teoría de la Normatividad», *José Ramón Suárez Villalba* (UCM, España). Reseña de: K. Pollok, *Kant's Theory of Normativity. Exploring the Space of Reason*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

pp. 402-406

Listado de evaluadores /Reviewers' List

p. 407

Normas editoriales para autores / Editorial Guidelines for Authors

pp. 408-411



Editorial CTK 9

Con el próximo número *Con-Textos Kantianos* cumplirá cinco años, dado que su número cero vio la luz en Noviembre de 2014. Esperamos recuperar para entonces algunas secciones como las de Textos Kantianos, Entrevistas y Conversaciones, que no pueden salir en todos los números. Sin embargo *CTK 9* presenta un total de dieciséis artículos (uno en francés, dos en italiano, cuatro en español y nueve en inglés). En el apartado de Discusiones se recogen cinco trabajos en español sobre “Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto”. El número se cierra con seis reseñas.

Las diversas iniciativas vinculadas a este proyecto editorial siguen desplegándose a buen ritmo, como demuestran los anuales *Encuentros internacionales CTK*, cuya cuarta edición tendrá lugar muy pronto en México –en el marco del V. Congreso Iberoamericano de Filosofía-, gracias a los buenos oficios de Efraín Lazos y Julia Muñoz, tras los celebrados con anterioridad en Bogotá (Colombia), Madrid (España) y Santiago de Chile, organizados respectivamente por Catalina González en la Universidad de Los Andes, Roberto R. Aramayo y Nuria Sánchez Madrid en el Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC, Pablo Oyarzun, Luis Eduardo Molina y Luis Placencia en la Universidad de Chile. O como testimonia igualmente la creación de la RIKEPS (<https://kantrikeps.es>), la Red Iberoamericana *Kant, Ética, Política y Sociedad* que coordina Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Dpto. Filosofía y Sociedad, UCM) y que celebrará su primer congreso del 26 al 28 de noviembre del presente año en la Facultad de Filosofía de la UCM.

Por otra parte, la *Biblioteca Digital de Estudios Kantianos CTK E-Books* continúa incrementando sus títulos y es muy posible que su catálogo acoja muy pronto una cuarta serie llamada *Aetas Kantiana*, que se sume a las tres ya existentes *Dialectica Kantiana*, *Hermenutica Kantiana* y *Translatio Kantiana*: <https://ctkebooks.net>

Roberto R. Aramayo
Editor principal de *CTK*
Junio 2019



CTK 9 Editorial Note

The journal CTK will complete soon five years of life, since the issue 0 was released in November 2014. We aim to retrieve for that ephemerid sections as *Kant's Texts*, *Interviews* and *Conversations*, which it is difficult to produce for every issue of this periodical. CTK 9 offers sixteen articles (one in French, two in Italian, four in Spanish and nine in English). The section *Notes and Discussions* contains five papers in Spanish on the subject "Kant, non-Conceptualism and the Judgments of Taste". The issue closes with six reviews.

The many initiatives stemming from this publishing project go further with good rhythm, as show the *CTK International Meetings*, whose fourth edition will be held very soon in Mexico hosted by Efraín Lazos and Julia Muñoz, within the framework of the *Fifth Iberoamerican Philosophy Congress*. The previous *CTK International Meetings* were held in Bogota (Columbia), Madrid (Spain) and Santiago de Chile (Chile), respectively organized by Catalina González at Los Andes University, Roberto R. Aramayo and Nuria Sánchez Madrid at the Institut of Philosophy of CSIC, Pablo Oyarzun, Luis Eduardo Molina and Luis Placencia at University of Chile. Another key endeavour tied to CTK is the launch of RIKEPS (<https://kantrikeps.es>), the *Iberoamerican Network "Kant: Ethics, Politics and Society"*, coordinated by Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Dpt. Philosophy and Society, UCM), whose First Congress will be held the next 26th-28th November 2019 at the Faculty of Philosophy of the University Complutense of Madrid.

Moreover, the *Digital Library of Kantian Studies (CTK E-Books)*, keeps enlarging the volumes of its three series. Soon will be added a new series, called *Aetas Kantiana*, which is expected to enrich the three already available: *Dialectica Kantiana*, *Hermeneutica Kantiana* y *Translatio Kantiana*: <https://ctkebooks.net>.

Roberto R. Aramayo
Editor-in-Chief
June 2019



La déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolégomènes* et le problème de l'idéalisme

The Transcendental Deduction in the Prolegomena and the Problem of Idealism

PAULO R. LICHT DOS SANTOS*

Universidade Federal de São Carlos - CNPq – Brésil

Résumé

Je me propose d'examiner les paragraphes 18 et 19 de la deuxième partie des *Prolégomènes*. Bien que ces deux paragraphes ne constituent pas l'intégralité de la déduction transcendantale des *Prolégomènes*, ils ont une fonction essentielle dans la mesure où ils exposent l'argument entier *in nuce*. Ces deux sections établissent de façon claire que la doctrine de l'idéalisme critique, présentée dans la première partie des *Prolégomènes* comme un idéalisme qui ne supprime pas « l'existence de la chose qui apparaît », joue un rôle indispensable dans la déduction transcendantale, qui est présentée dans la deuxième partie à partir de la distinction entre jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience.

Mots clés

Déduction transcendantale, jugement de perception, jugement d'expérience, idéalisme transcendantal, réalisme.

Abstract

I examine sections 18 and 19 of the second part of Kant's *Prolegomena*. Although these two sections do not constitute the entire Transcendental Deduction in this work, they are strategic to understand it, offering the core of the whole argument. In particular, they make it clear that the

* Paulo R. Licht dos Santos – Professeur de l'Universidade Federal de São Carlos – Brésil et chercheur du CNPq. E-mail de contact : paulolicht2@gmail.com Je remercie Carlos Alberto Ribeiro de Moura, qui a lu la première version de ce texte, ainsi que François Calori, Juliette Cors, Bento Prado Neto et Luc Foisneau, pour la révision de sa version en français, présentée d'une manière plus concise lors de la Journée annuelle du Séminaire Kant de 2016 à l'Université de Nantes et lors de l'Encontro Kant e a História da Filosofia à l'Universidade Federal de São Carlos en 2017. Je remercie aussi CAPES et CNPq pour le soutien financier à la recherche qui l'a rendu possible.

doctrine of critical idealism, presented in the first part of the *Prolegomena* as an idealism that does not nullify "the existence of the thing that appears", plays a significant role within the transcendental deduction, discussed in the second part of this work from the distinction between judgment of perception and judgment of experience.

Key words

Transcendental deduction, judgment of perception, judgment of experience, transcendental idealism, realism.

Introduction : la déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolegomènes* et le problème de l'idéalisme critique

Kant déclare, dans les *Prolegomènes*, qu'il est pleinement satisfait de la *Critique de la raison pure* « en ce qui concerne le contenu, l'ordre, la méthode et le soin accordés à chaque proposition [...] » (Prol, AA 04 : 381). Kant avoue, cependant, son insatisfaction à l'égard de l'exposé de la *Critique* : « [...] en quelques sections de la théorie des éléments, par exemple dans la déduction des concepts de l'entendement ou dans la section qui traite des paralogismes de la raison pure, mon exposé ne me satisfait pas tout à fait parce qu'une certaine prolixité y fait tort à la distinction » (Prol, AA 04 : 381).¹ Pour contourner le problème de l'exposé à la fois de la déduction transcendantale et des paralogismes, Kant recommande au lecteur de « leur substituer pour en faire la base de l'examen ce que les présents *Prolegomènes* disent à propos de ces sections » (Prol, AA 04 : 381). Cependant, malgré cette recommandation, Kant n'indique pas où le lecteur pourrait la trouver dans les *Prolegomènes*. En fait, il n'y a ni paragraphe dont le titre pourrait nous l'indiquer ni indication exacte de l'endroit où elle se situe.² En général, il est admis que la déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolegomènes* se situe dans la deuxième partie du problème capital de la philosophie transcendantale, intitulée : « Comment la science pure de la nature est-elle possible ? ». ³ Toutefois, il n'y a pas de consensus parmi les interprètes de Kant sur son emplacement exact.⁴ On peut faire valoir pourtant qu'elle se situe aux paragraphes §18 à 20 de la deuxième partie des *Prolegomènes*.⁵ Je me propose d'examiner seulement deux

¹ J'utilise ici la traduction de Guillermit des *Prolegomènes*, sauf à deux endroits que j'indique aux notes.

² Cf. "[...] le texte des *Prolegomènes* marque une suite continue, dont aucun appareil externe ne nous montre les articulations [...]" (de Vleeschauwer, 1976, II, p. 442).

³ Cf. Vleeschauwer, 1976, II, pp. 443 -471; Guyer, 1987, 99-102; Allison, 2015, pp. 289-306;

⁴ Selon Vleeschauwer, « les §§ 18 à 22 renferment la nouvelle déduction transcendantale [...] » (1976, II, p. 454). Pour lui, cependant, « le § 20 contient la déduction principielle ou la réponse à la question : Comment le jugement d'expérience est-il objectivement valable ? » (Vleeschauwer, 1976, II, 454). Guyer n'est pas explicitement concerné par cette question. Il affirme cependant que la prémisse la plus fondamentale de la déduction transcendantale des *Prolegomènes* se trouverait dans le § 22. Les § 18 et § 19, à leur tour, chercheraient à exploiter cette prémisse dans le contexte spécifique de la distinction entre jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience. Selon ces indications, donc, la déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolegomènes* serait pour Guyer aux § 18, § 19 et § 22 (Guyer 1987, pp. 99-100). Allison considère, toutefois, que « §18-§20 constitute a coherent line of argument, whereas § 21 corresponds to the Metaphysical Deduction in the *Critique* [...] ». (Allison 2015, p. 292, n. 11).

⁵ Je suis donc les indications d'Allison (cf. ci-dessus, note 4).

paragrapes, les 18 et 19. Bien que ces deux paragraphes ne constituent pas l'intégralité de la déduction transcendantale, ils permettent d'en comprendre les enjeux, en offrant au lecteur l'argument entier *in nuce*. Ces deux paragraphes posent de façon claire la question de savoir si la doctrine de l'idéalisme critique, présentée dans la première partie des *Prolégomènes*, joue un rôle significatif au sein de la déduction transcendantale. Ce problème, loin d'être secondaire, est suscité à la fois (1) par la stratégie argumentative générale des *Prolégomènes* et (2) par la controverse de Kant contre Garve qui occupe une partie significative de cet ouvrage.⁶ Il est donc nécessaire d'examiner ces deux raisons avant même d'analyser la déduction transcendantale proposée par les *Prolégomènes*.

1. La stratégie argumentative des *Prolégomènes* : la compréhension synoptique

Dans les *Prolégomènes*, Kant reconnaît que l'étendue et la complexité de la *Critique de la raison pure* entraînent une « certaine obscurité », ce qui « empêche de bien embrasser d'un coup d'œil [übersehen] les points principaux » de la recherche (Prol, AA 04:261).⁷ La tâche principale des *Prolégomènes* est donc de présenter de manière plus claire et concise non seulement le plan général de la *Critique*, mais aussi l'articulation de ses parties selon ce plan : « (...) embrasser l'ensemble de cette science [*das Ganze zu übersehen*], de vérifier un à un les points principaux et d'améliorer certains détails d'exposition » (Prol, AA 04:263).⁸ Pour effectuer cette tâche, Kant change de méthode de recherche. Au lieu de la méthode progressive ou synthétique de la première *Critique*, Kant utilise la méthode régressive ou analytique. La méthode analytique « part de ce que l'on cherche comme s'il était donné et que l'on remonte aux conditions sous lesquelles seules, il est possible » (Prol, AA 04 :276). Cette méthode aurait l'avantage d'une sorte de compréhension globale ou synoptique, puisqu'elle nous présente d'un seul coup « un ensemble de connaissances qui naissent toutes des mêmes sources » (Prol, AA 04 :275). Ainsi, aussi bien la concision de l'exposé des *Prolégomènes* que la compréhension synoptique (« *das Ganze zu übersehen* ») promise par la méthode analytique exigent que le lecteur essaie de saisir les parties principales de la doctrine en les rapportant à son plan général. Il est donc raisonnable de penser que cette même exigence générale vaut également pour la compréhension de la déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolégomènes*. Cela signifie qu'il faut comprendre non seulement son économie interne, mais aussi son rapport à l'analyse qui la précède, à savoir l'analyse contenue dans la première partie du

⁶ Ces deux points marquent, respectivement, les deux côtés qui caractérisent les *Prolégomènes*, comme l'affirme De Vleeschauer : « Cette œuvre manifeste à la fois un caractère explicatif et un caractère défensif ou polémisant » (Vleeschauer 1976, p. 420). Une observation similaire sur les deux différentes motivations des *Prolégomènes* est faite par Gary Hatfield dans l'introduction de sa traduction des *Prolégomènes* : « The new work was motivated both by a desire to redress the disappointing reception of the *Critique* by publishing a more approachable work, and by a desire to improve the exposition of crucial points » (Kant, E. 2009, xix-xxiii). Cf. aussi Allison (2015, p. 288).

⁷ Dans ce passage de Kant, j'utilise la traduction de Brunschvicg, qui nous semble plus appropriée pour tenir compte de l'intention synoptique (*übersehen*) des *Prolégomènes*.

⁸. J'utilise ici aussi la traduction de Brunschvicg pour la même raison indiquée dans la note précédente.

problème capital de la philosophie transcendantale, intitulée : « comment la mathématique pure est-elle possible ? ». Cette partie, qui correspond, selon Kant, à l'Esthétique Transcendantale de la première *Critique*⁹, présente, en deux remarques du paragraphe 13, ce qu'est l'idéalisme critique et en quoi il se distingue de toutes les formes traditionnelles d'idéalisme¹⁰. Si tel est le cas, il faut au moins soulever la question de savoir si, dans les *Prolégomènes*, la déduction transcendantale s'harmonise avec l'idéalisme critique et présuppose la notion d'apparition y énoncée comme l'apparition d'un objet (*Gegenstand*) « qui nous est inconnu, mais qui pour autant n'en est pas moins réel » (Prol, AA 04 :289).¹¹

2. La polémique de Kant contre Garve : la sensibilité et l'entendement dans l'idéalisme formel

La stratégie argumentative synoptique des *Prolégomènes* semble trouver, cependant, une limite dans leur aspect « défensif ou polémisant ». ¹² Dans deux Remarques (II et III) à la fin de la première partie des *Prolégomènes*, Kant essaie de répondre à une objection de Garve, publiée en 1782 anonymement dans une recension de la première *Critique*. Selon Garve, la *Critique* serait un « système de l'idéalisme supérieur » qui, tel celui de Berkeley, « embrasse de la même manière l'esprit et la matière, qui transforme le monde et nous-mêmes en représentations et fait ainsi surgir tous les objets des phénomènes (...) » .¹³ Contre Garve, Kant fait observer, de façon assez acerbe, que l'idéalisme critique ne conteste pas « l'existence réelle des choses extérieures » (Prol, AA 04: 289).¹⁴ On doit ici comprendre le terme « extérieur » dans le sens transcendantal qu'il a dans le contexte du quatrième Paralogisme de la première édition de la *Critique de la raison pure* où Kant oppose l'idéalisme transcendantal à l'idéalisme empirique.¹⁵ Dans ce sens, l'extérieur ne signifie pas quelque chose spatialement en dehors de nous, mais ce qui est indépendant des conditions *a priori* de l'expérience. En ce sens, l'existence réelle de la chose est extérieure au sujet seulement dans la mesure où elle n'est produite ni par les conditions formelles de la sensibilité ni par les conditions formelles de la pensée.¹⁶ Par cela, l'apparition (*Erscheinung*) en ce qui concerne l'existence dépend de l'existence de la

⁹ Cf. Prol, AA 04:318.

¹⁰ Prol, AA 04: 288- 294.

¹¹ Il convient de noter que les interprétations plus récentes de la déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolégomènes* ne traitent pas de cette question. Cf. Allison (2015, pp. 289-306) ; Longuenesse (2000, pp. 167-195) et Pollok (2012).

¹² Expressions utilisées par Vleeschauwer (1976, p. 420). Cf. ci-dessus, note 6.

¹³ Ferrari (1964, p. 14).

¹⁴ En Allemand: « wirklichen Existenz äußerer Dinge ».

¹⁵ Cf. Klotz (2013, p. 4).

¹⁶ Kant définit son idéalisme comme un idéalisme formel ou critique dans l'appendice des *Prolégomènes* (Prol, AA 04 : 318)

chose dont elle est la manifestation selon les conditions formelles de sa présentation.¹⁷ Par conséquent, l'idéalisme kantien est seulement un idéalisme par rapport à la forme de la présentation de la chose et non par rapport à l'existence de la chose même immédiatement présentée comme apparition :

[...] l'existence de la chose qui apparaît [*die Existenz des Dinges, was erscheint*] ne se trouve de ce fait nullement supprimée, comme c'est le cas dans le véritable idéalisme ; ce qu'on montre seulement c'est que les sens ne nous permettent pas du tout de la connaître telle qu'elle est en elle-même (Prol, AA 04 : 289).

Si'il en est ainsi, l'idéalisme formel a pour contrepartie nécessaire le réalisme quant à l'existence de la chose présentée : l'apparition (en l'occurrence, un corps) est « l'apparition de cet objet qui nous est inconnu, mais qui n'en est pas moins réel » (Prol, AA 04 : 289).

Toutefois, l'argument de Kant ne serait-il pas seulement un argument *ad hominem* et donc entièrement circonstanciel ? Ce qui renforce cette impression est le fait que la réponse de Kant est présentée dans deux remarques séparées de l'exposé qui les précède. En ce sens, la stratégie argumentative synoptique des *Prolégomènes*, qui exige que chaque partie de l'exposé soit comprise en vue de l'ensemble, ne s'appliquerait pas à la doctrine dans son ensemble, mais uniquement à l'aspect considéré comme purement explicatif des *Prolégomènes*. Si tel est le cas, il semble en principe possible d'isoler l'idéalisme kantien du reste de la doctrine critique, notamment de la déduction transcendantale.

Il n'y a pas de doute qu'on peut expliquer les termes acerbes de Kant par son irritation contre Garve. Mais d'autre part, la thèse que l'apparition est « l'apparition de cet objet qui nous est inconnu, mais qui n'en est pas moins réel » peut être considérée comme le vrai corollaire de l'analyse des conditions *a priori* ou formelles de l'intuition sensible et, par conséquent, d'un idéalisme qui assigne l'idéalité seulement à la forme de la (re)présentation. Cela signifie que le côté polémique de la première partie des *Prolégomènes* n'est pas un obstacle à leur stratégie argumentation synoptique. Il est donc raisonnable de s'attendre à

¹⁷ Par rapport à la représentation intuitive, on peut comprendre le terme *Vorstellung* comme « présentation », comme le suggère un passage de la *Dissertation* de 1770 : « Cum itaque, quodcunque in cognitione est sensitivi, pendeat a speciali indole subiecti, quatenus a praesentia obiectorum huius vel alius modificationis capax est [...] » (MSI, AA 02 : 392). Déjà en 1770, la présence de la chose présentée dans les sens est considérée par Kant comme un antidote à l'idéalisme traditionnel : « Primo enim, quatenus sensuales sunt conceptus s. apprehensiones, ceu causata testantur de praesentia obiecti, quod contra idealismum » (MSI, AA 02 : 397). Les *Prolégomènes* reviennent presque littéralement à la définition de l'intuition introduite par la *Dissertation de 1770* : « L'intuition, c'est une représentation de nature telle qu'elle dépende immédiatement de la présence de l'objet » (Prol, AA 04 : 281). Ainsi, le terme *Vor-stellung* en tant que *praesentia* indique la présence immédiate sous deux sens distincts, mais corrélés : (1) *praesentia* comme présentation directe de la chose comme objet au sujet par l'intuition sensible, sans aucun intermédiaire entre l'un et l'autre ; (2) cette même présence directe sans aucune médiation d'un acte de synthèse (qu'il s'agisse de la synthèse intellectuelle ou de la synthèse de l'imagination). Sur le premier point, dans le contexte de Déduction-A de la *Critique*, voir (Licht dos Santos, 2009) ; sur le deuxième point, dans le contexte de Déduction-B de la *Critique*, voir (Licht dos Santos, 2012). D'autres interprètes de Kant ont déjà attiré l'attention sur le rôle de présentation d'objets de la représentation (*Vorstellung*) sensible. Voir Allais (2009, pp. 389-390) et Fonseca (2013, pp. 80-99.). Sur l'anti-idéalisme dans le contexte de la Déduction B de la *Critique de la raison pure*, voir Caimi (2002, p. 70). Cependant, discuter ces interprétations dépasse le but de cet article.

ce que la notion de phénomène et l'idéalisme formel qui en découle soient incorporés dans la déduction transcendantale présentée dans la deuxième partie des *Prolégomènes*.

Il est nécessaire de faire un pas de plus en ce qui concerne le côté polémique des *Prolégomènes*. Celui-là présente un aspect qui, bien que rarement souligné par la littérature secondaire, renforce la nécessité de prendre en compte le rapport de la déduction transcendantale à l'idéalisme critique. En fait, l'objection de Garve ne se limite pas au rôle de la sensibilité dans la fondation d'un idéalisme qui serait semblable à celui de Berkeley, mais s'étend également à la fonction qui conviendrait à l'entendement dans le cadre de cette "histoire". En effet, après avoir assimilé l'Esthétique transcendantale à l'idéalisme de Berkeley, Garve soutient que, pour la *Critique*, les objets sont entièrement produits par l'entendement : « l'entendement fait des objets ». Il convient de mentionner le passage, aussi long soit-il :

Des phénomènes sensibles qui se distinguent des autres représentations par leur seul conditionnement subjectif (c'est-à-dire par leur lien avec l'espace et le temps), l'entendement fait des objets. Il les fait, car c'est lui en premier lieu qui lie plusieurs petites modifications de l'âme, différentes et successives, en sensations entières et totales ; c'est lui qui à nouveau lie entre elles ces totalités dans le temps de telle sorte qu'elles se suivent les unes les autres comme cause et effet ; par là chacune reçoit sa place déterminée dans le temps infini et, toutes ensemble, elles reçoivent l'allure et la consistance des choses réelles. (...) Ces lois de l'entendement sont plus anciennes que les phénomènes auxquels elles sont appliquées : il existe donc des concepts *a priori* de l'entendement.¹⁸

Il ne fait aucun doute que la recension Garve-Feder présente une explication trop hâtive de l'Analytique Transcendantale de la *Critique*. Cependant, elle découle directement de l'incompréhension de Garve sur l'Esthétique Transcendantale. En fait, il est naturel que, n'ayant pas compris le rôle de l'intuition sensible de présenter une chose en tant qu'objet, Garve finisse par surestimer la fonction objectifiante de la pensée : « l'entendement fait des objets ». Si la sensibilité ne peut offrir qu'une diversité d'impressions sensibles, il ne peut y avoir d'objet que par un acte de l'entendement : c'est par lui qu'elles reçoivent l'allure et la consistance des choses réelles ». En ces termes, il n'est pas difficile de voir que Garve réduit la doctrine de l'objectivité kantienne à une doctrine de la cohérence interne entre les représentations. La lecture de l'Esthétique par Garve et celle de l'Analytique sont donc les deux faces d'une même pièce. D'où l'objection générale de Garve à Kant, objection selon laquelle l'idéalisme kantien est, après tout, superflu :

Et si, comme veut nous l'imposer l'idéaliste, on admet le cas extrême où tout ce que nous avons le désir et le pouvoir de connaître et de nommer n'est que représentation et loi de la pensée (...); si les représentations, modifiées et ordonnées d'après des lois certaines, sont précisément ce que nous appelons objets et monde : à quoi bon le combat contre le langage communément admis ? À quoi bon la distinction idéaliste et d'où vient-elle ?¹⁹

¹⁸ Ferrari (1964, p. 15).

¹⁹ Ferrari (1964, p. 19).

Alors, si l'objection de Garve ne se limite pas à l'Esthétique transcendantale, il est raisonnable de s'attendre à ce qu'une réponse complète de Kant doive dissiper également les malentendus de Garve à propos de l'Analytique. En particulier, on peut s'attendre à ce que les *Prolégomènes* réfutent la thèse de Garve selon laquelle, dans la *Critique*, l'objet est entièrement réduit à une connexion régulière de représentations immanentes à la pensée, sans aucune référence à l'existence de la chose elle-même (« tout ce que nous avons le désir et le pouvoir de connaître et de nommer n'est que représentation et loi de la pensée »).²⁰

Toutes ces observations convergent vers un seul point. La stratégie générale des *Prolégomènes*, en insistant sur la compréhension synoptique, et le double aspect de la polémique de Kant contre Garve suggèrent, du moins en principe, qu'il devrait y avoir un lien fort entre la déduction transcendantale, présentée dans la deuxième partie des *Prolégomènes*, et l'idéalisme formel, établi dans leur première partie, comme un réalisme direct sur l'existence de la chose elle-même présentée comme apparition. Ces observations ne donnent bien sûr aucune assurance qu'il y ait vraiment un tel lien, mais elles donnent des paramètres clairs pour l'analyse des §18 et §19 de la déduction transcendantale des *Prolégomènes*.

3. La déduction transcendantale : la distinction entre jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience

Tout l'argument de la déduction transcendantale tourne autour de la distinction entre deux types de jugement empirique : jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience. Les deux sortes de jugement sont empiriques, puisqu'ils ont « leur fondement dans la perception immédiate des sens » (Prol, AA 04 : 298). Cependant, ils ont des valeurs cognitives différentes. Les jugements de perception n'ont qu'une validité subjective, à savoir qu'ils ne valent pour nous que dans certaines conditions empiriques spécifiques. Les jugements d'expérience, en revanche, ont une validité objective, pour autant que « nous voulons qu'ils soient également valables pour nous toujours et de même pour chacun » (Prol, AA 04 : 298). Étant donné cette caractérisation, nous pouvons nous demander, selon la méthode régressive caractéristique des *Prolégomènes*, comment le jugement d'expérience est possible. La réponse est que le jugement d'expérience est possible *en raison* de sa relation avec l'objet (« il s'accorde à un objet²¹ »). La même question se pose à nouveau : comment la relation de jugement avec l'objet est-elle possible ? La réponse de Kant, au moins celle que l'argument devra prouver, c'est qu'on doit ajouter au jugement de perception des concepts purs « sous lesquels chaque perception

²⁰ C'est d'ailleurs en ces termes que Kant réduit toute sorte d'idéalisme traditionnel : « L'idéalisme consiste à soutenir qu'il n'y a pas d'autres êtres que les êtres pensants : les autres choses, que nous croyons percevoir dans l'intuition ne seraient que des représentations dans les êtres pensants ; à ces représentations ne correspondrait aucun objet ayant une existence à l'extérieur de ces représentations. » (Prol, AA 04 : 288.)

²¹ Prol, AA 04 : 298.

peut tout d'abord être subsumée et grâce auxquels elle peut ensuite être transformée en expérience » (Prol, AA 04 : 298). Autrement dit, l'argument devra prouver la validité objective des concepts purs comme condition de l'accord du jugement d'expérience avec l'objet. Remarquons que cette preuve de la validité objective est de nature indirecte, puisqu'elle se déroule en deux étapes, qui correspondent à deux paragraphes : le §18 établit, d'abord, la réciprocité entre la validité objective (*objektive Gültigkeit*) et la validité universelle nécessaire (*Allgemeingültigkeit*), considérées comme deux propriétés de tout jugement *en général* ; le §19 applique, ensuite, ce principe de réciprocité au contexte spécifique de l'idéalisme critique, afin de prouver la validité objective des concepts purs dans leur relation à des objets des sens dans un jugement d'expérience.

3.1 La première étape : le paragraphe § 18 et le principe de réciprocité (l'objet et la conscience en général)

Kant, dans le § 18, analyse d'abord ce que signifie en général la relation d'un jugement à son objet pour ensuite montrer comment la même analyse s'applique au cas particulier du jugement d'expérience. Kant ne développe pas explicitement dans le texte l'idée que l'analyse du jugement objectif en général sert de point d'appui pour comprendre le jugement d'expérience, mais cette idée affleure dans le mouvement argumentatif :

[...] car lorsqu'un jugement s'accorde à un objet, il faut que tous les jugements sur le même objet s'accordent également entre eux, et la validité objective du jugement d'expérience ne veut rien dire d'autre que sa nécessaire validité universelle. Mais réciproquement aussi, si nous trouvons motif à tenir un jugement pour universellement valable de façon nécessaire (ce qui ne repose jamais sur la perception, mais sur le concept pur d'entendement sous lequel la perception est subsumée), il faut que nous le tenions aussi pour objectif, ce qui veut dire qu'il n'énonce pas simplement une relation de la perception à un sujet, mais une manière d'être de l'objet ; car il n'y aurait pas de raison pour que les jugements des autres s'accordent aux miens s'il n'y avait pas l'unité de l'objet auquel tous se rapportent, auquel ils s'accordent et auquel, de ce fait ils doivent également tous de s'accorder entre eux (Prol, AA 04: 298).

Il faut noter, en premier lieu, que ce passage considère l'objet du jugement en termes généraux. Kant ne prend pas en compte ici le fait de savoir si l'objet avec lequel un jugement doit s'accorder est un objet considéré comme phénomène ou comme chose en soi. Il ne prend pas en compte non plus le fait de savoir si le jugement est un jugement de perception ou d'expérience. Il dit simplement, sans qualifier ni le terme « objet » ni le terme « jugement » : « [...] lorsqu'un jugement s'accorde à un objet, il faut que tous les jugements sur le même objet s'accordent également entre eux ». Il parle ici de l'objet en un sens neutre ou, plutôt, de l'objet d'un jugement considéré en général. Ce qui le prouve c'est que Kant parle ensuite de l'objet comme d'une « unité », sans autre précision, utilisant l'expression « l'unité de l'objet ». Ainsi, cette analyse du jugement en général est importante pour mettre en évidence deux propriétés de *tout* jugement objectivement valable, indépendamment de la nature de l'objet jugé. De ce point de vue, un jugement est

susceptible d'un double type d'accord : soit avec un objet, soit avec d'autres jugements qui se rapportent au même objet. Dans le premier cas, le jugement a une validité objective (*objektive Gültigkeit*) ; dans le second cas, il a une universalité nécessaire (*nothwendige Allgemeingültigkeit*).

Qu'est-ce que l'universalité nécessaire ? À première vue, il semble que si un objet est considéré comme une unité nécessaire de propriétés, divers jugements doivent s'accorder entre eux s'ils représentent différentes propriétés d'un même objet. Dans ce cas, on pourrait dire que « le plat est rond » doit s'accorder avec le jugement : « le plat est blanc », de sorte que l'on pourrait dire que le plat rond est blanc.²² Pourtant, tel n'est pas le cas car cet accord reste encore sur le plan de la « validité objective ». La validité universelle et nécessaire est d'un autre ordre. Elle est l'accord qui doit exister entre les jugements pour chaque sujet indépendamment des circonstances particulières ou contingentes. En ce sens, elle signifie que « les jugements des autres s'accordent aux miens », et vice-versa. De cette façon, l'on peut dire que l'universalité nécessaire d'un jugement exprime ce qu'est la conscience en général ou, même, l'intersubjectivité. Il en résulte que cette universalité et cette nécessité ne doivent pas être confondues avec les deux critères connexes de l'*a priori* présentés dans la première *Critique*.²³ Rappelons que ces deux critères, l'universalité et la nécessité, concernent, dans la *Critique*, la relation *a priori* d'un jugement à son objet et se rapportent ainsi à sa validité objective. D'autre part, l'universalité nécessaire implique, dans les *Prolégomènes*, que l'accord subjectif d'un jugement avec d'autres jugements sur le même objet soit nécessaire.²⁴

Un résultat important de cette analyse du jugement en général est la relation d'interdépendance entre ses deux principaux modes de validité. La validité objective d'un jugement (son accord à un objet) a comme contrepartie sa validité universelle et nécessaire (pour quiconque). Autrement dit, si mon jugement s'accorde à un objet, il doit aussi s'accorder aux jugements d'autrui et vice-versa : validité objective et validité universelle nécessaire sont donc des concepts réciproques (*Wechselbegriffe*, dit Kant dans le § 19).²⁵ De ce point de vue, l'objectivité en général et l'intersubjectivité sont les deux faces d'une même pièce.

Cette analyse du jugement objectif en général, à première vue rébarbative, est toutefois décisive pour l'argument kantien, puisque Kant l'applique au contexte particulier de la distinction entre le jugement de perception et le jugement d'expérience : « La validité objective du jugement d'expérience ne veut rien dire d'autre que sa nécessaire validité universelle. » Dans ce contexte, la validité objective du jugement d'expérience sera établie indirectement, à partir de la validité universelle nécessaire. De fait, si ces concepts sont

²² Cf. Rx 6350 (Refl, AA 18 : 676).

²³ Cf. KrV B 2.

²⁴ Cette observation est faite aussi par Allison: "it must be a 'subjective universality,' which applies to the universe of judging subjects. Moreover, as is indicated by its connection with necessity, this universality cannot be regarded merely as a contingent circumstance, as if it just happens that everyone agrees regarding the matter; it is rather that in some sense everyone must agree because the judgment holds of the object, which suggests that the universality, like the necessity, is normative in nature" (Allison, 2015, pp. 294-295).

²⁵ Prol, AA 04 : 298.

récioproques, l'on peut s'appuyer sur l'un pour arriver à l'autre : « Si nous trouvons motif à tenir un jugement pour universellement valable de façon nécessaire [...], il faut que nous le tenions aussi pour objectif, ce qui veut dire qu'il n'énonce pas simplement une relation de la perception à un sujet, mais une manière d'être de l'objet »²⁶ (Prol, AA 04 : 298). Cette preuve est manifestement indirecte. On doit établir la validité objective non pas en montrant à quelle condition *a priori* un jugement s'accorde avec son objet, mais en montrant à quelle condition *a priori* un jugement est nécessaire et universel (pour quiconque). Lorsque l'on met en œuvre la méthode régressive des *Prolégomènes*, on doit se demander quelle est la condition *a priori* en fonction de laquelle on doit considérer un jugement d'expérience comme universellement valable. Il va de soi que le concept pur de l'entendement est cette condition. En tant que *pur*, le concept est en effet une condition universelle nécessaire ; en tant qu'*intellectuel*, il est la condition de l'unité discursive des concepts dans un jugement.²⁷ Ainsi, le concept pur de l'entendement est la condition en fonction de laquelle nous tenons « un jugement pour universellement valable de façon nécessaire ». Mais, étant donné le principe de réciprocité, si un jugement a une validité universelle nécessaire, il a aussi une validité objective.

3.2. La deuxième étape : le paragraphe § 19 et le jugement d'expérience (la conscience en général et la chose représentée comme objet)

Le § 19 reprend l'argument du paragraphe précédent en termes très proches. Cela nous dispense de son analyse détaillée, mais non pas de la question de son but. L'argument, en invoquant le principe de réciprocité établi au §18, montre que la preuve de la validité objective sera établie indirectement :

De là vient que la validité objective et la validité universelle nécessaire (pour quiconque) sont des concepts récioproques, et tout en ne sachant pas ce qu'est l'objet en soi, quand nous considérons un jugement comme universellement valable et par conséquent comme nécessaire, c'est la validité objective que l'on entend précisément par-là (Prol, AA 04 : 298).

Il y a, cependant, une différence significative par rapport au §18. Le §18 ne faisait référence à l'objet que comme unité, tout court, sans qualifier ni le terme objet ni le terme unité. Ainsi, le §18 mettait en jeu la condition *a priori* de l'objectivité en général. En

²⁶ Prol, AA 04 : 298.

²⁷ Selon la *Réflexion* 5931 (1783 – 1784), la catégorie est la condition de l'unité *nécessaire* de la conscience d'un jugement de validité objective : « La catégorie est l'unité {nécessaire} de la conscience dans la composition du divers des représentations {intuition}, dans la mesure où elle rend possible le concept d'un objet général (à la différence de l'unité simplement subjective de la conscience des perceptions). Cette unité dans les catégories doit être nécessaire. *E. g.* un concept, logiquement, peut être sujet ou prédicat. Mais un objet, considéré transcendentement, présuppose quelque chose qui est nécessairement simplement sujet et l'autre chose simplement prédicat » (Refl, AA 18 : 390 -391 ; Kant 2011, p. 182).

conséquence, l'argument avait pour but de montrer comment un jugement de validité subjective pouvait acquérir une validité objective sous la seule condition de l'objectivité en général, ou plutôt, sous la condition de l'universalité nécessaire (intersubjectivité en général) qui est exprimée par la catégorie. Il n'y a pas de doute qu'une perception, comme représentation, se rapporte aux sens et à leur objet. Il semblerait donc que, dans la démarche argumentative du §18, la référence à l'objet des sens soit implicite. Cependant, l'argument du §18 neutralise cette référence, pour ainsi dire. Puisqu'il s'agit d'une preuve indirecte, l'accord du jugement avec l'objet est montré par son rapport avec l'intersubjectivité ou la conscience en général. Le problème que le §18 se pose est donc de savoir comment un jugement de validité subjective peut acquérir une validité objective en se soumettant aux conditions de la conscience en général.

Par sa stratégie argumentative, donc, le §18 considère la perception seulement du point de vue de son rapport au sujet, et non pas à l'objet des sens²⁸. Plus précisément, par sa stratégie argumentative indirecte, le §18 met en suspens la référence du jugement à l'objet donné *in concreto*, pour s'astreindre à l'unité nécessaire de l'*objet en général*, comme corrélat de la conscience en général.²⁹ Ainsi, le rôle du §18 est tout simplement de montrer qu'un jugement de perception, compris comme représentation qui n'a qu'une validité subjective, exige une condition universelle *a priori* sous laquelle seulement il peut avoir une validité intersubjective et, partant, une validité objective (il s'accorde à l'objet).

Ainsi, il faut bien noter qu'il existe dans le §19 une différence importante par rapport au §18, puisque le §19 qualifie l'objet. En fait, au §19, l'objet (*Objekt*) sera d'abord considéré comme ce « qu'il peut être en lui-même » et ensuite comme « objets des sens » (*Gegenständen der Sinne*) :

Par ce jugement nous connaissons l'objet [das Objekt] (lors même que par ailleurs ce qu'il peut être en lui-même nous demeure inconnu) grâce à la liaison nécessaire et universellement valable des perceptions données ; et comme c'est le cas de tous les objets des sens [Gegenständen der Sinne], ce n'est pas à la connaissance immédiate de l'objet [Gegenstand] (car elle est impossible), mais uniquement à la condition de la validité universelle des jugements empiriques que les jugements d'expérience emprunteront leur validité objective, et comme nous l'avons dit, ce n'est jamais sur les conditions empiriques, ou même sensibles en général, mais bien sur un pur concept d'entendement que repose cette validité universelle (Prol, AA 04: 298)³⁰.

²⁸ Il est à noter à ce propos que le § 18 définit des jugements empiriques (donc, jugement de perception et jugement d'expérience) en disant qu'ils ont « leur fondement dans une perception immédiate des sens » ; il n'y a ici aucune référence à leur objet (Prol, AA 04 : 298).

²⁹ Cf. R 5933 (1783 – 1784) : « Le jugement est l'unité de la conscience du divers dans la représentation d'un objet en général. La catégorie est la représentation d'un objet en général dans la mesure où il est déterminé eu égard à cette unité objective de la conscience (eu égard à l'unité logique) ». (Refl, AA 18 : 390 - 391 ; Kant 2011, p. 184).

³⁰ Traduction modifiée.

Dès lors, on a une double indication. La première, c'est que le §19 doit prendre en compte le rapport du jugement à un objet donné *in concreto*. (« les objets des sens »).³¹ La deuxième indication, c'est que le § 19 doit le faire dans le contexte de l'idéalisme formel, établi dans la première partie des *Prolégomènes*. En effet, ici, le terme d'objet est spécifié de deux façons : l'objet inconnu (*Objekt*) et l'objet des sens (*Gegenstand*).

Quelle est l'importance de cette distinction ? Evidemment, elle vise à nier que le jugement d'expérience puisse emprunter sa validité objective à la connaissance immédiate de l'objet. Cette connaissance immédiate (*unmittelbar*) est impossible pour deux raisons. (1) Si l'objet est objet des sens, aucun jugement, comme unité discursive des concepts, ne peut se rapporter à l'objet sauf par la médiation d'une intuition sensible (i.e., d'une perception) ; (2) si l'objet est l'objet considéré en lui-même, sans la médiation des formes pures de sa présentation, on n'a ni connaissance immédiate ni *a fortiori* connaissance médiante. En excluant ces deux cas, il ne reste plus que l'appel à la condition de l'universalité des conditions intellectuelles du jugement lui-même : c'est « (...) uniquement à la condition de la validité universelle des jugements empiriques que les jugements d'expérience emprunteront leur validité objective ». Cette condition de l'universalité (pour quiconque) n'est autre que le concept pur de l'entendement. Étant donné le principe de réciprocité, il est par là démontré que le concept pur, parce qu'il a une « validité universelle nécessaire (pour quiconque) », a également une validité objective.

Pendant, si l'argument s'arrêtait ici, il serait assez trivial par rapport au §18, comme s'il affirmait, au fond, que ce qui est vrai pour l'unité nécessaire des perceptions est vrai aussi pour l'unité nécessaire de leurs objets. Mais il ne s'agit pas du tout de passer trivialement du genre (jugement en général) à l'espèce (jugement d'expérience). En fait, le § 19 effectue un pas décisif, qui n'était pas présent au § 18 : il prétend montrer l'universalité nécessaire du jugement pour les objets phénoménaux dont le corrélat existentiel est quelque chose d'inconnu en lui-même. La suite du texte le montre bien, en s'appuyant directement sur la doctrine de l'idéalisme formel :

L'objet [*Objekt*] demeure en lui-même à jamais inconnu ; mais lorsque, grâce au concept d'entendement, la liaison des représentations qui sont données de cet objet à notre sensibilité est déterminée comme valable universellement, alors l'objet [*Gegenstand*] est déterminé grâce à cette relation et le jugement est objectif (Prol, AA 04 : 299).³²

³¹ Le paragraphe 8 des *Prolégomènes* avait déjà indiqué la nécessité de passer du concept pur, comme concept d'objet en général, à son emploi *in concreto*: « Il est vrai qu'il y a bien des concepts tels que nous sommes capables d'en former quelques-uns tout à fait *a priori* : ceux qui n'impliquent que la pensée d'un objet en général, sans nous trouver en un rapport immédiat à l'objet, par exemple : les concepts de grandeur, celui de cause etc. ... ; mais même ces concepts-là ont cependant besoin, pour acquérir valeur et sens, de quelque emploi *in concreto*, c'est-à-dire, de l'application à une quelconque intuition, grâce à laquelle nous soit donné un objet de ces concepts » (Prol, AA 04: 283).

³² Selon le texte original: « Das Object bleibt an sich selbst immer unbekannt; wenn aber durch den Verstandesbegriff die Verknüpfung der Vorstellungen, die unsrer Sinnlichkeit von ihm gegeben sind, als allgemeingültig bestimmt wird, so wird der Gegenstand durch dieses Verhältniß bestimmt, und das Urtheil ist objectiv » (Prol, AA 04: 299).

Il faut remarquer que Kant ne dit pas que, puisque l'objet demeure en lui-même à jamais inconnu notre connaissance d'un objet est réduite à une détermination des représentations sensibles par le concept pur de l'entendement. Une telle lecture rejoindrait celle de Garve, pour qui "l'entendement fait des objets". Kant, cependant, dit tout autre chose. Le terme « en soi » est un terme qui modifie le verbe (« demeure »), non pas un adjectif qualifiant l'objet (« L'objet [*Objekt*] demeure en lui-même à jamais inconnu »). Ensuite, Kant dit que les représentations sensibles sont des représentations de cet objet (*Objekt*) qui reste en lui-même toujours inconnu (« des représentations qui sont données de cet objet »). Rappelons-nous que cette formulation est très proche de la formulation que nous avons déjà trouvée dans la première partie des *Prolégomènes*. Kant disait alors : l'apparition est « l'apparition de cet objet qui nous est inconnu, mais qui n'en est pas moins réel » (Prol, AA 04 : 289). Troisièmement, Kant dit ici que la liaison des représentations sensibles de cet objet (*Objekt*) qui « demeure en lui-même à jamais inconnu » reçoit une valeur universelle par le concept pur. Quatrièmement, il affirme que par cette la liaison l'objet (*Gegenstand*) devient déterminé. Ainsi, à partir du dernier de ces quatre points, on arrive à ce résultat-ci : le concept pur est la détermination comme objet (*Gegenstand*) d'une connexion de représentations sensibles d'un objet (*Objekt*) qui demeure, au cours de toutes ces étapes, toujours inconnu en soi même. Ici, nous trouvons la caractéristique des *Prolégomènes*, c'est-à-dire, l'identité de l'objet dans les différentes étapes de la réflexion critique : comme une chose considérée en soi, comme l'apparition de cette chose donnée à la sensibilité et comme un phénomène déterminé par un jugement de valeur universel.

La question la plus naturelle est donc : pourquoi ne pas prétendre connaître les choses en soi ? Les *Prolégomènes* ont déjà donné la réponse dans leur première partie, dans le contexte de l'idéalisme formel. L'existence de quelque chose est toujours sa présentation immédiate à nous selon nos formes *a priori* de présentation. Dans le contexte du jugement d'expérience, la réponse n'est pas essentiellement différente. On ne prend pas quelque chose comme quelque chose en lui-même (*Etwas als Etwas*), mais toujours comme objet pour nous (*Etwas als Gegenstand*).³³ Si tel est le cas, l'existence réelle de la chose présentée par l'intuition sensible comme apparition demeure toujours le terme auquel nous sommes renvoyés par le jugement si les concepts purs doivent acquérir une *réalité objective*.³⁴

³³ Selon la formule du § 14 de la déduction transcendantale de la *Critique de la raison pure* : « Comme la représentation ne donne pas par elle-même l'existence [Dasein] à son objet (car il n'est pas ici question de la causalité qu'elle peut avoir au moyen de la volonté), elle détermine l'objet *a priori* en ce sens qu'elle seule permet de connaître quelque chose [etwas] comme *object* » (KrV A92/125). Voir sur ce point (Licht dos Santos, 2009).

³⁴ Le terme "réalité objective" figure dans la première partie des *Prolégomènes*, tandis que "validité objective" est un terme caractéristique des paragraphes § 18 et § 19 de la seconde partie : « La mathématique pure et notamment la géométrie pure, ne peut avoir de réalité objective qu'à la condition de concerner uniquement les objets des sens ; mais on établit ce principe à propos de ceux-ci que notre représentation sensible n'est représentation des choses en elles-mêmes, mais seulement de la manière dont celles-ci nous apparaissent » (« ...unsre sinnliche Vorstellung keinesweges eine Vorstellung der Dinge an sich selbst,

4. Conclusion

Le résultat ainsi obtenu est remarquable à plusieurs points de vue :

(1) il correspond parfaitement aux exigences de la nouvelle méthode d'exposition introduite par les *Prolégomènes* dans la mesure où il rend visible l'articulation entre leurs deux premières parties ; en fait, le § 19, en rapportant les conditions d'objectivité générale du jugement au cadre de l'idéalisme transcendantal, articule et unifie l'analyse critique des conditions sensibles et l'analyse des conditions intellectuelles ;

(2) ce résultat justifie donc la cohérence doctrinale des *Prolégomènes* en montrant que les deux parties de cet ouvrage ne sont pas seulement parallèles, mais sont corrélées ;

(3) ainsi, il offre une réponse complète à l'objection de Garve. Cette objection relève tout aussi bien de l'Esthétique que de l'Analytique Transcendantale de la *Critique de la raison pure*. La déduction transcendantale dans les *Prolégomènes*, en montrant que l'objet jugé ne peut être réduit à la simple connexion interne des représentations sensibles, mais possède comme corrélat « l'existence de la chose qui apparaît », répond intégralement aux deux côtés de l'objection de Garve.

(4) Ce résultat offre donc une conception intéressante du jugement qui ne réduit pas le rapport de la représentation à son objet à une simple relation interne entre des représentations sensibles et des représentations intellectuelles. Au lieu de reléguer la chose elle-même à un incommode préambule de l'examen de l'objectivité des jugements empiriques, la déduction transcendantale des *Prolégomènes* incorpore l'existence de la chose comme fondement réel du phénomène, d'abord présenté dans la sensibilité et ensuite déterminé comme objet de connaissance par un concept pur dans le jugement de l'expérience. L'analyse des conditions formelles de la représentation des objets présente donc un réalisme robuste, à la fois direct et critique. Le réalisme est direct puisque, selon la première partie des *Prolégomènes*, l'intuition sensible est la présentation *immédiate* de la chose elle-même en tant que phénomène ; et ce réalisme est critique dans la mesure où il constitue une contrepartie nécessaire de l'idéalisme formel, corollaire de l'analyse critique des conditions formelles de la représentation d'objet. Par cette analyse, la cognition objective s'explique par l'accord entre le fondement formel et le fondement réel de la représentation.

(5) Cependant, bien qu'il soit intéressant, ce résultat est, pris par lui-même, superflu. Si une déduction transcendantale est nécessaire, c'est pour résoudre le problème

sondern nur der Art sei, wie sie uns erscheinen») (Prol, AA 04 : 287 ; souligné par moi) «. « Celles-ci » : c'est-à-dire, les choses en elles-mêmes qui nous apparaissent. On a donc ici, comme dans le § 19 des *Prolégomènes*, le même principe de l'identité ontologique de l'objet dans les différentes étapes de la réflexion critique de l'objectivité. Pour finir, il faut remarquer qu'autant cette expression (« identité ontologique de l'objet dans ses différentes étapes de détermination ») que la conception générale qui la soutient, nous les avons empruntées à Bernard Rousset (1967,167).

de la métaphysique transcendantale, qui est la question traitée dans la dernière partie des *Prolégomènes* :

Pour leur sûreté et certitude propres, mathématique pure et science pure de la nature n'auraient eu nul besoin de la Déduction dont nous venons de les munir ; car la première s'appuie sur son évidence propre ; quant à la seconde, bien qu'elle soit issue des sources pures de l'entendement, elle s'appuie cependant sur l'expérience et la confirmation qu'elle ne cesse d'en recevoir [...].Ce n'est donc pas pour elles que ces deux sciences avaient besoin de l'enquête en question, c'est pour une autre science : la métaphysique. (Prol, AA 04 : 327)

Ainsi, toute la démarche analytique des *Prolégomènes* a pour but la délimitation de la connaissance en vertu du problème de la métaphysique transcendantale. Toutefois, selon la conception critique, la limite « appartient à la fois au contenu interne et à l'espace situé en dehors de sa surface donnée » (Prol, AA 04 : 361), c'est-à-dire qu'elle appartient à la fois à l'apparition et à « l'existence de la chose qui apparaît ». Alors, c'est seulement en vertu du problème de la délimitation de la connaissance que la preuve de la réalité objective des catégories, telle qu'elle est accomplie dans le §19, montre vraiment toute son importance, selon la nature synoptique de la méthode régressive caractéristique des *Prolégomènes*.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE

- Adickes E. (1924), *Kant und das Ding an sich*, Pan Verlag Rolf Heise, Berlin.
- Allais, L (2009), Kant, “Non-Conceptual Content and the Representation of Space”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 47, Number 3, pp. 383-413.
- Allison, H. (2015), *Kant's Transcendental Deduction - An Analytical-Historical Commentary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- _____ (2004), *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: an Interpretation and Defense*, Yale University Press, New Haven.
- Caimi, M. (2002). *Leçons sur Kant, La déduction transcendantale dans la deuxième édition de la Critique de la raison pure*. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne.
- Ferrari, J. (1964), « Kant et la recension Garve-Feder de la ‘Critique de la raison pure’ », *Les Études philosophiques*, vol.1, pp. 11-47.
- Fonseca, R. D (2013), “Aparência, apresentação e objeto. Notas sobre a ambivalência de ‘Erscheinung’ na teoria kantiana da experiência”, *Studia Kantiana* 14, pp. 80-99.
- Freuler, L. (1992), *Kant et la Métaphysique Spéculative*, Vrin, Paris.
- Garve, C. (1991), « Zugabe zu den Göttingischen Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen. Göttingen », 1782. In: *Rezensionen zur kantischen philosophie*, Albert Landau Verlag, Bebra.

- Guyer, P. (1987), *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Kant, E. (1902-1983), *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 29 vol., de Gruyter, Berlin-NewYork.
- _____. (1891), *Prolégomènes à toute métaphysique future*, trad. Brunschvicg, Librairie Hachette, Paris.
- _____. (2008). *Prolégomènes à toute métaphysique future*, trad. L. Guillermit, Vrin, Paris.
- _____. (2009). *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science*. Translated and edited, with an introduction, and selections from the Critique of Pure Reason, by Gary Hatfield,. University Press, Cambridge.
- _____. (2011). *Réflexions Métaphysiques (1780-1789)*, présentation, traductions et annotation par Sophie Grapote, J. Vrin, Paris.
- Klotz, C (2013). “A existência da coisa que aparece”: sobre a gênese do projeto da Refutação do Idealismo nos *Prolegômenos*”, non publié.
- Licht dos Santos, P.R. (2009), “Representação, Objeto e Unidade da Consciência no Idealismo Crítico”, in: *Kant e o kantismo - Heranças Interpretativas*. Org. Clélia. A. Martins e Ubirajara R. A. Marques. Brasiliense: São Paulo: pp. 130-155.
- _____. (2012), “A unidade da intuição e a unidade do conceito”, in: *Comentários às obras de Kant: Crítica da Razão Pura*. Org. Joel Thiago Klein, Florianópolis: NEFIPO, pp. 145-177.
- _____. (2015), “O enigma da representação na *Crítica da razão pura*: entre epistemologia e idealismo absoluto”, *Revista de Filosofia Aurora*, v.27, n.42, pp. 733-758.
- Longuenesse, B. (2000), *Kant and the Capacity to Judge*. Trans. Charles T. Wolfe. University Press, Princeton.
- Pollok, K. (2012), “Wie sind Erfahrungsurteile möglich?”. *Kants Prolegomena, Ein Kooperativer Kommentar*, Hamburg, Klosterman, pp, 85-103.
- Riehl, A (1908), *Der Philosophische Kriticismus: Geschichte und System*, Band I, 2. Aufl., Engelmann, Leipzig.
- Rousset, B. (1967), *La Doctrine Kantienne de l' Objectivité*. Vrin, Paris.
- Vleeschauwer, H. J. de, (1976), *La Déduction Transcendantale dans l' Oeuvre de Kant*, II, ed. por L. W. Beck, Garland Publishing, Inc., New York and London.



The Understanding in *Transition*: Fascicles X, XI and VII of *Opus postumum*

TERRENCE THOMSON*

CRMEP, Kingston University, London

Abstract

This essay investigates the transformation of the faculty of understanding in Kant's *Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics* drafts found in *Opus postumum*. I argue that in fascicles X and XI Kant implicitly reverses the architectonic order of sensibility and understanding. Without an account of this reversal, Kant's critique of Isaac Newton's conception of phenomena and the so called *Selbstsetzungslehre* (doctrine of self-positing) in fascicle VII fall apart. I argue that what is at stake is a challenge Kant makes to his own presuppositions and a challenge to the Kantian philosopher who wishes to stay with a strictly 'critical' Kant.

Keywords

faculties, understanding, sensibility, architectonic, natural science, phenomena

Introduction

The architectonic order of the faculties is a much-discussed topic in Kant scholarship, particularly the role of the understanding in *Critique of Pure Reason*. Much less discussed, however, is the architectonic position of the understanding in the *Transition from Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics* (*Übergang von den metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft zur Physik*), Kant's last, unfinished work found in *Opus postumum*. In this essay, I seek to address this by suggesting an implicit transformation of the understanding in fascicles X, XI and VII.

The question of the transformation of the understanding is a controversial topic in *Opus postumum* scholarship, since it indicates that Kant undermines the critical edifice at the level of faculty – a major claim. Early literature on *Opus postumum* simply shrugged off this topic by appealing to the deterioration of Kant's mental state; if Kant made fundamental changes to the critical edifice we should not take this seriously, since he was

* PhD candidate at the Centre for Research in Modern European Philosophy, Kingston University, London.
Contact email: terrencethomson1@gmail.com

not in his right mind. Whilst most modern literature does not agree with this tactic, most does agree that *Transition* presents no major change to the faculty of understanding. It will be such an opinion that this essay challenges. Hence, the basic questions underpinning this essay are, (1) what justifications are there for the transformation of the understanding in *Transition*; (2) if it is the case, what is the genesis of this transformation; and (3) how can we account for it in the wider context of the *Transition*?

The structure of this essay is as follows. In section 1, I investigate a paragraph mentioning the term ‘*Sinnenwelt*’ in *Critique of Pure Reason*, to suggest the conflation of the faculties, despite Kant’s attempts to keep them separate. I trace this issue back to the *Inaugural Dissertation* of 1770, exploring the faculties as they are sketched out in §23. By opening this connection I seek to show the fundamental plasticity of the understanding in Kant’s corpus, hence opening the way for the more explicit transformation in *Transition*.

In section 2, I present the main thesis of the essay. I start from a discussion of the *imponderabilis* and the observer in the experimental physics side of *Transition*. Drawing on this I plot out three stages of the transformation of the understanding: first, as a faculty of production via the act of insertion (*hineinlegen*); second, as a faculty anticipating sensibility; third, as preceding sensibility. This effectively reverses the primacy of sensibility, meaning that the understanding directly inserts content into sensibility, making experience possible. This is a radical shift away from the critical edifice.

In section 3 I show how the reversal opens a new slant on the meaning of ‘phenomenon’ in Kant’s view. This also plays into and is informed by Kant’s critique of Isaac Newton’s *Principia* in fascicle XI, which I investigate. From a more general perspective, this questions whether the observations made by physicists are direct, realist cognitions or whether we must account for observation as an act preceded by the conceptual genesis of the observer.

In section 4, I show how this reversal allows Kant to formulate the so called *Selbstsetzungslehre*, which in turn modifies the spontaneity/receptivity divide, indexing both as *actus*. My aim is to show that without an architectonic reversal, fascicle VII would simply not make sense.

In advancing this essay we gain the possibility of opening *Opus postumum* to further critical study and table a fundamental transformation to the critical edifice more generally.

1. A Problem in the *Sinnenwelt*

In analytic philosophy of science, questions about ‘theory-ladenness’ abound thick and fast. One thinker of this theory, Paul Feyerabend, presents a particularly stark image of the sciences in this regard. He asks a fundamental question about ‘whether experience can be regarded as a true source and foundation (testing ground) of knowledge’ in a natural science context, claiming that ‘a natural science without sensory elements’ must be possible (Feyerabend 1985, p.132). It is with this image that I think the discussion of a transformation of the understanding can be framed in relation to Kant’s work, especially

the *Transition*. For Feyerabend's question – and the whole analytic problematic around how best to account for theory and observation – is a fundamentally epistemological-ontological one, and it is precisely along these lines that the architectonic of the faculties in *Transition* unfolds. But before visiting *Transition* we must first uncover the basic problematic Kant works from, which I claim can be found in his earlier work.

In the second edition Introduction of *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant says that the faculty of understanding forms one of 'two stems of human cognition,' the other being sensibility, both of which 'may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root.' (KrV A15/B29). The division of these faculties describes two reciprocal relations to representations: sensibility as the receptive faculty of intuition and understanding as the spontaneous faculty of thought and concepts. Kant tells us repeatedly that one is not possible without the other, that for experience to be possible both must simultaneously operate in the subject, and the first *Critique* is very much based on this simultaneity.

Yet a peculiar seriality emerges between the faculties in the first *Critique*, wherein sensibility precedes the understanding. One of the places this is most apparent is in the famous 'stepladder' (*Stufenleiter*) passage of Transcendental Dialectic (KrV A320/B376-7).¹ In this section, Kant describes sensibility and understanding as forming distinct halves of a staggered/stepped (*gestuft*) relationship whereby sensibility passes raw content to the understanding, which it organizes according to the categories. It is, in fact, the absolute receptivity of sensibility which first makes experience of the object possible and without it no experiential material could be given. The sequential theme is continued in the Amphiboly of Concepts of Reflection, which is specifically designed to keep sensibility and understanding from inadvertently crossing paths by introducing a demand for the precedence of sensibility: 'The understanding, namely, demands first that something be given (at least in the concept) in order to be able to determine it in a certain way.' (KrV A267/B322-3). The overarching reason for Kant's sequential ordering of the faculties here is to critique the rationalist metaphysics popular at the time, which consistently involves a conflation according to Kant. In this regard, the empiricist sentiment is very much emphasized, as the words of John Locke demonstrate: 'the understanding is not much unlike a closet wholly shut from light, with only some little opening left to let in external visible resemblances or ideas of things without' (Locke 1995, §17) and this perhaps acts as an historical anchor to the seriality of the faculties more generally. Both the first *Critique* and the quote from Locke put forward the assertion that the understanding *depends* on sensibility for its content, i.e., it does not create content. Broadly, this forms the architectonic relationship of the understanding and sensibility in the first *Critique*. Although they are supposed to be reciprocal and simultaneous to ward off the error of rationalist metaphysics, sensibility must serially precede the understanding.

But this seriality is not without problems in *Critique of Pure Reason* nor is it entirely un-mysterious.² The first problem is how Kant can maintain a genuinely reciprocal

¹ Also see (Caygill 2007, pp.18-9).

² Deleuze notes that the 'accord between these two faculties is no less "mysterious"' just because a seriality has been introduced. (Deleuze 2008, p.19).

simultaneity of the faculties alongside this seriality; does this not represent a blatant indecision in Kant's thinking? Another is how Kant might distinguish between a simultaneity and a conflation of the faculties. With regards the latter problem, it is useful to start with a revealing passage in the Antinomy of Pure Reason, Section Nine:

Since, as we have several times shown, there is not as much transcendental use of pure understanding as there is of concepts of reason, because the absolute totality of series of conditions in the *Sinnenwelt* is itself based solely on a transcendental use of reason, which demands this unconditional whole from what it presupposes is a thing-in-itself. (KrV A515/B543, t.m).

The German noun '*Sinnenwelt*' is usually translated 'sensory world' or 'world of senses' in English, which is largely uncontested in Kant literature.³ I would, however, like to draw attention to the complexity of Kant's use of the word in this context. As a noun '*Sinnen*' means 'thought' or 'meditation', and it can also be used as a verb (*sinnen*) meaning, 'to plot' or 'to devise'. Kant does not use the word as a verb so it appears that the literal translation of '*Sinnenwelt*' should be 'thought world'. Yet, the noun from which *Sinnenwelt* is actually constructed, the pluralized form of '*Sinn*', pertains to physiological sense or sensibility so is translated, 'world of senses'. I do not want to semantically contest the meaning of words, but I would like to suggest that an implicit ambiguity resides in Kant's use of the term '*Sinnenwelt*'. Although Kant uses the term in an apparently easy and relatively unproblematic way, it does not clearly mark the sequential line between sensibility and understanding. Further, if we cache the term in the original ambition of Kant's architectonic of the understanding and sensibility, as reciprocally simultaneous, the paragraph seems to lose its point. For this reason, I argue that we read *Sinnenwelt* as an indication of a tacit condensation of the two terms.

To flesh out this claim, when we consider the wider context of Kant's discussion in the quoted paragraph above, we can see how the two poles of sensibility and understanding may easily become ambiguously conflated rather than systematically simultaneous. Kant is trying to show that a totality of conditions supporting experience is demanded by reason as an unconditional whole. But this totality can only be answered by a regulative idea of reason (i.e., it cannot be given in sensibility). Yet Kant tells us that the *Sinnenwelt* contains the totality of conditions *and* is based on regulative ideas of reason. If we read *Sinnenwelt* unambiguously in the register of sensibility alone – as pure receptivity⁴ – Kant seems to be contradicting himself, which is why he goes on to say, 'the *Sinnenwelt*, however, contains nothing like that completeness.' (KrV A516/B544, t.m). We are thus forced to introduce into the *Sinnenwelt* a dimension of the thought world, if only for a moment, and in doing so we introduce the possibility of an inadvertent conflation of sensibility and understanding, which is not explicitly laid out.

³ E.g., (Martin 1974, p.190).

⁴ See (KrV A68/B93).

The wider historical significance of such a reading is that it propels the first *Critique* back to the rational metaphysics Kant wants to refute. The first node in this line is the conflation of thinking and sensory awareness found in Descartes' *Principles of Philosophy*, where he says, 'Hence, *thinking* is to be identified here not merely with understanding, willing and imagining, but also with sensory awareness.' (Descartes 1999, p.162). The second and perhaps more relevant node is found in Leibniz's conflation of the sensible and intelligible. Of particular note is the 1702 letter to Queen Sophie Charlotte of Prussia, where Leibniz defines three types of notion: sensible, sensible and intelligible and intelligible (Leibniz 1989, p.188). The first of these notions is 'confused,' which is explored a few pages later where Leibniz says, 'The senses provide us material for reasoning, and we never have thoughts so abstract that something from the senses is not intermixed with them' (Leibniz 1989, p.191). For Leibniz, no thought is without an element of sensibility and no sense is without an element of thought, which leads Kant to say that he 'intellectualized the appearances' (KrV A271/B327). It is this Leibnizian conflation Kant seeks to upend by introducing architectonic seriality into the order of the faculties.

It is perhaps first in *On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (Inaugural Dissertation)* of 1770 that Kant takes issue with the Leibnizian node by attempting to systematically distinguish sensibility from understanding.⁵ The need for this clear distinction was prompted by the work of Johann H. Lambert, a Swiss polymath with whom Kant corresponded. Lambert had begun to disentangle the term 'architectonic' from its rationalist metaphysical context of ontology – as it was used in Baumgarten's *Metaphysica*, for example – to define it as a methodological tool for making systematic divisions and determining the true seriality of concepts.⁶ The distinction at stake and the means for making it in the *Inaugural Dissertation* – a text Lambert read and praised – can be said to pervade the whole framework of the first *Critique*,⁷ although there is a complicated movement between the two works. That being so, after reading *Inaugural Dissertation* Lambert pointed out to Kant the difficulty of systematically keeping sensibility and understanding separate from one another (Br 10:105), but Kant had already tried to account for this problem in a subtle yet innovative way in *Inaugural Dissertation*, which Lambert may have missed.

In Section 5, §23 of *Inaugural Dissertation*, Kant raises a curious problem. He talks of '*the infection of sensitive cognition by cognition deriving from the understanding.*' (MSI 2:411). This gives us a clear indication of Kant's thinking at this point: rationalist metaphysics had allowed for a disease-like understanding to infect sensibility at a devastating cost. He goes on to show, under Lockean auspices, how such an infection leads to 'illusions of the understanding,' best stated in the expression, '*metaphysical fallacy of subreption*' (MSI 2:412) whereby a shaky assumption is made based on misguided

⁵ See especially Section 2, entitled, 'On the Distinction Between Sensible Things and Intelligible Things in General', (MSI 2:392-8).

⁶ See (Lambert 2009, pp.267-8).

⁷ See (MSI 2:395) for comparison.

reasoning. ‘Subreption’ is appropriated by Kant from the Leibnizian Christian Wolff, who derived the term from a concept in Roman law denoting an act of theft through concealment. Wolff uses the term to mark the incorrect conflation of experience and knowledge.⁸ When Kant uses the term, however, he means something like ‘tacit assumption’, as when we assume that something is the case when the actual case is concealed from us. Although the first *Critique* encrypts a general opposition to subreption, the issue seems to be transposed into the Transcendental Dialectic, where Kant redresses the term as ‘transcendental illusion’. These ‘infections’ now appear to be built-in transcendental conditions of the possibility of experience, which arise from the ‘unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding’ (KrV A294/B350). This is the same dynamic as in *Inaugural Dissertation* but the prime influencer has now switched and when subreption is mentioned directly it is in relation to an error of judgement rather than solely understanding or sensibility (KrV A643/B671). In the *Inaugural Dissertation* the understanding does the influencing or ‘infecting’, whereas in the first *Critique* it is sensibility which intervenes. This marks a deep rejoinder in Kant’s corpus, suggesting that a reversal of the roles has occurred between the two works.

Before moving on, it is important to note that in Kant’s attempt to make the understanding and sensibility simultaneously reciprocal in the first *Critique*, he cannot help but fall back into a position of seriality, whereby sensibility precedes the understanding to avoid (a) rationalist metaphysics (dogmatism) and (b) a complete conflation (amphiboly). From a wider philosophical perspective, at stake is a challenge to the notion that sensibility and understanding can be stripped of each other or be independent in the context of the first *Critique* prompting us to follow John McDowell’s thinking, ‘that the understanding is already inextricably implicated in the deliverances of sensibility themselves.’ (McDowell 1996, p.26). The *Sinnenwelt* opens a key clue (*Leitfaden*) in this debate in that it marks a wavering stamped into Kant’s thinking. Thus, any interpretation of Kant premised on the rigid separability *or* systematic simultaneity of sensibility and understanding is put into question. This is Johann August Eberhard’s unique insight. He claims that although Kant wants to work from the basis of a complete architectonic division and seriality of the faculties, this proves extremely difficult without tacitly falling back into the Leibnizian conflation of the sensible and intelligible.⁹ It also indicates that to understand these faculties in a way that makes sense we must be prepared to contextualize them as faculties in transition, something that Kant’s early critics such as Eberhard, did not and perhaps could not do.

2. The Wound Before the Blow: Fascicles X and XI

I now move on to *Transition* and how the understanding/sensibility relationship develops in fascicles X and XI which were written between 1799 and 1800. I argue that included in these fascicles is a transformative architectonic line wherein the roles of sensibility and

⁸ See (Sng 2010, p.79).

⁹ See (Allison 1973).

understanding are twisted and contorted, culminating in the total primacy of the understanding. With the preceding section in mind, this should not come as a surprise to us and hence the object of this section is to explore the genesis of this modification within *Opus postumum* as well as provide a defence of its actuality.

By way of a brief contextual background, we must recount the structure of *Transition*. Kant aligns a priori cognition with metaphysics, which has the job of interconnecting disparate elemental, dynamic concepts (e.g., attractive and repulsive force, cohesion, density of matter) into a systematic unity Kant calls the Elementary System of the Moving Forces of Matter (*Elementarsystem*).¹⁰ Metaphysics does not possess the capacity to form the empirical constituents of the *Elementarsystem*, instead it organizes empirical facts given through the activities of physics, according to conceptual principles. In other words, in so far as the *Transition* is concerned, metaphysics has been purged of all empirical content, whilst physics is conceived of in a double sense: *physica rationalis* and *physica specialis* – or in contemporary terms, theoretical physics and special or experimental physics. Kant illustrates this by distinguishing between conceptual, formal principles and empirical principles in the Xth fascicle of the *Transition*:

Physics is the doctrinal system of the moving forces of matter in so far as they are objectively contained in a natural system. It contains an absolute whole of empirical cognition of outer sensory objects (*Sinnengegenstande*), and as a science is called upon to attain the work of natural research (*Naturforschung*), whose material (empirical) principle is based on observation and experiment. The formal principle, however – how and what one researches – shall be based on a priori principles alone. (OP 22:319, p.106, t.m).¹¹

The formal principle is called upon to provide the conceptual orientation of investigation – the ‘how’ and the ‘what’ – and experimental physics, in turn, conducts empirical, investigatory research into nature (*Naturforschung*) using the tools of experiment and observation. These tools of experimental physics form the genesis of a change in the understanding/sensibility relationship which starts in Kant’s discussion of the lever-arm or scale (*Hebelarm*).

In fascicle VIII, written between October and December 1798, Kant says that the concept of ponderability of matter, or matter’s tendency to be a significant, measurable quantity, ‘presupposes an instrument for the measurement of this moving force (of weight) in the form of a lever-arm (*Hebelarm*)’ (OP 22:138, p.46). Following this, Kant says we are also inclined to account for the ponderability of the lever-arm itself along the same lines as the matter it weighs, but that this is impossible. The lever-arm cannot possibly measure itself in the act of weighing, just as it is impossible to ‘lift oneself up by one’s own bootstraps,’ as the saying goes. Thus, if we conceive of the fact that matter can be

¹⁰ See (OP 21:181-6, pp.58-61) for a schematic of the *Elementarsystem*.

¹¹ Also see (OP 22:355, p.115).

weighed, we must introduce a mysterious ‘something’ to account for the matter constitutive of the lever-arm, which is unweighable:

Thus the ponderability (*Ponderabilität*) of matter is not a property knowable *a priori* according to the mere concept of the quantity of matter; it is, rather, physically conditioned and requires the presupposition of an *internally* moving matter which results in the immobility of the parts in contact with one another [in the lever-arm], by itself being mobile inside this matter [...] Thus, even ponderability (*Ponderabilität*) (represented subjectively as the experiment of weighing) will require the assumption of a matter which is not ponderable (*wägbar*) (*imponderabilis*); for, otherwise, the condition for ponderability would be extended to infinity, and thus lack a foundation.’ (OP 22:138, p.46).¹²

In this passage, Kant considers the ponderability of matter as an external, physical correlate which rests upon an internal, non-physical substrate, the *imponderabilis*. In other words, the lever-arm invokes a substratum of matter which cannot be observed but is nonetheless present as a necessary condition of the matter being weighed. Such a view was not uncommon in seventeenth and eighteenth-century natural science, where it was postulated that an imponderable, invisible fluid allowed heat to travel. The difference in Kant’s reading of the term is that he tries to establish its place in the critical edifice and in the context of *Transition* this poses a problem since it cannot be ‘written in’ to a conceptual schema, nor is it governed by the categories, nor can it be simply equated to sensibility. Hence, whilst the *imponderabilis* is the condition of possibility of the empirically determinable weight of matter, the matter of the lever-arm itself cannot be accounted for directly. It thus lies in a transitorial site; it is neither an entirely empirical object given in sensibility nor an entirely conceptual object given in the understanding.

Later, in fascicle X, written between August 1799 and April 1800, the *imponderabilis* leads into a methodological engagement, which is the point at which the understanding begins to play a role: ‘Physics is a system, but we cannot cognize (*erkennen*) a system as such unless we ourselves insert (*hineinlegen*) the manifold of an aggregate according to *a priori* principles.’ (OP 22:299, p.103, t.m and italics added). What Kant seems to be saying here is that the observer – in an experimental physics setting – actively inserts (*hineinlegen*) content which is not derived from sensibility – i.e., *a priori* principles. We can thus see the problematic of observation and insertion (*hineinlegen*), gleaned from experimental physics, open onto a philosophical-architectonic issue.¹³ By venturing this route Kant intimately connects the act of insertion with the understanding, thus morphing the latter:

The understanding must therefore synthetically insert (*hineinlegen*) the elements of sensible cognition into a system of the moving forces to make an experience;

¹² Also see (OP 22:260).

¹³ As Hansgeorg Hoppe notes, ‘the concept of insertion (*hineinlegen*) is the central concept of fascicle X and XI, which is at the same time clearly related to the experimental approach of physics.’ (Hoppe 1969, p.117, m.t).

hence, not *from* experience, but *for* experience and the possibility of inserting (*hineinlegen*) it into an empirical whole as a system of physics. (OP 22:316-7, m.t).

This epistemic act creates the possibility of experience by inserting content directly into sensible cognition and does not stem from the merely organizational operation of the categories, but the active, contentful intervention of the understanding into sensibility.

To account for the stakes of this reading, we may be tempted to return to the first *Critique*, where, in the second edition Introduction, Kant says, ‘we can cognize of things *a priori* only what we ourselves have put (*legen*) into them’ (KrV Bxviii). On the face of it, this is strikingly similar to the passages from fascicle X, e.g., ‘We can extract nothing other from our sense-representations than that which we have inserted (*hineingelegt*) (with consciousness of its presentation) for the empirical representation of ourselves – that is, by the understanding (*intellectus exhibit phaenomena sensum*).’ (OP 22:343, p.112). Erich Adickes reads passages like this one in a purely logical key, stating that the insertion is of a ‘categorical function’ (*Kategorialfunktionen*) (Adickes 1920, p.633).¹⁴ But it is clear on a basic terminological level that these two passages differ. The second sentence claims not only that we *a priori* take out of things what we put into them via the categories,¹⁵ but that we empirically take out of things only what the understanding inserts into sensibility. It is in this sense that we can understand Kant’s Latin inscription as marking a departure of how the understanding operates: ‘*intellectus exhibit phaenomena sensum*’; ‘the understanding exhibits the phenomena of sense’. The understanding can no longer be a simple organizational faculty in need of material given to it but an originary and productive-creative faculty, which does not simply inflect observation but gives rise to it.

We may still object, however, that no change occurs since in *Critique of Pure Reason* the understanding is also a productive faculty endowed with spontaneity. This is especially the case in the Transcendental Deductions where Kant considers the understanding as the spontaneous act of combining appearances to find common rules. At the beginning of the B Deduction, Kant says: ‘for it is an act (*Actus*) of the spontaneity of the power of representation, and, since one must call the latter understanding, all combination (*Verbindung*) [...] is an act of the understanding (*Verstandeshandlung*).’ (KrV B130, t.m). This is pointed up by Gottfried Martin, who emphasizes the understanding as a spontaneous power of unifying material via the categories, concluding, quite radically, that the ‘understanding *underlies* the sensible world.’ (Martin 1974, p.193, italics added).¹⁶ This would mean that the evolution of the understanding is already implicitly folded into the first *Critique* and that the *Transition* does not actually change anything per se, but merely unfolds this implicit evolution.

Yet this perspective would ignore the fundamental differences at stake between the first *Critique* and *Transition*. In *Critique of Pure Reason* the understanding is simply not a

¹⁴ Also see Smith (1992, pp.614-5) for one of the first agreements in the English literature with Adickes on this point.

¹⁵ In passages where Kant uses the term ‘*hineinlegen*’ e.g., (KrV A125) he refers to the insertion of ‘unity’ or *form* according to the categories.

¹⁶ Also see (Martin 1974, pp.124-5).

productive-creative faculty since it always needs material given to it, which even Martin admits: ‘Human understanding is [...] dependent on sensibility, it does not simply create its objects but has to have something given to it’ (Martin 1974, p.163).¹⁷ Hence, despite Kant’s attempts at shaping the understanding into a spontaneous faculty in the first *Critique*, it essentially remains a solicitor, always trying to organize the files of its bothersome, disorganized client, sensibility;¹⁸ it *relies* on sensibility for its content and this belies the productive-creative core of spontaneity.¹⁹ Although this argument is by no means exhaustive, it highlights why we cannot account for the transformative arch of the understanding by simply returning to the first *Critique* as though this evolution were implicitly folded into it.

Returning to fascicle X, it must be admitted that Kant does primarily attempt to stick to the architectonic seriality of the faculties but it soon becomes clear that this is no longer a viable possibility. The changed role of the understanding begins to call into question the basic critical premise that it only works with concepts:

All our cognition consists of two constituents: intuition and concept, which both lie a priori at the ground of cognition; and *the understanding is that form of connection (Verknüpfung)* of both into unity of the manifold in the subject, where, through that which was subjectively thought is represented objectively, as given. (OP 22:415, p.181, t.m and italics added).²⁰

In this sentence the formulation of the understanding indexes two subtle changes: first, the change from an act to a form, second, from *engaging* in connection to *being* a connection. In the Transcendental Dialectic, ‘connection’ (*Verknüpfung*) denotes the standing together and linking of concepts into a nexus and is technically distinguished from ‘interconnection’ (*Zusammenhang*),²¹ which denotes the more integral interpenetrating principle of unification or synthesis – as in the interconnection of metaphysics and physics. In the sentence from fascicle X above, the understanding is aligned with connection (*Verknüpfung*), but not only between concepts, it is now a *form* of connection between concept and intuition; it connects both into a chain. This is a curious shift, for although the understanding is a faculty of *making* connections (*Verknüpfung*) and interconnections (*Zusammenhang*) in *Critique of Pure Reason*, it is never considered as itself a mediating form of connection or interconnection.²² Nor is the understanding

¹⁷ This is also in line with the *Jäsche Logic*, where the distinction is made between the ‘lower faculty’ of sensibility and the ‘higher faculty’ of understanding ‘on the ground that sensibility gives the mere material for thought, but the understanding rules over this material and brings it under rules of concepts.’ (Log 9:36).

¹⁸ E.g., ‘[The understanding] is always busy poring through the appearances with the aim of finding some sort of rule in them.’ (KrV A126).

¹⁹ Also see (Massimi 2018, p.170) on the ‘cookie-cutter’ conception of the faculty of understanding, which I remain close to here.

²⁰ Also see (OP 22:418, p.183).

²¹ See (KrV A643/B671).

²² Although one could certainly argue that imagination occupies this role as a function of understanding, e.g., as does (Heidegger 1997, pp.62-64) and (Deleuze 2008, p.15).

considered a passage connecting empirical representation with the categories in the Deductions of the first *Critique*, where transcendental schematism – an operation of the imagination²³ – is vital in making formal connections. According to fascicle X it seems as though the understanding directly creates the integral connection between subjective and objective representation, or intuition and concept, which marks a widening in its field of operation.

Thus, the understanding transitions away from the conception in the first *Critique*, but there is also an internal transformation within the *Transition* itself, which we will move onto now.

In fascicle XI Kant ‘tumbles down the rabbit-hole’ so to speak, by appending a series of rapid transformations that implicitly challenge the understanding/sensibility relationship. I will quote three representative passages, which I interpret as a single trajectorial arch. I would like to add one caveat to this schematic, however; this transition should be contextualized as a problematic, especially in relation to the second transitional position. This is because in these quotations we still see elements of Kant’s previous distinctions bubbling and jostling, such that we might frame these steps as segments from a continual tension.²⁴

1. ‘the understanding anticipates (*anticipare*) the influence on the senses’ (OP 22:509, p.150).

2. ‘the understanding cannot begin from perception (empirical cognition with consciousness), [if it is] to determine the intuiting subject into a complex of representations, as cognition of the object (*objects*). It [the understanding] contains *a priori* the formal element of a system of perceptions prior to these empirical cognitions’ (OP 22:439, p.161, t.m) and ‘The faculty of making experience is the understanding’ (OP 22:497, m.t).

3. ‘The material from which experience is originally woven is not the perception of objects [...] – not from the material sense receives – but from what the understanding *makes* from ~~the formal element~~ of the senses/intuition’ (OP 22:447, p.165, t.m) and hence, ‘The object (*Object*) is neither idealistically nor realistically given, it is, on the contrary not *given* at all, but is merely thought (*non dari, sed intelligi potest*).’ (OP 22:441, p.162, t.m).²⁵

Whilst these phases raise many issues in connection with Kant’s corpus, I shall only home in on the issues posed to the understanding as we have explored it so far. Because of the rapid change between these phases, it will be helpful to briefly unpack them.

1. *The understanding anticipates the material given to/by sensibility.* In this formulation, the understanding anticipates or expects empirical content *before* it has been

²³ See (KrV A179/B140).

²⁴ My thanks go to Stephen Howard for his helpful comments on this.

²⁵ The Latin quotation reads: ‘It cannot be given, but it can be understood’.

given to/by sensibility. In this connection, we are flung back into the world of *Inaugural Dissertation*, where the understanding ‘infects’ sensibility rather than the other way around. But by this point Kant is working with a model of the understanding as insertion into sensibility for the sake of experience. Hence, its anticipation of sensibility is not only an infection but an *indication* of the possibility of experience, or in other words, the understanding anticipates experiential material by actively inserting material into sensibility.

2. *The understanding makes and is prior to experience and empirical cognition.* This leads to the relatively small step which involves premising the possibility of experience entirely on the understanding’s creation. In this phase the understanding not only anticipates material received and given by sensibility, nor does it merely indicate the possibility of experience, it *contains* the material before the subject receives anything sensible. It seems that in this phase the understanding is uncoupled from sensibility and is no longer sequentially reliant on it to receive material, rather, the understanding now autonomously generates its own material which is the basis for experience. It is with this phase that Kant undoes the *Stufenleiter* series, ‘senses [...] understanding [...] reason’ (KrV A298/B355) and the simultaneous reciprocity wished for in the first *Critique* so that the understanding now ‘makes’ experience and precedes sensibility.²⁶

3. *The understanding thinks the object in place of its ‘givenness’ in sensibility – the object is only thought.* In a crucial and final step Kant sees the object not as *given*, but as thought or perhaps *created*. This last phase is dubious but demonstrates a crystallization of the new understanding/sensibility relation. Kant now contends that objects are made by the understanding to such a degree that they are only thought, rather than given, hence the Latin inscription: ‘It cannot be given, but it can be understood’. Sensibility becomes entirely subordinate and reliant on the understanding as the seat of possibility, receiving only what the understanding has inserted. Hence, the object is thought instead of passively given.

From this transformative arch a major question is put to the possibility of a materialist dimension in Kant’s fascicle XI discussions. The materialist contention is compellingly argued by Jeffrey Edwards, who proposes that the ether constitutes a transcendental material condition for sensible experience (Edwards 2000, pp.163-4). But this is problematized by the preceding argument in that it would mean the understanding elementally inserts the ether, which could not then be a transcendental *material* condition, but a transcendental *conceptual* condition. This discussion leads back to a general problematic root which inhibits the entirety of the *Transition*: how material forces affect a subject that creates the concept of attractive and repulsive force prior to the empirical-sensible event itself;²⁷ and stated more generally: how the understanding determines

²⁶ Bryan Wesley Hall claims ‘we make everything ourselves’ is phrased in a purely organizational key. That is, that we simply organize perceptions emanating from the ether. This seems a weak interpretation since it insufficiently accounts for the radical thesis of the understanding ‘making’. See (Hall 2017, p.192).

²⁷ As fascicle X makes clear: ‘For experience does not come of its own accord as influence of the moving forces on sense, but must be made.’ (OP 22:320, p.107). Also see (OP 21:477, p.41 and 22:408, p.123).

material before it is given in sensibility.²⁸ In fascicle XI Kant seems clear that to answer these questions effectively we must change the order of the faculties: we only experience what the understanding makes possible to begin with, which in this case are the affections of force. So, this cannot be read in an entirely materialist sense, which rests on the architectonic primacy allotted to sensibility in the first *Critique*.

But there is, nonetheless, something stubborn and irrational in this reversal as when F.H. Bradley spoke of a world where ‘Death would come before birth, the blow would follow the wound, and all must seem to be irrational.’ (Bradley 1916, p.215). That is, Kant essentially seems to be arguing for the precedence of the (non-categorical) conceptual over the sensible, which cannot square up to the critical edifice by any measure. It requires an immense amount of unpacking to try and switch from the standard critical perspective, based on traditional causality, to a more fluid perspective, which leads some commentators to profoundly question this thesis.

Frederick Beiser is explicit about not believing the faculties to change in *Opus postumum*. His argument runs as follows. After detailing the fluidity of the understanding and sensibility, he goes on to question whether this constitutes a ‘*transformation* or *revision*’ of the faculties (Beiser 2008, pp.195-6). He answers in the negative, claiming that Kant retains his ‘old dualisms’, or his ‘continuing allegiance to the distinction between understanding and sensibility.’ (Beiser 2008, pp.197-8). Understanding must still rely on sensibility, otherwise Kant’s whole critical architectonic is jeopardized; he would have to account for a modification to the theory of space set out in *Transcendental Aesthetic* as well as revise the schematism and perhaps even the *Deductions*. Furthermore, there are textual elements in *Opus postumum* which seem to contradict this thesis, showing Kant’s allegiance to the *Stufenleiter* rendering of the faculties. How should we account for these moments?

My retort is that Kant works out of a changed notion of architectonic, an architectonic building-site of transition, which allows for confluences that would otherwise result in error, but this is still tacit in Kant’s thinking, he has not yet formalized it. Thus, Kant does not abolish the critical *distinction* between the two faculties (he remains faithful to their difference) but he tends towards reversing them for the simple reason that later fascicles depend on this, such as fascicle VII, written directly after fascicle XI. For, as we will see in section 4, without the reversal of the faculties the *Selbstsetzungslehre* falls apart.

Further, Kant is playful with the relationship between the faculties, sometimes insisting on the precedence of the forms of sensibility (space and time), sometimes on the precedence of the understanding (especially the synthetic unity of apperception). But as stated above, if we fail to note the changed methodological space within which Kant works, we fail to note the micro-transformations taking place, one of which is that made to the understanding. Hence, although sometimes Kant appears to restate the *Stufenleiter* formulation of the faculties, we must place this in the wider context of transformation occurring in fascicle XI, and indeed in the whole *Transition* site. This can explain the lead-

²⁸ This is effectively identical to Kant’s critical question of how synthetic a priori cognition is possible.

up to fascicle VII, where, one of the concluding thoughts of fascicle XI is taken to its extreme: that the ‘material element of sensible representation lies in perception, i.e., in the act through which the subject affects itself and becomes an appearance of an object for itself.’ (OP 22:502, p.146 t.m).²⁹

3. A Problematic of Phenomena

We can also conjecture a wider problematization around Kant’s notion of ‘phenomenon’ here. Phenomena in the first *Critique* were supposed to pertain to objects given through sensibility, divorced from any conceptual engendering, but in light of the architectonic reversal this no longer seems possible. A further issue is how this problematic is expressed in Kant’s discussion of Newton’s Book III of *Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy* (*Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica*), for one of the main themes of fascicle XI is a critique of Newton’s magnum opus.³⁰ I claim that Kant’s interrogation of the sensibility/understanding relationship questions Newton’s famous ‘deduction from the phenomena,’ but ultimately questions the assumptions about phenomena in *Critique of Pure Reason*.

In *On the Ground of the Distinction of all Objects in General into Phenomena and Noumena* in the first *Critique*, Kant connects phenomena with the empirical and sensible (KrV A248/B305nC) and noumena with abstractions of sensibility by the understanding (KrV A255/B311). After showing the impossibility of having one without the other, Kant connects the two terms to the conceptions of *mundis sensibilis* and *mundis intelligibilis*.³¹ The former, *mundis sensibilis*, pertains to the ‘sum total of appearances,’ which is intuited (this is correlated to theoretical astronomy, ‘which expounds the mere observation of the starry heavens’), and the latter, *mundis intelligibilis*, pertains to the interconnection (*Zusammenhang*) of appearances which is thought (this is correlated to ‘contemplative astronomy’ such as Newton’s laws of gravitation). The latter makes ‘an intelligible world representable’, or, a world of understanding something phenomenally given (KrV A256-7/B312-3). So here, Kant’s theorization of the place-holder of phenomena is quite bound up with Newton’s use but in a very peculiar way. By aligning Newton’s phenomena with *mundis intelligibilis*, Kant effectively places them in the register of noumena, obviously a contradictory move, since Newton could not have ‘deduced’ his theory from noumena. So what does Newton say about phenomena?

To begin an exegesis of what this term means in Newton’s system, we must start with the basic methodological premise that Newton claims to have no metaphysical edifice in his work, since he is not engaging in formal questions of *how* we know, but with the

²⁹ I am in agreement with Lehmann in foregrounding the aspect of the subject as an appearance here: ‘The subject posits itself not merely as *cogito*, rather as an object in appearance, as psychophysical subject, as an organism.’ (Lehmann 1969, p.409, m.t). Also see (Basile 2013, p.135-7) for an overview of Lehmann’s understanding of the *Selbstsetzungslehre*.

³⁰ See (Caygill 2005, p.33). See (Tuschling 1971, p.91) for a list of references to the ‘Newton-Polemik’ in *Opus postumum*.

³¹ *Sinnenwelt* (world of senses) – see section 1 of this essay – and *Verstandeswelt* (world of understanding), respectively.

mathematical foundations of *what* we know via the content of scientific observation and experiment.³² It is in this sense that he ‘present[s] principles of philosophy that are not [...] philosophical but strictly mathematical’ (Newton 1999, p.439), and that these are ‘deduced from the phenomena’ (Newton 1999, p.589) rather than from hypotheses. Hence, trying to locate a direct philosophical vocabulary of phenomena in the framework of *Principia* would seem like a futile exercise, but their difference from hypotheses suggests an indirect clue as to what this might look like.

Newton meant many things by the term ‘hypothesis’ which Alexandre Koyré has usefully catalogued. Koyré demarks an early use of the term by Newton as ‘a fundamental assumption or supposition in a theory.’ (Koyré 1965, p.264). This is the general sense of the term in the seventeenth century, whereby one can develop a hypothesis to justify a more general theory. It is not in this sense, however, that Newton is against hypotheses later in his life but a narrower definition with connotations of fictionalization or unscientific presumption for the sake of a theory – of which Descartes and Leibniz are the chief targets in Newton’s mind. In this narrower definition, hypotheses present a feigned (*finjo*) framework upon which no science can be based.³³ In Book III of *Principia* hypotheses are contrasted with the rules of philosophical reasoning (*regulae philosophandi*) and the phenomena from which wider mathematical propositions can be deduced. We know this contrast is great because, as Koyré points out, the first edition of Book III listed nine ‘hypotheses’, whilst the second and third editions replace these with the three then four ‘rules’ respectively, and the six ‘phenomena.’³⁴ With this change we are given the entry point into a more broadly philosophical perspective than other sections of the *Principia*. What are the rules of philosophical reasoning and the phenomena? Are we to assume that phenomena are empirical receptions given in sensibility and rules the categorical strictures placed upon this content? That is, can we read a critical epistemology into these terms?

That there is an epistemology in Book III is a difficult claim to stake, but this does sometimes seem a suitable description and has been discussed in some of the (non-philosophical) Newton literature.³⁵ In Rule 3 for example, Newton claims that based on evidence gleaned from experiments on particular bodies, we can conjecture about all other bodies like them. That is to say, the rule acts much like an epistemological-categorical generalization: ‘The extension of bodies is known to us only through our senses [...] but because extension is found in *all* sensible bodies, it is ascribed to *all* bodies universally.’ (Newton 1999, p.441, italics added). The ‘all’ in this sentence indicates something akin to the critical model of the understanding as a function of conceptualizing inductive connections, interconnections and combinations distended from sensible content. So far this is a model which seems to conform to the traditional Kantian critical edifice.

³² See (Caygill 2005, p.38).

³³ See (Koyré 1965, pp.34-5).

³⁴ See (Koyré 1965, pp.262-3) and (Newton 1999, p.440).

³⁵ For example, (Kerszberg 2012, p.530) discusses ‘two epistemological strategies’ at play in the deduction from phenomena.

But a problem emerges when trying to map the faculty of sensibility onto Newton's phenomena. To take the first two examples:

Phenomenon 1: *The circumjovial planets [satellites of Jupiter], by radii drawn to the centre of Jupiter, describe areas proportional to the times, and their periodic times – the fixed stars being at rest – are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from that centre.* (Newton 1999, p.443).

Phenomenon 2: *The circumsaturnian planets [satellites of Saturn], by radii drawn to the centre of Saturn, describe areas proportional to the times, and their periodic times – the fixed stars being at rest – are as the 3/2 powers of their distances from that centre.* (Newton 1999, p.444).

These phenomena constitute a series of inferences, describing mathematically the behaviour of physical, celestial bodies. Within the descriptions of the phenomena Newton includes a table which collates all the observational data that goes toward making up a single phenomenon, from the observations of Giovanni Alfonso Borelli to the observations of Giovanni Domenico Cassini. The importance of observational data for verifying phenomena, or even simply describing them, tells us immediately that for Newton phenomena are not 'given' in empirical sense-impressions but are constructed from inherently conceptualized statistics of observation. The phenomena Newton works with are strictly numerical documentations of the times and distances of elliptical orbits and hence are resistant to alignment with sensibility or the critical conception of the faculties more generally. As much as the term 'phenomenon' in the modern context has become generally intertwined with a relation to sensibility (perhaps no thanks to *Critique of Pure Reason*), this is simply not so in the *Principia*. There are no sensible correlatives in Book III, only mathematical correlatives, which seems an entirely purposeful intention of Newton, who, as I have quoted above, claims he only engages in principles of mathematics which form a foundation on which to base natural philosophy.

Kant picks up on this complicated situation in fascicle XI by raising the issue of the title Newton chose for his 'immortal work'. The problem Kant has is that a mathematical principle cannot properly lie at the foundation of a *philosophy* of nature, just as a philosophical principle cannot lie at the foundation of a *mathematics* of nature; both occupy separate territories and would need to be put through the rigorous building-site of transition in order to find their intermediary concepts (*Mittelbegriffe/Zwischenbegriffe*), before transitioning from one to the other (OP 22:488-9, p.138). Kant takes this problematization to an extreme, suggesting two new branches: 1. 'Philosophical principles of natural science' (*scientiae naturalis principia philosophica*) and 2. 'Mathematical principles of natural science' (*scientiae naturalis principia mathematica*) (OP 21:238, m.t). Between August and September 1798, in fascicle IV, Kant hints at the problematic implicit in Newton's methodology,

What are called the *mathematical* foundations of the science of nature (*philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*), as expressed by Newton in his immortal work, are (as the expression itself indicates) no part of the *philosophy of nature*. They are only an instrument (albeit a most necessary one) for the calculation of the magnitude of motions and moving forces (which must be given by observation of nature) and for the determination of their laws for physics. (OP 21:482, p.43).

Hence, in Kant's mind it is absurd to engage in a *mathematical* foundation of natural philosophy, since it acts merely as the instrumental calculation of moving forces (phenomena), not their grounding principle. Accordingly, Newton made a fundamental – not to mention *architectonic* – error by engaging in an amphiboly of two different territories without explaining the transitorial principle for doing so. In fascicle XI Kant claims that vis a vis this confusion, the *Principia* 'assumes' gravity 'for the sake of the system' (OP 22:455, p.125),³⁶ which means it engenders the definition of a conceptualized phenomenon against a sensible phenomenon. Thus, a non-empirical – conceptual – gloss must be given to Book III, wherein it does not unfold according to phenomena understood in the register of sensibility, but in the register of the understanding. But as I have argued above, Newton had already mapped out this criticism by claiming only to engage in mathematical principles.³⁷ Hence, it is Kant's theorization of phenomena which is changed from *Critique of Pure Reason*, not Newton's. It may well be that the object of critique in fascicle XI is Newtonianism but the direct result is a critique of the *Critique*.

What differs with both Book III *and* the first *Critique*, however, is the changed role of architectonic wherein the forces – as phenomena – genetically stem from and are posited by the subject. Book III did not come close to suggesting this and it dramatically differs from *Critique of Pure Reason*. In a sense, what Kant does with the concept of phenomena is place it on the site of transition, turning it into a mid-way point, not quite a pure hypothesis, not quite a pure sensible item but *inserted* via the understanding, nonetheless:

The first principle of representation of the moving forces of matter is not to regard them as things in themselves but as phenomena, according to the relation which they have to the subject – as they affect our sense, or as we affect our sense ourselves. [It involves] inserting the formal element of sensible representation into the subject in order to progress from the Axioms of Intuition, the Anticipations of Perception, etc. to experience – that is, *for* experience as a system, not as derived from experience. Consequently, [it amounts to] oneself founding such a system *a priori* – composing it synthetically, not deriving it analytically from the material

³⁶ Friedman traces this problem of assumption to *Metaphysical Foundations*. See (Friedman 1994, pp.149-50).

³⁷ Adickes suggests that Kant missed this due to the peculiar English use of the term '*philosophia naturalis*' (natural philosophy), which is equivalent to '*Naturwissenschaft*' (natural science) (Adickes 1920, p.159n1). But it seems unlikely, since the two terms in German or English were not explicitly separated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Even in Newton's hands the terms were still obscure, although some argue that he set in motion their separation and the eventual supersedence of natural philosophy by natural science in the nineteenth century. See (Maxwell 2017, pp.30-58).

element of empirical representation. Hence, it is this principle of form – not the *material* which moves the senses (*Sinnenbewegende Stoffe*)³⁸ – which provides *a priori* the basis for the possibility of experience (by the rule, *forma dat esse rei*). (OP 22:300, pp.103-4, t.m).

In other words, Kant’s notion of phenomenon in *Transition* diverges from an immediate sensible element which affects the subject externally to reflect the fact of its intermediary concept (*Mittelbegriff/Zwischenbegriff*) status, sandwiched between both sensible and conceptual elements without clear boundaries between them. In this sense Kant’s phenomena are more like Newton’s in Book III (although still very different) than his own in the first *Critique*.³⁹ Further, this underscores the architectonic transformation of the faculties in the *Transition* project more generally as well as beyond the remit of Kant studies.

From a more contemporary perspective, whilst the experimental physicist may argue that they merely observe brute facts,⁴⁰ the transformation in fascicles X and XI suggests this can no longer be maintained since ‘to observe’ necessarily indicts the chain of genesis of the subject stemming from the understanding. This throws up an extremely *modern* perspective of physics as W.H. Werkmeister points out: ‘It is a fact [...] that in the *Opus postumum* Kant developed ideas that are strikingly similar to principles and conceptions of modern physics and quantum mechanics.’ (Werkmeister 1980, p.127). The transformation of the understanding ties a Gordian knot between observer and observed, between phenomenon and subject – an unwitting anticipation of the wave function collapse in the Copenhagen theory of quantum mechanics. It is in this spirit that I claim we should read Kant when he quotes the scholastic saying, ‘*forma dat esse rei*’ (‘form gives being to the thing’) throughout fascicle X.⁴¹

Hence, in as much as the experimental physics side of *Transition* is intimately bound up with the observation of phenomena, the meaning of ‘observation of phenomena’ takes on a new, richer significance emboldened by the understanding. When a subject observes an experiment, the observation cannot be considered passive nor primarily received through sensibility but engendered by the understanding and the conceptual. Kant’s whole line of argumentation in fascicle X and XI is premised on the implicit reversal with the understanding as the root from which all possibility grows, or in Burkhard Tuschling’s words, ‘We cannot understand nature, the world and its objects, as absolutely independent entities but only as products of the synthesizing activity of our understanding’ (Tuschling 1989, p.210). Only we must now extend the understanding beyond solely engaging in synthesizing material. In this way Kant comes close to Christoph Lichtenberg’s view that, ‘in observing nature, and especially the order found in

³⁸ Literally, ‘sense-moving material’.

³⁹ I am in agreement with (Friedman 1994, pp.230-1) on this point.

⁴⁰ The now classic example is (Kuhn 2012, pp.25-8) where three descriptions are given to account for ‘fact-gathering’.

⁴¹ See (OP 22:318, p.105; 22:322, p.108; 22:355, p.115).

nature, we are always only observing ourselves.’ (Lichtenberg 2012, p.113). Building on such a sentiment in fascicle XI, Kant races to an extreme point in fascicle VII and the *Selbstsetzungslehre*, which I now turn to.

4. The *Selbstsetzungslehre* and Fascicle VII

Most of fascicle VII discusses ‘self-positing’ (*Selbstsetzung*). Exactly what this means for Kant and how it plays into the evolution of the understanding shall be the focus of this section.

As a preliminary starting point, it is worth noting Kant’s methodological use of the term ‘positing’ (*Setzung*) in his 1763 essay *The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God*. Kant tells us that positing involves positioning relations, and hence defines the concept of combination (*verbindungs begriff*) (BDG 2:73). This constitutes a ‘relative’ element or the epistemological side of the act of positing as opposed to the ontological, which Kant describes as ‘absolute positing’, an attribute of God. More importantly, in the next sub-section Kant goes on to state that ‘a distinction must be drawn between what is posited and how it is posited’ (BDG 2:75). Although in 1763 Kant had not developed clear distinctions of methodology, the difference between ‘what’ and ‘how’ in the act of positing hints at a distinction between the practical and theoretical in Kant’s later corpus. Indeed, these two sides return in the *Selbstsetzungslehre*, written some 37 years after the *Only Possible Argument*, playing an important role in differentiating the theoretical-epistemological (‘how’) discussions from the practical-moral (‘what’) discussions of self-positing. In the following, I investigate the theoretical-epistemological (‘how’) side of fascicle VII. This brief departure is a reminder that Kant is not introducing a new concept, he is transforming an old concept, whilst sticking to its original methodological underpinning.⁴²

In a letter to Johann Heinrich Tieftrunk of November 5, 1797, Kant refers to the act of positing (*setzen*) as ‘the *a priori* condition of apperception’ (Br 12:213), pointing up the link between apperception and positing, claiming that ‘positing, as a function of the mind, is spontaneity and, like all functions of self-consciousness, is a spontaneous synthesis (*zusammensetzen*) and therefore a function of unity.’ (Br 12:213). This is a good place to start, since three years later Kant begins writing on self-positing in a much more sustained, radical way. Thus, I will start with the Transcendental Deductions to better understand the role of apperception, before moving on to the *Selbstsetzungslehre*.

Although there are voracious disagreements over the divergencies of the two Transcendental Deductions, we may say that both share the contention that transcendental apperception constitutes a synthesis.⁴³ In schematic terms, transcendental apperception is

⁴² Alongside Eckart Förster, I disagree with Adickes when he says that Kant only engages in a repetition of Fichte’s ‘extreme idealism’ by adopting the popular discourse of ‘*setzen*’ (Adickes 1920, p.668). The term had already been theorized in Kant’s work long before. See (Förster 1989, pp.217-8).

⁴³ To pick two examples, the A edition reads, ‘the original and necessary consciousness of the identity of oneself is at the same time a consciousness of an equally necessary unity of the synthesis of all appearances in accordance with concepts’ (KrV A108); and the B edition reads, ‘it is only because I can combine a

the identity or synthetic unity of the subsisting ‘I think’ which accompanies and unifies all representations of objects in sensibility into a singular self-conscious experience (KrV B131-2). In its role as a unifier, Kant theorizes that apperception precedes the empirical content of objects: ‘no cognitions can occur in us, no connection and unity among them without that unity of consciousness that *precedes all data of the intuitions*’ (KrV A107, italics added). And in the B edition Kant is even more direct:

The synthetic unity of consciousness is therefore an objective condition of all cognition, not merely something I myself need in order to cognize an object (*Object*) but rather something under which every intuition must stand *in order to become an object (Object) for me*. (KrV B138).

Transcendental apperception, then, is the condition of possibility of *all* cognition, through which sensible objects must pass to become ‘objects for me’. But it is only this in so far as it unifies the field of disparate empirical material into a singular experience according to the categories. That is to say, Kant sticks to the architectonic ordering of the faculties peculiar to the first *Critique*: simultaneous reciprocity and *Stufenleiter* seriality.

The importance of the faculty of understanding in this regard cannot be downplayed, however. Indeed, Kant notes that ‘the synthetic unity of apperception is the highest point to which one must affix all use of the understanding’ (KrV B134). The ‘highest point’ pertains to the various stages in the A Deduction: (1) synthesis of apprehension in intuition – aligned with sensibility; (2) synthesis of reproduction – aligned with imagination; and (3) synthesis of recognition in the concept – aligned with the understanding (KrV A98-110). Via the categories, the understanding organizes the material synthetically and ‘legislates’⁴⁴ over sensibility, which is combined in transcendental apperception. This is a contested area of Kant scholarship⁴⁵ and there are many perspective we could take, but we at least get a sketch of a relationship between the faculty of understanding and transcendental apperception, that the latter has its root in the former.

Returning to the motif put forward in section 2, another important factor is Kant’s identification of the spontaneity of transcendental apperception with the understanding, which he states clearly in the B Deduction: ‘this representation is an act of *spontaneity*, i.e., it cannot be regarded as belonging to sensibility.’ (KrV B132).⁴⁶ But what is spontaneous about transcendental apperception, if all it can do is unify – and ‘legislate’ over – sensible content? To table an answer it seems obvious to return to the understanding as the act of combining appearances to find their common rules and form through the categories, as Kant does in the A Deduction (KrV A127), but this would water down the much stronger

manifold of given representations *in one consciousness* that it is possible for me to represent the *identity of the consciousness in these representations* itself’ (KrV B133-4).

⁴⁴ See (Deleuze 2008, pp.13-5).

⁴⁵ See (Gardner 1999, p.145 and pp.158-9) and (Martin 1974, pp.192-3).

⁴⁶ Also see (KrV A126).

thesis that spontaneity involves production and creation.⁴⁷ We see this notion emerge at the beginning of Transcendental Logic, where Kant uses the term '*hervorbringen*' to describe the spontaneity of understanding, which is translated 'bringing forth' but should be appended by the terms, 'to generate', 'to spawn' or 'to produce'. This productive-creative aspect of spontaneity does not seem at stake in the Transcendental Deductions, however, especially not in connection with transcendental apperception and the understanding, which remain organizational.

Zooming out to the *Selbstsetzungslehre*, we initially find a similar line of thought to the Deductions. For example, midway through fascicle VII Kant says, 'The faculty of representation proceeds from the consciousness of myself (*apperceptio*), and this is a merely logical act, an act of thought, through which no object is yet given by me' (OP 22:79, p.187), which is to say, self-consciousness, or apperception, is a pure '*ens rationis*' or concept without an object, a logical act, or act of the understanding combining disparate material. Further, in a deleted passage from the same section of fascicle VII Kant gives us further information about the *Selbstsetzungslehre*'s methodological *raison d'être*, which also resonates with the Deductions: 'what is thinkable (*cogitabile*) requires an object (*dabile*), namely, something which corresponds as intuition to a concept' (OP 22:79, p.187). Determining the giveable (*dabile*) object corresponding to the thinking/thinkable (*cogitabile*) subject is hence the task of the *Selbstsetzungslehre*.⁴⁸ It seems that Kant is staying within the bounds of the first *Critique* here, as Edwards suggests, 'one could, it seems, justifiably maintain that the description of theoretical self-positing does nothing more than refine the presentation of the a priori anticipation of the form of possible experience already offered in the first *Critique*.' (Edwards 2000, pp.168-9).

I claim that although its methodological ambition is similar to the Deductions, the *Selbstsetzungslehre* is fundamentally different because it is premised on the reversal effected in fascicles X and XI and hence the understanding is the origin of one's self as an object. This brings to light the productive-creative spontaneity of the understanding and with it the altogether new thesis of the *Selbstsetzungslehre*: to be self-conscious *is* to posit one's self as an object.⁴⁹ The emphasis is thus on explicating the specific act whereby the subject makes itself into an object *for* sensibility since this machination cannot be 'derived from a sense-object, but determines the object by its [the subject's] *a priori* act, [through which] it is the owner and originator of its own representations.' (OP 22:82-3, p.189, t.m). We can see here how the possibility of the subject as object is indexed in the spontaneous act of self-generative creation; no longer is the subject with apperception given reciprocally with sensibility, nor is it reliant on sensibility, but via the understanding it creates the very possibility of sensibility: 'The understanding begins with the consciousness of itself (*apperceptio*) and performs thereby a logical act. To this the

⁴⁷ What (Ellis 2017, p.139) calls 'absolute spontaneity'.

⁴⁸ In Förster's words, it tries 'to show how the I as mere object of thought (*cogitabile*) can become an empirical object given in space and time (*dabile*).' (Förster 2000, p.103).

⁴⁹ 'Consciousness of itself (*apperceptio*) is an act through which the subject makes itself in general into an object.' (OP 22:413, p.180). 'Consciousness of myself (*apperception*) is the act of the subject to make itself into an object (*object*).' (OP 22:89, m.t). Also see (OP 22:98, p.196).

manifold of outer and inner intuition attaches itself serially, and the subject makes itself into an object in a limitless sequence.’ (OP 22:82, p.189). What’s more, by reading the architectonic reversal of understanding and sensibility into *Transition* before the advent of fascicle VII, we can understand Kant much more clearly when he writes things such as, ‘That there is something else outside me is my own product. I make myself.’ (OP 22:82, p.189). If we were to read these sentences from a strictly ‘critical’ perspective, they obviously indicate a major contradiction along Berkeleyan subjective idealist lines. But if we read them as logical consequences of the architectonic reversal, that is, in the transitional context from which they arise, we get a much clearer perspective on what Kant might mean. Kant is saying that the possibility of the subject’s empirical content is premised on the understanding producing – or, indeed, conceptually *inserting* – this content in the first place, and that this content – the object – is therefore made by the spontaneous, apperceptive act of the subject. But what then happens to receptivity?

In the Transcendental Deductions receptivity is defined in opposition to spontaneity as an act, but this is changed in fascicle VII, where receptivity must also be considered an activity.⁵⁰ If the understanding precedes sensibility and makes experience possible through a self-positing act, then receptivity, the defining feature of receiving sensible impressions, must also be made into an act. But how does this active conception of receptivity not abolish what Hall calls, ‘genuine receptivity’ (Hall 2017, p.188), and is the relation between spontaneity and receptivity not completely undermined here? As Kant himself states in the November 5, 1797 letter, the question is, if the subject posits itself as object, ‘from where does the manifold of sensation come, what in it is the *merely empirical* aspect of sensation? [...] what are these objects that affect sensibility?’ (Br 12:215-6, t.m).

Unless by ‘genuine’ we mean ‘passive’ I do not think this thesis abolishes genuine receptivity. Receptivity is still a feature of sensibility in fascicle VII, but it is not premised on a conception of affectivity which lies permanently open like a black hole, rather, it forms an active affectivity of openings and closings; a kind of leaping out to take hold of content. But then we are led into the second question, does this not reduce receptivity and spontaneity to the same definition? This question marks the radical departure Kant makes from the first *Critique* to *Transition*, for in the latter he does not want to define spontaneity and receptivity solely on whether they are acts but also by their relation to forces. Hence the distinction between spontaneity and receptivity is not undermined, nor do they become conflated and subsumed under the same definition, rather, they are deferred to a different set of definitions involving two interconnected ways of being affected by forces. This is in keeping with the new dynamical theory of matter Kant develops in *Opus postumum*. So, although there is a change in so far as receptivity becomes an act, it retains its characteristic distinguishing feature as bound up with sensibility, only deferred to the

⁵⁰ ‘The representation of apperception which makes itself into an object of intuition contains a *twofold act*: first, that of positing itself (the act of spontaneity); and [second], that of being affected by objects and interconnecting (*zusammen*) the manifold in representation to *a priori* unity (the *act* of receptivity).’ (OP 22:31, p.173, t.m, italics added). Also see (OP 22:28) and (OP 22:466, p.132).

context of force. But this opens even more issues, now to do with Kant's 'critical' conception of space.

According to Tuschling's 'subjects at stake' (Tuschling 1993, p.160), space – which was an a priori form of sensibility in the first *Critique*'s Transcendental Aesthetic – undergoes a revision in *Opus postumum* precisely along the lines of the change made to the role of apperception in *Selbstsetzungslehre*. Keeping with the general 'productive' thematic of fascicle VII, Kant says space becomes a form 'which we ourselves make (*machen*)' (OP 22:76, p.185), that is, if the first empirical content is made via the apperceptive subject, then it must also make space, since it is in space that the subject must encounter itself as a body. Space is hence no longer an empty, pure form of sensibility, but a continuum of posited affective forces – a plenum – pressing upon the body of the subject, which ties fascicle VII into the *Elementarsystem* that Kant had been working on for many years before. Although this indicates significant departures from fascicle VII, it is important for tracing out the wider consequences the transformation instigates.

One way to make sense of the modification made to space is given by Förster. First, he claims, 'Space must [...] be represented, not merely as a form of intuition, but as something existing outside me, as something empirically given. It can be this only if it is filled with moving forces'. Second, 'for there to be experience of any particular object in space, the object's moving forces must affect the subject'. And last, 'The moving forces of matter cannot be given to the subject by being passively received. They are recognized only by the subject's reaction, as forces with which we interfere' (Förster 1989, p.230).⁵¹ Rather problematically, this suggests an empirical realism with regards to space, something which Kant argues against throughout *Opus postumum*, but it nonetheless shows how the possibility of being affected by forces through space is premised on the activity of the subject. For the subject to be experientially affected by forces it must *intervene* by itself emanating forces. In this connection, the self-positing subject transforms space into an '*act* [...] of the power of representation positing (*setzen*) itself' (OP 22:88, p.193, t.m). Hence when Kant says, 'The position (*position*) of something outside me, itself first commences from me, in the forms of space and time, in which I myself posit (*setze*) the objects of outer and inner sense' (OP 22:97, p.195)⁵² it comes preloaded with such a modification. Space becomes filled with activity, first with the spontaneous act of understanding and then the receptive act of sensibility. A shift from space as a pure form of sensibility to space which is premised on proliferating affective forces and the dual active capacities of the self-conscious subject is thus at stake. Accordingly, to be affected is cached in the capacity to affect, but the wider implication is that the whole structure is grounded in the original act of the understanding, which can only be the case if it precedes sensibility;⁵³ space is the subject's power of spontaneous, theoretical self-positing given in representation.

⁵¹ Förster references a passage from fascicle IV in support of this reading: 'The concept of primordial motive forces is not taken from experience, rather it must lie *a priori* in the activity of the mind, and of which we are conscious in moving.' (OP 21:490, m.t).

⁵² Also see (OP 21:38)

⁵³ In a passage from fascicle X, but written around April 1800 (during Kant's writing of fascicle VII) Kant is clear on this: 'Our sensible intuition is, initially, not perception (empirical representation with

Conclusion

Ultimately, what the transition through fascicles X, XI and VII shows is an inherent experimental playfulness in Kant's methodological approach. He is willing to put his previous distinctions through radical twists and turns, which often result in some peculiar concepts and ideas in *Transition*, such as the *Selbstsetzungslehre*. But we must always situate transformations like this primarily on the architectonic site of transition, for it is here that Kant is able to play with concepts in an experimental way in an attempt to find their interconnections and points of contact. We should take this approach as a prompt, both to engage with Kant in this process of thinking by setting his work within a larger set of transitions, but also to challenge our own assumptions about what Kant's system of philosophy actually is.

Works Cited

I cite passages in *Opus postumum* according to volume and page number in Kant's *gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Prussian (now German) Academy of Sciences (1900–), followed by the page number in the English translation. I cite all of Kant's other works according to volume and page number in the Academy edition also, except Critique of Pure Reason, which is quoted according to first and second edition pagination (as is customary). Unless otherwise stated I follow the translations of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant. Where I have modified a translation, I have attached the abbreviation 't.m', where I have translated the passage myself, I have attached the abbreviation 'm.t'.

Adickes, Erich. (1920), *Kants Opus postumum: dargestellt und beurteilt*. Berlin: Reuther and

Reichard.

Allison, Henry E. (1973), *The Kant-Eberhard Controversy*. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.

Basile, Giovanni Pietro. (2013), *Kants Opus postumum und seine Rezeption*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

Beiser, Frederick. (2008), *German Idealism: The Struggle Against Subjectivism, 1781-1801*.

Harvard: Harvard University Press.

Bradley, F.H. (1916), *Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay*. London: George Allen and Unwin.

consciousness), for a principle of positing oneself and of becoming conscious of this position precedes it' (OP 22:420, p.184).

- Caygill, Howard. (2007), 'The Transition Problem in Kant's *Opus postumum*'. In *Kant: Making Reason Intuitive*, ed. Loli Patellis, Kyriaki Goudeli, Pavlos Kontos, pp.16-27. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Caygill, Howard. (2005), 'The Force of Kant's *Opus postumum*: Kepler and Newton in the XIth Fascicle'. *Angelaki* vol. 10, no.1: pp.33-42.
- Deleuze, Gilles. (2008), *Kant's Critical Philosophy*. trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. London: Continuum Publishing.
- Descartes, Rene. (1999), *Selected Philosophical Writings*. trans. John Cottingham and Robert Stoothoff. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Edwards, Jeffrey. (2000), *Substance, Force, and the Possibility of Knowledge: On Kant's Philosophy of Material Nature*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Ellis, Addison. (2017), 'The Case for Absolute Spontaneity in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*'. *Con-Textos Kantianos* no.6: pp.138-164.
- Feyerabend, Paul K. (1985), *Realism, Rationalism and Scientific Method: Philosophical Papers Volume 1*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Förster, Eckart. (2000), *Kant's Final Synthesis: An Essay on the Opus postumum*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Förster, Eckart. (1989), 'Kant's *Selbstsetzungslehre*'. In *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three 'Critiques' and the 'Opus postumum'*, ed. Eckart Förster, pp.217-238. California: Stanford University Press.
- Friedman, Michael. (1994), *Kant and the Exact Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gardner, Sebastian. (1999), *Kant and the Critique of Pure Reason*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Hall, Bryan Wesley. (2017), *The Post-Critical Kant: Understanding the Critical Philosophy Through the Opus postumum*. Oxon: Routledge.
- Heidegger, Martin. (1997), *Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Hoppe, Hansgeorg. (1969), *Kants Theorie der Physik: Eine Untersuchung über das Opus postumum von Kant*. Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann.
- Kerszberg, Pierre. (2012), 'Deduction Versus Discourse: Newton and the Cosmic Phenomena'. *Foundations of Science* vol.18, no.3: pp.529-44.
- Koyré, Alexandre. (1965), *Newtonian Studies*. London: Chapman and Hall.
- Kuhn, Thomas S. (2012), *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*. Chicago: Chicago University Press.

- Lambert, Johann. (2009), 'New Organon'. In *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason: Background Source Materials*, eds. Eric Watkins and Manfred Kuehn, pp.257-274. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm. (1989), *Philosophical Essays*. trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garbor. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing.
- Lehmann, Gerhard. (1969), *Beiträge zur Geschichte und Interpretation der Philosophie Kants*.
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter
- Lichtenberg, Georg Christoph. (2012), *Philosophical Writings*. trans and ed. Steven Tester. New York: State University of New York Press.
- Locke, John. (1995), *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. New York: Prometheus Books.
- Martin, Gottfried. (1974), *Kant's Metaphysics and Theory of Science*. trans. P.G. Lucas. Connecticut: Greenwood Press.
- Massimi, Michela. (2018), 'Grounds, Modality, and Nomic Necessity in the Critical Kant.' In *Kant and the Laws of Nature*, ed. Michela Massimi and Angela Breitenbach, pp.150-70. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Maxwell, Nicholas. (2017), *In Praise of Natural Philosophy*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press.
- McDowell, John. (1996), *Mind and World*. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
- Newton, Isaac. (1999), *The Principia: Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy*. trans. I. Bernard Cohen and Anne Whitman. California: University of California Press.
- Smith, Norman Kemp. (1992), *Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International
- Sng, Zachary. (2010), *The Rhetoric of Error from Locke to Kleist*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tuschling, Burkhard. (1993), 'The Concept of Transcendental Idealism in Kant's *Opus postumum*'. In *Kant and Critique: New Essays in Honour of W.H. Werkmeister*, ed. R.M. Dancy, pp.151-167. Netherlands: Springer.
- Tuschling, Burkhard. (1989), 'Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's *Opus postumum*'. In *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three 'Critiques' and the 'Opus postumum'*, ed. Eckart Förster, pp.193-217. California: Stanford University Press.
- Tuschling, Burkhard. (1971), *Metaphysische und Transzendente Dynamik in Kants Opus postumum*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
- Werkmeister, W.H. (1980), *Kant: the Architectonic and Development of His Philosophy*. Illinois: Open court.



FUERZAS, FACULTADES Y FORMAS A PRIORI EN KANT

FORCES, FACULTIES AND A PRIORI FORMS IN KANT

EUGENIO MOYA*

Universidad de Murcia, España

Abstract

For the author of this paper, the Kantian rejection of the identification of his concept of *a priori* with the Leibnizian notion of innateness can be understood only in a clear and precise way, if we resort to the Kantian conception of epigenesis as epistemological model; that is, if we consider the faculties of knowledge as formative forces that are composed with other forces of nature to make possible the original acquisition of intuitions and concepts *a priori*.

Key words

Epigenesis, innateness, mind, original acquisition, preformation.

Resumen

Para el autor de este artículo, el rechazo kantiano de la identificación de su concepto de *a priori* con la noción leibniziana de lo innato solo puede comprenderse de manera clara y precisa, si recurrimos a la concepción kantiana de la epigénesis como modelo epistemológico; es decir, si consideramos las facultades cognitivas como fuerzas formativas que se componen con otras fuerzas de la naturaleza para hacer posible la adquisición originaria de intuiciones y conceptos *a priori*.

Palabras clave

Adquisición originaria, epigénesis, innato, mente, preformación.

Introducción

La Historia de la Filosofía ha proyectado siempre una imagen de Kant como pináculo filosófico de la Modernidad; como la mejor expresión de las insuficiencias de una razón

* Eugenio Moya es Catedrático de Filosofía en la Universidad de Murcia. E-mail: emoya@um.es.

exenta. Como le escribía, no sin sorna Hamann a Christian Jacob Kraus, el 18 de diciembre de 1784, un filósofo autoconcebido *solitario* (autónomo), *apoltronado detrás de la estufa y con el gorro de dormir hasta los ojos*.

No se trata solo de imágenes críticas, sino sostenidas por pensadores de filiación kantiana como Habermas. En *Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung* (1999) atribuye a Nietzsche haber sabido señalar, bajo el impulso que supusieron las revolucionarias tesis de Darwin, los límites y presupuestos de una razón kantiana no situada. Le reconoce habernos enseñado que la verdad de cualquier juicio (y en especial el sintético *a priori*) depende de hasta qué punto favorece la vida, conserva la especie, quizá, incluso, la selecciona. Le agradece habernos ofrecido, frente a la imagen antropocéntrica del sujeto soberano, capaz de autodeterminar sus acciones, las cosas o la misma historia, la imagen naturalizada del hombre como *producto*: de la naturaleza, de la historia... Habermas, por ello, termina reclamando la necesidad de renovar el concepto kantiano de lo *transcendental*:

El objeto del análisis transcendental ya no es aquella ‘conciencia general’, sin origen, que constituía el núcleo común de todos los espíritus empíricos. La investigación se dirige ahora más bien a las estructuras profundas del trasfondo que es el mundo de la vida; estructuras que se encarnan en las prácticas y rendimientos de los sujetos capaces de lenguaje y acción. El análisis transcendental busca los rasgos invariantes que se van repitiendo en la multiplicidad histórica de las formas de vida socioculturales. Habermas 2002, p. 21)

Con la detranscendentalización, señala el filósofo frankfurtiano, *la conciencia transcendental kantiana ha bajado a la tierra* en la forma desublimada de la práctica comunicativa cotidiana, ha perdido las connotaciones de una instancia “*situada más allá del espacio y del tiempo*” (Habermas 2002, p. 20), y lo *a priori* pasa a ser concebido como resultado de “*procesos propios de la génesis de una razón penetrada por la naturaleza y la historia*”. (Habermas 2002, p. 310).

Argumentaré en este trabajo que solo la desatención al *epigenetic turn* de la filosofía de Kant puede justificar la perspectiva del frankfurtiano, pues ese giro arroja luz sobre los problemas relacionados con la génesis y validez del *a priori*, además de darnos una imagen más ajustada de una mente y sus facultades como entidades mundanas, de origen natural, que responden, por tanto, a los mismos procesos –esquemas, dirá Kant– básicos de formación y funcionamiento que el resto de cualquier ser organizado (vivo). Pero antes intentaré mostrar en esta introducción que la orientación hermenéutica de Habermas rivaliza en su incompreensión del *a priori* con la visión analítica (principalmente anglosajona).

Sabemos que en su famosa *Respuesta a Eberhard* (1790), Kant dejó meridianamente claro que *apriorismo* e *innatismo* son incompatibles:

La *Crítica* no admite, en absoluto, representaciones implantadas en el sujeto desde la Creación [*annerschaffene*], ni innatas [*angeborene*]; a todas ellas, ya pertenezcan a la intuición o a los conceptos del entendimiento, las considera adquiridas [*erworben*]. Pero hay una adquisición originaria [*ursprüngliche Erwerbung*] (como se expresan los maestros del derecho natural), una

adquisición, por tanto, de aquello que antes no existía en modo alguno, y que, por consiguiente, no pertenecía a ninguna cosa antes de esa acción. (AA 8: 221)¹

Sorprenden, sin embargo, las dificultades que la tradición analítica ha tenido siempre para tematizar de modo adecuado esta incompatibilidad. Isabel Cabrera (1994) ha sabido resumir y asumir bien estas dificultades. En principio, se pregunta por qué Kant hace del espacio una *forma de la sensibilidad*, además de una *intuición pura*, cuando la noción de “intuición pura” ya recogía su carácter de condición epistémica. Es evidente, según la autora (aunque introduce un desconcertante “me parece” en su texto), que Kant no consideraba el espacio “innato”, porque lo concebía más como una forma o estructura de la percepción que como una representación con contenido propio; sin embargo, pensar en “formas” cuyo asiento está en la mente humana es, para ella, otro modo de pensar en algo innato, solo que quizá más en la línea de Chomsky que la de Descartes. Conforme a la tradición analítica, considera que si el filósofo de Königsberg rechazaba el innatismo por ser una hipótesis explicativa innecesaria, “*también pudo rechazar la teoría de las formas de la subjetividad por las mismas razones*”. Así pues, concluye, que pese a los heroicos intentos de Allison², la sugerencia de Strawson continua en pie: “*siempre podemos quedarnos con una interpretación austera del a priori, solo en tanto condición de posibilidad, sin buscar un apoyo adicional.*” (Cabrera 1994, p. 158).

Habermas reclamaba una detranscendentalización del *a priori*; la tradición analítica su deflación³. Ambas tradiciones hacen buena a su manera la injusta anotación que Schiller introduce en la decimotercera de sus *Cartas sobre la educación estética del hombre* sobre la molestia que siempre supuso, al menos para el transcendentalismo kantiano todo lo material, fáctico y contingente.


¹ Las referencias a obras de Kant se harán indicando el volumen y la página de la edición de la Academia (Immanuel Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, vols. 1-22: Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vol. 23: Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, vols. 24 -...: Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, 1900-). La única excepción a esta norma es la *Crítica de la razón pura*, que, según lo usual, se citará con las letras A y/o B (según se trate de la primera o segunda edición) y el número de párrafo correspondiente.

² Allison (1992, p. 497) ha intentado siempre superar una “explicación convencional” del idealismo trascendental que termina por acercarlo en demasía a Berkeley, pues relega el conocimiento al ámbito subjetivo de las representaciones. Esta mezcla de escepticismo y fenomenismo resulta inapropiada para una comprensión del apriorismo. En esencia, él propone considerar lo *a priori* como simple *condición de posibilidad del conocimiento humano* (1992, p. 40).

³ Tengamos en cuenta que, aunque en las últimas tres décadas hemos asistido a un renacer del *a priori* en la epistemología analítica (Coffa 1991, p. 8), sobre todo por el declive del empirismo quineano y el empuje del giro historicista de Kuhn (Friedman 2002) siempre se ha tendido a una interpretación semántica de la idea kantiana. De hecho, *a priori* es entendido como *presuposición*. Esto es: *A es una condición de posibilidad de la experiencia de B, si A es una condición necesaria de la significatividad o el valor de verdad de B*. (Friedman 2001, p. 74). Friedman ha hablado, incluso, de un “*relativized a priori*”. (Friedman 2009, pp. 265-266)

Más allá del giro copernicano: el *epigenetic turn* de Kant

Una simple mirada bibliométrica a la *Crítica de la razón pura* nos pone en la pista de que la anotación de Schiller no parece corresponderse bien con el trascendentalismo kantiano.



Kant muestra gran interés por los pensadores modernos. Los cita 25 veces, frente a las 12 referencias a pensadores antiguos. Entre los pensadores modernos, el 60% de las veces cita a científicos. Y entre éstos, casi el 54% son “baconianos”.

Entendemos “baconianos” en sentido kuhniano. En efecto, numerosos historiadores, entre ellos Koyré (1938, pp. 16-17) o Butterfield (1964, p. 61), han afirmado que el movimiento baconiano fue un fracaso, sin consecuencias para la revolución científica moderna. Tal evaluación, sin embargo, es resultado de considerar que las ciencias son una sola. Si el baconianismo contribuyó en poco al desarrollo de las ciencias clásicas, no puede negarse, escribe Kuhn, que dio lugar a gran número de nuevos campos científicos, que arraigaban en los oficios existentes; en las artes mecánicas, que el de Verulam siempre propuso como paradigmas culturales. El estudio de la química, del magnetismo, etc., extrajeron sus primeros datos de las experiencias tenidas con la fabricación de cerveza, la brújula o la conductividad eléctrica. Son desarrollos científicos que dependían de la fabricación y perfeccionamiento de instrumentos; ejemplos típicos que, según Kuhn, han hecho a Bacon merecedor de dar título a las ciencias emergentes (Kuhn 1983, pp. 66 y ss¹). No por casualidad Kant le dedica a Bacon la segunda edición de la *Crítica*.

Claro que entre esas ciencias baconianas brillaba ya en el siglo XVIII con luz propia las investigaciones sobre la reproducción animal y, por tanto, la embriología. Aunque pueda sorprender, no es extraño que Timothy Lenoir, en 1989 -en su imprescindible *The Strategy of Life*- le reservara a Kant un puesto destacado en el pensamiento biológico. Aplicando la metodología lakatosiana de los programas de investigación, defendió que la biología tedesca, durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX –esto es, el tiempo en el que se erige la

embriología y, con ella la biología del desarrollo, en disciplina con *status* científico- estuvo guiada por un núcleo de ideas en cuya formulación y clarificación tuvo Kant un papel fundamental (Lenoir 1989, p. 2).

En el mismo sentido, Helmut Müller-Sivers, en 1997, sugería que la imagen kantiana de la filosofía trascendental como *revolución copernicana* oscurecía el verdadero sentido de su aportación: el propio Kant era ya consciente de que a finales del siglo XVIII las ciencias de la vida habían desplazado en gran parte a la físico-matemática a la hora de convertirse en una de las fuentes fundamentales de la reflexión filosófica, incluido su programa trascendental (Müller-Sievers 1997, p. 1). De hecho, planteaba lo que hemos introducido como *epigenetic turn* de la filosofía kantiana.

Lo cierto es que la idea de *epigenesia*, extraída del contexto de la embriología dieciochesca, le ofreció un modelo con gran rentabilidad heurística para dar cuenta de la *vis autoformativa* que presupone la idea de *a priori* y la capacidad *autoengendadora* de la mente humana. Induzcamos aquí, todavía sin mediación interpretativa, un texto importante de la *Crítica de la razón pura* (A 765/B 793):

Hume pensaba tal vez, aunque jamás lo haya desarrollado, que en los juicios de cierta clase vamos más allá de nuestro concepto del objeto. A esta clase de juicios les he dado el nombre de sintéticos. El modo de ir, mediante la experiencia, más allá del concepto que hasta entonces poseía es algo que no ofrece dificultades [...] Pero creemos también que podemos sobrepasar *a priori* nuestros conceptos extendiendo nuestro conocimiento [...] Nuestro escéptico no distinguió estas dos clases de juicios, cosa que hubiera debido hacer. Consideró directamente imposible la autopoyesis de nuestro entendimiento (y de la razón) sin ser fecundado por la experiencia [*die Selbstgebärung unseres Verstandes (samt der Vernunft), ohne durch Erfahrung geschwängert zu sein*].

Para Müller-Sivers, la noción de *epigénesis* reforzaba un modelo teórico que, más allá del mecanicismo, reafirmaba la *subjetividad* –la espontaneidad y la libertad- como fundamento absoluto (Müller-Sievers 1997, pp. 4-5). Limitaremos aquí el alcance espontaneísta, “metafísico” de la epigénesis. En Kant no encontraremos, como en Herder (DeSouza 2018, pp. 125-126) la presencia de lo invisible (espiritual, animado) en lo visible (material e inanimado). Pero, no restaremos ni un ápice la importancia de una noción que, opuesta a la de *preformación divina* -mantenida por científicos (Swammerdam, Haller, Bonnet...) y filósofos (Malebranche, Leibniz...) del XVII y XVIII- justificaba opciones ontoepistémicas alejadas del innatismo, y abogaba por una mente, como la humana, con capacidad para interactuar con el mundo y autoproducir formas. Ahora bien, a diferencia de la *Naturphilosophie* tedesca, nunca fue Kant un defensor del vitalismo organicista (“animismo” o “hilozoísmo”, en su lenguaje). Su polémica con Herder así lo atestigua. Tampoco del materialismo. El primero lo vivifica todo. “*Der Materialismus, wenn er genau erwogen wird, tötet alles*”: *el materialismo, tomado de un modo preciso, lo mata* – escribe en *Sueños de un visionario* (AA 2: 330)- *todo*. En cualquier caso, su conocimiento de la fisiología, la embriología y, posteriormente, del galvanismo, le hizo pensar que no era descabellado concebir una ley de continuidad en lo vivo entre irritabilidad, sensibilidad y

pensamiento como efectos de una naturaleza *autoprodutora* que se *auto-organiza* en todos sus productos, incluido el humano, gracias a su *bildende Kraft*.

Fuerza activa y comunicación universal

Durante mucho tiempo los comentaristas de Kant creyeron que su filosofía precrítica no era más que un ejemplo en su propia obra de lo que el prólogo a la segunda edición de la *Crítica de la razón para* denunciaba como un errado y continuo ir y venir desde una solución a otra; incapaz, pensaban, de ofrecer una filosofía de la naturaleza coherente con los logros teóricos de la ciencia natural newtoniana y las investigaciones fundamentales de la metafísica racionalista. Sin embargo, en los últimos cincuenta años los trabajos de Beck (1969), Laywine (1993), Schönfeld (2000) y Watkins (2005) nos han hecho rastrear en ese periodo lo que podemos llamar “hallazgos críticos”; esto es, piezas teóricas que fueron finalmente decisivas para los desarrollos de la filosofía madura de Kant. Entre ellos está el de *fuerza activa*. Veamos.

En su intento por superar el dualismo sustancial cartesiano, Leibniz defendió que todas las sustancias eran dinámicas e inmateriales; todas actuaban con espontaneidad aunque con grados diversos de actividad y pasividad. Se trataba de una doctrina que permitía compatibilizar el comercio o comunicación universal de unas sustancias individuales con otras al incluir en cualquiera y en cualquier instante temporal su noción completa, gracias a la armonía universal. De este modo, cada una de ellas se constituía es un mundo aparte, independiente de todo lo demás, excepto de Dios, su causa última (*Discurso de metafísica*, § 14); sin que pudiera interactuar causalmente con otras, ni recibir influjo físico alguno. Como metafóricamente afirma en la *Monadología* (§ 7), las mónadas “*no tienen ventanas*”: cada una de ellas alberga en sí, en su individualidad, la representación de todo el universo. No es solamente el hombre, como sostuvieron los renacentistas, un microcosmos; lo es todo ser individual. Toda mónada es un “espejo del universo”, un mundo abreviado. La reducción del ser al pensar no podía ser más radical.

Desde esta perspectiva, extensión y fuerza representativa habían dejado de ser pares irreconciliables, desde el origen, desde el mismo nacimiento (todo es, en realidad, innato) aunque de un modo oscuro, inconsciente, y es el esfuerzo intelectual y reflexivo el que hace que poco a poco vayamos adquiriendo claridad y distinción.

A pesar de los esfuerzos y predicamento de Leibniz, la aceptación de una eficiencia causal entre las sustancias, que patrocinaron los cartesianos y a la que se adscribieron los aristotélicos, era todavía dominante a principios del siglo XVIII en la Universidad de Königsberg (Wundt 1964, pp. 117-118). De hecho, a partir de 1727 la doctrina del influjo real (*physicus*) se abrió paso dentro de la propia escuela wolffiana, gracias al *Systema causarum efficientium* de Martin Knutzen, el maestro de Kant en Königsberg.

No resulta extraño, por ello, que, como ha sostenido Watkins, lo que unifica las publicaciones tempranas de Kant es su interés por desarrollar un sofisticado tratamiento

metafísico de la causalidad. Sus *Pensamientos acerca de la verdadera estimación de las fuerzas vivas* (1746), la *Nova dilucidatio* (1755) y la *Monadología Física* (1756), dan buena cuenta de ello. Convendrían en que todas las sustancias que existen en el mundo [Welt], del cual nosotros somos una parte, poseen fuerzas esenciales de manera que sus acciones [Wirkungen] se difunden [sich ausbreiten] en asociación mutua [in Vereinigung miteinander] (AA 2: 24).

El papel que tuvo Knutzen en todo este proceso de maduración intelectual de Kant es discutible, pero no deja de ser cierto que determinadas aportaciones suyas, asumidas por Kant, forman parte de lo que hemos llamado “hallazgos críticos”. Reparemos en que su obra de referencia es la disertación académica *Commentatio philosophica de commercio mentis et corporis per influxum physicum explicando* de 1735, cuya segunda edición apareció con el título referido de *Systema causarum efficientium* en 1745, un año antes de que Kant presentara en la Universidad de Königsberg su primer libro.

Knutzen orienta su trabajo a intentar disminuir la distancia entre materia y espíritu, pero no al estilo leibniano, intelectualizando, como después diría Kant, el mundo, sino estableciendo una comunidad real entre ellos, de tal modo que el alma humana pueda representárselo conforme a las modificaciones de su cuerpo. La cuestión es cómo puede producirse tal comercio sin caer en un monismo materialista. Y la respuesta de Knutzen consiste en hacer que cuerpo y espíritu se comporten como si fueran vasos comunicantes, una hipótesis que tendrá un largo alcance en la filosofía crítica kantiana al concebir la *adquisición originaria* de las representaciones *a priori* como un resultado de la composición de fuerzas.

El cuerpo, para Knutzen, “no hace penetrar en el espíritu ni ideas de las cosas exteriores, ni una fuerza representativa, sino que sólo modifica la fuerza del espíritu y su sustancia de manera que la representación nazca en él”; y el espíritu “no hace penetrar en el cuerpo ninguna fuerza motriz, sino que sólo modifica y dirige con su acción la que reside en los elementos del cuerpo de manera que finalmente el movimiento se produce” (Knutzen 1745, pp. 145-147.). Con una analogía: de igual modo que el macillo del piano percute contra una cuerda cuando se acciona una tecla, pero el sonido está siempre en función de las propiedades inherentes a la cuerda, actuando aquél de potenciador de la resonancia o del timbre.

En su trabajo sobre la *Estimación de las fuerzas vivas* asume Kant la idea de composición de fuerzas, pero corrige al maestro atribuyendo a los cuerpos no solo fuerza motriz, sino la *fuerza activa*. Un reproche que, *sensu contrario*, dirige en la *Crítica de la razón pura* a Leibniz al reducir éste toda fuerza activa a la fuerza representativa:

Las sustancias en general deben poseer algo interior, algo exento de todas las relaciones externas y, consiguientemente, exento de composición. Lo simple es, pues, el fundamento de lo interior de las cosas en sí mismas. Pero lo interior de su estado no puede consistir en el lugar, la figura, el contacto o el movimiento (determinaciones todas ellas que constituyen relaciones externas). En consecuencia, no podemos asignar a las sustancias otro estado interno que aquel mediante el cual

nosotros mismos determinamos interiormente nuestro sentido, a saber, el estado de las representaciones. Así fue como quedaron perfiladas las mónadas, que deben constituir la materia básica del universo entero, pero cuya fuerza activa no consiste más que en representaciones, una fuerza en virtud de la cual sólo son realmente activas dentro de sí mismas.

Esta es precisamente la razón de que su principio de la posible *comunidad de las sustancias* entre sí tuviera que ser una *armonía preestablecida*. No podía ser un influjo físico. (KrV. A 274/B 330).

Desde su primer opúsculo, Kant, se muestra convencido de que la materia no puede ser definida por la simple extensionalidad. Introduce, por ello, el concepto metafísico de *fuerza viva o activa*, como “*la verdadera medida de fuerza en la Naturaleza*” (AA 1: 139). No se trata de una simple *fuerza motriz*, de atracción o repulsión, sino una fuerza *interna y formativa*, que se incrementa “*por la acción de cualquier movimiento externo*” [AA 1: 140; 21: 249-251], con lo que, esta vez frente a Leibniz y su doctrina de la armonía preestablecida, Kant sostiene la idea de que “*las mónadas se influyen mutuamente*”. Es el mismo planteamiento que aparecerá una década más tarde, en 1755, en su famosa *Historia general de la Naturaleza y teoría del cielo*. En su prefacio (AA 1: 234, después de poner entre paréntesis las explicaciones antropomórficas como las de la intervención divina, sostiene una conjetura sobre la evolución general del Universo, según la cual, la masa informe y heterogénea que lo componía inicialmente comenzó a organizarse impulsada por sus fuerzas de atracción y repulsión. El proceso comenzó cuando en la nebulosa inicial se produjeron condensaciones que empezaron, en virtud de principios newtonianos, a atraer los materiales de su entorno, que acabaron por organizarse en forma de sistema (solar, por ejemplo) en equilibrio dinámico (AA 1: 269 y ss]. La materia, en virtud de su *fuerza activa*, tiene, por tanto, una inagotable fuerza formativa (*Bildungskraft*) que permite la emergencia (*Entstehung*) de órdenes de realidad diferentes.

Así pues, la fuerza motriz hace posible que un cuerpo, en virtud de su masa, resista no sólo a la penetración sino también al movimiento. De ella se derivan otras como la atracción, repulsión, elasticidad... Así pues, la fuerza pasiva haría referencia a lo que en la segunda parte de los *Principios metafísicos de la ciencia de la naturaleza* [AA 1: 496 y ss.] Kant llama *antitypia* o *impenetrabilidad*. La fuerza activa presupone, en cambio, no sólo un conato o tendencia inherente a la acción, sino también una tendencia a la receptividad de la acción; algo que será clave en el planteamiento crítico de la sensibilidad⁴ y, por ende, el papel que tiene el mundo o las fuerzas exteriores para hacer emerger las representaciones *a priori* de espacio y tiempo. Con el lenguaje del comienzo de la *Estética Trascendental* (§ 1):

Sean cuales sean el modo o los medios con que un conocimiento se refiera a los objetos, la *intuición* es el modo por medio del cual el conocimiento se refiere inmediatamente a ellos, así como aquello a que apunta todo pensamiento en cuanto medio. Tal intuición únicamente tiene lugar

⁴ Reparemos en que Kant concebirá siempre la sensibilidad como receptiva, pero no pasiva, ya que, alimentando la imaginación, ha de poder “afectar” a los conceptos de sus objetos (KrV A77/B 102), y que *pensar* y *conocer* son concebidos por Kant como “acciones” (*Handlungen*), en cuanto que resultan de dos actos básicos del entendimiento que se concretan en juicios: la *subsunción* conceptual y la *síntesis* de categorías e intuiciones (KrV, A 77-78/B 102-104).

en la medida en que el objeto nos es dado. Pero éste, por su parte, sólo nos puede ser dado [al menos a nosotros, los humanos], si afecta de alguna manera a nuestra mente. La capacidad (receptividad) de recibir representaciones, al ser afectados por los objetos, se llama *sensibilidad* (KrV, A 19/B 33)

En la famosa carta a Herz en febrero de 1772 –sobre la que luego volveremos-, Kant ya es consciente de que su problema fundamental consiste en haber concebido una mente humana *ectípica* (necesitada de sensaciones) y tener que explicar una relación de nuestras representaciones intelectivas puras [*die reine Verstandesbegriffe*] con sus objetos que no sea la de la abstracción *von den Empfindungen der Sinne*, ni la del *influxo hiperfísico*, ni la del *preestablismo* (AA 10: 131-132). Y veremos, de nuevo, como la noción de composición de fuerzas y, con ella, la idea de epigenesia cobrarán un papel determinante para explicar la generación de las representaciones puras *in der Natur der Seele*, como le dice a Marcus Herz.

No sugerimos, con todo, que haya una línea explicativa unitaria entre el periodo crítico y el precrítico. Hemos hablado de hallazgos críticos, o sea, respuestas o planteamientos que Kant considera conquistas teóricas. Pero no desconocemos que el lenguaje crítico ha cambiado o reorientado la perspectiva. Gustavo Sarmiento ha insistido con razón en este punto (Sarmiento 2004, p. 14). En el periodo crítico el filósofo de Königsberg ya no habla de “mundo”, sino de una naturaleza que puede ser *materialiter* o *formaliter spectata* como *conjunto completo de todos los fenómenos, en la medida en que, gracias a un principio interno de causalidad, se hallan en una completa interdependencia* (KrV, A 419/B 446).

***Bildungstrieb* y epigénesis. Las facultades de la mente como fuerzas de la naturaleza**

Estimulado por los escritos de Blumenbach, Kant se vincula definitivamente en los años 80 con la doctrina de la epigénesis. Lo hace, como escribe en el decisivo § 81 de la *Crítica del Juicio*, porque “*considera la Naturaleza como productora de suyo y no sólo como capaz de desarrollo*” (AA 5: p. 424]. Aunque como ha sostenido Zammito (2018, pp. 233-235) el *formative drive* tiene un componente metafísico, sus premisas son también empíricas. La existencia de “monstruosidades”, de híbridos, de caracteres heredados de los dos progenitores, la regeneración de partes amputadas en la cola de las lagartijas, etcétera, evidencian, para él, que hay que dejar algo, al menos, a cargo de la naturaleza. Sin embargo, la razón principal de su alineamiento la encontramos en la combinación de dos conceptos fundamentales, generalmente muy desatendidos por los intérpretes de su obra crítica y que suponen un avance sin rupturas entre los diferentes periodos de la producción intelectual de Kant: me refiero a los conceptos de *fuerza vital* y *comunidad de interacción recíproca* (sistema). Ellos le permitirán unir las hipótesis biológicas con las cognitivas. Y es que, como escribe en la recensión sobre la obra de Herder, existen en todo organismo fuerzas que le hacen modificarse internamente a sí mismo en función de las diferentes circunstancias externas en las que vive (AA 8: 62). Podríamos hablar de una “*autoproducción inducida*” por el medio.

Desde esta perspectiva, no compartimos las interpretaciones de Zöller (1988), Sloan (2002), Zammito (2003) o Goy y Watkins (2014, introducción). Todos coinciden en sostener que la doctrina biológica de la epigénesis no fue asumida plenamente hasta después de su polémica a mitad de los años 80 con Herder y Forster⁵, de ahí que solo aparezca en la segunda edición de la *Crítica*. Sin desconocer que las analogías embriológicas aparecen ya en textos inmodificados de esa *Crítica*, ellos piensan que el lenguaje kantiano no es claramente antipreformista. Tal es así que Zöller considera que el apriorismo kantiano hasta esos años -coincidiendo con la recepción de las hipótesis de Blumenbach- estaría muy cercano al innatismo leibniano (Zöller 1989). De parecida opinión es Claud Piché. Considera que, aunque Kant conoce desde el *Beweisgrund* (1762) la teoría biológica, la epigénesis (AA 2: 114-115), no le sirve en rigor, más allá de la metáfora de la *productividad*, para dar sentido a su giro copernicano ni para ofrecer un modelo epistemológico claro (Piché 2001, p. 188).

No comparto esta opinión. Kant sabe que el preformismo leibniano sustrae a *todo individuo la fuerza formativa [Bildungstrieb] para hacerla provenir directamente del Creador (Crítica del Juicio, § 81; AA 5: 423)*, necesitando una cantidad excesiva de *disposiciones sobrenaturales* para que cada embrión formado al comienzo del mundo no padeciese cambio alguno a lo largo de la evolución natural en su interacción con el entorno. El conocimiento de los epigenetistas franceses que demuestra en los años 60, en el *Beweisgrund* (AA 2: 126) indica a las claras un cambio de paradigma. Por eso, en los setenta tiene pleno convencimiento de que la idea de epigénesis tiene un claro significado epistémico para dar respuesta al problema crítico fundamental. Sabe que es preciso distinguir entre *auswickeln* y *entwickeln*, entre el mero *desenvolvimiento de formas “vorgebildet” (voraus-gebildet; vorausgestaltet)* de los preformistas, que siempre supone una *evolutio partes involutae [Auswicklung der eingewickelten Teile]*, o sea, simple *educación*; y el *desarrollo [Entwicklung]* epigenético, dirigido siempre por los gérmenes originarios y disposiciones naturales [*Keimes-entwicklung*], presentes en la fuerza interna formativa de cada especie –*Zeugungskraft*, la llama ya en su primer tratado sobre las razas humanas (AA 2: 435)⁶-, pero siempre, eso sí, inducidos por la interacción con el entorno. Las diferentes reflexiones de Kant durante la década silenciosa dejan siempre claro los papeles activo e interactivo que Kant siempre atribuyó a la mente y sus facultades. En la *Reflexión 4275*, fechada en 1770-71, escribe:

⁵ Kant emplea el término “Epigenese” en una obra publicada en la (primera) *Recensión* al primer volumen de *Ideas para una filosofía de la historia de la humanidad* (1784-1785) de Herder. (AA 8: 50)

⁶ Natalia Lerussi, apoyándose en Beiser, Zammito, Bernasconi y Shell, sostiene que la concepción kantiana de epigénesis tiene su fuente de origen y de inteligibilidad en la teoría de las razas desarrollada por el filósofo en tres textos, respectivamente, de 1775/1777, 1785 y 1788 (Lerussi 2013, p. 88.).

Crusius explica los principios reales de la razón conforme al sistema de preformación (desde principios subjetivos); Locke conforme al influjo físico de Aristóteles; Platón y Malebranche por intuición intelectual; nosotros, según la epigénesis, a partir del uso de las leyes naturales de la razón.(AA 17: 492)

Son las mismas opciones que plantea en la *Reflexión* 4446 (1769-1772?) sobre los conceptos del entendimiento (AA 17: 554). En todos los casos, como señala la *Reflexión* 4851 (1776-78) se trata de entender conceptos intelectivos no como *educta* sino *producta priori*. Escribe literalmente:

producta o bien por influjo físico o conforme a las condiciones formales de nuestra sensibilidad y entendimiento con ocasión de la experiencia [*bey gelegenheit der Erfahrung*]; por lo tanto, *producta* a priori, no a posteriori” (AA. 18: 8).

Podríamos seguir acumulando reflexiones: la 4859 (1776-1778); la 5637 (1780-1783). Insiste siempre en la idea de una “*epigenesin intellectualem*” (AA 18: 12). Una idea que enfrenta, del mismo modo que hace el § 27 de la segunda versión de la Deducción Transcendental que ofrece la *Crítica* de 1787, tanto a la deducción empírica que intentaron los empiristas como al preformismo leibniciano. En último término, Kant apela a la capacidad de las facultades de la mente, como *Naturkräfte*, de autoengendrar conceptos; de producir *formas*, estimuladas por las fuerzas exteriores. De ahí la importancia de la afección sensible.

Lo mismo sucede en el plano de la embriogénesis. No compartimos, por ello, la mixtura que Boris Demarest ha defendido:

Kant (1) thinks of what is pre-formed as a species, not an individual or a part of an individual; (2) has no qualm with the idea of a specific, teleological principle or force underlying generation, and conceives of germs and predispositions as specific constraints on such a principle or force. (Demarest 2017, p.3).

La misma plasticidad germinal que Kant defiende nos obliga a pensar en procesos autopoyéticos cuyo resultado es siempre un *natürliche Neubildungs-Prozesse*, esto es, un proceso natural (no preestablecido) lleno de emergencias y ganancias (Moya 2008, pp. 159-182). Es un modelo presente desde comienzos de los ochenta, que se consolida tras las lecturas de Caspar Wolff y Blumenbach, y que no duda en elevarlo al plano filogenético de la evolución de las especies. Leamos la *Reflexión metafísica* 6302 (1783-1784):

La conservación de las especies [*die Erhaltung der Arten*] puede ser considerada o completamente natural o necesitada de un influjo sobrenatural. En el primer caso, podría ser visto también como natural el origen de las especies [*der Ursprung der Arten*], pues cada generación es, en cuanto nuevo comienzo [*als neuer Ursprung*], tan duradera como permitan las causas externas [*fremde Ursachen*] que pueden modificar y variar la fuerza formativa [*die bildende Kraft*] (AA 18: 574).

Considero, por ello, que el error fundamental a la hora de evaluar el papel de la epigénesis en la gnoseología kantiana radica en que no se ha sabido ver la prioridad que tiene el plano epistémico en la consolidación de su idea de epigénesis. Es lo que el filósofo llama *la conciencia de la productividad de nuestro entendimiento y voluntad* lo que, desde el plano

reflexivo, le ofrece más aval. En *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie* (1788) lo señala con claridad:

Conocemos tales fuerzas según su fundamento de determinación a través de la experiencia de nosotros mismos, es decir, en nuestro entendimiento y voluntad, como causa de la posibilidad de ciertos productos” (AA 8: 181)

Añade Kant que el *entendimiento y la voluntad son nuestras fuerzas fundamentales*. Por eso, en el *Opus Postumum* insiste que es *das Bewustseyn unserer eigenen Organisation als einer bewegenden Kraft der Materie macht uns den Begriff des organischen Stoffs* (AA 21: 190).

Kant fue, en definitiva, más allá de Leibniz. Y en sentido opuesto. Entendió que la *fuerza vital (vis vivifica)* de todo lo orgánico es siempre autoorganizadora [AA. 21: 264 y 643; 22: 189; 22: 210]. “*Los cuerpos orgánicos son aquellos que poseen —dice Kant [23: 484] — fuerza vital*”. Y aunque siempre mostró serias reservas críticas a las implicaciones hилоzoístas del epigenetismo (Zammito 2003, pp. 73-109), lo cierto es que pensó que por las fuerzas pasiva y activa *emergen* de la materia los cuerpos y sistemas físicos, y por la fuerza vital nuevos cuerpos orgánicos; seres orgánicos que, en circunstancias preservadas e inducidos por su entorno, son capaces de “*reproducirse a sí mismos según la especie*” y “*existir para sí y por mor de sí mismos*” (AA 22: 193]. En los *Träume* (1766), introduce, de modo pionero (Weber y Varela 2002, p. 106), la idea moderna de *vida* como la posibilidad interna de autoorganización o autodeterminación (AA 2: 327n.).

Los cuerpos orgánicos e inorgánicos, en definitiva, han de ser concebidos, por tanto, más que como sustancias, como “*plexos de fuerza*”. Es también el caso de la mente. Kant abandonó muy pronto la concepción del alma cartesiana. Para el de Königsberg, el alma no es “cosa”, sustancia, sino sistema. De ahí que la conciba de modo orgánico. Sustituye, así, el término *Seele* por el de *Gemüt*. La mente posee unas fuerzas o facultades irreductibles entre sí; cuenta con disposiciones naturales diferentes, y, por tanto, con capacidad de actuar y funcionar de distinto modo en función de su interacción con el mundo (entorno).

Insistir como Falduto (2017, pp. 21 y 26), o la misma tradición analítica, en abandonar el problema de las fuentes cognitivas para restringir el estudio de las facultades mentales o las formas *a priori* a la perspectiva de las condiciones de posibilidad no solo supone descuidar aspectos fundamentales del trascendentalismo kantiano, sino incapacitarse para entender de un modo adecuado las formas *a priori* como adquisiciones originarias.

No olvidemos dos cosas. Primero: las fuerzas o facultades de la mente, por sus disposiciones naturales, terminan teniendo fuerza normativa. Y, segundo: la deducción trascendental de las mismas categorías del entendimiento exige “*examinar primero las fuentes subjetivas que constituyen la base a priori de la posibilidad de la experiencia*” (*KrV*, A 97). Como escribe en la *Analítica Trascendental*, se trata

de investigar la posibilidad de los conceptos *a priori* a base de buscarlos sólo en el entendimiento como su lugar de procedencia y a base de analizar su uso puro en general. Tal es la tarea propia de una filosofía trascendental. El resto pertenece al tratamiento lógico de los conceptos dentro de la filosofía en general. Perseguiremos, pues, los conceptos puros hasta llegar a sus primeros gérmenes y disposiciones en el entendimiento humano, en los cuales se hallan preparados hasta que, finalmente, la experiencia los desarrolla [*entwickelt*]. (*KrV*, A 66 /B 90-91).

O, como señalaba ya en la Reflexión 4873 (1776-1778): “*Die transcendente Philosophie betrachtet nicht die Gegenstände, sondern das Menschliche Gemüth nach den Quellen, woraus in ihm die Erkenntnis a priori abstammt*”. (AA 18: 16)⁷.


Consideramos, por lo demás, que Heinrich (1989) ha aportado suficiente información sobre el contexto jurídico de la deducción trascendental de Kant como para concluir que la *quaestio originis* y la *quaestio iure* están indisolublemente unidas en su filosofía trascendental.

Formas a priori y adquisiciones originarias


Aunque como ha defendido Scheurer (1982, p. 241), Newton, a fin de que sus *Principia* fuesen más fácilmente comunicables y entendibles en su tiempo, lo publicó en forma de lenguaje geométrico, lo más característico de la revolución newtoniana fue un cambio de lenguaje matemático que le permitió reducir los principios físicos a principios matemáticos, como hace en los dos primeros libros, para después, como hace en el tercero, aplicar esos principios matemáticos a fin de resolver problemas físicos. Y es que su novísimo *cálculo de fluxiones*, le permitió pensar en términos de rectas y curvas trazadas a partir de puntos en movimiento, elongables. Lo que está en juego no es, como sucedía en Galileo, un trazado cinemático de las condiciones de un espacio geométrico (donde la descripción del movimiento se hace en función de la posición), sino más bien estudio de las propiedades del espacio a partir de principios dinámicos (de magnitudes que “fluyen”, es decir, que indefinidamente hacen crecer otras magnitudes).

Un ejemplo, extraído del *Waste Book* (8 de noviembre de 1665), una especie de cuaderno de notas del propio Newton, servirá para ilustrar su programa. En efecto, a la hora de resolver el problema matemático de cómo trazar tangentes a líneas mecánicas, Newton aplica principios del movimiento rectilíneo uniforme (inercial). En esencia, su procedimiento es análogo al que aprenden los estudiantes de los primeros cursos de física cuando tienen que resolver problemas de composición y descomposición de fuerzas. En efecto, supongamos que tenemos las dos rectas OA y OB y que tratamos de encontrar su tangente.


⁷ En *Welche sind die wirklichen Fortschritte, die Metaphysik seit Leibnizens und Wolffs Zeiten in Deutschland gemacht hat?* (1791), escribe: “Para resolver el problema de la Razón es necesario considerarlo en su relación con las facultades que configuran lo que puede llamarse una ‘Razón pura’, las cuales permiten al hombre disponer de conocimiento *a priori*”. AA 20: 324.



Evidentemente, esas dos rectas pueden ser interpretadas dinámicamente como dos fuerzas centrífugas que se ejercen sobre un mismo punto (O), es decir, con un mismo punto de aplicación, con lo que el problema de encontrar la tangente se reduce a hallar la fuerza resultante, entendiéndolo OA y OB como sus componentes. Teniendo en cuenta la regla del paralelogramo, trazamos paralelas a cada fuerza, que pasen por el extremo de la otra, esto es



De este modo, uniendo el punto de aplicación mecánico (O) con la intersección de las paralelas tenemos la fuerza resultante (F_R) y, por ende, la tangente buscada. Gráficamente:



El principio fundamental con el que se construye el método de fluxiones es un principio básico de la mecánica: toda magnitud matemática, la extensión por ejemplo, puede concebirse como generada por un movimiento local continuo.

Traigo a colación este capítulo de la historia de la ciencia moderna, porque si uno lee la introducción a la Dialéctica trascendental que Kant hace en sus dos versiones de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, descubre que Kant, a la hora de explicar el origen del error, utiliza el procedimiento newtoniano de la composición de fuerzas. En efecto, para Kant, ni la verdad ni el error se hallan en el objeto en cuanto intuitivo, sino en el juicio sobre éste en cuanto pensado. Es, pues, correcto decir que los sentidos no se equivocan, pero no porque juzguen correctamente, sino porque no juzgan en absoluto. La sensibilidad, recordemos, siente o intuye, pero no piensa (KrV, A 51-52 / B 75-76). Tampoco hay que atribuir el origen del error al entendimiento puro: en un conocimiento enteramente concordante con las reglas del entendimiento, no hay error. Ninguna fuerza de la naturaleza puede, por sí sola, apartarse de sus propias leyes. Y el entendimiento es –lo repetimos– una fuerza normativa más de la naturaleza; lo dice ya con meridiana claridad en el *Preisschrift* de 1764: “*El entendimiento humano, como cualquier otra fuerza de la naturaleza [so wie jede andere Kraft der Natur], está sujeta a ciertas reglas.*” (refl. III, § 1; AA 2: 292). Por eso,

Como no tenemos más que estas dos fuentes de conocimiento, llegamos a la conclusión de que el error sólo es producido por el inadvertido influjo de la sensibilidad sobre el entendimiento. A causa

de tal influjo, ocurre que los motivos subjetivos del juicio se funden con los objetivos, haciendo que éstos se aparten de su disposición del mismo modo que un cuerpo en movimiento seguiría siempre, de por sí, la línea recta [...] (KrV, A 293-295 / B 350-351)

Es preciso, señala Kant, distinguir el acto propio del entendimiento respecto de la fuerza sensible que con ella se compone a fin de evaluar la relación entre las dos; o sea, si el influjo de la sensibilidad es conforme o disconforme con las reglas propias del entendimiento, pues solo en el primer caso podrían ser obtenidos juicios puros *a priori*.


Pues bien, teniendo en cuenta que en la misma *Crítica de la razón pura* nunca deja de pensar la mente como una comunidad de interacción (sistema) y su dinamismo *-también su normatividad-* como un modo más del dinamismo y actividad propia de la naturaleza [*freiwirkenden Natur* (KrV A 626 / B 654)], podemos lograr una explicación adecuada y precisa, más allá de las confusiones de analíticos y hermeneutas, no solo del significado de las *formas a priori* como *adquisiciones originarias*, sino también del *gap* que separa el apriorismo kantiano del innatismo preformista. Mostraremos, incluso de modo gráfico, que aquél siempre supone, conforme a la idea de epigenesia, *ganancia, adquisición, Erwerbung*; el segundo, *herencia [Vererbung]*. No hacemos, en cualquier caso, otra cosa, que apoyarnos en la tarea que se impuso a sí mismo Kant en el comienzo de la Analítica de los Conceptos (KrV, A 66 / B 90-91), y que repite en el § 4 de los *Prolegómenos: buscar aquellos conocimientos que la razón misma [Vernunft selbst] en su ejercicio desarrolla [entwickelt] a priori a partir de sus ursprünglichen Keimen* (AA 4: 274).

Partimos, pues, sin las dudas que manifiesta Rancán de Azevedo (2008) en su, por otra parte, bien documentado trabajo sobre lo innato en Kant, de una premisa: Kant rompe la ecuación innato=a priori, planteando la alternativa de una adquisición originaria o *a priori* (Yamane 2010, pp. 416-417.), un concepto que Kant toma del derecho natural (AA 8: 221) y más en concreto, como anota en la *Metafísica de las costumbres*, de la noción de *posesión jurídica* (AA 6: 258)

Adquiero una cosa cuando hago (*efficio*) que algo devenga mío.. -Originariamente mío es lo exterior que también es mío sin un acto jurídico. Pero una adquisición originaria es aquella que no se deriva de lo suyo de otro. Nada exterior es originariamente mío; pero sí puede ser adquirido originariamente, esto es, sin deducirlo de lo suyo de algún otro.

Todos para Kant tenemos el derecho a una primera ocupación de un suelo como adquisición originaria, pero alguien puede llegar a tener legitimidad para hacerse dueño de una parcela privada fundándose en la posesión común originaria del suelo y en una voluntad de uso (libertad exterior), que le corresponde *a priori*, siempre y cuando no haya ningún propietario que, apelando a lo que es suyo por herencia o compra (derecho real), se oponga a la ocupación e impida su uso privado por otro durante un tiempo prolongado⁸. Podemos decir que en tal caso, la segunda *adquisición ex novo* también es *originaria*. Por prescripción adquisitiva o usucapión. Gráficamente:

⁸ En el Código Civil español ese uso sin oposición se fija en 30 años.



La *possessio communis originaria* del suelo no legitimaría la apropiación privada, sino que la limita en función del reconocimiento de la libertad de asentamiento de todo el género humano (AA 6: 261). Por eso, el uso y ocupación efectiva, no fraudulenta ni delictiva, justificaría el nuevo dominio sin dañar la libertad del otro, pues la ausencia de cuidado sobre el suelo poseído compromete los propios derechos (AA 6: 292-293). La nueva adquisición sería, en todo caso, *originaria* porque garantiza la posesión jurídica de un bien que antes de la acción de ocupar no se tenía en modo alguno. Como decíamos, hay *facta* que tienen valor *jurídico*.

Pues bien, Kant traslada este modelo no solo a la deducción trascendental de las categorías, sino a la de cualquier representación pura (incluidas las de espacio y tiempo) para explicar lo que desde el punto de vista epistémico llama “*sistema epigenético de la razón*”. “Epigénesis” y “adquisición originaria” apuntan así a un núcleo común de significado: a saber, la “actividad” de unas facultades de la mente capaces por su *bildende Kraft* de adquirir o producir *a priori* formas, siempre inducidas (que no fecundadas) por la experiencia (léase: sensaciones). Reproduzcamos al respecto un texto fundamental de la *Crítica de la razón pura* (A 85-86/B 118):

Tenemos ya dos clases de conceptos de índole completamente distinta, que coinciden, sin embargo, en referirse a objetos enteramente *a priori*, a saber, los conceptos de espacio y tiempo como formas de la sensibilidad, por una parte, y las categorías como conceptos del entendimiento, por otra. Pretender deducirlos empíricamente sería una tarea totalmente inútil, ya que el rasgo distintivo de su naturaleza consiste precisamente en que se refieren a sus objetos sin haber tomado nada de la experiencia para representarlos. Si hace falta deducirlos, su deducción tendrá, pues, que ser trascendental. No obstante, respecto de esos conceptos, como respecto de todo conocimiento, puede buscarse en la experiencia, si no el principio de su posibilidad, sí al menos la causa ocasional de su producción. En tal sentido, las impresiones dan el impulso inicial para abrir toda facultad cognoscitiva en relación con ellas y para realizar la experiencia.

Ésta incluye dos elementos muy heterogéneos: una *materia* de conocimiento, extraída de los sentidos, y cierta *forma* de ordenarlos, extraída de las fuentes internas de la pura intuición y del pensar, las cuales, impulsadas por la materia, entran en acción y producen estos conceptos.


Me parece suficientemente claro el texto, pero volvamos otra vez a *Über eine Entdeckung*, porque allí Kant realiza seis afirmaciones que recojo con literalidad y que han de ser interpretadas como precisiones conceptuales y terminológicas decisivas (AA 8: 222-223):

1. La condición de posibilidad de la intuición sensible no es ninguna intuición sensible, ni un concepto del entendimiento, ni una imagen; es la propia receptividad de la mente cuando se ve afectada por algo (en la sensación) para obtener una representación de acuerdo con su naturaleza subjetiva.
2. Solo esta primera condición formal, por ejemplo de la posibilidad de una intuición del espacio, es innata⁹, no la representación del espacio misma.
3. El espacio, como una noción adquirida originariamente (la forma de objetos externos en general), cuyo fundamento es innato (como mera receptividad), se adquiere mucho antes de la concepción definida de las cosas que se ajustan a esa forma, cuya adquisición es una adquisición derivada.
4. Toda adquisición derivada presupone conceptos trascendentales del entendimiento.
5. Los conceptos trascendentales son adquiridos y no innatos, pero su adquisición, como la del espacio, es originaria.
6. Esa adquisición no presupone nada innato excepto las subjetivas condiciones de la espontaneidad del pensamiento (conforme a la unidad de la apercepción).

Reparemos en 1-6: hacen intervenir tres elementos: a) las condiciones subjetivas tanto de la sensibilidad como del entendimiento; b) las sensaciones, como efecto de la afección de nuestra sensibilidad por algo; c) el resultado del ejercicio de aquellas facultades: intuiciones puras de espacio-tiempo y conceptos puros del entendimiento. Son tres elementos que remiten a lo que *supra* llamábamos *composición de fuerzas* y que nos ha servido para explicar la adquisición originaria en el plano de la posesión jurídica.

En efecto, comencemos por las formas o intuiciones puras de espacio y tiempo. El esquema sería éste:

⁹ Kant introduce aquí en término *angeborene* para referirse a unas disposiciones naturales que no son adquiridas. Tengamos en cuenta que Kant siempre rechazó que los factores externos puedan producir gradualmente formas nuevas que no estén permitidas por la organización originaria (AA 2: 435; 8: 97). Lo contrario supondría, primero, en el plano bioevolutivo, la defensa de un epigenetismo espontaneísta, cercano a lo que será después el lamarckismo e incompatible con la idea kantiana de “planes de formación”; y, segundo, en el plano epistémico una idea querida para la epistemología darwiniana de “experiencia filogenética de la especie”, una noción que olvida la lección esencial de Kant: nunca podemos derivar el conocimiento *a priori* del saber perceptivo.



En el lenguaje de la Estética Trascendental (KrV, A26-27/B 42-43):

Sólo podemos, pues, hablar de espacio, del ser extenso, etc., desde el punto de vista humano. Si nos desprendemos de la única condición subjetiva bajo la cual podemos recibir la intuición externa, a saber, que seamos afectados por los objetos externos, nada significa la representación del espacio. Este predicado sólo es atribuido a las cosas en la medida en que éstas se manifiestan a nosotros, es decir, en la medida en que son objetos de la sensibilidad.

Convendría, de todos modos, hacer una precisión en este punto. Ya en la precitada carta a Herz de 1772 Kant no parecía encontrar problema alguno en explicar la naturaleza *a priori* del espacio. Y es así porque tempranamente, en 1768, en el opúsculo *Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume*, había realizado tres hallazgos críticos importantes:


1. Las representaciones intelectivas y sensibles son irreductibles. Basándose en el argumento de las contrapartidas incongruentes (Moya 2008, pp. 383-390) sostendrá que unas y otras no se diferencian solo por la mayor o menor claridad, sino por su origen o fuente (AA 2: 382-383).
2. El espacio, en cuanto absoluto y originario, tiene la prioridad sobre las cosas que en él se representan (AA 2: 383).
3. El cuerpo-sensible (y sus disposiciones) es el fundamento primero de la noción de espacio y sus regiones (AA 2: 378-379).

Si pasamos ahora al plano del entendimiento, tenemos que subrayar dos cosas. La primera es que, como Kant afirma nada más comenzar la “Analítica de los conceptos” (KrV, A 65 / B 89-90), el entendimiento, como subsistema de la mente, “*constituye una unidad subsistente por sí misma, autosuficiente, no susceptible de recibir adiciones exteriores*” [Er ist also eine für sich selbst beständige, sich selbst gnugsame und durch keine äußerlich hinzukommende Zusätze zu vermehrende Einheit]. En efecto, todo sistema S está integrado

por una serie de elementos (E), que poseen una dinámica (D) y que interaccionan con un medio (M). Formalmente:

$$S = \langle E, D, M \rangle$$

Es claro que, desde esta perspectiva sistémica (orgánica), el medio no es algo “exterior” que añade o adicione algo a la estructura “interna”. En otros textos hemos podido comprobar cómo Kant señala que el entendimiento nunca es “fecundado” por la experiencia. Aquí, en el pasaje de la “Analítica”, señala que no recibe adición exterior alguna. Es evidente: en cualquier sistema la interacción con el medio solo introduce una perturbación a la que responde con sus propias reglas el sistema. Por eso, a lo largo de este trabajo hemos manejado el término “induce”; una noción que nos lleva al segundo subrayado que queríamos hacer: las categorías como formas puras del pensar, como conceptos *a priori*, son también adquisiciones originarias (producciones) que requieren, tanto en su uso lógico como referencial, unas reglas que “*debo suponer en mí ya antes de que los objetos me sean dados*”; unas reglas (*a priori*, dice aquí Kant), que, inducidas por la interacción sensible con los objetos, “*se expresan en conceptos a priori (welche in Begriffen a priori ausgedrückt wird) a los que, por tanto, se conforman necesariamente todos los objetos de la experiencia y con los que deben concordar*”. (KrV, B XVII-B XVIII)¹⁰. De modo gráfico:



De nuevo, la interacción sensible, el momento receptivo, es necesario. Frente a Reinhold, Jacobi o Fichte, que consideraron que la idea kantiana de un sujeto a la vez sensible


¹⁰ En la “Analítica de los conceptos” Kant diferencia entre “conceptos a priori originarios” y “conceptos a priori derivados”. Son los dos puros, independientes de toda experiencia, pero los primeros no presuponen otro tipo de conceptos, como les sucede a los segundos. Kant cita la causalidad como concepto “originario” y el de “fuerza” como concepto puro derivado de él (A 81-82/B 107-108). Podríamos distinguir así entre adquisiciones originarias primarias y adquisiciones originarias secundarias.

(receptivo) e intelectual (espontáneo) no debía ser tomada literalmente en serio, el mismo Kant, en lo que fue su último texto publicado en vida: “Erklärung in Beziehung auf Fichtes Wissenschaftslehre” (1799), defendió con rotundidad que “*la Crítica ha de ser entendida atendiendo exactamente a su literalidad*” [*so erkläre ich hiermit nochmals, daß die Kritik allerdings nach dem Buchstaben zu verstehen*] (AA 12: 370-371)¹¹. Como ha escrito recientemente Dalia Nassar, si se desatiende a la receptividad sensible y se recupera, al modo poskantiano, con el concepto de autoproducción la viabilidad de una intuición intelectual, se hace difícil explicar la objetividad de las categorías (Nassar 2017, pp. 804-805).

En resumen, la *adquisición originaria* de las formas *a priori* o representaciones puras por parte de nuestras facultades es el resultado de una composición de fuerzas: presupone, por un lado, como comienzo (en el orden temporal) la sensación (la interacción corporal-sensible con el mundo), pero, en cuanto totalmente independiente de ella, tiene, por otro lado, como condición formal las fuentes subjetivas de nuestra intuición y pensamiento. En el fondo, buscar el *Ursprung der Begriffe* exige, conforme al modelo epigenético, explicar *die Entstehung der Begriffe*; esto es, remitirlos a la capacidad autopoyética que la mente, como cualquier otro órgano, exhibe. Las formas puras o categorías, por eso, como dice la *Dissertatio* de 1770, *in legibus menti insitis (attendendo ad eius actiones occasione experientiae)*” (AA 2: 395). En el lenguaje de la *Crítica*, *son die wahren Stammbegriffe des reinen Verstandes* (KrV, A 81/B 107); esto es: serían *ursprüngliche Stammbildung*, dispuestos con el linaje característico de la especie [*Stammgattung*] humana¹². De ahí su validez universal y necesaria. La *normatividad lógica* presupone, pues, *normalidad biológica*, una *invarianza funcional de la especie ante los problemas que les plantea a los individuos su medio ambiente*. Gráficamente, y como modelo general de la adquisición originaria de las formas *a priori*, tendríamos:

¹¹ El 11 de enero de 1799 en la misma *Erlanger Literaturzeitung*, en la que Kant publicará el 28 de agosto la “Erklärung”, apareció la recensión de Buhle del *Entwurf der Transzendentalphilosophie* y en ella se comentaba: “*Kant es el primer maestro (der erste Lehrer) la filosofía transcendental, y Reinhold el excelente divulgador de la doctrina crítica: pero el primer filósofo transcendental es sin duda Fichte. Fichte ha realizado el plan esbozado en la Crítica, y ha llevado a cabo sistemáticamente el idealismo transcendental insinuado [angedeuteten] por Kant.*” (AA 13: 542-543).

¹² Christoph Görtanner, discípulo de Blumenbach y seguidor de Kant, en *Über kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte* (1796, pp. 58-59) tomó el concepto de “*Stammgattung*”, que Kant introdujo en su teoría de las razas, para referirse al conjunto de *Keime* y *Anlagen* que, como fuerzas generadoras, son responsables, en función de las circunstancias del entorno, de la emergencia y durabilidad de ciertos caracteres (fenotípicos) de cada raza. La tarea de historia natural consistiría en investigar cómo la forma original de cada *Stammgattung* de animales y plantas, su *a priori biológico*, fue adquirida; y cómo se han derivado gradualmente de ella las diferentes especies, en función de las variaciones del medio. Para apreciar la importancia de la visión kantiana en el desarrollo de este punto en la biología alemana de finales del XVIII y comienzos del XIX, véase el libro de Zammito *The Gestation of German Biology* (2018, especialmente pp. 313-316).



Referencias bibliográficas

- Allison, H. E. (1992), *El idealismo trascendental de Kant: una interpretación y defensa* Barcelona, Anthropos.
- Beck, L. W. (1969), *Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors*, Bristol, Thoemes Press, pp. 438-469.
- Butterfield, H. (1964), "The History of Historiography and the History of Science", en: Cohen, I.B. y Taton, R. (ed.), *Mélanges Alexandre Koyré II: L'aventure de l'esprit*, París, Hermann.
- Cabrera, I. (1994), "El espacio kantiano: interpretaciones recientes", *Diánoia. Revista de filosofía*, 40 pp. 143-176.
- Coffa, J. A. (1991). "La filosofía de la ciencia después de Kuhn", *Cuadernos de filosofía*, 35, pp. 7-23.
- Demarest, B. (2017), "Kant's epigenesis: specificity and developmental constraints" *History and philosophy of the life sciences* vol. 39/1; DOI 10.1007/s40656-017-0129-2.
- DeSouza, N. (2018), "Herder's Theory of Organic Forces and Its Kantian Origins", en: Dahlstrom, D.O. (ed.), *Kant and his German Contemporaries*, vol. 2, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 109-127.
- Falduto, A. (2017), "Los conceptos kantianos de "facultad" y "mente" frente a la lectura epigenética", *Revista de Estudios Kantianos* Vol. 2, Núm. 1, pp. 20-28.

- Friedman, M. (2009), "Einstein, Kant, and the Relativized A Priori". En: Bitbol, M. et al. (eds.), *Constituting Objectivity*, Springer Science + Business Media B.V, pp. 253-267.
- (2002), "Kant, Kuhn, And The Rationality Of Science". *Philosophy of Science* , 69/2, pp. 171-190.
 - (2001). *Dynamics of Reason: The 1999 Kant Lectures at Stanford University*. California: CSLI Pub, Stanford.
- Girtanner, C. (1796) *Über kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte*, Gottinga, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1796.
- Goy, I. y Watkins. E. (eds.), 2014, *Kant's Theory of Biology*, Berlín, Walter de Gruyter.
- Habermas, J. (2002), *Verdad y justificación*, Madrid, Trotta.
- Heinrich, D. (1989), "Kant's Deduction and the Methodological Background of the First Critique, en: Förster, E (ed.), *Kant's transcendental Deductions*, Standford, Standford University Press, pp. 29-46.
- Koyré, A. (1938), *Trois leçons sur Descartes*, El Cairo, Facultad de Letras de la Universidad Egipcia.
- Knutzen,M. (1745), *Systema causarum efficientium*, Klaubarth, Leipzig, 2ª ed.
- Kuhn, Th. S. (1983), "Tradición matemática y la tradición experimental en el desarrollo de la física", en: *La tensión esencial*, México: FCE.
- Laywine, A. (1993), *Kant's early Metaphysics and the Origin of Critical Philosophy*, Atascadero: Ridgeview Publishing Company.
- Lenoir, T. (1989), *The Strategy of Life. Teleology and Mechanics in Nineteenthcentury German Biology*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Lerussi, N. (2013), "La teoria kantiana de las razas y el origen del epigénesis". *Studia Kantiana* 15, pp. 85-102.
- Moya, E. (2008), *Kant y las ciencias de la vida*, Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva.
- Müller-Sievers, H. (1997), *Self-Generation. Biology, Philosophy, and Literature around 1800*, Stanford, Stanford University Press.
- Nassar, D. (2017), "The Critical Function of the Epigenesis of Reason and Its Relation to Post-Kantian Intellectual Intuition". *Philosophy Today*, 61/3, pp. 801-809.DOI:10.5840/philtoday2017613164.

- Piché, C. (2001), “The precritical Use of the Metaphor of Epigenesis”, en: Rockmore, T. (ed.), *New Essays on the Precritical Kant*, Nueva York, Humanity Books, pp. 182-200.
- Rancan de Azevedo, (2008), “Sobre o innato em Kant”, *Analytica*, 12/2, pp. 101-161.
- Sarmiento, G. (2004), *La aporía de la división en Kant*, Caracas, Equinocio.
- Scheurer, P. (1982), *Revoluciones de la ciencia y permanencia de lo real*, Barcelona: Destino, 1982
- Schönfeld, M. (2000), *The Philosophy of the young Kant. The precritical project*, New York, Oxford University Press.
- Sloan, P. (2002), “Preforming the categories: Kant and eighteenth-century generation theory”, en: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 2, pp. 229-253.
- Watkins, E. (2005), *Kant and the Metaphysics of Causality*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Weber, A., y Varela, F. (2002), “Life after Kant: Natural purposes and the autopoietic foundations of biological individuality”, en *Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences* 1, pp. 97-125
- Wundt, M. (1964), *Die deutsche Schulphilosophie im Zeitalter der Aufklärung*, Olms, Hildesheim.
- Yamane, Y. (2010), “Eine Studie zum kritischen Begriff a priori als ein Sachverhalt, der ursprüngliche Erworben wird”, *Kant Studien*, 101/4), pp. 413-428.
- Zammito, J. H. (2018), *The Gestation of German Biology: Philosophy and Physiology from Stahl to Schelling*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- (2003), “This inscrutable principle of an original organization’: Epigenesis and ‘Looseness of Fit’ in Kant’s Philosophy of Science,” en: *Studies In History and Philosophy of Science*, 34/1, pp. 73-109..
- Zöllner, G. (1989), “From innate to a priori: Kant’s radical transformation of a Cartesian-Leibnizian legacy”, en: *Monist*, 72, pp. 222–235
- (1988), “Kant on the generation of metaphysical knowledge”, en: Oberer, H. Y Seel, G. (eds.), *Kant: Analysen—Probleme—Kritik*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 71-90.



Kant's anthropological study of memory

HECTOR LUIS PACHECO ACOSTA*

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. Barcelona, Spain

Abstract

The aim of this article is to shed light on Kant's anthropological theory of memory. I shall contrast physiological studies of memory against Kant's own study. I suggest some ideas about the relation between memory and time, as long as memory has the power to store and reproduce the temporal configuration of our representations. Moreover, I deal with the problem of personal identity and I suggest that memory contributes to the possibility of this identity from a *pragmatic* point of view. Finally, I hold that Kant's pragmatic anthropology does not only provide a description of memory for the human being's *self-knowledge* but also for the human being's *self-perfection*. Thus, such description discloses not only what the human being *is* but also what this can *become*, insofar as it is capable of *perfecting* itself.

Key words

Kant, anthropology, memory, personal identity, obscure representations

Memory is at the center of the revolutionary redistribution of the powers of the mind, as it is undertaken in Kant's lectures on anthropology, although unfortunately it has not yet received due attention among Kant's commentators.¹ James Russell (2014) and Robert

* Research assistant at the Department of Philosophy of the Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona (Spain). E-mail for contact: hpacheco@unal.edu.co

¹ References to Kant's works are by volume and page of Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften (ed.) (so-called Akademie edition), 1902–, *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, 29 vols., Berlin: Georg Reimer (later Walter De Gruyter) (AA). References to the *Critique of pure Reason* use the standard notation (CPR) followed by

Hanna (2012) were interested in the problem of memory, as they trace back the roots of episodic memory to Kant's theory of spatio-temporal conditions of experience. I, by contrast, maintain that the essential characteristics of episodic memory can be found in Kant's anthropological study of memory. It is noteworthy that Kant's analysis of memory has its own place in the majority of his lectures on anthropology between 1772 and 1796 (*Collins*, AA 25:87; *Friedlander* AA 25:521; *Pillau*, AA 25:757; *Menschenkunde*, AA 25:974; *Mrongovius*, AA 25:1272-3). Although, such analysis is quite scattered in the *Parow* anthropology lectures (1772-3). Even, he attaches a distinctive place to memory in the book I 'On the cognitive faculty' in the *Anthropology*² (see AA 7:182). However, Kant's lectures on anthropology do not exhibit a monolithic description of memory but such description changes over the years, encompassing similar and different ideas. I shall peruse Kant's official view of memory in the *Anthropology*, contrasting it with the role played by memory in his lectures on anthropology.

1. Physiological vs pragmatic views on memory

Kant's anthropological analysis of memory is meant to be regarded as *pragmatic* rather than *physiological*, for his lectures on anthropology aim to reach a very useful knowledge for common human beings (see AA 15:801). However, Kant was acquainted with prominent authors associated with a physiological or medical approach, such as Johann Theodor Eller (1689–1760), Albrecht von Haller (1708-1777), Georges-Louis Leclerc de Buffon (1707-1788), Johann Gottlob Krüger (1715–1759), Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), Ernst Platner (1744 - 1818), among others (see AA 25:85-6; Kant, 2012, p. 2; Brandt, 1999, p. 65; Sturm, 2008, p. 496). J. G. Krüger, for instance, makes some physiological remarks on memory by stating that certain movements in the brain are at the basis of the power of imagination. It means that memory and remembrance are conditioned by the occurrence of such movements, insofar as the former relies on imagination (see Krüger, 1756, §69, p. 213). Accordingly, an excessive numbness in the fibers of the brain may cause not only the lack of memory but also paralysis in arms and feet. This numbness also accounts for the fact that memory is weaker in old age than in youth (see §69-70, pp. 213-4, §74, pp. 220-1). Afterwards, Bonnet holds that memory, through which we retain ideas of things, is connected with the body (see Bonnet, 1770, §57, p. 42).

Kant's interest on physiological investigations of human nature is mainly evident in his *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* (1764), *Review of Moscati's "On the Essential Corporeal Differences between the Structure of Animals and Human Beings"* (1771), *Note*

the pages of its first (1781) and second (1787) edition (A/B). Translations are from the *Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*; it should be noted, nonetheless, that I have occasionally modified these translations. Where there is no reference to an English translation, the translation is my own. Here and throughout the thesis the gender-unspecific reference (mind, subject, human being) is made with the pronoun 'it' and its cognates.

² All references to Kant's *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (1798) will have this form (*Anthropology*).

to *Physicians* (1782), “From Soemmerring's *On the organ of the soul* (1796), and the third essay of “*Conflict of the Faculties*” (1797). For instance, in his *Essay on the maladies of the head*, he maintains that the ‘disturbed faculty of remembrances’ (*das gestörte Erinnerungsvermögen*) is a particular form of the reversedness of the head and that the appearances caused by such illness are chimerical representations of previous states that never existed (see AA 2:267). This suggests that the role of the brain is essentially stronger in the early years of Kant’s lectures on anthropology than in the years thereafter (see Brandt, 1999, p. 65).

However, Kant considers that physiological knowledge of human nature lies outside of the scope of pragmatic anthropology because the former describes a set of facts that cannot be changed by the subject, who would be then a mere observer of what takes place in its mind. In this vein, Kant holds:

He who ponders natural phenomena, for example, what the causes of the faculty of memory may rest on, can speculate back and forth (like Descartes) over the traces of impressions remaining in the brain, but in doing so he must admit that in this play of his representations he is a mere observer and must let nature run its course, for he does not know the cranial nerves and fibers, nor does he understand how to put them to use for his purposes. Therefore, all theoretical speculation about this is a pure waste of time. (AA 7:119)

Kant, as R. Brandt notices, is not committed to explaining how unavailable representations, although contained by the faculty of remembrance, are *physiologically* deposited in consciousness (see Brandt, 1999, p. 65). For the problem of the physiological process which are at the basis of memory was not relevant for his *Anthropology* (see also AA 15:749; 2:345; 29:908-9). Kant’s approach to Descartes’s view of (*corporeal*) memory³ leans partly on what he stated in the *Passions of the soul*:

When the soul wants to remember something, this volition makes the gland lean first to one side and then to another, thus driving the spirits towards different regions of the brain until they come upon the one containing traces left by the object we want to remember. These traces consist simply in the fact that the pores of the brain through which the spirits previously made their way owing to the presence of this object have thereby become more

³ Descartes introduced the notion of *intellectual* memory (in opposition to *corporeal* memory) during the spring 1640 in his letter to Mersenne (see Descartes, 1991, pp. 146, 148, 233), but Kant, in his *Anthropology*, mainly focuses on Descartes’ *corporeal* memory. Accordingly, I deem correct Emanuela Scribano’s claim that “a theory of “intellectual” memory not only surfaced in the year 1640, but, and above all, it was given a central role in human memory—even if that role was not specified. In any case, in 1644 memory still seems to be “intellectual” because it concerns thoughts not produced via brain traces, thoughts representing immaterial things” (Scribano, 2016, p. 142). However, there is no reference in the *Passions of the soul* to intellectual memory and this has led John Morris to say that Descartes was not yet ready to defend the doctrine of intellectual memory in public (see Morris, 1969, p. 457; see Yates, 1966, pp. 370-4). Against the latter interpretations see: Kessler, 1988, pp. 509-518, Sutton, 1998, pp. 64-5, and others.

apt than the others to be opened in the same way when the spirits again flow towards them. (Descartes, 1985, article 42, pp. 343-4)

To remember something, it is necessary to find the traces left by the impressions of objects, so that the spirits easily can go through those traces and the more they go through them, the easier it will be the act of remembering. Images are stored in memory, akin to the lines left by a folded and unfolded piece of paper; this is pointed out by Descartes in a letter (1640) to Meysonnier: “for the impressions preserved in the memory, I imagine they are not unlike the folds which remain in this paper after it has once been folded; and so I think that they are received for the most part in the whole substance of the brain” (Descartes, 1991, p.143). These spirits are nothing but a very fine air, contained by little tubes (nerves) coming from the brain, which transmits information through the nervous system (see Descartes 1985, article 7, p. 330; 1985, p.100). As a consequence, these spirits can be regarded as purely physical items whose role is probably filled today by neuro-electrical impulses (see Descartes, 1985, article 10, pp. 331-2; Cottingham, 1993, p. 13).

The act of finding something in memory is connected with the *pineal gland*, which is “where the seat of the imagination and the ‘common’ sense is located” (Descartes, 1985, pp. 106; see also pp. 340-1). Namely, the soul and the body interact with each other in the *pineal gland*. Memories, nonetheless, are not exclusively received on the gland but are also retained in different areas of the brain (see Sutton, 1998, p. 63). Descartes’ “pneumatic” explanation of the nervous system invokes nothing more than mechanical micro-events that are explained in the same way as any other physical phenomenon (see also Cottingham, 1993, pp. 13-4; Joyce, 1997, p. 376). However, his psychophysiological ideas do not pretend to locate memory’s seat but rather to model the mechanism of retention and storage (see Sutton, 1998, pp. 52-3). Of course, some of Descartes’ ideas about memory had a big influence on his contemporaries and on subsequent philosophers; thus, correctly Joyce suggests that

One trend in the Renaissance was toward placing more weight on physiology and an organic conception of the soul, and many naturalistic works were published in the spirit of the Alexandrian revival of the fifteenth century, more in line with the materialistic account of memory favored in Descartes's published works. (Joyce, 1997, p. 381, footnote 17).

Similarly, John Locke holds that external objects produce ideas in us if any motion goes from the object to our sense-organs, which is continued by our nerves (named *animal spirits*), by some parts of our body to the brain (see ECHU 2.8.12. 171-2; 2.9.3. 183-4).⁴ Locke believed that memory was grounded on processes occurred in the brain and that the constitution of the body could affect memory, just like diseases (even fever) can strip the mind of all its ideas (see ECHU 2.10.5. 196-7; Brandt, 1999, p. 64; Sutton, 1998, p. 170). Locke also explains why sleeping thoughts are forgotten, by claiming that “the memory of

⁴ All references to Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* will have this form (ECHU), followed by book, chapter, section numbers, and the pagination in Locke (1959).

thoughts, is retained by the impressions that are made on the brain, and the traces there left after such thinking” (ECHU 2.1.15. 134). Locke argues that when an ‘awaking man’ thinks, the materials of the body are employed, but when a man sleeps its soul thinks apart and makes no use of the organs of the body, it brings as a result that no impression is left on the brain, and, therefore no memory of these thoughts remains.

In contrast, Kant is not interested in a “scholastic” anthropology that produces science for the school, but which is of no utility to the human being (AA 25:856, 853). Therefore, he does not aim to explain which physiological brain processes are at the basis of the faculty of remembrances (see AA 7:176; 15:801; see also Svare, 2006, p. 87). He is rather concerned with the identification and application of what might hinder or stimulate people’s memory:

If he [someone] uses perceptions concerning what has been found to hinder or stimulate memory in order to enlarge it or make it agile, and if he requires knowledge of the human being for this, then this would be a part of anthropology with a *pragmatic* purpose, and this is precisely what concerns us here. (AA 7:119)

In Kant’s view, memory is not a subject-matter of natural sciences and he does not want to provide a purely speculative analysis of memory. Instead, he champions the sort of knowledge that turns out to be *useful* for human beings in common life; thus, special tricks, like rhymes, or maxims in verse (*versus memoriales*), become a great advantage to the mechanism of memory (see AA 25:1282, 762). It follows that all pragmatic knowledge, or skills derived from cultural progress should have no other goal than its use for the citizens of the world, that is to say, these are pursued by us in as much as we benefit from them (see AA 7:119).

In a section of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, amazingly titled “A human being's duty to himself to develop and increase *his natural perfection*, that is, for a pragmatic purpose”, Kant maintains that the human being looks after its own perfection: “a human being has a duty to himself to cultivate (*cultura*) his natural powers (powers of spirit, mind, and body), as means to all sorts of possible ends” (AA 6:444). It means that the human being should work on its natural predispositions and capacities, if it is to be regarded as an *animal rationale*. Of course, the human being uses its powers according to the freedom by which this determines its scope. However, the human being should not develop its capacities *for* the advantages involved in their cultivation but rather *for* a command of a *morally* practical reason (see AA 6:445; 7:277). The improvement of memory should be a subject of study for education, because the latter seeks to promote the *general* and *particular culture of the powers of the mind*. Kant suggests that the improvement or “culture” of memory belongs to the *particular culture*, as long as memory is a cognitive faculty that belongs to the *lower powers* of the understanding (see AA 9:475; 6:445).

Memory is a *power of soul* crucial for the self-improvement, since it is a disposal of the understanding i.e. of the rule which is used by human beings in order to fulfill their purposes. The analysis of the forms of memorizing is one of the most evident signs of Kantian interest for the human being's self-development. Certainly, he seeks to identify what can *enlarge* or make memory *agile*, in order to reach a more effective use of memory in the daily experience (see AA 7:119, 183; Svare, 2006, p. 56). As a result, a more effective use of memory can contribute to the human being's fulfillment of its duties with itself and with the others, for "quite apart from the need to maintain himself, which in itself cannot establish a duty, a human being has a duty to himself to be a useful member of the world" (AA 6:445-6). Kant is concerned with the cognitive role of memory in his *pragmatic* study of the functioning of memory and of the way in which certain social practices enhance the human being's memory. As Helge Svare notices, pragmatic anthropology seeks to identify what promotes or impedes memory, and that is why the study of human behavior in context becomes central. That study focuses on:

Exploring what either promotes or impedes memory, we have to look at the practices entertained by people trying to learn, for instance, a certain method or technique. Or we may look at the pedagogical institutions where the art of making students remember what is being taught is cultivated in the form of didactic practices. (Svare, 2006, p. 87)

The contribution of memory to human self-perfection is also linked to the field of education as the human being must look after the cultivation of memory as well as of the understanding, even from a very early age. For instance, memory can be cultivated by remembering the names in stories, or reading and writing texts that should be understood by the child in languages that the children should be taught, first by hearing while they are in social intercourse, even before they can even read (see AA 9:474-5).

2. Memory and time

In this section I suggest that, according to Kant, memory is a storing-reproducing faculty that preserves the formal and material conditions of experience, so that memory *stores* and *reproduces* experienced events, as well as *tensed* and *tenseless* temporal relations contained in these events (see Pacheco, 2018). This description of memory agrees with recent characterizations of *episodic* memory, according to which it stores "spatial and temporal landmarks that identify the particular time and place when an event occurred" (Squire & Shrager, 2009, p. 19; see on this point also Tulving, 1972, p. 385). J. Russell and R. Hanna argue for Kantian roots of a current account of episodic memory, particularly with regard to Kant's account of space, time, and the synthetic unity of experience (see Russell & Hanna, 2012, pp. 32-4). Unfortunately, they do not deal particularly with Kant's account of memory. Furthermore, Russell argues that "Kant's analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development" (Russell, 2014, p. 391). However, I shall not argue that

Kant's theory of space and time evidences the existence of episodic memory, but rather that his theory of memory involves essential elements associated to this kind of memory.

Kant suggests, in different places, that memory involves *tensed* temporal series, for it constitutes a mental power directed at the *past* (see AA 25:1277, 1289, 1471; 15:816). For instance, he admits in the *Anthropology* that the 'faculty of remembrance' (*Erinnerungsvermögen*) is a sensible faculty by which human beings are capable of bearing in mind the past through imagination:

The faculty of deliberately visualizing the past is the *faculty of memory*, and the faculty of visualizing something as taking place in the future is *the faculty of foresight*. Provided that they belong to sensibility, both of them are based on the *association* of representations of the past and future consciousness of the subject with the present; and although they are not themselves perceptions, as a connecting of perceptions *in time*, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what *no longer exists* with what *does not yet exist* through what *presently exists*. (AA 7:182)

Nevertheless, the quoted passage is ambiguous because it is not clear whether the faculty of remembrance, or rather the past, present or future state of the subject cannot be regarded as a kind of perception. In my view, this impossibility should be admitted with regard to the faculty of remembrance, for a particular kind of *perception*, i.e. an empirical representation accompanied by consciousness (see AA 7:144; 9:65; CPR B160, B207), cannot reach the status of a mental power. In Kant's view, the faculty of remembrance has the power to associate the representation of a past 'state' (*Zustand*) of the subject with that of its present state. Since this faculty has the power to unite perceptions in time, the following interrogation arises: What perceptions is Kant referring to? The passage apparently suggests that perception is constituted by a set of items that differ by their temporal condition, namely 'what no longer exists' (the past), 'what does not yet exist' (the future) and 'what presently exists' (the present):

Although they [the faculty of memory and that of foresight] are not themselves perceptions, as a connecting of perceptions *in time*, they serve to connect in a coherent experience what *no longer exists* with what *does not yet exist* through what *presently exists*. (AA 7:182)

Memory is a necessary faculty for the connection of perceptions in a 'coherent' (*zusammenhängende*) or *connected* experience. To my knowledge, 'what *no longer exists*' expresses the *form* of a representation evoked by memory, namely the tensed temporal determination of a representation by which the latter exists in the *past*. This representation also expresses the *matter* of a representation, that is, that which no longer exists and can only be previously derived from sensibility, such as color, figures, flavors, sounds, etc. Therefore, the power of memory includes the reproduction of both the *form* of perceptions

and their *matter*, so that perceptions or similar kinds of representations (“intuitive-remembrances”) also can be reproduced by memory.

The relation between tensed aspects of time and memory is also indicated by Kant's claim that “they are called the faculties of *memory* and *divination*, of respiciance and prospiciance (if we may use these expressions), where one is conscious of one's ideas as those which would be encountered in one's past or future state” (AA 7:182; see also 25:974; Krüger, 1756, §68, p. 212). Accordingly, memory is a *reproductive* power of imagination through which we can be conscious of ideas that, according to their temporal features, are posited in the past and, according to its material content, are derived from sensibility (see AA 29:881). Thus, it seems reasonable to assert that “a memory is an inner appearance that has temporal content (i.e., what the memory represents is temporally ordered)” (Bader, 2017, p. 133).

As noted earlier, Kant holds that memory has the power to **reproduce** voluntarily former representations, and this prevents the mind from being a mere plaything that has no control of its functions. This reproduction involves three different acts that constitute the *formal perfections* of memory⁵: ‘to grasp’ (*fassen*) something rapidly in memory, ‘to recollect’ (*besinnen*) it easily and ‘to retain’ (*behalten*) it for a long time (see AA 7:182). The first act means that memory representations must be processed in order to identify the pursued one, among several representations, and once this representation is identified, it is certainly caught up. The second one refers to the *effort* or the act by which the representation is brought to consciousness (see AA 25:521). Finally, the third one consists in the act of retaining the yearned representation for a sufficient time, so as not to lose it. Kant, nonetheless, confesses that these acts do not appear always together, for sometimes one believes that one has something in memory but one cannot bring it to consciousness, namely one cannot ‘remind’ (*entsinnen*) it (see AA 7:182).

The functioning of memory is described as follows: to remember something we need to catch it from memory, then we must recollect it by means of imagination and finally we have to retain it in consciousness. Moreover, memory stores many representations by using the reproductive imagination to evoke them. Indeed, Kant says that “*this reproductive power of imagination is that which lies as ground of memory and is differentiated from the latter only by the fact that consciousness must come in addition and then, it is memory [for] does not produces anything but only repeats it*”⁶ (AA 25:1464; my translation; see also AA 25:511; 7:182; Bruder, 2005, p. 10). Accordingly, the act of remembering

⁵ Ernst Platner suggests a very similar description of memory, according to which memory is composed by three effects: i) ‘receptivity’ (*Empfänglichkeit*), that is, the capacity to catch something; ii) ‘to retain’ (*Behalten*) something and iii) ‘remembrance’ (*Erinnerung*), understood as the activity through which the retained ideas can be brought back and represented to the soul with the consciousness that we had them previously (see Platner, 1772, §336-7, p.104).

⁶ “*Diese reproductive Einbildungskraft ist die, welche dem Gedächtniße zu Grunde liegt und ist von derselben in weiter nichts unterscheiden als daß das Bewustseyn hinzu kommen muß, und dann wird sie Gedächtniß Sie bringt nichts hervor sondern wiederholt nur*” (AA 25:1464).

demands consciousness of the stored representations, and an agreement between the initial experiential input received from experience and its faithful reproduction through memory (see AA 15:805).

Furthermore, Kant suggests that our experience of the world often involves a reference to the past (and to the future). For instance, in our daily experience, we can observe that if we stare at a particular street, this empirical intuition somehow triggers our memory, reproducing a past representation associated with the intuition. As a result, our mind “draws forth the representations of the senses from previous times, and connects them with the representations of the present” (AA 28:236). The aforementioned example entails a form of consciousness, for “in the intuiting of the present we always look at the past and the future. We put it into connection in this way and we become conscious of it”⁷ (AA 25:87; my translation). It follows that, we can be conscious of what has been *stored*, of what is recently *apprehended*, and of the *connection* between them (see AA 28:236). This connection is determined by the law of association inasmuch as the empirical intuition should be similar with the reproduced past representation; these recalled representations can be images, sounds, concepts, etc., which express a past episode of our life associated with what we are experiencing.

The association between memory and time is clear in the description of *autobiographical* memory as the set of memory that human beings have about their past experiences (see Robinson, 1986, p. 19; Kasabova, 2009, pp. xi, xiv). This idea was present in Kant’s own philosophy. Like H. J. Paton, Anita Kasabova maintains that memory is a consciousness of the past, which comes in two steps, that is, *retention* and *recollection*. Concerning the latter, she claims:

Recollection (...) is the reflective level of recalling not only the past object, but recalling it as past. In order to do that, we have to recall the elapsed act as well as the elapsed object so that what is not now present once more appears before us. (Kasabova, 2009, p. 92)

Accordingly, both Paton and Kasabova stress the difference between to recall a past object and to recall the *tensed* temporal cues that posit the object in the past and not in the present. This distinction can be supported by Kant’s *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* where he claims that “there is a distinction [~~crossed out~~: itself the] between to have the learned in memory and to remember the time in which we receive these representations”⁸ (AA 15:148; my translation). It means that, for instance, when we remember the first time we rode bicycle, we do not remember only the representations associated with the event but also their “position” in time as past (see Paton, 1939, pp. 171-2). As a result, the

⁷ “Beym Anschauen des gegenwärtigen sehen wir stets aufs vergangene und aufs künftige. Dadurch bringen wir es in Verbindung, und werden es uns bewußt” (AA 25:87).

⁸ “Es ist ein Unterschied, ~~sich der~~ das Gelernte im Gedächtnis zu haben und sich der Zeit zu erinnern, da wir diese Vorstellungen empfangen” (AA 15:148).

remembrance of the tensed temporal position prevents us from regarding the past representation as a new one in the mind but rather as a remembrance.

It is tempting to assume that, according to Kant, the representations of our inner states are ordered according to *tenseless* temporal relations of succession or simultaneity, so that our autobiographical recollection involves the temporal relations, according to which our past representations can be 'earlier', 'later', or 'simultaneous' to others (see Pacheco, 2018). However, since the dimension of time is *succession* and all representations of ourselves are related in time, then our autobiographical memory involves a successive time-span of discrete episodes of our own life. This interpretation, to certain extent, agrees with Kasabova's view of autobiographical recollection, as she claims that "recollection presentifies the past and constructs a temporal continuity of discrete episodes as 'earlier' and 'later': its sequences are arranged as the part in a literary work. If we read it, events unfold in a successive time-span" (Kasabova, 2009, p. 92). Kasabova surely is not concerned with our memory of time alone but also, like Kant, with the way the human being experiences time (see Kasabova, 2009, p. 94). Accordingly, in the *Anthropology*, Kant admits the possibility of experiencing time and this depends upon the experience of one's life:

How are we to explain the phenomenon that a human being who has tortured himself with boredom for the greatest part of his life, so that every day seemed long to him, nevertheless complains at the end of his life about the *brevity* of life? (AA 7:234)

Kant answers that the thought of such brevity is motivated by the fact that the various and different tasks of the last part of an old person's life produce in its memory the deceptive conclusion that this part has been a *longer*-travelled lifetime than what it actually was. In contrast, the emptiness of the major part of its early lifetime generates 'little remembrance' (*wenig Erinnerung*) of what has happened in its life, producing the illusion that this (early) part of its lifetime has been *shorter* than what it really was (see AA 7:234). In other words, the illusion of such *brevity* is produced by both the "memory scarcity" of events occurred in the *early* part of an old person's life and the "rich memory" of events occurred in the *late* part of it. In this example, an old person experiences the brevity of its life as the brevity of time, and in terms of the present, past and future, for "to feel one's life, to enjoy oneself, is thus nothing more than to feel oneself continuously driven to leave the present state (which must therefore be a pain that recurs just as often as the present)" (AA 7:233). It means that the abolishment of a person's life brings as a consequence the abolishment of time and vice versa.

Furthermore, Kant indirectly points out the relation between self-consciousness and tensed series of time in the "Leningrad *Reflexion* on Inner Sense", where he states that time contains the way in which we appear to ourselves. Therefore, the cognition of ourselves is

determined by the way in which we appear to ourselves in time. Kant here refers to the typical distinction between *pure* (transcendental) and *empirical* apperception: “the first merely asserts **I am**. The second that I was, I am, and I will be, i.e., I am a thing of past, present, and future time” (AA 18:623). The idea is that pure apperception refers to intellectual consciousness that, in strict sense, provides no cognition of ourselves, because the proposition “I am” is not an experiential proposition but, rather, a formal one.

In contrast, empirical apperception emphasizes a *temporality* in the self, insofar as this is capable of obtaining an empirical cognition of its past mental states. This has led J. Bennet to claim that “when Kant speaks of ‘the determination in time’ of my existence he means the establishment of the empirical facts about me-of what my states have been-at the various stages in my history” (Bennet, 1966, p. 205). Of course, the subject has access to a knowledge of its own mental history and to its past states, resorting to its memory. The empirical apperception, termed also “cosmological apperception”, allows the self to consider its existence as a magnitude in time and in relation to other external things: “I am immediately and originally conscious of myself as a being in the world and only thereby is my own existence determinable as a magnitude in time” (AA 18:623). In this vein, Kant does not deal with the self in “isolation”, but as a being posited in temporal relations of the present, past and future. Thus, these relations rule both its self-experience and its experience of other things. Indeed, Kant’s pragmatic account of memory includes not only an *observational* knowledge, but also a *practical* one that is meant to help our memory:

The effort to remember the idea, if one is anxious about it, is mentally exhausting, and the best thing to do is to distract oneself for a while with other thoughts and from time to time look back at the object quickly. Then one usually catches one of the associated representations, which calls it back to mind. (AA 7:182-3)

It follows that when too much attention is focused on what we try to remember, the act of “remembering” turns out more difficult; we should focus on other representations associated with that which is to be remembered, in order to bring it to our consciousness more easily (see also AA 25:975).

3. Obscure representations in our memory

The analysis of the emergence of unconscious mental content is not a discovery of Kant but is already present in Alexander Baumgarten⁹ and has its sources in the Leibnizian theory of the *petites perceptions*, which was probably known by Kant himself (see Kitcher, 2012, pp 10-11; Sánchez, 2012, p. 193). As Leibniz claims, “an *obscure* notion is one that is not sufficient for recognizing the thing that it represents” and adds an example: “I once saw a certain flower but whenever I remember it I cannot bring it to mind well enough to

⁹ Baumgarten accepted the existence of dark perceptions in the soul; the collection of these perceptions was named *fundus animae* (see Baumgarten, 2013, §§ 10-11).

recognize it, distinguishing it from other nearby flowers, when I see it again” (Leibniz, 1989, pp. 23-4). Thus, *clear ideas* are those which, even as memories, represent the objects themselves with accuracy, while *obscure ideas (notions)* lack the original exactness, or have lost any of their freshness, and are faded by time (see *New Essays*, II. 29. 254. §2).¹⁰ Kant's view of an obscure representation is slightly different from Leibniz's own, albeit both take into consideration the existence of obscure notions and memory. As P. Kitcher notices (see 2012, p. 9), Leibniz grounds self-identity on the train of *petites perceptions* of which we are not conscious. These, nonetheless, are guarantee of the connection among the perceptions of our past existence (see *New Essays*, II. 27. 239. §14; see also *Monadology*, §§20, 23).

Kant states in the CPR that the faculty of being conscious of oneself, like the faculty of memory, varies in *degrees* (see CPR B415 footnote; see also A175/B217). In this vein, Kant does not think that clarity is the consciousness of a representation, namely the less consciousness of a representation we have, the more obscure the representation is. He, by contrast, holds that “a representation is clear if the consciousness in it is sufficient for a **consciousness of the difference** between it and others” (CPR B415 footnote). We have representations in memory of which we have a certain degree of consciousness, which nonetheless is not sufficient for the remembrance, that is, sufficient to be remembered (see Svare, 2006, pp. 202-3).

However, even though we are not conscious of these representations, we can still make a distinction in the connection of obscure representations, just like we do it with the marks of some concepts. It means that neither the *consciousness*, nor the *distinction* of the presentation (from others) prevents a representation from being **obscure** (as Leibniz believed). For this can only be “clear”, if we are *conscious of its difference* from other representations (on this compare Wolff, 1983, §729-30). For instance, we usually make a distinction between the concepts of right and equity, albeit we have no consciousness of their distinction. Likewise, a musician who hits many notes simultaneously when improvising is not necessarily conscious of the distinction among the different hit notes (see CPR B414-15 footnote).

These obscure representations, nonetheless, should not be taken as an innate stock that reflects the world in its entirety in a metaphysical context (see Oberhausen, 2002, pp. 133-4). Instead, these should be regarded, in general, as representations derived from experience, which are stored in memory and have an influence on our thoughts and actions. Kant even remarks that there are representations which we cannot be fully conscious of, so that we cannot, even by the most strenuous self-examination, “get entirely behind our covert incentives, since, when moral worth is at issue, what counts is not actions, which

¹⁰ All references to Leibniz's *New Essays on Human Understanding* will have this form (*New Essays*), followed by book, chapter, the pagination and section numbers in Leibniz (1996).

one sees, but those inner principles of actions that one does not see” (AA 4:407; see also 6:43, 51; Rockmore, 2012, p. 309).

Kant’s anthropology lectures (including the *Anthropology*) have always stated the existence of unconscious representations, although his reflection on them changes over time (see Kitcher, 2012, p. 13). I am concerned with an aspect of this problem, namely the relation between obscure representations and memory.¹¹ One of the most evident signs of the Kantian anchoring of obscure representations in memory can be found in the *Busolt* anthropology lectures from 1788- 1789, where he states that memory is “the field of obscure representations” (AA 25:1439-40). In other words, the mind is not totally transparent to itself but our memory encloses representations of our own mental states, which are not always “visible” to us. Instead, he remarks that

One can represent the human soul as a map, whose illuminated parts are the clear ones, especially bright, the distinct ones, and the unilluminated parts signify the obscure representations. Obscure [ones] occupy the biggest place, and are the ground of the clear ones. Human beings are often become a play of obscure representations. (AA 25:1440)

Kant’s example reveals that the human being is not only conscious of all its mental processes but is also capable of noticing these in a particular way (see also AA 25:867-8). Like Leibniz, Kant argues (against Locke) that there are effectively obscure representations, whose existence we are not directly conscious of, but only through their *effects*. Concerning to the existence of *obscure* representations in the mind, Kant illustrates: “the field of sensuous intuitions and sensations of which we are not conscious, even though we can undoubtedly conclude that we have them; that is, *obscure* representations in the human being (and thus also in animals), is immense” (AA 7:135; see also 2:266). In this regard, mental processes demand that some of our representations should happen in our consciousness, while others should be kept in our memory in order to avoid an “overcrowding” of representations that could not be associated properly: “if I wanted to become conscious in an instant of all obscure representations all at once, then I would necessarily be very astonished at myself. Thus what lies in my memory is also obscure and I am not conscious of it” (AA 25:480). This has lead me to consider controversial Nuria Sánchez’s claim that

The discovery of the predominance of obscure regions of the mind does not supply an instrument to reveal the most concealed human thoughts either, since it cannot break the resistance which human beings can oppose, in order to keep their thoughts hidden”. (Sánchez, 2012, p. 178)

¹¹ For a thoughtful study of the role of unconscious representation in Kantian theory of cognition, see Kitcher (2012).

I think that this interpretation causes some problems because, first, it suggests that there is no way to know these obscure representations, but such idea is contrary to Kant's known suggestion that these representations can be cognized by means of *inferences*. Second, if the human being were capable of choosing, among many thoughts, those which need to be hidden, then these would not be contained in obscure regions, namely the human being would be conscious of them. It is a fact that the external observation of human beings makes them behave in a different way (hiding or changing behavior) as they feel observed. However, Kant does not regard this difficulty as a phenomenon brought about by obscure representations, but rather by a desire of disguising (see AA 7:120-1).

Kant suggests at times that most of the human soul's acts are carried out in obscurity and despite of the fact that we are not immediately conscious of obscure representations through *senses*, we could be conscious of their existence through *inferences*: "obscure representations are those of which we are conscious not immediately, but rather through their effects. Everything contained in our memory lies in the field of obscure representations" (AA 25:1439-40). He also sets out two similar examples of the existence of obscure representations:

If an individual reads, then the soul attends to the letters, for if it spells [the words] out, then it reads, [and] then it attends to what it reads. The individual is not conscious of all this. The musician who is improvising must direct his reflection upon every finger he places, on playing, on what he wants to play, and on the new he wants to produce. If he did not do so, then he also could not play, but he is not conscious of this. (AA 25:479)

Accordingly, the musician man's reflection on the performed and pretended movements of his fingers is, on a certain level, obscure. For he is not conscious of every single movement of his fingers, which is involved in the more general act of improvising (see Svare, 2012, p. 203). Even more, Kant maintains that "the greatest store of cognitions exists in obscurity", so that the cognitions of the soul depend upon philosophical reflections along with judgements that arise from obscure representations already prepared beforehand in obscurity (see AA 25:479). In this vein, human beings judge universally and such judgements are based on reason, although at times one is not aware of them because their ground lies in obscurity:

For example, a drunken man is more tolerable than a drunken woman. Everyone judges this way. What is the basis? Women are subjected to impugment. Why does one shake hands with a stranger with one's right hand? The right hand is [our] active one, thus we leave it free for him. Why do we put the most distinguished among three [persons] in the middle? Because he can then converse on both sides. (AA 25:480)

Indeed, the existence of *obscure* representations relies on the fact that the human being does not lose everything that has come to its mind, but some of those contents remain obscure in memory. These representations lie in the mind, although one cannot be

conscious of all of them *in an instant*. We are conscious of some of them only, if something, in the community with others, occasions them (see AA 25:868). Kant underlines that it is difficult to draw such representations out of obscurity in as much as one cannot inspect them *directly*. For when one is supposed to narrate something obscure, one can think of nothing, whereas if one simply were to narrate everything one knows, abundant representations would come to light indirectly. It is reasonable to suggest that “if we do not enter *into the world*, the obscure representations will have serious difficulties to be conveniently identified” (Sánchez, 2012, p. 200). However, these obscure representations, stored in memory, have a great influence on the human being to the extent that these can make understanding fall into error. It seems astonishing the fact that, according to Kant, human beings are *a play of obscurity* (see AA 25:481-2, 869).

The study of secret processes in the soul is very important and still today controversial, since obscure representations like feelings, superstitious ideas, prejudices, etc., determine human being’s judgements (see AA 25:869). For it is common to observe that at times human actions or decisions are not determined by a judgement formed with consciousness, through a careful weighing of the pros and cons, but rather these are guided by a preliminary unconscious judgement (see AA 25:481). Despite of the fact that these obscure representations have an influence on our actions, they cannot be simply withdrawn thereby from our will (see Brandt, 1999, p. 150).

In my view, Kant’s analysis of obscure representations could not only *draw* attention to their existence but also may *help* us to get rid of them in certain circumstances, since “obscure representations are that which produces, in one human being more, in the other fewer, *follies*. The human being is rational as long as this can consider itself superior to the influence of obscure representations”¹² (AA 25:870; my translation). Kant is here suggesting that the human being is aware of the existence of obscure representations in its mind, and that it has the power to overcome these, replacing them with representations guided by the free use of its own reason.

4. Personal identity and memory

In this section I show how personal identity and memory are related in Kantian anthropology. I focus on the following questions: What would be the effects of the removal of memory from human self-consciousness? Does personal identity rely on memory? I shall not prove, or even attempt to prove, that memory can indeed provide an adequate criterion of personal identity. However, I shall assemble some indications about the contribution of memory to personal identity from a pragmatic perspective. As to the first question, I answer that there is a positive and negative effect.

¹² “Dunkle Vorstellungen sind, das was bei dem einen Menschen mehr, bei dem andern weniger *Thorheiten* hervorbringt. Der Mensch ist vernünftig, so lange er sich des Einflusses der dunklen Vorstellungen überheben kann” (AA 25:870).

On the one hand, Kant argues that the existence of many gaps in memory upon awakening, derived from inattention to neglected interconnected ideas, is a necessary condition for dreaming. That is to say, without these gaps we would dream, every night, again just where we were the night before, so that there would be a continuity not only in our waking life but also in our states of sleep and we would live in two different worlds. Certainly, these gaps of memory prevent us from being in a *diseased* condition in which we take the stories we sleep as revelations from an invisible world (see AA 7:175-6).

On the other hand, Kant holds that 'forgetfulness' (*Vergeßlichkeit*), contrary to memory, is a misfortune in which "the head, no matter how often it is filled, still remains empty like a barrel full of holes" (AA 7:185). Of course, being oblivious of remote or near past events can be caused by old age or by habits that humans have. This second case, for Kant, takes place in persons who read fiction books and have the freedom to create things according to the drift of their imagination. For instance, human beings' occupation in fantasy and in all the ways of killing time undermines memory, making a human being useless for the world. Memory is weakened by fantasies that distract the human being, turning the absent-mindedness (i.e. a lack of attention to the present) into something habitual (see AA 7:185).

Kant warns against the potential risks of reading novels, suggesting that we should not read something in general with the aim of forgetting it in the future. Unfortunately, most of the people do not read novels with the aim of retaining them but simply to amuse themselves (see AA 25:1275, 979, 523), so that the more people neglect retaining things, the weaker the memory will be (see AA 25:1462). However, Kant's observation of problems related to memory is not merely descriptive but it is also intended to help the human being to overcome them. For example, he suggests that to suspend our judgement may be helpful, if the human being wants to avoid a mistake derived from eventual memory faults (see AA 25:1273). Kant does not regard memory as an inalterable faculty but its capacity fluctuates over time; thus, in old age it is harder to grasp something in memory, although it is easier to extend it. Perhaps this happens because, so to speak, ideas have no more place for new information (see AA 25:1462, 522; 29:912). For instance, old people often can remember what they did as they were young but cannot remember what they did last night (see AA 7:185; 15:147, 149). Young people, by contrast, have a 'capable' (*capax*) memory rather than 'tenacious' (*tenax*) one, as far as they grasp quickly but they forget very soon (see AA 25:1462).

It may be pointed out that, in Baumgarten's view, memory may be *good* with regard to extension or intensity. According to the first one, memory is vast and according to the second one, it is firm, tenacious, capable, vigorous or ready. Kant suggests that *melancholic* people have a vast and faithful memory, while *choleric* people have a faithful but not a vast memory (see AA 25:1276); *sanguine* people easily grasp something (*capax memoria*) but they cannot retain it for a long time, and *phlegmatic* people grasp something

with difficulty but they retain it for a long time (*tenax memoria*) (see AA 25:975, 1273). It seems, however, that only some elements of this taxonomy lingered in Kant's lectures on anthropology and most of them are left out (see AA 25:975, 1462; 21:443).

Moreover, unlike Kant, philosophers like Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes and even Leibniz believed that self-observation was only possible in the form of a remembrance. Descartes, by contrast, thought that this self-observation could take place 'at once' (see Kulstad, 1994, pp. 32-4; Brandt, 1999, p. 82; Bobro, 2004, p. 26). In my view, Kant occupies an intermediate position because all the representations, which are reached through a "synchronic" (simultaneous) empirical self-consciousness concerning one's inner states, must be stored by memory as soon as they appear in consciousness. Even though a "synchronic" empirical self-consciousness is admitted, it does not entail that the representations of oneself are static or permanent, but they flow successively in time and cannot be stopped (see Pacheco, 2018). Thus, we can only be conscious of past representations, if memory stores and reproduces these representations; thus, memory grounds the connection of the present representations of our inner states with the past ones.

Kant nowhere explicitly states that memory is a necessary condition of self-consciousness, so that human beings could be conscious of their representations while being conscious of, say, inner states. However, all these representations are neither static nor fixed but rather they *flow* successively in time, so that they can only have continuity, if memory's functions of storing and reproducing are presupposed. In other words, if memory were torn from the self-consciousness, the human being would be conscious of a set of totally new representations. As a result, memory is not a necessary condition of empirical self-consciousness, but rather a condition of the *continuity* of the representations derived from an empirical self-consciousness.

With regard to the second question, I argue that the unity and sameness of the self are grounded on memory from a pragmatic point of view. As A. Brook notices, this idea may be problematic, for it is difficult to find even "a *prima facie* argument for personal identity in the role of memory or other kinds of retention of representations and/or their objects in synthesis" (Brook, 1994, p. 187). Other commentators argue that personal identity cannot be justified *via* memory but, on the contrary, memory is grounded on both synthesis and the unity of consciousness (see Brook, 1994, pp. 179, 186; Paton, 1929, p. 324; Kitcher, 1990, pp. 124-6; Powell, 1990, pp. 158-9; Kemp Smith, 2003, p. 251). In other words, memory *presupposes* the notion of personal identity, so that the former should not be used to *define* personal identity. I believe, nonetheless, that these two claims are compatible, namely *personal identity* depends upon memory's power to reproduce earlier experiences of our mental states (*e.g.* belief, desire, etc.) whose synthetic unity has been previously submitted to the unity of consciousness.

Of course, the problem of the reliance of personal identity on memory was not only attractive for D. Hume (1978, pp. 262, 259) but also for J. J. Rousseau (1979, p. 283), D. Diderot, D' Alembert (1769/1964, pp. 155-6), among others. For instance, Locke suggested that memory was a necessary condition for personal identity of the personal self:

As far as any intelligent being *can* repeat the idea of any past action with the same consciousness it had of it at first, and with the same consciousness it has of any present action; so far it is the same personal self. For it is by the consciousness it has of its present thoughts and actions, that it is *self to itself* now, and so will be the same self, as far as the same consciousness can extend to actions past or to come. (ECHU 2.27.10, 451)

Personal identity is not exclusively integrated by memory but also by consciousness, time, and action (see Powell, 1990, p. 155). Locke's view of memory, albeit not unproblematic¹³, provides elements that are compatible with Kant's own view. For, in Kantian anthropology, personal identity, to an extent, relies on our consciousness of *past* thoughts and actions.

In Leibniz's view, personal identity is secured by continuity of consciousness or memory (see Kitcher, 2012, pp. 8-9). Indeed, he held in *New Essays on Human Understanding* that "the existence of real personal identity is proved (...) by present and immediate reflection; it is proved conclusively enough for ordinary purposes by memories across intervals and by the concurring testimony of other people" (*New Essays*, II. 27. 219-220. §§9-10). Leibniz believed that consciousness was a necessary condition for personal identity and that memory is involved in the consciousness of our mental states, in as much as *consciousness* is nothing but a form of memory. It visibly means that if a human being were stripped of all sense of its past existence, beyond the power of ever retrieving it again, this could not be the *same person* anymore (see *New Essays*, II. 27. 238-9 § 13-14).

Similarly, Baumgarten grounds *personality* on intellectual memory: "reason (§640) is the faculty for perspicuously perceiving the correspondences and differences of things distinctly (§572, 579), and hence it is intellectual wit and acumen (§575), intellectual memory or PERSONALITY" (Baumgarten, 2013, §641). He also grounds *personality* on the spirituality of the human soul: "the human soul is a spirit (§754). Therefore, it has freedom (§755). And since spirituality, intellectuality, personality" (Baumgarten, 2013, §756); thus, a human soul that cannot conceive of something distinctly nor determine itself

¹³ On the reception of Locke's account of personal identity, see Sutton, 1998, p. 160f; Powell, 1990, pp. 152-157; Ameriks, 1982, pp. 149-151; Kitcher, 1990, pp. 123- 127. The *circularity objection* to the memory criterion of personal identity can be traced back to E. Joseph Butler (1692-1752), who claimed that personal identity is not *constituted by*, but *presupposed in* our consciousness of the past, i.e. recollection. In his view, if our consciousness of the past were a condition of personal identity, it would imply erroneously that "a person has not existed a single moment, nor done one action, but what he can remember; indeed none but what he reflects upon" (Butler, 1896, p. 388). Accordingly, the "remembering our experience of X" does not prove our personal identity, which arises rather from the fact that "we are the same while we are experiencing X", so that our "remembering of X" presupposes the idea of personal identity (see Butler, 1896, p. 389; see also Bernecker, 2009, pp. 47-8).

(according to its preferences), and which loses all of its personality and freedom, is merely a chimera.

Kant also accepts a relation between memory and personal identity. For he admitted Jean-Jacques Rousseau's claim that "what I know surely is that the identity of the I is prolonged only by memory, and that in order to be actually the same I must remember having been" (Rousseau, 1979, p. 283); Kant integrated this claim into the *Collins* anthropology lectures (see AA 25:12). The identity of the person cannot be demonstrated as the human being does not have access to an empirical intuition of such identity, but rather to a stream of many representations: "with the human soul we cognize nothing perduring, not even the concept of the I, since consciousness occasionally disappears. A principle of perdurability is in bodily substances, but in the soul everything is in flux" (AA 28:764; see also 29:1038; CPR B415). Kant identifies the notions "the identity of the person" with "intellectual memory" and emphasizes that even though we cannot demonstrate this identity, we are allowed to assume its existence: "with respect to the identity of the person, intellectual memory <*memoria intellectualis*>, no one comprehends its necessity, and also cannot demonstrate it, although its possibility can be assumed" (AA 28:764). This identification can also be found in *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie* where he states that "memoria intellectualis [is] the identity of the person in its consciousness"¹⁴ (AA 15:148; my translation). Indeed, Kant maintains that *intellectual* memory consists in the consciousness of oneself in a psychological sense and that it is concerned with personal identity (see AA 29:1036-1038). Certainly, it does not seem right to ascribe personal identity to a human being who lacks intellectual memory and suffers from amnesia that prevents it from reproducing memories of its personal life, past experiences, and so on ("autobiographical" memory). The importance of this identity is evident from a pragmatic point of view, as long as we *use it* all the time in our daily life. That is, we think of ourselves and others as creatures tied to the past, that is, as agents as having a personal identity constituted by a set of past social characteristics (see Wollheim, 1979, p. 224).

I believe that according to Kant, *personality* is what makes the human being rational. This idea can be inferred from a passage in which he comments that the best proof of the immortality of the human being (particularly of its soul) demands for the "future" life. The immortality entails the perdurability of the soul as substance, as a living being with representations and the survival of its *personality*. Kant underlines that without personality "one cannot say that human beings will exist in the future as rational beings. — Perduring memory <*memoria perdurabilis*>, connection of both states with the consciousness of the identity of the subject, without this the person is dead" (AA 28:688). Despite of the fact that the latter passage is extracted from an ontological rather than anthropological or scientific context, it still serves to show that *personality*, the *status of rational being* and *memory* are tightly connected in Kant.

¹⁴ "Memoria intellectualis — Identität der Person in ihrem Bewusstseyn" (AA 15:148).

Again, memory cannot guarantee a psychological continuity of intentions, beliefs, character traits, values, etc. It is plain that the human being is not conscious of all events of its life, but, as notices Brook, “we have countless representations of self of which we are not aware — memories of oneself, for example” (Brook, 1994, p. 151). Memory, hence, cannot provide the human being with an *absolute* continuity of all events relating to its existence but only with a *relative* one that involves memories of some number of events. This relative and partial identity, which could be called a “pragmatic identity” (see CPR A365-6), has been interpreted by A. Brook in terms of an *illusion*. He declares that

Kant was able to do something no one else has done. He was able to diagnose why memories of a certain kind, namely, of having had experiences and having done actions, as well as some other representations represented as past, generate an illusion that the earlier subject whose experiences and actions one represents as having been had or done is guaranteed to be oneself. (Brook, 1994, p. 179)

Accordingly, the relation between identity of the subject and memory is explained by means of a relation between “looseness in persistence” and “tightness in the unity of one's consciousness across time” (see Brook, 1994, p. 180). If my reading is correct, personal identity is possible, only if this relation is “displayed in memories of having had experiences and having done actions” (Brook, 1994, p. 180). Thus, Brook seems to suggest that personal identity, which is usually regarded as grounded on memory, is actually grounded on the unity of consciousness (see Brook, 1994, pp. 183-4, 193). In a sense, this is correct. For the empirical representations of *myself* can only be *my* representations, if transcendental apperception is presupposed. Kant even seems to leave open the possibility of an organization of memory content via *apperception*, insofar as memory is grounded on the reproductive power of imagination (see AA 29:884).

Indeed, memory is a source of representations of mental states, external objects, events, etc., which provides the human being with past materials *in which* this unity of consciousness is displayed. Kant notices the relevance of empirical material for the judgement “I think”. As he puts it: “only without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act I think would not take place, and the empirical is only the condition of the application, or use, of the pure intellectual faculty” (CPR B423). Kant does not refer here to memory, although it is reasonable to consider that memory is concerned with the storing and retrieval of empirical material on which this pure faculty is applied. In brief, if memory is impossible without unity of consciousness, unity of consciousness is also impossible without a memory that provides a potential unified material (see on this point Strawson, 1966, p. 99 and Kitcher, 1990, p. 124).

On top of that, human consciousness of personal memories constitutes a *conditio sine qua* the human being could not represent itself as being the same. Since humans cannot reach an empirical intuition of their personal identity, it seems that any form of personal identity could only arise from the set of changes that constitutes the human being. This

identity, which should be explained from a *pragmatic* perspective, is not only recognized by the subject, but also by other human beings in social intercourse. The relation between the human being's self-consciousness of the representations of its lifetime and memory, as the faculty that has the power to preserve these representations, constitutes a basic condition for personal identity. Nuria Sánchez correctly points out that "the inner sense alone cannot yield any fruitful observation, because it is an uninterrupted flow of representations" (Sánchez, 2012, p. 184). It follows that without the "autobiographical" memory, the human being would not have access to the very stream of the past representations of its own existence.

However, this stream of representations must be somehow subject to a form of *apperception*, by which these are connected by consciousness as *my* memories (see AA 29:884). P. Kitcher points out a similar practical use of the term *apperception*, as she holds: "identical *apperception* is both necessary and sufficient for the practical use of the concept of personality. And, given human epistemic limitations, that is all that can be used" (Kitcher, 2011, pp. 186-7). Thus, without such unity of consciousness, these memories would not belong to one and the same human being but to various consciousness or "selves". Evidently, Kant's concern for a knowledge of the human being as embedded in the world is more obvious in the *Anthropology* than in the CPR.

Conclusion

Memory is a crucial power of the mind because it has the power to preserve the temporal framework of those representational contents that have been previously stored and later reproduced. The operations of memory are accompanied by our will, so that we voluntarily evoke contents that are to be remembered. Memory is also relevant for the problem of the brevity of life, in the sense that the duration of life seems to be longer if we have *many* memories of present events, but *few* of earlier ones. However, Kant's analysis of memory is not only descriptive but also prescriptive, as he seeks a knowledge that may help us to improve our memory with regard to the *number* of things that can be remembered and the *duration* of those remembrances. Certainly, memory is not guarantee of personal identity, since the former cannot provide the human being with an *absolute* continuity of all events relating to its existence but only with a *relative* one that only involves some events. Finally, personal identity should be regarded as the composite of memory and the unity of consciousness because the former, integrated by memories of one's past experience, presupposes the synthetic power of pure understanding as a necessary condition for experience in general.

References

Ameriks, K. (1982). *Kant's Theory of Mind: An Analysis of the Paralogisms of Pure Reason*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Bader, R. M. (2017). 'Inner Sense and Time'. In A. Gomes and A. Stephenson (eds.), *Kant and the Philosophy of Mind: Perception, Reason, and the Self* (pp. 124-137). Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Baumgarten, A. G. (2013). *Metaphysics: A Critical Translation with Kant's Elucidations, Selected Notes and Related Materials*. C. D. Fugate & J. Hymers (ed. and trans.). London, New York. Bloomsbury. (First published 1739/⁴1757/⁷1779).

Bennet, J. (1966). *Kant's Analytic*. New York. Cambridge University Press.

Bernecker, S. (2009). *Memory: A Philosophical Study*. Oxford. Oxford University Press.

Bobro, M. E. (2004). *Self and Substance in Leibniz*. Maine. Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Bonnet, C. (1770-71). *Analytischer Versuch über die Seelenkräfte*. C. G. Schütz (trans.). Vol. 1. Bremen und Leipzig.

Brandt, R. (1999). *Kritischer Kommentar zu Kants "Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht" (1798)*, Kant-Forschungen 10, Berlin: F. Meiner Verlag.

Brook, A. (1994). *Kant and the mind*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bruder, M. (2005). 'Latent memory: An extrapolation of the structures of memory at work in Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason" (Immanuel Kant)'. *Electronic Theses and Dissertations*. 2580. <http://scholar.uwindsor.ca/etd/2580>

Butler, J. (1896). *The Analogy of Religion Natural and Revealed to the Constitution and Course of Nature*. In W. E. Gladstone (ed.), *The Works of Joseph Butler* (vol. 1). Oxford. Clarendon Press. (First published 1736).

Cottingham, J. (1993). *A Descartes dictionary*. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell.

Descartes, R. (1985). *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Vol. I. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff & D. Murdoch (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

----- (1991). *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*. Vol. III, The correspondence. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch & A. Kenny (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Diderot, D. (1769/1964). *Conversation between Diderot and D'Alembert*. In *D'Alembert's Dream*, L. Tancock (trans.). Penguín. Harmondsworth.

Hanna, R. (2005). 'Kant and Nonconceptual Content'. *European Journal of Philosophy*, 13(2), 247–290.

Hume, D. (1978). *A Treatise of Human Nature*. Selby-Bigge & P. H. Nidditch (eds.). Oxford. Oxford University Press. (First published 1739/²1978).

Joyce, R. (1997). 'Cartesian memory'. *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 35(3), 375-393.

Kant, I. (1900ff.). *Kant's gesammelte Schriften, Akademie Ausgabe* (Königlich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Ed.) (29 vols. to date). Berlin: G. Reimer [later W. de Gruyter].

----- ([1781/1787] 1998). *Critique of pure reason*. In: P. Guyer., & A. W. Wood (eds.), Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

----- ([1798] 2007). *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view (1798)*. In: G. Zöllner and R. Louden (eds.). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.

Kasabova, A. (2009). *On Autobiographical Memory*. Newcastle. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Kitcher, P. (1990). *Kant's Transcendental Psychology*. New York. Oxford University Press.

----- (2011). *Kant's Thinker*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

----- (2012). 'Kant's Unconscious "Given"'. In P. Giordanetti, R. Pozzo & M. Sgarbi (eds.), *Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious* (pp. 5-36). Berlin. De Gruyter.

Krüger, J. G. (1756). *Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre*. Halle & Helmstädt: C. H. Hemmerde.

Leibniz, G. W. (1989). *Philosophical Essays*. Ariew R. & Garber D. (trans. and eds.). Indianapolis & Cambridge. Hackett Publishing Company.

Locke, J. (1959). *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, A. Campbell Fraser (ed.), Vol 1. New York. Dover.

Pacheco, A.H.L. (2018). 'Theoretical assumptions in Kant's theory of time'. *Sincronía*, 74. México, 29-58.

Paton, H. J. (1929). 'Self-Identity'. *Mind*, 38 (151), 312-329.

----- (1936). *Kant's Metaphysic of Experience: A Commentary on the first half of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Vol II. Allen & Unwin. United Kingdom.

- Powell, C. T. (1990). *Kant's Theory of Self-Consciousness*. Oxford. Clarendon Press.
- Robinson, J. A. (1986). 'Autobiographical memory: a historical prologue'. In D. C. Rubin (ed.), *Autobiographical memory* (pp. 19-24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Rockmore, T. (2012). 'Kant on Unconscious Mental Activity'. In P. Giordanetti, R. Pozzo & M. Sgarbi (eds.) *Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious* (pp. 305-326). Berlin. De Gruyter.
- Rousseau, J. J. (1979). *Emile or On Education*. A. Bloom (ed.). New York. Basic Books.
- Russell, J. & R. Hanna. (2012). 'A minimalist approach to the development of episodic memory'. *Mind and Language*, 27(1), 29-54.
- Russell, J. (2014). 'Episodic Memory as Re-Experiential Memory: Kantian, Developmental, and Neuroscientific Currents'. *Review of Philosophy & Psychology*, 5(3), 391-411.
- Sánchez, N. (2012). 'A Linneaus of Human Nature: The Pragmatic Deduction of Unconscious Thought in Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology*'. In P. Giordanetti, R. Pozzo & M. Sgarbi (eds.) *Kant's Philosophy of the Unconscious* (pp. 177-232). Berlin. De Gruyter.
- Scribano, E. (2016). 'La forge on Memory: From the *Treatise on Man to the Treatise on the Human Mind*'. In D. Antoine-Maut & S. Gaukroger (eds.), *Descartes' Treatise on Man and its Reception* (pp. 139-154). Gewerbestrasse. Springer.
- Strawson, P. (1966). *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Methuen & Co. Ltd., London.
- Sturm, T. (2008). 'Why did Kant reject physiological explanations in his anthropology?' *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, 39(4), 495-505.
- Sutton, J. (1998). *Philosophy and memory traces: Descartes to connectionism*. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press.
- Svare, H. (2006). *Body and practice in Kant*. Dordrecht. Springer.
- Tulving, E. (1972). 'Episodic and semantic memory'. In E. Tulving and W. Donaldson (eds.), *Organisation of memory*, (pp. 381-403). New York. Academic.
- Wolff, C. (1983). 'Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt'. In A. Corr (ed.), *Christian Wolff: Gesammelte Werke*, I, 2. Hildesheim. Georg Olms. (First published 1724).

Wollheim, R. (1979). 'Memory, Experiential Memory, and Personal Identity'. In G. F. MacDonald (ed.), *Perception and Identity: Essays Presented to A. J. Ayer with his Replies to them* (pp. 186–234). London. Macmillan.

Yates, F. A. (1966). *The art of memory*. London. Routledge and Kegan Paul.



**La necessità del gusto e il *sensus communis* kantiano.
A partire da alcune recenti letture**

***The Necessity of Taste and the Kantian Common Sense
On the basis of recent interpretation***

FEDERICO RAMPININI*

Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”, Italia

Sinossi

La nozione di “*sensus communis*” è una delle nozioni più importanti e allo stesso tempo complesse dell’intera filosofia kantiana. Tale complessità è dovuta alla diversità di significati che essa acquisisce nel corso degli scritti kantiani, i quali non dedicano mai una analisi precipua a questo concetto. Recenti studi, come quelli di Zhengmi Zhouhuang e di Serena Feloj, hanno contribuito a focalizzare l’attenzione su tale nozione, sulla sua importanza e sulle difficoltà ad essa connesse. Proprio a partire dalla discussione di queste interessanti analisi, vorrei proporre una lettura epistemologica del “senso comune”, che tenga conto della molteplicità delle connotazioni che tale nozione di volta in volta assume, senza per questo perdere di vista l’unità e la sistematicità del sistema delle facoltà. Questa nozione a mio giudizio può essere identificata con la stessa facoltà di giudizio: facoltà che nell’esperienza estetica esprime pienamente la sua eautonomia, essendo a sé stessa sia oggetto sia legge. In questo senso la trattazione del “*sensus communis*” rende più che mai evidente l’importanza e la ricchezza teorica dell’approfondimento delle condizioni trascendentali che ha luogo nella terza *Critica*.

Parole chiave

Kant, *Critica della facoltà di giudizio*, giudizio di gusto, facoltà di giudizio, senso comune.

* Università degli Studi di Roma “Tor Vergata”, federico.rampinini@gmail.com

**[Recibido: 5 de abril de 2019
Aceptado: 27 de abril de 2019]**

Abstract

The concept of “*sensus communis*” is one of the most important, yet intricate, notions among the whole kantian philosophy. Such complexity is due to the diversity of significances that it acquires throughout the progression of Kantian texts, which never seem to devote to this concept a thorough analysis. Recent studies, such as those by Zhengmi Zhouhuang and Serena Feloj, have contributed to bring the attention to such notion, to its relevance and to its related hardships. Basing myself upon these interesting assessments, I would like to propose an epistemological reading of “*sensus communis*”, taking into consideration the multiple and diverse undertones it assumes from time to time without, however, losing track of the unity and systematicity of the faculties’ system: a faculty which in its aesthetic experience fully expresses its autonomy, being both the object and the law to itself. This notion, as I claim, can be identified with the faculty of judgement itself: in this regard the handling of “*sensus communis*” clearly emphasizes the relevance and theoretical richness of the transcendental conditions’ in-depth examination held in the third *Critique*.

Keywords

Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, judgment of taste, faculty of judgment, common sense.

1.

Come è noto Kant nel corso dell’*Analitica del bello*¹ volge lo sguardo al mondo del bello, orientando la sua ricerca non tanto all’oggetto d’arte o all’oggetto bello in sé, quanto piuttosto, in accordo con l’impianto generale della sua filosofia, al particolare giudizio attraverso il quale un determinato oggetto, naturale o artistico, viene valutato bello. Diversamente, non sempre, in modo particolare in ambito anglosassone², è accolta l’idea, proposta fra gli altri da Garroni (1989), secondo cui l’*Analitica del bello* rappresenta un lento ma progressivo scavo verso la determinazione del *Bestimmungsgrund* del giudizio di gusto, e in generale della facoltà di giudizio. Le nozioni di “disinteresse”, “universalità” e “finalità senza fine”, che contraddistinguono lo sviluppo della trattazione kantiana (§§ 1-17), non vanno intese in senso materiale, non devono essere attribuite né all’oggetto in sé, né al piacere del gusto, né tanto meno all’esperienza estetica nel suo insieme, che risulterebbero così astratti e meramente formali: esse piuttosto vanno concepite come qualificazioni delle condizioni trascendentali, del “fondamento determinante” del piacere e

¹ Le opere di Immanuel Kant, come è d’uso, sono citate dalla cosiddetta *Akademie-Ausgabe* (Kant, 1900 sgg.) indicata con AA, seguita nell’ordine dal numero del volume, in caratteri romani, dal numero della pagina e della riga, in caratteri arabi, ed eventualmente, dopo i due punti, dal numero della pagina della traduzione italiana adottata. Solo la *KrV* viene citata, come di consueto, secondo la paginazione originale delle prime due edizioni. Nei passi citati lo spaziato è sempre di Kant, mentre il corsivo è mio. Faccio uso delle abbreviazioni consuete. Le traduzioni italiane a cui mi riferisco sono: per la *Anth.* si veda Kant (2010); per la *GMS* si veda Kant (2003); per le *GSE* si veda Kant (1989); per la *KrV* si veda Kant (2014); per la *KU* si veda Kant (2011); per la *Log.* si veda Kant (2010a); per i *Prol.* si veda Kant (1996); per *WA* si veda Kant (2013).

Vorrei esprimere la mia gratitudine al prof. Anselmo Aportone e alla prof.ssa Gianna Gigliotti, per aver letto con attenzione questo testo e per avermi fornito preziosi consigli.

² Si veda soprattutto Guyer (1997).

del giudizio di gusto. Qualora invece si ascrivessero questi attributi all'oggetto stesso si incorrerebbe in fraintendimenti spiacevoli, quali quello di leggere l'estetica kantiana come una semplice "estetica dell'arabesco", come una teoria meramente formale che rifugge emozioni e sensazioni, perdendo di vista il problema di fondo della prima sezione della *Critica della facoltà di giudizio*³. Essa concentra la sua attenzione non sul giudizio estetico effettivo, non sulla normazione dell'esperienza estetica effettiva, che pure talvolta viene affrontata, bensì sulla ricerca delle sue condizioni di possibilità: tale ricerca è condotta attraverso una messa a fuoco del sentimento della bellezza, realizzata grazie a una progressiva delimitazione del suo territorio, escludendo da esso residui di piacere morale, sensuale o conoscitivo.

Se il momento della qualità e quello della quantità conducono a un principio autonomo (disinteressato appunto) che risiede nella soggettività trascendentale (pertanto universale) – identificato nel momento della relazione, col principio della *Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck* – quello della modalità, piuttosto che introdurre un ulteriore tema nella discussione, affronta il problema relativo alla tipologia della richiesta di universalità insita nel giudizio di gusto. Esso avanza tale richiesta con forza, con la presunzione che il sentimento che comunica debba esser "necessariamente" esperito anche dagli altri soggetti che si rapportano con quel determinato oggetto. Nel caso del bello si «attribuisce agli altri il medesimo compiacimento: [si] giudica non semplicemente per sé, ma per ciascuno, e [si] parla quindi della bellezza come se essa fosse una proprietà delle cose» (*KU, AA v 212, 32-34: 48*). La necessità estetica, contrariamente a quella logica, «non può essere derivata da concetti determinati, e quindi non è apodittica» (*KU, AA v 237, 12-13: 73*); essa non riguarda la connessione che si instaura fra il soggetto e il predicato, bensì è «soltanto esemplare, vale a dire: una necessità dell'accordo di tutti in un giudizio che viene considerato come esempio di una regola universale che non si può addurre» (*KU, AA v 237, 7-10: 72*). Eppure, poiché la necessità di un giudizio estetico investe l'intera sfera dei soggetti giudicanti (essa è la «necessità dell'accordo di tutti» [*KU, AA v 237, 7: 72*]), credo che possa dirsi allo stesso tempo necessaria anche la relazione fra il predicato (bello) e il soggetto (la rosa, ad esempio) del giudizio⁴: affermare che tutti i giudicanti devono necessariamente concordare col mio giudizio vuol dire sostenere che il rapporto sussistente fra soggetto (la rosa) e oggetto (bello) deve rimanere il medesimo, pur mutando il soggetto

³ Emblematiche a tal proposito sono le letture di Guyer (1977 e 1997, pp. 184-227) e di Rogerson (1986). Rogerson ha affermato che Kant non può sostenere che la configurazione spaziale fornisce la base per un giudizio di gusto perché tale configurazione è concettualmente determinabile e questo confligge chiaramente con la natura disinteressata di un tale giudizio. Tuttavia la disposizione spazio-temporale degli elementi del giudizio di gusto non è necessariamente in contrasto con il primo momento dell'*Analitica del bello*: è possibile salvare la configurazione spazio-temporale all'interno dell'esperienza estetica distinguendo semplicemente fra l'apprensione di tali elementi attraverso l'immaginazione e la loro determinazione concettuale, che davvero priverebbe il giudizio di gusto del suo necessario "disinteresse". Paul Guyer ha interpretato la "forma" dell'oggetto bello come il segno della concezione classicistica, a causa dell'esemplificazione, nel caso della pittura, della forma mediante il disegno e dell'attrattiva mediante il colore: eppure tale esemplificazione non può esser presa per un'identificazione, anche alla luce delle affermazioni sulla bellezza come espressione di idee estetiche. Si veda inoltre quanto sostenuto in *MSI, AA II 392, 23-393, 11*.

⁴ Su questo si veda anche Longuenesse (2006).

empirico che compie il giudizio. L'oggetto deve necessariamente esser ritenuto bello da ogni soggetto. Il quarto momento approfondisce dunque quanto era stato già affermato nel secondo, dichiarando che l'universalità del giudizio di gusto è "necessaria", e, allo stesso tempo, fornisce anche il presupposto che fonda una tale necessità, introducendo la nozione di "senso comune" – di cui verrà data anche giustificazione, sebbene non come principio unicamente assunto dall'esperienza estetica, bensì come principio della conoscenza empirica in generale⁵.

All'interno di questo quadro, tuttavia, la necessità del giudizio di gusto, la legittima pretesa al consenso universale, non è certo di facile comprensione né di facile argomentazione a causa proprio del carattere paradossale del giudizio di gusto: esso «determina il suo oggetto rispetto al compiacimento (come bellezza) mediante un'esigenza di accordo da parte di ciascuno, come se fosse oggettivo» (*KU*, AA v 281, 32-34: 118), ma d'altro canto «non è determinabile per mezzo di argomenti, come se [...] fosse semplicemente soggettivo» (*KU*, AA v 284, 3-4: 120). A tal proposito nel § 7 dell'*Introduzione* si afferma:

ciò che vi è di strano e singolare sta solo nel fatto che non è un concetto empirico, ma un sentimento di piacere (quindi nessun concetto), che mediante il giudizio di gusto deve essere attribuito a ciascuno e collegato con la rappresentazione dell'oggetto, come se fosse un predicato legato alla conoscenza di questo (*KU*, AA v 191, 6-11: 26. Traduzione leggermente modificata)⁶.

La prospettiva kantiana se da un lato rinviene nel giudizio di gusto una pretesa di universalità, dall'altro lato rifugge da un'estetica prescrittiva. Come ha giustamente rilevato Feloj i tratti di soggettività, idealità ed esemplarità, che appartengono al giudizio di gusto e alla sua pretesa di universalità, sono conciliabili con un'estetica che non prescrive principi o norme, sulla base dei quali sia possibile classificare gli oggetti e dedurre le loro qualità estetiche. La studiosa ha recentemente pubblicato un importante lavoro proprio sul tema della normatività estetica, *Il dovere estetico. Normatività e giudizi di gusto*: sin dalle prime pagine sono dichiarate le intenzioni teoriche, le quali d'altro canto traggono la loro ispirazione e il loro fondamento da una solida e meditata riflessione ermeneutica relativa alle filosofie di Hume e di Kant.

2.

Il dibattito filosofico-estetico odierno ha luogo, in larga misura, all'interno di quella tradizione che, non senza qualche approssimazione, può esser detta "analitica": facendosi erede di problemi già ben presenti all'estetica settecentesca, essa ha riconsiderato il

⁵ Il § 21 ha da sempre diviso gli interpreti, da un lato coloro i quali vedono una deduzione del concetto di senso comune, dall'altro lato i sostenitori di una lettura più ampia, che intenda tale paragrafo come un tentativo di fornire in maniera rigorosa le ragioni dell'introduzione della nozione di senso comune, in guisa di una "deduzione metafisica". Fra i primi occorre ricordare: Guyer (1997, pp. 228-273); e Ameriks (2003). Mentre fra i secondi è necessario citare: Garroni (1998, pp. 86-88) e Allison (2001, pp. 144-159).

⁶ *KU*, AA v 191, 6-11: 26. Traduzione leggermente modificata.

problema di una valutazione fondata unicamente sul sentimento, ponendo la questione sotto una luce nuova e interessante. Si comprende dunque il valore e la novità del volume di Feloj, tanto più se si considera che tali questioni erano rimaste estranee al dibattito, più propriamente teoretico, ma in parte anche ermeneutico, che ha avuto luogo entro i confini italiani. La studiosa, notando che il giudizio estetico si configura come una valutazione soggettiva (dando voce alle emozioni), si propone di affrontare il tema dell'intersoggettività di questi giudizi, conferendo alla nozione di normatività un carattere ideale e regolativo, a partire dall'esegesi della nozione di *sensus communis* in Hume e in Kant⁷.

Se, come giustamente Feloj (2018, p. 12) afferma, parlare di normatività del giudizio estetico non è in contraddizione con un'estetica non normativa, non mi sembra altrettanto convincente l'attribuzione alla normatività del giudizio di gusto kantiano di un carattere ideale, a partire dalla constatazione che la sua pretesa di universalità rimane spesso disattesa, collocando la realizzazione di tale accordo «nell'attesa e non nell'attualità dell'accordo estetico» (p. 14). Il concetto di *Normativität* è infatti completamente assente all'interno del *corpus* kantiano⁸ ed è chiaramente introdotto nel lessico filosofico attraverso l'inglese *normativity*, calco del francese *normatif*. Questa nozione, se usata in relazione alla filosofia kantiana, conduce a perdere la distinzione fra i primi tre momenti concettuali e la loro stessa carica problematica: da un lato, (§§ 6-9) l'attitudine del giudizio di gusto ad «attribuire [a priori] a ciascuno un simile compiacimento» (*KU*, AA v 211, 22-23: 47), dall'altro lato la pretesa di far ciò con ragione (messa a fuoco soprattutto nel § 8, grazie alla nozione di “voce universale”), e dall'altro lato ancora la ragione stessa di questa stessa pretesa, che l'analisi critica mira a portare alla luce (scoperta propriamente nei §§ 10-12, sistematizzata con esattezza nei §§ 18-22 attraverso la nozione di “senso comune”, e approfondita nei §§ 30-40). La mancata chiarificazione della diversità di questi tre momenti concettuali (la richiesta a priori di universalità, la pretesa che tale attribuzione sia legittima, e il motivo della sua legittimità) e la tendenza a leggere quasi senza soluzione di

⁷ Feloj (2018 p. 84) guarda positivamente all'interpretazione guyeriana della relazione fra sentimento e giudizio: «la via più promettente sembra [...] quella di separare il sentimento e il giudizio, senza però assimilare l'esperienza estetica, come tende a fare Guyer, alla dimensione cognitiva». Paul Guyer (1997, pp. 60-115), ad esempio, sulla base della dicotomia fra “giudizi di fatto” e “giudizi di valore” – che tutt'oggi caratterizza in maniera peculiare sia la filosofia sia l'interpretazione kantiana analitica, le cui origini sono da rinvenirsi già nel pensiero di Hume (1987, p. 230; trad. it. Hume, 2017, p. 14) – ha sempre inteso distinguere da un lato il sentimento di piacere estetico, dall'altro lato il giudizio di gusto: quest'ultimo, muovendo da determinati vincoli (che Kant proverebbe, senza riuscirci, a esplicitare, in modo particolare nel terzo momento), avrebbe il compito di valutare i sentimenti e di stabilire se essi siano universalizzabili attraverso la formulazione del giudizio. Questa interpretazione si sviluppa a partire dal rinvenimento di una serie di problemi ed errori logici insiti nell'argomentazione della *Critica*, che lo studioso vorrebbe pertanto ristrutturare. Eppure Kant afferma in maniera molto chiara come «io debbo mettere immediatamente l'oggetto a fronte del mio sentimento del piacere e del dispiacere, e non mediante concetti, allora il giudizio di gusto non può avere la quantità di un giudizio universalmente valido oggettivamente» (*KU*, AA v 215, 15-17: 50). Fra gli altri, si è contrapposta a questa lettura in maniera acuta Ginsborg (2015). La discussione è proseguita recentemente, si vedano Ginsborg (2017) e Guyer (2017). Su questo è da vedere anche La Rocca (1995 e 1999, pp. 245-252).

⁸ È possibile ormai effettuare una semplice ricerca telematica sul sito internet: <https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/kant/suche.html>

continuità il percorso che la riflessione estetica compie da Hume a Kant, dall'altro, mi sembra che conduca Feloj a identificare, di fatto, la questione che attiene al diritto del giudizio di gusto di porsi come universalmente comunicabile con quella che concerne la riuscita empirica di tale pretesa, che Kant, come la stessa Feloj (2018, p. 56) rileva, non affronta. Cosicché, se la studiosa afferma a ragione che lo *standard of taste* humeano indica «un dato di fatto, ossia l'effettivo insieme di oggetti che, resistendo alla prova del tempo, sono stati riconosciuti come opere d'arte» (pp. 22-23), mentre in Kant «la condizione che orienta il dovere estetico, che lo rende possibile e al tempo stesso lo limita è una condizione soggettiva ed è l'idea di un senso comune, ossia il fondamento trascendentale condiviso da tutti gli uomini» (p. 55), non credo si possa arrivare a dichiarare come «soltanto intendendo il senso comune come una mera idea, che dunque dà una norma indeterminata e ideale, è possibile indicare una regola del gusto, una regola che è distinta dallo standard humeano, dal momento che non è dedotta empiricamente, che non costituisce né prescrive nulla» (p. 60). Posto che non c'è un criterio che permetta l'affermazione di una verità estetica e al tempo stesso è possibile e legittimo richiedere un accordo sulla base delle facoltà conoscitive, secondo Feloj, Kant opera uno slittamento del discorso dal *Sollen* estetico allo *Pflicht* morale: «emerge cioè l'occasione di estendere la norma indeterminata del gusto a norma di regolamentazione sociale» (*ibidem*). La studiosa, ispirandosi a Hannah Arendt⁹, intende il senso comune come «un principio quasi-trascendentale» (Feloj, 2018, p. 63), e ritiene che «il dovere estetico sarebbe allora fondato sull'esigenza che si produca un accordo in virtù dell'umanità, e in questo senso, si ottiene il passaggio da *Sollen* a *Plicht* che Kant lascia soltanto intravedere» (p. 60). Richiamandosi inoltre allo studio di Gabriele Tomasi (2017), ella soggiunge come «il gusto si fonda in ultima analisi sull'esigenza, di tipo morale, di coltivare la nostra capacità di condivisione; il nostro senso comune si costituisce come un'idea in virtù della quale percepiamo un senso di appartenenza a una comunità» (Feloj, 2018, p. 69).

3.

Questa lettura, che rinviene il fondamento della cosiddetta normatività del giudizio di gusto nel suo significato morale, è stata sostenuta in ambito internazionale da autorevoli interpreti quali ad esempio Béatrice Longuenesse (2006, p. 199)¹⁰. In particolare, la studiosa francese, per chiarire la nozione di *Lebensgefühl*, che designa il piacere esperito

⁹ Arendt (1982; trad. it. Arendt, 2006) ha posto al centro della sua lettura del pensiero kantiano il concetto di *sensus communis*, interpretato come sentimento intersoggettivo di apertura originaria al mondo. La filosofa tedesca ponendo in risalto l'importanza dell'uso pubblico della ragione e la centralità della seconda massima della facoltà di giudizio, ossia «an der Stelle jedes andern denken» (*KU, AA v 294, 17*), ha di fatto detrascendentalizzato la terza *Critica*, in modo particolare la nozione di *sensus communis*, conferendole una curvatura politico-comunitaria.

¹⁰ Cfr. anche Pippin (1996). Una differente linea esegetica è stata sostenuta fra gli altri da Allison (1990).

dinnanzi all'oggetto bello¹¹, accosta il concetto di *Leben*, implicato nell'esperienza estetica (ovviamente differente da quello di "vita biologica"), a quello di *Geist* hegeliano, letto come la "vita della comunità di uomini". Tale interpretazione conduce ad alcune conseguenze: anzitutto, qualora si intenda secondo un'ottica sociale e cosmopolita il concetto di *Leben* implicato nell'esperienza estetica, è necessario spiegare il piacere che la caratterizza come un sentimento suscitato dalla consapevolezza della comunicabilità universale di un determinato stato dell'animo – come del resto fa Longuenesse (2006, p. 200), distinguendo fra un piacere di primo e uno di secondo livello. In secondo luogo, una simile lettura del concetto di *Lebensgefühl* conduce a intendere il piacere estetico, e *lato sensu* l'intera terza *Critica*, secondo una prospettiva comunitario-politica, che non mi sembra comprendere in profondità e nella sua interezza il testo. Il rapporto di connessione fra la comunicabilità universale del giudizio di gusto e la socievolezza dell'uomo è affrontato certamente da Kant in alcuni luoghi della terza *Critica* e di altri scritti¹². Nel § 60, ad esempio, egli afferma che le arti belle devono esser coltivate perché sviluppino in noi «quella socievolezza, adeguata all'umanità, mediante la quale essa si distingue dalla limitatezza animale» (*KU*, AA v 355, 30-32: 190). Queste tesi saranno ribadite nel § 83, laddove, rapportandosi criticamente con il pensiero di Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Kant dichiara che lo scopo finale dell'uomo nel suo accordo con la natura è lo sviluppo della "cultura"¹³, e che essa è conseguibile solo sotto la condizione

del rapporto degli uomini tra di loro in cui al danno delle libertà che si contraddicono l'un l'altra reciprocamente è contrapposto il potere conforme a leggi in un tutto, che si chiama società civile, ché solo in essa può avvenire il massimo sviluppo delle attitudini naturali (*KU*, AA v 432, 29-33: 265).

La dimensione intersoggettiva e comunitaria dell'esperienza estetica è dunque una componente viva delle attente considerazioni kantiane, eppure una tale prospettiva non mi pare possa dirsi "fondante" la sua teoria del gusto, tale da penetrarne e costituirne il fondamento, che rimane trascendentale ed estetico. Numerosi sono i luoghi kantiani ove è possibile rinvenire una tematizzazione del sentimento estetico in senso eminentemente critico-epistemologico. Anzitutto credo sia necessario ricordare quanto Kant scrive alla fine della *Prefazione*, dove, tracciando una linea programmatica, afferma: «la ricerca intorno alla facoltà del gusto, come facoltà estetica di giudizio, viene compiuta qui *non per la formazione e la cultura del gusto* [...] ma semplicemente da un punto di vista

¹¹ «Qui [nel giudizio di gusto] la rappresentazione viene riferita interamente al soggetto, e cioè al suo sentimento vitale [*Lebensgefühl*], sotto il nome di sentimento del piacere o del dispiacere» (*KU*, AA v 204, 7-9: 39).

¹² Il tema della natura sociale del gusto è trattato già nelle *Osservazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime* ove si dichiara che: «chi sacrifica una parte del pasto nell'ascolto di una musica o si immerge profondamente in una narrazione traendone diletto o legge volentieri cose argute, anche se sono solo minuzie poetiche, acquista agli occhi di quasi tutti il garbo di un uomo raffinato, del quale si ha un'opinione elevata e per lui onorevole» (*GSE*, AA II 225 n.: 102 n.).

¹³ «Solo la cultura può essere lo scopo ultimo che si ha motivo di attribuire alla natura rispetto al genere umano» (*KU*, AA v 431, 31-32: 264).

trascendentale» (*KU*, AA v 170, 6-8: 6). Ancora più chiaro del § VI è il § VII dell'*Introduzione*, ove Kant ribadisce che: «il piacere non può esprimere *nient'altro* che l'adeguatezza dell'oggetto rispetto alle facoltà conoscitive che sono in gioco nella facoltà riflettente di giudizio, in quanto sono in gioco» (*KU*, AA v 189, 36-190, 1: 25). Inoltre credo sia necessario ricordare anche la nota al § 2. Qui Kant dichiara come il giudizio di gusto non fonda di per sé alcun interesse, seppure «nella società diviene interessante aver gusto» (*KU*, AA v 205 n.: 41 n.): dimostrando come l'aspetto sociale-comunitario, seppure importante, non trovi posto nel nucleo della struttura trascendentale che deve conferire legalità al giudizio di gusto, giustificandone la natura sintetica a priori. In conclusione, mi pare utile far menzione di una riflessione manoscritta che a chiare lettere mostra come la bellezza possa costituire una "totalizzazione" della conoscenza¹⁴, perché fornisce una immagine compiuta «dell'ufficio dell'intelletto [...] vale a dire: introdurre in esse [nelle molteplici ed eterogenee leggi della natura] un'unità» (*KU*, AA v 187, 8: 22):

La bellezza si distingue dalla piacevolezza e dall'utilità. L'utilità, quando viene pensata, produce un compiacimento solo indiretto, mentre la bellezza uno immediato. Le cose belle mostrano che l'uomo sta bene nel [è conforme al] mondo e che persino la sua intuizione delle cose si accorda con le leggi della propria intuizione¹⁵.

Tale accordo fra uomo e mondo, manifestato emblematicamente nelle cose belle, e fondato trascendentalmente nel più favorevole e libero rapporto fra le facoltà, permette a Kant di configurare il sentimento come un apriori degli stessi apriori logici¹⁶, come una precondizione del conoscere particolare. Il piacere per il bello è dunque l'emblema fenomenologico del felice incontro del soggetto con l'oggetto, il quale, pur presentandosi come altro e indipendente, favorendo un'armonica attività delle nostre facoltà, sembra star lì intenzionalmente per esser conosciuto da noi.

4.

Mi propongo ora, al fine di suffragare e di integrare una tale lettura critico-epistemologica dell'esperienza estetica, di focalizzare meglio la nozione di *sensus communis*, che mostrerà così in tutta la sua evidenza la linea di confine fra la prospettiva humane e quella kantiana, un po' troppo trascurata dai recenti studi.

Il complesso e variegato panorama delle discussioni settecentesche su questioni estetiche traspare in molteplici passi della terza *Critica* e si deve ritenere per certo che tale sfondo dovette essere tutt'altro che ignoto a Kant. A dispetto della diversità delle posizioni assunte da filosofi e intellettuali del secolo diciottesimo in ambito estetico, è possibile rinvenire,

¹⁴ Si veda Garroni (1998, p. 97).

¹⁵ «Die Schönheit ist von der Annehmlichkeit und Nützlichkeit unterschieden. / Die Nützlichkeit, wenn sie woran gedacht wird, giebt nur ein / Mittelbares Wohlgefallen, die Schönheit ein unmittelbares. Die Schöne / Dinge zeigen an, daß der Mensch in der Welt passe und selbst seine Anschauung / der Dinge mit den Gesetzen seiner Anschauung stimme» (*Nach. Log.*, AA XVI 127, 11-15: traduzione mia).

¹⁶ Cfr. Gigliotti (2001, pp. 36-37).

non senza qualche approssimazione, un elemento comune: l'esperienza estetica costituisce secondo gli uomini del Settecento un livello inferiore, preliminare o tutt'al più integrativo della conoscenza teoretico-scientifica e dell'attività pratica. I paragrafi dedicati alla *Critica della facoltà estetica di giudizio* sono permeati, talvolta in maniera celata, talaltra in maniera più evidente, da componenti polemiche nei confronti delle due correnti estetiche allora dominanti. In maniera molto esplicita, nel § 58, Kant dichiara:

In via preliminare si può porre il principio del gusto nel fatto che questo giudica sempre secondo principî di determinazione empirici, e quindi tali da esser dati solo a posteriori mediante i sensi, oppure si può ammettere che giudichi a partire da un principio a priori. Il primo caso sarebbe quello dell'empirismo della critica del gusto, il secondo del suo razionalismo. Secondo il primo l'oggetto del nostro compiacimento non sarebbe distinto dal piacevole, secondo l'altro, se il giudizio riposasse su concetti determinati, non sarebbe distinto dal buono; e così si negherebbe l'esistenza di ogni bellezza nel mondo e rimarrebbe al suo posto solo uno speciale nome per, forse, una certa mescolanza di entrambi i suddetti tipi di compiacimento (*KU, AA v 346, 25-35: 181*).

Da un lato, l'estetica cosiddetta razionalistica, rappresentata principalmente da filosofi quali Leibniz e Baumgarten, considerava l'ambito estetico come una forma di conoscenza inferiore rispetto a quella puramente razionale, a causa del ruolo egemonico svolto dalla sensibilità. Dall'altro lato, empiristi quali Burke o Hume¹⁷ fondavano il bello sul mero sentimento di piacere, senza riconoscere una specifica autonomia al gusto rispetto alle abitudini o alle convenzioni, disconoscendo in tal modo la sua capacità di conservare, a fronte della convenzione e della moda, una libertà e una superiorità specifiche.

I razionalisti – percorrendo la strada indicata da Descartes, secondo il quale la conoscenza che ha luogo attraverso i sensi è confusa, al contrario di quella “distinta” che avviene grazie all'intelletto¹⁸ – ritenevano l'ambito estetico come un caso particolare, per quanto paradigmatico, della conoscenza sensibile¹⁹. Costoro consideravano l'esperienza estetica come una conoscenza confusa, che l'intelletto avrebbe potuto rappresentare chiaramente e distintamente. L'assimilazione dell'ambito estetico alla sfera conoscitiva non impedisce ovviamente ai razionalisti di scorgere il problema dell'universalità del giudizio di gusto, eppure la loro soluzione è connessa strettamente a quella della grande questione dell'accordo intersoggettivo della conoscenza. Posto che il fine dell'estetica è la perfezione della conoscenza sensibile, ogni oggetto, se conosciuto distintamente, mostra al proprio fondamento un concetto, il quale può regolare tutte le dispute intorno alla sua propria

¹⁷ Secondo Meerbote la critica a Burke di Kant nella *Nota generale all'esposizione dei giudizi riflettenti estetici*, che segue al § 29, può essere interpretata anche come una critica a Hume. Cfr. Meerbote (1991, p. 13).

¹⁸ Si veda il celeberrimo esempio della cera in Descartes (1904, pp. 26-28); trad. it. Descartes (1997, pp. 49-51).

¹⁹ Si veda Baumgarten (1986); trad. it. Baumgarten (1992). Per l'estetica di Baumgarten è doveroso il rinvio a Piselli (1991); e a Tedesco (2000).

bellezza: pertanto l'unanimità del gusto può essere raggiunta solo chiarificando la confusione del concetto dell'oggetto, dunque attraverso il distacco dalla sfera estetica, attraverso la rinuncia alla contemplazione, dal momento che tale confusione caratterizza strutturalmente il regno della bellezza. L'ambito conoscitivo, nella concezione razionalista, tende a risolvere in sé quello estetico, giacché fra i due non è stata effettuata una vera e specifica differenziazione, come invece si propone di fare Kant.

Gli empiristi sembrano obliare la distinzione fra il piacere della contemplazione di un oggetto bello e il godimento materiale per un oggetto piacevole, in seguito alla riduzione della risposta estetica del soggetto a un mero stimolo sensorio: una tale analisi fisiologica, benché interessante e utile per una trattazione psicologica e antropologica, non è in grado di assicurare al giudizio di gusto nient'altro che una validità soggettiva empirica e contingente, non certo necessaria e universale. I filosofi britannici tentarono di comprendere la natura del piacere estetico assimilandolo al modello meccanico della risposta sensoriale a stimoli esterni²⁰. In particolare, David Hume (1987, p. 268; trad. it. Hume, 2017, p. 14), rifiutando l'idea secondo cui sia possibile determinare lo *standard of taste* a priori, riteneva che, per il tramite dell'esperienza, sia possibile armonizzare i diversi sentimenti con lo scopo di giungere a una regola che «confermi un sentimento e ne condanni un altro». Il filosofo scozzese, muovendo dalle trattazioni degli scettici francesi del Seicento, prende atto della varietà e della variabilità dei gusti, ciononostante ritiene possibile rinvenire una concordanza generale dei gusti: essa va rintracciata nei casi limite, quando si rivelano valori imponenti e disvalori indubbi, oppure quando si effettua un paragone fra produzioni artistiche di valore notevolmente differente. Questo prova, in un certo senso, che esiste una regola del gusto universale, oggettiva, per quanto difficile da scoprirsi. La ricerca humeana non mira a definire un'idea metafisica del bello, ma solo a ricavare dagli effettivi giudizi di gusto delle tendenze comuni; cosicché egli, muovendo dall'assunto secondo cui gli uomini condividono la «struttura originale della fabbrica interiore», dichiara come:

nonostante tutta la varietà e i capricci del gusto, vi sono certi principi generali di approvazione e di biasimo la cui influenza può esser notata da uno sguardo attento in tutte le operazioni dello spirito. [...Pertanto] certe particolari forme o qualità piaceranno e [...] altre dispiaceranno; e se il loro effetto mancherà in qualche caso particolare, ciò deriva da qualche evidente difetto o imperfezione dell'organo (Hume, 1987, p. 271; trad. it. Hume, 2017, pp. 17-18).

²⁰ Francis Hutcheson nel saggio *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, che Kant poteva leggere nella traduzione tedesca pubblicata a Lipsia del 1760 ad opera di Johann Gottfried Gellius, dal titolo *Abhandlung über die Natur und Beherrschung der Leidenschaften und Neigungen und über das moralische Gefühl insonderheit*, teorizzava un vero e proprio "senso della bellezza" (*Sense of Beauty*), a causa della somiglianza fra l'esperienza estetica e l'ordinaria esperienza percettiva. Egli scriveva: «the Ideas of Beauty and Harmony, like other sensible Ideas, are necessarily pleasant to us, as well as immediately so; neither can any Resolution of our own, nor any Prospect of Advantage or Disadvantage, vary the Beauty or Deformity of an Object: For as in the external Sensations, no View of Interest will make an Object grateful, nor View of Detriment, distinct from immediate Pain in the Perception, make it disagreeable to the Sense» (Hutcheson, 2004, p. 25).

Il fondamento dell'universalità del gusto è conferito da un dato di fatto, non dall'universalità di un'idea platonica o di un'idea innata cartesiana, ovvero dall'analoga struttura psichica e fisiologica degli uomini²¹. Poiché Hume non distingueva una facoltà, un senso o un principio eminentemente autonomo deputato a giudicare il bello, bensì demandava tale valutazione alla "fabbrica interiore", è evidente come fosse portato a porre il piacere estetico e quello sensuale sul medesimo piano, rinvenendo una «grande rassomiglianza fra il gusto spirituale e quello corporeo» (Hume, 1987, p. 273; trad. it. Hume, 2017, p. 19). Considerata la possibilità di giungere a principi generali del gusto è conseguentemente plausibile ritenere che i disaccordi estetici possano trovare una risoluzione certa²².

5.

Queste concezioni, a giudizio di Kant, «fanno conoscere solo come si giudica, ma non impongono come si debba giudicare» (*KU*, AA v 278, 25-26: 115): esse possono stabilire unicamente una congruenza contingente circa i diversi modi di giudicare dei soggetti, ma non sono in grado di giustificare e fondare una volta per tutte la pretesa di universalità presente a priori in ogni giudizio sul bello. Gli empiristi cercavano di non ridurre la validità universale di un giudizio di gusto alla mera contingenza facendo ricorso alla concezione metafisica dell'umanità come specie unica, con determinate caratteristiche essenziali e ideali, incluso un accordo dei soggetti giudicanti su certi oggetti belli. Ciononostante considerare il senso della bellezza come una proprietà essenziale di una determinata specie necessita il superamento di osservazioni empiriche, che possono evidenziare perciò solo un mero accordo di fatto, senza dimostrare mai una norma del gusto: gli empiristi entrano dunque in un circolo vizioso e compromettono le loro teorie.

Kant, che ancora nel 1787, con la seconda edizione della *Critica della ragion pura*, era convinto che il gusto fosse qualcosa di meramente soggettivo, seppure non privato²³, dopo

²¹ Giulio Preti aggiungeva come rispetto a Hume «analogamente lo Spalletti, circa negli stessi anni, approdava, da un identico problema, a un'identica soluzione; ma – in quanto superiore a Hume – tentava di dedurre dai principi generali di una psicologia edonistica gli effettivi fondamenti del gusto; Hume invece non approfondiva il problema preoccupato unicamente di determinare l'universalità del gusto riferendosi a un concetto, naturalmente statistico, ossia empirico, di "normalità" psichica del gusto [...] analoga alla normalità biologica e da questa, in fin dei conti, condizionata» (Preti, 2017, p. 106).

²² «Quando mettiamo loro [i cattivi critici] davanti un principio artistico ben stabilito, e illustriamo questo principio con esempi la cui efficacia, per il loro stesso gusto particolare, devono riconoscere conforme a quel principio, quando dimostriamo che lo stesso principio può essere applicato al caso in discussione, in cui non avevano percepito o sentito la sua influenza, devono concludere, alla fin fine, che il difetto sta in loro stessi, e che mancano di quella delicatezza che è necessaria per avvertire ogni bellezza e ogni difetto in qualsiasi composizione o in qualsiasi discorso» (Hume, 1987, p. 274; trad. it. Hume, 2017, p. 20).

²³ Cfr. *KrV*, B 36: 115. D'altra parte, nelle *Osservazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime*, Kant manifesta la convinzione secondo la quale la moralità si fonda sul sentimento, e per questo rinvia una stretta connessione fra l'ambito morale e la sfera del gusto, entrambe prive di un principio a priori: «la vera virtù, quindi, può essere inculcata solo in base a principi che, quanto più sono universali, tanto più la rendono nobile e sublime. Tali principi non sono regole speculative, ma consistono nella consapevolezza di un sentimento che vive in ogni petto umano e si estende molto più in là delle specifiche cause della compassione e della compiacenza. Credo di riassumere il già detto se concludo che si tratta del sentimento della bellezza e della dignità della natura umana» (*GSE*, AA II 217, 11-17: 92). Anche nel quarto capitolo

trasformazioni sorprendenti in ambito teoretico ed etico, riesce, mercé l'identificazione di un principio a priori anche nei giudizi di gusto, ad emancipare una volta per tutte l'estetica dalle altre discipline filosofiche, fondando la legalità peculiare della pretesa di universalità di tale giudizio. Tale principio, pur implicato anche nella conoscenza empirica, si esprime esplicitamente solo nel giudizio estetico, laddove rende manifesta precipuamente la sua natura trascendentale e non metafisica²⁴: esso è estetico in senso nuovo, non in quanto condizione dell'intuizione sensibile, bensì come garanzia che rende pensabile il realizzarsi dell'esperienza. Come ha rilevato Garroni (1986, p. 211) «è questo il nuovo principio trascendentale della facoltà di giudizio, elevata con ciò da semplice capacità, “applicativa”, a vera e propria facoltà, “costruttiva”». Tale principio epistemologico ed estetico allo stesso tempo è la *Zweckmäßigkeit*: «là dove non semplicemente la conoscenza di un oggetto, ma l'oggetto stesso (la sua forma o esistenza), in quanto effetto, viene pensato come possibile solo mediante un concetto di quest'ultimo, allora si pensa a uno scopo» (KU, AA v 220, 4-7: 55). Esso si esprime in tutta la sua natura trascendentale nel giudizio estetico, laddove assume la forma di una *Zweckmäßigkeit überhaupt*, o meglio di una *Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck*:

la conformità a scopi può essere senza scopo, in quanto non possiamo porre le cause di questa forma in una volontà, e tuttavia possiamo renderci comprensibile la spiegazione della sua possibilità solo derivandola da una volontà [...] Quindi possiamo almeno osservare una conformità a scopi secondo la forma anche senza porre a suo fondamento uno scopo (come materia del *nexus finalis*) e possiamo rilevarla negli oggetti, sebbene non altrimenti che con la riflessione (KU, AA v 220, 22-31: 55-56).

Se Hume interrogando l'esperienza rintracciava delle costanti nei molteplici giudizi di gusto, Kant rinviene un principio a priori che legittima la pretesa di universalità del giudizio di gusto, nonostante nel corso della storia possano emergere difformità di giudizio, che anzi mostrano solo la perfettibilità della capacità umana di giudizio. Nel quarto momento dell'*Analitica del bello*, traendo le conseguenze dell'analisi precedente, specifica ancor meglio tale legittimità grazie alla nozione di *sensus communis*.

6.

Se Feloj ha inteso il *sensus communis* quale ideale regolativo, Zhengmi Zhouhuang (2016) ha di recente proposto una originale e complessa lettura della nozione kantiana.

afferma: «il sentimento della poesia e della musica, non in quanto esprimono arte, ma sensazioni, è quello che gioca in ogni sua forma a raffinare ed elevare il gusto del bel sesso, e ha sempre qualche connessione con il sentimento morale» (GSE, AA II 231, 18-21: 109).

²⁴ «Un principio trascendentale è quel principio con il quale è rappresentata la condizione universale a priori sotto di cui, soltanto le cose possono diventare oggetti della nostra conoscenza in genere. Un principio si chiama invece metafisico, se esso rappresenta la condizione a priori sotto di cui, soltanto, possono essere ulteriormente determinati a priori oggetti il cui concetto deve essere dato empiricamente» (KU, AA v 181, 15-20: 17).

L'interessante e utile lavoro della Zhouhuang prende le mosse dalle molteplici accezioni del *sensus communis*, cercando di darne una lettura organica e sistematica, arrivando a una sorta di riformulazione del sistema delle facoltà. La studiosa articola tale nozione nei suoi tre campi d'azione: conoscitivo, pratico ed estetico. Il *sensus communis* nell'ambito teoretico, laddove si presenta anche come *gemeiner Menschenverstand* (comune intelletto umano) o *gesunder Menschenverstand* (sano intelletto umano), è la facoltà innata di giudicare il mondo empirico. Esso, contrapponendosi all'intelletto speculativo (*spekulativer Verstand*), non gode di regole a priori e non ha una validità universale, sebbene possa svilupparsi attraverso l'esperienza e costituisca il punto di partenza nel campo della speculazione²⁵. Il *sensus communis practicus*, o *gemeine praktische Vernunft*, è nel campo morale ciò che il *sensus communis logicus* è in quello teoretico; esso può esser inteso anche come *moralisches Gefühl*, ossia come una naturale capacità emozionale, una sensibilità morale, che può formarsi nel confronto con l'esperienza²⁶. Nell'ambito estetico Zhouhuang (2016, p. 95) considera il *sensus communis*, in particolare per come viene tematizzato nei §§ 20-22 e nel § 40 della *Critica della facoltà di giudizio*, come una operazione di riflessione generalizzante e, nello specifico del giudizio di gusto, come l'effetto del libero gioco delle facoltà conoscitive. Come rileva la stessa autrice «Es ergaben sich: (1) ein gemeinschaftlicher Sinn in der intersubjektiven Perspektive, nämlich in Bezug auf die „gemeinen“ oberen Erkenntnisvermögen im theoretischen, praktischen und ästhetischen Bereich und (2) ein intellektuelles Gefühl in der intrasubjektiven Perspektive, nämlich das moralische Gefühl, das Vergnügen des Verstandes und das ästhetische Gefühl. In beiden Fällen stand immer die Beziehung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Intellektualität im Zentrum» (p. 115). Dal momento che Kant alla fine dell'*Introduzione* della terza *Critica* ha posto una tavola dell'insieme delle facoltà superiori (*obere Vermögen*), considerandole nella loro attività a priori, la studiosa ha inteso ampliare tale prospetto considerando le stesse facoltà non solo nel loro uso puro ma anche in quello empirico. Nell'ambito empirico possono nascondersi delle insidie tali da richiedere un processo di riflessione al fine di assicurare una validità intersoggettiva dei giudizi. In tal senso è necessario un senso comune, ossia una sensibilità comune che, attraverso un particolare modalità del pensiero²⁷, sia in grado di riconoscere e allontanare eventuali errori.

La lettura della Feloj corre consapevolmente il rischio di leggere il testo kantiano attraverso alcune tessiture concettuali proprie della tradizione anglosassone, al fine di avanzare una proposta teoretica certamente interessante nel quadro del dibattito attuale²⁸.

²⁵ Cfr. Zhouhuang (2016, p. 14).

²⁶ Zhouhuang (2016, p. 2).

²⁷ La studiosa fa riferimento soprattutto alla seconda delle tre massime che Kant presenta nel § 40 della terza *Critica*: «le seguenti massime del comune intelletto umano non c'entrano qui, come parti della critica del gusto, ma possono servire come chiarimento dei suoi principii. Sono le seguenti: 1. Pensare da sé; 2. Pensare mettendosi al posto di ciascun altro; 3. Pensare sempre in accordo con se stessi. La prima è la massima del modo di pensare libero da pregiudizi, la seconda di quello ampio, la terza di quello conseguente» (*KU*, AA v 294, 14-19:130).

²⁸ Feloj (2018, p. 103) infatti afferma come «la via più promettente sembra dunque essere quella che colloca nell'ideale la pretesa normativa del gusto, sebbene occorra definire meglio la funzione del sentimento in un

Diversamente, l'interpretazione della Zhouhuang si pone all'interno del sentiero indicato da Kant e lo percorre in maniera personale, proponendo allo stesso tempo molti spunti di riflessione. Mi pare tuttavia che tale esegesi senza necessità complichino il quadro epistemologico e trascendentale kantiano, separando i tipi di esperienza in maniera assoluta e assegnando loro una e una sola facoltà, come se nell'esperienza estetica non abbia voce la ragione o l'intelletto, ma solo il "sentimento di piacere e dispiacere"²⁹. L'indagine sulle facoltà si instaura in una esperienza già tutta data, per cui l'intelletto nell'ambito conoscitivo, la ragione in quello "del desiderare" e la facoltà di giudizio in quello del "sentimento" occupano una posizione di predominanza, fornendo il *Bestimmungsgrund*, non di unicità.

7.

Vorrei provare ora a fornire una lettura personale della nozione di senso comune, la quale tenga conto di come il pensiero kantiano abbia recepito e approfondito talune istanze vive nello spirito moderno, sistematizzandole all'interno di un quadro teorico più ampio e complesso. Diversamente rispetto al sentire contemporaneo, per il quale attribuire una questione all'ambito del gusto equivale spesso a demandarla alle più svariate valutazioni soggettive, per gli uomini del Settecento la sfera del gusto era colma di istanze normative: essa non costituiva un dominio meramente privato, ma era anzi una materia inseparabilmente connessa all'ambito sociale³⁰.

La nozione di "senso comune" viene introdotta nel § 20 con lo scopo di identificare meglio il complesso principio a fondamento del giudizio di gusto. A questo concetto Kant non dedica né una trattazione autonoma all'interno della propria produzione, né è possibile rinvenire nei suoi scritti un pur breve ma organico discorso; oltre a ciò, egli fa uso di espressioni differenti a seconda del contesto concettuale. Limitandoci agli scritti editi, è possibile notare come all'interno dell'ambito conoscitivo Kant designi il "senso comune" come *allgemeiner Menschenverstand*, nei *Prolegomeni* (1783), e come *gemeiner Menschenverstand* nella *Logik* (pubblicata, con l'aiuto dell'allievo Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, nel 1800)³¹. Nella *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi* (1785), i concetti di *gemeiner Verstand* o di *gemeiner Menschenverstand* non vengono distinti in maniera precisa da quelli di *gemeine Menschenvernunft* o di *gemeine Vernunft*³². Le difficoltà non paiono diradarsi se si volge lo sguardo alla terza *Critica* (1790): qui Kant parla del "senso comune" in tre diverse maniere. Da un lato, nel primo capoverso del ventesimo paragrafo,

simile orizzonte interpretativo. Chiaramente questa posizione si riferisce a Kant come fonte che fornisce i principali strumenti concettuali, ma vuole elaborare una proposta per il dibattito contemporaneo».

²⁹ Alla facoltà di giudizio viene assegnato unicamente l'ambito estetico, così come l'intelletto e la ragione vengono rispettivamente destinati alla sfera teoretica e a quella pratica, eppure lo stesso Kant, pur in tutt'altro contesto, conferendo alla facoltà di giudizio un ruolo anche nel dominio della morale, afferma: «Damit man scheine einen Character zu haben oder in Ermanglung desselben sich mit sich zufrieden seyn könne, halt man sich oft an Regeln und macht sich welche, die ofters dem Herzen entgegen seyn, weil man seiner Urtheilskraft nicht zutraut, daß sie ohne Regel werde bestimmen können. Ein innerlich angenommener Character (gekünstelter). Ein niederträchtiger, ein redlicher Character» (*Refl.*, AA xv 513, 2-6).

³⁰ Cfr. Gadamer (1986, pp. 9-47); trad. it. Gadamer (2001, pp. 31-107).

³¹ Cfr. *Prol.*, AA v 278, 11- 279, 2: 55 e *Log.*, AA ix 57, 6-17: 50-51.

³² Cfr. *GMS*, AA iv 404-405: 81, 83.

dopo aver ribadito che i giudizi di gusto devono avere un principio (in quanto *vice versa* sarebbero delle semplici considerazioni sul piacere sensuale), e che esso non può essere oggettivo (in tal caso infatti sarebbero dei giudizi di conoscenza o morali), Kant dichiara che tali giudizi «debbono avere un principio soggettivo, che solo mediante il sentimento e non mediante concetti, ma in modo universalmente valido, determini ciò che piace e che dispiace. *Ma un tale principio potrebbe essere considerato solo come un senso comune*» (KU, AA v 238, 4-7: 73). Dall'altro lato, nel secondo capoverso dello stesso paragrafo la nozione di “senso comune” viene riferita a un sentimento piuttosto che a un principio: «senso comune (con il quale però intendiamo non un senso esterno, ma *l'effetto del libero gioco delle nostre facoltà conoscitive*)» (KU, AA v 238, 12-14: 74); giacché questo effetto è il sentimento di piacere espresso nel giudizio di gusto, il senso comune sarebbe allora un sentimento, anziché un principio. Dall'altro lato ancora, nel § 40, il “senso comune” non viene considerato né come un sentimento né come un principio, bensì esso viene identificato con la stessa facoltà di giudizio: «con *sensus communis* si deve intendere l'idea di un senso che abbiamo in comune, cioè di *una facoltà di giudicare* che nella sua riflessione ha riguardo (a priori) nel pensiero al modo rappresentativo di ogni altro» (KU, AA v 293, 30-34: 130). Kant appare dunque criptico, tuttavia non credo che queste differenti definizioni siano in contraddizione, al contrario esse si integrano e si completano reciprocamente³³: difatti come lo stesso Kant dichiara alla fine del § 22: «ora abbiamo solo da analizzare la facoltà del gusto nei suoi elementi e unificarli infine nell'idea di un senso comune» (KU, AA v 240, 13-15: 76).

La nozione di “senso comune” non è originaria della filosofia kantiana³⁴ ma gode di una tradizione antica e presenta pertanto un'area semantica notevolmente ampia. In primo luogo, essa, come *koinè aisthesis*, ha designato quella capacità generale che, nell'atto della percezione, attua un coordinamento dei singoli sensi. Aristotele intese con questa espressione una facoltà dell'animo alla quale attribuì una duplice funzione: da un lato quella di costituire la coscienza della sensazione, il “sentire di sentire”, giacché tale coscienza non può appartenere a un senso particolare (*Parva Naturalia*, 455 a 13-20; trad. it. Aristotele, 2002, pp. 159,161); dall'altro lato quella di percepire e coordinare le determinazioni sensibili comuni alle diverse percezioni provenienti dai singoli sensi, come il movimento, la quiete, la figura, la grandezza, il numero e l'unità (*De anima*, 424 b 22-425 b 10; trad. it. Aristotele 1991, pp. 171-173). La funzioni di integrare e coordinare i cinque sensi, senza aggiungersi ad essi come sesto, portando a unire le singole percezioni, furono affidate al “senso comune” anche dagli stoici, poi da Avicenna e, per suo tramite, da Tommaso, oltretutto dalla scolastica e dagli aristotelici rinascimentali³⁵.

³³ Lo stesso Guyer nota che: «fortunately for Kant's deduction of aesthetic judgment, this plethora of senses is more confusing than damaging, for justifying the presupposition of a common sense in any one of its three sense will in fact establish its existence in the other sense as well» (Guyer, 1997, p. 250).

³⁴ La bibliografia sulla nozione di “senso comune” è chiaramente vastissima; è necessario tuttavia il rimando alla trattazione che ne ha fatto Gadamer (1986, pp. 24-47); trad. it. Gadamer (2001, pp. 61-107). Per una panoramica generale si veda Agazzi (2004).

³⁵ Si veda ad esempio Tommaso d'Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 78, a. 4; trad. it. Tommaso d'Aquino (1984, pp. 299-304).

In secondo luogo, il “senso comune” è stato inteso come sinonimo della comune capacità intellettuale della specie umana, come buon senso, facoltà primitiva, e talvolta popolare, che, senza ricorrere a procedimenti razionali, procura un accesso immediato alla verità delle cose. Cicerone, nel *De oratore* (I, 3, 12; trad. it. Cicerone, 1970, p. 94), fa riferimento al *sensus communis* come a una generale maniera di pensare, dalla quale l’arte dell’oratore non deve affatto allontanarsi, al contrario delle altre arti, che sono stimate allorquando si allontanano dal «modo di comprendere e di sentire del volgo». Con Cicerone mi pare ravvisabile l’inizio di uno slittamento del significato conoscitivo verso quello etico-politico, ossia verso la terza accezione attribuita a questo concetto: il *sensus communis* è sì l’insieme delle nozioni e delle credenze su cui esiste un implicito accordo da parte degli uomini, ma è considerato ora sotto una luce nuova, retorico-politica³⁶.

In terzo luogo, a partire dalla fine del XVIII secolo, il senso comune, interpretato come sinonimo di *Gemeingeist*, *public spirit*, *esprit public*, è stato connotato viepiù da una marcata accezione politica, indicando così l’interesse e la passione che hanno come oggetto la sfera pubblica e la ricerca del bene comune. Questo significato non si radica in un contesto psicologico, gnoseologico o epistemologico, non ha il suo luogo nativo nel concetto aristotelico di *koinè aisthesis*; al contrario la sua accezione è marcatamente etica, sociale e politica, essa trova la sua origine nell’accezione italiana umanistica di Giambattista Vico. Il filosofo italiano, in polemica contro il razionalismo cartesiano e contro la scienza moderna, richiamandosi ai classici latini e all’ideale umanistico dell’*eloquentia*, legge la nozione di senso comune in modo per certi versi simile a come farà dopo di lui Kant, conferendole sia un valore educativo, come principio di una retta condotta, sia il significato di un comune sentire politico. Secondo Vico, le leggi astratte non possono indicare all’uomo la direzione del suo agire, è piuttosto l’universalità concreta, incarnata nel comune sentire di un popolo, a costituire i moventi dell’azione individuale e sociale. Il momento educativo è in tal senso fondante e deve procedere per immagini, non attraverso indagini puramente teoriche: questo poiché, platonicamente, l’ambito di pertinenza del senso comune, ovvero quello dell’agire mondano, non è né una scienza esatta, né procede per assiomi e dimostrazioni: esso è piuttosto il variegato mondo empirico, ove è necessario il discernimento del “verosimile”³⁷.

A questa accezione si riconnette Thomas Reid, iniziatore e ispiratore della Scuola scozzese, che propose una teoria della conoscenza di tipo realistico fondata sul senso comune (opponendosi all’ideismo di Cartesio, Locke e Berkley). Il senso comune è qui inteso come il criterio ultimo del giudizio e il principio dirimente le controversie. Eppure secondo costoro il senso comune non è né una capacità perfezionabile attraverso l’educazione né un fenomeno sociale e politico: esso è quindi inteso come una mera capacità di giudizio istintiva con la quale ci si orienta nel quotidiano.

³⁶ Si cfr. anche Tommaso d’Aquino, *Summa Theologiae*, II, 16, 68; trad. it. Tommaso d’Aquino (1984, p. 275).

³⁷ «Il *sensus commune* è un giudizio senz’alcuna riflessione, comunemente sentito da tutto un’ordine, da tutto un popolo, da tutta una Nazione, o da tutto il Gener’Umano» (Vico, 2013, p. 63). Sul “senso comune” in Vico si veda Modica (1983).

L'estetica inglese del Seicento e del Settecento ha inoltre connesso il senso comune col gusto. Burke, attraverso una prospettiva psicologico-organica, sostenne che il "senso comune" del bello derivasse dalle uniformità presenti nel nostro modo di percepire gli oggetti. Hume, come si è visto, credette che la regola del gusto potesse derivarsi da un'indagine statistica riguardo a ciò che risulta universalmente apprezzato in ogni luogo e in ogni epoca. Shaftesbury – pur anteriore di circa un secolo rispetto a Burke e a Hume, i quali avevano inteso il senso comune come un a posteriori – anticipò per certi versi la posizione kantiana: egli ritenne che la regola del gusto avesse, platonicamente, un significato oggettivo e ontologico, esprimendo un'armonia metafisica, il cui valore estetico, etico e teleologico sono intimamente fusi³⁸.

La nozione di "senso comune", nelle sue diverse accezioni, rappresenta dunque una facoltà valida sia sul piano privato, come capacità non razionale di unificare le percezioni, esprimere giudizi e condurre azioni, sia sul piano pubblico come senso sociale; tuttavia l'Illuminismo tedesco ruppe il legame fra privato e pubblico, tra l'aspetto conoscitivo e quello pratico, presente in questa nozione, intendendola come semplice "buon senso" (*gemeiner* o *gesunder Verstand*), come quella facoltà che l'essere umano deve possedere per distinguersi dall'animale³⁹.

Kant si richiamerà a questa secolare tradizione quando, prima nei *Sogni di un visionario* e poi nei *Prolegomeni*, definisce il *gesunder Verstand* come la capacità immediata di scorgere la verità prima di comprendere le ragioni atte a dimostrarla o a chiarirla, criticando gli scozzesi Reid, Oswald e Beattie, i quali hanno permesso ad esso di oltrepassare il proprio campo, ossia quello dell'immediata esperienza pratica⁴⁰. Nei *Prolegomeni* il "buon senso" (*gemeiner Verstand*) è infatti «la facoltà della conoscenza e dell'uso delle regole in concreto, a differenza dell'intelletto speculativo, che è una facoltà della conoscenza delle regole *in abstracto*» (*Prol.*, AA IV 369, 30-33: 267). I limiti del "buon senso" sono evidenziati, oltreché nei *Prolegomeni*, anche nella *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, laddove si sottolinea come, benché ogni uomo possa agire correttamente, quando è necessario chiarire il fondamento delle azioni morali il "buon senso" deve lasciare il posto alla filosofia critica pratica. Allorché invece si considera questa facoltà all'interno del suo proprio dominio, quello dell'esperienza, essa

³⁸ Numerosi sono gli studi che hanno confrontato l'estetica kantiana con quella dei filosofi appena citati, così rinvio ai recenti studi di Tschurennev (1992); Guyer (2016), il quale tuttavia ritiene che Kant abbia fallito nel fornire un fondamento a priori per il giudizio di gusto; Lories (1989).

³⁹ «La metafisica wolffiana e la *Popularphilosophie* del XVIII [...] non poteva operare in sé una trasformazione per cui le mancavano completamente le condizioni politiche e sociali. Si riprese bensì il concetto di *sensus communis*, ma poiché esso fu spogliato completamente del suo aspetto politico, perdette anche il suo specifico significato critico. Si venne quindi ad intendere [...] semplicemente una facoltà teoretica, la capacità teoretica di giudicare, che si poneva accanto alla consapevolezza morale [...] e al gusto. Il concetto di *sensus communis* venne così subordinato a una partizione scolastica delle facoltà fondamentali» (Gadamer, 1986, p. 32; trad. it. Gadamer, 2001, p. 77).

⁴⁰ «Essi [Reid, Oswald, Beattie e Priestley] trovarono perciò un mezzo più comodo: disdegnare l'esame e appellarsi al comune intelletto umano [*den gemeinen Menschenverstand*]. È infatti un gran dono del cielo possedere un intelletto diritto [...]. Ma lo si deve dimostrare con i fatti, con ciò che di meditato e ragionevole si pensa e si dice; e non con lo invocarlo come un oracolo, quando a propria giustificazione non si sa addurre nulla di buono» (*Prol.*, AA IV 259, 9-19: 11).

risulta particolarmente utile e importante. Esplicati i cardini del suo sistema, Kant, nell'*Antropologia*, laddove l'intento non è più l'esame trascendentale delle condizioni di possibilità dell'esperienza, non senza una certa ispirazione letteraria, afferma:

Gli esseri umani, per giudicarli in base alla loro facoltà conoscitiva [...], si suddividono fra coloro a cui si deve riconoscere il senso comune (*sensus communis*) – che invero non è comune nel senso di volgare (*sensus vulgaris*) e la gente di scienza. I primi hanno cognizione delle regole quando è il caso di applicarle (*in concreto*), gli altri ne hanno cognizione di per se stesse e prima della loro applicazione (*in abstracto*). [...] È da notare che il primo, che di solito viene preso in considerazione esclusivamente come facoltà conoscitiva pratica, non soltanto viene rappresentato come se potesse fare a meno della cultura, ma perfino come se questa gli fosse dannosa, dunque lo si apprezza fino all'esaltazione, considerandolo come una miniera di tesori nascosti nelle profondità dell'anima; addirittura, talvolta le sue sentenze vengono prese come un oracolo (il genio di Socrate) e ritenute più degne di affidamento di tutto ciò che potrebbe mai offrire una scienza consumata. Il sano intelletto però può mostrare questo suo privilegio solo riguardo a un oggetto dell'esperienza; tramite quest'ultima, esso non si limita a crescere nella conoscenza, ma può anche ampliare l'esperienza, non però dal lato speculativo, bensì soltanto da quello pratico-empirico (*Anth.*, AA VII 139, 18-140, 7: 123-124).

Esiste dunque, in ogni essere appartenente alla razza umana, una facoltà che, sebbene non rappresenti un privilegio, costituisce un ingegno naturale (*Mutterwitz*), il quale consente di approdare alla soluzione di un problema senza rendersi conto analiticamente delle operazioni compiute. Come ha messo in luce Menegoni (1990, p. 30), se in tutte le opere degli anni '80 prevale una valutazione in larga misura negativa del "buon senso" (*gemeiner Verstand*), con l'*Antropologia* (1798) Kant ne evidenzia il contributo positivo, qualificandolo anche come *Gemeinsinn*, ossia come una generica capacità di ragionare e giudicare, come un buon senso comune a tutti gli esseri umani, che consente la comunicazione del singolo giudizio. Il punto di svolta di questo percorso intellettuale è sicuramente da rinvenire nell'opera del 1790, laddove, nel § 20, a proposito del principio soggettivo che deve fondare i giudizi di gusto, si legge:

un tale principio potrebbe essere considerato solo come un senso comune, il quale è essenzialmente distinto dal comune intelletto, che talvolta viene chiamato anche senso comune (*sensus communis*), in quanto quest'ultimo giudica non secondo il sentimento, ma sempre secondo concetti sebbene di solito solo in quanto sono principî rappresentati oscuramente (*KU*, AA V 238, 6-11: 73).

Nella terza *Critica* talune istanze già presenti nella prima vengono condotte così a un compimento sistematico: esse troveranno la loro elaborazione unitaria e la loro sintesi rigorosa nella nozione di "senso comune". Kant raccoglie una tradizione vetusta,

reinterpreandola in maniera originale e tornando ad assegnare a questo concetto quella ricchezza e plurivocità di significati che l'uso umanistico, tornato in auge in Italia a cavallo fra il XVII e XVIII secolo grazie ai lavori di Giovambattista Vico, le aveva attribuito⁴¹. Il *sensus communis aestheticus* sta a fondamento del giudizio di gusto, giudicando attraverso il sentimento, mentre il *gemeiner Verstand*, o *sensus communis logicus*, si pronuncia sempre a partire da concetti, sebbene possano essere insufficienti o non completamente chiarificati, così fa anche nell'ambito della morale il *sensus communis practicus*⁴². La varietà di significati che vengono da Kant attribuiti alla nozione di senso comune non manifestano pertanto una contraddizione o un luogo oscuro della sua filosofia: questo concetto, al contrario, ricomprende armonicamente in sé tutto ciò che i primi tre momenti dell'*Analitica del bello* avevano rivelato essere necessario per la possibilità dei giudizi di gusto. Il "senso comune" è la sola facoltà in grado di combinare i requisiti di "disinteresse", o meglio d'indipendenza da idiosincrasie o inclinazioni della sensibilità e da condizionamenti provenienti da altre facoltà dell'animo, di universalità e di a-concettualità, dal momento che esso rappresenta un senso (distinto chiaramente dai cinque sensi) o una facoltà autonoma della distinzione e della valutazione sulla scorta di un "sentimento", di un sentire in senso ampio. Questa articolata, porosa e multiforme significazione della nozione di "senso comune" permette, come ha notato anche Anselmo Aportone (2018, p. 115)⁴³, di rinvenire il suo significato più profondo nel rapporto soggettivo armonico delle facoltà della conoscenza, nel corso della loro attività estetica e conoscitiva, e di identificarlo non semplicemente con il gusto⁴⁴ ma con la stessa facoltà di giudizio. Il § 21 e, più

⁴¹ Non mi pare corretto quanto afferma Gadamer: «quando Kant parla in tal modo del gusto come del vero "senso comune", egli non tiene più alcun conto della grande tradizione politico-morale del concetto di senso comune» (Gadamer, 1986, p. 49; trad. it. Gadamer, 2001, p. 111). In maniera simile si è espresso anche Rivera de Rosales (2008, p. 95).

⁴² «Si potrebbe designare il gusto con l'espressione *sensus communis aestheticus* e il comune intelletto umano con quella di *sensu communis logicus*» (KU, AA v 295 n.: 131 n.).

⁴³ Limitandosi agli studi italiani degli ultimi decenni è possibile notare come essi abbiano cercato di interpretare la nozione di "senso comune" sulla base fondamentalmente delle prime due definizioni, ovvero come principio e come sentimento, intendendolo come una norma ideale. Menegoni (1990, pp. 47-48), nella sua acuta analisi, ha posto l'attenzione sul significato comunitario del senso comune: «il senso comune è dunque il vero senso sociale, fondamento della comunità fatta di uomini che sentono, giudicano, conoscono, agiscono sulla base di un principio valido per tutti e che costituisce proprio per la sua elementarità la condizione base per la vita associata [...] il senso comune è [...] un sentimento di considerazione [...] per il punto di vista altrui». Savi (1998, p. 102) ha affermato che «il senso comune è [...] la regola del Giudizio che, in quanto non ci è data allo stesso modo in cui ci viene indicata una legge oggettiva, rappresenta al tempo stesso un ideale che il giudizio di gusto deve realizzare, per essere universalmente valido». La Rocca (1999, pp. 274-287) ha ritenuto che vada inteso come una presupposizione che fonda il giudizio di gusto: «il senso comune è dunque una "norma indeterminata" della riflessione, che svolge la funzione di rendere necessario il piacere estetico [...] la necessità che si fonda nel senso comune [è] un *Sollen*, una necessità da assumere e da istituire che [...] significa [...] una possibilità». Anche Garroni e Hohenegger (2011, pp. XXXIX-XL) dichiarano: «il principio della facoltà estetica di giudizio viene poi detto "senso" o "sentimento comune", cioè non un sentimento qualsiasi, ma un sentimento di un tipo assai speciale, caratterizzato dall'esigenza a priori di essere condiviso da ciascun giudicante, in quanto comporta un'identità, pur oscillante tra i suoi due aspetti, empirico e puro, privato e pubblico, di *questo* sentimento e del principio *a priori* che lo determina» (Garroni & Hohenegger, 2011, pp. XXXIX-XL). In questo filone interpretativo si collocano anche Dallarda (2017) e Tomasi (2017).

⁴⁴ L'identificazione del senso comune kantiano con il "gusto" operata fra tutti da Gadamer appare dunque piuttosto limitante. Cfr. Gadamer (1986, p. 39); trad. it. Gadamer (2001, p. 91). Il filosofo di Marburgo,

distesamente, la *Deduzione* dei giudizi di gusto dimostrano effettivamente come il senso comune non possa identificarsi con il solo gusto, giacché esso è la condizione di possibilità dello stesso giudizio di gusto.

Il “senso comune” è pertanto la stessa facoltà di giudizio (*Urteilkraft*): una facoltà soggettiva, che, non godendo di principi determinanti al modo dell’intelletto o della ragione, non è apoditticamente deducibile né induttivamente inferibile, ma è dotata solo di validità esemplare e nondimeno riesce a evitare il rischio di un regresso *ad infinitum*. Essa, in modo particolare nell’esperienza estetica, è a se stessa effetto e principio, oggetto e legge⁴⁵: il sentimento del piacere o dispiacere della riflessione, come effetto del libero relazionarsi di immaginazione e intelletto, è ciò attraverso cui tale facoltà si esprime nella maniera più libera e, allo stesso tempo, ciò che determina il giudizio che tale facoltà emette. La particolare natura della facoltà di giudizio o senso comune risente certamente della partecipazione di Kant all’assimilazione dell’idea dell’uomo come essere “perfettibile”, che ha luogo nella Germania della seconda metà del Settecento⁴⁶. Il senso comune è la facoltà innata di giudicare attraverso il “sentimento di piacere e dispiacere”; esso, proprio a causa della sua intima costituzione, è rivolto a uno sviluppo culturale – laddove per “cultura” si intenda il complesso ambito che vede il sapere intersecarsi profondamente anche con la morale⁴⁷ – che sta all’uomo effettuare⁴⁸. Esso è l’elaborazione ricca e profonda dell’“ingegno naturale”, di cui Kant aveva già parlato nella prima *Critica*⁴⁹ come di un talento che nessuna scuola può mediante nozioni pre-determinate insegnare: essa concerne la capacità di applicare le regole generali ai casi particolari, la cui sussunzione sotto l’universale *in abstracto* non può essere garantita da nessuna regola, pena il *regressus ad infinitum*, ma può esser solo “sentita”. Così il senso comune, la facoltà di giudizio, e in qualche modo il piacere della riflessione, sono alla base non solo del giudizio estetico o del giudizio di gusto in particolare, ma anche del giudizio conoscitivo e

prendendo le mosse dalla definizione dell’universalità soggettiva e ispirandosi a Hegel, ha rimproverato a Kant una estrema soggettivizzazione dell’estetico. Tuttavia Gadamer forza il momento soggettivo dell’“universalità privata” kantiana nella direzione di un’“opinione privata”, caratteristica invece del piacevole, sottovalutando la componente trascendentale, dunque universale.

⁴⁵ Cfr. *KU*, AA v 288, 24-26: 125.

⁴⁶ Si veda a tal proposito Hornig (1980).

⁴⁷ Ha affrontato la questione della “perfettibilità” in relazione alla problematica del carattere, ponendo in luce il rapporto fra ragione e sensibilità, natura e cultura, che la nozione stessa di carattere sottende Gigliotti (2001a).

⁴⁸ Amoroso (1984), facendo sue talune occorrenze dell’ermeneutica, ha sottolineato l’importanza del momento intersoggettivo per il senso comune (interpretato come un “senso comunitario”), sostenendo che la filosofia kantiana, attraverso la scoperta della rilevanza trascendentale della dimensione intersoggettiva, avvenuta nella terza *Critica*, si apre agli orizzonti della storia, della cultura delle istituzioni (religiose, politiche e scientifiche) nelle quali ha luogo l’organizzazione del consenso.

⁴⁹ «La facoltà di giudizio è perciò anche l’elemento specifico del cosiddetto ingegno naturale, la cui mancanza non potrà essere colmata da nessuna scuola: quest’ultima, infatti, potrà anche offrire, e in un certo qual modo inculcare, in un intelletto limitato una grande abbondanza di regole prese a prestito dalla conoscenza altrui, ma la facoltà di servirsi correttamente di esse dovrà appartenere allo scolaro stesso, e in mancanza di questa dote naturale nessuna delle regole che potrebbero essergli prescritte a questo scopo lo garantirebbe da un uso scorretto» (*KrV*, A 133/B 172: 295, 297). Si veda anche *Anth.*, AA VII 220, 12-229, 7: 223-232.

di quello morale⁵⁰. La facoltà del giudizio, non potendosi fondare su dimostrazioni o principi apodittici, esprime piuttosto un rapporto di familiarità dell'uomo col mondo che egli abita: in essa è possibile rinvenire un riferimento metaforico alla dimensione corporea del senso⁵¹: chi gode di una facoltà di giudizio spiccata mostra una "sensibilità" grazie alla quale è in grado di orientarsi adeguatamente nel mondo.

8.

Al *sensus communis* così inteso appartiene un certo "bisogno sociale". Alcuni interpreti, come Feloj o ancor prima Menegoni (1990, pp. 47-48), hanno rintracciato proprio nel senso comune «la condizione della vita associata: esso consente infatti la reciproca comprensione e possibilità di comunicazione»⁵². Menegoni (pp. 48-49) arriva a identificare il senso comune con la seconda delle tre massime esposte nel § 40 della terza *Critica*, affermando come: «il senso comune è [...] un sentimento di considerazione [...] per il punto di vista altrui. Su un sentimento dunque Kant fonda la possibilità della comunità degli uomini [...]. Alla base di questo mondo è possibile individuare un elemento di universalità [...] incarnato in un sentimento [...] sentimento di considerazione per il punto di vista altrui». Tomasi (2017, p. 92) ha affermato inoltre che «c'è un'esigenza (in ultima analisi morale) di coltivare in noi stessi la capacità di sviluppare un senso comune; [...] questo ideale è la norma dei nostri giudizi di gusto». Eppure credo che questa lettura, assegnando alla seconda massima un ruolo primario, spezzi l'equilibrio del discorso kantiano. A mio giudizio, la possibilità della comunità sociale e della comunicabilità delle conoscenze non sono tanto fondate sul sentimento dell'accordo delle facoltà; se è vero che i confini della comunicabilità tendono a coincidere con quelli di ciò che, in senso trascendentale, possiamo fare⁵³, la comunicabilità è garantita dal concetto dell'oggetto e dall'appercezione trascendentale, non dal sentimento o dal senso comune. Il dovere e la necessità per la ragione umana di aspirare a divenire pubblica, attraverso il confronto con i risultati dell'azione giudicativa degli altri soggetti, sono fondati su ragioni anzitutto epistemologiche, ancor prima che su presupposti etici di natura illuministica. L'esigenza di coltivare in noi il senso comune non è affatto «in ultima analisi morale»: essa è profondamente epistemologica. Il senso comune o facoltà di giudizio, non godendo di un principio apodittico su cui fondare la propria riflessione, deve sempre avere

⁵⁰ Il rapporto fra la riflessione estetica e l'esperienza conoscitiva ha diviso gli interpreti italiani, in occasione soprattutto del confronto epistolare fra Emilio Garroni e Silvestro Marcucci. Si veda Garroni (1998), il quale ha rinvenuto una condizione *lato sensu* estetica a fondamento del giudizio cognitivo, e Marcucci (1988, pp. 9-29, 67-102), il quale ha invece concesso pari dignità teoretica alla sfera estetica e a quella teleologica, senza prevalenza alcuna. Fra gli studiosi vicini all'interpretazione data da Garroni è necessario ricordare Hogrebe (1979); mentre sulla via indicata da Marcucci si sono mossi Cozzoli (1991) e La Rocca (1999, soprattutto pp. 194-298), il quale ha ribadito la «contemporanea autonomia» del processo estetico e del giudizio di conoscenza.

⁵¹ Come ha fatto Amoroso (1984, pp. 139-147).

⁵² Si veda anche Wingert (2000) e Felten (2004). Leyva (1997) ha posto l'accento sull'importanza del *sensus communis* per fondare una comune sfera dell'azione politica.

⁵³ Si veda *Briefe*, AA XI 515, 10-14. Si cfr. anche *KrV*, B XIII. A riguardo si veda quanto è sostenuto da Dörfliger (1991) e da Aportone (2018, p. 149).

riguardo nel pensiero al modo rappresentativo di ogni altro, per mettere a fronte, per così dire, il suo giudizio con la ragione umana nel suo complesso e con ciò sfuggire a un'illusione che, sulla base di condizioni soggettive private che potrebbero essere tenute facilmente per oggettive, avrebbe un'influenza svantaggiosa sul giudizio (KU, AA v 293, 32-36: 130)

Allo stesso tempo, però, non deve dimenticarsi di «pensare da sé [...] pensare sempre in accordo con se stessi» (KU, AA v 294, 14-17: 130), come ammoniscono la prima e la terza massima della facoltà di giudizio. La prima è la massima dell'*Aufklärung*, necessaria «per l'uscita dell'uomo dalla minorità che è a sé stesso imputabile. Minorità [che] è l'incapacità di servirsi del proprio intelletto senza guida di un altro» (WA, AA VIII 35, 1-3: 11) a causa di pigrizia e della vigliaccheria. La seconda è quella del “pensare ampio”. In seguito all'uscita dallo stato di minorità, è necessario usare correttamente l'intelletto, senza condurlo in errore: l'incompatibilità delle altre opinioni con la nostra può indicare la presenza di equivoci, generati per aver condotto il proprio giudizio sulla base di motivi meramente personali e parziali. Questa massima non si realizza solo attraverso il confronto reale di opinioni altrui ma anche come l'operazione della riflessione sulle altre possibili opinioni, come l'esame atto a verificare la possibilità di universalizzare il proprio punto di vista. La terza massima infine sintetizza la posizione delle precedenti, indicando la necessità di far uso in modo coerente e maturo della propria capacità di giudizio.

9.

L'operazione grazie alla quale Kant, tracciando un solco indelebile nella storia della filosofia, conferisce uno statuto proprio alla sfera del bello è dunque complessa e profonda. Posto che il giudizio di gusto dà voce a un sentimento di piacere, e non è dunque né fondato su nessi concettuali, né diretto alla loro esplicazione, potrà godere di una sua propria specificità solo se risulta fondato da un principio trascendentale. Quest'ultimo lo distingue dal giudizio sul piacevole, mera espressione di un piacere sensuale, e viene identificato col gioco libero e armonico delle facoltà, espresso concettualmente in maniera analogica dalla locuzione *Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck*⁵⁴, il quale dà luogo al particolare tipo di piacere (della riflessione) che caratterizza l'esperienza estetica. L'ultima definizione del bello può asserire che il piacere estetico è “necessario”, che la relazione fra il soggetto giudicante e l'oggetto giudicato conduce necessariamente al piacere, poiché è stato rinvenuto un principio trascendentale, che rende possibile, attraverso il giudizio di gusto, affermare a priori l'universalità del piacere provato, senza ricorre a indagini storiche o statistiche. Il fallimento empirico della comunicabilità universale di un giudizio di gusto non può condurre a mutare lo statuto a priori del suo principio: esso garantisce la legittimità della domanda di universalità, ma non può costituire né la garanzia né la prova di una sua effettiva riuscita – allo stesso modo per cui le leggi generali dell'aritmetica non assicurano la correttezza di una particolare moltiplicazione. La normatività estetica del

⁵⁴ Si veda quanto affermano Garroni e Hohenegger «la conformità a scopi è piuttosto l'espressione concettuale già analogica da parte del pensiero discorsivo di un principio che non si può esporre o addurre» (Garroni & Hohenegger, 2011, p. XXXIX).

giudizio kantiano di gusto non possiede affatto una validità semplicemente ideale, allo stesso modo per cui il senso comune non può essere inteso come un mero principio ideale a cui tendere all'infinito: così facendo si corre il rischio di far crollare l'intero edificio kantiano, negando uno statuto proprio all'ambito della bellezza, e di obliare la distinzione profonda (ed evidente già sul piano fenomenologico)⁵⁵ fra il giudizio di gusto e il giudizio sul piacevole.

Bibliografia

- Agazzi, E. (2004), *Valore e limiti del senso comune*, Franco Angeli, Milano.
- Allison, H. E. (2001), *Kant's Theory of Taste. A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Ameriks, K. (2003), "How To Save Kant's Deduction of Taste as Objective", in Id., *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 285-306.
- Amoroso, L. (1984), *Senso e consenso. Uno studio kantiano*, Guida, Napoli.
- Aportone, A. (2018), "Le condizioni soggettive comuni della riflessione. Note sui §§ 39 e 40 della Critica della facoltà di giudizio di Kant", *Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica*, Volume 36, pp. 143-158.
- Arendt, H. (1982), *Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy*, ed. by R. Beiner, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
- Arendt, H. (2006), *Teoria del giudizio politico. Lezioni sulla filosofia politica di Kant*, trad. it. a cura di P. P. Portinaro, Il Melangolo, Genova.
- Aristotele (1991), *De anima*, Loffredo editore, Napoli.
- Aristotele (2002), *Parva Naturalia*, Bompiani, Milano.
- Baumgarten, A. G. (1986), *Æsthetica*, Georg Olms Verlag, Hildesheim.
- Baumgarten, A. G. (1992), *Estetica*, trad. it. a cura di F. Piselli, Vita e Pensiero, Milano.
- Cicerone (1970), *Opere retoriche*, trad. it. a cura di G. Norcio, Utet, Torino.
- Cozzoli, L. (1991), *Il significato della bellezza. Estetica e linguaggio in Kant*, Mucchi, Modena.
- d'Aquino, T. (1984), *La somma teologica*, Edizioni Studio Domenicano, Bologna.
- Dallarda, G. (2017), "Normatività e creazione: i giudizi di gusto in Kant", *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Experience*, Volume 10, pp. 14-35.
- Descartes, R. (1904), *Meditationes de prima philosophia*, édité par C. Adam & P. Tannery, Cerf, Paris.
- Descartes, R. (1997), *Meditazioni metafisiche*, trad. it. a cura di S. Landucci, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Dörfliger, B. (1991), „Zum Status der Empfindung als der materialen Bedingung der Erfahrung“, in G. Funke (Hrsg.), *Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongreß*, Bouvier, Bonn, pp. 101-117.

⁵⁵ Come spero di poter argomentare in altra sede, a mio giudizio, i primi cinque paragrafi della terza *Critica* mostrano come secondo Kant il piacere meramente sensuale e il piacere provato dinanzi a un oggetto bello presentino decise differenze fenomenologiche; tale questione è tuttavia discussa e dalle conseguenze tutt'altro che irrilevanti per l'intera teoria kantiana del gusto, pertanto non può trovare spazio in questo luogo.

- Feljo, S. (2018), *Il dovere estetico. Normatività e giudizi di gusto*, Mimesis, Milano-Udine.
- Felten, G. (2004), *Die Funktion des sensus communis in Kants. Theorie des ästhetischen Urteils*, Wilhelm Fink Verlag, München.
- Gadamer, H.-G. (1986), *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik*, Mohr, Tübingen.
- Gadamer, H.-G. (2001), *Verità e Metodo*, trad. it. a cura di G. Vattimo, Bompiani, Milano.
- Garroni, E. (1986), *Senso e paradosso. L'estetica, filosofia non speciale*, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Garroni, E. (1989), "Kant e il "principio di determinazione" del giudizio di gusto", *Paradigmi. Rivista di critica filosofica*, Volume 7, pp. 9-19.
- Garroni, E. (1998), *Estetica ed Epistemologia. Riflessioni sulla "Critica del Giudizio" di Kant*, II ed., Unicopli, Roma.
- Garroni, E. & Hohenegger, H. (2011), "Introduzione", in Kant, I. (2011), pp. XI-LXXXV.
- Gigliotti, G. (2001), "Il rispetto di un tulipano. Riflessioni sul sistema kantiano delle facoltà", *Rivista di Storia della Filosofia*, Volume 56, pp. 25-61.
- Gigliotti, G. (2001a), "«Naturale» e «artificiale»: il problema del carattere in Kant", *Rivista di filosofia*, Volume 92, pp. 411-433.
- Ginsborg, H. (2015), "On the Key to Kant's Critique of Taste", in Ead., *The Normativity of Nature. Essays on Kant's Critique of Judgement*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 32-52.
- Ginsborg, H. (2017), "In Defence of the One-Act View: Reply to Guyer", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Volume 57, pp. 421-435.
- Guyer, P. (1977), "Formalism and the Theory of Expression in Kant's Aesthetics", *Kant-Studien*, Band 68, pp. 49-70.
- Guyer, P. (1997), *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, II ed., Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Guyer, P. (2016), "Hume, Kant, and the Standard of Taste", in P. Russel (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Hume*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 507-530.
- Guyer, P. (2017), "One Act or Two? Hannah Ginsborg on Aesthetic Judgment", *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Volume 57, pp. 407-419.
- Hogrebe, W. (1979), *Per una semantica trascendentale*, trad. it. a cura di G. Banti, Officina Edizioni, Roma (ed. orig. *Kant und das Problm einer transzendentalen Semantik*, Alber, Freiburg-München 1974).
- Hornig, G. (1980), „Perfektibilität. Eine Untersuchung zur Geschichte und Bedeutung dieses Begriffs in der deutschsprachigen Literatur“, *Archiv für Begriffsgeschichte*, Band 24, pp. 221-257.
- Hume, D. (1987), *Of the Standard of Taste*, in Id., *Essays Moral, Political, and Literary*, ed. by E. F. Miller, Liberty Classics, Indianapolis, pp. 226-249.
- Hume, D. (2017), *La Regola del Gusto*, in Id., *La Regola del Gusto e altri saggi*, ed. it. a cura di G. Preti, II ed., Abscondita, Milano, pp. 11-33.

- Hutcheson, F. (2004), *An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*, Liberty Found, Indianapolis.
- Kant, I. (1900 sgg.), *Gesammelte Schriften*, Bd. I-XXII hrsg. von der Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Bd. XXIII von der Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, ab Bd. XXIV von der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, de Gruyter, Berlin-New York.
- Kant, I. (1989), *Osservazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime*, trad. it. a cura di L. Novati, Rizzoli, Milano.
- Kant, I. (1996), *Prolegomeni ad ogni futura metafisica che potrà presentarsi come scienza*, trad. it. a cura di P. Carabellese, rev. a cura di H. Hohenegger, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Kant, I. (2003), *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, trad. it. a cura di V. Mathieu, Bompiani, Milano.
- Kant, I. (2010), *Antropologia dal punto di vista pragmatico*, trad. it. a cura di M. Bertani & G. Garelli, Einaudi, Torino.
- Kant, I. (2010a), *Logica*, trad. it. a cura di L. Amoroso, Laterza, Roma-Bari.
- Kant, I. (2011), *Critica della facoltà di giudizio*, trad. it. a cura di E. Garroni & H. Hohenegger, Einaudi, Torino.
- Kant, I. (2013), *Risposta alla domanda: che cos'è l'illuminismo?*, trad. it. a cura di M. Bensi, Edizioni ETS, Pisa.
- Kant, I. (2014), *Critica della ragion pura*, trad. it. a cura di C. Esposito, Bompiani, Milano.
- La Rocca, C. (1995), *Ästhetische Erfahrung und ästhetisches Bewußtsein: Das Lustgefühl in Kants Ästhetik*, in H. Robinson (Ed.), *Proceedings of the Eight International Kant Congress*, vol. I, Marquette University Press, Milwaukee, pp. 757-770.
- La Rocca, C. (1999), *Esistenza e Giudizio. Linguaggio e ontologia in Kant*, Edizioni ETS, Pisa.
- Leyva, G. (1997), *Die «Analytik des Schönen» und die Idee des «sensus communis» in der «Kritik der Urteilskraft»*, Peter Lang Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.
- Longuenesse, B. (2006), “Kant’s Leading Thread in the Analytic of the Beautiful”, in R. Kukla (ed.), *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant’s Critical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 194-219.
- Lories, D. (1989), “Du désentéressement et du sens commun. Réflexions sur Shaftesbury et Kant”, *Etudes Phénoménologiques*, Tome 8-9, pp. 189-217.
- Marcucci, S., (1988), *Studi kantiani*, vol. II, *Kant e l'estetica*, Maria Pacini Fazzi editore, Lucca.
- Meerbote, R., ed. (1991), *Kant’s Aesthetics*, Ridgeview Publishing Company, Atascadero.
- Menegoni, F. (1990), “L’a priori del senso comune in Kant”, *Verifiche*, Volume 19, pp. 13-50.
- Modica, G. (1983), *La filosofia del «senso comune» in Giambattista Vico*, Salvatore Sciascia, Caltanissetta-Roma.
- Pippin, R. (1996), “The Significance of Taste: Kant, Aesthetic and Reflective Judgment”, *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Volume 34, pp. 549-569.

- Piselli, F. (1991), *Alle origini dell'estetica moderna: il pensiero di Baumgarten*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano.
- Preti, G. (2017), "Postfazione", in D. Hume, *La Regola del Gusto e altri saggi*, Abscondita, Milano, pp. 99-113.
- Rivera de Rosales, J. (2008), "Relation des Schönen (§§ 10-17), Modalität des Schönen (§§ 18-22)", in O. Höffe (Hrsg.), *Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, pp. 79-97.
- Rogerson, K. (1986), *Kant's Aesthetics: The Role of Form and Expression*, Lanham, New York-London.
- Savi, M. (1998), *Il concetto di senso comune in Kant*, Franco Angeli, Milano.
- Tedesco, S. (2000), *L'estetica di Baumgarten*, Centro Internazionale Studi di Estetica, Palermo.
- Tomasi, G. (2017), *L'oggettivismo debole di Kant in estetica*, "Estudos Kantianos", Volumen 5 (número 2), pp. 81-98.
- Tschurennev, E.-M. (1992), *Kant und Burke: Ästhetik als Theorie des Gemeinnsinns*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main.
- Vico, G. (2013), *Scienza Nuova*, edizione critica a cura di P. Cristofolini-M. Sanna, Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma.
- Wingert, L. (1993), *Gemeinsinn und Moral. Grundzüge einer intersubjektivistischen Moralkonzeption*, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main.
- Zhouhuang, Z. (2016), *Der Sensus communis bei Kant. Zwischen Erkenntnis, Moralität und Schönheit*, W. de Gruyter, Berlin-Boston.



Freedom and Bonds in Kant *Libertad y Vínculos en Kant*

ALMUDENA RIVADULLA DURÁN*

Universidad de Navarra, España

Abstract

The thesis that I intend to address in this article can be summarized with the idea that positive bonds¹ engender not only dependence, but also freedom and autonomy. Accordingly, it is worth asking what positive human bonds are based on. Or, to phrase the question another way, how can dependence and autonomy be blended when we talk about relationships in terms of bonds, that is, relationships with a special quality of union?

I will try to answer these questions through a selection of texts that pay special attention to these issues from Kant's *Metaphysics of Morals*, *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, and his *Lectures on Ethics*². I will thus briefly address the Kantian concept of freedom and introduce the idea of bonds that, as we will see below, is not as alien to Kantian ethics as it may at first seem.

Keywords

Freedom, Kant, friendship, beneficence, bonds

Resumen

La tesis que pretendo abordar a lo largo de estas pocas páginas se condensa en la idea de que cuando los vínculos son positivos, no hay solo dependencia, sino que reina también la libertad y la autonomía. De acuerdo con esto cabe preguntarse lo siguiente: ¿de qué depende que los vínculos

* PhD Student of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Navarra and team member of the research group CEMID of the Institute of Culture and Society of the University of Navarra. Email: arivadulla@alumni.unav.es

¹ What I mean by “positive bonds” is the idea of being bound to someone without becoming passive, that is, without losing your autonomy. As Lara Denis holds: “We owe it to ourselves to avoid relationships in which we are continually dependent on someone else” (Denis, 2001, p.5).

² I will cite Kant's texts according to their initials in German, followed by the volume and page of the Prussian Academy edition of *Kant's Gesammelte Schriften*. Thus, the *Critique of Practical Reason* corresponds to KpR; *Metaphysics of Morals* corresponds to MS; *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* to RGV; and his *Lectures on Ethics* from Collins correspond to V-Mo/Collins.

humanos sean positivos? o, ¿cómo pueden conjugarse la dependencia y la autonomía cuando hablamos de relaciones en términos de vínculos, esto es, de relaciones con un especial carácter de unión?

Intentaré dar respuesta a estos interrogantes a través de una selección de textos procedentes de la *Metafísica de las Costumbres*, de las *Lecciones de ética* y de la *Religión dentro de los límites de la mera Razón*, en los que Kant parece especialmente preocupado por estas cuestiones. Trataré así de abordar brevemente el concepto kantiano de libertad y de introducir la idea de vínculo que, como veremos a continuación, no es tan ajena a la ética kantiana como puede parecer en un primer momento.

Palabras clave

Libertad, Kant, amistad, beneficencia, vínculos

I.

The idea of bonds in Kant has always been linked to the idea of obligations. The term in German for both is: *Verbindlichkeit*. It is the idea of each human being bound to the moral law and it is also the idea that governs Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason* and also his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. In this brief article we will try to introduce a broader notion of this idea, one that includes social relations, that is, the idea of being bound to others. We will see that both, the idea of being bound to the moral law and the idea of being bound to others, do not contradict each other. On the contrary, the first one grounds the moral character of our social relations. In her article, Eleni Filippaki considers this same issue:

[Human beings are] “beings that stand in essential relation to one another: not as isolated rational machines with a merely vertical relation to the moral law, but as rational substances in dynamic horizontal interrelations which provide the indispensable context for the proper conception of Kantian rational moral action” (Filippaki, 2012, pp.34-35).

At first the idea of social bonds may seem non-existent in Kant's moral theory, but among his texts we do find certain references to the idea of it. On the one hand, friendship is defined in a positive way as a “special bond” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 430). But, on the other hand, the situation of bonding is described as a situation of passive obligation (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 259-60). The distinction made by Kant between “passive obligation” and “active obligation”, and the identification of the idea of bonds with the first type of obligation, gives us the impression that for Kant the fact of being bound to someone is a negative fact, a situation of passivity and dependence. This perspective contrasts with the one about friendship in which Kant values very positively the union of two people as “purely moral” (MS AA 06: 470-471). It seems therefore that we have two alternatives when it comes to addressing the question of social bonds in Kant: one positive and one negative. However, it is possible to address both alternatives in a complementary way. Both in the *Metaphysics of Morals* and in his *Lectures on Ethics* we find a whole moral reflection in which the protagonist is no longer “the rational being in general” or “the

rational nature of human beings”, as it happens in his *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, but it is “the man”: a rational being indeed, but also a being corporally and socially situated. In these works, Kant tries to find the balance between man as “noumenon”, that is, as a radically active being, and man as “phenomenon”, that is, as a receptive being (not only in terms of knowledge, but also in terms of interaction with other human beings). In short, between the moral vocation of men to autonomy, on the one hand, and their necessity of society, on the other.

It seems then that it is not necessary to keep only one of the two alternatives about bonds, but it should be possible to transform the situations of negative bonding into new situations of positive bonding. In fact, Kant also defined freedom in this way: first, as a negative concept, and then he confirmed its positive reality.

Therefore, in order to address the question of social bonds in Kant, we will make use of the Kantian concept of friendship as a reference. In the same way that freedom does not destroy the reality that contradicts it (the natural inclinations), but it introduces its law and with it, a new order³, so does the concept of friendship. It does not replace dependence (which characterizes negative bonds) with pure autonomy, but it introduces that “equality in mutual love and respect” (MS AA 06: 469) with which dependence (attraction) and autonomy (repulsion) are balanced (MS AA 06: 470).

There hasn't been a full investigation of this topic yet, but some experts on Kant have done deep work in this direction. Experts such as Christine Korsgaard, Marcia Baron, Andrews Reath, Kyla Ebels-Duggan, Ana Marta González, have studied the social aspect of Kant's moral theory and they have developed new lines of interpretation which do not break the traditional ones but completes them. We will take into account this recent research and try to introduce the positive concept of bonds which, as I will try to hold, is not alien to Kant's moral theory, but central.

II.

In the Introduction to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, the concept of freedom is defined, on the one hand, as the “independence from being *determined* by sensible impulses” (MS AA 06: 213-214), and, on the other hand, as “the ability of pure reason to be of itself practical” (MS AA 06: 214), that is, as offering itself (reason) laws for human will and human action.

³ “we are conscious through reason of a law to which all our maxims are subject, as if a natural order must at the same time arise from our will. This law must therefore be the idea of a nature not given empirically and yet possible through freedom, hence a supersensible nature to which we give objective reality at least in a practical respect, since we regard it as an object of our will as pure rational beings” (KpV AA 05:44).

In effect, freedom requires independence from sensible nature, as well as from external coercion⁴. However, for Kant, properly speaking, freedom is a positive reality. An undeniable reality lies behind the first definition of freedom as a negative concept: on the one hand, there is a sensible nature, which has its own laws, and, on the other hand, “the spherical surface of the earth unites all the places on its surface” and thus *community with one another is a necessary result of human’s existence on the earth* (MS AA 06: 262). Thus, if freedom is a positive, rather than a merely negative, reality, it requires the affirmation of a new order and, with that, new laws. Hence, Kant speaks of laws that differ from those of nature, which correspond to the laws of freedom. These laws, when introduced among men, inaugurate a new order, i.e., the moral order⁵.

Freedom is thus responsible for the transformation of man’s factual aspects (his sensible nature and the existence of human beings on a spherical surface) into a moral reality. If we focus on the concept of freedom as independence from the influence that others exercise over us with their actions, its positive version consists of new ways of relating that are compatible with freedom. The moral principles therein correspond to right and virtue.

The fact that freedom transforms this factual situation of coexistence and renews it “as a beautiful moral whole in its full perfection” (MS AA 06: 458) is due to the very fact that freedom— as a faculty of reason that is practical— introduces new ends that differ from nature’s ends.

These new ends respond to a certain concept with which Kant introduces the concept of duty at the same time. It corresponds to what Kant calls an “end that is also a duty”. “[I]t is not a question here of ends the human being *does adopt* in keeping with the sensible impulses of his nature, but of objects of free choice under its laws, which he *ought to make* his ends” (MS AA 06: 385).

Another term that Kant uses to talk about these new ends of freedom is that of “duties of virtue” with which he highlights such duties as those of beneficence, sympathy, gratitude, as well as friendship. They all come from reason and are possible as ends of human action because of freedom, not because of nature.

To deal with the question that here concerns us—freedom and bonds in Kant— I will focus on comparing two of the duties of virtue that Kant seems to prefer, namely the duty of beneficence and the duty of friendship.

⁴ In the first pages of the *Doctrine of Right*, Kant also writes about the negative version of external freedom, referring to the coercive influence that others and their actions can exercise over one’s own action. In this sense, freedom consists in the “independence from being constrained by another’s choice” (MS AA 06:237).

⁵ In this respect, it is interesting to consider the arguments that Andrews Reath uses to give priority to the secular version of the Highest Good, that is, to the version in which not God but human beings are the agents responsible for bringing morality and happiness together in this world (Reath, 1988, pp.609-612).

III.

Kant takes into account that human beings have an innate social impulse; it cannot be eradicated from man's nature. It is part of man's disposition toward animality:

“The predisposition to animality in the human being may be brought under the general title of physical or merely *mechanical* self-love, i.e., a love for which reason is not required. It is threefold: *first*, for self-preservation; *second*, for the propagation of the species, through the sexual drive, and for the preservation of the offspring thereby begotten through breeding; *third*, for community with other human beings, i.e., the social drive” (RGV AA 06: 26-27).

However, man has other dispositions— such as those toward humanity and personality—that engender growth and the expression of that animal impulse in other ways. In effect, the social impulse that resides in man's animality appears in his disposition towards humanity as “the inclination *to gain worth in the opinion of others*, originally, of course, merely *equal worth*: not allowing anyone superiority over oneself” (RGV AA 06: 27).

The disposition to personality already assigns man the freedom that corresponds to him as a being endowed with reason and amounts to the freedom of the law. In effect, the predisposition to personality is, according to Kant, one of the three elements that determine the nature of the human being (RGV AA 06:26-28). And it is this one where freedom becomes real. It is here where the moral law “announces to be itself an incentive, and, indeed, the highest incentive. Were this law not given to us from within, no amount of subtle reasoning on our part would produce it or win our power of choice over to it” (RGV AA 06:26*).

In accordance with these three dispositions, man must “raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (*quoad actum*), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends” (MS AA 06: 387). Taking into account the difference between humanity and personality, man must also strive to arrive at moral perfection which lies in making “one's object every particular end that is also a duty” (MS AA 06: 387). That is so because “freedom of choice cannot be defined -as some have tried to define it- as the ability to make a choice for or against the law (*libertas indifferentiae*)” (MS AA 06: 226). “[F]reedom can never be located in a rational subject's being able to choose in opposition to his (lawgiving) reason, even though experience proves often enough that this happens” (MS AA 06: 226).

This growth, which man owes to himself through his very dispositions, happens by virtue of a few principles, which Kant reveals in his *Metaphysics of Morals*. In fact, according to Kant, “every human being also has it [such a metaphysics] within himself” (MS AA 06: 216). Therefore, if the *Metaphysics of Morals* is divided into the *Doctrine of Right* and the

Doctrine of Virtue, it is because the laws that emerge from both doctrines constitute the new laws in which freedom finds its own affirmation, and these are the laws that every human being finds within him.

Right and virtue are, for Kant, principles that are introduced among men not just for the individual progress of each man towards his personality but are also there to transform the inevitable situation of coexistence into a properly human coexistence that is, in short, a moral one. Friendship and marriage reflect the possibility of that transformation. He thus speaks of both bonds as particularly exemplary cases of a social exercise in which those who interact experience freedom. They are relations of equality or, at least, relationships in which reciprocity (legal and/or ethical) tries to restore the inequalities that can arise in interaction⁶.

This moral transformation occurs, for Kant, through constriction⁷. Intuitively, it may sound contradictory to speak of freedom in terms of coercion (or self-coercion), as Kant does. However, since man is a natural as well as a rational being, the subjective and the objective do not coincide in him immediately⁸. Morality is tinged with contingency⁹, that is, this moral transformation does not occur in man with absolute necessity. It depends on whether man attends to the imperatives of the moral law. Whether he does or does not, it is under this law that human reality, with all its dispositions, finds unity¹⁰.

“Hence a person constrained by motivating grounds of reason is constrained without it conflicting with freedom” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 268).

⁶ According to Kant, freedom is an innate right and from it emerges an innate equality: “independence from being bound by others to more than one can in turn bind them” (MS AA 06:237-238).

⁷ “No other necessitation save practical necessitation *per motiva* is compatible with freedom. These motives can be pragmatic and moral, the latter being drawn from the *bonitas absoluta* of the freewill. The more a man can be morally compelled, the freer he is; the more he is pathologically compelled, though this only occurs in a comparative sense, the less free he is. It is strange: the more anyone can be compelled, in a moral sense, the more free he is. I compel a person morally through *motiva objective moventia*, through motivating grounds of reason, whereby he is maximally free, without any incentive. Hence it takes a greater degree for freedom to be morally compelled, for in that case the *arbitrium liberum* is more powerful -it can be compelled by motivating grounds of reason and is free of stimuli. So the more a person is free of stimuli, the more he can be morally necessitated. His freedom increases with the degree of morality” (V-Mo/Collins VE AA 27: 268).

⁸ As Ana Marta González explains: “As finite beings, humans need to be impelled to activity by some incentive (KpV AA 05:79), yet there is a difference between being merely impelled by a sensible incentive and being impelled by reason, between “having an interest” and “taking an interest”. That finite rational beings can *take* an interest in the moral law, however, follows from their mixed nature as rational and sensible beings: while as sensible beings they are influenced by inclinations, as rational beings they do not find those inclinations decisive in themselves. Negative freedom creates room for the thought of the law to have its peculiar effect on our sensible nature, inducing a peculiar kind of feeling, which, unlike other feelings, has its source in moral law itself and enables us to act to not just in conformity with the law, but also out of respect for the law (KpV AA 05:81)” (González, 2019, p.5).

⁹ This contingency is not about the moral law, but about human beings because they may or may not follow the moral law.

¹⁰ As Korsgaard holds at the end of her Prologue to *The Sources of Normativity*: “Obligation is what makes us human” (Korsgaard, 1996, p.5).

Below I include two fragments from the *Lectures on Ethics* in which Kant addresses this very question with a somewhat pressing tone:

“All animals have the capacity to use their powers according to choice. Yet this choice is not free but necessitated by incentives and *stimuli*. Their actions contain *bruta necessitas*. If all creatures had such a choice, tied to sensory drives, the world would have no value. But the inner worth of the world, the *summum bonum*, is freedom according to a choice that is not necessitated to act. Freedom is thus the inner worth of the world. But on the other hand, insofar as it is not restrained under certain rules of conditioned employment, it is the most terrible thing there could ever be. [...] If freedom is not restricted by objective rules, the result is much savage disorder. For it is uncertain whether man will not use his powers to destroy himself, and others, and the whole of nature” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 344).

“I shall therefore not follow my inclinations but bring them under a rule. Anyone who allows his person to be governed by his inclinations is acting contrary to the essential end of mankind, for as a free agent he must not be subject to his inclinations but should determine them through freedom; for if he is free, he must have a rule; and this rule is the essential end of mankind” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 345).

These “essential ends of mankind” are the ends of right and virtue. They are ends in which freedom recovers itself because with them and in them man does not remain in his disposition to animality, but rather is integrated into a higher, rational and properly human order, which corresponds to personality.

According to the above-cited text, we can affirm that freedom brings conciliation with it. Freedom as law is integrated among men and their inclinations. It does not try to destroy that which falls under other laws (under the laws of nature, for example)¹¹, but rather tries to order it according to certain conditions¹², namely those under which the greatest use of freedom is possible, because freedom is “the highest *principium* of life” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 346).

IV.

Right and virtue complement and require one another. On the one hand, civil society is not simultaneously moral, but, on the other hand, an ethical community can only emerge from

¹¹ “This law is to furnish the sensible world with the form of a world of the understanding, though without infringing upon the mechanism of the former” (KpV AA 05:43).

¹² “For us -dependent as we are on objects of the senses – happiness is by *nature* the first that we desire and desire unconditionally. Yet by our nature (if this is how we want to name something innate in us) as a substance endowed with reason and freedom, this very happiness is not the first by far, nor is it indeed the object of our maxims unconditionally: this is rather the *worthiness of being happy*, i.e., the agreement of all our maxims with the moral law. Now that this worthiness is objectively the condition under which alone the wish for happiness can conform with the law-giving reason, in this consists every ethical advance; and in the disposition to wish only under such condition, the ethical frame of mind.” (RGV AA 6: 46)

a political community¹³. Kant indicates this in his work *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* in speaking of an “ethical community” as “an association of human beings merely under the laws of virtue” (RGV AA 06: 94). According to him, “it can exist in the midst of a political community and even be made up of all the members of the latter (*indeed, without the foundation of a political community, it could never be brought into existence by human beings*)” (RGV AA 06: 94). Along with this complementarity, Kant does not fail to distinguish right from virtue because the augmented external freedom that comes with the law of right upon establishing civil society is not the only advance in freedom to which man can aspire. Indeed, we must consider the sense of freedom that Kant addresses in his *Doctrine of Virtue*.

In *Religion*, Kant speaks of “the ethical state of nature” as that in which “[the citizen of the political community] may wish to [...] remain” (RGV AA 06: 94). This corresponds to a peaceful situation in which the law of right regulates external relationships between men (RGV AA 06: 94), but it is not yet an “ethical community” in which, in addition to being legally bound to one another, men mutually engage in moral relationships.

This lack of ethical union with other citizens is described in his *Metaphysics of Morals* as follows:

“the benevolence present in love for all human beings is indeed the greatest in its *extent*, but the smallest in its *degree*; and when I say that I take an interest in this human being’s well-being only out of my love for all human beings, the interest I take is as slight as an interest can be. I am only not indifferent with regard to him” (MS AA 06: 451, paragraph 28).

With this, Kant seems to indicate that the ethical union to which man has to aspire to get out of the “ethical state of nature” consists in something more than individual relationships with the moral law; more than a general respect towards human beings. Particular relationships of love are necessary¹⁴. Hence, Kant believes that the duty to love other men is a duty to love in particular (MS AA 06: 448-452). Love cannot be reduced to “taking delight in the well-being of every other” but must also consist in the action of “contributing

¹³ As Kyla Ebels-Duggan holds: “people are not perfectly virtuous, so we can reasonably trust them to respect our external freedom only in the context of an institution that gives them an independent incentive to do so. Thus, we forge the unity of the state by setting up a sovereign with both power and authority to exercise coercion” (Ebels-Duggan, 2009, p.16). That is the political community.

¹⁴ “The *Groundwork* argument purports to establish an obligation to, as it were, create a benevolence fund but does not entitle any particular person to draw on it. That is, you don’t owe the duty to any particular person. It is merely an obligation *with respect to* others, not one that recognizes another person as having the authority to give you reasons. We can read the *Religion* discussion of the Ethical State of Nature as attempting to fill this gap by grounding a class of positive duties *beyond* the general duty of benevolence: duties owed to particular others to do particular things. These are different from, though obviously related to, the duties established by the general duty of beneficence. Ethical duties—duties of virtue—are duties to acknowledge certain considerations as reasons and act accordingly. The duties in question are duties to particular others to regard their choices as providing reason to act.” (Ebels-Duggan, 2009, pp.9-10)

to it” (MS AA 06: 452). The duty to love is possible only in particular. Hence the differences between benevolence and beneficence that Kant coined a little later:

“benevolence is satisfaction in the happiness (well-being) of others; but beneficence is the maxim of making others’ happiness one’s end, and the duty to it consists in the subject’s being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as a universal law” (MS AA 06: 452, paragraph 29).

Beneficence is undoubtedly the consequence of taking benevolence as the maxim of our actions. However, the moral horizon to which man can aspire is broader. While beneficence generates situations of debt (dependence), friendship is formed with a certain equality¹⁵.

For Kant, friendship is a moral and particular phenomenon: it brings together the moral duties of men and their particular aspirations toward happiness. Friendship does not lose its moral character because of its particularity.

“Ties to others may occasionally make it harder for me to act morally -since morality requires that I not make exceptions for my friend- but this is no reason to sever ties to others. What is needed is a firm commitment to putting morality first, no matter what the competing considerations” (Baron, 1997, p.150).

Friendship between two people does not arise because both parties independently propose benevolence as the maxim of their actions; it does not consist in the exercise of mutual beneficence¹⁶. If friendship could be reduced to this, it would not be possible to speak properly of bonds; we would remain in a context of obligations— mutual ones, but obligations nonetheless. For that “ethical union” between fellow citizens to exist, something else must emerge, namely bonds, and not just (individual) obligations¹⁷. To

¹⁵Friendship “is the union of two persons through equal mutual love and respect” (MS AA6: 469).

¹⁶ In her article “Against beneficence: A normative account of love”, Kyla Ebels-Duggan discusses the concept of beneficence and introduces “the shared-ends view” about love: “The shared-ends view requires even more. It demands not just that you advance your beloved’s ends but that you share ends with her, and this requires reciprocal interaction. Since, as I claimed above, neither party in a relationship may set a significant end without the other’s concurrence, the shared- ends view requires that you and your partner interact to decide together what you will do together. The shared-ends view thus understands love as inherently seeking reciprocity” (Ebels-Duggan, 2008, p.162).

¹⁷ Korsgaard holds something similar. What bounds one another aren’t just obligations, but also feelings, the moral feelings of love and respect: “Friendship in its perfection involves what Kant calls the most intimate union of love with respect (MS, 6:469). While love moves you to pursue the ends of another, respect reminds you that she must determine what those ends are; while love moves you to care for the happiness of another, respect demands that your care for her character too. Kant means here the feelings of love and respect, for he is defining the friendship of sentiment, but this does not sever the tie to morality. Love and respect are the primary duties of virtue we owe to others. Although only the outward practices can be required of us, Kant makes it clear in many passages that he believes that in the state of realized virtue these feelings will be present. In one place he even defines love and respect as the feelings which accompany the exercise of our duties towards others (MS, 6:448; see also R 23-24n). Feelings of sympathy, gratitude, and delight in the happiness of others are not directly incumbent upon us, but they are the natural result of making the ends of

highlight the difference between the two, we will stop to consider the set of obligations in which the duty of beneficence consists, and in what way bonds of friendship can be developed from such dynamics. We will see that friendship completes, rather than annuls, the goodness that characterizes all beneficent action.

V.

The concept of obligation in Kant does not apply to the individual in solitude; rather, it applies to his relational situation (if there is one already), or it generates a new one, in such a way that we can indeed speak of bonds. To understand this latter consideration, we will introduce Kant's distinction between passive obligation and active obligation. According to him,

“If I am under an obligation [verbunden] to help the unfortunate, and thus to the action but not the man, that would be *obligatio activa*. But if I owe a debt to someone, I am obligated [verbunden], not only to the act of payment, but also to the creditor, and that is *obligatio passiva*. It seems, however, that all *obligatio* is *passiva*, for if I am obligated [verbunden] then I am constrained [genöthigt]. Yet with an *obligatio activa* there is a constraint of reason, I am constrained by my own reflection, so there is nothing passive about it; and *obligatio passiva* must come about through another, whereas if a man is necessitated by reason, he rules himself” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 259-60).

It seems that, for Kant, “being bound to someone” involves passive obligation and is, therefore, a negative situation of debt that can be improved upon. The ones which are “non-binding” to another are the active obligations. They do correspond with “an instance of reason” alone. In such situations, I am no longer forced by anyone; rather, I am “constrained by my own reflection, so there is nothing passive about it”. It is this active situation that is, for Kant, preferable to debt.

However, Kant does not ignore that human society is founded on relationships based on reciprocal actions, which generate bonds for which active and passive elements are distributed and balanced differently. Kant speaks positively of these relationships insofar as they succeed in reflecting a moral reality. A clear example of this corresponds to the relationships generated by the practice of beneficence. In them, the receptivity and passivity that affect the beneficiary must be transformed (if they want to be a reflection of a moral reality) into new occasions for moral action. For this, according to Kant, a benefit

others our own, as duty demands. The feeling of respect, a still higher achievement, is the natural result of keeping the humanity of others and so their capacity for good will always before our eyes. So this kind of friendship really is in Kant's eyes the friendship of virtue, the moral relation in a perfected form” (Korsgaard, 1996, p.191).

She is referring to a perfect moral situation and that need not to be a problem. For Kant perfection is an ideal and, as such, it can be assumed by human agents as a moral disposition, that is, as an internal disposition directed towards external actions. In effect, although ideals can never be empirically experienced, they do influence the sensible world in an imperfect way. The ideal can remain real as a perfect form in the dispositions of the agent.

should not be considered “as a burden one would gladly be rid of (since the one so favored stands a step lower than his benefactor, and this wounds his pride), but taking even the occasion for gratitude as a moral kindness, that is, as an opportunity given one to unite the virtue of gratitude with love of man, to combine the *cordiality* of a benevolent disposition with *sensitivity* to benevolence (attentiveness to the smallest degree of this disposition in one’s thought of duty), and so to cultivate one’s love of human beings” (MS AA 06: 456). It seems, therefore, that situations of debt or passive obligation can present an occasion for new moral activity in relationship with the benefactor. In fact, for the benefactor himself, “it is our duty to behave as if our help is either merely what is due him or but a slight service of love, and to spare him humiliation and maintain his respect for himself” (MS AA 06: 448-449). The beneficiary thus becomes free to correspond to the favor received without being forced to do so; it is as if this were a case of active, and no longer merely passive, obligation. Indeed, if in the exercise of the duty of beneficence, in addition to generating relationships of debt, one takes into account “the self-love of others” (MS AA 06: 448-449), one will thereby avoid humiliating the other and will open up a space of interaction between equals. In fact, self-respect or self-esteem is, according to Kant, a natural predisposition that resides in every human being and which makes us receptive to the concept of duty (MS AA 06: 399). Therefore, if the beneficiary is not humiliated in addition, he will conserve an active disposition (the one called “self-esteem”) toward corresponding to the favor received because he counts on internal freedom; he is still capable of obligating himself (MS AA 06: 418), rather than being only externally obligated. It seems then that, beyond the position of inferiority in which the beneficiary is placed with respect to his benefactor, it is possible to restore equality if both the benefactor and the beneficiary attend completely to what the moral law prescribes: for the former, to perform the duty of beneficence in a certain way (respecting the other’s self-love) and for the latter, to receive the favor in a certain way (reacting in a moral, grateful way).

It is clear then that, for Kant, the fact of finding oneself under a passive obligation does not amount to a complete lack of freedom. Although it is true that, “[a] person under *obligatio passiva* is less free than one under *obligatio activa*” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 269). However, receiving a favor does not completely nullify the receiver's freedom, but it does affect his condition of being free. As Kant himself states, “we still have to distinguish here between the capacity for freedom and the state of being free. The capacity for freedom can be greater, although the state is worse” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 269). This may be the case for the passive situation in which the beneficiary remains. His personality is not annulled, that is, his ability to be free, although it is conditioned. It is in other cases where the exercise of freedom is impossible:

“where actions are simply not free, and nothing personal is involved, there is also no obligation; thus a man, for example, has no obligation to stop hiccupping, for it is not in his power. So for obligation we presuppose the use of freedom” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 261).

On the other hand, however, Kant does not settle the question of love when exploring the duty of beneficence, but rather introduces in this same framework the duty of gratitude. The beneficiary's grateful response initiates, in a certain sense, the bilateral nature of the positive bonds that are characterized by a balance between mutual dependence and each person's freedom or moral autonomy. In addition, when it comes to beneficence, the practice of love not only binds the receiver of an action, but also has an effect on the one who performs the action (MS AA 06: 453-454). With his action, the benefactor cultivates the disposition that Kant likes to call, "Menschenfreundschaft" (MS AA 06: 473). One can, in fact, overcome one's resistance to enter into close relationship with others starting from this disposition. This is how one, according to Kant, "each of us seeks to be worthy of being a friend for someone" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 429).

"[B]ut to be everybody's friend will not do, for he who is a friend to all has no particular friend; but friendship is a particular bond [eine besondere Verbindung]" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 430). Friendship as a particular bond is very different from beneficence; it is characterized as a "purely moral union" (MS AA 06: 470-471), rather than by the pragmatism that characterizes the way of being bound generated by beneficent actions.

In friendship, unlike beneficence, moral goodness takes preference over pragmatic goodness which "gives man no inner worth" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 247). It seems then that it is in the context of friendship where two people can enjoy the highest degree of freedom, since freedom is, as mentioned above, "the inner worth of the world, the *summum bonum*" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 344). Indeed, according to Kant, friendship arises from the idea that "a man clings especially to what gives worth to his person" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 422), and that is, freedom:

"Our free acting and refraining has an inner goodness, and thus gives man an immediate inner absolute worth of morality. The man, for example, who keeps his word, always has an immediate inner worth of free choice, be the end what it may. But pragmatic goodness gives man no inner worth" (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 247).

VI. Conclusion

If, according to Kant, moral (not pragmatic) demands serve the ends of freedom (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 256); if it is in fact in the ends of freedom where men coincide (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 276); and if the purpose of civil society is to guarantee freedom for all, then society must aspire to become a moral community. For this, morality must be understood not just as a matter of obligation, but also as a matter of bonds.

Right, undoubtedly, introduces the first level of bonds and it is from there that we can even speak of coexistence in terms of humanity, that is, of society¹⁸. However, “it is curious that, even when we engage in social intercourse and companionship, we still do not enter completely into society” (V-Mo/Collins AA 27: 427). A deeper level of bonding, which is found in friendship, is still needed. And it is in friendship, as a “purely moral union”, that freedom is fully itself.

BIBLIOGRAFY

- Baron, M. (1997), “Kantian Ethics and Claims of Detachment,” *Feminist Interpretations of Immanuel Kant*, edited by Robin May Schott, Pennsylvania State University Press, pp.145-170.
- Baron, M. (1991), “Impartiality and Friendship,” *Ethics*, 101, 4, pp. 836-857.
- Dörflinger, B. (2017), “Los deberes del amor en la doctrina kantiana de la virtud. Su ubicación en el límite entre razón y sentimiento”, *Revista de Estudios Kantianos*, 2, 2, pp. 125-134.
- Ebels-Duggan, K. (2009), “Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature,” *Philosophers’ Imprint*, 9, 8, pp.1-19.
- Ebels-Duggan, K. (2008), “Against beneficence: A normative account of love,” *Ethics*, 119, 1, pp.142-170.
- Filippaki, E. (2012), “Kant on Love, Respect and Friendship,” *Kant Yearbook*, 4, pp. 23-48.
- González, A. M. (2019) “Unpacking moral feeling: Kantian clues to a map of the moral world”, forthcoming in *Kant on Emotions. Critical and Historical Essays*, edited by Mariannina Failla, Nuria Sánchez Madrid, Paulo Tunhas.
- González, A. M. (2011), *Culture as mediation. Kant on nature, culture, and morality*, Olms: Hildesheim, Zürich, New York.
- González, A. M. (2010), “Kant and a culture of freedom,” *Archiv für rechts-und sozialphilosophie, ARSP*, 96, 3, pp. 291-308.
- Kant, I. (1997), “Lectures on ethics,” Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on ethics*, edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind; translated by Peter Heath, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1996), “Metaphysics of Morals,” Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an introduction by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, I. (1996), “Religion within the boundaries of Mere Reason and other writings,” Immanuel Kant, *Religion and Rational Theology*, translated and edited by Allen Wood and George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

¹⁸ There is discussion about the moral character of the duties of right. It is not the topic of this paper, but it is related to it. Marcus Willaschek and Christoph Horn are representatives of this discussion and stand against the idea of understanding right as a moral concept.

- Kant, I. (1996) "Critique of Practical reason", Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, translated and edited by Mary Gregor; with an introduction by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Korsgaard, C. M. (1996), *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Korsgaard, C., M. (1966), *The sources of normativity*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Library.
- Pauer-Studer, H. (2016), "'A Community of Rational Beings'. Kant's Realm of Ends and the Distinction between Internal and External Freedom," *Kant-Studien*, 107, 1, pp. 125-159.
- Schönecker, D. (2013), "Duties to Others from Love", *Kant's "Tugendlehre": A Comprehensive Commentary*, edited by Andreas Trampota, Oliver Sensen, Jens Timmermann, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, pp. 309-341.
- Reath, A. (1988), "Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant," *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, Johns Hopkins University Press, 26, 4, pp. 593-619.
- Tenenbaum, S. (2005), "Friendship and the Law of Reason. Baier and Kant on Love and Principles", *Persons and Passions. Essays in Honor of Annette Baier*, Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 250-281.



Kant's Analogy between the Moral Law and the Law of Nature

MANJA KISNER*

Ludwig-Maximilian University, Germany

Abstract

In the *Groundwork* Kant refers to the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature when clarifying the concept of the categorical imperative. However, in the *Groundwork* itself, he does not give any further explanation as to why he introduces the analogy. Therefore, I take the *Groundwork* as a starting point of my article, but then I explicate on the analogy from a broader perspective, focusing especially on his lecture courses *Moral Mrongovius II* and *Naturrecht Feyerabend* as well as on his Typic chapter of the second *Critique*.

Keywords

Kant, moral law, law of nature, analogy

1. Introduction

In the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), Kant's first published work on moral philosophy from his critical period, Kant articulates the supreme principle of morality by calling it not only a universal law, but also a law of nature (GMS, 4: 421).¹ Kant introduces the two formulas of the categorical imperative as follows:

The Formula of the Universal Law: "[A]ct only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law [ein allgemeines Gesetz]." (GMS, 4: 421)

The Formula of the Universal Law of Nature: "[A]ct as if the maxim of your action were to become by your will a universal law of nature [allgemeines Naturgesetz]." (GMS, 4: 421)

* Dr. Manja Kisner, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, Manja.Kisner@lmu.de

¹ Quotations from Kant's works are cited by volume and page in *Kants gesammelte Schriften* (Kant 1900–). For translations I use – with occasional modifications – the English translations in *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant* (Kant 1992–). In the paper, I use following abbreviations: *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* (GMS), *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (KpV), *Moral Mrongovius II* (V-Mo/Mron II), *Naturrecht Feyerabend* (V-NR/Feyerabend).

While the second formula is only a variation on the first, it includes a new element, namely, that of a law of nature. Kant gives a brief explanation as to why the first formulation can be converted into the second: since the universality of a law refers to his notion of “nature in the most general sense [Natur im allgemeinsten Verstande] (as regards its form)” (GMS, 4: 421), the supreme principle of morality is formally a universal law of nature.

This is not the only passage in the *Groundwork* where Kant mentions the laws of nature when speaking about the moral law. In a later passage he declares that moral imperatives have a lawfulness (*Gesetzmäßigkeit*) similar to that of the natural order (GMS, 4: 431). Accordingly, Kant assumes an essential similarity between their respective laws. Moreover, he extends this similarity to the spheres of morality and nature as such by conceiving of the kingdom of ends as analogous to the kingdom of nature:

A kingdom of ends is thus possible only by analogy with a kingdom of nature; the former, however, is possible only through maxims, that is, rules imposed upon oneself, the latter only through laws of externally necessitated efficient causes. Despite this, nature as a whole, even though it is regarded as a machine, is still given the name “a kingdom of nature” insofar as and because it has reference to rational beings as its ends. (GMS, 4: 438)

As we can infer from these quotes the comparison between the moral law and the law of nature must represent something more than just a random association between two different types of law; Kant understands it as an analogical relation. On the one hand we have to distinguish between these two laws, but on the other hand we have to see them as being essentially similar (GMS, 4: 431). However, in the *Groundwork*, Kant does not give any further explanation as to how it is possible to refer to them as analogous at all; he just presents the analogy without a comprehensive justification. These passages are hardly of any help for a detailed interpretation of the analogy. Therefore, in my paper I will aim at explicating the analogy from a broader perspective.

As we will see, it is not only the *Groundwork* which is important for interpreting the analogy but also his two lecture courses from the same period, namely the *Moral Mrongovius II* (1784/85) and the *Naturrecht Feyerabend* (1785).² They are relevant since they give a fuller account of the various laws under consideration than do Kant’s published works from this period. They therefore provide a firmer basis for an inquiry into the diverse relations between the laws. Accordingly, in what follows I will first explicate Kant’s classification of the various laws in these two lecture courses and show how they shed light on the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature. Thereby, I will indicate how Kant’s use of this specific analogy concurs with his general definition of

² Lecture *Moral Mrongovius II* was delivered in winter term 1784/1785 (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 596–642). Lecture *Naturrecht Feyerabend* was written on the basis of the lectures given in summer term 1784 (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27:1316–1394). For the improved printed version of the manuscript of the lecture *Naturrecht Feyerabend*, see Delfosse (2010, pp. 5-15).

analogy from the *Prolegomena* (1783). In this work, Kant describes analogy as a relation between two dissimilar things, which must, nonetheless, be perfectly similar in one aspect. This description also holds for the relation between the law of nature and the moral law.

After that, I will relate Kant's classification of the laws to his general definition of law-giving, which he articulates not only in his lectures but also in the *Groundwork*. Kant's conception of law-giving (*Gesetzgebung*) is composed of two principles: an objective principle, which enables him to identify laws as laws, and a subjective principle, which enables him to differentiate between different kinds of laws. As I will demonstrate, this twofold notion of law-giving is also helpful for interpreting the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature. Through this comparison, we can explain why Kant understands the relation between the moral law and the law of nature as an analogical relation. However, this does not explain why Kant refers to analogy in the first place when defining the moral law. The answer to this second question we can find, I argue, in the *Typic* chapter of his second *Critique*, where Kant defines the law of nature as the type of the moral law.

Interpretations of the *Typic* chapter are still scarce in the literature on Kant. Although we can find some older studies on the chapter, they are not very detailed or comprehensive.³ It is only in the last few years that the *Typic* chapter has started to gain some attention. In 2015 Stephan Zimmermann published a paper on the chapter, in which he discusses the role of practical judgment, but he refers only briefly to the analogy.⁴ In 2016 the first book on this chapter was published: Adam Westra's *The Typic in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason*.⁵

Westra's main claim is that Kant's notion of the law of nature as the type of the moral law functions as a third thing or as a non-sensible representation. In doing this, Westra pleads for a tripartite interpretation of the procedure through which the moral law makes use of the law of nature. In opposition to Westra, however, I argue that for explaining the *Typic* chapter it suffices to stick to the dual structure of law-giving. On my interpretation, we have to understand the concept of practical judgment in the chapter as an analogical judgment. Hence, the analogy is crucial to the process of representing the moral law, and it is crucial for understanding the sense in which Kant sees the moral appraisal of actions as possible.

In section 2, I begin by explicating Kant's classification of the various laws from his lectures, and in this way I provide the background necessary for an analysis of the analogy. In section 3, I then introduce Kant's general definition of law-giving, as it is found both in the *Groundwork* and in the lecture *Moral Mrongovius II*, and I show why

³ Until recently there were almost no studies dealing with the *Typic* chapter extensively. For the current state of research on the *Typic* chapter and the list of older studies, see Westra (2016, p. 4). I agree with Westra that older studies deal with the *Typic* chapter and with the analogy only superficially. Therefore, in this paper I will primarily refer to Westra's comprehensive interpretation.

⁴ Zimmermann (2015, pp. 430–460).

⁵ Westra (2016). But despite this increased interest for the *Typic* chapter, this part of the second *Critique* is still very often ignored. Another exception is Konstantin Pollok's book *Kant's Theory of Normativity* (2017), in which he mentions the *Typic* chapter and also suggests that the type of a law represents a unifying idea of Kant's entire critical system. See Pollok (2017, p. 306).

this definition is relevant to an understanding his analogy. In section 4, I finally inquire into the role of the analogy for interpreting the Typic chapter and offer an explanation as to why the analogy is useful for Kant. In this way I hope to clarify the meaning of the analogy for Kant's moral philosophy.

2. Kant's classification of laws

In order to clarify why Kant is entitled to refer to the law of nature as analogous to the moral law, it is helpful first to look at his classification of the various laws.⁶ Different laws must on the one hand have common elements, but on the other hand they must have certain distinguishing elements. These connecting and distinguishing elements are, as I will show, of relevance for the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature.

Kant presents his classification of the laws especially comprehensively in his lectures *Naturrecht Feyerabend* and *Moral Mrongovius II*.⁷ Here he not only distinguishes between the laws of nature and moral or practical laws, but he also distinguishes between moral and juridical laws.⁸ These two lectures are very important in this regard, since Kant will not return to a discussion of juridical laws in his published writings until the *Metaphysics of Morals* in 1797.⁹ The lectures show that Kant was aware of the importance of juridical laws from much earlier on.¹⁰ For the purposes of my analysis, however, a detailed inquiry into the particular laws will not be necessary. Instead, I will primarily look into the reasons for Kant's classification of the laws. There are two distinctions we have to consider: first Kant distinguishes between the laws of freedom and the laws of nature, and second, with regard to the laws of freedom, between moral and juridical laws.

⁶ Eric Watkins discusses the classification of the various kinds of laws in his paper "Kant on the Unity and Diversity of Laws". See Watkins (2017).

⁷ For the interpretation of these two lectures, see Hirsch (2012). Hirsch compares these two lectures with Kant's late *Metaphysics of Morals*. Zöller (2015) on the other hand compares the lecture *Naturrecht Feyerabend* with Kant's *Groundwork*.

⁸ Although Kant does not use the expression juridical laws in the *Naturrecht Feyerabend* explicitly, he here nonetheless operates with particular laws, which belong to the sphere of right. Kant speaks for instance about the coercive law as a principle of right: "An action is right if it agrees with the law, just if it agrees with the laws of coercion, i.e. agrees with the doctrines of right. In general one calls something right that which that agrees with a rule. (...) The agreement of private freedom with universal freedom is the supreme principle of right, it is a law of coercion" (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1328). In *Moral Mrongovius II* he then directly uses the expressions the laws of right (*Rechts Gesetze*) and the juridical laws (*Juridische Gesetze*): "Pragmatic imperatives are merely counsels; moral imperatives either motiva, rules of virtue, or leges, juridical laws [*Rechts Gesetze*]" (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 620). Here Kant uses the expression the laws of right. In a further quote he uses the expression of the juridical laws: "Juridical laws [*Juridische Gesetze*] are really just duties of omission" (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 632).

⁹ Nevertheless, Kant was dealing with juridical laws already in his pre-critical writings, see Ritter (1971) and Busch (1979).

¹⁰ The juridical terminology also influenced the development of Kant's moral philosophy. See Zöller (2015, p. 349): "In Kant there is to be found an outright juridification of ethics, by means of which concepts and categories that are properly and originally grounded in the sphere of juridical law (or legal right) are carried over into ethics, and especially into the latter's foundation. The point of Kant's articulation of ethical conceptions in juridical terms is not to turn ethics into juridical law, as though the external, constraint-based character of juridical law were to be carried over into ethical matters. Rather than involving doctrinal content, the juridicoethical transfer undertaken by Kant is concerned with and limited to basic methodological concepts that are imported, mutatis mutandis, from ius into ethic."

As to the first distinction, Kant establishes in this way the opposition between a practical and a theoretical domain. In his lecture *Naturrecht Feyerabend* Kant points out this difference by contrasting the will of nature with the will of human beings: whereas the will of nature is determined by the universal laws of nature, the will of men on the contrary is not determined by nature (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1319). Therefore, the will of man needs an alternative law-giving, and it has to obey its own laws – the laws of freedom (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1322). Humans are ends in themselves because of freedom. As a result, the distinction between laws of nature and freedom presents a necessary starting point. However, the primary focus of Kant's lectures lies on the differences within the domain of freedom.

With regard to the second distinction we have to differentiate between moral and juridical laws. Kant's moral philosophy or ethics in the broad sense includes the sphere of right as well as the sphere of ethics in the narrow sense (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 630). Each sphere has its distinct laws, but freedom is the common ground of both. Therefore juridical laws are also grounded in freedom (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 618).¹¹

Given these two divisions, it is possible to further substantiate the differences between the laws. In the lectures, Kant points to two elements in every division: the first element acknowledges all different laws as laws, the second element enables the division between the various laws.

The first element that Kant recognizes as a common and necessary element of every law is universal lawfulness: "All actions, after all, are subject to the principle of lawfulness" (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1330). This lawfulness describes the form of the law. In this way, not only events of nature, but also human actions are subordinated to the principle of lawfulness (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1326). Additionally, respect for the law is, for Kant, a consequence of respect for the lawfulness of the law (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27:

¹¹ The question regarding the dependency of juridical laws (and not only moral laws) on the notion of freedom is important for the discussion about Kant's late *Metaphysics of Morals*. Whereas the connection between freedom and juridical laws is clear in Kant's lectures, the interpretations in regard to the *Metaphysics of Morals* are divided in Kant-scholarship; roughly we can find at least two opposing suggestions for interpreting the relation between ethical and juridical laws (for earlier discussions on the same topic, see Hirsch 2012, p. 39):

1.) Some interpreters read Kant's *Doctrine of Right* as independent of his supreme principle of morality introduced in his *Groundwork* or in the second *Critique*. Wood (2002, p. 7) is convinced that the universal principle of right – "Any action is right if it can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law, or if on its maxim the freedom of choice of each can coexist with everyone's freedom in accordance with a universal law" (MS, 6:230f) – is not derived from Kant's moral imperative. Wood grounds his argument in the fact that Kant takes the concept of right to be an analytic and not a synthetic statement, whereas the moral law in the *Groundwork* was understood as a synthetic judgment a priori. The analytic principle of right hence does not need to be derived from the moral principle. A similar interpretation about the independence of the principle of right and therefore of juridical laws has also Willaschek (2002, pp. 65-87).

2.) Guyer (2002, p. 26) on the other hand thinks that Kant's notion of right is dependent on and arises out of Kant's notion of the moral law. It is the law of freedom that precedes the principle of right. For that reason Guyer thinks that Kant's principle of right has to be grounded on Kant's notion of freedom and that the analyticity of the principle of right is of no obstacle.

1330).¹² Consequently, lawfulness, as the form of the law, provides no basis for distinguishing between laws; on the contrary it provides the common denominator of all laws.¹³

In order to distinguish between various laws other elements must be taken into consideration. The first element invoked by Kant in his lectures to distinguish between the laws of nature and the laws of freedom is more or less presupposed; it is not really derived or demonstrated. Therefore, we have to refer to the first *Critique* where the distinction is derived more rigorously. In the first *Critique* Kant recognizes the difference between the laws of nature and the laws of freedom as a result of different objects of legislation (KrV, A840/B 868). The laws of nature legislate in the domain of nature and laws of freedom legislate for the acts of freedom, and they are consequently self-legislating. Thus, the laws of nature and freedom are different because they refer to the objects of nature and to the objects of freedom respectively.

However, for purposes of the lectures, the second distinction is much more important – that between moral and juridical laws. This distinction is made on the basis of the accompanying incentives (*Triebfeder*; V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1326). More precisely, it is made on the basis of whether or not the incentive is relevant to the rightfulness of the action:

Ethic is the science of judging and determining an action in accordance with its morality. *Jus* is the science of judging an action in accordance with its legality. *Ethic* is also called the doctrine of virtue. *Jus* can also concern actions that can be coerced. For it is all the same whether the actions are done out of respect, fear, coercion, or inclination. *Ethic* is not concerned with actions that can be coerced; *ethic* is practical philosophy of action regarding dispositions. *Jus* is the practical philosophy of actions regardless of dispositions. (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1327)

In ethics it is important to define which incentives influence actions, since only respect for the law is allowed as an incentive. For a legal action, on the contrary, it is irrelevant which incentives determine my will. Even coercion or constraint are acceptable determining grounds. An action is legal when it is in agreement with the law, but we can follow the law out of motivations other than respect for the law itself; additional incentives are hence not decisive. Ethical actions on the contrary do not allow incentives such as fear or pleasure. Respect for the law itself is the only acceptable incentive.¹⁴ Hence, only when we ask about the relation between the law and incentives, can we distinguish between moral and juridical laws.

¹² Unlike the theories of natural law, which in his view did not yet point out the concept of lawfulness explicitly, Kant in his lectures fully recognizes the special importance of the notion of lawfulness (V-NR/Feyerabend, 27: 1331).

¹³ Watkins (2014, p. 474) points out that a univocal concept of a law underlies both the laws of nature and the laws of freedom.

¹⁴ In this context Kant distinguishes between outer and inner freedom. Outer incentives of legal actions correspond with outer freedom, the law as the solely acceptable incentive in the moral domain by contrast corresponds with inner freedom and thus with moral laws (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 630).

Now, why is this classification of laws relevant for understanding Kant's analogy between the moral law and the law of nature? In line with Kant's classification, the laws of nature and moral laws must correspond in one element, but differ in another. Since lawfulness is for Kant a necessary element of all laws, it must be common to both moral laws and laws of nature.¹⁵ Lawfulness therefore provides the common element grounding the analogy between the two kinds of law.

However, the analogy also requires that the laws differ in some respect. As we have seen, the laws differ as a consequence of their differing objects of legislation; moral laws refer to the objects of freedom and the laws of nature refer to the objects of nature. In moral laws, sensible incentives cannot function as the determining ground of a subject; only lawfulness itself can serve as such a ground. Moral laws cannot have any reference to incentives other than the law itself. Therefore they can have no reference to sensibility or the objects of nature whatsoever. Laws of nature, by contrast, are not only formal laws, since they get their content from sensible intuition. Therefore, there are insurmountable differences between moral laws and the laws of nature.

So, at this point, we can conclude that the proper explication of Kant's analogy must be able to account for both common as well as distinguishing elements. As a result, the analogy between moral law and the laws of nature is not a random comparison between entirely different things, which have nothing in common. Instead, both laws are, necessarily similar and in at least one aspect. But, since the analogical relation is not that of identity, Kant must also take into account the differences between the laws.

This interpretation of the analogy, which I have developed on the basis of Kant's lectures, is confirmed in Kant's *Prolegomena*, where he offers his general definition of analogy. There Kant writes that an analogy needs two elements: the two things we want to compare must be perfectly similar in one aspect, but totally different in another aspect; as a result, the analogy does not represent "an imperfect similarity between two things, but rather a perfect similarity between two relations in wholly dissimilar things" (Prol, 4: 357). As I have shown, we come to this conclusion also on the basis of Kant's classification of laws. The moral law and the law of nature are perfectly similar with regard to their lawfulness, but they are nevertheless two different laws. When we ask why the analogy between moral law and the law of nature is possible for Kant at all, we can answer that this is due to his specific understanding of the nature of the laws and his way of classifying them.

3. Kant's twofold notion of law-giving

¹⁵ Watkins defines this common element as a "necessary rule". See Watkins (2017, p. 15): "I suggest that Kant operates with a univocal concept of law that contains two crucial elements. First, the concept of law requires a necessary rule, where it is the element of necessity that constitutes its distinctive component. It is clear, for example, that both the moral law and the a priori laws of nature are necessary, since the validity of the moral law is in no way contingent (even if it is contingent whether we act in accordance with it) and a priori laws of nature carry with them both strict universality and necessity, given that they are a priori and Kant understands universality and necessity as criteria of a priority."

Now, I will further specify the distinction between the laws in general, and hence also the particular distinction between moral laws and the laws of nature on the basis of Kant's twofold conception of law-giving. Kant outlines his notion of law-giving, which consists of an objective and a subjective principle, in his lecture course *Moral Mrogovius II* as well as in the *Groundwork*.¹⁶ These two principles are in my view crucial for further justifying why it is appropriate to refer to the relation between the moral law and the law of nature as an analogy. I take these two quotes as a starting point for my discussion:

What, then, is the basis of morality (*Sittlichkeit*)? This question has been investigated in the modern age. The principle of morality, or the logical principle, is that from which all moral laws may be derived. It is either subjective, if I show from what power of the soul I adjudge morality, or it is objective. [...] So from what power does the principle come, and how does it run? The objective principle is: Act so that you can will that the maxims of your actions might become a universal law. It is the normal principle (*Normal Princip*). The subjective or pragmatic principle consists in the direction of this principle. (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 621)

The ground of all practical lawgiving lies (in accordance with the first principle) objectively in the rule and the form of universality which makes it fit to be a law (possibly a law of nature); subjectively, however, it lies in the end; but the subject of all ends is every rational being as an end in itself (in accordance with the second principle). (GMS, 4: 431)

In the first quote Kant distinguishes between the objective and the subjective principle of morality, but he does not use the word 'law-giving'. In the second quote he explicitly defines both principles as two elements of practical law-giving. Although these passages refer to the practical law-giving, I maintain that the twofold structure of the law-giving can be extended also to theoretical law-giving, as I will show later.

The description of the objective principle in the first quote, this is in the lecture *Moral Mrogovius II*, is very similar to the description in the second quote from the *Groundwork*. In the first quote the objective principle describes the first formulation of the categorical imperative which we also know from the *Groundwork*. In the lecture, Kant calls it a normal principle (*Normal Princip*). In both quotes the objective principle expresses the universality of a law, but in the second quote, additionally, also the law of nature is mentioned. Besides this, in the *Groundwork* Kant says that the ground of the laws, taken objectively, lies in rule and in the form of universality. As we saw in the

¹⁶ Later, in the *Metaphysics of Morals* we also find a twofold definition of law-giving, but for my purpose of interpreting the analogy in the Typic chapter it will suffice to refer only to his earlier definitions of law-giving. But we can see that his twofold notion of law-giving remains relevant for Kant until the end: "In all lawgiving (whether it prescribes internal or external actions, and whether it prescribes them a priori by reason alone or by the choice of another) there are two elements: first, a law, which represents an action that is to be done as objectively necessary, that is, which makes the action a duty; and second, an incentive, which connects a ground for determining choice to this action subjectively with the representation of the law. Hence the second element is this: that the law makes duty the incentive" (MS, 6: 218).

previous section, the form of the universality corresponds to Kant's notion of lawfulness. This means that the objective principle emphasizes the lawfulness of the laws.

I thus take the objective principle of morality to be the first element of Kant's notion of the practical law-giving. But this objective principle – expressing the form of universality, this is lawfulness – applies also to the theoretical law-giving as we can see in the second quote from the *Groundwork*, where Kant also refers to the law of nature. This confirms my thesis from the section 2 that the common element of all the laws, be it a moral, or a juridical law, or a law of nature, lies in the form of the law, which is conceived as the lawfulness. From a merely objective perspective, we cannot distinguish between laws of freedom and laws of nature: all laws are the same in this regard.

The second principle of the law-giving is more difficult to extrapolate. Nonetheless, I hold that the subjective principle is responsible for the division between the laws. In the first quote Kant writes that the subjective principle directs the objective principle and that it is a product of the power of the soul from which we can adjudge morality. From the quote we can derive that the subjective principle pertains to the faculties of the subject, or the lawgiver. The second quote confirms this interpretation, since Kant refers explicitly to the subject as an end in itself.

In the previous section, I pointed to the role of incentives to explain the differences between the laws of freedom. Here, we can further specify these distinguishing elements and relate incentives to the subjective principle of practical law-giving, since incentives have an effect on the subject and determine the will. In doing so, we see that the subjective principle cannot be directly identified with incentives, but it describes the relation between the law and the subject and this relation can be impinged due to incentives. The distinction between moral and juridical laws, which is very important for Kant in his lectures, is in this sense a consequence of the influence that the incentives exert on the subject.

For this reason, I propose that we interpret the subjective principle of the law-giving as a relational principle, which shows when the subject indeed follows the objective principle. Only when this is really the case, the moral law determines the will; but it is also possible that some other sensible incentives determine the will. In this case, we cannot speak about the moral law as the determining ground of the will, but it might be a juridical law that determines our actions. Therefore, Kant refers to the subjective principle in order to emphasize the particular differences in the executive powers of the laws with regard to their necessity (or lack thereof).¹⁷ As a consequence, in the domain of the practical, the reference to the subjective principle explains why we are able to distinguish between different laws. Objectively and formally all laws are the same, but we can differentiate between them subjectively.

So far, I have described the subjective principle on the basis of Kant's account of practical law-giving. But I think that we can also apply this distinction between the objective and subjective principle to theoretical law-giving and to the laws of nature.¹⁸ For

¹⁷ Similarly, also Watkins emphasizes different kinds of necessities. See Watkins (2017, p. 16-18).

¹⁸ Watkins (2014, p. 474) speaks about the univocal concept of the laws underlying the practical and theoretical spheres: "I maintain that Kant pursues a different and, to my mind, more interesting option by

Kant, it is reason that in each case prescribes laws, hence also the laws of nature. In practical law-giving, pure practical reason is the lawgiver and in theoretical law-giving (in natural sciences) it is the understanding.¹⁹ Hence, Kant's distinction between necessity and necessitation is crucial for explaining the difference between practical and theoretical law-giving: "Necessity and necessitation (*Nötigung*) are different: the former is objective necessity. Necessitation is the relation of a law to an imperfect will. In man, the objective necessity of acting in accordance with the moral laws is necessitation" (V-Mo/Mron II, 29: 611). As Kant explains, we humans have only an imperfect will and hence it is for us possible to disobey the moral law. In the case of the laws of nature, or the hypothetical perfect will, by contrast, every act is necessary. Therefore, the difference between practical and theoretical law-giving is again due to the subject as a lawgiver and its executive powers. This subjective aspect is hence unique to each particular kind of law, but the universal form of the law is the same for all the laws.

Not only for perfect wills, but also for the laws of nature, strict necessity is stringent; perfect wills as well as the laws of nature fully follow the objective principle. For imperfect human wills by contrast, only necessitation is required, since it is possible not to follow the objective principle. Therefore, the difference between necessity and necessitation also points to a difference between laws of freedom and nature, and this difference corresponds to the difference in subjective principles. Differences between the laws cannot be explained on the basis of the objective principle, but only on the basis of the relation between the subject and its objective principle. One further consequence of this is that in the case of the theoretical understanding the object of its legislation is different than in the practical sphere. In the former case, the faculty of understanding as a lawgiver determines the objects of nature. In the latter case, the practical reason as a lawgiver determines the objects of freedom.

articulating a concept of law that has a genuinely univocal meaning at its core, but one that can be instantiated in different ways in the theoretical and practical contexts of laws of nature and the natural or moral law. Specifically, the core meaning of law that is univocal between laws of nature and the moral law contains two elements. First, the concept of law requires an objective or necessary rule, where it is the element of necessity that constitutes its distinctive component. Second, a law can be valid only if a proper authority has prescribed it to a particular domain through an appropriate act. This core meaning of law is then instantiated in somewhat different ways in the different cases of laws of nature and the moral law. While Kant insists on every law being the result of a spontaneous legislative act (of either the understanding or reason), the notion of necessity takes on different forms in each case, since the laws of nature involve determination, while the moral law can give rise to obligation."

¹⁹ The conviction that laws presuppose a lawgiver was still a ruling conception in Newton's times. For critical Kant however the lawgiver is not god, but understanding and reason. Cf. Massimi (2014). See also Watkins (2014, p. 485): "It is striking in this context that it is Kant's characterization of the understanding as an a priori faculty of rules that allows him to hold the understanding responsible not for the empirical content of the laws of nature, but rather for their lawfulness. That is, by actively employing rules that are general, a priori, and constitutive of the possibility of experience, the understanding has the authority to determine that nature must be rule-governed; it gives rise to the lawfulness of nature, or the necessary conformity of nature to law (see Prol, AA 04: 296). Thus, though the empirical content of empirical laws derives from the empirical natures of the objects that are found in nature, Kant makes it clear that the content of the a priori laws, which is just the lawfulness of these laws (including their universality and necessity), derives from the understanding, since the understanding is an active faculty that is able to prescribe, or legislate, lawfulness to nature a priori."

As a result of this, we see that Kant's twofold notion of law-giving provides further justification of the division between the laws and hence also of the analogy between the moral law and the law of nature. On the one hand both moral law and the law of nature are objectively and formally the same and bound to the notion of universal lawfulness. In regard to the subjective principle, on the other hand, we can distinguish between them. In this way Kant's twofold notion of law-giving accounts for the common source of all kinds of laws as well as for their distinguishing features, and this again verifies my understanding of the analogy between moral law and the law of nature.

The objective principle I take as a starting point of the analogy. But since the analogical relation is not that of identity, but of similarity, the differences between the laws are equally important. Therefore, I relate the subjective principle of law-giving to Kant's second element of the analogy. In this way my explication of the analogy again accords with Kant's definition from the *Prolegomena*, mentioned in the previous section. In the *Prolegomena* Kant also gives a concrete example for his definition of the analogy:

Such is an analogy between the legal relation of human actions and the mechanical relation of moving forces: I can never do anything to another without giving him a right to do the same to me under the same conditions; just as a body cannot act on another body with its motive force without thereby causing the other body to react just as much on it. Right and motive force are here completely dissimilar things, but in their relation there is nonetheless complete similarity. (Prol, 4: 358)

Here Kant exemplifies the analogy on the basis of the relation between human actions and the mechanical relation of moving forces. This example is very similar to our analogy between the law of nature and the moral law, since legal relations of human actions belong to the laws of freedom, and mechanical relations to the laws of nature. Therefore, the moral law and the law of nature are according to this example wholly dissimilar, but also perfectly similar. Therefore, on the basis of Kant's twofold notion of law-giving we can further specify how Kant is justified in determining the relation between moral law and the law of nature as essentially analogical.

4. Analogy in the Typic chapter

In the previous section, I have shown why the relation between the moral law and the law of nature can be described as analogical and why it corresponds to Kant's general definition of analogy in the *Prolegomena*. In this section, I will now go one step further and examine why Kant refers to the law of nature when demonstrating the moral law and in what sense the analogy is useful for his moral philosophy. To do this, I will analyse the Typic chapter in the second *Critique*, where Kant points to the law of nature in the process of representing the moral law. This process he attributes to the faculty of practical judgment. I will argue that in the Typic chapter the relation between the moral law and the law of nature is indeed analogical and that consequently practical judgment should not be understood as a special kind of judgment, but rather as a judgment per analogy. In this

way, I will contend that the usefulness of the analogy for Kant's moral philosophy is a consequence of the role it plays in practical judgment.

In the first *Critique*, Kant describes the power of judgment as a faculty of subsuming under rules, this means as a faculty which can mediate between the abstract rule and the concrete cases falling under it. Following from this definition, practical judgment should be defined as a faculty that mediates between moral law as an abstract practical rule and the concrete cases of actions in the empirical world (KpV, 5: 67). However, as Kant maintains in the *Typic* chapter, such a mediation is an impossible task for practical judgment. Since the moral law is a supersensible idea of reason, it cannot refer to sensible intuition and accordingly no direct mediation between the moral law and concrete cases is possible.²⁰ Nonetheless, there is another option left for Kant's *Typic* chapter and practical judgment: not a subsumption of concrete cases under a law, but only an inquiry into the possibility of representing the moral law as such. For this purpose Kant refers – analogically – to the law of nature. Thus, the task of the practical judgment in the *Typic* chapter is a modest one: to represent the moral law with the help of the law of nature.

This process of representing the moral law Kant first tries to describe through the concept of the schema of the law. In the first *Critique*, Kant introduced the notion, referring to a schema of sensible intuition which can, via the faculty of imagination, mediate between sensibility and the abstract law. But the *Typic* chapter, as Kant maintains, cannot deal “with the schema of a case in accordance with laws but with the schema of a law itself (if the word schema is appropriate here)” (KpV, 5: 69). Therefore, in the case of the *Typic* the schema can mediate only between the supersensible moral law and the law of nature. But as it seems, Kant is not fully satisfied with this new term ‘the schema of the law’ and in later passages he switches to the expression ‘the type’ for describing the process of representing the moral law.

With the notion of the type Kant explicitly connects the moral law to the law of nature: the law of nature is a type for the moral law. In order to demonstrate in which sense the relation between the moral law and the law of nature can be recognized as analogy, it is therefore crucial to focus on the interpretation of the notion of the type. This will, in the end, indicate why this analogy is useful for Kant's moral philosophy. Therefore, I argue that to properly understand his notion of the type, we have to interpret it as a part of his analogical procedure. There are two main passages which I take into consideration:

Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature, and what the understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a schema of sensibility but a law, such a law, however, as can be presented in concreto in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature, though only as regards its form; this law is what the understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of judgment, and we can, accordingly, call it the type of the moral law. (KpV, 5:69)

²⁰ Zimmermann (2015, p. 444) and Westra (2016, p. 42) agree on this point.

Hence it is also permitted to use the nature of the sensible world as the type of an intelligible nature, provided that I do not carry over into the latter intuitions and what depends upon them, but refer to this intelligible nature only the form of lawfulness in general (the concept of which occurs even in the most common use of reason, although it cannot be determinately cognized a priori for an purpose other than the pure practical use of reason). For to this extent laws as such are the same, no matter from what they derive their determining grounds. (KpV, 5:70)

As Kant holds in the first quote, the moral law cannot make use of sensible intuition, and therefore it also cannot make use of the faculty of imagination and its schema. Moral law can through the faculty of understanding refer only to the law of nature, however not to the law of nature in general, but only to the form of the law. In the second quote, Kant then explicitly links the form of the law to the notion of lawfulness. The second quote is more general in that Kant here considers not only the law of nature, but sensible nature at large to function as a type for intelligible nature.²¹ However, he again refers only to the form of sensible nature, hence to the lawfulness of nature.

On the basis of these passages, I propose that we interpret Kant's notion of the type in light of Kant's twofold notion of law-giving and his definition of analogy.²² First, Kant's notion of the type can be correlated with the objective principle of law-giving. In the previous section, I identified the notion of lawfulness and the form of the law with Kant's objective principle. With respect to the objective principle, laws of nature and moral laws are the same. Kant is very clear on this point in the Typic chapter: "For to this extent laws as such are the same, no matter from what they derive their determining grounds" (KpV, 5: 70). Seen in this way, the law of nature can function as the type of the moral law, because formally the laws are the same and the type of the law refers to their universal form. Hence both the moral law and the law of nature have a non-sensible nature and origin.

The starting point of Kant's analogical procedure thus lies in this common aspect of the laws. The type of the law cannot be understood as a sensible image, but only as an abstract feature of the laws. But the reference to the type does not, in my view, constitute the analogy as a whole, but applies only to the first element of the analogy. The second element of the analogy is clearly pointed out by Kant in the first quote, where he refers to a law that "can be presented in concreto in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature" (KpV, 5: 69). Here, we can clearly see that although the connecting point between the laws is the form, the special worth of the law of nature, however, comes from its ability to be presented in concreto. Kant refers to the law of nature when speaking about the moral law, because of this second distinguishing element, which is indispensable for the analogy as a whole.

The usefulness of the analogy for Kant's moral philosophy is a result of the differences between the laws. In the Typic chapter this becomes especially clear. The law

²¹ These two examples are not totally identical and therefore Westra (2016, pp. 59–74) distinguishes between two kinds of type: type 1 and type 2.

²² Westra (2016, p. 204) agrees that the connection between moral law and the law of nature can be described as an analogy.

of nature can make use of sensible intuition, whereas the moral law cannot be presented in the objects of the senses. Because of this restriction on the site of the moral law, the moral law cannot have any proper representation, and therefore the moral law must get a representation via the analogy with the law of nature.

In summary, we see that the representation of the moral law occurs in two steps: First, Kant recognizes the common element of the moral law and the law of nature and expresses it with his notion of the type. Second, the difference between both laws comes to expression because the law of nature is not merely a formal law, but also has a sensible representation and a schema of sensible intuition. Consequently, we can represent the moral law, which is per se non-sensible and non-representational, only through reference to the law of nature. So in the process of representing the moral law the practical judgment borrows via the analogy from the law of nature its material part which is missing in the moral law. Thus, we can conclude that the analogy in the Typic chapter is possible because the law of nature and the moral law are formally the same, but it is useful because of the differences between them. On the question of how it is possible for the practical judgment to represent the moral law we can therefore answer that it is possible through the analogy.

In my reading, I differ from Adam Westra's interpretation of the Typic chapter. He interprets the type of the law as a third thing – a notion he takes from Kant's characterisation of the schema from the first *Critique*:

Kant selects the law of nature as the type of the moral law in order to serve as a 'third thing' or 'schema' (in the broad sense) for mediating between the supersensible representation of the moral law and the sensible representations of actions – just as the third criterion requires.²³ (Westra 2016, p. 61)

Westra of course knows that the type in the Typic cannot function as a schema of sensible intuition. He nevertheless thinks that the type has to be understood as a third thing and as a representation, although not as sensible representation, but as an abstract nonsensible representation. To me it seems that Westra points to a tripartite structure of the typification: there is a moral law without any representation, then there is a form of a law of nature which functions as a type and as a nonsensible representation, and eventually there is a law of nature with sensible representation.

However, on my view the problematic point of Westra's interpretation is that in calling the type a third thing it is not clear that all the laws are formally the same and that on that background we cannot distinguish between them. As we have demonstrated, the

²³ Compare also Westra (2016, p. 51): "In the Typic chapter, accordingly, Kant cannot employ a 'schema' in the specific sense of the first Critique, but he can employ a 'schema' in the generic sense of a representation that would play a functional role in the practical heterogeneity problem analogous to the functional role played by the transcendental schema in the theoretical heterogeneity problem, namely a mediating representation [vermittelnde Vorstellung] or 'third thing' that enables subsumption between a general rule and particular cases despite their heterogeneity. But given the supersensible nature of the moral Ideas, the sought-after 'schema' must achieve a presentation without any direct temporalization or sensible rendering [Versinnlichung]."

moral law and the law of nature are the same with regard to their form. Accordingly, we cannot objectively distinguish between the moral law and the law of nature. The type describes just the elementary feature of lawfulness which both laws have in their own right. Therefore we cannot say that only the law of nature is a type. Every law has its type; in this respect, the laws of nature is in no sense special.

Westra, by contrast, seems to differentiate between the abstract, non-sensible representation, which he ascribes to the law of nature as a type, and the moral law. As a result of this confusion, he sees in Kant's notion of the type the essence of the analogy: "The form of the law of nature is analogically substituted for the supersensible moral law, as its type" (Westra 2016, p. 62; Cf. 14). Westra speaks also about "analogically transposing the pure form of nature's lawfulness into intelligible sphere" (Westra 2016, p. 136). However, from my perspective this is not appropriate. In my view the first element of the analogy is not yet the whole analogy and in regard to the form of the law there can be no reference to substitution, since formally all the laws are the same. Substitution is possible just in regard to the second, differentiating element and only both elements together constitute the analogy.

Hence, I think that the first two steps in Westra's tripartite typification fall into one: as regards the form, the moral law and the law of nature are the same. Formally the law of nature does not have any special abstract, non-sensible representation which the moral law does not also have. Both laws differ just in regard to the last step, because the law of nature can make use of sensible intuition and the moral law cannot. Therefore, the usefulness and helpfulness of the analogy must be a result of the distinguishing features that the law of nature possesses. And this second element goes beyond what Kant describes with the form of the law. Since there is no way to distinguish between the form of the moral law and form of the law of nature, it is misleading when we name the type as a third thing or as a mediating representation. Instead, I think that the two aspects of the analogy already completely suffice for explaining the procedure through which Kant wants to represent the moral law.

5. Conclusion

The result of my analysis of Kant's analogy is double: First, I maintain that with the help of Kant's twofold notion of law-giving we can adequately explain why Kant's analogy between the moral law and the law of nature is possible. Objectively and formally all the laws are the same, but with regard to the executive powers of the lawgivers (which can be either our practical reason or theoretical understanding), we can explain the differences between various laws. Just insofar as the laws have on the one hand a common element, but on the other hand a differentiating element, can we speak about the analogy.

Second, we can determine the purpose of the analogy when we inquire into Kant's notion of the law in the Typic chapter. Kant here looks for the possibilities of representing the moral law and for this reason he refers to the analogy between moral law and the law of nature. Therefore, the Typic chapter offers an explanation as to why this analogy is relevant for Kant's moral philosophy. The usefulness of the analogy is not a consequence

of the first common element of lawfulness, but is a consequence of the second, distinguishing element. Because we cannot represent the moral law as such, we have to refer to the law of nature for the representation. Both laws are objectively and formally the same, but their application is different. Therefore, in my opinion this shows why it is relevant to stick to the dual structure of law-giving when inquiring into the possibility of representing the moral law.

Finally, on the basis of my analysis I hold that Kant's conception of practical judgment in the *Typic* chapter does not function as a special kind of judgment, alongside the theoretical judgment that Kant introduced in the first *Critique*. Instead, I think that practical judgment has in comparison to the theoretical judgment only one additional step: practical judgment has to refer to the analogy in order afterwards to be able to make use of the theoretical judgment. In this sense, I understand practical judgment as a judgment per analogy. Accordingly, Kant's analogy is essential for his notion of practical judgment and is thus of special importance for understanding the *Typic* chapter as a whole.

References

- Busch, W. (1979), *Die Entstehung der kritischen Rechtsphilosophie Kants*, De Gruyter, Berlin/New York.
- Delfosse, H. *et al.* (2010), "Stellenindex und Konkordanz zum Naturrecht Feyerabend. Einleitung des Naturrechts Feyerabend. Forschungen und Materialien zur deutschen Aufklärung. Division III". Indices", in: *Kant-Index. Section 2: Indices zum Kantschen Ethikcorpus. Vol. 30.1*, Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt.
- Guyer, P. (2002), "Kant's Deductions of the Principles of Right", in: Mark Timmons (ed.), *Kant's Metaphysics of morals: Interpretative Essays*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 23–64.
- Hirsch, P.A. (2012), *Kants Einleitung in die Rechtslehre von 1784. Immanuel Kants Rechtsbegriff in der Moralvorlesung „Mrongovius II“ und der Naturrechtsvorlesung „Feyerabend“ von 1784 sowie in der „Metaphysik der Sitten“ von 1797*, Universitätsverlag, Göttingen, Göttingen.
- Massimi, M. (2014), "Prescribing laws to nature. Part I. Newton, the pre-Critical Kant, and three problems about the lawfulness of nature", *Kant-Studien*, 105 (4), pp. 491–508.
- Pollok, K. (2017), *Kant's Theory of Normativity: The Space of Reason*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Ritter, C. (1971), *Der Rechtsgedanke Kants nach den frühen Quellen*, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main.
- Watkins, E. (2017), "Kant on the Unity and Diversity of Laws", in: Michela Massimi and Angela Breitenbach (eds.), *Kant and the Laws of Nature*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 11-29.
- Watkins, E. (2014), "What is, for Kant, a Law of Nature?", *Kant-Studien*, 105 (4), pp. 471–490.

Westra, A. (2016), *The Typic in Kant's Critique of Practical Reason: Moral Judgment and Symbolic Representation*, De Gruyter, Berlin/Boston.

Willaschek, M. (2002), "Which Imperatives for Right", in: Mark Timmons (ed.), *Kant's Metaphysics of morals: Interpretative Essays*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 65–88.

Wood, A. (2002), "The Final Form of Kant's Practical Philosophy", in: Mark Timmons (ed.), *Kant's Metaphysics of morals: Interpretative Essays*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 1–22.

Zimmermann, S. (2015), "Wovon handelt Kants Typik der reinen praktischen Urteilskraft?", *Kant-Studien*, 106 (3), pp. 430–460.

Zöllner, Günter (2015), "Without hope and fear: Kant's Naturrecht Feyerabend on Bindingness and Obligation", in: Robert R. Clewis (ed.), *Reading Kant's Lectures*, De Gruyter Berlin/Boston, pp. 346–361.



The Reddish, Iron-Rust Color of the Native Americans Immanuel Kant's Racism in Context

*El color óxido rojizo de los nativos americanos
El racismo de Immanuel Kant en contexto*

JORIS VAN GORKOM*

Independent Researcher, Germany

Abstract

In this essay, I discuss Kant's views on the "American race." Robert Bernasconi has pointed out that more research on the sources of Kant's ideas on non-white races is needed in order to have a better understanding of his racism. This essay responds to that call in order to show how Kant contributed to on-going discussions on the causes and meaning of human differences. However, I will also focus on his influence on his contemporaries. The reason for doing so is two-fold. Firstly, I will question Irene Tucker's recent attempt to show that skin color was considered a racial sign because of its supposed self-evidence and immediate legibility. By way of a presentation of Kant's views on the "American race," I will show that race mixing formed the core of Kant's racial theory and not the alleged immediacy of racial sight. Secondly, I will focus on his influence in order to question the popular idea that Kant had in his late work developed second thoughts on his racial hierarchy. His appraisal of the work of one of his contemporaries (Christoph Girtanner) clearly shows that the matter is far more complicated than suggested in these interpretations of Kant's racial work.

Keywords

* Joris van Gorkom has published numerous articles on Immanuel Kant, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Jean-Luc Nancy. At the moment, he is working on Kant's racial thinking and on the topic of evil. E-mail: jvangorkom@gmail.com

**[Recibido: 21 de diciembre de 2018
Aceptado: 21 de abril de 2019]**

Immanuel Kant, race, racism, Native Americans, skin color

Resumen

En este ensayo, discuto los puntos de vista de Kant sobre la “raza Americana”. Robert Bernasconi ha señalado que se necesita más investigación sobre las fuentes de las ideas de Kant sobre las razas no blancas para tener una mejor comprensión de su racismo. Este ensayo responde a ese llamado para mostrar cómo Kant contribuyó a las discusiones en curso sobre las causas y el significado de las diferencias humanas. Sin embargo, también me centraré en su influencia en sus contemporáneos. La razón para hacerlo es doble. En primer lugar, cuestionaré el reciente intento de Irene Tucker de mostrar que el color de la piel se consideraba un signo racial debido a su supuesta evidencia y legibilidad inmediata. A modo de presentación de los puntos de vista de Kant sobre la “raza americana”, mostraré que la mezcla racial formaba el núcleo de la teoría racial de Kant y no la supuesta inmediatez de la visión racial. En segundo lugar, me centraré en su influencia para cuestionar la idea popular que Kant tuvo en su último trabajo de desarrollar segundos pensamientos sobre su jerarquía racial. Su valoración de la obra de uno de sus contemporáneos (Christoph Girtanner) muestra claramente que el asunto es mucho más complicado de lo que se sugiere en estas interpretaciones de la obra racial de Kant.

Palabras clave

Immanuel Kant, raza, racismo, indígenas americanos, color de la piel

In *The Moment of Racial Sight: A History*, Irene Tucker wants to show how the concept of race works in organizing our ways of understanding differences between people. Her analysis of the history of “the moment of racial sight” attempts to demonstrate the relation between a racial sign that one can immediately recognize and the meaning that this sign is made to bear. She realizes very well that an analysis of this history cannot work without a reading of the work of Immanuel Kant, for he presented the first scientific definition of the concept of race and wanted to show that skin color was the racial characteristic par excellence. As Tucker correctly states: “Immanuel Kant has long been identified as the first prominent European thinker to single out skin color in this way.” In her attempt to position Kant in this history, she argues that the concept of race was meant to account for the immediacy and the self-evidence of the legibility of skin color as a racial sign: “Kant’s racial skin [...] turns likeness from an idea that must be discovered over time to something legible instantly; the mutually constitutive relation between Kantian race and the nascent discourse of modern anatomical medicine makes apparent how such instantaneousness might be useful in organizing the ways in which subjects see other people’s bodies and their own” (Tucker 2012, p. 7).

In this essay, I will discuss Tucker’s view by way of an exposition of Kant’s views on the “American race.” She correctly notes that, in Kant’s view, nature had wisely arranged the possibility of developing racial traits, so that humans were able to live in all climates. Kant wanted to remind his contemporaries of the methodological necessity of clearly defining concepts that guide the inquiry of nature. This conceptual analysis was needed before the empirical data was gathered and analyzed. Kant introduced the concept of race as an *a priori* conceptual tool for the understanding of human differences: organic nature first of all had to be perceived with regard to the laws of heredity. He attempted to make his concept of race more plausible to others, but this also implied that he had to combine mechanical laws of nature with teleology. Much effort has already been put underscoring Kant’s essays on race for his teleology (McFarland 1970, 56-68; Zammito 1992, p. 199-213). The natural history of mankind should aim to provide a systematic view of the diversity observed in nature. However, I will limit myself primarily to Kant’s views on Native Americans, as his wavering ideas on their position in his scheme of racial types show how skin color was not associated with immediacy. Contrary to Tucker, I want to show that Kant’s main concern in his discussion on race was not the instantaneous legibility of skin color but race mixing.

I will also use this opportunity to respond to the call of Robert Bernasconi when he pointed out that the “sources from which Kant drew his portraits of Native American and Blacks need to be studied more rigorously” (Bernasconi 2002, p. 148). Kant’s ideas on the different skin colors were meant to explain the inferiority of non-white races. I will show which sources he used to ground his racism. Kant’s interest in different scientific domains is well known, but his work on races gives us the opportunity to uncover influences on Kant that have often been ignored. However, I will not limit myself to these sources but also pay attention to Kant’s own influence on some of his contemporaries. This reveals much about the reasons for the growing interest in race and natural history in the final decade of the eighteenth century. This allows us not only to again question Tucker’s history of racial sight but also an interpretation of Kant’s racial thinking that is becoming increasingly popular: Kant allegedly had in his late work second thoughts regarding his own views on non-white races (Kleingeld 2007; Kleingeld 2014; Cavallar 2015, p. 130; Flikschuh 2017, pp. 155-158). One recurring argument revolves around Kant’s appraisal of Girtanner in his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*: “*In Ansehung dieser kann ich mich auf das beziehen, was der Herr Geh. H. R. Girtanner davon in seinem Werk (meinen Grundsätzen gemäß) zur Erläuterung und Erweiterung schön und gründlich vorgetragen hat [...]*” [With regard to this subject I can refer to what Herr Privy Councilor Girtanner has presented so beautifully and thoroughly in explanation and further development in his work (in accordance with my principles)] (AA VII, p. 320; Kant 2007c, p. 415). Contemporary interpretations of Kant’s racial theory primarily limit themselves to Girtanner’s appropriation of the Kantian concepts of race and the underlying theory of inheritance (Sloan 1979, pp. 137-141; Lenoir 1980, pp. 96-99; Querner 1990; Zammito 2003, pp. 75-80; Bernasconi 2014, pp. 245-247). But those who argue that Kant had

second thoughts in his late work often claim that Girtanner had not adopted Kant's racial hierarchy. I will show that this misrepresents Girtanner's interest in Kant.

I will begin this essay with Kant's answer to the question of the origins of the American people. I will discuss the themes related to the Native Americans and see how Kant changed their status from an incipient degenerated race to an independent racial type. This will uncover the importance of race mixing to his racial ideas. Subsequently, we will focus on the scientific research that Kant used to support his wild speculations on the skin color of Native Americans. Thirdly, we will see that Kant's discussion about the physiological aspects of the Native Americans is linked to his explanation of their inferiority. In conclusion, I want to pay attention to the ways in which Kant influenced the work of Christoph Girtanner and Ludwig Emil Cichorius in order to question Tucker's main hypothesis and the idea that Kant had second thoughts on his racial hierarchy in his late work.

From the Hunnish to the American Race

Before Kant started to work on his newly invented definition of race, some thinkers had presented Native Americans as evidence of multiple divine creations. Isaac la Peyrère suggested that they already existed before the creation of Adam (La Peyrère 1655, p. 19). Also Henry Home, Lord Kames, did not believe that a migration could explain the populating of the New World, as the appearance of the aboriginal Americans differed from all other known peoples. He supposed, contrary to La Peyrère, that Native Americans were "planted in America by the hand of God later than the days of Moses," so that "Adam and Eve might have been the first parents of mankind, *i.e.* of all who at that time existed, without being the first parents of the Americans" (Home 1774, p. 75). However, Kant refused to accept polygenesis. Instead, he followed Georges-Louis Leclerc Buffon's suggestion that two organisms belong to the same species when they can have fertile offspring with one another (Huneman 2005). Buffon had indeed stated that "*l'Asiatique, l'Européen, le Nègre produisent également avec l'Américain*" [the Asiatic, the European, and the Negro also reproduce with the American] (Buffon 1766, pp. 312-313). Buffon suggested that this proved the origination of all human beings from the same stock. However, he also thought that climate influenced the colorization of the skin, thus accepting the possibility that black people turned white when they moved to Europe. Buffon's defense of monogenesis implied that he had to explain their presence on the American continent: the "savages" from Canada to the Gulf of Mexico descended from Tatars (Buffon 1749, p. 515). Since Kant would later state that the Native Americans were of *Mongolian* origin, I note that Johann Eberhard Fischer had previously pointed out that the name of the Tatars was often erroneously used for Mongolians (Fischer 1768, p. 28).

However, Kant suggested in response to Buffon that the climate was not a *productive* cause of racial differences but merely an *occasioning* cause for the development of permanently inheritable racial traits. In order to comprehend the possibility of

ineradicable traits, Kant stipulated that the original human stock possessed germs and predispositions before becoming an enduring race. These germs and predispositions were preformed, that is, these were given by nature. Environmental conditions had subsequently triggered the development of one of these germs. Once a germ for a specific racial constitution had been unfolded, the others were held back. This explained in Kant's view the permanence and inheritability of racial characteristics. More importantly, he believed not only that race mixing proved the unity of a species but also which characteristics were in fact racial. The mixture of races inevitably results in characteristics that were midway between those of the parents.

In his 1775 essay on race, Kant distinguished four races: the white race, the "Negro", the Hunnish (Mongolish or Kalmuckish), and the Hindustani race. However, this left him with the problem of the Native Americans. Kant concluded from their features – a beardless chin, black hair, thin lips, red-brown skin color, smaller build, short legs, and half-closed eyes – that they were a derivation of the Hunnish race. These features made them suitable for the cold climate of the northern parts of the New World: the blood needed less time to circulate when parts of the body were smaller, resulting in warmer blood. He subsequently noted that the inhabitants of Northwest America are "*den Kalmucken ganz ähnlich*" [quite similar to the Kalmucks] and "*nach einigen neuen Nachrichten [...] wie wahre Kalmucken aussehen*" [according to some recent reports [...] look like true Kalmucks] (Kant 1775, p. 433, 437; Kant 2013a, p. 48, 52).

Others had indeed observed similarities between Native Americans and Kalmucks. The German missionary David Cranz mentioned similarities between the Greenlanders and the "Kalmucks, Yakuts, Tungusi and Kamchadals" (Cranz 1765, p. 333). The theologian and geologist Anton Friedrich Büsching soon added that this observation would have gained credibility when Cranz had also pointed out that Kalmucks were originally the same people as the Mongolians, as the latter lived as far as the eastern seas, opposite of the North American coast (Büsching 1773, p. 72). Explorers who took part in the Second Kamchatka Expedition (1731-1742) had made similar observations. Gerhard Friedrich Müller reported that some inhabitants in Northwest America had "*platte Nasen, wie die Calmucken*" [flat noses like the Kalmucks] (Müller 1758, p. 219). Georg Wilhelm Steller suggested that Native Americans resembled the Itelmens and the Koryaks who originated from the Mongolians (Steller 1774, p. 246, 297; Gmelin 1748, p. 21). However, not everybody was convinced of this ancestry. The Dutch philosopher and geographer Cornelius de Pauw did not doubt Buffon's suggestion that these inhabitants descended from Tatars. Yet, he demanded a more precise characterization. He immediately added that (despite many reports) the Native Americans were with regard to their ugliness incomparable to the Kalmucks. He suggested that differences between their hands, eyes, noses, and teeth made it impossible to conclude that the Native Americans originated from the latter. Instead, he followed the lead of the Scottish traveler John Bell who argued that they descended from the Tungusi (Bell 1763, p. 231; Pauw 1768, pp. 135-136).

Since Kant was not willing to add more races to his list of four racial types, he had to show how the Kalmuckian origins accounted for the traits of the Native Americans. Consequently, Kant characterized the Native Americans as an *incipient* (*angehende*) race: they had “*in dem Clima noch nicht lange gnug gewohnt [...] um den Charakter der Race desselben völlig anzunehmen*” [not yet lived long enough in a specific climate to take on fully the character of the race]. Their ancestors allegedly migrated from Southwest or Central Asia to the cold regions of Northeast Asia and Northwest America. They had not yet been completely raced when their migration forced the germinal development to come to a standstill. Those who subsequently moved from northern parts of America to the south became a *degenerated* (*ausgehende*) race: they slowly lost some of the traits of the original Hunnish race. Thus, the Native Americans were actually “*eine noch nicht völlig eingearbeitete oder halb eingearbeitete hunnische Race*” [a Hunnish race that is still not fully acclimated or half degenerated] (Kant 1775, p. 5; Kant 2013a, p. 48).

This was a clear reminder of Buffon’s theory of degeneration. The latter had argued that species diversify through the effects of food, climate, and heat. Susanne Zantop erroneously writes that “Buffon’s theory of degeneracy had related to the flora and fauna exclusively” (Zantop 1997, p. 227n). He, in fact, also discussed this in relation to the aboriginal Americans. Recent inquiries on the Bering Strait had revealed evidence of a possible route from the Old World to the American continent. Degenerative changes resulted in forms that were smaller, weaker, and less stable in their species as they moved to the New World.¹ Buffon’s ideas on the degeneration of the Native Americans presupposed a deviation from an original line that was stronger and healthier. Additionally, he argued that their character consisted merely of animal instincts. As a result of their cold temperament, they were weak, stupid, and lazy. However, Kant adjusted this view in an important way. According to Buffon (and de Pauw), degeneration could be reversed. Kant argued, on the contrary, that the described characteristics of the Native Americans were part of their race. These traits were permanently inheritable.

However, Kant did not need the theory of degeneration after an alteration of his list of four races: as of 1777, when he published a revised version of his first essay on race, the Native Americans took the place of the Mongolians as an independent racial type. Native Americans were still considered an incipient race, but he deleted all mention of a degenerated race. Later, we will see that Kant still held on to the idea of the American race as an incipient race in order to account for their inferiority. Consequently, the American people were no longer the result of degeneration (*Ausartung*) but a direct deviation (*Abartung*) of the original phylum. More importantly, he structured his new scheme of racial types on the basis of skin color: white, black, copper-red, olive-yellow. Kant had already mentioned in 1775 that the mixture of the Native American with the white yielded

¹ De Pauw adopted these ideas in his description of the weakness, impotency, and inferiority of the Native Americans. The influence of de Pauw on Kant is discussed in: Gerbi 1973, p. 330; Zantop 1997, pp. 69-70; Zammito 2006, p. 52n.

“the red mestizo” and that of a “Negro” with a Native American was called “the Kabugl (the Black Caribs).” He underscored that this proved “*ihre Abkunft von ächten Racen*” [their origin from genuine races] (Kant 1775, p. 11; Kant 2013a, pp. 53-54). However, in the 1777 version of his first essay on race, he relocated this passage from the section “Of the Immediate Causes of the Origin of these Different Races” to that on the “Division of the Human Species into its Different Races” (Kant 1777, p. 138; Kant 2013b, p. 63). This reveals the importance of race mixing for Kant. The mestizo and caboclo (*Kabugl*) no longer merely *exemplified* the results of race mixing but *justified* his new scheme of four racial types based on skin color. Thus, I cannot underwrite Tucker’s claim about the self-evidence and immediacy of skin color for Kant’s concept of race. Essential to Kant’s exposition on this concept is not this supposed immediacy but the possibility to observe the mixture of ineradicable traits in the offspring.

To understand the importance of race mixing, I want to return to the question why Kant changed his chart of racial types between 1775 and 1777. Erich Adickes suggested that Kant read in Peter Simon Pallas’s *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften* (1776) that the mixture of Russians or Tatars with Kalmucks or Mongolians resulted in children with very beautiful faces (Pallas 1776, p. 99; Adickes 1925, p. 414). Many had emphasized the extraordinary ugliness of Kalmucks (Tavernier 1676, p. 330; Buffon 1749, p. 381; Winckelmann 1764, p. 146). This made an explanation of these beautiful faces problematic since Kant presupposed that children showed racial characteristics that were midway between those of the parents. However, more recently, Bernasconi indicated that the case was not settled for Kant, since the latter pointed out in his 1785 essay on race that Pallas had failed to mention possible Kalmuckish features that might have been inherited (Bernasconi 2012, p. 197). He immediately added: “*Allein die mongolische Eigenthümlichkeit betrifft eigentlich die Gestalt, nicht die Farbe, von welcher allein die bisherige Erfahrung eine unausbleibliche Anartung als den Charakter einer Race gelehrt hat.*” [But the Mongolian particularity actually concerns the shape and not the color; and only with respect to the latter has hitherto existing experience taught us the unfailing heredity as the character of race.] (AA VIII, p. 101; Kant 2007a, p. 154) Pallas gave him at least no reason to doubt the Kalmuckish origin of the Native Americans, since he also mentioned the resemblance of the Kalmuckish facial formation of the Buryats with the indigenous people of North America (Pallas 1776, p. 171). More importantly, Kant felt the need in his 1785 essay to focus more on skin color and less on facial formations. Thus, he returned to his division of races (*Stammracen*) that he presented in his courses on physical geography from 1770: “*In dem warmen Clima ist der Europäer weiß, der Asiater Olivenfarbe, der Africaner schwarz, und der Americaner kupferroth.*” [In the warm climate, the European is white, the Asian olive-colored, the African black, and the American copper-red.]² By the time he revised his first essay on race, Kant concluded that there was

² Werner Stark has made the transcript available at http://kant.bbaw.de/base.htm/geo_hes.htm (accessed May 2019).

enough empirical evidence linking his concept of race to skin color. But the underlying reason was not the self-evidence of skin color but the claim that only race mixing could reveal which traits were racial.

Subsequently, in 1785, Kant rejected the idea that the plucking of the beards by American Indians could bring about alterations in the generative powers. This was nothing more than a “ghost story or case of magic” (AA VIII, p. 96; Kant 2007a, pp. 150-151). In his first essay, he had written that their beardlessness was a racial trait, but the geographer Eberhard August Wilhelm Zimmermann had soon afterwards confronted him on this matter, because others had clearly pointed out that this feature was a result of the plucking of the hair (Zimmermann 1778, pp. 71-72). But Kant rejected the suggestion that racial characteristics could have been artificially generated. Nature preserved itself so that these modifications did not affect the species or races as such. Considering the vagueness regarding causes of characteristics that he had previously considered racial traits, Kant felt the need to limit his exposition on the concept of race to the trait about which there seemed to be consensus: skin color. Surprisingly, Tucker denies the importance of Kant’s first two essays on race by stating that these were written “during Kant’s pre-critical period.” This is obviously a misconception. But she is also mistaken when she claims that these essays do not “analyze skin as a particularly salient sign of racial difference” (Tucker 2012, p. 255n). As of 1777, skin color became the primary marker for his scheme of racial types.

The renewal of his scheme of racial types with the Americans as an independent race was, thus, a result of his greater emphasis on skin color. Also, Kant seemed to have had difficulties categorizing the skin color of the Mongolian race. He initially mentioned a “red-brown” skin color of the Kalmuckish race, but this color was commonly ascribed to the Native Americans (Blumenbach 1776, p. 79). More importantly, Pallas had written in 1771 that the Kalmickish skin color was “relatively white” (Pallas 1771, p. 308). The yellow-brown coloring of the skin of the children and men was, according to him, effectuated by the sun, since they were (partially) naked and often outside. The women were in contrast often very white. There is enough evidence that Kant read Pallas’s 1771 report: both noted that the Torguts and the Dzungarians were a mixture of Kalmucks with Tataric blood (Pallas 1771, p. 309). Thus, considering his fascination for skin color, Kant must also have noticed that Pallas reported about the white skin color of Kalmucks. This explains why we find in student notes of Kant’s course on physical geography that the Kalmucks actually belonged to the white race (Starke 1833, p. 353). We read in the student notes from the mid-1770s that he relinquished the idea of a Mongolian race when he remarked that Mongolians were in fact a variety of the white race.³

Fixed Air and a Reddish, Iron-Rust Skin Color

³ Werner Stark has made the transcript available at http://kant.bbaw.de/base.htm/geo_mes.htm (accessed May 2019).

Kant also wanted to show what caused the specific skin color in order to demonstrate the possibility of combining the mechanical laws of nature with teleology. All non-white races were, according to Kant, confronted with a large amount of toxic gasses. Their lungs needed additional help with the removal of these gasses from the body. The skin color was for Kant a clear testimony that the skin was contributing to this process. The abilities of these races to remove certain kinds of air resulted from the development of a specific germ that was already present (albeit undeveloped) in the first human stock. It was, thus, a smart move of nature to give the original human beings all germs that were needed to survive in different climates. Before presenting his wild speculations on the causes of the different skin colors, Kant noted: “*Das Zweckmäßige in einer Organisation ist doch der allgemeine Grund, woraus wir auf ursprünglich in die Natur eines Geschöpfs in dieser Absicht gelegte Zurüstung und, wenn dieser Zweck nur späterhin zu erreichen war, auf anerschaffene Keime schließen.*” [The purposive character in an organization is surely the general reason for inferring a preparation that is originally placed in the nature of a creature with this intent, if this end could only be obtained later on.] (AA VIII, pp. 102-103; Kant 2007a, 156) Providence was wise enough to produce racial differences. With regard to the Native Americans, Kant argued that the “*Luftsäure*” [acidic air] in the cold regions effectuated their “*röthliche Eisenrostfarbe*” [reddish, iron-rust color]. Although Kant seemed to hesitate between 1775 and 1777 whether this skin color was a result of acidic air (*Luftsäure*) or saline acid (*Salzsäure*) (Adickes 1925, p. 421n), in 1785 he settled for his earliest hypothesis of acidic air.

In 1777, Kant wrote: “*Man schreibt jetzt mit gutem Grunde die veschiedenen Farben der Gewächse dem durch unterschiedliche Säfte gefällten Eisen zu. Da alles Thierblut Eisen enthält, so hindert uns nichts die verschiedene Farbe dieser Menschenracen eben derselben Ursache beizumessen.*” [We now, with good reason, ascribe the different colors of plants to the iron precipitated through different juices. There is also nothing to prevent us from attributing the different colors of the human races to exactly the same cause, since the blood of all animals contains iron.] (Kant 1777, p. 156; Kant 2013b, p. 63) Others had indeed discovered iron particles in plants when they managed to separate these with a magnet from the ashes. Consequently, the French physician and chemist Étienne François Geoffroy wanted to know whether these iron particles were already present in fresh and unburnt plants or a result of the combustion. Although Geoffroy concluded that iron was not detectable in the original plant, Louis Lemery maintained that all earth contained iron and that the roots of plants absorbed this. Iron would subsequently disseminate through them (Lemery 1706). The English natural philosopher Edward Delaval conjectured much later that “the colour of the *intire* (sic) *vegetables* arises also from the iron, so universally diffused throughout their substance in their growth” (Delaval 1765, p. 27).⁴ The analogy between animal blood and plants seemed

⁴ A German translation of Delaval’s book was available as of 1788 (Delaval 1788), but German extracts of Delaval’s findings had already circulated much earlier (Delaval 1766).

legitimate to Kant because Nicolas Lemery had already discovered iron particles in animal blood (Lemery 1713). Kant's natural history of mankind was, thus, still in need of its own Delaval who would be able to show that skin color was directly related to the effects of air on the iron particles in blood.

Kant thought that the copper-red skin color of the Native Americans was a result of the effects of great amounts of fixed air (carbon dioxide) on these iron particles. The Scottish physician Joseph Black had discovered in 1754 that animal respiration produced fixed air: exhaled air that went through limewater (a diluted solution of calcium hydroxide) resulted in a white precipitate of calcium carbonate. This discharge from the lungs must, therefore, be a cause of rendering common air unfit for respiration. However, one is still far from explaining a copper-red skin color. In the mid-1780s, Kant found another clue for his hypothesis in the work of the Italian chemist Felice Fontana: "*Wenn der Abt Fontana in dem, was er gegen den Ritter Landriani behauptet, nämlich: daß die fixe Luft, die bei jedem Ausathmen aus der Lunge gestoßen wird, nicht aus der Atmosphäre niedergeschlagen, sondern aus dem Blute selbst gekommen ist, recht hat: so könnte wohl eine Menschenrace ein mit dieser Luftsäure überladenes Blut haben, welche die Lungen allein nicht fortschaffen könnten, und wozu die Hautgefäße noch die ihrige beitragen müßten (freilich nicht in Luftgestalt, sondern mit anderem ausgedünstem Stoffe verbunden).*" [If Abbot Fontana is right about what he maintains against the cavalier Landriani, namely that the fixed air which is discharged from the lungs in every exhaling did not precipitate from the atmosphere but rather comes out of the blood itself, then a human race could well have blood that is overloaded with this aerial acid, which the lungs alone could not remove and to which removal the vessels of the skin would still have to contribute their share (to be sure, not in the shape of air but combined with some other perspired material.) (AA VIII, pp. 103-104; Kant 2007a, p. 157)

The discussion between Felice Fontana and Marsilio Landriani to which Kant alluded was initiated when the Dutch botanist Jan Ingenhousz wrote in his celebrated *Experiments on Vegetables*: "Abbé Fontana found that an animal breathing-in either common or dephlogisticated air renders it unfit for respiration by communicating to it a considerable portion of fixed air, which is generated in our body, and thrown out by the lungs as excrementitious" (Ingenhousz 1779, p. xlvi). However, Landriani soon questioned Fontana's claim about the ability of an organic body to generate fixed air (Landriani 1781, p. 77),⁵ as Antoine Laurent Lavoisier had shown earlier that common air turned into fixed air when it was combined with phlogiston (Lavoisier 1775). Thus, Landriani insisted that fixed air was created as soon as respired (phlogisticated) air came into contact with common (atmospheric) air. If fixed air was added by the body to the phlogisticated air in the lungs, then one would also expect an increase in the exhaled air. In his reply to Landriani, Fontana claimed that he did not recall having "*detto, o scritto che l'aria fissa,*

⁵ A partial, German translation of the text was published in: von Crell, 1783.

che sorte dai polmoni, sia generata dentro del corpo, potendo essa trovarsi benissimo nei cibi, e nel chilo” [said, or written that the fixed air, which arises from the lungs, is generated inside the body, since it can very well be found in food and in the chyle] (Fontana 1782, p. 662).⁶ Animals exhaled a mixture of phlogisticated and fixed air. During his experiments with fixed air that came into contact with blood, Fontana not only noticed that blood (without being agitated) polluted the air but also that the quantity of fixed air had increased. Fontana speculated that food and chyle released the fixed air that these products could not maintain. Something similar was to be expected when blood reached the lungs: it would impart the fixed air into the lungs since the blood was not able to maintain it.

Kant suggested that this might support a theory on the causes of the specific skin color of the Americans. But he still had to show that those who moved to North America were in fact confronted with large quantities of fixed air. The ancestors of Native Americans allegedly lived in a climate that occasioned the development of the physiological ability to remove great quantities of this air from the blood. The descendants of the original humans who migrated from North Asia to the American continent crossed cold regions and this forced the development of germs that gave rise to their specific skin color. The American race needed a specific bodily constitution, because they had arrived “*aus dem Nordosten von Asien, mithin nur an den Küsten und vielleicht gar nur über das Eis des Eismeereres in ihre jetzigen Wohnsitze [...]. Das Wasser dieser Meere aber muß in seinem continuirlichen Gefrieren auch continuirlich eine ungeheure Menge fixer Luft fahren lassen, mit welcher also die Atmosphäre dort vermuthlich mehr überladen sein wird, als irgend anderswärts*” [in their present habitats from northeast Asia, hence only along the coasts and perhaps even across the ice of the polar sea. But the water in these oceans must continuously expel an enormous amount of fixed air in its continuous freezing, with which the atmosphere there is presumably more overloaded than anywhere else] (AA VIII, p. 104; Kant 2007a, p. 157). Thus, Kant found in the coldness a clue that fixed air might have played an essential role. The English chemist Joseph Priestley had already noticed that water easily absorbs fixed air, which led to the discovery of the artificial production of carbonated water. He expected that coldness would promote this absorption, but when he “put several pieces of ice into a quantity of fixed air, confined by quicksilver, [...] no part of the air was absorbed in two days and two nights; but upon bringing it into a place where the ice melted, the air was absorbed as usual” (Priestley 1772, pp. 10-11).

But, then, how did Kant relate the observations on the iron particles in blood to those on fixed air? One important clue for his speculations was offered by “*einer der neuern Seereisenden, dessen Namen ich jetzt nicht mit Sicherheit nennen kann*” [one of the

⁶ An extract was published in German in 1785, although this did not explicitly mention the quarrel with Landriani (Fontana 1785).

more recent seafarers, whose name I cannot give with certainty right now]: this seafarer had described the skin color as “Eisenrost, mit Öl vermischt” [iron rust mixed with oil] (AA VIII, p. 175; Kant 2007b, p. 211). This was, in fact, reported in John Hawkesworth’s edited version of the papers of James Cook and the botanist Joseph Banks. The ascribed color is mentioned when the explorers encountered inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego (Hawkesworth 1773, p. 55).⁷ The Spanish explorer Antonio de Ulloa (whose work Kant had read) had already written: “Visto un Indio de qualquier Region, se puede decir que se han visto todos en quanto al color y contexture.” [If one has seen one Indian of any region, it may be said that they have all been seen in terms of color and build.] (Ulloa 1772, 308) This gave Kant reason to believe that all Native Americans had an iron-rust skin color. This characterization supposedly proved that fixed air would give “den Eisentheilchen im Blute die röthliche Rostfarbe [...], welche die Haut der Amerikaner unterscheidet” [the iron particles in the blood the red rust color which distinguishes the skin of the Americans] (AA VIII, p. 104; Kant 2007a, p. 157). Priestley had namely observed that iron-rust “gave a great deal of air, two-thirds of which was fixed air, and the rest was not affected by nitrous air, and extinguished a candle; so that the whole produce seemed to be fixed air, only with a larger residuum of that part which is not miscible with water than usual. At another time, however, I got from the rust of iron fixed air that was very pure, there being little of it that was not miscible with water” (Priestley 1775, pp. 111-112). Since the rust of iron mostly contained fixed air, Kant expected iron particles in blood to rust when these were exposed to large amounts of fixed air. Since he also presupposed that the vessels of the skin contributed to the removal of fixed air from the blood, this iron-rust color shone through the upper layer of the skin. Also Blumenbach adopted the characterization of the skin color as “iron rust mixed with oil,” but he did not link the color to iron particles in blood (Blumenbach 1797, p. 62). Kant took the description more literally than was probably intended.

Kant did not hesitate to link his explanation of skin color of the Native Americans to their supposed inferiority. For instance, in 1777, Kant stated with regard to the white race that “dieses in den Säften aufgelösete Eisen gar nicht niedergeschlagen [würde], und dadurch zugleich die vollkommene Mischung der Säfte und Stärke dieses Menschenschlags vor den übrigen bewiesen” [the iron dissolved in these juices might have been not at all precipitated, thereby demonstrating both the perfect mixing of juices and the strength of this human stock in comparison to others] (Kant 1777, pp. 174-175; Kant 2013b, p. 68). The connection between the “perfect mixing of juices and the strength of this human stock” tells us that the inferiority of the so-called American race was for Kant linked to the understanding of its constitution. Instead of questioning the assumed inferiority of the Native Americans, he perceived it as a fact that still needed an explanation.

⁷ A German translation appeared in 1774 (Hawkesworth 1774, p. 55).

It is known that Kant showed little interest in opposing slavery (Bernasconi 2002, pp. 148-152). In 1777, he even claimed that “*man sich in Surinam der rothen Sklaven (Amerikaner) nur allein zu häußlichen Arbeiten [bedient], weil sie zur Feldarbeit zu schwach sind, wozu man Neger braucht*” [red slaves (Americans) are used in Surinam only for domestic work, because they are too weak for fieldwork – for which Negroes are needed] (Kant 1777, p. 150n; Kant 2013b, p. 333n). The passage was amended to his suggestion that the reddish, iron-rust skin color and the “*halb erloschene Lebenskraft*” [half-extinguished life power] of Native Americans were a direct result of the cold region. The notion of “red slaves” first appeared in the *Journal politique ou gazette des gazettes* (1773): “*Outre les Negres de Guinée, il y a encore quelques Indiens des rivieres [sic] de l’Oronoque & des Amazones, connus sous le nom d’esclaves rouges; ceux-ci, moins robustes que les autres, sont, pour cette raison, presque tous employés à des occupations domestiques.*” [Besides the Negroes of Guinea there are also some Indians from the rivers of the Oronoque and the Amazon which are known under the name of the *red slaves* and because of their lesser strength are used almost solely for work in the house.] (Anonymous 1773, p. 67) A German translation was published soon afterwards in the *Encyclopädisches Journal* (Anonymous 1774, pp. 202-203) and, subsequently, reappeared in the German translation of Philippe Fermin’s *Description générale, historique, géographique et physique de la colonie de Surinam* (Fermin 1775, p. 114).⁸ The translator of Fermin’s book felt the need to amend this text after Fermin had suggested that slaves escaped either because of a refusal to work or a fear for well-deserved punishments. The translator wanted to point out that, as the article in the *Journal politique ou gazette des gazettes* explicitly remarked, a cruel treatment might just as well have been the reason for their escape. Contrary to Fermin’s defense of slavery, the author of the amended text refused to take a stance regarding the legitimacy of slavery; he was more concerned about the treatment of slaves. However, Kant’s mention of the red slaves indicates that, in his view, the lack of ability and durability of Native Americans justified the transportation of “Negroes” to the colonies. He even felt the need to add that not even coercive measures succeeded in making them do the hard labor in the fields.

In his third essay on race (1788), Kant put greater emphasis on the supposed fact that the American race was an *incipient* race. He concluded that the indolence of these Native Americans was a direct result of being unfit for any climate: “*Daß aber ihr Naturell zu keiner völligen Angemessenheit mit irgend einem Klima gelangt ist, läßt sich auch daraus abnehmen, daß schwerlich ein anderer Grund angegeben werden kann, warum diese Race, zu schwach für schwere Arbeit, zu gleichgültig für emsige und unfähig zu aller Cultur, wozu sich doch in der Naheit Beispiel und Aufmunterung genug findet, noch tief unter dem Neger selbst steht, welcher doch die niedrigste unter allen übrigen Stufen einnimmt die wir als Racenverscheidenheiten genannt haben.*” [That their natural

⁸ In 1770, Fermin expanded on his defense of slavery (Fermin 1770).

disposition did not achieve a *perfect* suitability for any climate, can be seen from the circumstance that hardly another reason can be given for why this race, which is too weak for hard labor, too indifferent for industry and incapable of any culture – although there is enough of it as example and encouragement nearby – ranks still far below even the Negro, who stands on the lowest of all the other steps that we have named as differences of the races.] (AA VIII, pp. 175-176; Kant 2007b, p. 211) Many had already mentioned the insensibility and indolence of American Indians (Venegas 1757, p. 74; Pauw p. 1769, 71-72, p. 169, 221). De Ulloa reported that even “Negroes” showed contempt for their laziness (Ulloa 1772, pp. 322-323). So Kant had no difficulties finding support for his views that Native Americans ranked lowest. But his racism implied that their laziness was a result of their unfailingly inheritable predisposition. Their laziness was in his view a permanent feature.

However, Adickes pointed out that Kant’s view on the inferiority of the Native Americans was not commonly accepted (Adickes 1925, p. 415). He could have read extracts of Francisco Javier Clavigero’s criticism of Buffon and de Pauw, which appeared in 1786 in *Der Teutsche Merkur*. For present purposes it is also important to note that, as Bernasconi has observed in response to Pauline Kleingeld’s claim about Kant’s supposed second thoughts on his racial hierarchy, “there is no evidence that he did renounce his views either about the scientific character of race as such or about the hierarchy of the races, although he did appear to modify his views on the slave trade” (Bernasconi 2011, p. 292). If Kant indeed had had second thoughts, then one could reasonably expect to find it unambiguously expressed in his work. In this regard, I would like to briefly refer to Johann Gottlieb Stoll’s *Philosophische Unterhaltungen, einige Wahrheiten gegen Zweifel und Ungewißheit in besseres Licht zu setzen, auf Veranlassung Herrn Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft* from 1788 in which the author explicitly criticized the denial of the right of mankind (*das Recht der Menschheit*) of the Native Americans by the Spaniards and the Portuguese. Not much later Stoll even concluded: “*Und jetzt unterdrückt die Geldbegierde der handelnden Nationen das Gefühl der Ehrfurcht, das man der Menschheit schuldig ist; und damit man wenigstens eine Entschuldigung habe, gegen die schrecklichste aller Unmenschlichkeiten, seine Mitbrüder wie das Vieh zu einer ewigen und schaudervollen Sklaverey zu verkaufen, hält man sich an die Farbe, an die Wolle auf dem Kopfe, an die dicken Lippen und an die gequetschten Nasen, und macht sie deshalb zum Vieh.*” [And now the lust for money of the trading nations suppresses the feeling of reverence owed to mankind; and so that one may at least have an excuse against the most terrible of all inhumanities to sell one’s brothers like cattle to an eternal and horrible slavery, one sticks to the color, to the wool on the head, to the thick lips, and to the flattened noses, and therefore makes them into cattle.] (Stoll 1788, pp. 70-71) We do not find such a clear condemnation of slavery in Kant’s work, although contemporaries were explicitly seeking ways *in response to his work*, as is the case with Stoll, to condemn slavery and the treatment of non-white races.

Kant’s Influence

CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS

International Journal of Philosophy

N.º 9, Junio 2019, pp. 154-177

ISSN: 2386-7655

Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.3252913

We have tried to offer some insights into the development of Kant's racism. This expressed itself not simply by way of an explanation of the inferiority of non-white races. Essential to his racism was the *permanence* of racial characteristics. We have tried to show how Kant attempted to ground this belief and what sources he used to support these views. But in order to understand Kant's role within the history of racial thinking, it is also important to take into account what his contemporaries were writing about with regard to these topics. I will focus here on two aspects. Firstly, in response to Tucker's account on the history of racial sight, I want to briefly discuss the appropriation of Kant's concept of race by the German anatomist Ludwig Emil Cichorius. Secondly, I will briefly focus on Christoph Girtanner's work as a way to evaluate the claim that Kant had in his late work second thoughts on a racial hierarchy.

Contrary to Tucker's account on the association of the apprehension of skin color with immediacy and self-evidence, I want to point out that the reception of Kant's racial theory reveals the centrality of race mixing. For instance, in 1801, Cichorius published two articles on the importance of Kant's concept of race. Following Kant and Girtanner, he believed that a racial division should primarily be based on the different skin colors: "*Diese Verschiedenheiten erhalten nicht bloss ihr Characteristisches unter jedem Himmelsstriche, sie arten auch bey jeder Vermischung unausbleiblich an. Und darum kann man auch nur auf sie eine Eintheilung der Menschen in Racen gründen.*" [These differences do not only merely keep their characteristics in all climates, but they also inevitably propagate with every mixing. And this is also why one can only base a division of human in *races* on this.] (Cichorius 1801a, p. 143) Race mixing allegedly proved inevitable inheritance: the mulatto showed a skin color that was midway between those of the parents. Although Cichorius realized that skin color could not ground racial differences among animals, he still relied heavily on the importance of their mixtures: "*Nie wird dem Jungen, das durch Individuen derselben Race entsteht, das Charakteristische mangeln, das die Gestalt seiner Ältern bezeichnet. Und immer wird hier der Bastard das Besondere der Formen jener Racen besitzen, durch deren Vermischung er entsprang.*" [Never will the offspring, created by individuals of the same race, lack the characteristic that characterizes the shape of his ancestors. And here, the hybrid will always have the particularity of the forms of those races that gave rise to him through their mixing.] (Cichorius 1801b, p. 180)

Tucker is thus incorrect when she emphasizes the immediacy of skin color for the interest in the link between the concept of race and skin color. Cichorius knew that it was not the immediacy of this color but race mixing that formed the core of Kant's racial theory. Girtanner already said as much when he formulated "the Kantian principle," i.e., "*das große Naturgesetz, welches der tiefe Denker Kant entdeckt hat, nämlich das Gesetz der halbschlächtigen Zeugung und des unausbleiblichen Anerbens alles dessen, was wirkliche Rassen unterscheidet*" [the great natural law discovered by the deep thinker Kant, namely the law of half-breed procreation and the inevitable inheritance of all that distinguishes real races]. (Girtanner 1796, p. 55) However, the neglect of the importance of race mixing to

Kant's ideas is not new. After briefly discussing Kant's introduction of his concept of race in 1859, the French zoologist Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire complained that race mixing "*a été depuis longtemps effacé de la définition de la race*" [has since long been removed from the definition of race] (Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire 1859, p. 312n). The relevance of Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire's remark cannot be stressed enough. As his colleague Armand de Quatrefages wrote soon afterwards in his *Unité de l'espèce humaine* in a section on race mixing: "*On doit à M. Isidore Geoffroy d'avoir rappelé l'attention des naturalistes et des anthropologistes sur le travail où Kant a exprimé ses idées sur cette question.*" [We owe it to Mr. Isidore Geoffroy for reminding naturalists and anthropologists of the work in which Kant has expressed his ideas on this issue.] (Quatrefages 1861, p. 252n)

Lastly, I want to focus on Kant's influence on Girtanner, for – as I mentioned above – recent interpretations of Kant's racial thinking argue that he radically changed his views on racial hierarchy in his late work. One recurring argument relies on Girtanner's appraisal of Kant's work on races. Interpreters who state that Kant had second thoughts often also claim that Girtanner limited his exposition on natural history to physiological traits. The first to do so was Pauline Kleingeld when she concluded that "Girtanner's Kantianism does not imply his endorsement of Kant's earlier race-related hierarchy of natural incentives and talents" (Kleingeld 2007, p. 590n). Also Allen Wood states that Girtanner's book "proposed to expound Kantian views on natural history but whose treatment of race was devoted mainly to the argument that racial differences are entirely matters of anatomy and physiology and provide no 'moral characterization'" (Wood 2008, p. 10). Alexey Zhavoronkov and Alexey Salinov come to the same conclusion: "Since Girtanner does provide his reader with a neutral description of physical differences between races without touching the subject of morals, we can conclude that the late Kant has abandoned his previous anthropological attempts to establish a connection between the description of natural features of each race and a racial hierarchy based on moral criteria." (Zhavoronkov and Salinov 2018, p. 289). However, these views misrepresent Girtanner's interest in Kant's racial theory.

Before he learned about Kant's ideas of natural history, Girtanner published on a variety of themes from chemistry and medicine, one of them being venereal diseases (Wegelin 1957). He thought that these diseases had reached Europe after the discovery of America. To support this hypothesis, Girtanner mentioned reports about the extremely weak business of procreation (*Zeugungsgeschäft*) of the Native American men. Their lack of a beard was considered a sign of their weak lustfulness. However, their women were supposedly very voluptuous, because of which they threw themselves in the arms of the Europeans who had reached the continent. Girtanner even believed that the New World would not have been conquered if it was not for the voluptuousness of these women. They were willing to sacrifice everything for their desires. In order to attain their goals, they would put "small, venomous insects" on the male genitals that consequently swelled up, which, subsequently, created an insatiable sexual drive. The importance of this lies in the fact that, at this time, Girtanner's degrading view of the Native Americans relied mainly on

de Pauw who had already reported about these venomous insects, the beardless (and thus weak) American men, and their weak sexual drives (Girtanner 1788, pp. 56-57; Pauw 1768, pp. 63-65).

A few years later, Girtanner discovered Kant's work on races. As one of the leading figures for the introduction of Lavoisier's reforms of chemical nomenclature in the German-speaking world, Girtanner obviously showed little interest in Kant's explanations of the causes of different skin colors. But then again, Kant had already realized that most of what he had stated in his exposition on these causes was very speculative: "*Sie sind indessen dazu gut, um allenfalls einem Gegner, der, wenn er gegen den Hauptsatz nichts Tüchtiges einzuwenden weiß, darüber frohlockt, daß das angenommene Princip nicht einmal die Möglichkeit der Phänomene begreiflich machen könne, - sein Hypothesenspiel mit einem gleichen, wenigstens eben so scheinbaren zu vergelten.*" [But they are at least good for addressing an opponent who has no sound objection against the main proposition but triumphs over the fact that the assumed principle cannot even render the phenomena comprehensible – and for repaying *his* play with hypotheses with one that is at least equally plausible.] (AA VIII, p. 104; Kant 2007a, p. 158) His views on these causes were primarily meant to demonstrate the possibility of using teleological principles in the study of nature. Racial differences showed purposiveness in the organic world. Girtanner was especially intrigued by this aspect.

However, we also observed that Kant's view on the Native Americans as an incipient race was related to his understanding of the inferiority of Native Americans. Girtanner did not adopt Kant's wild speculations on fixed air, but he showed little originality when he took over other aspects of Kant's exposition. Many passages from his *Ueber das Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte* in fact contradict the claim that Girtanner did not endorse Kant's so-called moral characterizations. Especially his views on the American Indians are in this regard relevant. He not only took over Kant's ideas on the Mongolian origin of Native Americans and their migration to the New World but also stated that this race (with regard to their capacities and talents) "*sogar noch tiefer unter dem Neger steht*" [ranks still far below even the Negro] (Girtanner 1796, p. 139). De Pauw shaped Girtanner's earlier views of the Native Americans, but Kant deepened Girtanner's disquieting understanding of the inferiority of the Native Americans. His mention of their inferiority was a clear reminder of Kant's racial hierarchy. This observation is especially relevant because Kant praised Girtanner's work on races in his *Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht*. Thus, Zhavoronkov and Salinov raise the wrong question when they rhetorically ask "why Kant refers to Girtanner instead of other sources which do not exclude the moral aspect from the description of different races." Girtanner's appropriation of his so-called moral characterizations of non-white races did not stop Kant from praising Girtanner's work. There is, therefore, also no ground to conclude – as Kleingeld does – that "Girtanner's Kantianism does not imply his endorsement of Kant's earlier race-related hierarchy of natural incentives and talents; so neither does Kant's endorsement of

Girtanner” (Kleingeld 2007, p. 590n). With his recommendation in 1798, Kant also gave his approval of Girtanner’s appropriation of his own racial hierarchy.

Bibliography

- Adickes, E. (1925), *Kant als Naturforscher*, vol. 2, W. de Gruyter, Berlin.
- Anonymous, (1773), “Hollande,” *Supplément pour les Journal politique, ou gazette des gazettes*, no. 42, pp. 57-79.
- Anonymous, (1774), “Nachricht von den Empörungen der Slaven in den holländischen Kolonien, besonders von der letzten, die im Jahr 1772 vorgefallen ist, und der glücklichen Eroberung des Dorfes Misalasi, wo die gefährlichsten Aufrührer ihren Aufenthalt hatten,” *Encyclopädisches Journal*, no. 3, pp. 202-217.
- Bell, J. (1763), *Travels from St. Petersburg in Russia, to Diverse Parts of Asia*, Robert and Andrew Foulis, Glasgow.
- Bernasconi, R. (2002), “Kant as an Unfamiliar Source of Racism,” in J. K. Ward and T. L. Lott (eds.), *Philosophers on Race. Critical Essays*, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, pp. 145-166.
- Bernasconi, R. (2011), “Kant’s Third Thoughts on Race,” in S. Elden and E. Mendieta (eds.), *Reading Kant’s Geography*, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 291-318.
- Bernasconi, R. (2012), “True Colors: Kant’s Distinction Between Nature and Artifice in Context,” in R. Godel and G. Stiening (eds.), *Klopffechterein-Missverständnisse-Widersprüche? Methodische und Methodologische Perspektiven auf die Kant-Forster Kontroverse*, Wilhelm Fink, Paderborn, pp. 191-207.
- Bernasconi, R. (2014), “Heredity and Hybridity in the Natural History of Kant, Girtanner, and Schelling during the 1790s,” in S. Lettow (ed.), *Reproduction, Race, and Gender in Philosophy and the Early Life Sciences*, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 237-258.
- Blumenbach, J. F. (1776), “Verschiedenheit im Menschen-Geschlecht,” *Göttinger Taschen Calender für das Jahr 1776*, no. 1, pp. 72-82.
- Blumenbach, J. F. (1797), *Handbuch der Naturgeschichte*, Johann Christian Dieterich, Göttingen.
- Buffon, G. (1749), *Histoire naturelle générale et particulière, avec la description du Cabinet du Roi*, vol. 3, De l’imprimerie royale, Paris.
- Buffon, G. (1766), *Histoire naturelle générale et particulière, avec la description du Cabinet du Roi*, vol. 14, De l’imprimerie royale, Paris.

- Büsching, A. F. (1773), "Neuigkeiten," *Wöchentliche Nachrichten von neuen Landcharten, geographischen, statistischen und historischen Büchern und Schriften*, no. 1 (9) , pp. 71-72.
- Cavallar, G. (2015), *Kant's Embedded Cosmopolitanism: History, Philosophy and Education for World Citizens*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
- Cichorius, L. E. (1801a), "Ueber die physischen Verschiedenheiten der Menschen und besonders über die in der Gattung dieser existirenden Racen," *Paradoxien: eine Zeitschrift für die Kritik wichtiger Meinungen und Lehrsätze aus allen Fächern der theoretischen und practischen Medicin*, no. 1 (2), pp. 131-174.
- Cichorius, L. E. (1801b), "Einige Bemerkungen über die Racen unter den Thieren," *Paradoxien: eine Zeitschrift für die Kritik wichtiger Meinungen und Lehrsätze aus allen Fächern der theoretischen und practischen Medicin*, no. 1 (2), pp. 175-180.
- Cranz, D. (1765), *Historie von Grönland: enthaltend die Beschreibung des Landes und der Einwohner, insbesondere die Geschichte der dortigen Mission der Evangelischen Brüder zu Neu-Herrnhut und Lichtenfels*, Heinrich Detlev Ebers, Barby.
- Crell, L. F. von (1783), "Ueber den Ursprung der verschiedenen Säuren, aus einem Grundwesen," *Die Neuesten Entdeckungen in der Chemie*, no. 11, pp. 258-262.
- Delaval, E. H. (1765), *A Letter to the Right Honourable the Earl of Morton, President of the Royal Society, Containing Experiments and Observations on the Agreement Between the Specific Gravities of the Several Metals, and Their Colours When United to Glass, as well as Those of Their Other Preparations*, n.p., London.
- Delaval, E. H. (1766), "Versuche und Beobachtungen über die Uebereinstimmung zwischen den specifischen Schwere der verschiedenen Metalle und der derselben Farben, wenn sie mit Glas vereinigt sind," *Neues Bremisches Magazin zur Ausbreitung der Wissenschaften, Kunste und Tugend*, no. 1 (1), pp. 614-616.
- Delaval, E. H. (1788), *Versuche und Bemerkungen über die Ursache der dauerhaften Farben undurchsichtiger Körper*, Friedrich Nicolai, Berlin.
- Fermin, Ph. (1770), *Dissertation sur la question s'il est permis d'avoir en sa possession des esclaves, et de s'en servir comme tels, dans les colonies de l'Amérique*, Jacques Lekens, Maastricht.
- Fermin, Ph. (1775), *Ausführliche historisch-physikalische Beschreibung der Kolonie Surinam*, vol. 1, Joachim Pauli, Berlin.
- Fischer, J. E. (1768), *Sibirische Geschichte von der Entdeckung Sibiriens bis auf die Eroberung dieses Lands durch die Russische Waffen*, vol. 1, Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, St. Petersburg.

- Flikschuh, K. (2017), *What is Orientation in Global Thinking? A Kantian Inquiry*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Fontana, F. (1782), “Lettera al Sig. Adolfo Murray,” *Memorie di matematica e fisica della Società italiana*, no. 1 (2), pp. 655-659.
- Fontana, F. (1785), “Brief an Hrn. Prof. Ad. Murray in Upsala,” *Chemische Annalen; für die Freunde der Naturlehre, Arzneygelahrtheit, Haushaltungskunst und Manufakturen*, no. 8, pp. 145-172.
- Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire, I. (1859), *Histoire naturelle générale des règnes organiques, principalement étudiée chez l’homme et les animaux*, vol. 2, Victor Masson, Paris.
- Gerbi, A. (1973), *The Dispute of the New World. The History of a Polemic, 1750-1900*, University of Pittsburgh Press, London.
- Girtanner, Ch. (1788), *Abhandlung über die venerische Krankheit*, Johann Christian Dieterich, Göttingen.
- Girtanner, Ch. (1796), *Ueber das Kantische Prinzip für die Naturgeschichte: ein Versuch, diese Wissenschaft philosophisch zu behandeln*, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen.
- Gmelin, J. G. (1748), *Leben Georg Wilhelm Stellers, gewesnen Adiuncti der Kayserl. Academie der Wissenschaften zu St. Petersburg: worinnen Nachrichten von deselben Reisen, Entdeckungen, und Tode*, n.p., Frankfurt.
- Hawkesworth, J. (1773). *An Account of the Voyages Undertaken by the Order of His Present Majesty for Making Discoveries in the Southern Hemisphere, and Successively Performed by Commodore Byron, Captain Wallis, Captain Carteret, and Captain Cook, in the Dolphin, the Swallow, and the Endeavour*; vol. 2, W. Strahan and T. Cadell, London.
- Hawkesworth, J. (1774). *Geschichte der See-Reisen und Entdeckungen im Süd- Meer welche auf Befehl Sr. Großbritannischen Majestät unternommen, und von Commodore Byron, Capitain Carteret, Capitain Wallis und Capitain Coock in Dolphin, der Swallow, und der Endeavour nach einander ausgeführet worden sind*, vol. 2, A. Haude and J.C. Spener, Berlin.
- Home, H. (1774), *Sketches of the History of Man*, vol. 2, W. Creech, W. Strahan, and T. Cadell, Edinburgh.
- Huneman, Ph. (2005), “Espèce et adaption chez Kant et Buffon,” in J. Ferrari, M. Ruffing, R. Theis, M. Vollet (eds.) *Kant et la France – Kant und Frankreich*, Georg Olms, Mildesheim, pp. 107-120.

- Ingenhousz, J. (1779), *Experiments upon Vegetables: Discovering their Great Power of Purifying the Common Air in the Sun-Shine, and of Injuring It in the Shade and at Night*, P. Elmsly and H. Payne, London.
- Kant, I. (1775), *Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen, zur Ankündigung der Vorlesung der physischen Geographie in Sommerhalbenjahre 1775*, G.L. Hartung, Königsberg.
- Kant, I. (1777), “Von den verschiedenen Racen der Menschen,” in J. J. Engel (ed.), *Der Philosoph für die Welt*, vol. 2, Dyckische Buchhandlung, Leipzig, pp. 125-164.
- Kant, I. (2007a), “Determination of the Concept of a Human Race,” in G. Zöllner and R. B. Loudon (eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education*, trans. H. Wilson and G. Zöllner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 145-159.
- Kant, I. (2007b), “On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy,” in G. Zöllner and R. B. Loudon (eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education*, trans. G. Zöllner, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 195-218.
- Kant, I. (2007c), “Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View,” in G. Zöllner and R. B. Loudon (eds.), *Anthropology, History, and Education*, trans. R. B. Loudon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 231-429.
- Kant, I. (2013a), “Of the Different Human Races. An Announcement of Lectures in Physical Geography in the Summer Semester 1775,” in J. M. Mikkelsen (ed.), *Kant and the Concept of Race*, trans. J. M. Mikkelsen, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 41-54.
- Kant, I. (2013b), “Of the Different Human Races (1777),” in J. M. Mikkelsen (ed.), *Kant and the Concept of Race*, trans. J. M. Mikkelsen, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 55-7.
- Kleingeld, P. (2007), “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Race,” *The Philosophical Quarterly*, no. 57(229), pp. 573-592.
- Kleingeld, P. (2014), “Kant’s Second Thoughts on Colonialism,” in K. Flikschuh and L. Ypi (eds.), *Kant and Colonialism: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 43-67.
- Landriani, M. (1781), *Opuscoli fisico-chimici*, G. Pirola, Milan.
- La Peyrère, I. (1655). *Praeadamitae, sive Exercitatio super Versibus duodecimo, decimotertio et decimoquarto, capituli quinti Epistolae D. Pauli ad Romanos, quibus inducuntur primi homines ante Adamum conditi*, n.p., Amsterdam.
- Lavoisier, A. L. (1775), “Sur la nature du principe qui se combine avec les Métaux pendant leur calcination, & qui en augmente le poids,” *Observations sur la physique sur*

- l'histoire naturelle et sur les arts, avec des planches en taille-douce*, no. 5, pp. 429-433.
- Lemery, L. (1706), "Que les plantes contiennent réellement du fer, & que ce métal entre nécessairement dans leur composition naturelle," *Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences*, pp. 411-417.
- Lemery, N. (1713), "Examen de la manière dont le Fer opère sur les liqueurs de notre corps, et dont il doit être préparé pour servir utilement dans la Pratique de la Médecine," *Mémoires de l'Académie royale des sciences*, pp. 31-44.
- Lenoir, T. (1980), "Kant, Blumenbach, and Vital Materialism in German Biology," *Isis*, no. 71 (256), pp. 77-108.
- McFarland, J. D. (1970), *Kant's Concept of Teleology*, University of Edinburgh Press, Edinburgh.
- Müller, G. F. (1758), *Sammlung Rußischer Geschichte*, vol. 3, Kayserliche Academie der Wissenschaften, St. Petersburg.
- Pallas, P. S. (1771), *Reise durch verschiedene Provinzen des Rußischen Reichs*, vol. 1, Kayserliche Academi der Wissenschaften, St. Petersburg.
- Pallas, P. S. (1776), *Sammlungen historischer Nachrichten über die mongolischen Völkerschaften*, vol. 1, Kayserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, St. Petersburg.
- Pauw, C. de (1768), *Recherches philosophiques sur les Américains, ou Mémoires intéressants pour servir à l'Histoire de l'Espèce Humaine*, vol. 1, George Jacques Decker, Berlin.
- Priestley, J. (1772), *Observations on Different Kinds of Air*, W. Bowyer and J. Nichols, London.
- Priestley, J. (1775), *Experiments and Observations on Different Kinds of Air*, vol. 2, J. Johnson, London.
- Sloan, Ph. (1979), "Buffon, German Biology, and the Historical Interpretation of Biological Species," *The British Journal for the History of Science*, no. 12 (41), pp. 109-153.
- Starke, F. Ch. (1833), *Immanuel Kant's vorzügliche kleine Schriften und Aufsätze*, vol. 2, Die Expedition des europäischen Aufsehers, Leipzig.
- Steller, G. W. (1774), *Beschreibung von dem Lande Kamtschatka: dessen Einwohnern, deren Sitten, Nahmen, Lebensart und verschiedenen Gewohnheiten*, Johann Georg Fleischer, Frankfurt.

- Stoll, J. G. (1788), *Philosophische Unterhaltungen, einige Wahrheiten gegen Zweifel und Ungewißheit in besseres Licht zu setzen, auf Veranlassung Herrn Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Johann Gottlob Sommer, Leipzig.
- Tavernier, J.-B. (1676), *Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, écuyer baron d'Aubonne, qu'il a fait en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes*, vol. 1, Gervais Clouzier and Claude Barbin, Paris.
- Tucker, I. (2012), *The Moment of Racial Sight: A History*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Quatrefages, A. de (1861), *Unité de l'espèce humaine*, L. Hachette et Cie, Paris.
- Querner, H. (1990), "Christoph Girtanner und die Anwendung des Kantischen Prinzips in der Bestimmung des Menschen," in G. Mann and F. Dumont (eds.). *Die Natur des Menschen: Probleme der Physischen Anthropologie und Rassenkunde (1750-1850)*, G. Fischer, Stuttgart, pp. 123-136.
- Ulloa, A. de (1772), *Noticias americanas: entretenimientos phisico-historicos sobre la América meridional, y la septentrional oriental*, Don Francisco Manuel de Mena, Madrid.
- Venegas, M. (1757), *Noticia de la California, y de su conquista temporal, y espiritual hasta el tiempo presente*, Viuda de M. Fernández, Madrid.
- Wegelin, C. (1957), 'Dr. med. Christoph Girtanner (1760-1800),' *Gesnerus: Swiss Journal of the History of Medicine and Sciences*, no. 14 (3-4), pp. 141-168
- Winckelmann, J. J. (1764), *Geschichte der Kunst des Altherthums*, vol. 1, Waltherische Hof-Buchhandlung, Dresden.
- Wood, A. W. (2008), *Kantian Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Zammito, J. H. (1992), *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago.
- Zammito, J. H. (2003), "The Inscrutable *Principle* of an Original *Organization*': Epigenesis and 'Looseness of Fit' in Kant's Philosophy of Science," *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science*, no. 34, pp. 73-109.
- Zammito, J. H. (2006), "Policing Polygeneticism in Germany, 1775: (Kames,) Kant, and Blumenbach," in S. Eigen and M. Larrimore (eds.), *The German Invention of Race*, SUNY Press, New York, pp. 35-54.
- Zantop, S. (1997), *Colonial Fantasies: Conquest, Family, and Nation in Precolonial Germany (1770-1870)*, Duke University Press, Durham.

Zhavoronkov, A. and A. Salinov. (2018), “The Concept of Race in Kant’s Lectures on Anthropology,” *Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy*, no. 7, pp. 275-292.

Zimmermann, E. A. W. (1778), *Geographische Geschichte des Menschen und der allgemein verbreiteten vierfüssigen Thiere*, vol. 1, Weygandsche Buchhandlung, Leipzig.



**Philosophical Grounding For the Moral Law: In Defense of
Kant's *Factum der Vernunft* (Fact of Reason)**

***Fundamentos Filosóficos de la Ley Moral: En Defensa del
Factum der Vernunft de Kant (Hecho de la razón)***

DANIEL PAUL DAL MONTE*

Temple University, United States of America

Abstract

In this paper, I first explain Slavoj Žižek's analysis of the grounds of Kant's categorical imperative. I show how Žižek considered the grounds of the categorical imperative to be an example of irrationalism that ran counter to the spirit of the Enlightenment, of which Kant was, ironically, a major proponent. The irrationalism in Kant's moral law makes him vulnerable to moral skepticism. I go on to counter this interpretation by drawing from Kant's practical philosophy. I counter the moral skeptic by arguing from moral phenomenology to the existence of a reason that is independent of empirical motivations and so objectively determining. Whatever is objectively determining logically supersedes that which is based on a particular context. The moral law is rooted in the ontology of an independent faculty of reason capable of issuing a universal law. The union of ontology and ethics means that the categorical imperative is not irrational.

Keywords

Žižek, Kant, fact of reason, moral skepticism

Resumen

En este documento, primero explico el análisis de Slavoj Žižek sobre los fundamentos del imperativo categórico de Kant. Muestro cómo Žižek consideraba que los fundamentos del imperativo categórico eran un ejemplo de irracionalismo que iba en contra del espíritu de la

* Doctoral candidate at Temple University, USA. Email for contact: tuf42914@temple.edu

Ilustración, del cual Kant era, irónicamente, un defensor importante. El irracionalismo en la ley moral de Kant lo hace vulnerable al escepticismo moral. Continúo para contrarrestar esta interpretación basándose en la filosofía práctica de Kant. Contrario al escéptico moral argumentando desde la fenomenología moral hasta la existencia de una razón que es independiente de las motivaciones empíricas y que es tan objetivamente determinante. Lo que sea que esté determinando objetivamente, lógicamente, reemplaza lo que se basa en un contexto particular. La ley moral está arraigada en la ontología de una facultad de la razón independiente capaz de emitir una ley universal. La unión de ontología y ética significa que el imperativo categórico no es irracional.

Palabras Claves

Žižek, Kant, hecho de la razón, escepticismo moral.

I. Introduction

Slajov Žižek's work, "The Sublime Object of Ideology," is a major philosophical work emerging from the Slovenian Lacanian school (Laclau 1989, p. ix-xi). Though obviously informed by the work of Lacan, Žižek refers broadly to a host of thinkers, including Immanuel Kant (Laclau 1989, p. xii). In this paper, I will focus specifically on Žižek's analysis of Kant's categorical imperative. The categorical imperative is, for Kant, the fundamental moral law that is universally applicable (*KpV* 5:31). Žižek seems to align himself with other very reputable commentators on Kant by affirming the view that there are no philosophical grounds for the categorical imperative. It is simply dogmatically asserted. Kant tells us that the moral law is a *fact of reason* (*KpV* 5:31, 5:47). The only response, therefore, that Kant has to the challenge of a moral skeptic, who would question whether the moral law is more than a mere fiction, is to simply restate that the moral law is a fact of reason. Next, I will refer to the work of two Kant scholars, Karl Ameriks and Allen Wood, who agree that Kant's notion that the fundamental moral law is a fact of reason amounts to mere dogmatism, lacking in philosophical development. I will then develop my own account of how the fundamental moral law in Kant actually does have a philosophical basis—i.e. it is more than just a dogmatic claim.

II. Grounds for the Categorical Imperative in Žižek

In this section, I will explain in more detail how Žižek understands the epistemic grounding of the categorical imperative. In his analysis of Kant's categorical imperative, Žižek focuses on the fact the categorical imperative is a sort of brute fact of moral philosophy. The categorical imperative has unconditional authority. Its authority is therefore intrinsic to it, and not dependent on something else.

Kant has grand ambitions for his moral philosophy. He seeks not merely provisional rules of prudence, applicable only in certain contexts, or a relativistic acquiescence to the presence of a plurality of conflicting moral views. Instead, Kant seeks

a practical law that has universal application. The existence of practical law, that does not permit exceptions, presupposes something that is valuable in itself. The practical law has to be an implication, in other words, of something the value of which is absolute, and so does not vary according to context. That which has absolute value, for Kant, is rational nature. The fact that rational nature has absolute value means that one can never treat it as a means. To treat rational nature as a means would be to violate its absolute value—one would, in this case, be treating rational nature as a mere tool to obtain something that is valued more highly. So, the implication of the absolute value of one's rational nature is the practical law that one can never treat rational nature as a means. In the formulation of this practical law, Kant conflates rational nature with humanity, since a rational nature is an essential and uniquely differentiating feature of humanity:

So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means. (*GMS* 4:428-429)

The fact that Kant deals in absolutes in his formulation of the moral law—a formulation which presupposes the existence of *absolute* value, and issues in a practical law that does not permit exception—is what drives Žižek's to make the accusation of dogmatism. Žižek describes Kant's moral philosophy as formalistic. Seeing as the moral law is based on that which has absolute value—i.e. rational nature—the moral law's power to compel is intrinsic to it. The intrinsic, unconditional worth of rational nature leads to the stipulation that we are to always respect rational nature as an end, and never use it as a means to some other end. We are to follow this practical law regardless of our circumstances, and regardless of the outcome of following it. To try to argue for exceptions, and to make obedience to the practical law conditional on some other factor, would be to deny the absolute foundations on which the practical law is built. This is, then, what Žižek means by formalism: it is the form of the law that compels obedience, not some possible outcome of obedience to the law. We are to follow the practical law *because it is the law* (Žižek 1989, p. 80). In other words, Kantian formalism consists in a stark dualism between the moral law and associated incentives that might lead us to behave in accordance with the moral law. The absolute authority of the moral law gives it an intrinsic power, and so forces one to disregard extrinsic incentives, which are only contingently associated with following the moral law.

The formalism of Kant's moral philosophy, according to Žižek, is essential to its irrationality. Absolute value, and unexceptionable practical laws, do not permit derivation from higher principles. If that which is alleged to have absolute value in fact derives its value from something else, it does not really have absolute value. Similarly, if a practical law alleged to be unexceptionable is derived from another law, it actually is *exceptionable* insofar as it would not have universality were it not for the existence of the law from which it is derived. Kant's practical law is built in such a way that, at some point, we have to identify certain principles as axiomatic. These principles are true, that is, *because they are*

true. To attempt to derive them from other principles would be to compromise the absoluteness that Kant seeks in his formulation of the moral law.

Žižek sees this strategy of grounding one's moral philosophy in brute absolute facts as a form of irrationalism. He writes that the

categorical imperative is precisely a Law which has a necessary, unconditional authority, *without being true*: it is—in Kant's own words—a kind of 'transcendental fact,' a given fact the truth of which cannot be theoretically demonstrated; but its unconditional validity should nonetheless be presupposed for our moral activity to have any sense. (Žižek 1989, 81)

Kant, the way Žižek interprets him, ends up in irrational formalism in virtue of the methodology by which he tries to arrive at universal moral principles. I have already noted that a universal moral principle cannot follow from that which has only conditional worth. Objects of desire, for example, have conditional worth, since their worth is dependent on the presence of the desire for them. However, it is precisely in virtue of appeals to things of conditional worth that Kant's moral philosophy can escape its irrational formalism. One might justify obedience to the practical law by pointing to some desirable end one might obtain by obedience. For instance, one might argue that one should obey the moral law because it will improve one's reputation. But, reputation is an object of conditional worth. If there is no one present to desire a good reputation, it has no value. Reputation, at least, is not something to which we can assign an intrinsic positive value. A good reputation may, in fact, be morally suspect, insofar as person with ill-intentions may cultivate a good reputation in order to escape scrutiny. A good reputation is an object of conditional worth just like intelligence, or personal charm, which may be abused by someone with a malign will (*GMS* 4:393). Since goods like reputation and intelligence have only conditional worth, the only way to reach that which has unconditional value is to take the will in isolation from any objects it may have, which only have conditional worth. It is the will in isolation from any conditionally valuable objects, and therefore obedient to the law *for its own sake*, that is the only proper location for unconditional value (*GMS* 4:394). The problem for a thinker like Žižek, though, is that demanding obedience to the law for its own sake, in order to secure some vaunted unconditional status, precludes any chance of justifying such obedience, and so amounts to a form of irrationalism.

Justification of obedience, which would consist in an appeal to some object of conditional worth, would undermine the universality of the moral law. Another way of putting this is that only an *a priori* law can be universal—a priori means independent of any experience. Experience consists in objects that have conditional worth, since whatever is in experience are contingent sets of particular circumstances.

A universal moral law, then, has to reject any sort of justification by appeal to particular circumstances in order to remain universal. By dispensing with such justification, though, the moral law is merely axiomatic, a fundamental first premise of practical reasoning that is simply assumed as true. This accounts for Žižek's interpretation

of the Kantian moral law as truth-less and nonsensical (Žižek 1989, p. 81). Indeed, Kant himself speaks in ways that lend some credence to Žižek's interpretation. Kant describes the moral law as a "fact of reason." One does not have to justify or defend what is obviously and simply a fact. Kant writes,

Consciousness of this fundamental law may be called a fact of reason because one cannot reason it out from antecedent data of reason...and because it instead forces itself upon us of itself as a synthetic a priori proposition that is not based on any intuition..." (GMS 5:31)

Ultimately, an objection to the claim that there is an axiomatic moral law, that dispenses with any justificatory data, is that the claim is vulnerable to moral skepticism. What is to stop someone from denying another person's perception of what the axiomatic moral law is? This perception is put forth as axiomatic and so groundless. If there are differing perceptions with respect to the nature of the axiomatic moral law, they can only end in permanent impasse. Without grounds, there can be no adjudication.

Žižek's questions about the grounding of the categorical imperative, which lead to worries about moral skepticism, are echoed and even more precisely framed in Lewis White Beck's 1960 essay, "Das Faktum Der Vernunft: Zur Rechtfertigungsproblematik In Der Ethik." In this essay, Beck distinguishes between internal and external forms of justification. Internal forms of justification draw upon the resources internal to a certain conceptual space. For instance, one may be confronted with the ethical question of whether or not one should tell the truth. This question can be adjudicated according to some foundational moral principle that is internal to the conceptual space of ethical questions. For instance, one might appeal to a principle of utility, that mandates seeking the greatest good for the greatest number, to resolve the question of whether or not one should tell the truth. In the case of Kant, of course, one would appeal to the categorical imperative to resolve this question, since the categorical imperative serves as the supreme moral dictate in light of which all particular maxims ought to be evaluated. These foundational ethical principles are internal to the universe of discourse involving particular ethical questions. Beck points out, however, that a problem of justification arises in ethics when we ask for justification of foundational ethical principles like the categorical imperative. It may be the case that we should tell the truth because of the categorical imperative, but we may still ask for justification for obedience to the categorical imperative itself. In seeking justification of the categorical imperative, we venture outside of the conceptual space of moral questions, towards the very grounding of this conceptual space. We cannot ground the categorical imperative in some fact, because it seems as though we can never derive an evaluative principle from a mere fact. It seems impossible, that is, to identify an entailment relationship between what is the case and what should be the case. If we appeal to an even higher evaluative principle to justify the categorical imperative, then we have to seek some external justification for this higher principle as well. Žižek and Beck, then, note a similar problem related to the seeming groundlessness of the categorical imperative in Kant. If we are to obey the categorical imperatives with entirely pure motives, because it is our duty to

do so, then it seems our obedience is groundless, because there can be nothing external to the categorical imperative that justifies it.

III. Agreement with Other Interpretations of Kant

In this section, I will show how Žižek's interpretation of Kant's moral law is far from singular in contemporary Kantian scholarship. Karl Ameriks, for instance, states, of Kant, that there are only some technical oddities that prevent it from being an intuitionistic system (Ameriks 1982, p. 218). Intuitionism about the moral law consists in both a metaphysical and an epistemological thesis. The metaphysical thesis is that there are evaluative properties, indicating the goodness or badness of a state of affairs, that are not reducible to naturalistic properties. These properties are also objective, attaching to the object and so independent of any subjective feelings. The epistemological thesis of intuitionism is that we are able to have direct perception of these evaluative properties, even though we cannot access them through any of our five senses, since they are not naturalistic. So, we do not need empirical calculations—e.g. calculation of pleasure—to identify evaluative properties (Huemer 2005, p. 6). Ameriks describes Kant's moral philosophy as embracing a

non-naturalistic ultimacy that is found explicitly and typically in intuitionistic systems. (Ameriks 1982, 218)

These non-naturalistic facts are ultimate insofar as rightness and wrongness just characterize an act as properties of it—it is not the case that we consider the acts to be right or wrong via a reasoning process, and/or through appeal to sources of evidence independent of the act. Instead, we perceive the evaluative property as attaching to the act *directly*. Also, it is important to note that, in intuitionism, the property of rightness or wrongness has to be non-natural. How could rightness or wrongness characterize an act as an empirical property? Rightness or wrongness are qualities that are not—at least not obviously—measurable, quantifiable, or even identifiable with some observable property.

Seeing as moral intuitionism dispenses with empirical evidence and even reasoning in establishing moral principles, it is vulnerable to the charge of dogmatism. The only argument for moral principles in moral intuitionism is the discernment of them, a process which is mysterious, since moral properties are non-empirical.

There is an agreement of sorts, then, between the interpretation of Žižek and that of Ameriks. Both see the fact of reason in Kant as just having unconditional authority—the unconditional authority does not have grounds in empirical data or reasoning (*KpV* 5:47).

Allen Wood, another respected Kant scholar, also is critical of Kant's proposal that the moral law is a fact of reason. Wood also thinks that the doctrine of the fact of reason lacks a sufficient answer to the moral skeptic. A moral skeptic might deny the authority of the moral law. There may be a moral law present to consciousness, but perhaps it is a mere delusion, an error that prevents us from behaving freely. Seeing as the moral law is just a

fact of reason, and cannot be proved by any deduction, there is no answer to the moral skeptic. The only possible response is “moralistic bluster”—that is, the dogmatic insistence that the moral law is a fact (Wood 2008, p. 135).

In the following section, I will defend Kant’s doctrine of the fact of reason against these charges of dogmatism.

IV. Grounds for the Categorical Imperative

In this section, I will reveal a method in Kant’s practical philosophy for grounding the moral law that differs from the mere dogmatic assertion one finds in the interpretations of Žižek, Ameriks, and Wood. The method begins with a distinction between empirical and formal motivations.¹ Empirical motivations are driven by contextual factors in a particular situation. Formal motivations, on the other hand, are independent of any contextual factors in a particular situation. One acts on a formal motivation when one acts out of obedience to a moral rule that has universal applicability. Since the moral rule has universal applicability, it cannot include in its formulation any particular contextual factors. So, for example, one may remain placid in traffic because one should always treat other people the way one would wish to be treated, and not because of a specific advantage one might obtain through remaining placid (*KpV* 5:27).

Kant is firm that moral laws can only be formal motivations. Empirical motivations cannot ground moral laws because they have to do only with particular situations. Even a law to the effect that one should always pursue one’s own happiness fails to establish itself as a law of universal applicability. One’s own happiness is grounded in one’s particular context. Far from establishing a universal moral law, grounding a principle on individual pursuit of happiness would lead to chaotic fragmentation. Since each individual’s happiness is differentiated according to subjective factors peculiar to him or her, making happiness central to a practical principle would lead to infinite variation according to the particular situation of each individual. Speaking of a practical law based on happiness, Kant writes,

For then the will of all has not one and the same object but each has his own (his own welfare), which can indeed happen to accord with the purposes of others who are likewise pursuing their own but which is far from sufficing for a law because the exceptions that one is warranted in making upon occasion are endless and cannot be determinately embraced in a universal rule. (*GMS* 5:28)

Real lawfulness, therefore, does not permit any admixture of empirical motivations. Empirical motivations inevitably introduce particular contextual factors that compromise

¹ I am using the word ‘formal’ here in the same sense as I used it when I described how Žižek criticized Kant’s moral philosophy as formalistic. Someone with a formal motivation to adhere to one’s duty so adheres only because it is one’s duty. Formal motivations do not include factors in one’s situation that may incentivize one’s adherence to duty.

the universality of the moral law. Formal motivations, on the other hand, *can* ground a universal moral law, since formal motivations are independent of empirical factors.

It is notable, at this point, that Kant and Žižek have opposite views on the relationship between formalism and justification. For Kant, it is only by appealing to formal motivations, entirely grounded in reason, that one can justify a moral law. For Žižek, though, formalism undermines justification. Formalism requires an obedience to the law because it is the law. Formalism cannot permit any appeal to empirical benefits that might accrue from following the law. But, formalism for Kant is actually a bulwark against moral skepticism, or at least a weak relativism. It is an insistence on formal motivations that functions to save a moral law from being distorted and fragmented according to subjective peculiarities of different individuals. If, for instance, we are to be moral because it makes us happy, morality becomes subject to the different possible definitions of happiness that vary by individual.

Thought experiments show that, in the midst of empirical motivations, there are also motivations that are purely formal and rational. Kant asks us to imagine someone who has been asked by a prince to provide false testimony against a good man, or face death by hanging. This individual, Kant argues, would admit that it is possible for him to refuse to provide false testimony, even if it meant he would end up dead (*KpV* 5:30). This thought experiment provides evidence of a rational principle that has the power to motivate—a purely formal principle that contains no admixture of empirical factors. The individual in the thought experiment feels called to tell the truth *because he ought to*, and not because of any gain he might accrue. Kant's reasoning is that all empirical motivations push one towards providing the false testimony. Even so, all would acknowledge that there is a powerful motivation to tell the truth. Since this motivation flies in the face of one's empirical motivations—telling the truth could only lead to death—it must be purely formal (*KpV* 5:30).

The only way to account for this phenomenon, according to Kant, is by assuming that there is a rational principle at the basis of our behavior that is independent of all empirical motivations. In other words, we are to assume that there is *pure practical reason*, i.e. practical reason which has an aspect that is independent of experience, and so independent of the arena of empirical motivations.

For, pure reason, *practical of itself*, is here immediately lawgiving. (*GMS* 5:31)

Pure practical reason is able to issue an imperative to the individual in the thought experiment that is compelling independently of any empirical objectives that individual might obtain.

The idea that such a rational principle, which is the source of an unconditional imperative that transcends all empirical factors, exists, is consistent with Kant's transcendental idealism. Kant's transcendental idealism divides the human person into two aspects: an empirical aspect, which figures in experience, and an intelligible aspect, which cannot figure in experience. The fact that we cognize the human person through structures

of consciousness that we bring to cognition means that there is an aspect of it, i.e. the intelligible aspect, that is unavailable to our cognition. We can never know what the human person is in itself, apart from the structures of consciousness, because we can only experience through these structures of consciousness. Transcendental idealism, with its distinction between the intelligible and empirical aspects of the person, nicely frames the moral phenomenology in which there is a rational principle that is independent of any empirical motivation. The rational principle is able to be independent of empirical motivations, which figure in our experience, because it is part of a layer of reality that is permanently independent of our experience, in which empirical motivations exclusively figure (*GMS* 4:452).

All maxims—i.e. principles upon which we act in a particular situation—therefore must come under examination from this independent rational principle. Individual maxims mediate between empirical factors in particular situations and the rational principle that is independent of all empirical factors and so serves as the “supreme maxim” (*GMS* 5:31).

There is a logic, therefore, to which the consideration of individual maxims is subject that will make it clear why accusations against Kant of dogmatism are not fair. The logic has to do again with the distinction between formal and empirical motivations. For a maxim to be truly formal, it must be a law for all rational beings, and so serve as the supreme maxim. Having abstracted from all empirical motivations, one is dealing with reason in its pure state. If a maxim truly is rooted in reason in its pure state, then there is no reason why the maxim is not applicable to all other rational beings. It is the inclusion of empirical motivations that make a maxim peculiarly applicable to only one individual, or a group of individuals. The rational or formal motivations of one’s behavior, then, have a corollary call to objectivity and universality. If a maxim is not objectively applicable—i.e. it applies regardless of the empirical circumstances in which one finds oneself—then it is not really rationally motivated. A maxim that is not objectively/universally applicable must be compromised in some way by the admixture of some empirical, non-rational, motivation.

Empirically-based maxims are, in fact, logically incoherent in so far as they are not generalizable. The inclusion of some empirical objectives makes empirically-based maxims perspective-dependent in their validity. For instance, if the individual in the thought experiment provides false testimony, he would escape with his life. However, the reputation of an honorable man would be ruined. If one were to think of the situation from the perspective of the honorable man, one would demand honest, not false, testimony. By rooting one’s maxims in particular empirical circumstances, one ends up in logical incoherence that involves an ambiguous application depending on perspective.

On the other hand, by rooting a maxim in reason, independently of any empirical circumstance, one develops a maxim that has objective applicability. Telling the truth, in the situation involving the honorable man and the prince, is one’s duty because it is consistent with what can be universally affirmed. A purely formal law, rooted in reason, is a universal law and the supreme maxim because by definition it is independent of any

particular empirical circumstances. Empirical motivations cannot be the basis of establishing one's duty, since empirical motivations arise only from particular contexts. Any maxims arising from particular contexts cannot be shared by those not in those particular contexts.

So, from the experience of situations in which we are aware of a motivation that is purely rational and so independent of any empirical circumstances, and the fact that any purely rational/formal maxim is objectively applicable, we can formulate a fundamental moral law. This moral law is fundamental insofar as it applies to any situation which involves a rational agent.

So act that the maxim of your will could always hold at the same time as a principle in the giving of a universal law. (*GMS* 5:30)

There is a rational motivation, then, at the basis of our behavior that is call to universalizability. This is the categorical imperative—a call to be motivated by an objectively applicable rule. The categorical imperative is purely formal, insofar as it does not depend on any empirical motivations, peculiar to specific circumstances. The categorical imperative, in fact, represents the fulfillment of any purely formal motivation. The categorical imperative represents the *logical entailment of any formal motivation*. To be truly formal, a maxim has to be universal, since a formal maxim has to abstract from any empirical considerations that variously characterize different individuals. The categorical imperative is therefore the logical entailment of the pure practical reason of the human person, which it has in virtue of an intelligible aspect that is independent of any empirical circumstances. The categorical imperative is the demand of pure practical reason to fulfill its purity, so to speak, in the sense that it issues an injunction that transcends all empirical contextual factors.

The fact that pure practical reason is by nature capable of issuing universally applicable moral dictates gives it a special moral status. Accordingly, the law that we are to act only on maxims that are universalizable can be reformulated in the form of a ban on treating any rational being as a means, and not as an end (*GMS* 4:428). In other words, we are not to exploit another person for an objective of ours, but instead treat the welfare of the person as itself an intrinsically worthy objective. The rational nature is of absolute worth. That which is a mere object of desire has only conditional worth, since it lacks the worth once the desire is gone. The distinction between empirical and formal motivations undergirds the conditionality of the worth of objects of desire and the absolute worth of rational nature. Objects of desire figure in empirical motivations. Objects of desire cannot figure in formal motivations which abstract from all empirical content. Since it is one's rational nature that can impart value absolutely—it alone has the power to generate universal rules that apply independently of any empirical circumstances—one cannot treat it as a means. To treat a rational nature as a means is to subordinate to an object of desire, which can only have conditional worth, that which alone can generate absolute worth. To use, for example, a human being as a slave is to subordinate his or her rational nature for

the sake of some object of desire—i.e. money—which only has conditional worth (*GMS* 4:428).

Again, in the second formulation of the categorical imperative, the imperative is not dogmatically issued but has a logical basis that is in accord with a distinctive ontology of the person. Rational nature, which transcendental idealism tells us is independent of the empirical aspect of the person, is the only possible source of unconditional worth. It alone can issue rules that transcend any empirical factors peculiar to an individual. We therefore cannot subordinate rational nature, which is the source of an unconditional value, to some empirical objective, which only has conditional worth. The upshot of my analysis is that there is a marriage of ontology and ethics that grounds the fact of reason, and redeems it from the accusations of circular arbitrariness with which Žižek, and other commentators, smear it. It is the rational nature of the person which issues an objectively valid principle that transcends empirical motives and external pressures that affect the person. The rational nature is able to issue such a principle because it is independent of these empirical objectives and the causal network that unites empirical motivations and forces. To treat a human being, i.e. a rational being, as a means to some empirical objective, therefore, is to subordinate something of absolute worth to what only can have conditional worth. It is also to surrender the privileged independence from empirical motives which is unique to the rational nature of human beings. Surrendering to empirical motives means surrendering rational agency itself. It is the nature, therefore, of rational agency (an ontological position) that makes it wrong to treat it as a means (an ethical position).²

At this point, a distinction can be established between Žižek's interpretation of the categorical imperative, and the interpretation I have developed. In Žižek's interpretation of the categorical imperative, it has an unconditional authority that is nevertheless nonsensical. This authority is nonsensical because the categorical imperative is purely formal. What Žižek means by formalism is that the only motive for obedience to the categorical imperative is the categorical imperative itself. There is no justification for following the categorical imperative other than an empty circular one.

The moral Law is obscene in so far as it is its form itself which functions as a motivating force driving us to obey its command—that is, in so far as we obey moral Law because it is law...(Žižek 1989, 81).

The categorical imperative, for Žižek and commentators like Ameriks and Wood, is understood in an intuitionist manner. It is based in a property of acts, that is merely perceived through some mysterious non-sensible mode of perception. Evaluative properties are not justified, but simply happen to characterize certain acts.

² See Dieter Heinrich's piece, "Der Begriffe der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft," for more on the relationship between ontology and ethics. Heinrich traces the relationship between these subdisciplines of philosophy back to the ancient Greeks. Dieter Heinrich, "Der Begriffe der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft," in *Kant: Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln*, ed. G. Prauss, (Köln: Kiepenhauer and Witsch, 1973): 223-256.

In my interpretation, though, of the Kantian moral law, its grounds are not merely circular and dogmatic, and we can account for it in a more sophisticated way than the seemingly arbitrary attribution of intuitionistic evaluative properties. The argument that concludes with the moral law begins with a fact of moral psychology, namely, that we experience a principle in our moral decisions that is independent of any empirical factors. The way to account for this call that is independent of any empirical motivations is to posit an independent reason, i.e. *pure* practical reason. The independent reason is principled. The empirical circumstances in which one finds oneself do not sway that which reason affirms. It is of the essence of pure practical reason, in fact, not to take directions from empirical circumstances that are independent of it, and which moreover are non-rational (e.g. a mere impulse is non-rational). Instead, reason must be the author of its own judgments, otherwise it would be subject to the shifting pressures of empirical circumstances that would lead it to contradiction and so to violate its nature (*GMS* 4:448).

At the fundamental level of our moral experience, then, is a rational nature that generates universal principles. Again, these principles are not answerable to the shifting empirical circumstances in which one may happen to find oneself. Abstracting, then, from all empirical circumstances leaves us with this *call for consistency*. The categorical imperative is a call for consistency. It has no empirical content. The categorical imperative does not recommend any concrete objective—it is not a call for universal happiness, pleasure, avoidance of harm, etc. It merely mandates that one's maxims be universalizable. Since one's rational nature can rise above any change in one's empirical circumstances, such that it upholds duty even if all empirical motivations go against it, one's rational nature has to have built into it a mandate for consistency. Otherwise, one's rational nature would shift according to changing empirical circumstances. The call for consistency that is the categorical imperative is the very extension of reason's non-empirical nature.

In sum, there is an argument for the fact of reason, i.e. the moral law, that takes the form of an inference to the best explanation. We are aware of a call to behave in ways that are wholly independent of empirical circumstances. We can assume, therefore, to account for this call of conscience, an independent, principled reason.³ Reason has to be principled, otherwise it would sway according to empirical circumstances. Having abstracted all empirical circumstances, there must be, as part of the nature of reason, a mandate for universalizability. Universalizability is a corollary of abstraction from empirical circumstance. If I am abstracting from empirical circumstances, then I am making a universal rule that applies regardless of empirical circumstances. The categorical imperative is simply a call for the rational principle to realize itself, in the form of a universal principle that recognizes its independence from empirical factors.

In sum, the best way to explain our experience of a call of conscience that goes against all empirical motivations is to posit the presence of an independent and autonomous rational principle within us. The categorical imperative is a mandate issued by

³ Kant actually infers the independence, or autonomy, of reason from the moral law. The man who thinks he should tell the truth in spite of the prince's threat to execute "cognizes freedom within him, which, without the moral law, would have remained unknown to him." (*KpV* 5:30).

this autonomous rational principle that embodies the independence of the rational principle from empirical circumstances.

To surrender one's reason to empirical circumstances is, in fact, to surrender one's capacity to change empirical circumstances. To surrender one's reason is to concede a privileged place in the context of empirical circumstances. A moral imperative, therefore, emerges from the fact that to allow oneself to be subject to whatever impulses one may have, and so fall into contradictions that offend against reason's mandate to universalizability, amounts to a concession of one's rational agency (Korsgaard 1996, p. 168-169). Again, the categorical imperative emerges from the nature of pure practical reason, which as an independent faculty resists assimilation into its empirical context which would limit it to maxims that have only particular, and not universal, validity. The categorical imperative, then, is really a call for pure practical reason to protect its own nature as an independent faculty.

The mandate of a pure practical reason, that is independent of any empirical context, supersedes any judgment that is based on a certain empirical context. By its nature, pure practical reason issues rules of universal applicability, because it is not tied to any empirical context. Judgments having to do with an empirical context are, by their nature, only of limited relevance. The moral imperative of pure practical reason, therefore, arises from the logical principle that context-independence always trumps context-dependence (Sussman 2008, p. 76). That which is universally true is more logically fundamental than that which is only contextually true.

There is the further consideration that one's rationality is corollary to one's autonomy. To be rational, one cannot be subject to mere empirical motivations—impulses, desires, etc. A being entirely at the mercy of empirical motivations is entirely subject to non-rational drives. To be rational is to be able to exert some pushback against these non-rational drives, and so rationality is essential to one's autonomy.

To treat another rational being as a means is to hinder their autonomy. Such treatment subordinates the rationality of the exploited being to some empirical motive. In a case of exploitation, then, the autonomous exercise of one rationality hinders the autonomous exercise of another. The negation of autonomy by autonomy is always logically superseded by the exercise of autonomy that respects the autonomy of others. This is because the former presupposes a maxim that can only have limited validity. The expansion of the exploiter's autonomy devours the autonomy of another, and so in exploitative situations autonomy is both affirmed and denied. Exercise of autonomy that respects the autonomy of others, on the other hand, can have objective validity, since it consistently affirms autonomy. Objectively valid presuppositions always trump maxims of limited, or subjective, validity, when considering logical status (Guyer 2007. 450-451).

Rather than a dogmatic insistence on some abstract principle that is contrary to the spirit of the Enlightenment, then, Kant's moral imperative actually represents the fulfillment of the Enlightenment's guardianship over human freedom. The moral imperative upholds the autonomous rational nature of the individual over all conditional

empirical objectives. We are not to subjugate another autonomous human being, because this involves an inappropriate subordination of that which issues objectively valid principles (i.e. autonomous human reason, which is distinct from empirical situations) to that which grounds only subjectively valid principles (i.e. principles that pertain only to a limited set of contingent circumstances). The centrality of human freedom to the moral imperative in Kant means that Kant is more of a so-called value theorist—i.e. his moral philosophy is centrally concerned with human value—than a moral theorist who emphasized a merely formalist devotion to moral principles that are detached from any source of human value (Pippin 2001, 387). That is, rather than a moral imperative that is predicated on an abstract motivation to conform to a merely formal rule on maxims that is detached from any account of the human good or human flourishing, the Kantian moral imperative is centrally concerned with protecting the *value* of human freedom.

Kant's fact of reason is not merely the byproduct of dogmatic circularity—i.e. the moral law is the law because it is the law. Instead, the fact of reason arises from a careful analysis of the faculties involved in moral decision-making. There is a way, then, for the Kantian moral philosophy to respond to the challenge of the moral skeptic, beyond mere bluster. A substantive response can be provided to those who claim that the fact of reason is

an empty delusion and a chimerical concept. (*GMS* 4:402)

The moral skeptic would find it difficult to deny the near universal—possible exceptions are people with mental handicaps—experience of a moral mandate that is independent any empirical motivations. Given this experience, it makes sense to posit that reason, the faculty from which this moral mandate emerges, is independent or autonomous. At the very least, we must say that we act *as if* reason is autonomous. Though it would go against Kantian epistemological limits to posit that we *are* free, it makes sense to claim that we act as if we are free. We conceive of ourselves as being able to make rational judgments that are not subject to shifting empirical circumstances. For example, though one is threatened with death if one does not spread a malicious lie, one would still, along with external observers, conceive of oneself as able to tell the truth in spite of the alignment of every empirical motive towards preserving one's life. To claim that empirical motivations are fully in charge, and that whatever rationality we may have can be led into contradiction because it is subject to shifting empirical pressures, is to deny the basic phenomenology of moral decision-making. This phenomenology indicates that we are free, and so our moral reasoning must be such as to appeal to a free being—i.e. universal rules that are independent of any empirical context and so objectively valid for any rational agent.

The independence of the rational principle means that it is not swayed by any empirical circumstances that may or may not happen to be present. The rational principle is objectively determining, precisely because it does not emerge from any circumstance that is peculiar to a particular person or group of people. It is of the essence of rationality to mandate consistency. A rationality that is schizophrenic, i.e. affirming contradictions, is not really rationality. At the bottom of every experience of moral decision-making, therefore, is a mandate for universalizability that is built into the nature of rationality and

which allows for the formulation of imperatives that are independent of any empirical context.

The moral skeptic cannot merely shrug off these points. The moral skeptic cannot merely abandon, as something of limited relevance, a mandate that stems from his or her nature as a rational agent. Donald Regan argues that Kant does not sufficiently justify the idea that our rational nature has value. Seen in light of my arguments in this paper, Regan's point would have to accept the radical idea that universally valid claims are interchangeable and have equal logical status to conditionally valid claims. Regan would also have to defend the equally radical idea that self-conscious deliberative agency, which seeks to square particular maxims with a call for universal validity, is indistinguishable in terms of value from blind surrender to empirical impulses (Regan 2002, 267). To abandon the universal principle of one's rational nature, in the name of some non-rational empirical motive, is actually to surrender one's rational agency to a mere impulse that is blind with respect any call to universalization. A nihilist might argue that surrendering one's rational agency and blind impulse are, in terms of value, indistinguishable. But, it is also the case that a moral philosophy that predicates itself on a distinction between rational agency and blind impulse, and makes protection of the former central to its development of moral principles, is not dogmatic. The idea that rational agency and blind impulse are evaluatively indistinguishable is a radical claim. This idea would entail that an individual on a drunken rampage, or having an acute psychotic episode, is evaluatively indistinguishable from a bioethicist in a hospital, or a philosopher writing about the ethics of divorce. If there is dogmatism in grounding the fact of reason, there is no more dogmatism than in any human epistemological achievement, the finitude of which mandates the presence of axiomatic first principles. To return to Beck's problem of external justification of the foundational principle of an ethical system, I have shown how the categorical imperative rests on foundational logical and evaluative principles. Objectively valid judgments supersede those that are subjectively valid, and deliberate agency has higher value than blind impulse. We can ask for justification of even these fundamental principles, but the fact that a moral theory relies on them does not make it dogmatic. Similarly, a proof in geometry is not dogmatic because it relies on fundamental definitions and principles, such as the idea that the angles of a triangle add up to one hundred and eighty degrees or that a line is the shortest distance between two points.

One might account for the accusation of dogmatism that Žižek levels at Kant by noting that he fails to appreciate the kind of argument Kant is using. Žižek notes that Kant, in his doctrine of the fact of reason, strayed from the spirit of the Enlightenment. He writes,

The ultimate paradox of Kant is this priority of practical over theoretical reason: we can free ourselves of external social constraints and achieve the maturity proper to the autonomous enlightened subject precisely by submitting to the 'irrational' compulsion of the categorical imperative. (Žižek 1989, 81)

In other words, the moment we begin to legislate maxims for our own behavior, rather than accept the norms of our society, we surrender to a new kind of irrationality. In realizing ourselves as agents who legislate maxims from our own reason, we begin to act from a moral law that compels obedience not because of any consequence associated with it but because of itself—i.e. its own intrinsic and mysterious power to compel.

If one's view of Enlightenment thinking is limited to evidence-based inductive reasoning—i.e. gathering observational data and then making generalizations based on this data—then the doctrine of the fact of reason surely does introduce an element of irrationalism that departs from the spirit of the Enlightenment. The argument I have developed, from the work of Kant, for the fact of reason, does not rely on the sort of scrupulous gathering of empirical data, and the formation of beliefs that is strictly proportioned to this empirical data, that we find in the methodology, for instance, of Francis Bacon (Bacon 1995, p. 39). An empirical, or a posteriori, argument for the moral law would rely on observed psychological phenomena, and deal with contingent features of human psychology, rather than features that are necessarily associated with rationality (Guyer 1989, p. 55). It is worth noting, though, that even an empirical argument for the moral law would have to presuppose axiomatic value claims. If, for instance, one were to measure moral claims in light of the empirical fact of the amount of happiness they produced, this sort of measurement would presuppose the value of human happiness.

If the claim that the authority of the categorical imperative is nonsensical and dogmatic means that it lacks the sort of justification characteristic of an empirical argument, then this claim is correct. Žižek claims that the mandate of the categorical imperative is purely formal—that is, we are to obey the categorical imperative because it is the law, and not for reasons separate from the law itself (Žižek 1989, 82). An empirical argument would supply these reasons—for instance, by noting a correlation between obedience to the moral law and level of social cohesion.

But rejecting the categorical imperative because its authority is presented in a way that is purely formal fails to take into account the possibility of an argument that is not empirical. The argument I developed for the moral law did not deal with observed psychological facts that occur in specific situations, like the level of happiness or social cohesion. The presence of a call to duty that goes against empirical motivations is presented as a universal feature of human moral phenomenology. The fact that rationality, having abstracted all empirical motivations, prescribes a rule that is independent of any particular empirical context and so universal, is also not a mere observed feature of human psychology in a particular situation. These are not contingent matters, but are necessary features rooted in the very nature of reason. Reason cannot be reason if it is merely subject to whatever empirical motivations happen to be in play. If reason involves a recognition of necessary and universal logical truths, then it has to transcend empirical motivations, which align with logical truths only haphazardly. So, instead of collecting empirical observations to ground the moral law, Kant grounds the moral in an a priori way in the nature of rationality (*GMS* 4:412).

Though there is no empirical argument for the fact of reason, then, there is a philosophical and a priori, i.e. independent of empirical observation, argument available. In fact, my argument for the fact of reason can redeem Kant from the distortions of a certain interpretation of his moral theory that is vulnerable to objections of formalism and rigorism. In this distorted interpretation, obedience to the moral law is justified merely insofar as it conforms to a dry and technical universalizability test, without regard to any substantive account of human value.⁴ We are to conform, moreover, to the dry logical demand of universalizability regardless of the particular contours of our individual situation. The moral law, in this distorted interpretation of Kant's moral philosophy, consists in a merely logical exercise that is supposed to serve as our primary motivation, regardless of any concerns about human happiness or flourishing. My account, though, shows instead that Kant's grounding of the moral imperative is centrally concerned with a substantive account of human value. The moral imperative represents, in my interpretation, a call to protect one's rational nature, and the rational nature of other human beings. The Kantian moral imperative gives a privileged place to reason's call to universalize its own judgments over the shifting and contradictory pressures of empirical motivations. We are not to subordinate our rational nature, or that of someone else, to some empirical objective, because it is rational nature that is the source of universal and objective worth, whereas empirical objectives can only have conditional worth. We are not to commit suicide, for instance, because suicide annihilates our rational nature for the sake of some empirical end, i.e. tranquility and/or cessation of pain. Suicide, then, gives a false priority to what has only conditional worth (cessation of pain is not an absolute good) over one's rational faculty, which alone can ground that which has unconditional worth (i.e. a supreme moral principle that transcends all empirical circumstances). I have shown, then, a way in which Kant's moral theory is *not* a merely abstract exercise in logic that is completely detached from a substantive account of human value. Instead, this moral theory is centrally predicated on an account of the value of the rational principle in human nature. This rational principle is, as I have stated, synonymous with human autonomy.

V. Conclusion

In this paper, I explained Žižek's view of Kant's moral law. I then probed Kant's work on moral philosophy and identified there a philosophical, but not an empirical, argument for the fact of reason. The fact of reason consists in a moral imperative that is grounded in the idea that one's rational nature/autonomy ought to protect itself from being controlled by empirical motivations. One's rational nature, as essentially independent of empirical motivations, issues a call to universalize its maxims in a way that transcends empirical context. This call to universalize one's maxims is morally compelling because following it allows one to uphold the privileged independence one's rational nature has

⁴ Robert Pippin, "Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's *Kant's Ethical Thought*," *Inquiry* vol. 43, no. 2 (2000): 239.

with respect to empirical motivations. Not universalizing one's maxims is immoral *not* because the call to universalize is the law by an arbitrary fiat. Rejecting universalization, rather, is immoral because it involves surrendering one's autonomous agency, which alone is capable of generating universal judgments, to non-agential empirical motivations that can only generate maxims of subjective validity. I therefore reject the interpretation of the doctrine that the moral law is a fact of reason that holds that this fact of reason is dogmatic.

Bibliography

- Ameriks, Karl. (1982), *Kant's Theory of Mind*, Clarendon Press, Oxford.
- Bacon, Francis. (1995), "The New Science," in Isaac Kramnick (ed.), *A Portable Enlightenment Reader*, Penguin Books, New York, pp. 39-43.
- Beck, Lewis White, (1960), "Das Faktum Der Vernunft: Zur Rechtfertigungsproblematik In Der Ethik," *Kant-Studien*, 52, pp. 271-283.
- Guyer, Paul. (2007), "Naturalistic and Transcendental Moments in Kant's Moral Philosophy," *Inquiry*, Vol. 50, no. 5, pp. 444-464.
- ,(1989), "Psychology and the Transcendental Deduction," in Eckart Förster (ed.), *Kant's Transcendental Deductions*, Stanford University Press, Stanford, pp. 47-69.
- Heinrich, Dieter. (1973), "Der Begriffe der sittlichen Einsicht und Kants Lehre vom Faktum der Vernunft," in *Kant: Zur Deutung seiner Theorie von Erkennen und Handeln*, ed. G. Prauss, Kiepenhauer and Witsch, Cologne: 223-256.
- Huemer, Michael. (2005), *Ethical Intuitionism*, Palgrave Macmillan, New York.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1996), *Critique of Practical Reason*, translated by Mary J. Gregor, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- ,(1996), *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- ,(1998), *Critique of Pure Reason*, translated by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Korsgaard, Christine. (1996), *Creating a Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Pippin, Robert. (2001), "A Mandatory Reading of Kant's Ethics?" *The Philosophical Quarterly*, vol. 51, no. 204, pp. 386-393.
- ,(2000), "Kant's Theory of Value: On Allen Wood's *Kant's Ethical Thought*," *Inquiry*, vol. 43, no. 2239, pp. 239-266.
- Regan, Donald, (2002), "The Value of Rational Nature," *Ethics*, 112, pp. 267-291.
- Sussman, David. (2008), "From Deduction to Deed: Kant's Grounding of the Moral Law," *Kantian Review*, Vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 52-81.
- Wood, Allen. (2008), *Kantian Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Žižek, Slavoj. (1989), *The Sublime Object of Ideology*, Verso, New York.



**Lo incondicionado e irrestricto en Kant o del valor de una
buena voluntad**

*The Unconditioned and Unrestricted in Kant or About the Good
Will's Value*

YOHAN MOLINA*

Universidad Central de Venezuela, Venezuela

Resumen

El presente escrito pretende ser un aporte a la comprensión del singular valor de la buena voluntad según lo descrito en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*. Para ello, después de aclarar sucintamente ciertos extravíos conceptuales sobre esta noción, repasaremos dos de las más representativas aproximaciones contemporáneas a la axiología kantiana que, sin embargo, arrojan resultados insatisfactorios al momento de precisar el valor de la voluntad buena: los abordajes de Korsgaard y Sensen. Intentaremos develar dichos fallos y luego replantearemos la distinción entre valor irrestricto e incondicionado para aliviarlos en el marco general de la propuesta de Sensen.

Palabras clave

Kant, Valor, Buena Voluntad, Korsgaard, Sensen

Abstract

This paper aims to be a contribution to the understanding of the good will's value according to the *Groundwork*. Hence, after clarifying some conceptual mistakes around this notion, we will focus on two of the most important approaches to the Kantian axiology which yield unsound results to determine the nature of the good will's value: the Sensen and Korsgaard's approaches. We will try to reveal these failures and then we will reformulate the substantial distinction between unrestricted and unconditioned value to alleviate them in the general framework of Sensen's proposal.

Keywords

Kant, Value, Good Will, Korsgaard, Sensen

I. Presentación

* Departamento de Filosofía Teorética-Universidad Central de Venezuela/ Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales. Email: yohan.molina@ucv.ve

Resultan paradigmáticas, cuando no inspiradoras, las primeras líneas de la *Fundamentación* donde Kant señala que: “Ni en el mundo, ni en general, tampoco fuera del mundo es posible pensar nada que pueda considerarse como bueno sin restricción, a no ser tan solo una buena *voluntad*.” (GMS 393) La dificultad que desenvuelve la sentencia delinea la complejidad misma de la obra a la que sirve de inicio y requiere el interés de todo aquel que se preocupe por estudiar seriamente la propuesta ética kantiana a razón de su relevancia para lo que pudiera ser la axiología del filósofo alemán. No obstante, debemos advertir que nuestra preocupación central en el presente trabajo no será directamente el problema del valor aunque esté conectado estrechamente con él. La cuestión que nos interesa es un tanto más específica. Nos planteamos dar cuenta del especial peso axiológico otorgado a la buena voluntad tomando como marco de discusión dos sendas aproximaciones contemporáneas al problema del valor en Kant; las propuestas de Christine Korsgaard y Oliver Sensen. Intentaremos mostrar que ambas perspectivas a pesar de sus virtudes arrastran deficiencias: la primera resultaría particularmente oscura y problemática mientras que la segunda sería insuficiente. Al final, terciaremos a favor de la propuesta general de Sensen pero con algunas importantes objeciones, distinciones y acomodos que colaborarían para lograr el mejor sentido de la propia descripción kantiana de la buena voluntad. Pero no podemos avanzar en este terreno sin afrontar primero el ya engorroso problema de explicar, al menos de manera muy general, qué pudo haber llegado a entender Kant por tal noción.

II. La buena voluntad kantiana

En un primer momento debemos señalar que, como bien apunta Wood, Kant nunca provee una consideración explícita de lo que es una buena voluntad (Wood 2003, p.457; 2008, p.32). Sin embargo, lo que sí nos queda claro en la obra del pensador de Königsberg es que al concepto de buena voluntad le es primordial la noción de principio moral. Para justificar esto primero debemos señalar que Kant entiende por "voluntad" la facultad de determinación práctica a partir de la representación de leyes: “Sólo un ser racional posee la facultad de obrar por la *representación* de leyes, esto es, por principios; posee una *voluntad*.” (GMS 412)¹ De esta manera, lo menos que puede esperarse es que el rasgo fundamental de una *buena* voluntad sería su constitución como intencionalidad práctica a favor de un tipo especial de ley. Más adelante nuestro filósofo lo confirma: “La voluntad es absolutamente buena cuando no puede ser mala y, por tanto, cuando su máxima, al ser transformada en ley universal, no puede nunca contradecirse.” (GMS 437) La buena voluntad, en consecuencia, es aquella cuyas máximas se rigen por el Imperativo Categórico, es *voluntad moral*. Así, marca una aguda conexión en su posibilidad respecto del principio moral y, por ende, sería hartamente inapropiado asignarle entonces algún tipo de rol como fundamento a pesar de que en la primera parte de la *Fundamentación* la presentación de Kant aparentara otorgarle un papel central en cuanto a la justificación de la moralidad.

¹Aclara Thomas Hill Jr. de este pasaje que: “Decir que los seres humanos tienen una voluntad, entonces, implica que puede hacer que ocurran cosas intencionalmente y a causa de razones, donde esto se entiende en el fondo por referencia a sus políticas, fines y principios racionales subyacentes.” (Hill Jr. 2013, p. 18)

Es más, desde hace más de cuarenta años algunos autores como Onora O’Neill nos han prevenido de esta situación al indicarnos que el énfasis expositivo de esta parte del texto kantiano apunta a mostrar, muy en contra de las apariencias iniciales, no que la buena voluntad sea efectivamente la noción fundamental para dar cuenta de nuestros deberes, sino más bien que ella solo puede ser explicada en términos de la ley moral (O’Neill 1975, p.101).

Dejaremos a un lado la reconstrucción del complejo argumento que permitiría concluir a Kant que la buena voluntad está determinada por la representación de la ley moral en tanto su principio de acción². Por ahora lo que resulta relevante señalar es que la voluntad buena expresa una fuerte intimidad conceptual con el Imperativo Categórico, tal que la posibilidad de un aspecto es señal de la posibilidad del otro³: más allá de aceptar que la buena voluntad está rígidamente vinculada a la ley moral en tanto su principio práctico, es menester entender que la exigencia incondicionada del Imperativo solo puede posar sobre una clase especial de voluntad no determinada empíricamente⁴. La ley moral únicamente puede determinar una voluntad que no esté dispuesta *pasivamente* por meros incentivos naturales y contingentes⁵, por lo que la inviabilidad de la última mostraría como impracticable a la primera⁶. El último punto nos sirve a su vez para recordar que la apuesta kantiana de una buena voluntad no se expresa únicamente en pretender la regla sino en pretender acciones *por* la regla (GMS 403;444), en consecuencia, las acciones exitosas de una buena voluntad revelarían genuino valor moral y no mera conformidad con el deber o legalidad⁷.

²Me permito para un intento minucioso en este sentido remitir al trabajo de Rickless (2004).

³Y en este sentido estructurarían una relación bicondicional.

⁴Posiblemente por esto afirma Kant que el concepto de deber *contiene* al de una voluntad buena (GMS 397).

⁵Esto no impide la asignación de un rol motivacional a los sentimientos e inclinaciones en la medida en que pueden ser “[...] incluso favorables a esta buena voluntad y pueden facilitar muy mucho su obra.”(GMS 393) Donde Kant establece con mayor extensión y claridad la contribución del plexo afectivo para la recepción de la ley moral en nuestras vidas es en la “Doctrina de la virtud”, en especial cuando expone las disposiciones anímicas para la recepción del concepto del deber en general (MS 399-403). Tales exploraciones no deben ser asimiladas como un flagrante golpe de timón en la ruta ética del barco kantiano como sí al modo de un desarrollo que nos sumerge de lleno en su carácter complejo, pues “[...] los sentimientos que acompañan la fuerza constrictiva de la ley moral hacen sensible su efectividad [...] con el fin de aventajar a los estímulos *meramente* sensibles.” (MS 406) De hecho, el asunto de la sensibilidad en la teoría ética kantiana puede abordarse yendo más allá de su consideración como un plano objetual esencialmente empírico, pues es plausible reconocer en el ámbito afectivo orígenes e influencias genuinamente *racionales* o *trascendentales* (Nuzzo 2008, pp. 159-193).

⁶ En tal caso existiría un procedimiento que formalmente nos permitiría generar normas pero estas no serían ejecutables de manera *categorica*, por lo que se colocaría en cuestión la posibilidad misma de deberes incondicionales.

⁷Sin embargo, y relacionado con la nota previa a la anterior, es bien sabido que las condiciones del valor moral de una acción han sido motivo de reservas desde los inicios de la ética kantiana, no más recordar el tono sarcástico del epigrama shilleriano: “Yo sirvo gustosamente a mis amigos pero, ay, lo hago con placer. / Me asedia entonces la duda de si seré persona virtuosa. / A lo cual se me responde: / seguramente tú único recurso es tratar de despreciarlos por entero. / Y haz entonces, con aversión, lo que te ordena el deber” (extraído de Rawls 2001, p.196). Este problema ha sido motivo de constante tratamiento en la literatura kantiana (Paton, 1967, Ch. 4) (Henson 1979, pp. 39-54) (Allison 1999, p. 112 y ss.; 2011, p. 89 y ss.) (Herman 1996, Ch. 1) (Wood 1999, pp. 27-30) (Pareles 2005).

Este respecto urge de una acotación pertinente. Apunta Kant en el prólogo de la *Fundamentación* que su tarea primordial es el establecimiento del principio de la moralidad (GMS 392). Esta tarea es meramente conceptual pues busca justificar sin acudir a los recursos de la investigación empírica el concepto de deber y su posibilidad. De esta manera, poco le interesa al filósofo en este trabajo, donde más testifica el valor irrestricto e incondicionado de la voluntad buena, establecer exactamente cuándo o cómo alguien *efectivamente* tiene una buena voluntad, de hecho, ni siquiera otorga muchas esperanzas a este pretendido saber empírico cuando taxativamente señala que “[...] es absolutamente imposible determinar por experiencia y con absoluta certeza un solo caso en que la máxima de una acción, conforme por lo demás con el deber, haya tenido su asiento exclusivamente en fundamentos morales y en la representación del deber.” (GMS 407) Se muestra más importante en cambio aclarar el vínculo conceptual entre el principio de la moralidad y la clase especial de voluntad que estaría asida a tal principio. Asimismo, estimo igual o más importante aclarar que sería un dañino malentendido concebir restringidamente a la buena voluntad como aquella que *desenvuelve acciones* con valor moral. No parece el mejor modo de ver las cosas porque si bien es signo de una buena voluntad la acción que posee valor moral, al plantearse aquélla como determinada analíticamente en su intención o querer por la ley es independiente de cualquier acción que pudiera producir. “La buena voluntad no es buena por lo que efectúe o realice, no es buena por su adecuación para alcanzar algún fin que nos hayamos propuesto; es buena solo por querer, es decir, es buena en sí misma.” (GMS 394) Esto además se aviene con nuestras más sanas intuiciones porque una voluntad puede expresar la intención de actuar de determinado modo en cierta situación a partir de lo que es debido aunque no sea posible, póngase el caso, por algún tipo de impedimento físico o contextual. Ante tal escenario, ¿hablaríamos de una mala voluntad? Al parecer no, y tampoco nos abstendríamos de decir que estamos ante una voluntad buena. Podemos apuntar lo mismo de las acciones preterintencionales: cuando la voluntad buena se plantea algún objetivo moral pero su actuar termine en resultados no buscados o formalmente indebidos⁸.

Ahora bien, la postura que hemos ido exponiendo se opone a ciertos abordajes que admiten la posibilidad de concebir la buena voluntad sin la necesidad de considerar la intención de actuar debidamente desde la exigencia del principio. Dentro de esta clase, se encuentra en franco desacuerdo con aquellos enfoques que asumen que por “buena voluntad” Kant denota en lugar de la intención moral de la voluntad, algún tipo de compromiso amplio, de carácter o de disposición (Johnson 2009, p.23) (Dean 2006, pp.21-22) (Amerik 2003) (Allison 1999, pp.136-137) (Sullivan 1989, pp.73-75) (Harbison 1980), y revela un desacuerdo menos profundo con aquellos que a partir de sugestivos argumentos dejan ver que lo característico de la voluntad buena es la intención de adecuarse a lo que es debido pero independientemente de si se hace *conforme* al deber o *por* motivo del deber (Wood 2003) (Herman 1996, p.36).

⁸Aunque no sea del todo diáfano, apreciaciones de este tipo parecieran ser defendidas por Kant (GMS 394).

Nuestra duda en el primer caso reside en las reiteradas afirmaciones de Kant que explícitamente destacan que la buena voluntad está indisolublemente referida al principio de acción moral como su fundamento práctico-regulativo (GMS 402;403;414;426;437;444;445;447), con lo que coloca en el tapete la *intención* de promover acciones a partir de la representación del Imperativo Categórico, lo que se diferencia ostensiblemente de algún tipo de carácter o disposición —naciones que, dicho sea de paso, el filósofo no plantearía explícitamente como descripción adecuada de la voluntad buena—. De igual manera, Kant caracteriza a la buena voluntad como buena por *querer* (GMS 394), lo que refiere a intenciones *particulares*⁹ mas no a alguna disposición o carácter que se diferencia de actividades específicas y apunta más bien a una cualidad general o rasgo duradero de los sujetos. Al hablar de un carácter establecemos una descripción general que expresa propensiones o vocaciones estables, influidas por la formación propia¹⁰, a querer y actuar de ciertas maneras; asimismo, al hablar de una disposición hacemos referencia a la mera capacidad o potencialidad para actuar de ciertos modos o desde ciertos incentivos independientemente de nuestro carácter o rasgos conductuales habituales; pero ni la noción de carácter ni la noción de disposición, elementos referidos a aspectos generales de nosotros mismos, en sentido estricto constituyen en sí mismas *un querer* o *una intención*. Podemos remitirnos también a la *Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar* donde Kant sugiere que el valor absoluto de la voluntad buena del ser humano “[...] consiste en *lo que hace, cómo y según qué principios* actúa él, no como miembro de la naturaleza, *sino en la libertad de su facultad de desear* [...]” (KU A407-B411, énfasis añadido). Así, apela nuevamente al desear o querer según los principios adecuados, algo que desde luego difícilmente remita a una condición general o perdurable de la personalidad como sí a una actividad específica.

En un sentido similar, si la voluntad se piensa como factor causal de acciones a partir de la representación de leyes (GMS 446-458), valdría la pena cuestionarse cómo una

⁹Algunos asertos en la *Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón* aparentan sugerir lo contrario: “[...] al hombre, que, junto a un corazón corrompido, sigue teniendo sin embargo una voluntad buena, se le deja aún la esperanza de un retorno al bien, del que se ha apartado.” (RGV 6:44) Pareciera que aquí Kant defiende una lectura de la buena voluntad como la capacidad general de ser moral —algo independiente de actuaciones particulares, propensiones y actitudes generales— o, tal vez, como un compromiso general y perdurable con la moralidad que sin embargo puede ser excepcionalmente defraudado por desenvolvimientos específicos. Otro tanto se deja ver en las *Lecciones de ética* (V-Mo/Collins 417). No me atrevo por ahora a negar que esto sea plausible, pero sospecho que en tales situaciones cuando Kant usa el término “buena voluntad” no lo hace en el mismo sentido que tiene presente en la *Fundamentación*, por lo que habría que estimar la posibilidad de que haya manejado más de un registro semántico de la expresión en su obra. Dicha sospecha puede verse respaldada por el hecho de que poco antes en la *Religión* no se refiere a secas a la buena voluntad sino a la buena voluntad *en general* —lo que serviría para precisar un segundo sentido como rasgo permanente—, cuando en un comentario similar señala que la perversidad o el mal corazón “[...] puede darse junto con una *voluntad buena en general* y procede de la fragilidad de la naturaleza humana [...]” (RGV 6:37, énfasis añadido). En todo caso, en el presente texto tendremos solo en cuenta el sentido que según nuestra exposición argumentada se desarrolla en la *Fundamentación*.

¹⁰Dice del carácter Kant en *La antropología en sentido pragmático* que: “No depende de lo que la naturaleza hace del ser humano, sino de lo que este *hace de sí mismo*; porque lo primero es cosa del temperamento (donde el sujeto es en gran medida pasivo), y solamente lo último permite conocer que tiene un carácter.” (Anth. 292)

disposición o un carácter podrían llegar a ser causa de acción particular alguna —y desde luego de una acción moral—. Teniendo en cuenta nuestras apreciaciones anteriores, cuando hablamos de carácter moral haríamos alusión a una descripción general acerca de nuestras tendencias de acción frente a la variabilidad de motivos para cumplir mandatos morales, pero en tanto tal el mismo no genera acciones. Asimismo, una disposición o capacidad de ser moral pone en el tapete la posibilidad general de todo ser humano, como criatura racional y libre, de actuar desde los mandatos prácticos de la razón —así sea un ser malvado—, pero en tanto capacidad no forja acciones como sí la realización de esa potencialidad que en cada caso es un fenómeno específico. Afirmar que un rasgo general, sea el carácter moral o la disposición a la moralidad, puede generar acciones específicas y por tanto ser una *voluntad*, sería no más que una turbulenta trampa de lenguaje.

En el segundo caso, no se comete el error de anclar la comprensión de la buena voluntad en algún rasgo general de nuestra naturaleza sino en el simple compromiso de la voluntad para con los mandatos morales. De estos me distancio dado que defienden que la exigencia mínima de la voluntad buena sería la conformidad normativa sin importar la base misma de la pretensión práctica, es decir, sin importar que la aceptación del contenido de la regla pueda partir de meras inclinaciones naturales. Si no me equivoco, Kant directamente se encargaría de descartar esta opción:

[...] la necesidad de mis acciones por puro respeto a la ley práctica es lo que constituye el deber, *ante el cual tiene que inclinarse cualquier otro fundamento determinante, porque es la condición de una voluntad buena en sí*, cuyo valor está por encima de todo. (GMS 403. énfasis añadido)

En otro lugar escribe:

La voluntad absolutamente buena, cuyo principio tiene que ser un imperativo categórico, quedará, pues, indeterminada respecto de todo los objetos y contendrá sólo la forma del querer en general, como autonomía; esto es, la aptitud de la máxima de toda buena voluntad para hacerse así misma ley universal es la única ley que se impone a sí misma la voluntad de todo ser racional, *sin que intervenga como fundamento ningún impulso o interés*. (GMS 444, énfasis añadido).

De igual modo, Kant en el pasaje 394 de la *Fundamentación* que ya hemos citado señala que la buena voluntad no es buena “[...] por su adecuación para alcanzar *algún fin que nos hayamos propuesto* [...]” Al decir “algún fin”, naturalmente deben ser incluidos aquellos objetos de acciones debidas, y con ello, desestimaría el filósofo que sea el mero apego al fin debido el rasgo que nos permitiría hablar de una buena voluntad. En cambio, siguiendo el mismo fragmento, la buena voluntad “[...] es buena sólo por querer”. Ahora bien, dado que según lo señalado en GMS 444 este querer o actividad intencional de la voluntad en la adopción de los principios no puede estar fundada meramente en contingentes inclinaciones naturales, se sigue que para Kant el compromiso de la buena voluntad con el Imperativo Categórico no dependería solo de las acciones que promueve,

sino de la adopción voluntaria de máximas morales *por* la regla. Tanto vale decir de la cita arriba referida de la *Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar* que vimos plantea que la buena voluntad del hombre “[...] consiste en *lo que hace, cómo y según qué principios* actúa él [...]”(KU A407-B411, énfasis añadido); es fácil percibir que la referencia al desenvolvimiento de la voluntad buena no solo plantea la condición de conformidad con el principio, indicada con el “según”, sino que además llama la atención sobre la manera en que se debe dar esa conformidad práctica, condición indicada con el “cómo”. Si el cumplimiento del deber fuera suficiente para hablar de una voluntad buena, entonces Kant no habría tenido necesidad de hacer especial referencia al modo en que una buena voluntad ha de apegarse a los fines moralmente debidos, no aludiría al “cómo” —que a fin de cuentas se explicaría con base en una pretensión *por* lo debido—.

Manteniendo presente todo lo anterior, entenderemos en nuestro escrito que la buena voluntad para Kant expresa una intención que revela un apego práctico a la regla moral por virtud de la misma. Así, estamos en condiciones de seguir adelante en la tarea de hurgar en torno a la naturaleza y posibilidades del especial valor que le adjudica en la *Fundamentación*. Para ello, repasaremos con cierto detenimiento las propuestas de Christine Korsgaard y Oliver Sensen por ser, a mi modo de ver las cosas, de las más interesantes, representativas y elaboradas alrededor del peliagudo problema del valor en la filosofía moral kantiana.

III. La cuestión kantiana del valor según Christine Korsgaard

El problema del valor de los fines ha ocupado un importante lugar en la reflexión filosófica desde la antigüedad. Dos son los grandes modelos justificativos que desde entonces se han pronunciado alrededor de su naturaleza: las posturas subjetivistas y objetivistas de la bondad. Las primeras calibran el valor de las cosas a la regla de nuestros estados psicológicos, en ellas se circunscriben las distintas formas de hedonismo y todo aporte que identifique lo bueno con el fin de cualquier deseo o interés natural. Por otro lado, las posiciones objetivistas, verbigracia la de G.E. Moore (2014; 1951), no aceptan esta relativización de lo bueno y consideran que decir que algo es bueno como fin es atribuirle la cualidad de ser un bien intrínseco, es decir, que no depende de ningún otro elemento: el fin es bueno sin acudir a algún tipo de deseo o interés¹¹. El par de posturas están famosamente representadas por el modo en que contemporáneamente se formulan las opciones ofrecidas en el dilema del *Eutifrón* (10a) a propósito de la discusión sobre el valor: ¿es algo bueno porque lo deseamos o lo deseamos porque es bueno? Pero ambas consideraciones, piensa Korsgaard, a pesar de sus aspectos positivos son problemáticas.

El subjetivismo al hacer descansar las cosas buenas en la variabilidad de nuestro deseos e inclinaciones no logra explicar por qué nos vemos frecuentemente llevados a

¹¹En “The Conception of Intrinsic Value” Moore indicaba que: “Decir que un 'tipo' de valor es 'intrínseco' significa simplemente que la cuestión de si una cosa lo posee, y en qué grado lo posee, depende únicamente de la naturaleza intrínseca de la cosa en cuestión.” (Moore 1951, p. 260)

pensar que las personas no valoran lo que es bueno, o por qué creemos que tienen intereses por objetos que no son buenos. En los casos de reclamo o crítica tan solo expresaríamos nuestra irremediablemente personal y aislada percepción del bien, los deseos o inclinaciones que sirven de base a nuestros juicios poseerían la misma dignidad del sentir ajeno: lo que es bueno para ti no sería bueno para mí y por ello no tendría cabida algún tipo de discusión fructífera. Las teorías subjetivistas al defender que aquello que nos regocije, plazca o deseemos es bueno, y por consiguiente que ante la ausencia de estas disposiciones subjetivas los objetos pertinentes no pueden ser considerados valiosos, se encuentra fuera de sintonía con muchas de nuestras creencias y prácticas más arraigadas que se basan en la consideración de que una cosa puede ser buena así una persona no la desee u obtenga algún placer de ella o, en un mismo sentido, que existen deseos cuya satisfacción precisa acciones reprobables. El objetivismo, por su parte, ofrecería un camino para dar sentido a estas asentadas intuiciones al plantear la existencia de entidades en sí mismas valorativas independientemente de nuestra inclinación hacia ellas, pero más allá de los problemas epistemológicos y ontológicos que esto acarrearía, el costo que debe asumir es muy alto: el divorcio entre bondad e interés natural hace difícil concebir por qué las cosas intrínsecamente buenas pueden llegar a importarnos o a interesarnos.

La teoría racionalista de la bondad que Kant manejaría, y que Korsgaard intenta precisar, toma los aspectos favorables de ambas posturas intentando separarse de sus indeseables implicaciones (Korsgaard 2011a, Cap. XVIII, p.421). De acuerdo con esta postura un objeto o un estado de cosas es bueno si su alcance o producción es objeto de una elección racional¹². Es decir, se incluye un elemento —racionalidad— que no se identifica a secas con nuestras condiciones, necesidades y deseos naturales, sino que *a partir* de nuestras disposiciones subjetivas establece qué fines tienen valor¹³, esto es, la clase de consideraciones que son elementos de privilegio reflexivo o elección racional.

Puesta así las cosas, la teoría racionalista de la bondad obtendría un tinte objetivista en tanto no todo lo que deseamos debe ser bueno sin apresurarse a romper el vínculo entre valor y naturaleza humana, ya que las razones que consideramos en nuestros procesos deliberativos de elección no están desconectadas de nuestras disposiciones naturales. De esta manera, el rasgo racionalista que separaría a Kant de las tradicionales visiones objetivistas y subjetivistas tendría que ver con la posibilidad humana de pronunciarse o impulsar el origen de fines. Tanto el objetivismo como el subjetivismo no evalúan esta posibilidad, definen lo bueno con independencia de nuestras aptitudes reflexivas al hacer reposar el valor en estructuras independientes de nosotros o en nuestros estados subjetivos.

Ahora bien, el hecho de que desde una perspectiva kantiana los fines que se reputan valiosos dependerían de nuestra promoción racional no significa que cualquier avance reflexivo pueda dejar de ser impugnado, el cuestionamiento de un fin tenido como

¹²Korsgaard guiada por esta idea básica desarrolló una interesante argumentación sobre los compromisos valorativos supuestos en la motivación racional de las acciones (Korsgaard 2008, pp. 207-229).

¹³Para autores como Hilary Putnam este aparente dualismo tan propio de Kant y sus epígonos— fundamentalmente Korsgaard y Habermas— entre disposiciones naturales y principios prácticos, que sirve como punto de partida en la justificación del valor, obviaría complejidades de nuestro lenguaje axiológico, en específico, los conceptos éticos densos (Putnam 2008, pp. 53-58).

razonablemente valioso podría llevarse hasta el infinito “[...] pues siempre se puede preguntar el porqué de cualquier razón que se ofrece.” (*Ibid*, p.423) Por lo que para evitar este desenlace necesitaríamos toparnos con una noción de lo incondicionalmente valioso, una justificación que nos permita establecer un plano que no pueda ser interrogado. Esta sería una explicación que detendría la iterada pregunta en torno a por qué el fin es bueno y que, asimismo, fundaría su objetividad puesto que sería incuestionable al estar justificado por completo, con lo que evitaríamos el relativismo y sabríamos a su vez, independientemente de cualquier deseo o interés, que ese elemento ensancha el conjunto de cosas que valen en el mundo: eso haría del mundo aquí y ahora un lugar mejor. Korsgaard nos dirá que sí son posibles los bienes objetivos gracias a su relación con la mismísima existencia de un bien incondicional—y por lo tanto también objetivo—, relación que se da bajo determinadas estipulaciones. Este bien incondicional sería el de una *buenavoluntad* (*Ibid*, p.424). Intentemos ahora brevemente indicar con más precisión cómo llega a esta conclusión explicando importantes distinciones realizadas por la autora en el seno de la noción de bondad.

Una distinción concerniente al valor con frecuencia realizada en la filosofía se basa en la contraposición de los llamados bienes “intrínsecos” e “instrumentales” (Korsgaard 2011a, Cap. IX, p.461). Se supone que las cosas y actividades que se consideran buenas instrumentalmente son aquellas que se valoran por otra cosa. En cambio, se considera que algo tiene un valor intrínseco si se valora por sí mismo, si no necesita valorarse por algo más. No obstante, la imagen que generalmente se tiene del valor intrínseco para Korsgaard es engañosa. Realmente lo que significa que algo tiene valor intrínseco es que porta su valor en sí mismo, esto apunta más al origen, ubicación o fuente de la bondad que a los modos en que valoramos las cosas. A consecuencia de ello, la contraposición tradicional resulta ser fraudulenta. En este sentido, para reconocer las oposiciones naturales para ambos valores tenemos que hacer dos distinciones en la bondad, es decir, entre “cómo valoramos las cosas” y “cuál es el origen de su valor”. Gracias a esta importante distinción conceptual podríamos ubicar cuatro clases de bienes agrupados con su contrario del siguiente modo: bienes finales e instrumentales, y bienes intrínsecos y extrínsecos (Cfr. *Ibidem*).

De acuerdo con “cómo valoramos las cosas”, podemos reconocer una oposición entre bienes finales e instrumentales. Si valoramos las cosas teniendo en cuenta otro fin entonces diremos que las valoramos instrumentalmente. Por otro lado, si valoramos algo por su propia causa, no a favor de otra cosa, entonces tenemos un bien final. Asimismo, manteniendo en cuenta “cuál es el origen de su valor”, tenemos que intrínseco es el valor que una cosa tiene en sí misma, no originado por otra cosa o circunstancia. El valor de la cosa intrínsecamente buena no viene de algo distinto a ella, es aquella bondad que posee algo que se exhibe a sí mismo como manteniendo su valor en todas las condiciones; en contraste, el valor extrínseco es aquel que obtiene algo de otro factor o circunstancia, proviene de un elemento distinto a la cosa como tal. Asumiendo este marco conceptual sería más fácil divisar el error de la distinción tradicional: se basa en dañinas fusiones

categoriales, en una asunción que impide la verdadera conformación de una oposición natural. Al contraponer los bienes intrínsecos a los instrumentales incluiríamos dentro de un mismo marco elementos que pertenecen a planos conceptuales diferentes, que responden a preguntas distintas. Tal aglutinamiento resulta en una consideración errónea que subyace a las clásicas posturas objetivistas y subjetivistas (*Ibid*, pp.462-464). Por ello se tiende a asimilar los bienes intrínsecos con los finales y a los bienes extrínsecos con los instrumentales: se supondría que los bienes finales serían intrínsecamente valiosos y los bienes instrumentales valiosos extrínsecamente.

No obstante, si mantenemos claras las distinciones pertinentes no debemos considerar ineludible atarnos a una u otra opción, ya que nos manejaríamos en una perspectiva mucho más abarcadora y flexible del valor. Esta flexibilidad haría posible “[...] que lo extrínsecamente valioso pueda ser valorado como un fin.” (*Ibid*, p.464) Para Korsgaard que un bien final pueda ser a su vez extrínseco, o que haya fines que valgan la pena ser buscados por sí mismos sin exhibir su valor en todas las condiciones, es una posibilidad kantiana. La fundición de las dos distinciones en un solo contorno conceptual, siguiendo con lo anterior, no es un error endosable a Kant. Por consiguiente, el engranaje axiológico de su teoría nos permitiría hablar de fines objetivos extrínsecamente buenos. Para justificar esto y su relación con el valor de una buena voluntad, tenemos que abordar en la obra kantiana la cuestión de los aspectos condicionados e incondicionados del valor, para lo cual tan solo hay que leer las primeras líneas de la primera sección de la *Fundamentación* donde Kant asegura que la única cosa buena sin restricción es una buena voluntad (GMS 393). La buena voluntad cargaría con su valor en todas las circunstancias, es algo cuyo valor no se origina por alguna otra situación o contingencia; ninguna eventualidad hace que aumente o rebaje su bondad, no posee grados.¹⁴ Atendiendo a la categorización korsgaardiana, la buena voluntad se ubicaría como un bien intrínseco o incondicional.

Según Korsgaard, la buena voluntad reportaría un valor incondicionado porque la voluntad racional al ser fuente o condición del valor de las demás cosas no puede reportar ella misma un valor condicionado¹⁵, es decir, si la elección racional es lo que otorga valor a todo lo demás, entonces la voluntad racional tiene que ser en sí un valor intrínseco o incondicionado (Korsgaard 2011a, Cap. XIII, p.443). Otros valores que generalmente se toman como finales no poseen esta cualidad, tal es el caso de la felicidad. La felicidad

¹⁴Dice Kant de ella que: “[...] por sí misma, es, sin comparación, muchísimo más valiosa que todo lo que por medio de ella pudiéramos verificar en provecho o gracia de alguna inclinación y, si se quiere, de la suma de todas las inclinaciones.” (GMS 394). Ella es “[...] como una joya brillante por sí misma, como algo que en sí mismo posee pleno valor.” (GMS 394) Como voluntad pura, la buena voluntad “[...] es la única buena en cualquier sentido.” (KpV 5:74.)

¹⁵Esta aproximación a la bondad estaría a la base del argumento de la Fórmula de la Humanidad. El movimiento en términos muy generales sería el siguiente: si aceptamos que nuestra naturaleza racional es al fin y al cabo fuente del valor de los fines, ella poseería un valor incondicional. Pero si tal es el caso, no podemos rechazar por el mismo fundamento que otros seres reportan en tanto seres racionales un valor incondicional. Asumido esto, los resultados del ejercicio de nuestras aptitudes práctico-racionales deberían ser cónsonos con el respeto del valor de la naturaleza racional de los otros y armoniosos con los fines que puedan llegar a promover. Para un desarrollo más detallado del argumento ir a Korsgaard (2011a, Cap. IV). Autores como Rae Langton sospechan que el argumento estaría infectado por una serie de *non sequitur* (Langton 2007, p.169).

pudiera ser tomada como un fin mas no como poseyendo valor intrínseco porque su bondad depende de otra cosa, de una buena voluntad. Diría Kant: “Esta voluntad no ha de ser todo el bien ni el único bien; pero ha de ser el bien supremo y la condición de cualquier otro, incluso del deseo de felicidad.” (GMS 396) Generalmente hacemos muchas cosas para alcanzar la felicidad, pero ella a su vez no es utilizada como medio para alcanzar otra cosa, la vemos como un bien final. Empero, sería un error decir que su valor sea autogenerado, no originado en otra cosa que la felicidad misma. La felicidad como fin sería un bien condicional, extrínseco, cuya cláusula valorativa para conformarse como un bien objetivo sería que esté condicionalmente relacionada con el bien intrínseco o incondicionado de una buena voluntad¹⁶.

Así, la naturaleza de la bondad de los fines que podemos considerar objetivos puede ser tanto no-relacional como relacional, tanto incondicional como condicional “Podemos decir que una cosa es objetivamente buena —echaré mano aquí de una terminología propia— si ésta es incondicionalmente buena o si es una cosa de una valor condicional cuyas condiciones de bondad se cumplen.” (Korsgaard 2011a, Cap. IX, p.473). De acuerdo con esto, a pesar de ser la felicidad condicionalmente valiosa, ella puede llegar a ser objetivamente valiosa cuando las condiciones de su bondad se cumplen. Por lo tanto, para saber cuándo un bien extrínseco es objetivamente valioso debemos retroceder hasta las condiciones de su bondad, y esta explicación resultará satisfactoria cuando nos topemos con un elemento incondicional, que por sí mismo impida la reiterada pregunta por su fundamento y que le otorgue, en consecuencia, una justificación irrefutable de su valor. *Dado que para Kant la buena voluntad es la única cosa que puede ser buena sin condición, ella debe ser la condición de toda otra bondad objetiva en el mundo, incluso de la bondad objetiva de la felicidad.*

De modo que para Kant nuestra humanidad o voluntad racional capaz de elegir fines, como aquello que puede conferir valor pero que a su vez no depende de otra cosa, resulta teniendo un matiz incondicionado¹⁷. Este aspecto incondicionado a su vez permitiría

¹⁶A decir verdad, esta conexión Korsgaard no la aclara como Kant mismo tampoco lo hace a pesar de sugerirla (GMS 393; 396) (KpV 5:111). En realidad, el propio concepto kantiano de felicidad es ambiguo porque a lo menos es posible rastrear un abordaje hedonista y otro abordaje organizativo-constitutivista (Paton 1967, pp. 85-86).

¹⁷ En un artículo muy posterior Korsgaard señala que en la consideración kantiana del valor de la humanidad como fin en sí mismo podemos encontrar al menos dos posiciones que ella resuelve llamar la perspectiva de las propiedades valiosas (*valuable property view*) y la perspectiva de la posición normativa (*normative standing view*) (2011b, p.33). Según el primer enfoque, Kant trataría el poder de elección racional como una propiedad valiosa. En el segundo caso, sería una cualidad que nos asigna una posición normativa como seres que legislan o juzgan lo que es valioso, aspecto que nos comprometería a asignar el mismo estatus a cualquier otro ser racional —lo que sería reconocer sus derechos legislativos de conferir valor a los fines que elige—, y con ello al respeto de sus elecciones o a la promoción de sus fines (*Ibid*, p.36). Los ejemplos de Kant en relación a nuestros deberes para con los otros serían mejor explicados teniendo presente esta última perspectiva, en cambio, sus apreciaciones en cuanto a los deberes del individuo para consigo mismo tendrían una mejor base en la primera. Ahora bien, piensa Korsgaard que es posible una visión ecléctica en relación al valor de la humanidad si se considera nuestra posición normativa en sí como una propiedad valiosa (*Ibid*, p.37), y esto encontraría viabilidad en el hecho de que confirmaríamos el valor de nuestra humanidad en la ejecución del rol de legisladores del valor de nuestros fines. Así, los deberes del individuo para consigo mismo no se basarían en algún supuesto valor depositado en la característica distintiva de la racionalidad,

justificar la objetividad axiológica de otros fines que no son intrínsecos pero que al ser cuestionados exhaustivamente referirían regresivamente a su condición última, al valor intrínseco de la voluntad. Así, por ejemplo, la felicidad del villano no sería objetivamente buena mientras sí lo sería la de algún sujeto cuando las condiciones de su bondad se cumplen, cuando la felicidad esté asistida por una buena voluntad.

El abordaje de Korsgaard es un intento interesante de dar cuenta de la complejidad kantiana del valor y del peso axiológico de la buena voluntad a partir de las aptitudes racionales de los seres humanos. Oliver Sensen en un espíritu similar refresca tremendamente la discusión axiológica de la teoría moral kantiana al desarrollar novedosamente la idea de que el valor depende de exigencias racionales.

IV. La cuestión kantiana del valor según Oliver Sensen

Para Sensen es claro en la obra moral de Kant la defensa del deber de respeto universal hacia los seres humanos independientemente de sus actuaciones viciosas, lo que no es tan claro y es objeto de arduos debates son las razones exactas del respaldo de ese deber (Sensen 2011, p.11). La literatura kantiana contemporánea, continúa Sensen, sostiene en gran medida que todos los seres humanos merecen respeto por poseer un valor absoluto o interno frecuentemente llamado “dignidad”. Es más, este valor es visto por algunos “[...] no solo como la razón por la que uno debería respetar a otros, sino incluso como el valor más fundamental para Kant, y hasta como un valor que es el fundamento del Imperativo Categórico.” (*Ibid*, pp.11-12) Al ser patente que existe un acuerdo básico en la consideración de que se le debe respeto a los otros porque cada uno posee un valor, lo que es objeto de disputa en este nivel de concierto general es la cuestión sobre el lugar donde reside ese valor: si los individuos poseen una dignidad en virtud de una capacidad pre-moral —como puede ser por ejemplo la capacidad racional de fijar fines— o a causa de una buena voluntad o voluntad moral. Sensen, por su parte, rechaza directamente el extendido

sino en el rol o posición de tipo legislativo que ella nos confiere. El acercamiento “combinado” del valor de nuestra humanidad podría encarar asimismo, según entiendo a Korsgaard, diversas sospechas atinentes tanto a la necesidad de valorar nuestra cualidad racional dado su talento de condición del valor, como a la necesidad de respetar a los otros desde la evidencia del valor propio. Respecto del primer punto, no sería el caso que por ser nuestra cualidad racional la condición del valor ella deba ser en sí valiosa, más bien la cuestión sería que al conferir valor mediante nuestra actividad legislativo-racional, entonces se afirmarían el valor que hacemos descansar sobre nosotros mismos, o, más propiamente dicho, sobre nuestra posición normativa como legisladores. Respecto del segundo punto, y aunque Korsgaard no lo plantee explícitamente, no sería el caso que el respeto a los fines del otro se base en una demanda implicada en el mismo reconocimiento del valor propio, más bien, se basaría en el mero reconocimiento de su posición normativa y de los “derechos” que ello aparejaría. De entrada, se torna difícil evaluar esta propuesta exegética porque Korsgaard no trabaja en detalle los argumentos. Por ejemplo, no es potable qué es aquello que haría de nuestra condición racional una “posición normativa” en el sentido de otorgarnos ciertas prerrogativas que tomarían la forma de deber para los otros. Asimismo, tampoco nos queda claro por qué ha de seguirse la valoración de nuestra posición normativa al ejecutar el rol de legisladores en que nos ubicaría nuestra cualidad racional. Mucho menos si Korsgaard prescinde o no de la categorización del valor de la que anteriormente echaba mano —como vimos agrupada en cuatro clases de bienes— y de qué manera operaría en esta lectura en caso de no prescindir de ella, y de hacerlo qué nueva comprensión axiológica propondría. Por último, y para lo que nos interesa específicamente en este trabajo, este esbozo no arroja luces sobre la explicación de la naturaleza del valor de la buena voluntad.

CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS

International Journal of Philosophy

N.º 9, Junio 2019, pp. 196-219

ISSN: 2386-7655

Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.3252926

convenio e inicia indicando que para Kant la noción de valor se deriva de las exigencias de la ley moral (Sensen 2011, Cap. I, part. III). Es decir, no existiría un valor que anteceda y fundamente al Imperativo¹⁸, ocurre justo lo contrario: cuando decimos que algo tiene valor moral exponemos su privilegio por parte del Imperativo Categórico, la ley moral determina lo que debe ser hecho y lo que es objeto del deber amerita tenerse como “valioso” — es lo que sería racional valorar o lo que debe valorar un ser completamente racional (Sensen 2011, p.30) —. Visto así, la noción de valor adquiere un matiz secundario y se opone a su descripción fundacional. Estaríamos en presencia de un giro similar al copernicano en filosofía teórica (KrV BXVI-XVIII): no somos observadores pasivos ni en la tarea del conocimiento de la naturaleza ni en la consideración de lo que debe ser respetado y es valioso, en ambas perspectivas nuestra aproximación al mundo está respaldada por principios de la razón. Afirmaría Kant: “[...] el bien o el mal significan siempre una relación con la *voluntad* en tanto que ésta se vea determinada por la ley de la razón a hacer de algo objeto suyo [...]” (KpV 5:60).

El valor en la ética kantiana, de esta manera, *no sería un fundamento previo* a la ley moral sea entendido como: 1) una propiedad (no natural) inherente de los objetos, “[...] una propiedad que pertenecería al objeto incluso si fuera el único objeto que existiera o si existe en total aislamiento de todo lo demás.” (Sensen 2009a, pp. 263-264); 2) Una prescripción de lo que debe ser valorado; 3) Una relación entre objetos, por ejemplo, una relación de utilidad; 4) Un simple expresión subjetiva deseos o inclinaciones contingentes. Indiquemos en cuenta inversa las falencias de cada opción para servir como fundamento:

A todas luces la concepción subjetiva del valor esbozada en (4) no puede pretender ser fundamento del Imperativo Categórico porque si lo que vale puede variar de persona en persona, no se haría justicia a las notas de universalidad que caracterizan a la moralidad. Por su parte, (3) correría un destino similar porque la relación, al menos la instrumental que es la que trata Kant, está asida a la perspectiva hipotética de la racionalidad y, en consecuencia, los objetos o acciones serían buenos de manera relativa bajo la condición de la satisfacción de disposiciones dadas, pero esto no se avendría con los comandos del Imperativo Categórico que ordenan de manera *incondicional*. Ahora bien, de acuerdo con (2) decir que algo tiene valor sería más bien una forma de expresar que debe ser valorado o respetado. La fuente de dicha exigencia puede ser variada, es decir, provenir de Dios, los padres, la sociedad, algún principio moral, etc. Así tenido, el valor como prescripción no puede tener algún rol de fundamentación moral porque el valor incondicional y necesario que supuestamente requeriría la justificación del Imperativo Categórico, realmente estaría asido a deberes incondicionales y necesarios que tendrían su referencia justificativa en dicho Imperativo, es decir, no se introduciría un valor previo e independiente a la ley moral. Empero, esta noción prescriptiva del valor, piensa Sensen, es justamente la que,

¹⁸Como defendería cierta línea contemporánea donde se incluyen autores e intérpretes como Christine Korsgaard (2000; 2011a), Allan Wood (1999), Richard Dean (2006), Paul Güyer (2000) y Samuel Kerstein (2006).

alejada de toda pretensión de fundamentación moral, ha de ser tomada para dar cuenta de la comprensión kantiana del valor (Sensen 2011, p.30 y ss.).

Por último, la inviabilidad de (1) se debe a que, en primer lugar, es harto posible que ni siquiera Kant haya contemplado la concepción del valor como una propiedad metafísica independiente o separada. De hecho, esta perspectiva no aparece en la lista kantiana de las posibles concepciones del bien o del valor que pudieran estar a la base de los intentos de fundar la moralidad (KpV: 5:39). En segundo lugar, si hubiese un valor independiente y separado que fuera previo a la ley moral, debería al menos estipularse cómo podríamos discernir o percibir este valor y, más allá de eso, por qué hemos de estar motivado a seguirlo. Siguiendo a Sensen, la respuesta kantiana reposaría en un sentimiento de placer mediante el cual podríamos discernir el valor y estaríamos motivarlo a seguirlo (Sensen 2011, p.18). Esto es así porque para Kant el modo en que uno podría relacionarse con un objeto externo es mediante la sensibilidad o receptividad, pero al entender las propiedades valorativas como no-naturales, el candidato idóneo no sería ninguno de los sentidos sino el sentimiento. No obstante, esto no engranaría muy bien con la caracterización universal y necesaria del Imperativo moral porque los sentimientos son subjetivos y contingentes (KpV 5:64); además, señala Kant, iría contra la extendida idea del lenguaje común de que el bien puede ser juzgado por la razón, esto es, a través de conceptos que pueden ser universalmente comunicables (KpV 5:58). Tampoco sería coherente para Kant con la idea de que los seres humanos pueden estar motivados no tan solo por el sentimiento placer, sino *también por efecto de una ley a priori* (KpV 5:63). Por ende, toda actuación conforme al deber estaría condicionada por contingentes sentimientos de placer, y en este sentido solo habría acciones heterónomas. Así visto, el objeto de nuestra voluntad jamás podría ser “bueno por sí” —algo directamente bueno—, sino siempre “bueno para algo”: para lo útil, para la satisfacción del placer (KpV 5:59).

A su vez, estimaría Kant que si el bien fuera un concepto justificativo anterior al principio moral no sería posible el Imperativo Categórico en la medida en que, como se ha dicho, se determinaría lo que es bueno por el sentimiento de placer; no obstante, habría una asimetría entre el aspecto *a priori* del principio moral y el talante *a posteriori* de la experiencia de placer, por lo tanto, este el último aspecto no serviría para fundar la ley moral que, bajo el signo de la universalidad y la necesidad, es *ley a priori* (Sensen 2011, p. 25).

No resulta baladí recordar que la preocupación de Sensen no se dirige a mostrar que estos argumentos kantianos frente a la idea de un valor independiente y anterior que fundamente al Imperativo son solventes y exitosos, más bien se vuelca a mostrar que Kant se apartaría de esa concepción. Así, Sensen termina concluyendo que la noción de valor que Kant maneja, fuera de todo afán de fundamentación, es justamente la prescriptiva. “Es decir: el valor es tan solo lo que la razón considera necesario o prescribe”. (Sensen 2009a, p.272). “El valor en general es lo que la razón juzga [...] Para Kant, «bueno» o «valor» es dependiente de un juicio de la razón.” (Sensen 2011, p.33) O, en igual sentido, es aquello que valoraría un ser completamente racional. Y la naturaleza de cada tipo de valor dependerá de la naturaleza del juicio y de los principios de racionalidad en juego. El juicio

puede ser de tipo condicional cuando lo que se juzgue obligatorio *sea un medio para* un fin dado: la razón da lugar a imperativos hipotéticos y el valor de ese medio, tal como la prescripción que expresaría el imperativo, sería condicionado y relativo a ese fin. Asimismo, si el juicio racional prescribe de manera necesaria una acción independientemente de nuestras inclinaciones, entonces daría lugar a exigencias categóricas cuyo signo valorativo “[...] no es relativo a, ni condicionado por, inclinaciones, sino que es bueno en sí mismo.” (*Ibidem*) En consecuencia, decir que algo o alguien tiene un valor interno o absoluto es decir que debe ser valorado incondicionalmente a causa de un juicio racional incondicionado, y algo está justificado de manera necesaria e incondicional cuando se sigue del Imperativo Categórico en tanto regla absolutamente racional que se abstrae de relaciones y ordena sin someterse a condición alguna (Sensen 2009, p.273; 2011, p.34). Si el Imperativo Categórico es incondicional y necesario e incluye el respeto por las personas, demanda respeto por cada uno de manera incondicional y necesaria. En consecuencia, nuestro valor incondicional residiría en la posibilidad de ser cobijados por la envergadura del Imperativo y no en una capacidad o propiedad innata.

Teniendo en cuenta todo lo anterior, la consideración kantiana del ser humano como un fin en sí no tendría algún tipo de connotación axiológica dispuesta a servir como fundamento normativo, por el contrario, significaría en primer lugar que es un ser libre — capaz de autodeterminarse— y, con ello, un ser capaz de moralidad. Pero esto es una mera *descripción, no un mandato ni un valor* (Sensen 2011, pp. 102-104). De tal modo que la exigencia normativa de tratar al ser humano siempre como fin y nunca solo como medio no podrá ser soportada por un supuesto valor intrínseco de las personas, pero lo relevante es que es una exigencia que Kant plantea. Delatar el equívoco de la lectura más asentada en lo que concierne al valor arrasa con el suelo tradicional de la exigencia kantiana de no instrumentalización, surge la pregunta: ¿entonces cómo se mantendría? La propuesta de Sensen es que la dimensión *normativa* de la caracterización del ser humano como “fin en sí”, la exigencia de la fórmula de la humanidad, en vez de *basarse* en un valor proviene de la fórmula de la ley universal.

Esto es, el requisito de respetar a los otros es «equivalente» al requerimiento de universalizar las máximas propias [...] En otras palabras, el requisito de universalizar nuestras máximas para cada sujeto contiene también el requisito de respetar aquellos sobre quienes uno universaliza. (Sensen 2011, pp.107-108.)

La clave de esta unión está en el hecho aparentemente sencillo pero filosóficamente relevante de que la universalización de máximas no sería factible si la misma no pudiera llegar a ser aprobada por otros o surgir de la voluntad de otros, ello a su vez significa que no actuar cuando estas condiciones no se den, abstenerse cuando la ley moral así lo demande, es respetar a los otros como seres igualmente racionales y condiciones limitantes de las máximas propias, es decir, como fines en sí (*Ibid*, p.108; 2009b, Sec. III). Ahora

bien, ¿qué ocurre con el valor de una buena voluntad? Para Sensen incluso la oración que inaugura la primera sección de la *Fundamentación*, donde se indica el valor incondicional e irrestricto de la buena voluntad, es susceptible de ser leída sin pensarse en una cualidad en sí valiosa anterior a la ley moral: decir que la buena voluntad vale incondicionalmente es decir que tiene que ser valorada sin restricciones o absolutamente a causa de su seguimiento de la ley moral (Sensen 2011, p.37). No obstante, podría cuestionarse la consistencia de esta respuesta ya que el valor incondicionado de la buena voluntad no parece derivarse de las prescripciones de la ley moral.

Al afirmar que Mengano tiene una buena voluntad diríamos, en coherencia con las ideas de Sensen, que Mengano tiene una voluntad que tiene que ser valorada incondicionalmente, y lo que haría que una voluntad sea buena incondicionalmente es que siga mandatos morales. Empero, si solo lo que se sigue de prescripciones incondicionadas tiene un valor incondicionado, ¿cómo entender que el aspecto central para entender el valor incondicionado de la voluntad buena sea su seguimiento de la moralidad, sin alusión alguna a que ella deba ser respetada según los mandatos incondicionales del Imperativo? El exégeta norteamericano le saldría al paso a esta problematización que hemos planteado al indicar que: “La principal demanda que la ley plantea es que las máximas propias deben ser queridas como una ley universal [...] En otras palabras, lo que uno debe hacer es elegir máximas que pudieran ser queridas como ley universal.” (*Ibid*, p.38)

El *cumplimento* del Imperativo Categórico configura lo que en primer lugar *debemos*, esto es, el deber personal e incondicional de todo ser racional de cumplir con la universalización de máximas; el deber primerísimo de respetar a todos los individuos como producto de universalizar máximas, el deber de todos los sujetos de participar en la legislación racional. Por lo tanto, si el valor depende de lo que es racionalmente prescrito, siendo el mandato de la razón moral incondicional, entonces no habría mayor dificultad para afirmar que una buena voluntad es incondicionalmente valiosa: al realizarse se inviste del valor que otorga el rango incondicionado de la exigencia moral que tiene por objeto la universalización de máximas (*Ibidem*). Nuevamente, el valor se sigue del Imperativo. Nótese que Kant en la cita que abre la primera sección de la *Fundamentación* apela a las expresiones “pensar” y “considerar” al momento de plantear las cualidades axiológicas de una buena voluntad, no afirma que exista algo llamado “buena voluntad” que *tenga per se* una bondad irrestricta o absoluta. El carácter incondicional, intrínseco o absoluto —estos términos jugarían un rol equivalente— del valor en ciernes estaría relacionado con la necesidad del juicio que le respalda, un juicio que al mostrarse como exigencia interna de la razón se abstrae de relaciones y elude de esta manera proponer una valoración debilitable e intercambiable característica de los demás fines adheridos a inclinaciones, consecuencias, contingencias, etc.

V. Desafíos interpretativos y reflexiones finales en torno a la voluntad buena

En nuestra senda explicativa luego de aclarar algunos errores en torno a la noción de buena voluntad hicimos patente que tanto Korsgaard como Sensen acuden en sus

complejas interpretaciones de la axiología kantiana, independientemente de las diferencias, a un marco ciertamente común; en ambos casos la justificación de lo que es valioso apela al elemento racional¹⁹. Con esto pretenden negar los extremos de una defensa anclada en estructuras metafísicas independientes del sujeto o basada en la relatividad de nuestras expresiones emotivas. No obstante, podría decirse que el compromiso racionalista de Sensen es más profundo que el de Korsgaard pues *únicamente* lo que es objeto de solicitud racional puede tenerse como valioso. Para la pupila de Rawls, en cambio, no habría una suscripción exhaustiva a un punto de vista racionalista —en el modo que explicamos ella lo entiende— porque lo incondicionalmente valioso *se seguiría vía inferencia regresiva* del hecho de que valoramos a partir de nuestras aptitudes racionales, pero ese mismo valor no dependería de una elección racional. Es decir, es un valor independiente o autónomo de nuestras elecciones racionales. Nos parece que quedaría una puntillosa pregunta en el aire, ¿cuál sería entonces la naturaleza cierta del valor incondicional cuando entendemos que no depende, *en tanto valor*, de una elección racional? ¿Habrá que ceder entonces ante indeseadas opciones metafísicas?

Sin embargo, nuestras principales reservas respecto de la apuesta axiológica korsgaardiana en su tratamiento del valor incondicional se debe a que, a nuestro modo de ver las cosas, da cobertura de manera tosca e indiferenciada a dos consideraciones de la voluntad ya distinguidas: la buena voluntad o voluntad moral y la voluntad como mera capacidad racional de fijar fines. El argumento regresivo, que ha sido arduamente criticado

¹⁹En un trabajo reciente Martin Fleitas adelanta un abordaje del trabajo de Sensen según el cual este colocaría a la base de la moralidad el valor de la libertad. Este sería “[...] un valor 'absoluto' que ciertamente sirve como fundamento de lo moral.” (Fleitas 2016, p.157) Me parece que esta lectura mantiene una flagrante desavenencia con las ideas de Sensen cuya interpretación está espetada, como nos hemos esforzado en exponer aquí, por la idea de que Kant no coloca *ningún tipo de valor* independiente a la base justificativa de la moralidad, ni siquiera el de la libertad (Sensen 2009b, p.109). El fundamento del Imperativo Categórico para Sensen se encuentra en la idea de libertad, pero entendida *en un sentido meramente descriptivo, sin ningún tipo de connotación valorativa* (Sensen 2009a, pp.270-274.; 2009b, pp.108-109; 2011, Ch. I & III). Para Sensen decir que la libertad es un valor interno es lo mismo que señalar que la capacidad de la voluntad racional de dirigirse mediante razones y principios tiene valor, pero este valor no es de ninguna manera independiente de la moralidad y proviene de los comandos del Imperativo Categórico que impone deberes, mediante el procedimiento de universalización, de respetar la naturaleza racional. La libertad posee un valor interno, absoluto o intrínseco —según Sensen, siguiendo a Kant, apuntan a lo mismo— pero a partir de la teoría prescriptiva del valor según la cual, como ya explicamos, decir que algo posee valor interno, absoluto o intrínseco está “[...] referido a una prescripción de lo que uno debería valorar independientemente de inclinaciones [...] decir que algo tiene valor interno es decir que ha de ser valorado incondicionalmente.” (Sensen 2009a, p.272) Y la base de esta prescripción, repetimos, es el principio incondicionado del Imperativo Categórico. Por consiguiente, la libertad si bien es en sentido descriptivo fundamento del principio moral, *como valor absoluto o interno* no funda el Imperativo Categórico sino que se seguiría de él pues este aspecto valorativo provendría, justamente, del hecho mismo de que exista un deber incondicional de cuidar la naturaleza racional o capacidad de fijar fines. Por otro lado, desde la lectura senseniana de Fleitas la buena voluntad posee un valor intrínseco o absoluto ella misma, en sí, sin necesidad de establecer algún tipo de condicionamiento valorativo con base en la moralidad (Fleitas 2016, p.157), pero esto es extraño a Sensen, ya que destaca que el valor de la buena voluntad en Kant, aclaramos puntualmente en el apartado anterior, también se sigue de las prescripciones de la ley moral (Sensen 2011, p.38). Fleitas al intentar precisar la interpretación de Sensen ha caído, sorprendentemente, en la trampa blanco de ataque del proyecto exegético del autor en cuestión: pensar que la filosofía práctica kantiana admite o necesita la existencia de alguna clase de valor autónomo o independiente de nuestras capacidades judicativas.

por el propio Sensen²⁰, otorgaría un valor incondicional a la voluntad como capacidad racional de elegir fines —lo que también se designa como la “humanidad”—, pero eso no explicaría el aspecto incondicional del valor de la buena voluntad aunque la autora pretenda que la inferencia sirva por igual para afirmar la incondicionalidad de ambas. Korsgaard está consciente de esta ligera traba y cree poder enfrentarla así: “Lo que permite a Kant hacer ambas aseveraciones sin problema alguno es lo siguiente: la humanidad es el poder de la elección racional, pero solo cuando la elección es plenamente racional la humanidad se realiza plenamente.” (*Ibid*, p.250) Según esta consideración la buena voluntad es una voluntad realizada plenamente y por ende también incondicional.

Korsgaard para explicar el valor incondicional de una buena voluntad en el fondo solo parece hacer una exposición de lo que ocurre con una voluntad cuando es moral o se realiza: carga con el mismo valor que la voluntad en general, no pierde su aspecto incondicional. Desde luego: ¡sigue siendo expresión de una voluntad! No obstante, si nos fiamos de ese modo de tratar las cosas, no podremos negar, *mutatis mutandi*, que una voluntad inmoral puede ser incondicionalmente valiosa porque el estándar de realización no exhibiría su importancia para el aspecto incondicional de voluntad alguna: al igual que la buena voluntad, sería expresión de una voluntad racional —que elige con base en razones— y con ello buena en todo aspecto. Apenas haría falta señalar que deberíamos reconocer entonces que la felicidad del malo podría ser buena: su bondad estribaría en el sencillo hecho de estar condicionada por una ¿voluntad inmoral incondicionalmente valiosa? Como es evidente, esto introduce serios problemas en la justificación. El conflicto surge esencialmente porque Korsgaard coloca a la mera voluntad racional como fuente del valor y por tanto como teniendo un carácter incondicionado, pero luego repentinamente señala que la buena voluntad al ser un valor incondicionado condiciona los demás valores objetivos del mundo sin justificar muy bien esta súbita variación.

Asimismo, resaltamos que resultaría muy complejo para Korsgaard esbozar alguna salida que permita separar axiológicamente a la buena voluntad de la simple voluntad, lo que serviría tanto para hacer justicia a la descripción kantiana de la buena voluntad como

²⁰“Si una cosa tiene valor solo si es valorado por seres humanos, entonces no se sigue los seres humanos tengan un valor absoluto, como ha sido frecuentemente señalado. En general, no parece ser el caso que si una cosa transfiere una propiedad hacia otra, la primera tenga la misma propiedad incondicionalmente. Por ejemplo, un rector puede otorgar un título de Doctor a un estudiante, pero esto no significa que el rector tenga un doctorado o un doctorado incondicional.” (Sensen 2011, p.64) Lo mismo ocurriría en el caso del mal. Si somos seres que introducimos mal en el mundo, ¿tendríamos una voluntad incondicionalmente mala? (*Ibid*, p. 72.) Críticas similares a este desplazamiento argumentativo también pueden encontrarse en Hills (2008, p.86). Korsgaard modificaría el argumento regresivo de tal modo que en vez de decir que por seres que colocan valor en el mundo “poseemos” un valor incondicionado, realmente debemos “considerarnos” teniendo un valor incondicionado (Korsgaard 2000, p.155). Para Sensen, esta inferencia trastocada es igualmente problemática (Sensen 2011, pp.72-74). Asimismo, notamos que si tomamos al pie de la letra la versión modificada del argumento, según el cual la voluntad racional *no tendría* un valor intrínseco o incondicionado sino que debe ser *considerada* como valiosa de manera incondicionada, se derrumbaría el engranaje conceptual representado por las dos distinciones en la bondad para abordar la estructura del valor en el caso kantiano, ya que justamente lo que diferenciaría al binomio bienes intrínsecos-extrínsecos del binomio bienes instrumentales-finales, es que los primeros apuntan al modo en que “las cosas *tienen* su valor”, y precisamente el bien intrínseco o incondicional, la voluntad racional, era aquel elemento que *portaría* su valor en sí mismo independientemente de cualquier estado o relación.

valor único, especial y distinto de todo lo demás en tanto irrestricto (GMS 393) (KpV 5:74)²¹, como para maniobrar a favor de una justificación de la preeminencia de la buena voluntad sobre la mera voluntad en tanto valor incondicionado que condicionaría a los demás valores objetivos, y por tanto colocarla como el bien fundamental en cuya relación se evite que fines intuitivamente malos puedan ser tasados como objetivamente buenos. Si tenemos en cuenta que para Korsgaard algo con valor incondicional o intrínseco cargaría su valor en cualquier circunstancia —no dependería de otra cosa para ser valioso—, cualquier intento de justificar la manera en que puede distinguirse axiológicamente la buena voluntad respecto de la mera voluntad deberá enfrentar embrollos difíciles de superar. Entendiendo que la voluntad como capacidad de ejercicio racional es incondicionalmente valiosa, ¿qué agregaría la realización moral a su incondicionalidad? ¿Será que aquello que vale de manera incondicional sería “más incondicional” cuando se realiza? ¿Será un valor “más intrínseco” o “independiente”? Como la incondicionalidad según el argumento regresivo es una propiedad de rasgos absolutos cara a la simple voluntad, es arduo ver de qué modo la el valor de una buena voluntad en tanto voluntad realizada se diferenciaría del valor de la mera voluntad.

Apreciamos por lo tanto que el tratamiento korsgaardiano de las nociones de “voluntad” y “buena voluntad” encubre implicaciones perjudiciales cuando manteniéndose diferenciadas apenas escrutamos el origen, naturaleza y posibilidades del peculiar valor que representarían. En el enfoque judicativo de Sensen veremos que estos problemas no se darían porque no sería el caso que el valor refiera a la cualidad *de* algo, la cuestión más bien apuntaría a la posibilidad de valorar algo incondicionalmente desde *planos distintos* teniendo como soporte la necesidad de la ley moral.

La tesis de Sensen decididamente se opone a toda clase de lecturas que incluyen valores anteriores a la ley moral. Ciertamente no resulta fácil y cuenta con múltiples sutiles distinciones que pretenden hacer el mejor sentido posible de la obra kantiana. No obstante, su opción interpretativa, que en lo básico estimo correcta, no ataría todos los cabos respecto de la buena voluntad y resultaría, cuando atendemos a la distinción voluntad-buena voluntad que tanto afectó a Korsgaard, manifiestamente insuficiente. Como ya hemos indicado, Kant al iniciar la *Fundamentación* no se limita a decir que la buena voluntad es buena sin restricción, también indica que *nada más* puede ser considerado de tal manera ni en el mundo ni fuera de él, que la *única* cosa buena sin restricción es una buena voluntad. En la segunda *Crítica* afirma una singularidad similar (KpV 5:74). Usualmente se piensa que algo que vale sin condiciones ha de poseer un valor irrestricto (Wood 2006, p.28 y ss.) (Rickless 2004, p.557) (Korsgaard 2011, pp.471-472), ya que la descripción del último valor como bueno sin límites o en todo aspecto tendría su fundamento en que no dependería de otra cosa o condición para ser. La cuestión que resulta un problema es que si entendemos “bueno sin restricción” centrándonos exclusivamente en, o de manera equivalente a, la idea de valor incondicional o absoluto, y reconocemos con Sensen que lo que vale incondicionalmente se basa en la necesidad del

²¹Ver *supra* nota 14.

juicio normativo, entonces el valor incondicional indicado en el caso de la voluntad racional, cuya nota distintiva es el ejercicio de fijar fines y que debe ser respetada —valorada— incondicionalmente según el Imperativo Categórico, se sumaría como valor irrestricto a la buena voluntad, y esta dejaría de ser la *única* cosa buena sin restricción tal y como Kant explícitamente lo asume. Si lo irrestricto e incondicionado comparten extensión, la simple voluntad racional al valer incondicionalmente sería también irrestrictamente valiosa. Por lo que una solución a tal contrariedad, que coloca en jaque hacer justicia a la caracterización kantiana de la voluntad buena, pasa necesariamente por el divorcio de este rígido matrimonio conceptual.

Pensamos que esto es posible dentro de las coordenadas de una perspectiva judicial del valor. La respuesta podría presentarse inicialmente así: la buena voluntad en tanto voluntad es valorable de manera incondicional por no excluirse del marco protector de la ley moral, y además, valdría también incondicionalmente porque no puede concebirse desatendiendo las exigencias universalistas de la razón, siquiera contrariar esa perspectiva la convierte en algo distinto a una buena voluntad. Es decir, ella vale incondicionalmente al ser una voluntad y por tanto objeto de respeto moral, pero también por su adecuación a las exigencias de acatar mandatos morales, dos perspectivas normativas y necesarias con base en el Imperativo Categórico que ligan valores incondicionales. Esto la volvería irrestricta puesto que no es concebible que desde los planos prácticos que exigen de manera incondicional ella deje de ser valorada: desde ningún enfoque judicial incondicional ella puede dejar de ser incondicionalmente buena, su bondad no tiene límites, es irrestricta. En cambio, el ser humano como entidad racional sería también valorable de manera incondicional porque la ley universal exige su respeto, que es realmente un resguardo al ejercicio de nuestra razón, pero en este caso es posible pensar esa voluntad, en tanto ejercicio racional, alejada de la moralidad. Si bien desde una perspectiva prescriptiva del valor la voluntad racional vale incondicionalmente por la necesidad del amparo normativo-moral que clama su protección, puede llegar a constituir el vicio cuando no respete la necesaria demanda moral de adecuarse a exigencias universalistas, y esto no le haría perder su valor incondicional en tanto ha de ser necesariamente respetada aunque, es relevante destacar, no poseería un valor *irrestricto* porque existe un enfoque o aspecto moral, relacionado con las exigencias del Imperativo Categórico, en el que esa voluntad puede no ser tenida como reportando un valor incondicional: cuando no realiza los actos que exige el principio moral, cuando no atiende a su principal deber; he ahí su talante axiológico *limitado*.

Cuando se señala que el objeto de la ley moral es cuidar la voluntad o naturaleza racional, debemos entender que se refiere a la protección de los obstáculos dañinos que impidan el *ejercicio racional* en la elección de nuestros derroteros prácticos. Este ejercicio incondicionalmente valioso cuando se adecua a los mandatos incondicionales de la ley moral cumple con el deber principal de universalizar máximas, por lo que su valor sería desde este ángulo también juzgado de modo incondicional y, además, irrestricto. Por tanto, se infiere de nuestra propuesta interpretativa que lo irrestrictamente bueno y lo incondicionalmente bueno no tienen que compartir extensión al ser lo irrestricto

incondicional pero no todo lo incondicional necesariamente irrestricto. Que algo tenga valor incondicionado se basa simplemente en la existencia de un respaldo judicial incondicional del que se siga su valor. En cambio, algo tiene valor irrestricto si desde todos los planos judiciales incondicionales, morales, vale incondicionalmente. La buena voluntad sería lo único que poseería valor irrestricto ya que desde ninguno de estos dos planos ella puede dejar de ser incondicionalmente buena, pues 1) no puede pensarse fallando al deber incondicional de la moralidad, dado que está conceptualmente referida en su pretensión práctica al imperativo moral; y 2) ya que el Imperativo Categórico demanda proteger la voluntad racional del ser humano independientemente de sus actuaciones y pretensiones, desde esta perspectiva también sería la buena voluntad incondicionalmente valiosa porque el Imperativo no dejaría de exigir respeto cuando la voluntad racional exprese un apego genuino a la ley. En cambio, la simple naturaleza racional si bien vale de manera incondicional al ser objeto de exigencias de respeto basadas en el principio moral —independientemente de sus actuaciones dañinas²² o virtuosas—, no necesariamente ha de valer de manera irrestricta porque puede fallar cuando evaluemos este ejercicio desde la exigencia categórica, incondicional y personal de respetar los mandatos morales. Es decir, puede fallar en ser una buena voluntad.

Es interesante destacar que Kant inicia el complicado pasaje donde justificaría que la ley universal es aquella cuya representación determina a una voluntad buena con la siguiente pregunta: “Pero, ¿cuál puede ser esa ley cuya representación tiene que determinar la voluntad para que ésta pueda ser llamada buena en absoluto y sin restricción alguna?” (GMS 402, énfasis añadido) En primer lugar, es explícito como Kant rehúsa nuevamente señalar que la voluntad moral *tendría* un valor absoluto e irrestricto, en cambio se limita a interrogar por el principio que *nos permitiría llamar* a esa voluntad absoluta e irrestrictamente buena. Es decir, parece que rechazaría la idea de valor como propiedad, como algo inmanente a la voluntad buena a la vez que establecería que lo que da paso o permite establecer la determinación axiológica absoluta e irrestricta es la referencia a la ley. En segundo lugar, llama la atención que la referencia de la buena voluntad a la ley moral da cuenta de su valor absoluto y, agrega Kant, sin restricción. El autor aquí pareciera apuntar no solo que los conceptos de valor absoluto y de valor sin restricción tienen contenidos distintos, como sería el caso, sino que *únicamente* la voluntad moral puede entenderse en esa doble caracterización axiológica en tanto determinada por la ley moral. Esto último se ve reforzado por el hecho de que Kant no alude en ninguna otra parte a la cualidad del valor irrestricto al considerar algo distinto a la buena voluntad, en cambio, sí plantea claramente que la voluntad racional, en tanto fin en sí, tiene un valor absoluto o interno —sin ninguna atribución de un tenor irrestricto— (GMS 428; 435; 436) (MS 435).

²²Esta afirmación se torna álgida en el caso kantiano cuando tenemos en cuenta el asunto del castigo que básicamente se entiende como una exigencia normativa *de hacer un daño* a causa de una acción reprochable. En el presente escrito omitiré deliberadamente este complejo punto tras la excusa de que desarrollarlo requeriría un espacio considerablemente superior del que disponemos. Para dos planteos diversos sobre la justificación del castigo en la teoría moral kantiana puede revisarse los trabajos de Fleischacker (1992) y Potter (2009).

Percibimos entonces que en la ética kantiana podemos hablar al menos dos planos judicativos universales y necesarios con base en el Imperativo Categórico, y que, por ende, están asociados como referencias de incondicionalidad axiológica: uno activo que apunta hacia el compromiso de acatar el imperativo moral, y uno pasivo que apunta a los objetos de respeto de la ley moral. La buena voluntad saldría necesariamente airosa en ambos planos, por lo que conservaría un valor irrestricto; mientras que la voluntad racional —aun valiéndose absoluta o incondicionalmente— no necesariamente, pues puede faltar al deber primero y personal de seguir incondicionalmente los mandatos de la ley moral. Puede fallar en ser una buena voluntad y, siguiendo la caracterización kantiana, en brillar en sí misma como una joya, brillo que puede entenderse refiriendo a la prominencia axiológica de la buena voluntad al ser esta la única cosa *irrestrictamente* buena en el sentido aquí planteado.

VI. A modo de conclusión

La idea ciertamente conflictiva para Korsgaard según la cual la buena voluntad y la mera voluntad, rasgo racional de los fines en sí, son valores absolutos o incondicionales para Kant pero en algún sentido axiológicamente diferentes, en tanto la primera al ser voluntad realizada moralmente es la único con valor irrestricto, puede ser bien asimilada desde el panorama interpretativo de Sensen pero al ser este robustecido con un instrumental conceptual mejor: aquel basado en la diferencia entre valor irrestricto e incondicionado. Algo incondicionalmente valioso puede no ser valorable desde otro plano así este punto de vista vincule también un valor incondicional, y ello deja de ser problemático cuando nos apartamos de la visión de las cuestiones valorativas asida a propiedades de las cosas y giramos nuestra atención hacia la estructura de los juicios de trasfondo: de este modo, es posible que un objeto sea susceptible de distintas valoraciones a partir de diferentes perspectivas judicativas sin que ellas necesariamente menoscaben el estatus asociado de valor de la otra. Así, cuando sea imposible desde de los distintos planos asociados al Imperativo Categórico dejar de juzgar algo como incondicionalmente valioso, entonces estaríamos además frente a un valor irrestricto: el valor propio de una buena voluntad.

Bibliografía

- Allison, H. (2011). *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: A Commentary*, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
- _____ (1990). *Kant's Theory of Freedom*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Amerik, K. (2003). *Interpreting Kant's Critiques*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Dean, R. (2006). *The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- Fleischacker, S. (1992). "Kant's Theory of Punishment", en *Essays on Kant's Political Philosophy*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago.

- Fleitas, M. (2016). “Una travesía kantiana a través del Escila constructivista y el Caribdis realista. Apuntes para un abordaje kantiano constitutivista de las fuentes de la normatividad”, *Revista de estudios kantianos* Vol. 1 N° 2, pp. 146-173.
- Guyer, P. (2000). “Kant’s Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom”, en *Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Harbinson, W. (1980). “The Good Will”, *Kant-Studien* Vol. 71 (1-4), pp. 47-59.
- Henson, R. (1979). “What Kant Might Have Said: Moral Worth and the Overdetermination of Dutiful Action”, *Philosophical Review* Vol. 88 N° 1, pp. 39-54.
- Herman, B. (1993). *The Practice of Moral Judgment*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge-Massachusetts.
- Hill, Th. Jr. (2013). “Kantian Autonomy and Contemporary Ideas of Autonomy”, en Sensen, O. (ed.): *Kant on Moral Autonomy*, Cambridge University Press, New York.
- Hills, A. (2008). “Kantian Value Realism”, *Ratio* 21 Vol. 2, pp. 182-200.
- Johnson, R. (2009). “Good Will and the Moral worth of Acting from Duty”, en HILL, Th. Jr. (ed.): *The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics*, Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
- Kant, I. (2006). *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Translated by Robert B. Loudon, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- _____ (2006). *Crítica de la razón pura*, Traducción de Pedro Ribas, Taurus, México D.F.
- _____ (2005). *Fundamentación de la Metafísica de las Costumbres*, Tecnos, Madrid.
- _____ (2000). *Crítica de la razón práctica*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
- _____ (1992). *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar*, Monte Ávila Editores, Caracas.
- _____ (1989). *Metafísica de las Costumbres*, Tecnos, Madrid.
- _____ (1981). *La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid.
- _____ (1988). *Lecciones de ética*, Crítica, Barcelona.
- Kerstein, S. (2006). “Deriving the Formula of Humanity”, en HORN, Ch. y SCHÖNECKER, D. (eds.): *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
- Korsgaard, Ch. (2011a). *La creación del reino de los fines*, Ediciones UNAM, UAM y UACH, México D.F.
- _____ (2011b). “Valorar nuestra humanidad”, *Signos Filosóficos* Vol. XIII, N° pp. 13-41. Hay una versión en idioma inglés no editada (recomendada): <http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~korsgaard/CMK.Valuing.Our.Humanity.pdf>
- _____ (2008). “Acting for a Reason”, en *The Constitution of Agency. Essays of Practical Reason and Moral Psychology*, Oxford University Press, New York.
- _____ (2000). *Las fuentes de la normatividad*, Ediciones UNAM, México D.F.
- Langton, R. (2007). “Objective and Unconditioned Value,” *Philosophical Review* Vol. 116 N°2, pp. 157–185.
- Moore, G.E. (2014). “The Conception of Intrinsic Value”, en *Philosophical Studies*, Routledge, New York, pp. 253–275.

- _____ (1971). *Principia Ehtica*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Nuzzo, A. (2008). *Ideal Embodiment. Kant's Theory of Sensibility*, Indiana University Press, Bloomington-Indianapolis.
- O'Neill, O. (1975). *Acting on Principle*, Columbia University Press, New York.
- Pareles, A. (2005). "«Kant» versus Kant, no Aristóteles frente a Kant", *EPISTEME* Vol.25 N° 2, pp. 15-36.
- Paton, H. J. (1967). *The Categorical Imperative*, London, Hutchinson's University Library.
- Platón (1985). *Eutifrón*, en *Diálogos Vol. I*, Gredos, Madrid.
- Potter, N. (2009). "Kant on Punishment", en HILL, Th. Jr. (ed.): *The Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics*, Blackwell Publishing, Sussex.
- Putnam, H. (2008). "Valores y normas", en PUTNAM, H. y HABERMAS, J.: *Normas y valores*, Trotta, Madrid.
- Rawls, J. (2001). *Lecciones sobre la historia de la filosofía moral*, Paidós. Barcelona.
- Rickless, S. (2004). "From the Good Will to the Formula of Universal Law", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* Vol. LXVIII N°3, pp.554-577.
- Sensen, O. (2011). *Kant on Human Dignity*, De Gruyter, Göttingen.
- _____ (2009a). "Kant's Conception of Inner Value", *European Journal of Philosophy* 19:2, pp.262-280.
- _____ (2009b). "Dignity and the Formula of Humanity", en TIMMERMANN, J. (ed.): *Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Sullivan, R. (1994). *An Introduction to Kant's Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Wood, A. (1999). *Kant's Ethical Thought*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- _____ (2003). "The Good Will", *Philosophical Topics* Vol. 31 N° 1/2, pp.457-484.
- _____ (2006). "The Good Without Limitation", en HORN, Ch. y SCHÖNECKER, D. (eds.): *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*, De Gruyter, Berlin.
- _____ (2008). *Kantian Ethics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.



Humanity as a Duty to Oneself

SUNDAY ADENIYI FASORO*

Technical University of Berlin, Germany

Abstract

This paper analyses the thorny interpretative puzzle surrounding the connection between humanity and the good will. It discusses this puzzle: if the good will is the only good without qualification, why does Kant claim that humanity is something possessing an absolute value? It explores the answers to this question within Kantian scholarship; answers that emanate from a commitment to the human capacity for freedom and morality and to actual obedience to the moral law. In its final analysis, it endorses Richard Dean's good will reading as the most reflective of Kant's ethics. It claims that in order for a person to reach the moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. Accordingly, it argues that before a person can be deemed as an object of respect, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person.

Keywords

humanity, good will, moral law, honour, respect, duty to oneself, Kant

Introduction

The second formulation of the categorical imperative, that is the humanity formulation, states that: "So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means" (*GMS* 4:429).¹ It is suggestive of this formulation that every person is an end in itself and

* Technical University of Berlin, Germany. Email for contact: adeniyi.fasoro@win.tu-berlin.de The publication was supported by a grant from the German Academic Exchange Service. Personal ref. no.: 91606230.

¹ References to Kant's works are cited by the volume and page numbers of the German Academy edition: *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*. All translations are taken from *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, Cambridge University Press, with the exception of *Lectures on Natural Law Feyerabend*, which is taken from Lars Vinx' translation (2003). This paper has used the following abbreviations for Kant's works:

an object of respect, insofar as he has humanity in his own person. But Kant has made some contradictory claims that conceal whether humanity in our own persons is unconditionally an object of respect. For instance, Kant says there is a “certain [humanity or] dignity and sublimity in the person who fulfils all his duties” (*GMS* 4:440). In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, he claims that only “the moral law is an object of the greatest respect” (*KpV* 5:73). At the start of the first section of the *Groundwork*, Kant unequivocally claimed that the only unconditional good that is good without qualification and having an absolute value is the good will (*GMS* 4:393).

In the second section of the *Groundwork*, however, Kant also claims that humanity is an end in itself and possesses an absolute value (*GMS* 4:428-9). Kant claims that this is because “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (*GMS* 4:428). For this reason, the human being (inasmuch as he is rational) must never be treated merely as a means but always as an end in itself. In fact, in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant claims that “[we] cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a man; [we] cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a man, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it (*MS* 6:463). But he again made a counterclaim that “he who violates duties to himself, has lost his humanity, and he is no longer suited to perform duties to others” (*Collins* 27:341).

This paper investigates these thorny interpretative puzzles. It explores the different interpretative accounts within Kantian scholarship. It examines the works of Christiane Korsgaard, Barbara Herman, Allen Wood, Thomas Hill, Richard Dean, and a large number of others. After assessing these different interpretative accounts, this paper endorses Richard Dean’s good will reading as the most reflective of Kant’s ethics and thus, considers humanity and the good will as identical concepts. It contributes to the discussion by claiming that humanity is a duty to oneself.

This paper shall claim that in order for a person to reach the moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. It shall argue that he must always respect the right of humanity in his own person before he can be deemed as an object of respect. This paper is rejuvenating Oliver Sensen’s initial claim that ‘dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself’ which he later abandoned.² It identifies the limitation of Sensen – that he could not successfully defend this claim because he did not indicate exactly what constitutes the capacity for morality. It argues that

<i>Br</i>	<i>Briefe (Correspondence)</i>
<i>Collins</i>	<i>Moralphilosophie Collins (Lectures on Ethics Collins)</i>
<i>GMS</i>	<i>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals)</i>
<i>KpV</i>	<i>Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (Critique of Practical Reason)</i>
<i>MS</i>	<i>Die Metaphysik der Sitten (The Metaphysics of Morals)</i>
<i>NF</i>	<i>Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend (Lectures on Natural Law Feyerabend)</i>
<i>Vigil</i>	<i>Die Metaphysik der Sitten Vigilantius (Lectures on Ethics Vigilantius)</i>

Citations from Kant’s texts are taken from the following books: (Kant, 1991, 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2007)

² Sensen, initially, supports this claim: (Sensen, 2011, pp. 169–170), but he has now abandoned it: (Sensen, 2015, p. 107,128)

in order to claim that humanity is always connected to a duty to oneself, it is required to first claim that ‘humanity’ and the good will are identical – because such a claim entails a commitment to actual obedience to the moral law.

Humanity and the Good Will: Thorny Interpretative Puzzle

In the second section of the *Groundwork*, Kant asserts that there must be something in existence which is an end in itself and an absolute value. But his rendering of the magnitude of such a thing is well captured in his *Naturrecht Feyerabend* lecture notes. There, Kant says:

[Something must exist that] is an end in itself, ...[because] it is impossible that all things exist as mere means, [the existence of something that is an end in itself] is as necessary in the system of ends as an *ens a se* is necessary in the progression of efficient causes. A thing that is an end in itself is a *bonum a se*. Something that can only be regarded as a means has value as a means only if it is used as such. But this requires a being that is an end in itself. In nature, one thing is a means for some other things, and this goes on and on. It is therefore necessary to conceive of a thing at the end of the progression that is an end in itself. Otherwise, the progression would not have an end” (NF 27: 1321).

That thing which is the source of value for mere things and an end in itself is the human being. Kant claims that it is because “rational nature exists as an end in itself” (GMS 4:428) that the human being is an end in itself. For this reason, the human being must never be treated merely as a means but always as an end in itself. As Kant puts it:

the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end (GMS 4:428).

Kant asserts that every human being essentially represents his own existence and, in turn, makes the derivation of the categorical imperative possible. It entails that all laws of the will are derived from rational nature. Indeed, Kant derives the second formulation of the categorical imperative on account of that. “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (GMS 4:429).

But there has been disagreement among Kantians on how to interpret the Formula of Humanity, and whether this ‘rational nature’ (or humanity) is what Christine Korsgaard understands as the capacity to set ends (Korsgaard, 1996), what Allen Wood describes as the capacity to set ends in addition to other capacities that are associated with this end-setting (for instance, the capacity to coordinate those ends into an adoptable end) (Wood,

1999), what William Nelson regards as the capacity for self-governance (Nelson, 2008), and what Thomas E. Hill, Jr., describes as the capacity to legislate and act on moral laws.³

Besides this problem of the meaning of humanity, there has also been an interpretative problem about what constitutes absolute value and unconditional good. At the opening of the first section of the *Groundwork*, Kant unequivocally claimed that the only unconditional good that is good without qualification (good in itself) and having an absolute value is the good will (*GMS* 4:393). In the second section, however, Kant again claims that humanity is an absolute value (*GMS* 4:428). If, for Kant, the good will is the only good without qualification, why does he say that humanity is the only thing possessing an absolute value?

The position widely held in the literature is that humanity is possessed by all human beings prior to human life: that we have humanity in virtue of the substantive value (the capacity for rationality) which we possess. Despite the popularity of this position and its immense acceptance, there are divergent views among its adherents about how the human being has humanity. Some of the recent Kantians who have attempted to offer new insights into this thorny interpretative puzzle include Korsgaard, Hill, Wood, Herman, Sensen, Klemme, Timmermann, Watkins, Bojanowski, Formosa, Nelson, Schönecker, and some others. Putting aside the differences in their interpretations, Korsgaard, Hill, Wood, and perhaps most significantly, Herman continue to be the most influential Anglo-American Kantians who consider the substantive value of rational nature as the unconditional good.

Korsgaard, for instance, argues that the reason why the object of our choice is unconditionally good (or without qualification) “is that it is the object of a rational choice” (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 196). As she explains it,

since we still *do* make choices and have the attitude that what we choose is good in spite of our incapacity to find the unconditioned condition of the object’s goodness in this (empirical) regress upon the conditions, it must be that we are supposing that rational choice itself *makes* its object good (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 196).

Korsgaard argues that Kant considers our rational choice to be a “value-conferring status” (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 196, 1996, p. 125). She suggests that under the Formula of Humanity we must acknowledge in our conduct the value-conferring status.

In her analysis of the principle of humanity, she contends that Kant’s claim must be read thus:

in our private rational choices and in general in our actions we view ourselves as having a value-conferring status in virtue of our rational nature. We act as if our own choice were the sufficient condition of the goodness of its object: this attitude is built into (a subjective principle of) rational action [...]. If you view yourself as having a value-conferring status in virtue of your power of rational

³ (Hill, 2002). See also, (Dean, 2006b), (Dean, 2006a, pp. 5–6).

choice, you must view anyone who has the power of rational choice as having, in virtue of that power, a value-conferring status. This will mean that what you make good by means of your rational choice must be harmonious with what another can make good by means of her rational choice – for the good is a consistent, harmonious object shared by all rational beings. Thus, it must always be possible for others to contain in themselves the end of the very same action (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 196).

Her rendering of the passage just quoted is that what we are to treat as an end in itself, which is considered to be an unconditional value and unconditional good, is nothing but our rational nature. This implies that, for her, rational nature is the limiting condition on our rational choice and action; since “no choice is rational [if it] violates the status of rational nature as an end” (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 197). To put it differently, since rational nature is an unconditional end, it would be contradictory if one acts against it.

The fundamental claim of Korsgaard’s argument is that rational nature, or the capacity to make a rational choice, is the unconditional good, rather than the good will. But on Korsgaard’s reading, I do not see how a rational being can respect his inner disposition to act on moral principles if the most important thing is the liberty to exercise the power of choice, rather than to strive to acquire a good will or his commitment to act on moral principles.

Hill has also raised sceptical notes about the good will for its excessive moralistic demand. He suggests that Kant has overrated the good will by stating it is the only good without qualification (Hill, 2002, p. 58). Considering that the good will, for Kant, “is the moral disposition expressed in morally worthy acts and the indispensable condition of being a good person” (Hill, 2002, p. 4), it must be of special value. In his interpretation of the special value of a good will in Kant, Hill argues that:

it is not that our decisions should be dominated by a self-righteous concern for our own moral purity but rather that we should not pursue any goods by means that we recognise to be morally wrong. The thesis, I suggest, is best understood, not as a guide to praise and blame, but as an indeterminate practical principle that becomes action-guiding only when supplemented by a standard of right and wrong (e.g. the Categorical Imperative) (Hill, 2002, p. 4).

In the just quoted texts, Hill proposes a new perspective on how he understands a good will, as something that is a practical and choice-guiding principle, which can be used only in combination with Kant’s broader picture of the fundamental aspects of a moral attitude. In our deliberative moral considerations, Hill suggests that we must override “excessive moralistic attitudes towards others or undue preoccupation with one’s own moral purity” (Hill, 2002, p. 38). Instead, the good will needs to be understood as being action-guiding in the manner that it can serve to determine human will or prescribe how human beings ought to choose to act, rather than just being a moral assessing concept that is based on

praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. However, what particular features of a will can qualify it for the special evaluation of ‘good without qualification’?

According to Hill, “a good will is a will to act as reason prescribes... [because] a good will[...] is a ‘will’ to act well; and the relevant standards of ‘acting well’ are those of ‘reason’” (Hill, 2002, p. 46). His interpretation of Kant is that “there is an equivalence between what it is rational to will to do and what it is good to will to do; but we cannot determine the latter first independently of the former” (Hill, 2002, p. 47). The centrality of Hill’s argument is his interpretation of how Kant understands or interprets a person’s ‘will’ – as the capacity to act for reasons, good or bad. In a similar vein, Herman posits that the will’s activity to adopt an end is an expression of the capacity to act for reasons. Since a person’s will rests on their capacity to act for reasons, rational nature exists as “a value of a special magnitude” (Herman, 1993, p. 237). Therefore, “rational nature is the regulative and unconditioned end of willing, for it is the condition of its own goodness, goodness independent of any further end” (Herman, 1993, p. 238).

Both Hill and Herman seem to overemphasise the importance of the capacity to act for reasons over the need to act on moral principles. In the *Groundwork*, Kant did differentiate the capacity to make choices about adoptable ends (*Willkür*) from the capacity to self-legislate moral principles (*Wille*). There, he emphasised the *Wille* as the basis of obeying the moral law, on the condition that a rational being makes proper use of his *Willkür* to act on moral principles legislated by the *Wille*. The dilemma in Hill and Herman’s reading (and perhaps, Korsgaard’s too) is that we are not certain about whether what we are to treat as an end in itself is the *Willkür* or the *Wille* or even both (Dean, 2009, p. 85).

The trending held view among Kantians is that a man has a substantive value, in virtue of rational willing alone. Some would defend this: Herman, Hill, Korsgaard and Wood, but others would dispute it, such as Sensen and Dean (who believe that the moral law is the substantive value to be treated as an end in itself, although Dean thinks that what we are to treat as an end in itself is only actual obedience to the moral law, whereas Sensen thinks it is the capacity for morality that is respected, whether or not the person obeys the moral law. Sensen’s position is widely held among Kantians; Dean’s position much less so). Those defending the widely held view tend to argue that the moral law does not exist, but rational nature does, as a substantive value and as the ultimate determining ground of “the wrong-or-right-making characteristics of action that renders moral requirements intelligible in a way that is then able to guide deliberation” (Herman, 1993, p. 216).

Herman, for instance, argues that Kant presents the notion of “rational nature as an end in itself because the moral law cannot be the final determining ground of a will unless it provides the will with an end that is a noncontingent condition of choice-worthiness or goodness, that is, a final end” (Herman, 1993, p. 228). Herman interprets Kant as saying that rational nature is itself a substantive value, and hence, the grounds of practical reason and morality. Furthermore, both Herman and Wood claim that since all laws of the will proceed from pure reason, the moral law cannot be conceived as constraining the will in determining choice-worthiness or goodness. Wood, Herman, Guyer, and Hill have also

raised sceptical notes about the prospect of moral constraint on the human will if it is devoid of value: “Without a theory of value the rationale for the moral constraint is a mystery” (Herman, 1993, pp. 210–11). The implication of their interpretations is that humanity and a good will are two sides of the same coin, as they are very closely related but different.

However, a new picture emerges if one appraises Kant’s description of humanity and good will very closely. In the following, I shall defend Richard Dean’s novel solution to this problematic interpretive puzzle. Dean trenchantly challenges the consensus and argues that it is misguided. I shall endorse his argument that humanity and the good will are identical. Dean’s interpretive solution is key to this paper; specifically, it helps to defend its claim that humanity is always connected to duties to oneself. Since humanity and the good will are identical, it is actual obedience to the moral law that we must treat as an end in itself. Therefore, in order for a person to act on moral principles, he must first fulfil his duties to himself because they are the highest duties of all, according to Kant.

Humanity as the Good Will

If, for Kant, the good will is the only good without qualification, why does he say that humanity is the only thing possessing an absolute value? Dean’s answer to this question is that, for Kant, humanity, really is the good will. He argues that the two terms are identical, and therefore, humanity is something to be realised by those who consistently strive to acquire a good will, and not something that all human beings possess intrinsically or prior to life. As Dean puts it,

‘humanity’ is Kant’s name for the more fully rational nature that is only possessed by a being who actually accepts moral principles as providing sufficient reasons for action. The humanity that should be treated as an end in itself is a properly ordered will, which gives priority to moral considerations over self-interest. To employ Kant’s terminology, the end in itself is a good will (Dean, 2006a, p. 6).

Dean’s good will reading of the principle of humanity is a thoughtful challenge to the consensus that exists in Kant scholarship and in contemporary moral debates that every human being merits basic moral respect in virtue of having an inner value and the dignity of humanity. Some commentators have embraced Kant’s humanity formulation solely because it serves as a “compelling intuition about the inalienable worth of humanity” (Dean, 2006a, p. 3). But Dean contends that Kant’s use of ‘humanity’ is warily ambiguous because it does not primarily speak of ‘human beings’, but rather describes some property that rational human beings have.

In his book, entitled *The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory*, Dean equates the principle of humanity with the fundamental principle of morality. He provides a compelling explanation for why the principle of humanity should be regarded as the good will and how Kant derived certain moral duties from it. Before Dean’s publication, Korsgaard, Wood, Hill, and O’Neill tried to correct the misleading use of ‘humanity’ to

refer to all members of the human species. They argue that, for Kant, it is not all human beings that must be treated as ends in themselves, but ‘rational nature’ – as a property ‘in’ a person (O’Neill, 1990, p. 137; Hill, 1992, p. 39; Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 110–11; Wood, 1999, pp. 119–20). Kant, indeed, emphasises this point in (*GMS* 4:429–39). It seems correct that only rational beings have humanity. But it becomes controversial when philosophers began to describe ‘rational nature’ or humanity as follows: Korsgaard describes it as the capacity to set ends; Wood describes it as principally this end-setting capacity, Guyer describes it as “normative essentialism” (Guyer, 2016a, p. 428), Nelson describes it as the capacity for self-governance, Hill describes it as the capacity to legislate and act on moral laws, and several others: Sensen, Hill, etc. describe it as the capacity for morality.

The peculiar issue with these descriptions is that they do not specify exactly how the human being possesses these capacities and, in particular, the capacity for morality. Before Dean’s publication, the fundamental problem of the irreconcilability of these different readings of ‘humanity’ was considered to be superfluous. Perhaps, since they all agree that ‘humanity’ is a certain feature of rationality, it seems to them that there are no controversial claims to be challenged. But Dean finds it controversial and believes it is mistaken to refer to ‘humanity’ in the Formula of Humanity to all minimally rational beings, rather than as some feature possessed by rational beings (Dean, 2006b, p. 6).

Dean begins his analysis by noting that some Kantians do not specify which features represent humanity and who has humanity. As he puts it: “It has become common to think that ‘humanity’ refers to some minimal feature or features of rationality, necessarily possessed by any rational agent. I think this is mistaken, and that ‘humanity’ instead refers to a good will, the will of a being who is committed to moral principles” (Dean, 2006b, p. 18). Dean contends against Wood and Korsgaard, in particular, who have argued that humanity is something that every minimally rational being inevitably has. Both Korsgaard and Wood have maintained that every rational being alive, including all functioning adult human beings, must automatically be considered as having humanity in their own person. For instance, they claimed that the Formula of Humanity cannot be equated with a good will (Korsgaard, 1996, pp. 123–4; Wood, 1999, pp. 120–1) because “‘humanity’ belongs to all mature members of human biological species” (Wood, 1999, p. 119).

In his analysis, Dean identifies three categories of the minimal reading of the humanity formulation: First, those who consider humanity as the capacity to set ends or make choices. Second, those who identify humanity with some necessary features of rationality and its description as the capacity to legislate moral principles to oneself. The second category also includes “the power to act on the Hypothetical Imperative, the ability to compare one’s various contingent ends and organize them into a systemic whole, and the ability to employ theoretical reason to understand the world” (Dean, 2006b, p. 25). Third, those who describe humanity as the capacity to act morally (Dean, 2006b, p. 25). He, specifically, criticises the adherents of the third category for failing to tell us what exactly constitutes the capacity for morality.

One important poser that Dean has made against the minimal reading, in general, is that it does not provide us with any reason to never act immorally. This seems correct to me. If all the emphases are placed on the importance of different capacities that are derived from some features of rationality, what becomes of the importance of the actual commitment to act as morality demands or actual obedience to the moral law? If one chooses to act in accordance with any of the three categories, there is no motivation to act morally since rational nature is the highest value that all persons possess and that cannot be forfeited. So, there is no moral incentive for a rational agent to choose to act morally since if he acts immorally, he would not be losing something of incomparable value. This, indeed, marks the difference between Dean's good will reading and the minimal reading. As Dean emphasises it:

An agent choosing to act immorally could be fully aware that she still possesses the capacity to act morally, so she need not take herself to be losing her most valuable possession. It is not surprising, of course, that any minimal reading of 'humanity' must see humanity as something that cannot be lost. That is what distinguishes the minimal readings from the good will reading. The minimal readings make humanity something that every rational agent necessarily possesses. So, the good will reading offers a reason for refraining from immoral actions that the minimal reading does not (Dean, 2006b, p. 45).

Furthermore, Dean argues that Kant attributes the highest magnitude of value to humanity and affirms it as an ideal that all human beings should strive for. By this, Dean is claiming that, for Kant, 'humanity' is an ideal because all rational beings "must seek to reach a moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law" (Dean, 2006b, p. 47). He argues trenchantly against the third category of the minimal readings of 'humanity' for claiming that humanity has the capacity to act on moral principles or the capacity for morality. If humanity is something that all persons (inasmuch as they are rational) possess unconditionally, it is impossible to conceive how humanity can be a moral ideal. To put it differently, if everyone already has humanity, it is counter-intuitive to concurrently say rational beings would strive toward humanity as a moral ideal.

But 'humanity' is a moral ideal for Kant, as is the good will (Dean, 2006b, p. 47). Kant preaches that all human beings must strive toward the moral ideal of acting rightly and to prioritise obedience to the moral law. As Dean explains it:

We must strive to make moral law a sufficient motive for our choices and must try to act in the ways that morality demands. These are precisely the distinguishing features of a good will. The fact that Kant uses the name 'humanity' for this ideal standard shows that he means 'humanity' to be a name for a morally good will. Both a good will and humanity provide the archetype toward which imperfect humans must strive, both good will and humanity possess an incomparably high value, and they are in fact the same thing (Dean, 2006b, p. 48).

In the quoted texts, Dean's argument is that humanity does not possess incomparably high value in all instances, but even if it did, it only shows that one must "strive toward the moral ideal of humanity at all times" (Dean, 2006b, p. 48).

One other important benefit of Dean's good will reading is that it helps to justify why one may exclude the immoral ends of others from the duty to promote their ends. His reading renders Kant's ethics more realistically relevant, as it points to "a treatment of Kant's 'kingdom of ends' as a constructivist device for moving from general moral principles to more particular guides to action" (Dean, 2006b, pp. 9–10). In addition, it does not allow the mistreatment of others who lack good wills; rather it offers the derivation of the duties of acting respectfully to others, even if they do not wholly merit this respect (Dean, 2006b, p. 50).

In fact, the benefit of the fundamental moral principle of good will as humanity includes the incentive it provides that every rational being must "strive for a good will, must seek to accept moral reasons as sufficient reasons for acting. Therefore, with regard to oneself, [Dean's reading] does give very direct guidance" (Dean, 2006b, p. 258). As Dean argues:

In order to preserve one's good will, one is obligated to 'strive with all one's might that the thought of duty for its own sake is the sufficient incentive of every action conforming to duty'. In addition, the humanity formulation would seem to lead in the most direct way possible to a duty not to damage permanently one's basic powers of rationality, since to damage one's will is also to damage one's good will (Dean, 2006b, pp. 138–9).

In light of this, I shall argue, in what follows, that humanity is always a duty to oneself and that all human beings must strive to acquire a good will at all times by acting from duty alone and respecting the right of humanity in their own person.

Humanity as a Duty to Oneself

Dean's criticism of the third category of the minimal reading is central to the claim that I make in this paper. It is central because it provides a clue as to why Sensen could no longer defend his initial claim that dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself. Sensen had earlier claimed that having the capacity for morality yields a sort of duty to oneself (Sensen, 2011, pp. 169–70). But, contrary to the account he gave in his book, *Kant on Human Dignity*, Sensen has now conceded to Bacin (Bacin, 2015, pp. 97, 101; Sensen, 2015, pp. 169–170) that: "[he does] not believe any longer that... dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself, and [he] grants that [dignity] has often been used as an intuitively plausible but incomplete shorthand argument for the requirement to respect others" (Sensen, 2015, pp. 107, 128).

I maintain that in order to 'reach a moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law' one must always honour one's duties to oneself. I think the reason for Sensen's concession to Bacin is that he does not indicate exactly what constitutes the capacity for morality. He does not clearly distinguish whether the capacity for morality is

merely the act of striving for it (whether or not the person obeys the moral law) or an actual commitment to act on moral principles. As I understand it, his rendering of ‘this capacity’ seems to be the former, but in order to claim that humanity is always connected to a duty to oneself, it is necessary to first claim that ‘humanity’ and the good will are identical – because such a claim entails a commitment to actual obedience to the moral law. With that limitation sorted out, I maintain that ‘humanity’ is always connected to a duty to oneself.

I contend that in order for a rational agent to be an object of respect from others, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person. The humanity formulation states that: “So act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (*GMS* 4:429). The first example as to whether this can be carried out that Kant illustrated was the “concept of necessity of duty to oneself” (*GMS* 4:429). This is no coincidence. Kant was concerned that the principle of humanity would be ineffectual if we despised the very humanity in our own person without giving it the proper respect it duly deserves (Atwell, 1986, pp. 125–137). According to Kant, every person has a duty to live in such a way that is “consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself” (*GMS* 4:429).

Not only that! Even if I act in a way that ensures my action will not contradict humanity in my own person as an end in itself, I still need to ensure that my action is in harmony with the principle of humanity (*GMS* 4:430). Kant draws a distinction between the preservation of one’s humanity and furtherance of humanity as an end in itself. As rational beings, we have a predisposition to striving to become moral beings, which is in the final end of nature with regards to humanity in our own person (Bayefsky, 2013, p. 825). If we neglect this predisposition and merely ensure that our actions are not in conflict with humanity, we simply act in a way that is “consistent with the preservation of humanity as an end in itself and not for furtherance of this end” (*GMS* 4:430).

By emphasising the need to harmonise our actions with the principle of humanity, Kant is asserting that the practical necessity of acting according to the principle of humanity is first a duty to oneself. This practical necessity fundamentally rests on the idea of *equality*. He puts it thus: “it merely rests on the relation of rational beings to one another” who are equal members of the kingdom of ends (*GMS* 4:434). If the value of every rational being is a prescription of reason, it means that “every maxim of the will [that is] giving universal law [is giving the law] to every other will and to every action toward oneself” (*GMS* 4:434).

This means that the “principle of humanity... is the supreme limiting condition on the freedom of the actions of each [member of the kingdom of ends]” (*GMS* 4:430-1). The ends of one person are subject to the ends of another. But in order for a will not to be subordinated to any other object, the principle of humanity and the principle of universalizability must be identical. I have satisfied this requirement by endorsing Dean’s good will reading. The reason the two principles must be identical is that Kant believes the restriction of freedom can only be made possible through a universal rule. As he puts it:

“There must be universal rule under which the freedom of [one member] can coexist [with the freedom of another member]” (*NF* 27:1320). And the only universal rule, for Kant, runs as follows: “Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law” (*GMS* 4:421). Therefore, the humanity formulation and universalizability formulation are identical.

In all moral judgements, we are bound to ask: what becomes of the action that is universalizable? According to Kant, whenever “an action is made into a universal rule, the intention agrees with itself, the action is morally permissible; but if not, then it is morally impermissible” (*Collins* 27:1428). But “an immoral action, therefore, is one whose intention abolishes and destroys itself if it is made into a universal rule” (*Collins* 27:1428). Therefore, “a moral action has a value not when it originates from inclination but when it originates from duty... We must perform moral actions, without the least incentives, but only out of duty and respect for the moral law” (*NF* 27:1326). If we must only act for the sake of duty and respect for the moral law, does this include a duty to respect the right of humanity in our own person? If we are ends in ourselves, duties to ourselves seem superfluous to respect since if we do not respect it, we are still ends in ourselves regardless and can never be treated as a means to someone else’s ends.

Kant establishes morality as the precursor for universalizability of our maxims. This is because whatever is contrary to morality cannot serve as a universal rule. For Kant, the task of universalizability of maxims is a duty to oneself, a striving to always act on moral principles. Although, Kant admits that duties to oneself are harder to discuss because we take them for granted, and as such, they are least familiar to us. In Collins’ lecture notes, Kant asks some questions, “for example, can a person, for the sake of profit, do harm to himself in his own body? Can he sell a tooth, or offer himself for money to the highest bid? What does morality consist in here?” (*Collins* 27:1427). In his answers to these questions, Kant says that:

I examine by the understanding whether the intention of the action is so constituted that it could be a universal rule. The intention is to magnify one’s advantage, and I now see that in such a case the man is making himself into a thing, and an instrument of animal gratification; but as men we are not things, but persons; so here one dishonours humanity in one’s own person (*Collins* 27:1427).

As Kant often accentuates, “fulfilment of duties to oneself is a necessary condition for the fulfilment of one’s duties to others” (Guyer, 2010, 2016b). If I have not perfected myself to become a moral being, I cannot fully know my duties to others or be motivated to fulfil them, and if I have not endeavoured to perfect my talents or skills (the capacities: reason, freedom, etc.), I will not be suited to practically fulfil my duties to others, even when I know them and I am motivated to fulfil them. One particular reason for this is that the respect I owe to others is an indirect duty to myself because its opposite is prohibited. My respect for the self-esteem of others is also, indirectly, respect for my own self-esteem. Hence, my respect for others and my duties towards them are, first of all, a duty to myself

(Paton, 1990, p. 228). My duties towards them are, therefore, obligations that prohibit me from either exalting myself above them or being scandalous towards them (*MS* 6:450, 465, 467; see also *MS* 6:394).

Even though Kant describes one's duties to oneself as "the highest duties of all" (*Vigil* 27:604), he still encounters difficulties discussing it explicitly because it involves self-contradiction. As Kant puts it:

For I can recognise that I am under obligation to others only insofar as I at the same time put myself under obligation, since the law by virtue of which I regard myself as being under obligation proceeds in every case from my own practical reason; and in being constrained by my own reason, I am also the one constraining myself (*MS* 6:417-8; see also, *Vigil* 27:521, 579).

If I am the one who is imposing an obligation and at the same time, I am the one bonded by the obligation, then I am one and the same person who imposes the obligation and is also bonded by it. Since I am the same person, it is likely that I release myself from the obligation I have placed upon myself. Can I act in a way that my action would be for the sake of duty alone, without involving myself in contradiction?

Kant suggests that the contradiction is of motives rather than duty (*Collins* 27:261). In the later part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant laid out the foundational role of duties to oneself and submits that regardless of this contradiction, man has duties to himself. As he puts it: "For suppose there were no such duties: then there would be no duties whatsoever, and so no external duties either" (*MS* 6:417). Here, Kant is stating an antinomy to the thesis that states there are no duties to oneself at all. If I have no duties to myself, I have no external duties whatsoever; but I have duties to others, hence I have duties to myself. (Timmermann, 2006, p. 509) But some commentators have not been impressed with Kant's solution to the self-contradiction associated with the duties to oneself (Singer, 1963, p. 138; Gewirth, 1978, p. 334). For instance, his explanation has been severely criticised and called a "blatant non-sequitur" by Marcus G. Singer (Singer, 1963, p. 138). However, these objections are not really fatal to Kant's elucidation of duties to oneself, as many of his critics do agree that agents do have perfect duties to respect the right of humanity in their own persons.

Albeit, Kant is unapologetic about the need to respect one's duties to oneself. For instance, in his reply to Johann Benjamin Erhard's letter, dated December 21, 1792, Kant puts two footnotes that further elaborate his exposition of "Duties to Oneself" that he had already discussed in the *Metaphysics of Morals*. In those two footnotes, Kant says that:

The moral law prescribes to me not only how I should be treated by others but also how I should allow myself to be treated by others; it forbids not only that I misuse others but also that I allow them to misuse me, that is, that I destroy myself. Therefore, I am just as much commanded not to suffer an injustice as not to commit injustice [...]. Therefore, I and all men have the task of finding a

means of making my physical powers equal to my moral obligations. From this there derives the moral drive and the need for society (*Br* 11:399).

It is clear that, for Kant, the moral law prescribes that in order for anyone to be worthy of respect, he must first fulfil his own duties to himself because this is the only way to obtain the esteem of others. In other words, for a rational agent to be an object of respect from others, he must first respect his own duties to himself.

My duties to others are, first of all, a duty to myself. According to Kant, my duties to others are connected to the duty I have towards myself because:

I have a self-love for myself which I cannot separate from my need to be loved by others as well, I hence make myself an end for others; and the only way this maxim can be binding is through its qualification as a universal law, therefore through my own will I make others my ends as well (*MS* 6:393).

By acting in accordance with the moral law, I am an end for myself as well as for others; generally, I assume it is my duty to make everyone my end. Since my capacity for ends stems from practical reason, my relation to myself and others can only be an end through practical reason. It would then be a contradiction if practical reason were to take no interest in my relational activities – otherwise, it would cease to be practical reason. Practical reason cannot prescribe ends for me and others without first giving duties (*MS* 6:395), and such duties are moral obligations because “in assessing the worth of one’s actions, one must not only assess them by their legality alone but also by their morality” (*MS* 6:393). For Kant, it is not enough to treat another as an end by respecting the other’s rights. I might respect the other’s rights because the law requires it and not because I am acting from duty.

In order for the human being to be an object of respect who obtains esteem from others, he must act from duty alone. Specifically, from respect for his own duties to himself. As Kant asserts in the *Groundwork*, the human being can only have “[humanity]... insofar [as] he fulfils all his duties” (*GMS* 4:440). But all his duties include those that he has towards himself and those he has towards others. In Collins’ lecture notes, Kant says, “all duties [he has toward himself] makes... reference to respect in [his] own eyes, and approval in that of others” (*Collins* 27:281). This is because he must always strive to act in such a way that “[he] would be worthy of honour and deserve respect and esteem from [others]” (*Collins* 27:281). For instance, if he degrades his own person, anything can be asked of him: “For he who violates duties to himself, has lost his humanity, and he is no longer suited to perform duties to others” (*Collins* 27:341).

The degree of offence that is committed in failing to fulfil one’s duties to oneself and one’s duties to others are not judged the same by Kant. Kant says that one may still possess certain inner worth if one has diligently observed one’s duty to oneself, even when one has performed one’s duties to others poorly. But if one has violated one’s duty to oneself, one has no claim to humanity (*Vigil* 27:667). Since one deliberately violates a self-regarding duty, one disposes oneself to “the shame of humanity, and acts contrary to the right thereof” (*Vigil* 27:667). Therefore, the human being has a baseless right claim to

humanity after he has deliberately forfeited it. For the violation of his duties to himself takes away his worth from him, but the violation of his duties to others take away his worth only in that regard (*Collins* 27:341).

Kant's claim is that the human being has a general duty to himself, not to dispose himself so that he "may be capable of respecting all moral duties... [for this to happen, he must] establish moral purity and principles in himself and strive to act accordingly" (*Collins* 27:348). Kant calls this "the primary duty to oneself", which involves "self-testing" and "self-examination" (*Collins* 27:341). These two forms of duties to oneself have been further appraised by Stephen Darwall as "Two Kinds of Respect," namely 'recognition respect' and 'appraisal respect' (Darwall, 1977). Kant's intention of introducing these two forms of duties to oneself is to ensure that our dispositions have moral purity. Since we have a lesser inner worth as imperfect human beings, Kant asserts that we must examine the bases of our dispositions if they rest on "honour or delusion, on superstition or pure morality" (*Collins* 27:348). Kant concludes that if we neglect the significance of the highest duties of all (i.e. one's duty to oneself), we are doing great harm to morality. In order to avoid harming morality, Kant says the human being must have autocracy over all his inclinations by ruling himself. As good actions are not those done from inclinations but on moral principles.

Can Someone Lose His Right of Humanity?

But what offence can a man commit that would make him violate the right of humanity in his own person? According to Kant, there is no excuse whatsoever for anyone to subvert the humanity in his own person. Acting contrary to duty for whatever price cannot match up to the primacy of one's morality and humanity (*Vigil* 27:629; *Br* 10:332; *MS* 6:464). A man subverts himself of freedom, morality and humanity when he transgresses from all his duties, particularly those towards himself. Kant argues that if this happens, he forfeits his true honour and virtue. Since transgression of duty is the antonym to fulfilment of duty, it is an obstacle in fulfilling the obligation to commit himself to actual obedience to the moral law (*Vigil* 27:608; 27:629-30).

As I have argued earlier, a person's duty to others is an indirect duty to himself. But the degree of the offence that a person commits in failing to fulfil his duties to himself is higher than the degree of offence he commits in failing to fulfil his duties to others. This is because Kant believes that the transgression of duty that is committed disregards his duty of respect for himself, and so, in turn, "he violates a higher duty than that which he owes to others" (*Vigil* 27:605; *MS* 6:427). Kant says:

Assuming there are duties to oneself, the duties of right in that regard are the highest duties of all. They relate to the corresponding right of humanity in our own person, and are therefore perfect duties, and every act of duty is indispensably required by the right of humanity and is a duty in and for itself. Any transgression is thus a violation of the right of humanity in our own person; we thereby make ourselves unworthy of the possession of our person that is entrusted

to us, and become worthless, since the preservation of our own worth consists solely in observing the rights of our humanity. We lose all inner worth and can at most be regarded as an instrument for others, whose chattel we have become (*Vigil* 27:604).

Kant strongly suggests that duty to oneself is not negotiable but must be respected at all times, and a transgression that leads us to become an instrument for others. It follows that if all moral actions must be done from duty and originate solely from the moral law, then any transgression of duty and of the moral law must be imputed (Guyer, 2005, p. 123). This is because any object of action coming from inclination would be deemed impermissible, for it must be assumed that the transgressed action is performed willingly, contrary to the moral law. As he puts it: “everything that contravenes the moral law is transgression of duty” (*Mrong* 29:615). Transgressing the moral law simply means the transgressor knowingly chooses to adopt contrary law into the maxims of his action. But why does Kant think respect for the moral law is identical with the respect for humanity, either in our own person or in the persons of another?

In the *Critique of Practical Reason*, Kant describes “the moral law [as] an object of the greatest respect” (*KpV* 5:73). And “the moral law is in our eyes estimable, treasurable and worthy of respect” (*Collins* 27:322). So one’s respect for one’s duty to others is a respect for the law because “everyone must have respect for the rights of others” (*Collins* 27:417, 462). Since respect for others must be called “actions of honour” insofar that “it deters us from transgression of the moral law” (*Vigil* 27:527). It follows that our observance of the law is the source of reciprocal respect that we have toward one another. Therefore, Kant must be interpreted as saying that duties to others or oneself can only be realised if there is respect for a universal rule or law. The mutual respect for humanity lies in the mutual restriction of reciprocal respect through the observance of the law. And this is only possible through the harmonisation of the principle of humanity with the principle of universalizability.

Conclusion

In this paper, I claim that in order for the humanity formulation to be plausible, it must be harmonised with the principle of universalizability because humanity and the good will are identical. I argue that in order for a person to reach a moral ideal of acting rightly and giving priority to moral law, he must always honour his duties to himself. I rejuvenate Sensen’s initial claim that ‘dignity is always connected to a duty to oneself’ which he later abandoned. I identify the limitation of Sensen – that he could not successfully defend this claim because he did not indicate exactly what constitutes the capacity for morality. I argue that in order to claim that humanity is always connected to a duty to oneself, it is required to first claim that ‘humanity’ and the good will are identical – because such a claim entails a commitment to actual obedience to the moral law. After establishing this fact, I argue that ‘humanity’ is always a duty to oneself. I show that in order for a rational agent to be an object of respect, he must first respect the right of humanity in his own person. I provide

textual evidence that, for Kant, immoral actions are considered superficial moral precepts because they are impervious to the demanding precept of duty and lack any respect for the dignity of humanity in our own person and in the person of others. I conclude that insofar as ‘humanity is always a duty to oneself’, the highest duty one has is to never commit a transgression of duty to oneself.

References

- Atwell, John E. (1986), *Ends and Principles in Kant's Moral Thought*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
- Bacin, Stefano. (2015), “Kant’s Idea of Human Dignity: Between Tradition and Originality.” *Kant-Studien* 106 (1): 97–106.
- Bayefsky, Rachel. (2013), “Dignity, Honour, and Human Rights: Kant’s Perspective.” *Political Theory* 41 (6): 809–837.
- Darwall, Stephen. (1977), “Two Kinds of Respect.” *Ethics* 88 (1): 36–49.
- Dean, Richard. (2006a), *The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dean, Richard. (2006b), *The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dean, Richard. (2009), “The Formula of Humanity as an End in Itself.” In *Blackwell Guide to Kant's Ethics*, edited by Thomas E. Jr. Hill, 83–101. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
- Gewirth, Alan. (1978), *Reason and Morality*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Guyer, Paul. (2005), *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom: Selected Essays*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Guyer, Paul. (2010), “Moral Feelings in the Metaphysics of Morals.” In *Kant's Metaphysics of Morals: A Critical Guide*, edited by Lara Denis, 130–151. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Guyer, Paul. (2016a), “Kant’s Politics of Freedom.” *An International Journal of Jurisprudence and Philosophy of Law* 29 (3): 427–432.
- Guyer, Paul. (2016b), *Virtues of Freedom: Selected Essays on Kant*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Herman, Barbara. (1993), *The Practice of Moral Judgment*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hill, Thomas E. Jr. (1992), *Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant's Moral Theory*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Hill, Thomas E. Jr. (2002), *Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1991), *The Metaphysics of Morals*. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1997), *Lectures on Ethics*. Edited by Peter Heath and J. B. Schneewind. Translated by Peter Heath. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Kant, Immanuel. (1998), *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. Edited by Mary Gregor and Christine M. Korsgaard. Translated by Mary Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. (1999), *Correspondence*. Edited and translated by Arnulf Zweig. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. (2000), *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Eric Matthews. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kant, Immanuel. (2002), *Critique of Practical Reason*. Translated by Werner S. Pluhar. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company.
- Kant, Immanuel. (2003), *Lectures on Natural Law Feyerabend*. Translated by Lars Vinx. Unpublished.
- Kant, Immanuel. (2007), *Anthropology, History, and Education*. Edited by Günter Zöller and Robert B. Louden. Translated by Mary Gregor, Paul Guyer, Günter Zöller, Robert B. Louden, Arnulf Zweig, Holly Wilson, and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Korsgaard, Christine M. (1986), “Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” *Kant-Studien* 77 (1–4): 183–202.
- Korsgaard, Christine M. (1996), *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Nelson, William. (2008), “Kant’s Formula of Humanity.” *Mind* 117 (465): 85–106.
- O’Neill, Onora. (1990), *Constructions of Reason: Explorations of Kant’s Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Paton, Margaret. (1990), “A Reconsideration of Kant’s Treatment of Duties to Oneself.” *The Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (159): 222–233.
- Sensen, Oliver. (2011), *Kant on Human Dignity*. Berlin: De Gruyter.
- Sensen, Oliver. (2015), “Kant on Human Dignity Reconsidered: A Reply to My Critics.” *Kant-Studien* 106 (1): 107–129.
- Singer, Marcus G. (1963), “Duties and Duties to Oneself.” *Ethics* 73 (2): 133–142.
- Timmermann, Jens. (2006), “Kantian Duties to the Self, Explained and Defended.” *Philosophy* 81: 505–531.
- Wood, Allen W. (1999), *Kant’s Ethical Thought*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



Perdón, impunidad y el difícil concierto de deberes

Forgiveness, Impunity and the Difficult Harmony of Duties

FRANKLIN IBÁÑEZ*

Universidad del Pacífico, Perú

Resumen

¿Perdonar es un deber? No, si significa la simple liberación de las deudas o debidas sanciones. En cambio, si perdonar se refiere a forjar un carácter indulgente, orientado a la cancelación de odios y rencores para con quienes nos han agraviado, entonces es posible que el sistema moral kantiano pueda justificarlo como deber. En el marco de la “Metafísica de las costumbres”, perdonar podría considerarse un deber imperfecto. En ese sentido, sería a la vez compatible con otros deberes, perfectos e imperfectos, como hacer cumplir la justicia o colaborar para que esta se cumpla. Distinguir entre perdón e impunidad constituye una tarea fundamental en contextos de justicia transicional. El artículo sostiene que perdonar es un deber y que este no contradice a la justicia.

Palabras clave

Metafísica de las costumbres – Deberes perfectos – Deberes imperfectos – Perdón – Impunidad

Abstract

Is forgiving a duty? Not if it means to remit debts or rightful penalties. Instead, if pardoning denotes to cultivate a merciful character, oriented to cancel hate and rancor towards someone who has harmed us, it is possible to justify such attitude as a duty from the Kantian moral system. In the framework of “Metaphysics of Morals”, forgiving might be considered an imperfect duty. In this sense, it might be compatible with other duties, perfect and imperfect, such as enforcing justice or collaborating with that compliance. Distinguishing among forgiveness and impunity is a

* Profesor en la Universidad del Pacífico y la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. E-mail de contacto: fe.ibanezb@up.edu.pe

fundamental task in the context of transitional justice. This paper holds that forgiving is a duty that does not contradict justice.

Keywords

Metaphysics of Morals – Perfect duties – Imperfect duties – Forgiveness – Impunity

¿Existe el deber de perdonar? ¿No reñiría con la exigencia moral de hacer cumplir la justicia? ¿Puede la moral kantiana guiarnos en la búsqueda de respuestas? Veamos. El *Diccionario de la Lengua Española* define *perdonar* como “[...] remitir la deuda, ofensa, falta, delito u otra cosa” o “exceptuar a alguien de lo que comúnmente se hace con todos, o eximirlo de la obligación que tiene” (2014). El diccionario recoge los sentidos más comunes en el mundo hispano que, en suma, significan, para este caso, que el responsable de una falta es liberado de su posible sanción o reparación. Solemos perdonarnos fácilmente entre familiares, vecinos y amigos por daños menores que nos provocamos entre nosotros. Siendo leves las faltas, se espera que la disculpa sea suficiente. No obstante, si se considera el perdón a otro nivel, se notará que su otorgamiento se complejiza conforme aumenta el tipo o grado de falta. Peleas y agravios engendran expectativas, de reparación y justicia, que desbordan el arrepentimiento expresado en palabras o gestos. Muertes y daños mayores dificultan incluso más la remisión de la falta.

El perdón, así, enfrenta dilema por sus complicaciones morales o legales ¿Perdonar a un delincuente representa una forma de impunidad? Si los crímenes han sido mayores contra un grupo o toda una sociedad, sea que hayan sido perpetuados por un grupo armado o por el Estado de forma sistemática, ¿qué sentido denota el perdón a los culpables? ¿Liberarlos del castigo? En tal caso no habría sanciones disuasivas para quien se siente tentado por el mal y sabe que será eventualmente exonerado. La espiral de agravios se elevaría. ¿No parece así la justicia?¹

En el presente texto, se desarrolla una aproximación kantiana a la paradoja que opone el perdón a la justicia. Intuitivamente se entiende que combatir la impunidad es un deber de justicia: no dejar una falta sin su respectivo castigo. Luego ¿disculpar o, al menos, procurar hacerlo es una obligación moral? Sostendré que sí lo es. Ahora, si ambos son deberes, ¿prima alguno de ellos? ¿Es posible armonizarlos para que nuestras exigencias morales fundamentales laboren al unísono? ¿Existe algún modo de eliminar las disonancias y componer con ambos una sinfonía? Después de todo, Kant sostenía que la razón, siendo única, no se contradice.

Propondré una salida al dilema moral que frecuentemente nos obliga a elegir entre perdón o justicia. Para ello resignificaré el perdón. En vez de seguir la definición del diccionario español –liberación de la deuda–, lo concebiré como el acto o proceso por el cual una persona decide cambiar una actitud negativa hacia otra que la ha agraviado.² Así,

¹ Hago eco temprano del lema kantiano *Fiat iustitia, pereat mundus* –literalmente, “¡Hágase justicia aunque perezca el mundo!”– de la *Paz Perpetua* (Kant 1998). Reformularé la frase al final de este trabajo.

² El argumento del presente texto asume el perdón como una actitud relacional, dirigida hacia otra persona, en el espíritu del deber universal de la benevolencia. Sin embargo, aunque no me ocupo del caso de un posible perdón a uno mismo, el argumento principal que expondré también sería válido para tal situación.

la sustancia del perdón se concentra en cancelar deliberadamente los sentimientos negativos como el rencor o el odio hacia el agresor,³ en modo semejante a lo que recoge, por ejemplo, el Diccionario de Oxford para el mundo anglófono: “*Stop feeling angry or resentful towards (someone) for an offence, flaw, or mistake*” (2019). Eventualmente esta disculpa puede estar acompañada de la liberación de la deuda, lo cual es el elemento central de la definición recogida por el diccionario español. En cambio, en nuestra definición alterna, la remisión del castigo constituye un elemento secundario, no esencial. Por otro lado, aceptemos que aquellos sentimientos negativos de odio pueden eventualmente reaparecer, pues los recuerdos buenos o malos suelen visitarnos sin tocar la puerta. La cancelación a la que me refiero no significa desaparecer completamente la memoria de la falta ni toda emoción negativa asociada, sino la capacidad de decidir que estas no guiarán de por vida nuestro futuro o nuestra conducta, ni tampoco provocarán en nosotros una actitud vengativa hacia el agresor. Por eso, es posible perdonar y, a la vez, exigir la debida pena o castigo legal cuando los actos del agresor han dado lugar a estos. En suma sostendré, primero, que el perdón puede concebirse como un deber imperfecto y, segundo, que este no riñe con el deber perfecto de hacer cumplir la justicia.

Estas líneas presentan una reflexión libre a partir del pensamiento de Immanuel Kant. Me propongo pensar con él a partir de ideas que están en su obra o intuiciones que podrían derivarse de ella. En la primera sección se expone el marco conceptual kantiano sobre el concepto del deber y su división entre perfectos e imperfectos. En la segunda sección, retomando la redefinición del perdón y su relación con la justicia, se examinan casos como la violencia doméstica, la pedofilia, o los crímenes masivos perpetuados por grupos terroristas y el propio Estado. Estas últimas cuestiones son particularmente apremiantes en países que aún atraviesan procesos complejos de reconciliación nacional y justicia transicional, como sucede en varias naciones latinoamericanas.

1. Los deberes, su esencia y clasificación

En la *Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres* y la *Crítica de la razón práctica*, Kant se esfuerza por mostrar un sistema moral deducido enteramente desde principios racionales, sin atender a situaciones concretas o las pasiones que suscitan. ¿Cuál es la esencia de los deberes? La forma común a todos ellos se obtiene del imperativo

Parte del razonamiento reposa en el deber de amar a la humanidad, la filantropía o benevolencia universal. Kant advirtió bien que la humanidad no estaría completa sin uno mismo: “Dado que todos los demás sin mí no serían *todos* [...], la ley del deber de benevolencia me incluirá a mí también como objeto suyo”. Y “la razón legisladora, que incluye en su idea de la humanidad en general a la especie entera (también a mí), siguiendo el principio de igualdad me incluye también a mí, como legislador universal, en el deber de benevolencia recíproca, igual que a todos los demás junto a mí, y te permite ser benevolente contigo mismo” (MS AA 06: 451).

³ Para ello existe un requisito previo: la consciencia de haber sufrido una falta. Sin tal percepción, no hay perdón. Por ejemplo, una mujer que ha interiorizado sentimientos de inferioridad y enajenación respecto de su marido, se autoconsidera su propiedad. Por tanto, asume como normal el maltrato físico que padece. No observa un problema moral en la conducta de su esposo. Piensa: “No hay nada que disculpar. Es mi dueño. Soy suya”. Efectivamente, allí no existe posibilidad de perdón, aunque no por las razones que la víctima expone.

categorico, el cual se presenta en tres formulaciones, de las cuales solo emplearé la primera.⁴ Reza así: “*Obra como si la máxima de tu acción pudiera convertirse por tu voluntad en una ley universal de la naturaleza*” (GMS AA 04: 421).⁵ Cada uno debe actuar, seguir una máxima, como cree que todo el mundo debiera hacerlo. La fórmula invita a que cada uno se sitúe en la posición de legisladores universales. Kant ilustra la validez y practicidad del imperativo con ejemplos de deberes en relación con uno mismo y con los demás. Para el tema del artículo, interesan especialmente los segundos.

Una persona necesita dinero con urgencia y puede engañar a un amigo y pedirle “prestado” sabiendo que no podrá devolverlo. “Cuando me crea sumido en un apuro económico, pediré dinero a crédito y prometeré devolverlo, aunque sepa que nunca sucederá tal cosa” (GMS AA 04: 422). Esta máxima se somete al imperativo categorico para examinar su validez moral. ¿Querría que todas las personas estafaran a otros al solicitar créditos insolubles cuando creen que los necesitan? No, pues se suscitan dos problemas. Primero, es contradictorio desear embaucar a otros y ser embaucado a la vez, es decir, no tiene sentido anhelar un mundo donde yo sea víctima y verdugo a la vez. Tampoco ansiaría una sociedad así donde mis seres queridos pierdan todo por culpa de algún timador. Como no puedo querer ese mundo, se evidencia una contradicción volitiva: mi voluntad desestima tal escenario. Segundo, asumiendo que fuera posible superar el escollo anterior, y se implementara la estafa como conducta habitual, ¿qué sucedería en un mundo así? Si las personas saben que la moral permite no reembolsar las deudas, es altamente probable que nadie otorgue préstamos: ni los bancos ni los individuos particulares. Sin la obligación de devolver créditos, los mismos desaparecerían. Por tanto, la implementación de tal sistema conlleva a su propia extinción. No se podría instaurar un mundo así. Es una contradicción lógica.⁶

El segundo caso atañe a la solidaridad. Kant acepta que el mundo funcionaría sin altruismo. Un pueblo donde el egoísmo y la indiferencia devienen la norma es imaginable y factible. “¿Qué cada cual sea tan dichoso como el cielo lo quiera o pueda hacerse a sí mismo, que yo no le quitaré nada ni tan siquiera le envidiaré, sólo que no me apetece contribuir en algo a su bienestar o a su auxilio en la indigencia!” (GMS AA 04: 423). Kant avizoraba lo que hoy se atestigua en sociedades o grupos altamente mercantilizados donde la solidaridad se interpreta como una pérdida para el dadivoso: pérdida de su tiempo, su energía, su dinero. Ciertos hombres de negocios se han vuelto exitosos precisamente

⁴ En el cuerpo principal prescindo de las otras dos versiones, que refieren a la persona como fin en sí y al reino de fines. Kant subraya la equivalencia entre las tres formulaciones del imperativo categorico. Si un deber ha sido validado por una versión, doy por descontado que también lo será por las otras dos.

⁵ Este “pudiera convertirse por tu voluntad” es interpretado o refraseado a veces como “un querer”. Así, por ejemplo, “*Obra según aquella máxima por la cual puedas querer que al mismo tiempo se convierta en una ley universal*” (GMS AA 04: 421). No se trata solo de establecer que el sujeto quiera la acción como universal. Ese “querer” pertenece a una voluntad racional o, mejor dicho, a una voluntad que solo es tal cuando es racional. La voluntad es libre cuando se deja guiar por la razón. Así podría reformularse: “*Obra según aquella máxima que puedas querer [racionalmente] que al mismo tiempo se convierta en una ley universal*”.

⁶ Sobre las contradicciones lógicas y volitivas, ver *La distinción entre deber estricto y deber amplio. Nota sobre un desacuerdo acerca de la esencia del formalismo ético* (Quirós 1999).

siendo mezquinos y calculadores. A diferencia del caso de la estafa, que entrañaba su imposibilidad lógica si se permitía, la indiferencia puede devenir usual, como de hecho alguna vez sucede. Sin embargo, se mantiene el escollo de la contradicción volitiva: no es racionalmente deseable un mundo así. La razón en mí comprende que puede requerir circunstancialmente el auxilio de otros. Del mismo modo, ¿no quisiera racionalmente una sociedad que acoja la solidaridad para mis seres queridos en caso de que algo les suceda? Sí. Por tanto, en este caso, la prevalencia de la generosidad sobre el egoísmo se debe a un querer racional, no a la imposibilidad lógica de una sociedad de seres exclusivamente autointeresados.⁷

Como se acaba de notar, honrar las deudas es un deber; también, ser solidario. Luego, ¿qué los distingue? ¿Ostenta uno prioridad sobre el otro? Para evaluar la incompatibilidad entre un posible deber de perdonar y otro de implementar las sanciones de la justicia, conviene ahora traer a colación la distinción kantiana entre deberes perfectos e imperfectos. Los deberes perfectos son de cumplimiento estricto: siempre y en todo lugar. No dejan espacio a ningún criterio personal de aplicación. Por ejemplo: “No debo matar”. Los deberes imperfectos se caracterizan porque sus circunstancias de aplicación son amplias. Por ejemplo: “Debo ser solidario”. Sin embargo, tras haber afirmado la última obligación, es factible añadir la pregunta: “¿Cómo?”. Una persona menesterosa solicita nuestra ayuda para comer. Dudo entre darle dinero para que compre algo o regalarle parte del refrigerio que llevo conmigo. ¿Qué solución concuerda más con el deber moral de ser solidario? Ninguna en particular, pues ambas satisfacen la exigencia universal de ser generoso. Complejicemos la situación. Una persona indigente solicita mi auxilio. Cuando estoy abriendo la billetera para darle algún dinero, observo que, unos metros más adelante, se encuentra otro mendigo cuya mirada me interpela de la misma manera. Entonces, ¿debo entregar toda la donación al primero que lo solicitó? ¿O dividir la suma entre los indigentes? Entrambas acciones satisfacen el criterio de solidaridad. En su época Kant también dejaba abiertas algunas preguntas sobre el cómo cumplir un deber imperfecto. Por ejemplo: “¿Hasta dónde podemos gastar los propios bienes en beneficencia?” (MS AA 06: 454).

Se constata la amplitud de opciones de las que se dispone para satisfacer un deber imperfecto, como el ser solidario. Dice Kant: “[...] deja un margen (*latitudo*) al arbitrio libre para el cumplimiento (la observancia), es decir, no puede indicar con precisión cómo y cuánto se debe obrar [...]” (MS AA 06: 390). En cambio, no existe ningún modo de estafar moralmente válido.

Algunos han notado que la diferencia fundamental entre un deber perfecto y uno imperfecto es que el primero evita una contradicción lógica –descarta acciones cuya implementación es impracticable o simplemente acabaría con el mundo, lo cual las

⁷ Además, habrá que distinguir la solidaridad del paternalismo. Este último no consiste en socorrer a alguien, sino en vivir por él o dirigir su vida. El benefactor debe respetar siempre al otro, tratarlo como un fin, un ser autónomo. La generosidad tampoco se confunde con limosna lastimera: “Es un deber evitar la humillación al receptor, adoptando una conducta que presente esta acción benéfica o bien como una simple obligación o bien como un pequeño obsequio, para mantener en él su respeto por sí mismo” (MS AA 06: 448-449).

convierte en racionalmente imposibles—; mientras que el segundo, una volitiva —promueve acciones deseables, descarta sus contrarios (Quirós 1999). Para fines del argumento principal, se puede subrayar otra distinción. Algunos deberes poseen la capacidad de convertirse en normas externas, ser parte del derecho positivo ordinario, que, a su vez, los determina y vigila celosamente. Otras obligaciones solo se mantienen como normas internas, cuyo cumplimiento queda en el ámbito de la conciencia del agente. Los primeros son los deberes perfectos, también llamados deberes jurídicos; los segundos, los imperfectos o éticos.

Ahondemos en el tema. Kant sostiene que la legislación moral se caracteriza por dos elementos.⁸ El primero es la representación de su contenido como necesario, lo cual convierte una máxima o guía de acción en un deber. Este elemento, la necesidad de un deber, se satisface cuando se valida a través del imperativo categórico. Cualquier deber, si es en verdad tal, sea perfecto o imperfecto, es necesario universalmente. El segundo elemento de la legislación es el móvil, aquello que constriñe la voluntad al cumplimiento de las obligaciones. A partir de este rasgo, se concibe una división de la legislación moral en sus especies ética y jurídica.⁹ En la legislación ética, ambos elementos, necesidad y móvil, están presupuestos en el deber o la acción misma. En la legislación jurídica, en cambio, el móvil es externo: la coacción del derecho y el sistema judicial. Cortina distingue aquellas dos del siguiente modo: “La legislación jurídica se presenta, pues, como externa, ya que sólo pretende [o requiere] adhesión exterior, mientras que la legislación moral es interna, porque exige una adhesión íntima. Las leyes jurídicas no podrán abrir más espacio que el de la libertad en su uso externo, mientras que las leyes morales abren el ámbito tanto interno como externo” (Cortina 2005: p. XXXIX).

A la legislación jurídica le interesa dictaminar las normas mínimas o indispensables que viabilizan la convivencia, es decir, aquellas que la hacen posible. Todas estas obligaciones están libres de contradicción lógica, propiedad común de los deberes perfectos. Resguardan, por ejemplo, los derechos fundamentales de las personas tales como no ser asesinado, agredido, embaucado, etc. Desde el punto de vista legal, estos derechos suponen una contraparte expresada en deberes: no matar, no agredir, no embaucar. Se convierten así en acciones punibles si se transgreden. La legislación jurídica responde a la pregunta: ¿cuáles son los deberes indispensables y sus prohibiciones para que la sociedad marche?¹⁰ Aunque a nadie gustase racionalmente la sociedad resultante, se sabe que, al menos, funcionará.

Por otro lado, la legislación ética no se orienta a los derechos, sino a los fines: regula las disposiciones que el ser humano, como individuo o especie, debe desarrollar.

⁸ Para esta parte sigo de cerca aunque no literalmente a Kant (MS AA 06: 218-221).

⁹ Genera confusiones el hecho de que la misma expresión, *legislación moral*, connota dos ideas dispares relacionadas. Primero, su enunciación abarca tanto a la legislación jurídica —a veces llamada *legalidad*— como también a la legislación ética —a veces llamada *moralidad*. Segundo, se la utiliza a veces solo como sinónimo de *legislación ética*.

¹⁰ Para Kant, cualquier acción es permitida por el derecho siempre que sea conforme a la máxima según la cual “la libertad de la gente ha de poder coexistir con la libertad de cualquier otro siguiendo una ley universal” (MS AA 06: 382). Recuerda ciertamente al principio del daño de Mill (2013).


Señalé en el párrafo anterior que la razón práctica manda no robar, no matar, y otros deberes jurídicos que no son fines, sino restricciones a mis acciones o contribuciones imprescindibles en función de la convivencia necesaria. En cambio, ¿cómo es posible sostener ahora que la razón propone fines obligatorios universales, deberes éticos? Los fines apuntalan el mundo racional que todos debiéramos querer racionalmente construir y alcanzar, no solo uno que funcione. El fundamento o justificación de la idea de que haya fines que son a la vez deberes recae en la imposibilidad de que todos los fines valgan lo mismo. Si tal fuera el caso, todos los fines serían relativos, simples medios entre ellos, esto es, no habría propiamente fines absolutos ni racionales. El ser humano solo actuaría cuidando lo mínimamente funcional. Su razón sería defectuosa, pues nunca le propondría metas éticamente valiosas.¹¹ De allí que los deberes imperfectos solucionen ese vacío. Apuntan a las virtudes como fines necesarios. Se pueden traducir en las preguntas: ¿cómo te gustaría racionalmente que funcione el mundo? ¿Qué virtudes son universales?

Para los deberes jurídicos, es posible una legislación exterior; para los deberes éticos, tal legislación es imposible. A los primeros, una vez traducidos en derecho positivo, les basta vigilar el acto externo; a los segundos les compete solo la intención interna. Allí surge un problema. Ni el propio sujeto ni el juez podrá comprobar a ciencia cierta la intención –actuar por deber–, sino solo la adecuación a la norma social promulgada –actuar conforme al deber. Al derecho le es suficiente que la acción externa se ajuste a la obligación universal. El cumplimiento de los deberes éticos o de virtud, en cambio, permanece oculto.¹² Los deberes perfectos son y deben ser resguardados por las autoridades. Se obliga a que las personas adecúen su conducta a ellos incluso si internamente el móvil para la acción es inmoral. Su cumplimiento es verificable, exacto, estricto. En cambio, como señala Cortina, “los deberes éticos son deberes de virtud, para los que la legislación ética prescribe la máxima, pero no la acción concreta. Es, pues, el sujeto quien decide la energía que invertirá en cada acción y establecer prioridades” (Cortina 2005: p. XLII).

La siguiente tabla ilustra y resume la clasificación de deberes (MS AA 06: 240).

¹¹ En palabras de Kant: “Tiene que haber, pues, un fin semejante [un fin que sea un deber mandado por la razón] y un imperativo categórico que le corresponda. En efecto, puesto que hay acciones libres, tiene que haber también fines a los que se dirijan como objeto. Pero entre estos fines tiene que haber algunos que a la vez sean deberes (es decir, según su concepto). – Porque si no hubiera fines semejantes, y puesto que ninguna acción humana puede carecer de fin, todos los fines valdrían para la razón práctica sólo como medios para otros fines, y sería imposible un imperativo *categórico*; lo cual anularía toda doctrina de las costumbres” (MS AA 06: 385).

¹² Sentencia Kant: “[...] porque no le es posible al hombre penetrar de tal modo en la profundidad de su propio corazón que alguna vez pudiera estar completamente seguro de la pureza de su propio propósito moral y de la limpieza de su intención, aunque fuera en *una* acción; aun cuando no dude en modo alguno de la legalidad de la misma” (MS AA 06: 392).



2. ¿Es un deber perdonar? La actitud clemente, sí

Kant casi no menciona el perdón. Apenas utiliza la expresión en sus textos éticos. Y lo poco que dice no parece claro ni alentador a primera vista para quienes hoy promueven la reconciliación. En la *Metafísica de las costumbres*, señala lo paradójico que es perdonar – usualmente entendido como exculpar o liberar del castigo– y, a la vez, cumplir con la justicia –usualmente asociada con imponer sanciones. Kant sabía bien que “toda acción que viola el derecho de un hombre merece un castigo” (MS AA 06: 460). Sin embargo, deja una puerta abierta para el perdón en los términos en que lo he interpretado: el acto o proceso de erradicar la actitud de odio o rencor u otros sentimientos negativos hacia el agresor, sentimientos que son caldo de cultivo de la venganza. Kant sostiene: “De ahí que la clemencia (*placabilitas*) sea un deber del hombre; sin embargo, no debe confundirse con la benigna tolerancia de las ofensas (*mítis iniuriarum pafientia*), entendida como renuncia a los medios severos (*rigorosa*) para evitar la continua ofensa de otros; porque esto supondría arrojar los propios derechos a los pies de otros y violar el deber del hombre hacia sí mismo” (MS AA 06: 461). Las categorías expuestas en la sección anterior ayudarán a entender esta cita.

Para ello es necesario especificar tres deberes. Comienzo por distinguir dos cercanos: realizar la justicia –en sentido jurídico–, y desear o colaborar para que esta se lleve a cabo. Ambos constituyen obligaciones dignas de ser universalizables en los términos del imperativo categórico. Luego, la primera es perfecta y corresponde únicamente a los responsables del sistema judicial; la segunda, imperfecta y compete a los agentes morales involucrados. La primera es cuestión jurídica o parte de la doctrina de derecho; la segunda, cuestión ética o de virtud.¹³ Añado una tercera obligación: el perdón o la forja de una actitud acorde con él. Más allá de demandar el perdón inmediato de una ofensa lo que se exigiría moralmente es el desarrollo de un carácter indulgente que elimine progresivamente rencores. Este sería también un deber imperfecto. Detengámonos en él.

¹³ Queda pendiente dilucidar en qué casos existe un deber jurídico de denunciar el delito, incluso bajo pena legal si se prefiere guardar silencio, que es comprendido como complicidad.

Kant señala que las obligaciones imperfectas o de virtud se dividen en deberes hacia uno mismo y hacia otros. Los últimos se subdividen a su vez en dos: aquellos con base en el amor a los hombres y aquellos con base en el respeto. Las obligaciones enraizadas en el amor son tres: beneficencia, gratitud, y simpatía. En conjunto, las tres constituyen el deber de amar a la humanidad o filantropía, procurar el bien de los demás. He hablado bastante, como ejemplo de este deber general, sobre la beneficencia o solidaridad. Kant apunta: “Hacer el bien, es decir, ayudar a otros hombres necesitados a ser felices, según las propias capacidades y sin esperar nada a cambio, es un deber de todo hombre” (MS AA 06: 453). Entre aquellos tres principales deberes de filantropía, no existe uno de perdonar; ni en el sentido del diccionario hispánico, ni en el propuesto para este escrito. Sin embargo, desde la definición de perdón que propongo, desarrollar una actitud o carácter indulgente o clemente, es compatible, sino deducible, de la obligación general de amar a los demás. No me refiero a condonar deudas, sino eliminar la animadversión que la ofensa puede haber suscitado. No se puede vivir odiando a otros; y a la vez amando la humanidad, incluso la de quienes agreden. Él mismo escribió: “De ahí que la clemencia (*placabilitas*) sea un deber del hombre”; siempre que se distinga de “la benigna tolerancia de las ofensas” que podría llevarnos a renunciar al derecho (MS AA 06: 461).

El cómo se coordinan tales deberes en pro de la justicia y el perdón se apreciará con ejemplos, que abarcan desde casos simples hasta otros bastante complejos. El caso más básico, y bastante común: un conflicto personal no acompañado de consecuencias legales. Por ejemplo: un amigo ha engañado a otro. La persona agraviada rompe la amistad y desarrolla animadversión hacia su examigo. Es cierto que nadie puede desear racionalmente un mundo donde los amigos se defraudan. Lo cual demuestra que traicionar la amistad es inmoral. Sin embargo, ¿se puede querer racionalmente un mundo donde los amigos se perdonen? En nombre del amor a la humanidad, sí. El carácter indulgente o clemente es universalizable, aunque no está acompañado de un derecho —en sentido legal— a ser perdonado si esto significa ser liberado del castigo. Disculpar es más bien parte de los deberes amplios donde se deja cierto juicio o discrecionalidad al agente sobre su cumplimiento. Como en otros casos, por ejemplo ser solidario con el necesitado, el agente posee cierta libertad sobre el modo de ejecución. Puede postergar por un tiempo una conversación solicitada por el examigo para arreglar las diferencias. Puede confesar: “Me sería muy doloroso ahora mismo encontrarnos”. Pero el aplazamiento no debe ser eterno. Si en verdad desea racionalmente un mundo donde los amigos se perdonen, debe ir dando pasos en esa dirección. El mandato más general se podría enunciar así: “Nuestro deber es cultivar un carácter indulgente, que no alimente rencores ni odios, sino su progresiva disminución hasta la extinción”. Queda a criterio de cada uno cómo forma o entrena su personalidad para lograr tal meta. Lo fundamental será comprometerse a no vivir como rencoroso ni odiador, sino más bien indulgente.

El perdón se inscribe, de este modo, en la doctrina de la virtud como un rasgo del carácter universalmente deseado. El deseo de justicia, en cambio, es un deber imperfecto

que conecta nuestra virtud con el derecho, donde se necesita que la ley se cumpla. Piénsese en un caso más complejo: una mujer golpeada por su pareja. Ciertamente, quien agrede a otra persona, como suele suceder en los casos de violencia doméstica, transgrede un deber perfecto cuya contraparte es el derecho de otro. Está claro que el imperativo categórico no autorizaría el ultraje como medio de regulación de los conflictos caseros. Luego, corresponde otro deber moral también perfecto: hacer cumplir la justicia. Pero esta no es tarea de la víctima. Solo jueces y magistrados, o sus equivalentes, detentan la autoridad competente para definir e imponer sanciones. Solo a ellos corresponde el deber de la implantación de justicia. El derecho se los exige; mejor aun si su conciencia también. En cambio, la víctima solo puede y debe desear justicia; de ser el caso, colaborar con ella. Por ejemplo, la mujer agredida activa el sistema a través de su denuncia. Sin su participación, ningún proceso comenzará en caso no haya más testigos y el propio agresor no se autoincrimine. ¿Su deber es denunciar al marido violento o más bien perdonarlo? Ambos. En la lectura kantiana que sostengo, se logra compatibilizar los dos deberes. Si bien la mujer puede sentir pena por el hombre que amó –o aún ama– y sus hijos, el razonamiento kantiano que protege sus derechos –en este caso la integridad física–, la invita a considerar si la violencia doméstica constituye un asunto íntimo de la pareja que puede quedar secreto. Es obvio que la parte agraviada no se reconoce como fin en sí. Es más, si el feminicidio impune se universalizase, la sociedad colapsaría. La agresión trasciende la esfera íntima, se convierte en un asunto social. Se debe denunciar a la pareja. Sin embargo, ello no resta al perdón en cuanto la mujer debe desarrollar un carácter indulgente hacia la humanidad en general. Ergo, perdona a su agresor particular, es decir, procura la cancelación progresiva del rencor.

Leer el suceso desde el lado del atacante no altera el sentido del razonamiento. Aquel puede pedir perdón a la aparte abusada. Incluso esta petición ayudaría en el propio proceso interno de la mujer para aplacar sus odios. Sin embargo, se debe distinguir entre pedir disculpas –cancelación de actitud negativa– y pedir silencio cómplice –anular la justicia. El agresor bien puede desear y solicitar ambos, pero la víctima solo debería conceder el primero.

Pasemos a otro nivel de complejidad, uno que incluye instituciones. Pensemos en un caso de pedofilia dentro de la Iglesia Católica. En principio, el hecho involucra al menos dos sujetos: infante y pederasta. El último ciertamente merece una condena jurídica. Ello no menoscaba su deber de pedir perdón y reparación de la pena en el grado posible. Sin embargo, los escándalos en diversas jurisdicciones eclesiales o congregaciones religiosas –Los Legionarios de Cristo en México o El Sodalicio de Vida Cristiana en Perú– incluyen un elemento novedoso frente a los casos anteriores: una institución. Si las víctimas denunciaron los abusos pero la institución no los tramitó, los minimizó o prefirió ocultar el escándalo, surge una nueva responsabilidad. La institución, siendo compuesta por miembros y autoridades que no han cometido los delitos imputados, calla las malas

actuaciones que otros sí realizaron.¹⁴ Este acto, el encubrimiento, se considera una nueva falta que compromete a las instituciones. De este modo, la responsabilidad del resarcimiento e incluso de solicitar disculpas recae también en ellas. Los dirigentes debieran pedir perdón no por el acto de pedofilia en sí –solo le corresponde al perpetrador–, sino por el rol de su organización. Por su parte, la persona agraviada puede abrigar emociones nocivas hacia dos sujetos: el abusador y la entidad que lo protegió. ¿Debe desarrollar un carácter indulgente hacia ambos? ¿El deber de perdonar incluiría la cancelación de actitudes negativas hacia las organizaciones? ¿O solo a las personas? Surge una cuestión previa: ¿cuánto se pueden equiparar moralmente las instituciones a las personas? El tema, derechos y deberes morales de las organizaciones, su estatuto moral, es novedoso. Al menos dentro del marco kantiano, parece evidente reservar el estatuto moral solo para las personas.¹⁵ Entonces ¿qué sucede con la animadversión de las víctimas hacia las organizaciones? En la línea del argumento esbozado, no habría un deber de perdonar a las instituciones. Desear que una institución desaparezca se distingue del anhelo de mal o desgracia para con las personas que la componen. Puede que la víctima confunda o mezcle ambos. Pero debiera intentar distinguirlos. Si su rencor se dirige hacia todos los miembros de la institución deseándoles que les vaya mal a los individuos particulares, ciertamente no se forja un carácter indulgente.¹⁶

Pasemos a un nivel más difícil: crímenes de lesa humanidad, ataques terroristas, o cruenta represión estatal. Para comenzar, sucesos de tal magnitud abarcan varios tipos de afectados. Las víctimas de un atentado de Sendero Luminoso, como en Lucanamarca o Tarata en el contexto de la violencia terrorista en el Perú de los 80' y 90', ciertamente incluyen a los deudos, pero también a la sociedad en general. Los heridos y sus familiares directos constituyen un grupo de particulares llamados a desarrollar el perdón como virtud personal sin que este merme su deseo de justicia. A los demás ciudadanos les corresponde una actitud análoga en cuanto se les considera víctimas indirectas. Pero al Estado no le corresponde otorgar el perdón. Un presidente es una persona particular, que coyunturalmente ocupa una alta dignidad. Mientras ejerce tal función, coadyuva al cumplimiento de la justicia –que puede incluir cárcel a los responsables–; como estadista está en la capacidad de proponer estrategias para desarrollar el carácter indulgente de la sociedad. Además, como cualquier otro ciudadano, cultiva su propia capacidad de perdonar. Pero no puede perdonar por otros, ni por las víctimas ni por la ciudadanía, sino solo por él mismo: como individuo, no como jefe de Estado.

Mientras las víctimas afrontan el desafío de eliminar el odio frente a los perpetradores y el Estado ejerce la justicia, resta la cuestión de si las gracias presidenciales, el indulto, la conmutación de la penas, contradicen lo enunciado hasta el momento. En

¹⁴ Me refiero al apañamiento de la institución como un todo, con sus reglas y políticas de secretismo: no, al encubrimiento por parte de personas muy específicas –normalmente los líderes– a las que también podría adjudicárseles responsabilidades penales específicas.

¹⁵ No puedo desarrollar en detalle la idea. Pero en principio Kant solo admitiría a las personas como seres racionales y fines en sí mismos. Por tanto, solo ellas poseen dignidad.

¹⁶ Una cosa es desear que se desmorone la institución metafóricamente; y otra, que literalmente “se caiga el edificio”, del cual sabemos que está ocupado por personas reales.

primer lugar, no deniegan el perdón como cancelación paulatina de actitudes negativas. Luego, como se ha visto, el cumplimiento de la justicia es un deber perfecto, cuya observancia es estricta, tal cual se recoge en los códigos penales. ¿Significa que una pena no puede rebajarse? En principio la lógica del argumento pareciera señalar que no, especialmente si supone una relajación o relativización del cumplimiento de la justicia. Pero existen dos razones que se podrían considerar para aceptar el indulto sin que se contradiga el deber de llevar adelante la justicia. La primera es formal; la segunda, más bien, de fondo.

Primero, el sistema de justicia funciona como un todo: incluye elementos o principios diversos como la pluralidad de instancias, la observancia del debido proceso, entre otros que son recogidos por las constituciones de los Estados como es el caso del Art. 139 de la Constitución política del Perú (1993). Uno de aquellos principios es el indulto. Siendo partes de una misma estructura, no hay contradicción entre emitir una condena larga en cárcel y, luego de un tiempo, conmutar la pena bajo ciertas condiciones que el mismo sistema prevé. En cambio, una exención o dispensa por fuera de las reglas establecidas, se considera una vulneración del sistema de justicia y, ciertamente, contradice el deber de su implementación. Así debiera interpretarse el rebajamiento de penas por favor político, cohecho, o simple afinidad con el sentenciado. Esto es precisamente lo que se discute en el caso del polémico indulto al ex presidente Alberto Fujimori concedido el 24 de diciembre de 2017 y anulado posteriormente. No es inmoral que el sistema de gracias presidenciales, que en el caso peruano otorga al presidente de turno la responsabilidad última, conmute ciertas penas. Lo obsceno es que el presidente o quienes colaboran con él tergiversen el sistema, como se sospecha que sucedió.¹⁷ En todo caso, la exoneración de parte de la pena no debe confundirse con el perdón. Nuevamente: el presidente no perdona; las víctimas directas y las indirectas, sí. La presidencia significa un cargo, el más alto de la función pública, que se rota en el tiempo. Pero el perdón corresponde a las personas reales, quienes desarrollan o no un carácter moral.

Una segunda razón para considerar el indulto como una concesión que no viola el deber de implantación de la justicia se enfrenta directamente con el lema kantiano: *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*, es decir, ¡hágase justicia aunque perezca el mundo! ¿Qué sucedería si muchos, casi todos o todos, somos criminales? ¿Debiéramos ir a la cárcel? El sentido de una amnistía o indulto radical generalizado no suele ser parte del sistema legal. Su excepcionalidad, propia de la justicia transicional, sitúa a la ciudadanía frente a escenarios para los cuales resulta imposible legislar por adelantado. Kant casi no desarrolla el tema. Sin embargo, ofrece un ejemplo bastante curioso:

Por consiguiente, todos los criminales que han cometido el asesinato, o también los que lo han ordenado o han estado implicados en él, han de sufrir también la muerte; así lo quiere la justicia como idea del poder judicial, según leyes universales, fundamentadas *a priori*.

¹⁷ Por tal razón en junio del 2018 la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos solicitó al Estado peruano que, a través de su poder judicial nacional, evalúe la legalidad del indulto. Meses después la Corte Suprema del Perú confirmó que efectivamente el indulto no procedía. Era tan ilegal como inmoral.

– Pero si el número de cómplices¹⁸ (*correi*) de tal acción fuera tan grande que el Estado, para librarse de semejantes criminales, tuviera que llegar casi al extremo de no tener ya ningún súbdito más y, sin embargo, no quisiera disolverse, es decir, pasar al estado de naturaleza, que es todavía peor porque carece de toda justicia exterior (no quisiera ante todo embotar el sentimiento del pueblo con el espectáculo de un matadero), entonces el soberano tiene que tener también poder en este caso extremo (*casus necessitatis*) para hacer él mismo de juez (representarlo) y pronunciar una sentencia que imponga a los criminales otra pena en vez de la pena de muerte, que conserve la vida del conjunto del pueblo, como es la deportación; pero esto no lo haría por medio de una ley pública, sino por un acto de autoridad, es decir, por un acto del derecho de majestad, que, como gracia, sólo puede ejercerse en casos aislados (MS AA 06: 334).

Sin duda Kant reclama el justo castigo para quienes matan, ordenan la muerte y colaboran con ella. Pero, si el número de cómplices fuese demasiado elevado, tan alto que el Estado o sociedad podría disolverse ya que ejecutaría, encarcelaría o deportaría a media población o más, entonces el soberano podría utilizar el derecho de gracia que detenta. Su juicio prudencial evitaría la disolución del pueblo. Se salva así la sociedad del propio sistema judicial, el mismo que habría dejado una puerta abierta en caso de emergencia. Sin sociedad, si todos fuesen ejecutados, el sistema se autoaniquila. La instauración de la civilización, que la humanidad viva racionalmente, es el fin o razón de ser de los sistemas legales, sean estos locales o internacionales. El espíritu de aquella larga cita aplaca el lema kantiano: *fiat iustitia, pereat mundus*. Ahora parece sugerir no que la humanidad prevalezca sobre la justicia, sino que es justo que la humanidad perdure.

3. Conclusiones

Los seres humanos debemos aspirar a la justicia; no a la venganza. Nadie la puede reclamar como suya. En buena cuenta, “porque el hombre ha acumulado sobre sí suficientes culpas como para estar él mismo muy necesitado de perdón” (MS 460). Para reconstruir la antropología detrás de esta afirmación, Sussman (2005) dirige sus estudios hacia la *Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*. Según Sussman, la *Metafísica de las costumbres* ofrece solo un esbozo incompleto sobre el perdón humano en comparación con lo mucho que Kant sí expone respecto de la gracia divina en la *Religión*. Según nuestro juicio, y como espero haber demostrado, existen suficientes elementos para elaborar una noción de perdón humano desde la MS. Puede entenderse como un deber moral si se refiere a la eliminación de sentimientos negativos. Entonces, puede y debe universalizarse. Cabría comprenderlo dentro de los deberes imperfectos kantianos, particularmente dependiente de la obligación general de amar a la humanidad.

La estrategia argumentativa que se ha desarrollado particularmente para los casos comprendidos por el derecho penal reposa en la posibilidad de distinguir entre cuestiones

¹⁸ Para el análisis que sigue en el cuerpo principal, es importante resaltar la distinción entre los asesinos y los cómplices. Parece que los segundos alcanzarían cierto beneficio que los primeros no. Sin embargo, el caso más radical emerge si todos fuesen asesinos, no solo cómplices. ¿El beneficio podría extenderse a todos en ese caso?

morales –cancelar el odio– y sus consecuencias legales o judiciales –cumplir una sentencia condenatoria. Si esto es posible, como espero haber mostrado, el indulto o conmutación de penas no contradicen el deber de cumplir la justicia porque se mueven también en el plano legal. Un indulto, por ejemplo, se debe comprender no como una obligación moral, sino como una facultad legal del soberano, aunque ciertamente por razones morales. He arribado a una conclusión semejante a la que llega Kotkas (2011). Para él, el derecho del gobernante a condonar penas no contradiría a la justicia, sino que se corresponde con el derecho a ser perdonado.

Bibliografía

Constitución política del Perú (1993).

Cortina, A. (2005), “Estudio preliminar”, en: Kant, Inmanuel. *La Metafísica de las Costumbres*. Madrid: Tecnos, 4ta ed.

Kant, I. (1981), *La Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*. Madrid: Alianza 2da. ed.

Kant, I. (1998), *Sobre la paz perpetua*. Madrid: Tecnos 6ta. ed.

Kant, I. (2003), *Crítica de la razón práctica*. Buenos Aires: Losada.

Kant, I. (2005), *La Metafísica de las Costumbres*. Madrid: Tecnos 4ta. ed. Citado como “MS”

Kant, I. (2012), *Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres*. Madrid: Alianza, 2da. ed. Citado como “GMS”.

Kotkas, T. (2011), “Kant on the Right of Pardon: A Necessity and Ruler's Personal Forgiveness”. *Kant-Studien*, 102,(4), pp. 413–421.

Mill, J. S. (2013), *Sobre la libertad*. Madrid: Alianza.

Oxford University (2019). *Oxford English Dictionary*. Oxford University Press.

<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/> Acceso marzo 12, 2019

Quirós, F. (1999), “La distinción entre deber estricto y deber amplio. Nota sobre un desacuerdo acerca de la esencia del formalismo ético”. *Revista de Filosofía*. 3ra. época. vol XII. núm. 21, pp. 247–253.

Real Academia Española (2014). *Diccionario de la lengua española*. Vigésimo tercera edición. Madrid: Espasa.

Sussman, D. (2005), “Kantian forgiveness”. *Kant-Studien*, 96(1), pp. 85–107.



Conocimiento y donación entre Rickert y Heidegger

Knowledge and Givenness between Rickert and Heidegger

STEFANO CAZZANELLI*

Universidad Francisco de Vitoria de Madrid, España

Resumen

En el presente artículo analizamos el problema de la donación en la filosofía neokantiana de Heinrich Rickert y la crítica que Martin Heidegger le dirigió desde el marco de la fenomenología. Gracias a un análisis previo de las estructuras fundamentales de la teoría del conocimiento de Rickert, intentaremos mostrar cómo la interpretación rickertiana de la donación permite captar algunos aspectos esenciales de las diferencias entre Kant y la filosofía trascendental de los valores. Finalmente, mostraremos cómo Heidegger critica la reducción de la donación a una categoría teórica por un lado y extiende su ámbito de aplicación al horizonte preteórico por el otro.

Palabras clave

Rickert, Heidegger, donación, neokantismo, fenomenología.

Abstract

In this paper we will analyze the problem of givenness in Heinrich Rickert's Neo-Kantian philosophy and the critique Martin Heidegger aimed at it from the phenomenological framework. Thanks to a previous analysis of the basic structures of Rickert's theory of knowledge, our intention is to show how his interpretation of givenness allows to capture some essential features of the difference between Kant and the transcendental philosophy of values. Lastly, we will show how Heidegger, on the one hand criticizes the reduction of givenness to a theoretical category and, on the other hand, widens its scope to the pre-theoretical horizon.

Keywords

Rickert, Heidegger, Givenness, Neo-Kantism, Phenomenology

* Profesor del Grado en Humanidades de la Universidad Francisco de Vitoria de Madrid, UFV. E-mail de contacto: s.cazzanelli.prof@ufv.es

En la obra de Heinrich Rickert, el problema de la donación es afrontado de manera directa en el tercer capítulo de la quinta sección de *El objeto del conocimiento*, titulado de manera reveladora “La categoría de la donación”. Afrontar el darse de algo como un problema categorial pone de manifiesto el planteamiento esencialmente idealista-transcendental de la cuestión. El reconocimiento de algo como dado es para Rickert el fruto de una operación teórica, es decir, la ordenación de un material sensible por medio de una forma intelectual.

Para comprender de la mejor forma posible las razones que llevan a Rickert a su particular interpretación de la donación, es útil y necesario detenerse en cómo él describe el problema del conocimiento. Que este último no sea una cuestión marginal dentro del marco filosófico rickertiano lo demuestra el hecho de que *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, la obra que trata el tema del conocimiento, fue retocada por el autor hasta seis veces (de 1892 a 1928), pasando de ser un pequeño ensayo de poco menos de cien páginas a convertirse en un volumen de casi quinientas. En los ambientes neokantianos de la época, la *Erkenntnistheorie* se consideraba el germen del sistema filosófico, el *organon* que permitía afrontar los demás temas de interés filosófico, como la historia, el arte, la ética, la religión, etc. Para empezar, enumeraremos y describiremos brevemente los principales componentes de la teoría del conocimiento rickertiana.

a) *El problema del conocimiento*

Un rasgo típico de todo el neokantismo es la presuposición del hecho del conocimiento: el análisis filosófico no pretende hallar el *origen* del conocimiento, sino *justificarlo* en su pretensión de verdad, la cual, en el neokantismo de Baden, se define como *validez* (*Geltung*). Que haya conocimiento, que el hombre conozca, es un hecho incontestable e indudable no tanto porque este conocimiento sea una evidencia absoluta –lo que haría superflua toda justificación–, sino porque, sin este presupuesto, no habría punto de partida alguno para el análisis.

Estas afirmaciones son bastante intuitivas aunque, como veremos, no del todo neutras. Si el conocimiento es una relación entre un sujeto que conoce y un objeto conocido, poner en duda o anular uno de estos tres elementos –sujeto, objeto, conocimiento– implicaría cerrar la cuestión antes de abrirla. Esto, por supuesto, no significa presuponer su *realidad*: Rickert solo los admite como presupuestos necesarios *lógico-formales* del conocimiento. Lo que ellos *son* a nivel de *contenido* habrá que discutirlo y demostrarlo, pero que *formalmente* tengan que ser presupuestos es, según Rickert, un punto infranqueable. “No es posible dudar de que haya conocimiento o de que un sujeto comprenda un objeto independiente de él. En caso contrario, [...] la teoría del conocimiento ya no tendría ningún material sobre el que poder investigar” (Rickert 1915, p. 13).

Estrictamente relacionada con el presupuesto del hecho del conocimiento se encuentra la heterotesis, es decir, la ausencia de todo monismo en el ámbito gnoseológico. En opinión de Rickert, la posición de una unidad sin oposición alguna es un presupuesto

dogmático que es preciso destruir porque, en la medida en que este *positum* es conocido, inmediatamente viene insertado en una inevitable relación con otro respecto de sí. Se trata de una versión kantiana de la tesis platónica del ἕτερον, por la que conocer significa relacionar lo que *es* distinguiéndolo de lo que *no es*. Por medio del conocimiento, lo que preteóricamente es posible considerar como una unidad perfecta pierde su encanto originario y se fragmenta en la diversidad conceptual. La misma estructura formal del conocimiento implica la imposibilidad de una unidad indivisa: sujeto y objeto nunca pueden comprenderse el uno sin el otro. Para Rickert, hablar de un objeto puro sin relación con el sujeto no tiene sentido: el objeto siempre es objeto del conocimiento, es decir, ya desde siempre es objeto para un sujeto.¹

El error del dogmatismo precrítico podría describirse como el intento ilusorio, inevitablemente destinado al fracaso, de conocer un objeto prescindiendo de la relación con el sujeto, es decir, prescindiendo de la heterotesis. Lo que Rickert contrasta radicalmente no es tanto el realismo ingenuo de la actitud cotidiana —este solo representa una modalidad acrítica, no filosófica, de moverse en el mundo—, sino el realismo transcendental teórico-cognoscitivo. Este último presenta, como presupuesto necesario para el conocimiento, la existencia *real* de un objeto transcendente e independiente de la conciencia, el cual constituiría la piedra de toque y el criterio para evaluar la veracidad de las afirmaciones que se le dirigen. El error de esta argumentación consiste en no darse cuenta de que la posición de un objeto real transcendente más allá de todo nuestro conocimiento implica un conocimiento. Creer que podemos argumentar acerca de la transcendencia en su pureza sin transformarla inmediatamente en un contenido de conciencia es una pretensión similar a la del niño que intenta saltar más allá de su propia sombra. Donde hay conocimiento, hay sujeto y objeto. Y objeto siempre es objeto de conocimiento, es decir, transcendencia en la inmanencia.

Sin embargo, para evitar generalizaciones indebidas, es necesario recordar que la supresión de la integridad del objeto propia de la heterotesis es exclusiva del ámbito cognoscitivo (*Erkennen*). Según Rickert, de hecho, el sujeto, la vida de conciencia, no coincide con la vida cognoscitiva: esta última viene precedida por un ámbito preteórico donde el yo se limita a vivir (*Erleben*) el mundo sin conocerlo. En opinión de Rickert, esta esfera de pasividad originaria de la vida es algo respecto a lo cual la filosofía no tiene nada que decir. O mejor dicho: respecto de esta esfera de pasividad, no puede esencialmente decir nada. Si se pronunciara al respecto, transformaría inmediatamente la vida en conocimiento, objetivaría las vivencias. La unidad originaria e indivisa de sujeto y objeto estaría dividida en un polo objetivo y en una conciencia cognoscente: el conocimiento desvitaliza todo lo que conoce, transformándolo en objeto.²

¹ A este respecto afirma: “Si se quiere evitar toda determinación metalógica del objeto, entonces es preciso pensarlo así como se presenta: en cuanto objeto *para* el sujeto que debe conocerlo” (Rickert 1915, p. 288).

² Esta tesis sobre la imposibilidad de captar la vida viviente en su originariedad es un rasgo común a todo el neokantismo. Piénsese, por ejemplo, en la famosa crítica de Natorp a la fenomenología husserliana o en las imágenes de Lask, en las que se describe lo originario como un paraíso perdido para siempre (Lask 1912, p. 173). Remontando todavía más, encontramos la neta separación entre filosofía y vida establecida por Fichte,

El principio fundamental que rige el idealismo filosófico de Rickert es el de la inmanencia: “Todo ser inmediatamente dado es un ser en la conciencia” (p. 53). La realidad ya no es una transcendencia, sino un contenido inmanente a la conciencia cuya cualidad es la concienciad (*Bewußtheit*). Rickert define el punto de vista de la inmanencia, es decir, el idealismo, en los siguientes términos: “Si se llaman reales solo los *objetos de representación* o los contenidos de conciencia o el ser inmediatamente dado y experimentado; si, por tanto, se apoya el punto de vista de la pura inmanencia o del positivismo, entonces esta postura se puede también llamar *idealista*, ya que *representación* equivale a *idea*” (p. 23). Todo aquello de lo que somos conscientes posee el carácter de la concienciad. Ser inmanente o ser consciente son términos equivalentes: “Ser inmanente no significa entonces nada más que llevar la forma de la concienciad” (p. 52). Sobre la base del idealismo, hablar de una realidad transcendente es una contradicción en términos, porque reales son solo y exclusivamente los contenidos de conciencia inmanentes.

Rickert llega a este resultado por medio de una operación similar a la desarrollada por la duda cartesiana: la suspensión de todo aquello de lo que se puede dudar. Es evidente que no es indudable la tesis por la que a todos nuestros contenidos de conciencia les corresponde una realidad transcendente. Por el contrario, es cierto que nuestra conciencia posea determinados contenidos. En otras palabras: a todo *cogito* le corresponde necesariamente un *cogitatum*, pero a este último no le corresponde necesariamente una *res*. En contraste con la inmanencia, cuya presencia es inmediatamente evidente, la transcendencia debe, por tanto, ser demostrada. En opinión de Rickert, ella constituye el problema fundamental de *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*. De forma más precisa: constituye *el objeto del conocimiento*, porque solo lo que excede nuestros contenidos de conciencia (*Bewußtsein*), es decir, lo que no es *Bewußt-Sein*, puede propiamente definirse como un objeto (*Gegenstand*), o sea, algo que se contrapone (*Gegen-stehen*) al sujeto y que, en último término, es independiente de él.

Otra de las tesis fundamentales del idealismo de Rickert, común a todos los neokantianos, es la *identidad entre conocer y juzgar*. El mero *representar* (*Vorstellen*) no implica conocimiento, porque en él el sujeto no desarrolla actividad alguna, sino que, por el contrario, es completamente pasivo y se limita a reproducir, a copiar (*abbilden*) lo que se le presenta. En esta circunstancia, la conciencia puede verse como una película fotosensible en la que se imprimen unas imágenes, en la que el material preteorético se recoge en representaciones (*Vorstellungen*).

Si el representar fuera conocimiento, volveríamos a concebir este último como una simple reproducción de una realidad en sí, extraconsciente, a la que se le asignaría un papel protagonista no solo por el privilegio que corresponde al original frente a las copias, sino también porque llevaría a cabo la función de *discrimen* entre lo que es verdad y lo que es falso, constituyendo el punto fijo al que tiene que adecuarse la representación (*veritas est adaequatio*). Para Rickert, Kant no consiguió liberarse completamente de este lastre a

uno de los autores más influyentes en todo el neokantismo de Baden hasta el estallido de la Primera Guerra Mundial.

pesar de su idealismo: siguiendo a Descartes y a Leibniz, continuó fundando el conocimiento sobre la representación, con la inevitable consecuencia de no poder prescindir de la cosa en sí.

Según Rickert, es necesario superar este idealismo de las representaciones (*Vorstellungsidealismus*) si se quiere acceder plenamente a la esfera del conocimiento, es decir, si se quiere pasar de la simple *conciencia de*, pasiva y reproductiva, al *conocimiento*, activo y *productivo*. La conciencia representativa, de hecho, es la que se limita a proporcionar el contenido (*Inhalt*) del conocimiento. Ahora bien, según el principio de la heterotesis, en el ámbito cognoscitivo no tiene sentido hablar de un contenido sin una forma. En consecuencia, pensar en un conocimiento puramente representativo es una abstracción que no da cuenta de forma adecuada de la dinámica real del proceso cognoscitivo: “Nosotros no podemos en absoluto hablar del contenido a título de puro contenido en general [...]. El puro contenido o *contenido del contenido* es lógicamente indiferente e indecible” (p. 145). Lo que distingue el conocimiento es la actividad judicativa que el sujeto opera respecto del contenido, asignándole una forma. El conocimiento no es entonces representación, copia (*Abbildung*), sino juicio: transformación y selección (*Umbildung*) de una forma para un contenido.

Según Rickert, cuando yo percibo (*Ich wahrnehme*) una casa roja, no me limito a representar lo que veo desde mi ventana, sino que juzgo, es decir, atribuyo formas a unos contenidos representativos. El ser *rojo* de la casa no es un contenido de mi intuición sensible, así como no lo es el *ser* de la casa roja. Las cualidades, así como el *ser* y la *realidad*, son por lo tanto formas que, para Rickert, el sujeto atribuye al contenido representativo en virtud de un juicio. El simple percibir no es simplemente percibir, sino ya juzgar: “Lo *percibido* (*das Wahrgenommene*) –si le corresponde un sentido lógico como conocimiento– es, como sabemos, ya desde siempre, lo tomado como *verdadero* (*das für wahr Genommene*)” (p. 378).³

Por medio de la interpretación del conocer como juzgar, Rickert ha rescatado el polo subjetivo del conocimiento de la pasividad del representar. Sin embargo, surge espontánea una pregunta: ¿qué sucede con el polo objetivo? No puede coincidir con el contenido porque este es puramente inmanente, es decir, dependiente de la conciencia. Además, si, como hemos visto, la única realidad es la de los contenidos de conciencia y el *ser* solo identifica un problema formal, podría parecer que la elección de una forma u otra dependiera completamente del sujeto. En otras palabras: no habría nada de trascendente al que el yo pudiera remitirse para establecer la objetividad de su juicio. El punto de vista de la inmanencia, queriendo deshacerse del dogmatismo realista, terminaría transformándose en una condena de signo contrario: un idealismo inmanentista absoluto.

³ A este respecto es emblemático el siguiente pasaje del artículo *Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transscendentalpsychologie und Transscendentallogik*: “La *percepción* de que algo es, y por tanto el conocimiento que se limita a constatar un hecho, contiene más que una simple percepción. Mejor: en esta *percepción* volvemos a encontrar el mismo problema presente en la *experiencia* y en todo conocimiento” (Rickert 1909, p. 179).

No pudiendo asignar la trascendencia –es decir, el momento de objetividad– al ser, Rickert se beneficia del descubrimiento lotziano de la esfera del valor (*Wert*) alternativa a la esfera del ser (*Sein*). El idealismo de Rickert se estructura entonces como una mezcla de inmanencia y de trascendencia: toda la realidad se reduce a la inmanencia, coincidiendo con los contenidos de conciencia representacionales, mientras que a la trascendencia le corresponderá la esfera de la irrealidad, pero del tipo particular del valor. Esta trascendencia coincide con el polo objetivo del conocimiento: esto confiere objetividad al juicio, siendo independiente del sujeto.

Es fundamental notar que, cuando Rickert habla de valor trascendente, no se está refiriendo a un *bien real* que *es* (*das ist*) –lo que significaría volver a un realismo trascendental–, sino al momento identificativo lógico-formal del sentido, que *vale* (*das gilt*) sin ser. Yo conozco que “la casa es roja” no porque el *ser rojo* sea una propiedad física de la casa. Si así fuera, ese se quemaría con esta en el caso de un incendio. Por otra parte, tampoco es una propiedad psíquica, porque el *ser rojo* permanece invariable a pesar de las modificaciones de mis actos psíquicos que a él se refieren (recuerdo de la casa roja, percepción, etc.). La única conclusión posible es, para Rickert, que el sentido de mi juicio “la casa es roja” no sea un ente existente, sino algo que vale. “Nosotros por tanto conocemos algo real en la medida en que reconocemos algo irreal” (p. 223). En el ámbito cognoscitivo, no es el ser el que fundamenta el valor, sino que este fundamenta aquel.

El sentido de mi juicio, interpretado como *Wert* trascendente, es algo que no depende de mí. Al contrario: se me impone como algo frente a lo cual debo (*Sollen*) posicionarme juzgando. El sentido del acto de juicio, que según Rickert es el objeto de estudio de la lógica subjetiva o psicología trascendental (equivalente a la noética pura de Husserl), es una afirmación o una negación de un valor trascendente. La conjunción disyuntiva “o” confirma lo que hemos dicho antes acerca del juicio como selección (*Umbildung*), frente a la representación como copia: juzgar no es un mero contemplar desinteresado, sino un comprometerse tomando posición, respondiendo –afirmando o negando– al *Wert* trascendente, que se me impone como *Sollen* trascendente respecto al cual *debo* decidirme. “El sentido del *mismo acto de juicio* en cuanto afirmación o negación debe equipararse al tomar posición respecto de un valor o de un desvalor” (p. 189). La afirmación será por lo tanto la aprobación de un valor y, la negación, el rechazo de un desvalor. En este caso, el juicio será verdadero. La afirmación de un desvalor y el rechazo de un valor constituyen, al contrario, el sentido subjetivo de un juicio falso.

Preguntemonos ahora: si el sentido objetivo del juicio, o sea, el objeto del conocimiento, es un *Wert* trascendente, independiente del sujeto, ¿cómo es posible que resulte determinante para el acto judicativo, es decir, para la conexión entre forma y contenido inmanente? ¿No nos encontramos aquí otra vez ante un abismo infranqueable entre trascendencia e inmanencia? Si así fuera, no podría tener conocimiento del valor trascendente, es decir, de lo que atribuye objetividad a mi juicio (objeto del conocimiento). Rickert es claro a este respecto:

Si se afirma que el objeto del conocimiento tiene que ser determinado en su pureza solo como una estructura en la que el contenido *está* en la forma, entonces todavía no se alcanza, por decirlo en pocas palabras, ningún objeto (*Gegenstand*), sino, como mucho, solo una *posición* (*einen Stand*) que habría que tratar como un simple *fragmento* del objeto del conocimiento (pp. 293-294).⁴

Para solucionar este *impasse* propio de la vía objetiva del conocimiento (lógica objetiva), Rickert introduce la *certeza*, la cual se presenta como el *index* de la transcendencia en la inmanencia. De hecho, el sujeto que conoce encuentra el valor transcendente que afirma en la certeza, reflejado en la inmanencia. La evidencia, o certeza, es un sentimiento psíquico (inmanente) que remite más allá, hacia la transcendencia.

El sentimiento de evidencia confiere necesidad al juicio. Sin embargo, no hay que leer esta necesidad como una necesidad causal o una constricción psíquica (*Müssen*), sino como una necesidad de carácter lógico (*Sollen*), es decir, como lo que fundamenta lógicamente el juicio desde el punto de vista subjetivo. En Rickert, por tanto, el objeto del conocimiento asume dos nombres diferentes según se analice desde un punto de vista objetivo (equivalente a la lógica pura o a la noemática pura husserliana) o desde un punto de vista subjetivo. En otras palabras: si nos limitamos al simple análisis del sentido del contenido del juicio, desde el punto de vista transcendental, el objeto (del conocimiento) será definido como *Wert*. Si, por otra parte, analizamos el sentido del acto de juicio, es decir, la relación entre el acto psíquico del juicio y lo que este significa, entonces el objeto del conocimiento será definido como *Sollen*. “El valor (*Wert*) independiente del acto de determinación y que vale eternamente se transforma en un deber (*Sollen*) cuando se refiere a un sujeto y a su valoración” (p. 205).

¿Qué significa que el objeto del conocimiento es un *Sollen* o un *Wert* transcendente? Para responder, recuérdese que estamos tratando del problema del sentido del conocimiento. Rickert realiza un análisis dirigido al estudio de la forma del conocimiento. Ahora bien, desde el punto de vista lógico-formal, el objeto del conocimiento se presenta al sujeto como algo que exige ser reconocido (vía subjetiva), y esta exigencia se traduce psíquicamente en el sentimiento de evidencia. Por otra parte, prescindiendo de la relación con el sujeto (vía objetiva), el sentido del objeto del conocimiento se presenta como algo que vale intemporalmente.

b) La donación como categoría

En la obra de Rickert, el problema de la donación se desarrolla en un ámbito determinado: asume un papel preponderante a lo largo de todo el quinto y último capítulo de *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis* y es objeto de un análisis directo en su segundo párrafo, titulado “La categoría de la donación”. Sin embargo, antes de llegar a este capítulo conclusivo, Rickert alude a la cuestión en varias ocasiones, unas veces directamente, otras

⁴ El juego de palabras alemán entre *Gegenstand* y el simple *Stand* es imposible de traducir: el término español *objeto* no expresa, de hecho, la idea de contra-posición presente en el alemán *Gegen-Stand*.

de forma implícita. Para una mejor comprensión del problema, es útil ofrecer un cuadro completo, recorriendo los pasos que llevan a su formación definitiva.

“El término mejor para indicar la inmediatez y la donación (*Gegebenheit*) de lo real es el de *contenido de conciencia (Bewußtseininhalt)*” (p. 111). Esta afirmación es perfectamente coherente con el principio de la inmanencia descrito antes. En antítesis a la actitud cotidiana o a la actitud propia de las ciencias empíricas –en las que lo que se *da* es considerado evidente, inmediato, pero esencialmente exterior e independiente del sujeto–, es un contenido de conciencia en la perspectiva del idealismo rickertiano. Si algo es dado, lo es *en* la conciencia. Por tanto, se puede hablar de datos de la realidad o de datos reales en la medida en que se abandona el punto de vista del realismo teórico-cognoscitivo: la realidad –y con ella todos los datos– no es trascendente, sino inmanente a la conciencia.

Para Rickert, es fundamental no confundir estas afirmaciones idealistas-transcendentales con las de la metafísica espiritualista o del psicologismo de Schopenhauer o de Berkeley. Decir que los datos son inmanentes a la conciencia no equivale a decir que los datos son inmanentes a *mi* conciencia. El adjetivo posesivo *mi* implica la reducción de la conciencia general cognoscente a una psique individual, con el peligro de reintroducir en el ámbito transcendental conceptos metafísicos como *alma* o conceptos empíricos como psique. Al contrario, a la *donación* corresponde para Rickert un nivel diferente, donde todavía no hay distinción alguna entre el estrato físico y el estrato psíquico del mundo, y donde lo *dado* no tiene una connotación individual. No hay que confundir, como hizo Descartes con su *sum cogitans*, la conciencia con la psique. Aquella, según Rickert, representa una transcendencia (no real, sino formal) contrapuesta a la inmanencia de los datos. La conciencia es lógicamente necesaria en el mismo momento en que se habla de inmanencia: esta no tendría sentido sin algo *respecto de lo que* ser inmanente. Si este algo fuera a su vez una inmanencia, el regreso al infinito sería inevitable. Por lo tanto, es necesario que la conciencia sea una transcendencia última.⁵

Estas consideraciones acerca de la transcendencia de la conciencia y de la donación como ámbito de los contenidos de conciencia dejan vislumbrar un punto muy problemático de la filosofía rickertiana. Si los *datos* definen la inmanencia, la transcendencia será descrita, en contraposición, como *no dada*: “Al comienzo de la teoría del conocimiento, no se puede decir nada acerca de la transcendencia porque ella es lo *no dado (das Nicht-Gegebene)*, lo que es independiente de la conciencia general, lo opuesto a la experiencia. En una palabra: lo transcendente” (p. 62). Para quien permanece fiel al punto de vista de la inmanencia, sin referirse nunca a algo transcendente, estas afirmaciones no constituyen un problema. Pero, para quien, como Rickert, asigna en su teoría del conocimiento un papel fundamental a la transcendencia, el asunto se complica.

Antes hemos visto cómo en Rickert la objetividad del juicio está determinada por el objeto del conocimiento, es decir, por el *Wert/Sollen* transcendente. Si a este último le

⁵ “Siguiendo la serie, si la recorrimos de modo coherente hasta el final, llegamos a un sujeto que no puede ser ni una realidad psicofísica, ni psíquica” (p. 45). Respecto de este sujeto último, Rickert afirma no querer utilizar la fórmula *yo puro* porque esta recuerda a Fichte y tiene, por lo tanto, una connotación, en último término, metafísica (p. 324).

añadimos el atributo de *no-dado*, obtendremos la conclusión de que la norma de la verdad del juicio es algo *no-dado*. Dicho con otras palabras (y modificando ligeramente los términos utilizados por Rickert, pero sin corromper su sentido): nosotros conocemos algo *dado* solo porque reconocemos algo *no-dado*. Intentamos ahora comprender esta afirmación.

En primer lugar, es necesario aclarar cómo es posible que algo independiente y que trasciende la conciencia sirva como criterio para la objetividad de los contenidos de conciencia. ¿Cómo es posible que la transcendencia no se transforme inmediatamente en algo *dado*, es decir, en un contenido de conciencia, cuando nos dirigimos a ella asumiéndola como norma? Según Rickert, la respuesta a esta pregunta se obtiene apelando al juicio. Este constituiría, de hecho, el único camino para responder a la exigencia de una transcendencia como norma de la objetividad, evitando de esta forma el idealismo subjetivista absoluto. Además, solo el juicio permite evitar que una independencia radical de la conciencia termine por replantear un transcendentalismo realista y dogmático. He aquí el camino para la solución: “No pudiéndose encontrar un objeto del conocimiento independiente de la *conciencia*, queda sin embargo la posibilidad de descubrir un objeto del conocimiento que podemos presentar como independiente del *saber*” (p. 152).

Estas afirmaciones marcan el límite del punto de vista de la inmanencia en el marco cognoscitivo. La inmanencia, de hecho, está limitada a la conciencia general representante que, sin embargo, no es todavía una conciencia cognoscente: en ella el sujeto es todavía pasivo, no juzgante. El paso de la conciencia al conocimiento coincide con el paso de la representación al juicio, de la inmanencia a la transcendencia, de lo *dado* a lo *no-dado*. Esto ayuda a comprender por qué, según Rickert, la forma última del sujeto cognoscente no es la conciencia general de tipo kantiano, es decir, representante, sino una conciencia general juzgante: “*El último elemento* en la serie del sujeto no puede ser una conciencia general representante sino solo una *conciencia general juzgante*” (p. 326).

Lo que acabamos de decir tiene unas consecuencias interesantes en el problema de la *Gegebenheit*. Por un lado, lo que es *dado*, lo que se inscribe en el marco de la *donación*, se limita necesariamente al campo de la inmanencia, es decir, al campo de la realidad. Por el otro, sabemos que este último no constituye la totalidad del mundo: más allá de la realidad *que es*, se encuentra la esfera de los valores trascendentes *que valen*. “El mundo en su totalidad es mucho *más grande* que la *realidad* [...]. Lo que vale (*das Geltende*) necesita tanta consideración como lo que es (*das Seiende*). La comprensión del mundo no coincide con la ontología” (p. 353). Inicialmente es posible definir lo trascendente como lo *no-dado*, subrayando de esta forma su diferencia radical frente a la esfera del ser. Sin embargo, no tendría sentido plantear una transcendencia radical, es decir, una *no-donación* absoluta del valor. Las dos orillas de inmanencia y transcendencia resultarían completamente incomunicables y esta segunda se transformaría en un presupuesto dogmático. Por esta razón, es necesario precisar que en Rickert la *no-donación* se refiere al conocimiento, es decir, a la conciencia juzgante, no a la conciencia. En otros términos: la transcendencia es *dada* a la conciencia, pero *no-dada* al conocimiento. Se entrevé, por

tanto, que el problema de la *donación* es en Rickert un problema esencialmente cognoscitivo. Por esta razón se define la transcendencia, que en último término no puede ser conocida⁶, como lo *no-dado*.

Podríamos resumir todo esto con la siguiente fórmula: lo que es conocido, es dado; lo que no es conocido, no es dado. Esto no significa que lo que no es dado no se encuentre en la conciencia, sino que de ello no sabemos nada. Que el *Sollen* transcendente sea un ingrediente de la conciencia es algo que Rickert afirma de forma explícita: “El objeto del conocimiento que nosotros buscamos es, según su concepto, un *Sollen* que –como todo lo que tratamos científicamente– se encuentra en el mundo de la conciencia” (p. 240). Podríamos preguntarnos de qué forma este *Sollen* está en la conciencia sin ser conocido. La respuesta a esta pregunta nos obliga a dirigirnos a aquellos contenidos de conciencia que, en el interior del yo, no representan un momento cognoscitivo, como, por ejemplo, los sentimientos. Ahora bien, como sabemos, Rickert define el *sentimiento* de evidencia como el *index* inmanente (es decir, consciente) de la transcendencia (de lo no-dado). Otro término que utiliza Rickert para describir la presencia del *Sollen* en la conciencia es el de *pretensión* (*Forderung*). Sin embargo, a nuestro parecer, el término más significativo es el de *sustracción*, de *retiro* (*Aufgegebene*): “Para los idealistas transcendentales, el objeto del conocimiento no está ni *dado* (*gegeben*) en la inmanencia, ni *dado* en la transcendencia, sino *sustraído* (*aufgegeben*) de ellas” (p. 365).

Que Rickert interprete la *donación* como un problema exquisitamente cognoscitivo resulta evidente cuando la define como *categoría*, es decir, como una forma que, revistiendo un contenido puramente representativo, transforma este último de consciente a conocido:

Nada más definir un contenido como hecho o como dato ya lo he *conocido* como hecho o como dato. Es decir, ya ha recibido una forma. Esta forma de la pura facticidad o “donación” es por tanto un problema teórico-cognoscitivo, exactamente como para cualquier otra forma de conocimiento. Se trata del más elemental y al mismo tiempo del más ineluctable de todos los problemas formales, ya que todo conocimiento de la realidad lo contiene (p. 147).

Preguntemonos ahora cuál es el significado del término *categoría* para Rickert. Con sus palabras: “La expresión griega [*categoría*] significa, como en origen, la forma de la *proposición* o de la *predicación*, por medio de la cual el sujeto cognoscente se apodera del objeto” (p. 371). Esta afirmación es una clara referencia a la teoría aristotélica según la cual las categorías son los géneros supremos de las predicaciones que conciernen a los objetos. La categoría es entonces una función lógica con la que el sujeto se dirige al objeto para conocerlo. Como neokantiano, Rickert rechaza la idea de que originariamente el objeto sería algo transcendente, metalógico, que, para ser conocido, tiene que ser aferrado por medio de las categorías y, junto con ellas, reconducido a la esfera de la conciencia como una presa.

⁶ “El *Sollen* [...] no se puede decir *conocido* (*gewußt*), sino solo *consciente* (*bewußt*)” (p. 223).

Apoderarse no significa, sin embargo, la pura introducción de un objeto metalógico, existente de por sí, en el interior de la esfera lógica del sujeto cognoscente, sino que hay que entenderlo en el sentido de que el sujeto *produce* el objeto como objeto real solo por medio de la unión afirmante del contenido con la forma de la realidad que a este le corresponde sobre la base de la norma (p. 372).

Esta última cita permite captar tanto los puntos de contacto como las diferencias respecto de Kant. La cercanía con el filósofo de Königsberg es evidente en la aceptación de la revolución copernicana, es decir, de la resolución de la ontología en la lógica trascendental y, entonces, de la dependencia trascendental del objeto respecto del sujeto. Sin embargo, hay dos términos que dejan vislumbrar el paso original de Rickert: *afirmante* (*bejahende*) y *norma* (*die Norm*). Estos denotan el tratamiento propio, no solo del idealismo trascendental rickertiano, sino también de la filosofía de los valores en general. Por decirlo con una imagen, se trata de leer a Kant con los ojos de Fichte, es decir, de añadir una aprioridad normativa como cimiento de la *Erkenntnistheorie* –más allá y como fundamento de la legalidad lógica trascendental–. Afirmar que las formas lógicas –y entre ellas las categorías– dependen en último término de una norma, significa fundamentar el problema teórico sobre una base práctica. De aquí procede inevitablemente lo que ya hemos dicho acerca del sujeto cognoscente: este no puede limitarse a representar, sino que debe tomar posición juzgando, afirmativa o negativamente, frente a una norma que se le impone.

El añadido del *Sollen* enriquece y complica el escenario de la teoría del conocimiento, terminando por asignar un nuevo papel a las categorías, diferente del kantiano. En primer lugar, tenemos 1) la *forma trascendental* del juicio, es decir, lo que determina la relación entre los conceptos (significados) representados.⁷ Según la perspectiva del realismo empírico, esta sería una simple reproducción de la 2) *forma del objeto real*, la cual se encuentra en unión real con el elemento material del objeto. Rickert, al contrario, en lugar de considerar el juicio como una copia de la realidad (*Abbildstheorie*), no solo la considera un fruto de aquel, sino que afirma que la recíproca adhesión de forma y contenido en el juicio está garantizada y finalmente determinada por una norma transcendente, por la 3) *forma del Sollen*: “La norma es la forma del *Sollen* o del objeto transcendente irreal que se contrapone al sujeto a título de recíproca adhesión de forma y contenido” (pp. 372-373). Sabemos además que esta norma, si se desvincula de la relación con el sujeto y por tanto con el juicio, asume las características de un valor (*Wert*) transcendente que Rickert define como 4) *forma de la lógica objetiva*.

Como el corazón del problema teórico-cognoscitivo viene determinado por el *conocimiento* del objeto, más que por el *objeto* del conocimiento, Rickert añade una quinta y última forma, la cual tendría el oficio de mediación entre la norma transcendente y el objeto en cuanto recíproca adhesión de forma y contenido. La llama 5) *categoría*. Esta

⁷ Por decirlo con Kant: “En todo juicio se puede denominar materia lógica (del juicio) a los conceptos dados, y forma del juicio a la relación de tales conceptos (por medio de la cópula)” (KrV, A 266/B 322).

expresa la esencia de la lógica subjetiva (psicología trascendental), es decir, la forma (el sentido) del *acto* de juicio. Este último es el puente entre la dimensión trascendente de la norma y la esfera de inmanencia de los contenidos de conciencia. Solo gracias a la categoría el yo puede, conforme al *Sollen*, atribuir una forma trascendental al contenido representativo. El acto de juicio es el reconocimiento (*Anerkennung*), afirmante o negante, de la recíproca adhesión de forma y contenido sobre la base del *Sollen*. La categoría, a título de forma del acto de juicio, es el momento que confiere objetividad a la forma, representa el significado lógico de la forma. Ella

todavía no es forma en la esfera del ente o de lo real, pero ya no es pura norma en cuanto recíproca adhesión, sino que representa lo que fundamenta al ente conforme al *Sollen*. En cierto sentido, entonces, constituye el *paso del Sollen al ente*, de la forma al objeto finito constituido de forma y contenido, en la medida en que al contenido adjunta la forma que, sobre la base del *Sollen*, le corresponde (p. 371).

La categoría ejerce en Rickert un papel intermedio totalmente ausente en Kant, ya que en este falta una norma trascendente. Sin embargo, si quisiéramos preguntarnos cuál es la forma última que confiere objetividad al conocimiento en la *Crítica de la razón pura*, tendríamos que dirigirnos a la sección de la *Analítica* dedicada a la deducción trascendental. Esta, de hecho, tiene la tarea fundamental de resolver el siguiente problema: “Cómo pueden tener *validez objetiva (objektive Gültigkeit)* las *condiciones subjetivas del pensar*, es decir, cómo pueden estas proporcionar las condiciones de posibilidad de todo conocimiento de los objetos” (KrV, A 89-90/B 122). La respuesta de Kant marca la profunda diferencia con el planteamiento rickertiano: “Solo la unidad de conciencia configura la relación de las representaciones con un objeto y, por ello, la validez objetiva de tales representaciones” (KrV, B 137). Es sabido que, en Kant, la unidad de la conciencia en último término está fundada sobre la forma de la apercepción *yo pienso*. Por eso, en el texto de la primera edición de la *Crítica*, el filósofo afirma: “Esta proposición [*yo pienso*] es la forma de la apercepción inherente y previa a cada experiencia” (KrV, A 354). Las formas de la intuición y las del intelecto unifican, formándolo, el material múltiple proporcionado por la sensación. Ellas constituyen y ordenan desde el punto de vista formal cualquier experiencia posible, la cual “es lo que da realidad objetiva a todos nuestros conocimientos *a priori*” (KrV, A 156/B 195). Sin embargo, la operación de ordenamiento del material desarrollada por los conceptos y por las formas *a priori* de la sensibilidad (categorías, espacio y tiempo) está finalmente fundamentada sobre la forma de la apercepción. En Kant, entonces, las categorías no son una vía mediana entre una norma trascendente y la esfera inmanente de los entes. Si, de todas formas, quisiéramos hablar de intermediación, haría falta plantearla entre la actividad del pensamiento del yo (*yo pienso*) y el material sensible. Sin embargo, es evidente que lo que en Kant no está presente, es una dimensión de transcendencia como fuente de objetividad para el conocimiento.

El hecho de que la objetividad del conocimiento esté determinada por la experiencia posible (o por la experiencia en general), obliga a Kant a plantear una

divergencia fundamental entre los juicios de percepción y los juicios de experiencia: los primeros, a diferencia de los segundos, son de hecho inevitablemente subjetivos. Lo que implica que a ellos no se les refiere ninguna categoría.⁸ El juicio de percepción “el cuaderno es azul” es una simple conexión, en mi conciencia, de dos sensaciones. Una conexión que no implica ninguna universalidad. Según Rickert, al contrario, no subsiste la diferencia entre estos dos tipos de juicios, puesto que ya la simple percepción implica la presuposición de la norma trascendente y, en consecuencia, de la aplicación de las categorías al contenido representativo. Para Rickert el término experiencia se extiende abrazando toda actividad del yo, todo acto subjetivo, incluidas las simples percepciones y sensaciones: “Nosotros no queremos plantear *aquí* ninguna diferencia entre percepción y experiencia” (p. 383). Donde hay experiencia hay pensamiento y donde hay pensamiento hay actividad categorial.

Llegamos por fin al núcleo de la cuestión. La descripción de la categoría de la donación emerge ahora como una necesaria consecuencia del idealismo trascendental rickertiano y de sus pilares fundamentales que acabamos de presentar. El quinto y último capítulo de *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, ya no es, como los primeros cuatro, una descripción del idealismo, sino una comparación entre este y el realismo empírico, es decir, la actitud teórico-cognoscitiva típica de las ciencias empíricas.⁹ El objetivo de Rickert es demostrar que su planteamiento filosófico no entra en contradicción con las ciencias positivas. Al contrario: constituye su fundamento gnoseológico, lo que permite a las afirmaciones de la física, de la biología, de la química, pero también de la historia y de las así llamadas ciencias del espíritu, ver demostrada su objetividad.

En opinión de Rickert, la categoría de la donación constituye la categoría fundamental y primigenia: el punto cero de la relación cognoscitiva entre el sujeto y la realidad. Las mismas ciencias empíricas, para empezar la operación de verificación experimental de sus hipótesis, necesitan la recopilación de *datos*, podríamos decir de *hechos*, sobre los cuales empezará sucesivamente el trabajo de reelaboración y de conformación de las teorías. Según las ciencias, este nivel inmediato de conocimiento no implica ninguna *con-formación* por parte del sujeto: el dato, como dice la propia palabra,

⁸ “Los juicios empíricos, en cuanto tienen validez objetiva, son juicios de experiencia; pero aquellos que solamente son válidos de un modo subjetivo, los llamo yo puramente juicios de percepción. Los últimos no necesitan de concepto alguno puro del entendimiento, sino solo del enlace de la observación en un sujeto pensante. Pero los primeros exigen siempre, sobre las representaciones de la intuición sensible, aun, de un modo especial, *conceptos originariamente formados en el entendimiento*, los cuales hacen precisamente que el juicio de la experiencia tenga *valor objetivo*” (Prol., AA 04: 298).

⁹ La diferencia que plantea Rickert entre el realismo empírico y el realismo trascendental (o teórico-cognoscitivo) repite la diferencia kantiana contenida en la estética trascendental entre realidad empírica e idealidad trascendental del espacio y del tiempo (Cfr KrV, A 37-40/B 54-57). Las ciencias empíricas cuando realizan sus investigaciones y se limitan a analizar la experiencia no afirman ninguna *teoría* filosófica, es decir, no admiten una realidad trascendente que se encontraría más allá de nuestros contenidos de conciencia. En la medida en que el realismo no se vuelve dogmático, es decir, en la medida en que no asigna una realidad absoluta a los contenidos de conciencia o a la “realidad” que estos se limitarían a representar, entonces, según Rickert, sería compatible con el idealismo trascendental. Véase a este respecto lo que Kant mismo afirma acerca del empirismo en la dialéctica trascendental: KrV, A 468-471/B 496-499.

es *dado*, es decir, recibido. El yo se limita a tomar nota de él. Su trabajo, su *actividad*, solo empieza *post factum*.

Rickert comparte la tesis según la cual el dato tiene en sí un elemento últimamente no deducible, pero refuta la tesis de la absoluta pasividad del yo respecto de él o, mejor dicho, la tesis que afirma que el ser-dado del dato (es decir la *donación* en cuanto forma de lo dado) no depende del yo. En su opinión, las ciencias empíricas se limitan a atestiguar el mero contenido del dato que, efectivamente, es independiente de la actividad subjetiva. Que se dé un cuaderno rojo o amarillo, un lápiz o un hombre es “desde cualquier punto de vista no deducible o, podríamos incluso decir, *irracional*, porque todo *pensar* encuentra su límite en los contenidos determinados” (p. 377). Sin embargo, si nos trasladamos al análisis de la forma, descubrimos que ya en este nivel básico de la investigación encontramos una primera categoría, una primera *conformación* subjetiva del contenido. Se trata propiamente de la categoría de la *donación* que Rickert define también como *forma del estar contenido* (*Form der Inhaltlichkeit*), es decir, la propiedad de ser un contenido de conciencia. Por decirlo con una fórmula: *qué* (*Was*) se dé no depende del sujeto. *Que* (*Dass*) se dé, en cambio, depende de él, aunque no en términos causales, sino a nivel del significado. Para que el contenido del dato tenga sentido, necesita de una forma. La forma originaria con la que se reviste el material irracional es la *donación*, el simple *ser-dado*.

Volvamos un instante a Kant para resaltar nuevamente la diferencia entre el idealismo del filósofo de Königsberg y el de Rickert. En la *Crítica de la razón pura* no se trata directamente del problema de la donación. Sin embargo, en las famosas páginas de la *Dialéctica trascendental* dedicadas a la refutación del argumento ontológico, es posible hallar unas indicaciones al respecto. Para Kant, como se sabe, el ser no es un predicado real. Esto implica que la efectiva existencia (léase “el darse efectivo”) de un objeto cualquiera es una determinación posible solo *a posteriori*. Que un triángulo tenga tres ángulos es una necesidad lógica indudable, pero que *haya/se dé* un triángulo es una pura posibilidad cuya efectividad *solo* es posible anotar empíricamente. Los juicios existenciales son, por lo tanto, juicios sintéticos *a posteriori*. Traduciendo esto en una terminología más adecuada para nuestro tema, podríamos decir que, en la determinación del darse de un objeto, el sujeto es puramente pasivo, intuitivo. En él no se ve implicada actividad intelectual (categorial) alguna:

En los objetos sensibles ello [la atribución de la existencia] sucede por medio de la conexión con alguna de nuestras percepciones, de acuerdo con las leyes empíricas [...]. Nuestra conciencia de toda existencia (sea inmediata, en virtud de la percepción, sea mediante inferencias que enlacen algo con la percepción) pertenece por entero a la unidad de la experiencia (KrV, A 601/B 629).

Rickert coincide con Kant en la tesis según la cual el ser no es un predicado real, sino una forma que puede revestir un contenido representativo. Sin embargo, esto no implica necesariamente que la afirmación del ser individual de algo, es decir, de su ser *dado*, sea un juicio sintético *a posteriori*. Al contrario, para Rickert la afirmación del simple *ser-ahí* (*es gibt*) de algo es un juicio sintético *a priori* y, por tanto, implica una

actividad categorial transcendental: la aplicación de la categoría de donación al material representado. Kant asignaría a la intuición sensible lo que pertenece a la lógica. Solo de esta forma puede interpretar la consideración de un dato como un juicio sintético *a posteriori*, y además establecer la diferencia señalada antes entre la subjetividad de los juicios de percepción y la objetividad de los juicios empíricos. Entre otras cosas, para el estatuto del dato esto implica el peligro de su reducción a los *data* sensoriales de corte empirista.

Entre Kant y Rickert se juega la alternativa estricta entre un *dato* como simple certificación *sensible* y un *dato* como producto categorial o, podríamos decir, entre un *dato* circunscrito a la *sensibilidad* de la intuición y un *dato* inscrito en la *categorialidad* del intelecto. Esta alternativa será superada por la fenomenología husserliana y por su *intuición categorial* que, por un lado –contra los neokantianos–, restablece el derecho de la estética, pero, por otro –contra Kant–, no la reduce solo a la sensibilidad, sino que la amplía a toda la esfera lógica. No se trata, entonces, de suprimir el momento intuitivo-perceptivo en favor de la absolutización del momento categorial, sino de ampliar este a aquel. Afirma Husserl: “Las funciones categoriales (lógicas) desempeñan sin duda un gran papel en el pensamiento de Kant; pero este no llega a hacer la fundamental ampliación de los conceptos de percepción e intuición a la esfera categorial” (Husserl 1968, vol. 2, p. 202).

Volviendo a Rickert, nos permitimos citar un pasaje bastante largo, pero en nuestra opinión fundamental, para comprender plenamente su diferencia con Kant:

Nosotros intentamos indicar que ya en los juicios de percepción de Kant, o en las “síntesis *a posteriori*”, se encuentra el mismo problema presente en los juicios de experiencia de Kant, o en las “síntesis *a priori*”. Con la presentación del factor transcendente vamos, por decirlo de alguna forma, más hasta el fondo de lo que hizo Kant. Nosotros buscamos hasta en los últimos *fundamentos de la experiencia* de todas las ciencias, la necesidad transcendente que se refiere a toda experiencia. Ya no hay para nosotros un *puro* juzgar *a posteriori* (Rickert 1915, p. 384).

Es importante subrayar que, para Rickert, la categoría de donación no coincide perfectamente con la categoría del ser; mientras esta última representa la forma del ser-dado *en general*, la donación es una forma del dato *individual*. Por esto afirma: “Podríamos incluso indicarla como categoría de *este ser* (*Kategorie des Diesseins*)” (p. 382).¹⁰ En segundo lugar, el puro *dato* es para Rickert una abstracción, es decir, el fruto de la desvinculación de un hecho de su contexto mundano y de la realidad en la que está insertado. Tanto en la actitud cotidiana como en la actitud científica, el sujeto nunca trata con puros *datos*, sino siempre con una realidad más extendida, que es el fruto de la síntesis del material con más categorías:

¹⁰ Esto no significa que la donación sea una categoría individual: sería una contradicción porque, para Rickert, las normas y las formas son siempre generales. La donación es entonces una forma *de* lo individual.

El *Sollen* aislado, reconocido por medio de la categoría de donación, no es suficiente como objeto del conocimiento de la realidad: se necesitan (*es gelten*) otras normas formales, de cuyo reconocimiento, operado por medio de otras categorías, resulta la realidad objetiva como un mundo de cosas que interactúan entre ellas (p. 398).

c) *La crítica de Heidegger*

El realismo crítico y las ciencias empíricas ven en los datos sensoriales, en los datos perceptivos, algo originario, el punto cero del que tiene que partir el análisis tanto del objeto que se quiere conocer como del conocimiento mismo de este objeto. Al contrario – como acabamos de ver–, para Rickert, los datos sensoriales no son de por sí un punto de partida, sino el punto de llegada de una articulación transcendental entre materia y forma. En cierto sentido, el neokantiano está inscribiendo las ciencias y el realismo filosófico en la misma ingenuidad de la que estos pretenden sustraerse cuando consideran como origen de sus investigaciones los datos sensoriales y no los objetos del mundo exterior. Creer que las percepciones son algo *inmediatamente* dado es todavía un planteamiento ingenuo precrítico:

Lo dado es lo que se *experimenta* inmediatamente y la experiencia es lo que toda ciencia de la experiencia tiene que presuponer en la medida en que quiere ser ciencia de la experiencia. Nosotros, sin embargo, no podemos aceptar lo que se da (*das Tatsächliche oder Gegebene*) como algo último desde el punto de vista teórico cognoscitivo. Nosotros intentamos remontarnos detrás de la experiencia y hacer de esta un problema (p. 376).

El hecho de que Rickert no acepte el darse de los datos sensoriales como un punto de partida filosófico adecuado le acerca evidentemente a Heidegger.¹¹ En este sentido, se puede entender que en el curso del semestre de invierno de 1919-1920 Heidegger celebre la categoría de la donación de Rickert como un paso hacia delante en la comprensión de la actitud teórica. Ella, de hecho, perfora el horizonte de las ciencias empíricas –y del realismo crítico–, introduciendo a una capa más originaria, más cercana a la vida preteórica aunque, como en breve veremos, permaneciendo todavía embaucada en la actitud teórica. Afirma Heidegger: “Problema de la donación: 1) una donación que en cierto sentido se origina por el trabajo de las ciencias; 2) una donación que, según su sentido, está necesariamente *dada previamente* a ese trabajo y a su posible acción. – (La categoría rickertiana de *donación*)” (Heidegger 1993, p. 71). Que esta identificación entre categoría de la donación rickertiana y predonación apunte hacia la vida histórica –aunque no la alcance–, es cuanto el propio Heidegger reconoció a Rickert en una misiva redactada el día en que terminó el curso del que estamos hablando y al que hace referencia con estas

¹¹ Para un cuadro general acerca de la relación entre Rickert y Heidegger véase Hobe 1971. Respecto de la relación entre Heidegger y el neokantismo, con referencias interesantes al problema de la donación, véase Carman 2010, Denker 2004, Lehmann 1964 y Steinmann 2004.

palabras: “He intentado alcanzar la misma vida histórica viviente, es decir, la experiencia fáctica del mundo-ambiente cuya aclaración fenomenológica ha extendido y confirmado lo que usted ha puesto de manifiesto, para una actitud específicamente teórico-cognoscitiva (*erkenntnistheoretische Einstellung*), en la categoría de donación” (Heidegger-Rickert 2002, p. 48). Lo que Rickert elaboró para la teoría del conocimiento, es decir, en un horizonte teórico, fue “extendido y confirmado” por Heidegger en el horizonte preteórico de la vida misma.

Intentemos aclarar el sentido de esta extensión y confirmación. Lo que Heidegger aprecia de la categoría de la donación rickertiana es que desvela una estructura previa de lo que inmediatamente se nos da. El problema de Heidegger en estos años es la comprensión de la vida fáctica, la cual se caracteriza de manera esencial por un entramado de presupuestos y prejuicios debido a su radical historicidad. La vida no se nos da de manera inmediata y tampoco se nos da de una vez por todas, sino que tiene que ser constantemente llevada a donación, recuperada de su tendencia a esconderse. Esto significa que la vida se ofrece de manera inmediata ocultándose y que, para comprenderla en su originariedad, es necesario destruir los estratos que velan su auténtica donación. Desde el punto de vista fenomenológico hay que evitar la identificación entre donación y visión inmediata (la evidencia y la donación ingenuamente entendidas) y esto implica que lo que inmediatamente vemos no es lo que se nos da inmediatamente: lo inmediato no es el dato – y menos aún los datos sensoriales– sino algo previo que Heidegger identifica con la significatividad preteórica. Afirma Heidegger: “Lo fenomenológicamente visible no debe ser interpretado como lo fenomenológicamente *dado* [...] No debo asombrarme de no *ver* la significatividad no destacada. Es preciso distinguir de lo fenomenológicamente visible aquello que, si bien es necesario según el sentido, no está destacado y, por ende, *no es visible*” (Heidegger 1993, p. 218). Estas palabras, además de aclarar la diferencia entre *donación* y *visión*, son muy útiles en la medida en que vuelven a centrar el problema de la fenomenología en la cuestión del *sentido* que –en nuestra opinión– es la clave de lo transcendental.

Los datos sensoriales de las ciencias empíricas y del realismo crítico son quizá lo que se ve *inmediatamente*, una vez se asume la actitud teórica, pero no son lo originario desde el punto de vista de una teoría del conocimiento –como demuestra la categoría de la donación de Rickert– y menos aún desde el punto de vista del origen del significado de los fenómenos. Esto significa que están doblemente alejados del origen por estar inscritos en un horizonte teórico y por no ser lo originario en este mismo horizonte. Por otra parte, tampoco inscribiéndonos en el horizonte preteórico se puede asumir lo que se ve como el dato fenomenológicamente originario. Esta sería una nueva forma de ingenuidad, ya que la inmersión en la esfera de las vivencias no es –una vez más– un punto de llegada, sino el punto de arranque de todos los problemas auténticamente fenomenológicos: “Solo ahora empiezan las dificultades fundamentales. Esta situación no es una arribada salvífica sino más bien el punto de embarque” (Heidegger 1994, p. 37). Las vivencias que intuimos, que inmediatamente vemos y vivimos, deben ser comprendidas, interpretadas, es decir,

llevadas a donación, a aquella donación que solo ahora asume el significado de lo *inmediatamente originario* desde el punto de vista del origen del sentido de la vida fáctica. Por esta razón, Heidegger afirma que el ámbito del origen *no nos es dado en la vida en sí*:

El ámbito del origen no nos es dado. No sabemos nada de él desde la *vida práctica*. Nos es lejano, y debemos acercárnoslo *metódicamente*. Así pues: 1) El ámbito del origen, el campo de objetos de la fenomenología, no es dado en la *vida en sí*. 2) [...] Por esencia, el ámbito del origen *nunca* es dado en la vida en sí. Siempre tiene que volver a ser captado (Heidegger 1993, p. 203).

Esta digresión acerca de la donación en Heidegger es necesaria para comprender la crítica de este a Rickert, pero sobre todo para la apreciación de la categoría de la donación que antes hemos citado. Ahora, de hecho, podemos comprender que “extender y confirmar” la categoría de la donación rickertiana significa, para Heidegger, trasladar su ámbito de aplicación de la esfera teórica a la preteórica. Así como en el horizonte teórico la categoría de la donación desvela una estructura previa en los datos perceptivos demostrando que estos tienen que ser interpretados como el resultado de una síntesis entre un contenido y una forma categorial, del mismo modo Heidegger encontrará en las vivencias preteóricas inmediatamente dadas una estructura previa que es necesario interpretar y llevar a donación si se quiere comprender el sentido propio de estas vivencias. En otras palabras, la categoría de la donación rickertiana tiene el gran mérito de remontarse a lo originario en la esfera teórica, superando como no originarios los datos sensoriales. Heidegger, por analogía, hará lo mismo en la esfera preteórica: supera las vivencias inmediatas para remontarse a su estructura previa. Evidentemente, el límite de Rickert consiste, para Heidegger, en su limitación a la esfera teórica y en no percatarse de que el origen de lo teórico se encuentra en la vida fáctica preteórica.

Este confinamiento en lo teórico tiene en Rickert una doble reducción. Por un lado, el material que viene ordenado por la categoría de donación se reduce a una materia irracional completamente indeterminada y, por otro, la experiencia es reducida y absorbida íntegramente en el pensamiento. En otras palabras, de las vivencias preteóricas no podemos afirmar nada: podemos comprender nuestro estar inmediato en el mundo solo en la medida en que las categorías –y en primer lugar la categoría de donación o la categoría del ser– visten su esencial irracionalidad: “*Este azul y este rojo permanecen a todas luces indeducibles [...]. Solo a continuación yo reflexiono que este azul y este rojo los reconozco como efectivos o los juzgo como dados, es decir, atribuyo al contenido la forma de la donación o de la efectividad*” (Rickert 1915, p. 377). Para Rickert no hay experiencias puras porque no hay experiencia sin pensamiento. En este sentido, la percepción, como hemos visto, es ya un juicio: percibir es juzgar.

Esta traducción de la experiencia en el juicio, esta extensión del dominio de las categorías hasta el estrato perceptivo, este destierro de todo horizonte pre-categorial en lo irracional, no podía dejar indiferente a Heidegger que, al contrario, hacía del horizonte preteórico el manantial de toda actitud teórico-categorial y la cuna misma de la filosofía. Toda actividad categorial necesita, para Heidegger, de un terreno previo de

experiencia concreta en el que insertarse y desde el cual empezar a operar. Este terreno previo es, a su vez, el fruto de una primera elaboración de la vida fáctica la cual, sin embargo, no es la patria de lo irracional. De manera esquemática, los pasos que siguen las ciencias –y también las teorías del conocimiento– son los siguientes: 1) experiencia fáctica del mundo; 2) elaboración del terreno de experiencia (*Erfahrungsboden*); 3) elaboración del campo temático (*Sachgebiet*). Para Heidegger, cada ciencia es una lógica concreta de un campo temático determinado fruto de la elaboración progresiva de la experiencia fáctica del mundo. Dicha elaboración consiste en la desvitalización de la vida preteórica, es decir, en la interrupción y consecuente eliminación del plexo de nexos significativos vitales (tendencias y motivaciones) que constituyen lo que en estos años Heidegger define –citando a Stefan George– como el “tapiz de la vida”.

La teoría del conocimiento de Rickert sería por tanto la lógica concreta de un campo temático fruto de la completa eliminación de la significatividad originaria de la vida, de lo que inmediatamente encontramos en el mundo para traducirlo en meros contenidos inmanentes a la conciencia; estos son ordenados y racionalizados en virtud de categorías que valen y, en último término, de la referencia a valores trascendentes. Para dar cuenta de nuestra experiencia de la realidad, las teorías del conocimiento reducen toda significatividad a meros datos, sean estos sensoriales o contenidos de conciencia. En ambos casos, asistimos a lo que Heidegger llama una *sovietización* (Heidegger 1993, p. 125) de los fragmentos de significatividad que encontramos en la vida fáctica.

La lógica concreta de Rickert traduce la significatividad en el correlato de una valoración, en un reconocimiento de un valor. Hace esto porque, siguiendo la enseñanza de Windelband, considera la verdad como una norma, un valor, y el conocer, por tanto, como una actividad práctica de reconocimiento de una norma. Por esta razón, todo juicio es siempre un tomar posición (afirmar o negar) frente a un valor reconocido. Juzgando que esta botella es azul experimento un sentimiento de placer fruto del apaciguamiento de mi impulso hacia el conocimiento. Este sentimiento, como el que se ha descrito antes, es la *evidencia*, la cual me impide juzgar de manera arbitraria. El valor de la verdad se me impone como una necesidad (*Sollen*), como un imperativo que me insta a juzgar de una manera determinada.

Rickert traslada el origen del significado de la vida fáctica a la esfera trascendente de los valores: en último término, el significarme de algo depende del carácter de valor de la verdad. Y esto vale para todos los juicios, no solo para los estéticos o los morales, sino también para los juicios sobre la realidad: un juicio es verdadero no porque las cosas sean tal y como las presenta el juicio, sino porque el valor trascendente de la verdad me obliga a juzgarlas de esta manera. La realidad, por tanto, se convierte en una especie de la verdad y la verdad es un tipo de valor trascendente. Aquí se pone de manifiesto cómo Rickert, en virtud de una radicalización del principio de inmanencia, ha puesto completamente entre paréntesis la experiencia del mundo concreto, asignando todo el peso de la demostración de la verdad de los juicios a los valores trascendentes.

Ahora bien, ¿qué significa que la verdad sea un valor? ¿Rickert consigue demostrar este punto clave de la filosofía de los valores? Según Heidegger, la respuesta está clara:

fijamos nuestra atención en estos dos puntos: 1) ¿Rickert ha demostrado el carácter de valor de la verdad? 2) Si lo ha demostrado, ¿significa esto que la lógica es una teoría de los valores y la filosofía es esencialmente ciencia de los valores? Rickert no ha mostrado ninguno de estos dos puntos y esto porque nunca ha visto como tal el problema del valor en general. ¡¡¡He aquí el sentido último de la filosofía de los valores!!! (Heidegger 1999, p. 193).¹²

Tras esta aclaración acerca del rol de los valores trascendentes en la filosofía de Rickert, recuperamos ahora el problema de la donación. Hemos visto cómo, para Rickert, la donación es fundamentalmente un asunto propio del juicio, una síntesis entre un contenido de conciencia y una forma categorial. Según Heidegger, Rickert elimina de esta manera toda la vertiente pre-categorial del problema de la donación, es decir, el darse significativo de algo en nuestro estar inmediato en el mundo. Esto resulta evidente no solo por su interpretación de la donación como categoría sino también porque de lo que esta categoría informa no deja de ser, en último término, una mera sensación, una impresión sensible. La significación, por tanto, no solo es el correlato de una referencia a un valor trascendente, sino que su significado está completamente desvitalizado en mera sensación:

Rickert confunde “impresión sensible percibida”, “constatar un contenido de conciencia como dado” y experiencia fáctica trascendente (en ella no se constata ninguna impresión sensible). Esto se debe a que la problemática es transpuesta sin más a una esfera ficticia. Se construye un *concepto de experiencia pura* –que pertenece a una esfera totalmente distinta que la experiencia fáctica del mundo circundante [...]– y se descubre en ella un contenido, sin problematizar en ningún momento su correlato vivencial, y no se problematiza porque se ha compuesto un concepto de conciencia en general que es pura construcción [...] Aquello de lo que se tiene experiencia en la experiencia fáctica es transformado en algo *encontrado inmanentemente* –mediante una falsa absolutización del principio de inmanencia (Heidegger 1993, p. 135).¹³

Para Rickert, el momento cognoscitivo equivale al momento judicial y lo que precede a este no comprende nada, no aferra nada, no *da* nada. Pensar de forma diferente,

¹² En el semestre de invierno de 1919-1920, Heidegger corrobora la misma tesis: “¿Por qué es un *valor* la verdad? La filosofía de los valores, la filosofía axiológica en cuanto ciencia de los valores universales no ofrece respuesta alguna sobre esto, y menos todavía sobre lo que significa *valor* – *cómo puedo tener experiencia de valores y saber de ellos*” (Heidegger 1993, p. 73).

¹³ Por completitud citamos esta misma frase de Heidegger tal y como la recogió Oscar Becker en sus apuntes: “Rickert mienta el sentido del juicio de que se constatan determinadas efectividades en el mundo fáctico; pero confunde este sentido con el de un juicio sobre un contenido de conciencia. Confunde el color de la pared (trascendente) con una sensación de color (inmanente). Rickert, bajo la influencia de Lask, reconoce algo último, irracional; pero plantea el problema solo para la donación de algo inmanente, de un contenido de conciencia. No se retiene el sentido de la experiencia fáctica, sino que se ocupa de datos sensibles” (p. 226).

es decir, conjeturando por ejemplo una intuición *donadora* capaz de captar cognoscitivamente la vinculación primigenia entre materia y forma, es decir, el *dato*, es para él una mistificación, un ver ultrateorético de corte místico, digno de Angelus Silesius (Rickert 1915, pp. 291-292).

Heidegger, criticando a Rickert, recuperará el ámbito de la intuición, es decir, el darse originario del aparecer, como un ámbito cognoscitivo. Lo hará remitiéndose al principio de todos los principios de Husserl. Sin embargo, trasladando la categoría de la donación de Rickert de la esfera teórica a la preteórica, se dará cuenta de la necesidad de transformar hermenéuticamente la propia intuición fenomenológica: el acceso a las vivencias no es, como para Husserl, un acceso inmediato, sino que, analógicamente a lo que dijo Rickert para el ámbito teórico, presenta una estructura previa que, para comprenderse, necesita ser interpretada y llevada a donación. Igual que para el neokantiano el objeto perceptivo inmediato esconde una estructura categorial previa (la categoría de la donación), del mismo modo para Heidegger nuestro estar inmediato en el mundo esconde una estructura precategorial que *pre-determina* el significado de aquello que, inmediata y regularmente, se nos da.

Bibliografía

- Carman, T. (2010), “Heidegger’s Anti-neo-Kantianism”, *The Philosophical Forum*, n.º 41, pp. 131-142.
- Denker, A. (2004), “Heideggers Lebens- und Denkweg 1909-1919”, *Heidegger-Jahrbuch 1*, Karl Alber, Friburgo/Múnich, pp. 97-122.
- Hobe, K. (1971), “Zwischen Rickert und Heidegger. Versuch über eine Perspektive des Denkens von Emil Lask”, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, n.º 78, pp. 360-376.
- Kant, I. (KrV), *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlín.
- (Prol.), *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*, Akademie-Verlag, Berlín.
- Heidegger, M. (1993), *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*, (Gesamtausgabe 58), Klostermann, Fráncfort del Meno.
- (1994), *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*, (Gesamtausgabe 61), Klostermann, Fráncfort del Meno.
 - (1999), *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie*, (Gesamtausgabe 56/57), Klostermann, Fráncfort del Meno.
- Heidegger, M., Rickert, H. (2002), *Briefe 1912 bis 1933 und andere Dokumente*, Klostermann, Fráncfort del Meno.
- Husserl, E. (1968), *Logische Untersuchungen*, Max Niemeyer, Tubinga.
- Lask, E. (1912), *Die Lehre vom Urteil*, J.C.B. Mohr, Tubinga.

- Lehmann, K. Von (1964), “Metaphysik, Transzendentalphilosophie und Phänomenologie in den ersten Schriften Martin Heideggers (1912-1916)”, *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, n.º 71, pp. 331-357.
- Rickert, H. (1915), *Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnis*, J.C.B. Mohr, Tubinga.
- (1909), “Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transscendentalpsychologie und Transscendentallogik”, *Kant-Studien*, n.º 14 (1909), pp. 169-228.
- Steinmann, M. (2004), “Der frühe Heidegger und sein Verhältnis zum Neukantianismus”, *Heidegger-Jahrbuch 1*, Karl Alber, Friburgo/Múnich.



The Kantian Background to Cassirer's Political Commitment and Its Parallelisms with Kant's Republicanism and Support of the French Revolution¹

ROBERTO R. ARAMAYO*

Instituto de Filosofía del CSIC, Spain

Abstract

Cassirer's thought took a radical turn in his mature life, comparable to the one that Kant went through in his last days, and in both cases this was motivated by the political events that they witnessed: the French Revolution in Kant's case, and the National Socialist ideology in Cassirer's case. In this work I canvass Cassirer's way of articulating his own political thought by constantly reclaiming the philosophy of Kant, whose work he never stops referring to, and by constantly reclaiming the values defended by the Enlightenment's project as a whole, in order to defend, among other things, the idea of a republican constitution and thereby the Weimar Republic. Cassirer decided to fight against Nazism in the field of History of Ideas, choosing Leibniz, Rousseau, Kant and Goethe as his allies. The second part of this work emphasizes this parallelism by unfolding the premises of Kant's republicanism.

Key words

Cassirer, Kant, Rousseau, political philosophy, republicanism, Weimar.

Resumen

El pensamiento de Cassirer tuvo un claro giro político en su madurez, comparable al experimentado por el último Kant y en ambos casos ello se debió a los acontecimientos políticos que les tocó vivir: la Revolución francesa en el caso de Kant y la ideología nacionalsocialista en el

¹ This article is a deliverable of the projects WORLDBRIDGES (F7-PEOPLE-2013-IRSES: PIRSES-GA-2013-612644), PRISMAS (FFI2013-42395-P), NEW-TRUST-CM (S2015-HUM-3466 / DER2015-71755-REDT), PAIDESOC (FFI2017-88272-P) and PRX16/00482.

* Professor of Investigation at the IFS/CSIC: <http://cchs.csic.es/es/personal/robertor.aramayo>.
E-mail for contact: aramayo@ifs.csic.es

de Cassirer. En este trabajo se rastrea el modo en que Cassirer articuló su pensamiento político reivindicando constantemente la filosofía kantiana, cuya obra no deja de citar en todo momento, al igual que reivindica los valores defendidos por el proyecto ilustrado en su conjunto, para defender entre otras cosas la idea de una constitución republicana y con ello a la República de Weimar. Cassirer decidió luchar contra el nazismo desde la historia de las ideas, eligiendo como compañeros de viaje a Rousseau y a Kant, a Leibniz y a Goethe. La segunda parte del trabajo realza este paralelismo desgranando las premisas del republicanismo kantiano.

Palabras clave

Cassirer, Kant, Rousseau, filosofía política, republicanismo, Weimar.

For Kant the whole of philosophy is indissociably linked to that fundamental question which so deeply and passionately moved the XVIII century: the question regarding the undying, immutable, inalienable rights of the human being.

(Ernst Cassirer, *The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem* -1935)

As is well known, Cassirer availed himself of his enormous familiarity with the Kantian thought in order to carve out his own philosophy of culture, transferring the premises of the transcendental system to his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms*. What may not be as well-known, however, is the way in which Cassirer recurred to the Kantian thought in the process of giving shape to his own increasing political commitment²; a commitment, on the other hand, which Kant himself deployed by taking a stance with regard to the politics of his own time, as e.g. *Toward Perpetual Peace* bears witness³. While Kant openly took a stance in support of republican cosmopolitanism against absolutist power, enthusiastically applauding the French Revolution in spite of its traumatic and inevitable side-effects, Cassirer, in his turn, had to confront the totalitarian ideology of Nazism in the field of the History of Ideas⁴, and he did so constantly evoking Kant and only once he had incorporated the main traits of the Kantian *corpus* into his own personal reflections.

² There are some works which point in this direction, however, such as Joël Gaubert, *La science politique d'Ernst Cassirer. Pour une refondation symbolique de la raison pratique contre le mythe politique contemporain*, Kimé, Paris, 1996; Bertrand Bergely, *Cassirer. La politique du juste*, Michalon, Paris, 1998; Deniz Coskun, *Law as Symbolic Form. Ernst Cassirer and the Anthropocentric view of Law*, Springer, Dordrecht, 2007.

³ See Roberto R. Aramayo, "El compromiso político de Kant con la causa republicana conforme a los principios de libertad, igualdad e independencia como derechos de la humanidad", introduction to the Spanish version of Kant's *Towards Perpetual Peace*: I. Kant, *Hacia la paz perpetua. Un diseño filosófico*, CTK E-Books, Madrid, 2018; see also Roberto R. Aramayo, *Kant. Entre la moral y la política*, Alianza Editorial, Madrid, 2018. The English translation of *Toward Perpetual Peace* cited in this paper is that of Mary J. Gregor, which appears in Kant, Immanuel, *Practical Philosophy. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Cambridge: University Press, 1996.

⁴ See Roberto R. Aramayo, "Cassirer, un historiador de las ideas en lucha contra la barbarie del totalitarismo", Introductory Study to Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe. Filosofía y cultura en la Europa del Siglo de las Luces*, Fondo de Cultura Económica, México, 2014, pp. 9-47.

1. The Presence of the *Critique of Judgement in Judaism and the Modern Political Myths* (1944)

At least from 1928 and until the end of his days, Cassirer gradually increased the political commitment of his philosophical activity, always hand in hand with Kant, who did likewise when he reached his 60's in texts like *Theory and Practice*, *Toward Perpetual Peace*, and *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Before going on to discuss Kant, I'd like to retrace Cassirer's itinerary and its growing political commitment, starting almost by the end, i.e. by one of the prolegomena to his posthumous work *The Myth of the State*. It is noteworthy that Cassirer identifies himself with the Jewish community in a text dated 1944 entitled *Judaism and the Modern Political Myths*. At the end of this text, Cassirer describes himself as a modern Jew who endorses the meaning and values of Judaism, portrayed by the Nazis as the very incarnation of evil. This is somewhat surprising, given Cassirer's family background. Cassirer's family was certainly of Jewish ancestry, but his parents' generation gave up any liturgical practices and never engaged in those rituals again.

Although originally from Breslau, the Cassirer family moved to Berlin by the end of the XIX century, and it would be worth exploring the parallels with a *fin-de-siècle* Vienna family called Wittgenstein—whose philosophical offspring was a Jew who coincided in a Linz school with a certain Adolf Hitler, both children having been born in April 1886, sharing classrooms as adolescents. The Cassirers and the Wittgensteins were liberal, educated, bourgeois families with a remarkable influence in the cultural life of their surroundings, often counting intellectuals, editors, art sponsors and dealers, musicians, and at times even philosophers within their ranks. There can be little doubt that amongst the components that constituted Cassirer's cultural formation the Jewish tradition was eclipsed by personalities such as Leibniz, Kant, and Goethe, or by the Greco-Latin culture, quite unlike what happened with e.g. Herman Cohen, who was predestined by his father to become a Rabin, and who nonetheless became a reputed German philosopher thanks to his studies on Kant. Cassirer never disowned his lineage, however. When in 1916, at the heart of the journal *Kant-Studien*, Bruno Bauch characterized Cassirer's and Cohen's interpretations of Kant as "Jewish formalism", Cassirer replied by reminding Bauch that, according to Goethe, "where we educate ourselves, there is our fatherland".

In the same spirit, in his last public appearance before leaving Germany and becoming an exile, which took place on January 22nd, 1933, in Berlin's Prinzenregenstrasse synagogue, Cassirer expounded his reading of Cohen's book *Religion of Reason: Out of the Sources of Judaism*. That same year his wife proposed to search for asylum in Palestine, where he was likely to be offered a position at the university, a proposal Cassirer rejected on account of his differences with Zionism, and because he thought he was incapable of learning Hebrew at that point in his life, even though he later had no option but to learn Swedish, and to lecture and publish in English.

In 1944 Cassirer wrote an article for the journal *Jewish Record* entitled *Judaism and the Modern Political Myths*, where he argues that it is not enough to explain the crusade of the National Socialists against Judaism solely from an emotional perspective, and that it would be useful to carefully analyze its intellectual component, in order to be capable of identifying the enemy at an earlier stage next time. In the draft of *Judaism and the Modern Political Myths*, Cassirer notes that asking for the “truth” of a political myth is as pointless and ridiculous as asking for the truth of a firearm or a war aircraft, since in any case we are referring to weapons, and weapons prove their truth by means of their effectiveness—a thread of thought which reminds us of our own times, where *Fake News*, those false statements that may be put forward or taken back according to the whimsical decisions of certain world leaders, seem to have acquired full citizenship.

Myths are always dramatic in nature and conceive of the world as a titanic war between antagonistic forces, i.e. between light and darkness. The deification of the undisputed leader, therefore, remains incomplete unless the demonization of the absolute enemy is also accomplished. Undoubtedly, there was a social climate of antisemitism, but what really concerned the Nazis at the beginning was not the influence the Jews had in the German society, as their propaganda claimed. That influence may indeed explain aversions and all sorts of personal resentments, spurred by well-entrenched anti-Semitic prejudices; but what the Nazis were really worried about was a challenge to their own ideological supremacy. Denying it was tantamount to a mortal sin, a crime against the almighty and infallible totalitarian state. And the Jews were guilty of that high treason crime on account of their tradition, their culture, and their religious life. The relentless anti-Jewish hatred spread by the Nazi ideology during the 1930's was to a large extent a response to the fact that this people had transited from a *mythical* religion to an *ethical* one.

In order to develop this analysis, Cassirer starts by pointing to a biblical passage against idolatry—*Exodus*, 20, 4, a passage also referred to in Kant's *Critique of Judgment* (Ak. 5: 175)—, praising the decisive step taken by the Jewish religion against the worship of images and of any other kind of sensible representations, and immediately drawing a connection between that attitude and the purity that must necessarily accompany our representation of the moral law. This allows Cassirer, who knew his third *Critique*, to characterize the Jewish rejection of idolatry as the step that turns a mythical religion into a religion of a moral nature. According to Cassirer, divesting a myth of any idolatry can only serve to consolidate the myth's decadence.

Quite on the contrary, National Socialism glorified bonds of blood in order to divinize the race, whereas Judaism had transited towards a kind of universalism from which the ideal of perpetual peace could emerge. “More than two thousand years had to go by—wrote Cassirer—for this idea to be defended and interpreted by a great philosophical thinker. By the end of the Enlightenment's century Kant wrote his essay *Toward Perpetual Peace*” (24, 205-206). This may look like an impossible ideal, a mere utopia, but one which the Jewish prophets weren't afraid to proclaim, for living in an idea—Cassirer quotes Goethe once again—means trying to realize the impossible as if it were possible. Against this ardent yearning for perpetual peace, modern political myths tend to perpetuate

and intensify war, promising to the German people the conquest of the whole world and the annihilation of its greatest ideological enemy, the Jewish people.

In their new political mythology—writes Cassirer—Germany’s leaders choose the Jewish people as the scapegoat to which all evils and sins should be charged. What the inventors of the myth of the superior race feared was not physical resistance, but the moral resistance of the Jews. And they wanted to make sure that that resistance was shattered. (ECW 24, 207).

Cassirer takes up and further develops the significance conferred to Judaism by Kant in the *Critique of Judgment*, taking one more step in his refutation of the perverse National Socialist ideology. Kant’s and Goethe’s admirer, identifying himself as a member of the Jewish community, finishes up his text making the following statement:

It was left for us to represent those ideals which have been advocated by Judaism and which have found their way into universal human culture, into the life of civilized nations. Those ideals can’t be destroyed. If Judaism has played a part in tearing apart the power of modern political myths, it has accomplished its duty and its historical mission. (ECW 24, 208).

2. Kantian Overtones in *The Myth of the State* (1946): The New Thaumaturges

When in *The Myth of the State* Cassirer talks about the technique of modern political myths, he places those citizens who are victims of totalitarianism in a puppet show, very much like the one of which Kant speaks in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, when he describes those who renounce the principle of autonomy and embrace a theological morality. In this case, “human conduct would thus be changed into mere mechanism in which, as in a puppet show, everything would *gesticulate* well but there would be *no life* in the figures.”⁵ In a similar way, those who, abducted by Nazism’s political theology, succumb to the rituals of modern political myths, find themselves deprived of their capacity for judgment and critical discernment, thereby losing their personality and giving up any personal responsibility. Here is Cassirer’s description of those persons, now turned into puppets:

But here are men, men of education and intelligence, honest and upright men who suddenly give up the highest human privilege. They have ceased to be free and personal agents performing the same prescribed rites they begin to feel, to think, and to speak in the same way. Their gestures are lively and violent; yet this is but an artificial, sham life. In fact they are moved by an external force. They act like marionettes in a puppet show—and they do not even know that the strings of this show and of man's whole individual and social life, are henceforward pulled by the political leaders.⁶

⁵ Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, Translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: University Press, 1996. AA 5: 147.

⁶ Ernst Cassirer, *The Myth of the State*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1946, p. 286.

The politician, according to Cassirer, becomes now some sort of *fortuneteller*.⁷ One may not believe in natural magic, but one might nonetheless believe in some sort of *social magic* if the longing for leadership becomes overwhelmingly strong, and if any hope of reaching collective goals in ordinary ways vanishes. This longing gets personified and takes a concrete, political, and individual shape. Any previous social bonds—the law, justice, the constitution—get invalidated and all that remains is the mystic power of the leader, whose authority becomes the supreme law.⁸

The thaumaturges who administer this new creed are the masters of political propaganda and are skillful in the art of coining new terms and giving new meanings to old ones, in order to use them as *magic words* which stimulate particular emotions. This clever use of magic words is accompanied by the strict imposition of regular, inexorable rituals, in such a way that it becomes unthinkable to come across a neighbor or even a friend walking down the street without performing a political rite whose non-compliance is severely punished.

Cassirer thinks that the best vaccine against the virus of totalitarianism is what Kant proposes in 'What is Enlightenment?', namely, to learn to think for ourselves without ever leaving this responsibility to those who are ready to become our tutors and think in our stead, for freedom is not a gift but the most difficult task which we can set to ourselves.⁹ In describing the thaumaturges of the modern political myths, Cassirer revitalizes Kant's denunciation in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, a text which I'll quote with a slight modification, adapting it to the present context; Cassirer, indeed, thoroughly agrees with it, and thinks, as Kant did, that philosophy's task is to unmask those who present themselves as savior-thaumaturges:

People seem to be looking for thaumaturges and magicians, with knowledge of supernatural things. [...] If someone has the effrontery to give himself out as such a miracle worker, the people will flock to him and contemptuously desert the philosophy, whose task is to publicly counteract these thaumaturges, in order to deny the magic power that the public superstitiously attributes to these teachings and the rites connected with them; as if, by passively surrendering themselves to such skillful guides, the people would be excused from any activity of their own and led, in ease and comfort, to achieve the ends they desire.¹⁰

3. A Refutation of National Socialism that Takes Its Cue from Kant and from the Enlightenment

⁷ Ibid., p. 289.

⁸ Ibid. Cf. p. 280.

⁹ Cf. Ibid., p. 281. And see Kant's 'An answer to the question: What is Enlightenment?'

¹⁰ Cf. *The Conflict of the Faculties*, AA 7: 30-31. Translated by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor. In *Religion and Rational Theology. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Cambridge: University Press, 1996.

In the biography of Cassirer written by his wife, Toni Cassirer, we are told how he decided, at a certain point, to stop writing altogether—a measure of how profoundly traumatized he was by the arrival to power of the Nazis. Nonetheless, it was not long before he changed his mind, and rushed to combat Nazism using philosophy’s weaponry.¹¹

Cassirer was profoundly moved by the fact that intelligent, cultivated, honest people massively disdained the greatest privilege of human beings, i.e., to be their own masters, and that they stopped being critical with the world that surrounded them, and accepted the political collapse as something natural and unavoidable, something against which there was absolutely nothing to do. In an unedited draft of *The Myth of the State*, he records the bewilderment caused in him by that manner of accepting those facts:

Within the first days in which Hitler came to power, I repeatedly heard from the lips of cultivated people, from academics and philosophers, that History had spoken. People who had never been inclined towards the National Socialist party suddenly changed their mind. Political success was contemplated by them as an irrefutable proof of truth and justice, as an irrevocable sentence of History, as destiny’s fateful decree. To subjugate oneself before the consummated facts was not just a matter of political prudence, but was rather some kind of categorical imperative, something like the product of profound metaphysical wisdom.¹²

When Hitler gets hold on absolute power, Cassirer decides to write a philosophical refutation of the National Socialist ideas, even though he delays its publication at his wife’s request in order to prevent any reprisal against their families living in Germany, the publication occurring only posthumously under the title *The Myth of the State*. This refutation had an effect on at least one member of Hitler’s closet circle, Albert Speer, that mediocre architect who was assigned the task of designing a megalopolis called *Germania*, which was supposed to become the millenary German empire’s capital, but who, in his role as Reich Minister of Armaments and War Production, indirectly contributed instead to Berlin’s devastation, immortalized by Rossellini in his astonishing *Germany, Year Zero*.

Albert Speer recounts in his memoir how impressed he was by reading Cassirer during his captivity, while carrying out the twenty years’ sentence imposed upon him at the Nuremberg trial. According to him, far from taking it to be mere propaganda, the German people appropriated the slogan that the leader had to think for all of them and guide their destiny as if they were underaged, with no responsibility whatsoever.

“Perhaps the background had prepared us like soldiers—writes Speer—for the kind of thinking we encountered once again in Hitler’s system. Tight public order was in our blood. The liberalism of the Weimar Republic seemed to us by comparison lax, dubious,

¹¹ Toni Cassirer, *Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer*, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 2003, p. 202. In this regard, one must also mention Massimo Ferrari’s splendid intellectual biography, *Ernst Cassirer. Stationen einer philosophischen Biographie. Von der Marburger Schule zur Kulturphilosophie*, Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 2003.

¹² Ernst Cassirer, *Zu Philosophie und Politik* (hrsg. von Michael Krois und Christian Möckel), Felix Meiner, 2008, ECN 9, p. 219 n.

and in no way desirable.”¹³ And he adds after a few pages: “Years later, in Spandau I read Ernst Cassirer's comment on the men who of their own accord threw away man's highest privilege: to be an autonomous person. Now I was one of them.”¹⁴

Michel Foucault has described how, when the Nazis' boots trespassed the doors of the Chancellor's Office, Cassirer's *The Philosophy of Enlightenment* became something of a last stronghold, for, as Jean Starobinski has written,

Presenting a picture of the Enlightenment at a moment when Nazi ideas held sway everywhere, finding in Rousseau the thought that inspired Kant, Goethe, and republican ideals, meant turning on their heads, although with no hope of success, all those myths that back then mobilized masses and found in universities historians and philosophers well-disposed to propagate them.¹⁵

4. Rousseau (Paris, 1932 – New York, 1945)

In 1932 the political situation in Germany forces Cassirer to move to Paris, where he studies Rousseau and, at the Sorbonne, discusses his reading of the Genevan thinker. As also pointed out by Starobinski, his way of fighting for certain causes consisted in going back to its intellectual sources and in reading the texts of the great thinkers, so that he could reinforce by means of a historical analysis those values which deserved to be saved.¹⁶ Cassirer himself recognized that Rousseau's legacy wasn't for him the mere object of erudite curiosity or of philologico-historical examination, for the questions raised by him continue to speak to his readers.¹⁷ Those claims that Cassirer identifies and analyses in Rousseau's work deserve close attention, especially when considered as a socio-political pedagogy designed to serve as a preventing device against any totalitarianism in the bud.

Cassirer insists further that Kant, who he takes to be the XVIII century's moralist *par excellence* and the champion of practical reason, was almost the only one who thoroughly understood Rousseau's radicality and who made it his own, when he affirmed that, in the absence of any contribution to the triumph of justice, and if the law disappears, the human being's existence on Earth has no meaning at all.¹⁸ It was, after all, after reading Rousseau that Kant decided to dedicate himself to defend the rights of humanity. As we read in *The Concept of Philosophy as a Philosophical Problem*, “for Kant the whole of philosophy is indissociably linked to that fundamental question which so deeply and passionately moved the XVIII century: the question regarding the undying, immutable, inalienable rights of the

¹³ Albert Speer, *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs by Albert Speer*. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1970, p. 33.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁵ Jean Starobinski, preface to Ernst Cassirer, *Le Problème Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Paris, 1987. p. x.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. xi.

¹⁷ Ernst Cassirer, *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, in *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, ed. cit. p. 51; New Jersey. Princeton University Press, 1945.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 89. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 230, and AA 6: 332.

human being.”¹⁹ This was the same meaning that philosophy in general and Kantian philosophy in particular had for Cassirer. One of the writings that Cassirer left on his desk when he died in New York—only a few days before Hitler killed himself in Berlin—was a work on Kant and Rousseau which, together with another one on Goethe, were to become the Introduction to the English edition of *The Philosophy of Enlightenment*, which proves that Kant accompanied Cassirer from the beginning to the very last moment of this stage in his philosophical itinerary.

5. The Metaphysico-Functional Plot of Our Symbolic Universe (University of Gothenburg, 1939, Columbia University, 1945).

Incapable of shaping up to that socio-political atmosphere, Cassirer resigned to the rectorate of the University of Hamburg and took an early retirement at 59, starting an exile which first reached port in Sweden, where he would stay for a few years. There he decided to pay homage to his academic hosts and to engage in dialogue with the Swedish thinker Axel Hägerström. As Cassirer writes in the preface to the resulting publication, this helped him to apply his *Philosophy of Symbolic Forms* to new realms, and to give an *ethical turn* to his thinking, approaching with much more detail moral and juridico-philosophical problems.²⁰

In this text, Cassirer asks whether it would be correct for us to spare ourselves all historical journey through philosophical ethics, on account of the fact that one can pinpoint metaphysical views entwined in it, or it would rather be preferable to keep the strength of what has been achieved, stripping it of any metaphysical covering. He wonders whether the Kantian concepts of *pure duty* and of *ethical autonomy* may be given a functional meaning and be kept away from any link to a substantialist one. The eradication of old superstitions is one of the most important tasks of the philosophy of culture, but in his view this clearing-up must first and foremost make a new edification possible.²¹ Cassirer illustrates this by pointing to the evolution of right, from customs and traditions to the forward-looking verdict, an illustration he couldn't help but accompany with a reference to the Kantian notion of an original contract as an idea with an undeniable practical reality, and another reference to the notion of a law that one can only give to oneself. The very concept of a *will*, cleared of any metaphysical connection, refers simply to a fundamental orientation of consciousness towards what is not given, whatever is yet to come and be realized, and this *prospective function*, which is complementary to the retrospective function of memory and to the perception of the present, gives us the capacities for prevision and anticipation which make our *symbolic universe* possible.²²

¹⁹ “Der Begriff der Philosophie als Problem der Philosophie”, in *Zu Philosophie und Politik*, ed. cit., ECN 9, p. 152.

²⁰ Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart*. p. 39.

²¹ *Ibid.* p. 125.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 148-5.

In this order of things, Cassirer defines the human being in his *Philosophical Anthropology* as a *symbolic animal*, for, owing to our immersion in culture, we inhabit a symbolic net constituted by the threads of linguistic forms, artistic images, mystic tales, and religious rituals, all of which make us live in the midst of emotions, hopes, fears, illusions, and imaginary delusions, inspired by fantasies and dreams, very far away from the raw facts and from our needs and immediate desires.²³ Kant looked at the French Revolution from a similar perspective, as he was interested mainly in *symbolically* grasping that historical event, evaluating it not in terms of its outcome, but in terms of its ethical motivation, of the moral and juridical orientation that it manifested.

6. In Defense of the Weimar Republic (Hamburg 1928)

In 1928 Cassirer made his commitment to the Weimar Republic explicit by giving a lecture on *The Idea of a Constitutional Republic*, on the occasion of the Weimar Republic's tenth anniversary.²⁴ In this text, Cassirer confers on the republican constitution of Weimar a symbolic meaning similar to the one that the French Revolution had for Kant, expressing his intimate conviction that present-day problems could not be satisfactorily resolved unless one engaged at the same time with fundamental philosophical problems. In this manner, Cassirer evokes in a certain way the Secret article of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, according to which statesmen should be more attentive to the contributions of those who engage in philosophy, in view of the unavoidable interaction between theory and practice, between the structure of our ideas and the configuration of our socio-political reality.

The Weimar Republic was often accused by the efficacious Nazi propaganda of being something foreign and imposed upon the Germans by the degrading Treaty of Versailles, something that did not fit well with German traditions. In order to counter this prejudice, Cassirer embarks on a fascinating intellectual journey that starts with Leibniz and ends with Kant, pointing at how certain Leibnizian ideas may have been exported, through Wolff and Blackstone, from Germany to England, thenceforth to North America, and finally brought back to their point of departure owing to the intervention of political actors such as Lafayette or Jefferson. Cassirer's conclusion is that the demand for inalienable rights first emerged in the realm of ideas with Leibniz, where it stayed until its openness towards the realm of effective history came forward, only in order later come back from the historic to the ideal realm, when Kant projects it from the kingdom of *being* to that of *ought*. In making this journey to the past in order to follow the trail of the origins of the idea of a republican constitution, Cassirer has his view on the future, his intention being to convince his readers that this *carta magna* derived from their very best cultural traditions, and that by appropriating it they could contribute to their own future. "Cassirer saw in the

²³ Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture*, Yale University Press, 1944.

²⁴ A first English translation of this work, by Seth Berk, appeared in *The Philosophical Forum* in 2018, Spring Issue, pp. 3-17.

constitution of Weimar a symbolic document that could guide the minds of the German people in a direction which found inspiration in the ideals of the Enlightenment and of German idealism.”²⁵

7. Kant’s Applause to the French Revolution

In defending the Weimar Republic against incipient totalitarianism and then dedicating himself to fight the National Socialist ideology with the conceptual tools available to him by including Kantian premises into his own philosophy of culture, Cassirer emulates Kant himself, who in his mature writings never failed to endorse republicanism as the only legitimate form of government. Right after the signing of the Peace of Basel in April 1795, whereby Prussia abandoned the coalition led by Austria against the brand-new French Republic, Kant published his essay on perpetual peace, in whose fifth preliminary article Kant points at the partition of Poland as an example of the undesirable consequences of meddling by force on a foreign constitution or government. In his correspondence with a former student, Kant calls this opuscle the *Dreams of a project of perpetual peace*, using the same French word —*Rêveries*— that Rousseau used in the title for the chronicle of his solitary wanderings.

Not quite as explicit as in *The Conflict of the Faculties* or in Reflection 8077, Kant nonetheless takes up the cudgels on behalf of the new legal order emerged from the French Republic, claiming the following: “If, owing to the impetuosity of a *revolution* generated by a bad constitution, another constitution more in accordance with legality had been achieved, then it wouldn’t be legitimate to lead the new people back to the former constitution, even though—Kant qualifies—one would have also to punish with fixed penalties those who took part in that revolution through violent means and ruses.” (*ZeF* B78 / AA 08: 372-373). Better to set ourselves the duty of undertaking the reforms necessary to adjust public right to the new constitution, since, in Kant’s mind, “nature does not produce revolutions in order to cover up an even greater oppression, but in order to utilize them as a calling from nature to institute through radical reform a constitution based on the principles of liberty, which is the only one that lasts.” (*ZeF* B79n. / AA 08: 373n.). In other words, revolutions aren’t desirable, but they may turn out to be unavoidable.

8. Freedom, Equality, and Independence as Requirements for a Kantian Republicanism

Kant decides to appropriate the Revolutionary triad of *freedom, equality, and fraternity*, but replacing the latter term by the independence needed in order to act autonomously.

These three criteria had already been described in *Theory and Practice* as the indispensable requisites for political right, and they are regained in the essay on peace in

²⁵ Deniz Cozkun, *Op. cit.*, p. 176.

order to delineate the republicanism that must permeate any legitimate legislation of a people that emanates from the idea of an original social contract. Juridical freedom means that we may not be subject to any law that is incapable of getting our own consent, whereas juridical equality means that nobody may legally oblige anybody without being subjected to that same obligation, and juridical independence derives from a self-evident blatancy. In Kant's own words, we are dealing here with inalienable, innate rights, inherent to humanity.

The obligatory character of our right can only be admitted if it is symmetrical to all involved parties, and if a duty is such that the one who imposes it cannot comply with it, no obligation to comply with that duty may be derived. Kant makes it very clear that we can only follow the rules of the game when these are equally valid for everyone involved, after having accepted them autonomously. There is no exception to this rule, and even the highest guardian of the laws must obey them as closely as any other. Only we can confer authority upon laws that wouldn't be proper laws without our consent, as Kant makes crystal clear:

As regards my freedom, I am under no obligation even before divine laws, which I can recognize through my own reason, unless I can accord them my consent, since I can only have a concept of the divine will thanks to the law of freedom given by my own reason (*ZeF* B21-22 / *AA* 08: 350).

According to *The Conflict of the Faculties*, Abraham should have taken as an illusion the divine command to sacrifice his own son instead of waiting for the counter-command, for it would only have taken him to consult his own conscience in order to see that such barbarity did not accord with the moral law; as Kant stresses in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, in effect, not even what we represent as God could fail to comply with the moral law and attempt to utilize a human being as a mere instrumental means to a given end. Needless to say, this is equally valid for those who take themselves to be small-time gods and abuse political power, when in fact they should look after the compliance with the law, preaching by example and counting themselves amongst ordinary citizens, for there is no room for confounding the function, however high it may be, with the person that performs that function at a given time.

9. A Nobility of Public Servants to which One Has Access through Merits and Not through Lineage

Kant takes from Rousseau his concern with social inequality and that is why he expresses his disagreement with any inheritance which is not intellectual in character. Each citizen ought to enjoy identical opportunities as regards the possibility of accessing a higher social class, and this access should therefore depend merely on *skill*, *effort*, and *luck*, as may be exemplified through Kant's own case, who became a university rector in spite of being the son of a humble harness maker.

Voltaire and Diderot, as declared in *Essay on Customs* and *The History of Two Indies*, were impressed by the fact that public servants in China got to the highest positions by their own merits and not on account of their family trees. Kant disqualifies any inherited prerogative, inquiring into such evident things as whether merit ought to precede rank, for nothing guarantees that belonging to or entering a nobility will ennoble anyone, which clearly reveals what Kant thought of the Ancien Régime's nobility. In this vein, Kant coins the curious expression *servant's nobility*, meaning the rank that one conquers through effort and not through ancestry. Merit is what should clear the path to the highest magistracies, ranks that do not adhere as a property to the persons who hold them, since by abandoning the function one immediately renounces its associated rank, and one becomes once again an ordinary citizen, a system thus thoroughly compatible with the presupposition of a radical equality amongst each one of the members of a political community.

10. Right and Politics as the Doorways to Morality

A republican constitution that complies with the criteria of freedom, equality, and independence must thoroughly agree with the criterion of the rights of humanity but, precisely on that account, it is the hardest one to institute and to preserve. In order to rebut the view that such a sublime format is incompatible with our selfish inclinations and only appropriate to a state composed by angelical beings, Kant creates the image of a *people of devils*, arguing that it is always possible to solve the problem of their coexistence in political terms, as one would only need to succeed in making all their antagonistic private intentions restrain one another; for even if one cannot force them to be morally good, one can always force them to be *good citizens*.

Kant thereby appropriates a thesis advanced by Rousseau in the *Geneva Manuscript*, according to which “we can't properly begin to become human beings unless we have become citizens”. Since this is not about moral improvement, it is enough that we are able to handle the keys to our unsocial sociability. Kant is completely aware that ethics does not ensure a better political community from a moral point of view, but he nonetheless believes, conversely, that a good juridical framework, together with education, may very well promote the ideal environment for the establishment of profound moral convictions. Humans are what politics has made out of them, Rousseau had claimed. Kant followed suit by arguing that “it is not morality that leads to a good constitution for the state, but, quite the opposite, we may hope that such a constitution fosters the moral formation of a people.” (*ZeF* B63 / AA 08: 367).

Reading Rousseau made Kant realize that the question regarding politics was crucial, way too important to be left in the hands of heartless and opportunistic politicians, who constitute for us the greatest threat, inasmuch as they even try to convince us that we have no remedy and that we have to conform to what there is, since it is impossible to change things. In fact, it is always possible to force ourselves to be good citizens—no matter how

devilish we take our nature to be—and to behave *as if* we were independent of our selfish expectations, inclinations that should neutralize one another owing to the mechanism of our unsocial sociability, together with the legal coercion of a juridical framework thoroughly adjusted to the law, which therefore responds to the moral demands of justice.

11. The Kantian Distinction between a Moral Politician and a Political Moralist

In order to carry out this delicate task, Kant asks for *moral politicians* that would replace what he calls *political moralists*. In order to clarify this famous distinction, thereby delineating the two figures that may be adopted by those who dedicate their lives to politics, Kant tells the story of a symbolic fight between two Roman gods, arguing that *Terminus*, who guards the frontiers of morality, should never give up any part of his territory, not even one millimeter, and not even to *Jupiter* himself, who guards the frontiers of power. Those who align themselves with power and idolize Jupiter will never become anything other than what Kant calls *political moralists*, whereas those who worship Terminus are unable to trespass the boundaries of morals through political action.

In Kant's view, this is an absolutely crucial matter. In the absence of the mediation of freedom, politics would be reduced to the art of utilizing the natural mechanism in order to govern, and the concept of right would be an empty thought. If, on the other hand, right is taken to be a restrictive condition to politics, as no one dares to explicitly deny, then it must be possible to bring ethico-juridical demands and political action together. Kant imagines “a *moral politician* for whom the principles of political prudence are compatible with morality, not a *political moralist* who shapes morality in order to adapt it to the statesman's advantage” (*ZeF* B77 / AA 08: 374) and utilizes ethics as a disguise to cover up their atrocities.

In keeping with this distinction, Kant speaks of two kinds of jurists, whose labor would correspond to the respective necessities of a political moralist and of a moral politician. First, there would be the professional jurist who, as the proxy of political power, after adopting as a symbol the balance of right and the sword of justice, makes use of the sword not only to remove all influxes foreign to right, but also to tip the scales by placing the sword on one side, if the jurist does not want that side to be outbalanced. The jurist who is not at the same time a philosopher has the enormous temptation to behave in this manner, because their profession consists in applying the existing body of laws, but not to enquire whether these need to be improved, hereby acting to the political moralist's advantage. The task of proposing such improvements would be left to the philosopher of right, and their application would be in the hands of the moral politician.

If we do not succeed in gradually introducing the necessary reforms that would implement the rule of republicanism, the latter will end up imposing itself in other ways. Kant found himself overwhelmed by a lively enthusiasm at the French Revolution, in spite of being totally aware of the tribulations and disappointments that accompany a phenomenon like this. According to Kant, that enthusiastic sympathy, similar to that of Adam Smith's impartial Spectator, can only be explained by reference to a moral disposition

inherent to humanity, which allows us to see the transition towards republicanism as an unmistakable sign of humanity's historical progress. We encounter this line of thought in *The Conflict of the Faculties*, where a note recounts the accusations of "reformist zeal, Jacobinism, and factious revolt" received by his political proposal in favor of republicanism and of the tendency to republicanize all existing political constitutions, for, as Rousseau says in *The Social Contract*, "every legitimate government is republican", in the sense explained by Kant in his own political thought, when he adds to the concepts of freedom and equality that of independence or autonomy.

12. Publicity as a Formal Criterion to Discriminate Unjust Maxims

Undoubtedly, Kant would have loved to write, in the manner of Spinoza, an Ethics demonstrated in geometrical order, which is why he looked in his *Groundwork* for a simple formula which could serve as a rule of thumb for the application of moral criteria, and why we also find theorems, definitions, and problems in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It does not come up as a surprise, therefore, that he appreciated a similar enterprise in the juridical realm, when in 1785 the Count of Windisch-Graetz called for a competition, offering a prize of a thousand ducats to the essay that contributed contractual formulas incapable of receiving anything but an unequivocal interpretation and that could serve to solve property-related legal conflicts. No one participated in the competition, in spite of the fact that it was publicized by the Paris, Edinburgh, and Berlin Academies, but Kant nonetheless praised the initiative because, in his view, "the possibility of a formula similar to the mathematical ones is the only genuine touchstone for a consistent legislation, for in its absence what we call *juridical certainty* will be little more than a pious wish" (*ZeF* B18 / *AA* 08: 349), it being impossible for us to secure universal validity without exceptions, instead of merely general validity.

Kant wields in the juridical realm the same reasoning that he put forward in the moral realm. If we abstract from public right all subject matter, what we are left with is obviously the form of publicity, which means that any legal proposal must be thought of as *publishable* in order to be considered just, or, what amounts to the same thing, "every action relative to the rights of others that is incompatible with publicity is unjust" (*ZeF* B99 / *AA* 08: 381). If a maxim must necessarily be kept secret in order to be successful, since making it public would immediately provoke everyone's opposition to my intentions, then its iniquity would be unmistakably revealed by this touchstone. This is why Kant also declares the right to rebellion to be nonsense from a juridical standpoint. No one would include anything of this sort in a civil contract, for it would be tantamount to recognizing double sovereignty, and claiming a legitimate power to exert violence upon the supreme authority would obstruct the establishment of the contract. Now, even though the criterion of publicity enables us to identify and leave out unjust maxims, it would be a mistake to infer, inversely, that just by being able to pass the publicity test a maxim is necessarily just, for not all those who hold absolute power need to keep their maxims secret. In spite of this,

“those maxims which require publicity in order not to frustrate their intentions unanimously coincide with right and politics.” (*ZeF* B10 / AA 08: 345).

Just as in the realm of ethics, conformity to morality gives the the juridico-political realm of justice its specificity and, not putting the cart before the horses, i.e., not placing the end before the conditions for its attainment, the end will come by itself, as some sort of collateral effect, that byproduct made familiar to us through Game Theory:

The less a conduct depends on its desired end—writes Kant—, whether it be a physical or an ethical benefit, the greater its coincidence with the general end, and this is so because the a priori given general will is the only one which determines what right is amongst human beings. But only if the execution proceeds accordingly can this union of everyone's will become the outcome that we were looking for, and make the concept of right effective, also in conformity with the mechanism of nature (*ZeF* B91 / AA: 08 378).

As we saw, in *Toward Perpetual Peace* Kant publicly expressed his moral-political commitment to the republicanism emerged from the French Revolution, and to those rights of humanity which he had avowed to defend after reading Rousseau, by making the ideas of freedom, equality, and independence the cornerstones of right and justice. And he does this by applying the principles of his own philosophical system, which he thereby turns into a useful tool in the fight against despotism and absolutism. This was quite well understood by Cassirer, when he used Kantian practical thought in order to fight against Nazism in the realm of the history of ideas, as we have seen in the first part of this paper, which has been prepared for our third international meeting *III CTK* (Santiago de Chile, August 2018).

Bibliography:

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2019a): “Las humanidades y el pensar por cuenta propia: el papel de la filosofía según Kant en *El conflicto de las Facultades*”, en Giusti, Miguel (ed.), *El conflicto de las facultades. Sobre la universidad y el sentido de las humanidades*, Barcelona / Lima: Anthropos / Fondo Editorial de la Universidad Católica del Perú, pp. 11-24.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2019b): “Diderot's Criticism of Colonialism: a Plea for Equality and Reciprocity among Peoples”, *Filosofija. Sociologija* 30, 1, pp. 62-69 [ISSN: 2424-4546]

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018a): *Kant. Entre la moral y la política*, Madrid: Alianza Editorial.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018b): “El compromiso político de Kant con la causa republicana conforme a los principios de libertad, igualdad e independencia como derechos de la humanidad”, introducción a su versión castellana de I. Kant, *Hacia la paz perpetua. Un diseño filosófico*, Madrid: CTK E-Books / Editorial Alamanda, pp. 11-64.

<https://ctkebooks.net/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/HACIA-LA-PAZ-PERPETUA.pdf>

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018c): “Ernst Cassirer et la dynamique spirituelle des Lumières selon Kant”, in *Natur und Freiheit, Akten des XII. Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, hrsg. v. Violetta L. Waibel, Margit Ruffing und David Wagner (eds.), Berlin / Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 2508-2514

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018d): “El trasfondo de la filosofía kantiana en el compromiso político de Ernst Cassirer (Una presentación a su artículo sobre *Judaísmo y los mitos políticos modernos*)”, *Isegoría* 59, pp. 375-390.

<http://isegoria.revistas.csic.es/index.php/isegoria/article/view/1029>

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018e): “Is Diderot Perhaps an Unknown Newton of Politics for Kant?”, in Falduto, Antonio und Klemme, Heiner F. (Hrsg.), *Kant und seiner Kritiker*, Hildesheim / Zürich / New York: Georg Olms, , pp. 171-180.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018f): “La esperanza kantiana como apuesta moral del creer en uno mismo. *Autoconfianza, autosuficiencia y autosatisfacción* o las tres dimensiones del concepto kantiano de *autonomía*”, en Nuria Sánchez Madrid y Paula Satne (eds.), *Construyendo la autonomía, la autoridad y la justicia. Leer a Kant con Onora O’Neill*, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanc, pp. 270-285.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2018g): “Radical and Moderate Enlightenment? The Case of Diderot and Kant”, in Concha Roldán, Daniel Brauer, Johannes Rohbeck (eds.), *Philosophy of Globalisation*, Berlin / Boston: Walter de Gruyter, pp. 315-326.

<http://doi.org/10.1515/9783110492415-023>

Aramayo, Roberto R. y Rivera, Faviola -eds.- (2017a): *La Filosofía práctica de Kant*, Ciudad de México / Bogotá / Madrid: UNAM / Universidad Nacional de Colombia / CTK-E-Books. [ISBNs: 978-607-02-9938-4 (UNAM) / 978-958-783-191-7 (UNG) / 978-84-94024146 (CTK E-Books)] <https://ctkebooks.net/dialectica/la-filosofia-practica-de-kant/>

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017b): “La plausible *impronta* (política) de Diderot en Kant, *Ideas y Valores* 66 (163) pp. 9-33.

<http://dx.doi.org/10.15446/ideasyvalores.v66n163.61939>

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017c): “Ideales platónicos y ensoñaciones rousseauianas en el pensamiento político de Kant”, *Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophy*, CTK 5, pp. 236-260.

<https://www.con-textoskantianos.net/index.php/revista/article/view/231/252>

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017d): “El diálogo de Kant con Spinoza: Una lectura immanente del papel asignado a Dios”, en Alegría, Daniela y Órdenes, Paula (coordinadoras), *Kant y los retos práctico-morales de la actualidad*, Madrid / Santiago de Chile: Tecnos & Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Madrid, 2017, pp. 75-91.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017e): “La perspective *juridico-politique* de l’usage pratique de la raison dans les opuscules Kantians de 1784”, in *Kant. L’année 1784. Droit et philosophie de l’histoire*, Paris: J. Vrin, 2017, pp. 295-303.

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2017f): “Spuren Rousseaus in Werk Kants. Erziehung,

Gesellschaft, Kosmopolitismus”, in Astrid Wagner, Cristoph Asmuth u. Concha Roldán (Hrsg.), *Harmonie, Toleranz, kulturelle Vielfalt. Aufklärerische Impulse von Leibniz bis zur Gegenwart*, Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, pp. 123-135 [ISBN: 978-3-8260-6083-0]

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2016): “Right as a Sign of a Philosophical Chiasm: Freedom and its Evolution in Kant's Opuscles”, en VV.AA., *Critical Paths outside the Critiques. Kant's Shorter Writings*, Newcatle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholar Publishing, pp. 398-409. [ISBN: (10) 1-4438-9930-5]

Aramayo, Roberto R. (2014): “Cassirer, un historiador de las ideas en lucha contra la barbarie del totalitarismo”, estudio introductorio a Ernst Cassirer, *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe. Filosofía y cultura en la Europa del Siglo de las Luces*, México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, pp. 9-47.

Bergely, Bertrand: *Cassirer. La politique du juste*, Paris: Michalon, 1998.

Cassirer, Ernst (1944): *An Essay on Man. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Culture*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cassirer, Ernst (1945): *The Question of Jean-Jacques Rousseau*. in *Rousseau, Kant, Goethe*, New Jersey: Princenton University Press.

Cassirer, Ernst (1946): *The Myth of the State*, New Haven: Yale University Press.

Cassirer, Ernst (1995ss.): *Gesammelte Schriften. Hamburger Ausgabe* –hrsg. Von Birgit Recki-, Hamburg, Felix Meiner (ECW).

Cassirer, Ernst (1995ss.): *Nachgelassene Manuskripte und Texte* –hrsg. Von Klaus Christian Köhne, John Michael Krois und Oswald Schwemmer-, Hamburg, Felix Meiner (ECN).

Cassirer, Ernst (2005): *Axel Hägerström. Eine Studie zur Schwedischen Philosophie der Gegenwart*. Hamburg: Felix Meiner (ECW 21)

Cassirer, Ernst (2008): *Zu Philosophie und Politik* (hrsg. von Michael Krois und Christian Möckel), Hamburg: Felix Meiner (ECN 9).

Cassirer, Ernst (2008): “Der Begriff der Philosophie als Problem der Philosophie”, in *Zu Philosophie und Politik* (ECN 9).

Cassirer, Ernst (2018): *The Idea of a Constitutional Republic*. A first English translation of this work, by Seth Berk, appeared in *The Philosophical Forum* in 2018, Spring Issue, pp. 3-17:

<https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/phil.12175>

Cassirer, Toni (2003): *Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Coskun, Deniz (2007): *Law as Symbolic Form. Ernst Cassirer an the Anthropocentric view of Law*, Dordrecht: Springer, Dordrecht.

Ferrari, Massimo (2003): *Ernst Cassirer. Stationen einer philosophischen Biographie. Von der Marburger Schule zur Kulturphilosophie*, Hamburg: Felix Meiner.

Gaubert, Joël (1996): *La science politique d'Ernst Cassirer. Pour une refondation symbolique de la raison pratique contre le mythe politique contemporain*, Paris: Kimé.

Kant, Immanuel (1796): *Zum ewigen Frieden*, in AA 08

Kant, Immanuel (1902 ss.): *Kant's gesammelte Schriften* –hrsg. Von de Preussischen und Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften Berlin.

Kant, Immanuel (1996): *Critique of Practical Reason*, Translated by Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: University Press.

Kant, Immanuel (1996): *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Translated by Mary J. Gregor and Robert Anchor. In *Religion and Rational Theology. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Cambridge: University Press.

Kant, Immanuel (1996): *Toward Perpetual Peace*. Translation of Mary J. Gregor, in Kant, Immanuel, *Practical Philosophy. The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*. Cambridge: University Press.

Sánchez Madrid, Nuria y Aramayo, Roberto R. (2019): “Ambigüedades del cosmopolitismo. Kant y Diderot frente a los abusos del colonialismo”, en Mendiola, Carlos y Aramayo, Roberto R. (ed.), *En busca de la ciudad ideal. Notas sobre el cosmopolitismo*, Iberoamericana & Escolar y Mayo, México-Madrid, pp. 93-124.

Speer, Albert (1970): *Inside the Third Reich: Memoirs by Albert Speer*. Translated by Richard and Clara Winston. New York: The MacMillan Company.

Starobinski, Jean (1987): preface to Ernst Cassirer, *Le Problème Jean-Jacques Rousseau*, Paris: Hachette.



Animality and Rationality
(On how John McDowell's Kantian view of moral experience
could accommodate research on emotion)

SOFIA MIGUENS*

University of Porto, Portugal

Abstract

My main goal in this article is methodological: I want to spell out how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current empirical work on cognition, and in particular on emotion. Having chosen John McDowell as a guide, I try to characterize his view of moral experience and underline its Kantian traits (McDowell 1998a, 1998b, 1998c, 1998d, 1998e, 1998f). I start by identifying the conception of freedom as exemplified in the rational wolf thought experiment in *Two Forms of Naturalism* as the main Kantian trait. I then go through the characterization of two other crucial aspects of our moral experience – (responsiveness to) reasons and value. I suggest that McDowell's approach to moral experience, although not itself strictly Kantian in all of its details, is an instance of a transformative view of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016) and that such transformative view is the key to accommodate empirical research on cognition within a Kantian perspective.

Key words

McDowell, Kantian perspective, emotion, rationality, transformative view

Among all the ideas of speculative reason freedom is also the only one the possibility of which we *know* a priori, though without having insight into it, because it is the condition of the moral law, which we do know.

(Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* 5:4)

* Professor at the Department of Philosophy of the University of Porto. Director of the Institute of Philosophy. Email: smiguens@letras.up.pt

The concept of freedom is the stumbling block for all *empiricists*.

(Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* 5:8)^[1]_{SEP}

Does research on cognition, for example research on emotion done in the context of affective science, bear directly on a view of morality and moral questions? More often than not, especially outside philosophy, it is assumed without any further problem that there is a positive answer to this question. In this article I will raise some doubts regarding such answer. I will take John McDowell as my guide; I will characterize his view of moral experience, underlining its Kantian traits. McDowell is one influential voice in current moral philosophy and a Kantian in a specific sense which I will try to spell out here. I believe his view of moral experience helps us understand how a Kantian perspective could accommodate current research on cognition, exemplified by research on emotion as pursued in affective science, without assuming such research bears directly on a view of morality. Although my main point in what follows will be such methodological point, I also want to call attention to the Kantian mark in McDowell's work in moral philosophy, visible in the very formulation of questions regarding moral experience, which he sees as questions concerning relations between animality and rationality, the authority of reason and the nature of moral imperatives.

Although emotion is my example of research on cognition supposedly bearing directly on questions of morality, it needs to be said that McDowell does not write directly about the emotions. Yet he does write on a topic often close at hand in philosophical approaches to emotions and passions, the topic of virtue; that is what I will concentrate on. The focus of McDowell's moral philosophy is the exercise of moral capacities as part of the life of a rational animal. Virtue is at the centre of his story. Such focus on the exercise of capacities and virtue stands in contrast, from the start, with approaches to emotions more often found in contemporary affective science, where emotions are taken to be 'relatively short-lived and bounded episodes'¹, whether these are related to bodily sensations and conditions or to the appraisal and evaluation of events or objects in the agent's environment. McDowell's view of morality, like Kant's, is a view of practical reason, a complex view of what we, human animals and rational beings, want and strive for, deliberate on and decide for. As with Kant, there is one focal point bringing together the many strands of analysis: a view of reason as freedom and spontaneity. Perhaps McDowell would not go as far as Kant in saying that passions make men reason as if they were slaves.² Still, although the components of his view may be different from Kant's, he too believes that freedom lies where reason lies. This is what I ultimately intend to get at.

Emotion: a very brief mapping

¹ Colombetti 2014, p. 25.

² Sánchez Madrid 2013, p.121.

In order to be able to weigh the Kantian flavour of McDowell's view against the background of current approaches to the emotions we need a notion of the main stakes in ongoing discussions.³ The nature of emotion – the question whether emotions are feelings, evaluations or appraisals, or motivations – lies at the center of such discussions. There are two, as it were, extremes in the positions in the field: we may call them somatic theories and cognitivist theories. According to somatic theories emotions are fundamentally *feelings of the body*. Authors such as William James, Antonio Damasio or Jesse Prinz are on that side. What somatic theorists do, in more or less sophisticated ways, Descartes had already done this with his view of the passions of the soul: he thought that a passion was the consciousness of the activity of animal spirits in the body. The very influential idea that there are so-called 'basic emotions' (e.g. fear, anger, happiness, sadness, disgust,...) and that they are wired-in fits roughly within such view. On the other extreme there are the cognitivist theories. According to them, emotions are *judgements*, more specifically evaluative judgements. We may think here of philosophers such as Martha Nussbaum or Robert Solomon. The important thing is that qua judgements, or appraisals, emotions call our attention not to our own body but rather to that which is outside of us, outside our bodies – a world imbued with value – and they guide us therein. There are of course other theories, which we may see as hybrids of these two orientations- we may think of the work e.g. of Lisa Barrett or Lawrence Barsalou. Most importantly, they criticize one crucial idea of the somatic view, the idea of basic emotions.⁴

The truth is every position above seems to have something going for it. Consciousness of the body does indeed seem to be involved in the emotions - if emotions were simply judgements how could we account for their phenomenology? And would they really motivate? Yet it is also clear that feelings of the body do not seem sufficient to orient and motivate agents in the world in specific ways – there should, as it were, be some conceptual content to emotion, as well as objects. If this is so, some 'constructivist' stance, 'injecting' articulated content in emotion, seems called for.

Involvement of emotions in motivation also naturally entangles emotions with complex issues in the philosophy of mind and action and in ethics, such as the issues of the nature of

³ My two main references for this overview were Scarantino and De Sousa (2018) and Deonna & Teroni. For the purposes of this mapping I will consider current philosophy of emotion as falling within affective science (2012). By affective science I mean the general field of study of affective phenomena, emotion included, which has at its center neuroscience and psychology but extends to other disciplines. The work of scientists such as e.g. Antonio Damasio or Jaak Panskepp belongs to affective science. Terminology may differ, but under the title of passions, affection, upheavals, appetites or (the more current) terms emotion and affect, the purpose is to give us an empirically-informed ways of thinking of anger, sadness, joy, love, envy, fear, pride, shame, disgust, anxiety, awe, boredom, panic, hostility, surprise, regret, *shadenfreude*, happiness, disgust, and others states and moods.

⁴ It should be stressed though, in spite of the fact that such criticism is important in the field, many current empirical studies simply take it that basic emotions exist, that they relate in a certain way to non-basic emotions, and that they are adaptations.

desire and value, and the metaphysical question of realism. Should emotions be understood in terms of desires or should they not? What is the relation of emotion to value? Are we necessarily led to subjectivism and antirealism in ethics if we bring emotion into an analysis of human motivation? Through this kind of questions philosophers (we may think of Martha Nussbaum, Jesse Prinz or Simon Blackburn) take on the task of trying to integrate a view of emotions into a view of the moral and rational life of humans. This is the arena in which McDowell's proposal, although not, as I said, a direct account of the emotions, appears as an alternative. Within moral philosophy McDowell's view may be classified as a fitting attitude theory of value.⁵ Fitting attitude theories of value propose to analyze value in terms of evaluative attitudes of agents which are endorsed as *fitting*—or, alternatively, as appropriate, correct, merited, proper, rational, or warranted. But here I am not as much interested in how McDowell's position could or should be classified within the map of alternatives in moral philosophy – although the fitting attitude characterization is illuminating - but rather in the Kantian spirit of his global approach to morality and in the way in which he depicts the relations between animality and rationality therein. It is such picture which would allow for the accomodation of empirical research on emotion within a view of morality.

Animality and rationality: the rational wolf thought experiment.

If we look at the texts, McDowell's moral philosophy often takes the form of a discussion of the classics, in particular of Aristotle, Hume and Kant. This gives rise to many exegetical discussions, but here I want to concentrate on just one thought experiment from a particular article, the article *Two Sorts of Naturalism*⁶. At the heart of the thought experiment lie the relations between rationality and animality in humans.

The thought experiment is about what being rational is for a natural being. Let us suppose that an animal other than a human becomes rational. In McDowell's terms, it becomes capable of giving expression to conceptual capacities and of asking for reasons of its own behavior. He would then ask himself: should I do as all wolves do? Should I hunt with the pack? Should I cooperate? Need I do it? Why should I do it? The point here is that being rational, once an animal such as the wolf becomes rational, is not conceiving one's own behaviour as just another phenomenon in the world, which the rational being then conceptualizes. Being rational involves being able to step rationally out of oneself and ask: why should I do as other wolves (or humans) do? It amounts then to, as McDowell puts it, letting (one's) mind roam over possibilities of behaviour *other than what comes naturally to wolves (or humans) and ask for reasons*. In other words, being rational, for a natural being such as an animal concerns agency and a particular position regarding one's agency, that of asking for reasons. In fact the topic of McDowell's thought experiment is that

⁵ See Jacobson 2011.

⁶ McDowell 1998.

which in the philosophical traditions is often called freedom⁷. It is freedom in the sense that mattered to Kant in the following passage of *An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment*:

For this enlightenment, however, nothing is required but *freedom*, and indeed the least harmful of anything that could even be called freedom: namely, freedom to make *public use* of one's reason in all matters. But I hear from all sides the cry: *Do not argue!* The officer says: Do not argue but drill! The tax official: Do not argue but pay! The clergyman: Do not argue but believe! (Kant 1996, 8:37, p. 18)

Freedom in the sense that matters here is asking for reasons for one's actions. This is done by beings who are 'capable of giving expression to conceptual capacities and of asking for reasons of [their] own behavior'. This is one sense of freedom which many current naturalists, either in philosophy or the cognitive sciences, often forget, or are blind to. Not McDowell: he thinks that paying attention to the concept of nature at use in one's investigations of mind and morals is crucial for avoiding blindness to such sense of freedom. By not paying too much attention to the concept of nature at use one risks appealing, in a less than reflective way, to (supposedly) natural facts as underlying what humans do, how they act, what it is for a human to be human. Reductionist and scientific naturalists are, according to him, prone to fall into such trap. McDowell's own focus on rationality as *second nature*⁸ to our *animal nature* is his particular way of avoiding such trap.

One different way to put the same point is to say that McDowell uses the thought experiment of the rational wolf to clarify the shape that naturalism should take. McDowell's naturalism is very distant from more mainstream naturalism in current philosophy of mind. In mainstream philosophy of mind the main questions usually concern the reduction of mental states to physical states. Yet the focus of McDowell's naturalism is on *reason*, or *rationality*, in its relation to nature. For him, being a naturalist does not lead to a project of reduction, rather it takes the shape of clarifying how our rationality fits within our animality, how the authority of reasons stands in relation to our animality. The task is not figuring out how particular mental states and physical states relate but rather how reason (i.e rationality) and nature relate. So McDowell's naturalism, often called second nature naturalism, involves the rejection of what Macarthur and De Caro call the ontological and methodological doctrines of scientific (reductionist) naturalism.⁹ Such rejection opens the way to what we may see as his pursuit of philosophical anthropology, or at least a beginning thereof. One main task of philosophical anthropology is to conceive

⁷ McDowell is often keen on using the Kantian term 'spontaneity'. Considering this would lead us into a different kind of discussions.

⁸ The term is inspired in Aristotle and his approach to virtue; for Aristotle a man's character becomes second nature.

⁹ According to the Ontological Doctrine of Scientific Naturalism, the world consists of nothing but the entities to which successful scientific explanations commit us to. According to the Methodological Doctrine of Scientific Naturalism, scientific inquiry is in principle the only genuine source of knowledge or understanding (see De Caro and Macarthur 2004 and 2010).

of the authority of reason in the face of the *authority of our first nature* ('first nature' is McDowell's term for the picture of humans provided by natural science).

Some critics of McDowell in the philosophy of mind and moral philosophy (not the reductionist naturalists I just mentioned, but yet another kind of critics) consider this focus on reason and nature abstract. It is abstract in that it is not an 'embodied' approach, and thus not centered on our bodily nature as individuals. It centers rather on the nature of our rational capacities. It is our rationality, our conceptual capacities, and not our individual body that matters for McDowell when weighing the relations of reason to nature. The capacities of the agent which are his reference are, of course, seen as belonging to an animal, a physical being, a living being in the world. One might even say that even if his approach to our rationality is not embodied it is – to use currently fashionable terms in the mind sciences – embedded, extended and enactive. But the focus is on the capacities, not the body.

Anyway at the center of McDowell's multistranded view of moral experience and of the capacities involved therein, of which I will say more in what follows, lies freedom, as captured in the thought experiment of the rational wolf. I will now analyse other aspects of our moral experience according to McDowell. Although these will appear under the guise of historical exegesis their point is not merely historical; what is being analysed is ultimately how, in ourselves, here and now, animality and rationality relate, as we exercise such moral capacities.

Moral experience (I): Responsiveness to reasons

If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle and, with respect to the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one such that, from the representation of what is necessarily an end for everyone because it is ^[SEP]an *end in itself*, it constitutes an *objective* principle of the will and thus can serve as a universal practical law.' The ground of this principle is: *rational nature exists as an end in itself*.

(Kant *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* 4: 429)

For McDowell one central component of our moral capacities is responsiveness to reasons. He wants to understand what the authority of reason amounts to, in rational animals such as ourselves. That is what he is doing in his article "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?".¹⁰ At the background of what McDowell says lies Philippa Foot's critique of Kant. In face of Kant's views on the inescapable character of moral reasons, Foot asks: What does it mean to say that we ought to do x? (e.g. what does it mean to say that I ought to pay my 100.000 euro debt to my friend Susana?) We inherited from Kant, and very often accept, the idea that there is a distance between hypothetical and categorical imperatives: moral imperatives are categorical. That *I ought to pay my debt to Susana* is categorical. But what is really at stake when we say that moral imperatives are categorical, or that we have moral reasons to do X?

¹⁰ McDowell 1998d.

According to the ‘orthodoxy’, hypothetical imperatives are conditional in that they state that I should do X if I want Y. In contrast, categorical imperatives are unconditional in the sense that the recommended action imposes itself as an end in itself. This is precisely what Foot rejects: if that were the only difference then we should take social rules (e.g. rules of etiquette) to be categorical. After all their use is also clearly non-hypothetical - it is not dependent on any further ends. (Think of “One ought to eat with knife and fork”; this is not dependent on any further ends).

If we are not willing to think of moral imperatives as etiquette imperatives, then we should think of another way of supporting the idea that moral imperatives are categorical. One such way is to claim that what Kant means is that in acting morally we do as reason dictates. But this is precisely what Foot thinks is ungrounded. She thinks it is perfectly rational that someone asks him or herself *Why should I be moral? Why be moral?* The immoral – he or she who sees no reason to obey moral precepts – cannot be accused of being irrational. Many things may be said about a person not willing to do x, when one thinks he, or she, ought to do it. We may say that she is cruel, selfish, rash or imprudent. Yet someone who thinks that moral imperatives are categorical would have to claim that *she is irrational*. But that we cannot do. Moral requirements do not *per se* give us reasons for acting. Moral reasons are available only for she who cares about moral good, Foot claims. It is in this sense that she claims that moral imperatives are conditional, or hypothetical.

McDowell does not agree: for him, as for Kant, moral imperatives are indeed categorical. Yet he does grant Foot that *there is no irrationality in not conforming to them*. His strategy for spelling this out is to focus on the virtuous person. He is never fully explicit about what a virtuous person is (nor need he be, he thinks). In McDowell’s eyes, that there are virtuous persons is simply the starting point for understanding morality as an exercise of reason. For the virtuous person the thing to do in a particular situation is objective, it is simply there to be seen. This is so because the virtuous person is distinguished by the way she reads (conceives of) events: the way she perceives things to be gives her the reasons to do x. In other words, the virtuous person recognizes requirements in situations: no further desires need to be added to that.

It is easy to see that in the arena of moral philosophy it matters to put things in such terms against the Humean. This is because the Humean sees reason (i.e. the representing of circumstances) as motivationally inert – it is my having a brute desire for E which constitutes my having a reason to pursue E. For the Humean there is thus a gap between representing things as thus and so – which does not move one to act – and being moved to act; such gap can only be filled by a desire.

Naturally, a whole view of perception goes with McDowell's criticism of the Humean belief-desire model¹¹. Yet the main point for my purposes here is that McDowell thinks that there is no such thing, for human agents such as ourselves, as a neutral perception of facts which is shared by every perceiver, to which a motivational layer is then added. He also thinks that beliefs are themselves motivating. And then if in a given situation someone does not see X as the thing to do (e.g. I do not see that I ought to my debt to Susana) this happens not because she lacks the desire a virtuous person has but because she does not see reality the same way a virtuous person does.

So Foot thinks that moral imperatives are hypothetical and thus Kant was wrong whereas McDowell thinks moral imperatives are categorical and Kant was right. They do give us the thing to do unconditionally in that there is no supplementary desire needed for being motivated to do the thing to do. It is here that Hume was wrong. Yet the fact that one does not see certain traits of moral reality is no sign of irrationality. For McDowell moral requirements are categorical *not because they are recognizable by every rational being* but because once they are recognized they necessarily motivate those who see them. In McDowell's expression *moral reasons silence every other reason present*.

It is important to notice that McDowell does not share Kant's rationality-based universalism. This is partly because the question for him, when it comes to understanding our moral experience and responsiveness to reasons, is seeing (i.e. conceiving things a certain way), and not (immediately) reasoning. This means that no rational argument can bring an agent to see a situation a certain way. In order to see things as being a certain way one has to be the right sort of person, a virtuous person, and that involves *Bildung* i.e. education and custom, and thus second nature. McDowell's account of responsiveness to moral reasons is definitely not a view of Platonic reasons: it involves the circumstances the agent is in and the agent's capacities to see moral saliences. The virtuous person has an understanding of the situation which involves not only having the belief that there is something to do but also being motivated to do it. She sees the thing to do; for her the thing to do is objective. Even if there is no external standpoint to recognize them truth and objectivity are present in moral perceptions and situations.

The most important point about rationality here, anyway, is that being virtuous is not something which separates rational from irrational people. It is rather a matter of *Bildung*, of training of the practical intellect so that certain reasons to act become visible for an agent. In other words, the exercise of our moral capacities is dependent on the tuning and

¹¹ The classic formulation of McDowell's position on perception can be found in *Mind and World* (1994). According to McDowell, although a perceiver's sub-personal cognitive states cannot be thought of as representations proper, perceptual experiences themselves represent things as being a certain way. A perceiving is a taking-to-be, which then is (or not) endorsed by judgement. In more recent formulations (namely in his 2009 article *Avoiding the Myth of the Given*), McDowell speaks of perceivings as *seemings* and thus claim-like. 'Claim' is a term of Wilfrid Sellars, a term which McDowell thinks is 'wrong in the letter but right in spirit'. For McDowell's conceptualist view of perception and what it stands opposed to in current philosophy of perception see Miguens 2019.

sharpening of (moral) perception by education. It is always in particular circumstances that virtue becomes an habit, and thus ‘second nature’ to a particular human.

Notice that if things are so with our moral capacities, then not only ethics cannot be formalized into a set rules to be applied in similar cases (knowing the thing to do in each case cannot be deduced from general principles, since it requires judgement in context) but also matters ethical in general will turn out to be quite different in nature from what one might have expected. They will turn out on matters of perceiving things in certain ways and in that sense close to perceptual judgements. Imagine that I am watching a woman being stoned to death for adultery and I see it as unimaginably cruel – and still the person next to me sees it as rightful. There will never be anything like a rational proof of a judgement such as ‘To stone an adulterous woman to death is cruel and unrightful’. But McDowell’s point is that this does not *per se* mean that reason is not involved in the agent’s thinking in any particular circumstances what the thing to do (or not to do) is.

Is this not clear relativism? It is certainly a picture in which recognizing the objectivity of moral reasons is dependent on capacities which are admittedly parochial. The problem is, how do we know that it is our eyes that are opened to the *right reasons* and not somebody else’s eyes? McDowell is aiming for a very difficult balance: since for him there is no such thing as universality of rationality, he cannot defend that moral reasons are universal. He is not a strict Kantian here. Moral reasons are objective only in that they necessarily appeal to rational beings for whom virtue has become second nature. Notice though, and that is what interests me most here, that according to McDowell not only no appeal is possible to the universality of rationality as foundation for morality but also there is also nothing like a *natural foundation for morality*. No appeal to our first nature, our animality, will ever open the doors of moral experience: only reason does. This second point is thus clearly Kantian: morality simply cannot be read off our animality, our first nature. Morality is a matter of reason. This is so in the sense that moral capacities are rational capacities, they are conceptual, and contextually tuned; they are not a rechanneling of natural impulses. Being rational for a natural creature is being able to step behind natural impulses and ask for reasons and according to McDowell there is no fixed way of doing that. That is the point of the thought experiment of the rational wolf – this is why the thought experiment is about freedom. It is being rational that brings freedom to a (human) animal.

Moral experience (II): the place of value in the natural world.

A view of value is a further element of McDowell’s account of our moral capacities. How are we to understand our capacity to see value? *Can it fit the viewpoint of natural science upon nature?* This is the question famously posed by J.L.Mackie’s, whose error-theory answers it negatively. Spelling out what is wrong with such answer, and what underlies it, is crucial for McDowell.

The error-theorist grants that our evaluative discourse has cognitive content. We see actions as cruel or generous, as just and unjust. It does seem to us that there is value in the

world. Yet there is not. It is a massive error, an illusion: values are not part of the fabric of the world, Mackie claims.

In “Values and Secondary Qualities”¹² McDowell takes the steps he believes are needed to counter this sort of approach: basically he proceeds to bring apart the conception of nature and value it is built upon. Ultimately he proposes that in order to be moral realists we do not have to think of moral properties as primary properties, or assume that the world as it is in itself can only be described in terms of primary properties. In fact, it is this idea of the world as it is in itself that is a fantasy. An analogy with colour does work here. Colours are not less real because they are to be understood in terms of the object’s disposition to present a certain kind of perceptive appearance and thus in terms of how they appear to a subject. The property of an object ‘being red’ is to be understood as ‘being in certain way such that under certain circumstances it appears red’ to a mind. Moral properties, like colour properties, depend on being perceived by subjects with the appropriate sensibility in certain circumstances. There is no such thing as ‘being red’ which is not appearing red to some mind. Yet this does not *per se* mean that such qualities are not there to be perceived independent of that particular appearing to a particular mind. Such properties are not subjective in the sense of being illusory. They are not illusory –in fact they are there to be experienced (by many minds).

McDowell’s main point here is that a conception of the world should include room for experience of the world and for what there is from the viewpoint of such experience – and this is not the case with Mackie’s conception. His conception of the world, or nature, is, in McDowell’s term, simply too thin; it identifies nature with the content of a view from nowhere, where there are only primary properties. Such view of nature should, according to McDowell, be rejected.

Of course, there is another alternative here. We might regard value not as illusion but simply as spreading (ourselves) unto the world. This is what Hume did, and this is the point in contemporary moral philosophy of e.g. Simon Blackburn’s projectivist quasi-realism, a Humean, i.e. a non-cognitivist, view of our moral capacities¹³.

The neo-Humean sees our moral judgements not as descriptions of reality but as expressions of our attitudes before it. According to Humean projectivism, properties that seem to genuinely belong to objects are just a projection or reflex of our subjective responses to a world which in fact does not contain such properties. Blackburn’s account of this situation, i.e. his quasi-realism, is McDowell’s target in “Projection and Truth in Ethics” and “Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following”.

According to McDowell the projectivist makes one all important mistake: she explains genuine traits of reality as reflexes of our subjective responses. According to the

¹² McDowell 1998a.

¹³ Blackburn 1984.

projectivist, there is priority and explanatory independence of our subjective responses in relation to the aspects to be explained. McDowell's claim is that there is no such priority: our feelings and traits of reality are paired as siblings, not as parents and children. Neither are moral properties prior and independent to our subjective responses as the realist would have it, nor are our subjective responses prior to moral qualities as the projectivist thinks¹⁴.

The opponent can obviously point out that McDowell's no-priority view is circular, and needs to appeal to something like the default human sensibility; the opponent naturally doubts that there could be such thing. The view is also obviously conservative: Blackburn accuses McDowell of merely citing or postulating the ethical verdicts of our own concepts and practices. These are the accusations McDowell is defending himself from in "Non-cognitivism and Rule-Following". His claim is that when we say that acting virtuously is what the virtuous person does that is simply the end of the line. We cannot go any further; there is no way out of this circle. The situation simply reflects the fact that we cannot think of value from without our evaluative experience. But that does not mean that there is no value or that value is merely a reflex of our responses. Only if we believe that it is possible to step back from our ongoing practices to ground them, will we believe that a realism dependent on human sensibility is not sufficient. But for McDowell there is no sideways-on view available here; we cannot transcend our practices nor our parochial viewpoint towards a supposed 'reality such as it is in itself'. When it comes to accounting for our moral capacities there is nothing to look for beyond that which we have learned when we were introduced into a practice. There is nothing to keep us on the rails, in McDowell's celebrated simile¹⁵, except for the shared practices themselves. Practices are all we have, even to account for the *rightness* of practices.

Conclusion: McDowell, Kant and Boyle's transformative view of rationality

Even if I have been looking for convergences between Kant and McDowell in their views of practical reason, McDowell's naturalism and his focus on virtue should *prima facie* preclude any deep affinity with Kant. That is not the case though: such deep affinity exists, at least in McDowell's eyes. I have been suggesting that one place to look for the affinity are the relations between our animality and our rationality: these are at the heart of McDowell's philosophical anthropology. The most general question of McDowell's view of practical reason is the relation between animality and rationality in our own being. This is why globally considered McDowell's naturalism, in moral philosophy and elsewhere, takes the shape of a fight, the fight against the ungrounded attraction of what he sees as bad metaphysics¹⁶. By this he means empiricism, what he calls bald scientific empiricism.

¹⁴ Here McDowell is obviously not a Kantian in a strict sense: Kant's view of value is ultimately that the only unconditionally good thing is a good will.

¹⁵ McDowell 1998g, p. 91.

¹⁶ Naturally McDowell's Wittgensteinian conception of philosophy informs the whole approach. See Miguens 2019.

Here too we might see an affinity with Kant.

Kant said in the *Critique of Practical Reason* that «The concept of freedom is the stumbling block for all *empiricists*.» (Kant, 5:8);^[17] McDowell would agree. In fact McDowell believes there is a spell, which he thinks should be broken, hanging over the discussions of the nature of reasons and value above, and many other discussion in philosophy (e.g. on meaning). The spell is, according to him, the picture of shallow empiricist naturalism which has us accept that what science aims to discover is nature of reality in so far as it can be characterized in absolute terms, as a view from nowhere. This is what leads to forms of naturalism based on a concept of nature according to which meaning and value are, in McDowell's expression, 'injected from the outside'. In contrast, as we saw in the cases of reasons for acting and of value, a naturalist such as McDowell has come to accept that he is dealing with the interior of nature. He sees moral values as attuned to particular sensibilities and moral properties as anthropocentric but real. He sees responsiveness to reasons as not attached to anything like universal rationality yet still objective. He believes that we examine our moral practices from within, and that in doing that there is no possibility of dissociating descriptive from normative elements. He thinks that there is no such thing as evaluatively neutral reality onto which moral judgement projects, or injects, our values. Such picture is of course not in itself thoroughly Kantian; the affinity with Kant lies in the move of countering the naturalist-empiricist picture¹⁷. But the affinities do not stop there.

I now want to introduce my final suggestion and give a name to what I believe a Kantian orientation consists in, methodologically speaking. McDowell's approach to our moral experience is an instance of a *transformative view* of rationality, as defended by Matthew Boyle (Boyle 2016). McDowell's philosophy in general and his moral philosophy in particular is a view of rationality, a view of our conceptual capacities. It is a framework in which to think of ourselves as a rational beings and position us in the world (actually, he is happy to call the world 'nature', and this is not indifferent – someone like, e.g. Heidegger, would never do it). What such framework does is to depict our rationality as second nature to our first nature – to our animality. It is also a view of rationality according to which there is no stepping outside *our own* rationality and this is the gist of what Matt Boyle calls a transformative view of rationality¹⁸. A transformative view of rationality contrasts with the 'additive views of rationality' which are taken for granted by the naturalist-empiricist-reductionist approaches which are dominating in large swaths of philosophy and cognitive science, including, naturally, much research on emotion. This is how Boyle sees the contrast:

Additive theories of rationality, as I use the term, are theories that hold that an account of our

¹⁷ Also by Wittgenstein, of course.

¹⁸ Boyle 2016.

capacity to reflect on perceptually-given reasons for belief and desire-based reasons for action can begin with an account of what it is to perceive and desire, in terms that do not presuppose any connection to the capacity to reflect on reasons, and then can add an account of the capacity for rational reflection, conceived as an independent capacity to ‘monitor’ and ‘regulate’ our believing-on-the-basis-of-perception and our acting-on-the-basis-of-desire (Boyle 2016, p. 527).

There is no such thing for McDowell, as there is not for Boyle. We cannot begin with such an account because we are simply not in the position for that¹⁹. I suggest that this be seen as a Kantian point updated. We cannot have an account of what it is to perceive or desire, or, to take my example of an empirical field of research, we cannot have an account of emotion, in terms that do not presuppose any connection to the capacity to reflect on reasons and then add to it an account of the capacity for rational reflection. This is a crucial point when we thinking of the appeal to first nature facts (e.g. neuroscience or affective science research on emotion) about ourselves and amounts to a critical stance on many current naturalisms. McDowell is right that most current naturalists do not pay sufficient attention to the concept of nature²⁰. And I believe he is right that this is partly explained by the fact that more often than not they are under the spell of a picture, the picture of shallow empiricist naturalism. What McDowell does then is to offer an alternative to such picture, one which starts from the idea that we cannot step outside our rational capacities to characterize our own first nature. Our rational capacities do neither involve a flight into a space outside nature (as Platonistic universalist views of rationality and reasons would see them doing) nor are they merely a rechannelling of natural impulses. In fact, and that is why focusing on the moral shape of our rational capacities is illuminating, there is no natural foundation for morality. For a natural creature being rational is being able to step behind natural impulses and ask for reasons. There is no fixed way of doing that. That is the point of freedom in the thought experiment of the rational wolf.

If a view of conceptual capacities is the core of any account of human moral sensibility and human emotional life, as McDowell thinks should be the case, then any view of emotions as ‘atomized’ states and conditions, will turn out to be at least insufficient, or in need of supplementation, by a broader picture, a philosophical anthropology. It is such project of a philosophical anthropology that McDowell is engaged in, as Kant was. McDowell’s philosophical anthropology takes the shape of an account of the relation between our animality and rationality, an account whose pinnacle is freedom.

Until now I have been keeping my eyes on parallels between Kant and McDowell. Still, it

¹⁹ In his article Boyle identifies two particular difficulties for the additive approach, each one in fact analogous to a classic problem for Cartesian dualism. The interaction problem concerns how capacities conceived as intrinsically independent of the power of reason can interact with this power in what is intuitively the right way. The unity problem concerns how an additive theorist can explain a rational subject’s entitlement to conceive of the animal whose perceptual and desiderative life he or she oversees as ‘I’ rather than ‘it’. He argues that such difficulties motivate a general skepticism about the additive approach to rationality.

²⁰ Appealing to first nature facts, as many contemporary naturalists do, is a move that comes too close to a single view of what natural is for a rational animal. McDowell thinks such is undue.

should by now be clear that McDowell's approach to moral experience also takes some inspiration from Aristotle and could in fact as such (independently) be seen as a suggestion for those who study cognition²¹. What is most specifically Kantian in McDowell's view is certainly not the emphasis on context and second nature – that comes from Aristotle – but rather the emphasis on freedom and on the connection of freedom with 'human nature', i.e. on what it is for humans to be human. The questions concerning the authority of reason, categorical imperatives, the viewpoint of reason, all lead to the question of freedom.

Again, what should we think of emotion in this picture? Of course emotions do matter, and they seem to bring in a conception of ourselves as bodies much more than as reason. Our minds as individually embodied are intrinsically affective. Emotions do mark a continuity of life and mind. Yet freedom is in fact a break in what can otherwise be seen as such continuity of life and mind. This is what we may take Kant to have thought and McDowell thinks too. What McDowell does then is to give us a picture of what freedom consists in for a rational animal, in a world – our world. He is proposing that freedom lies where reason lies – this is a conceptual matter for a thinker who is an agent, not so much a matter of our embodied individuality. So no matter what the outcome of the current empirical research on emotions might be – whether somatic theories, cognitivist theories, or hybrid theories win the game – the philosophical question at the center of philosophical anthropology, the question of freedom, persists, and will not be decided empirically. Empirical research leaves out freedom as it matters to Kant and McDowell – as often has been the case throughout the history of the empiricist tradition in philosophy.

It is in such context that McDowell, the naturalist, says about Kant, the anti-naturalist, that:

It takes reflection on Kant, of all people, to show us the way to an acceptable picture of the relation of reason to nature. (McDowell 1998f, p. 197)

References

- Blackburn, S. (1984), *Spreading the Word*, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
- Blackburn, S. (2002), "How emotional is the virtuous person", in P. Goldie (2002) *Understanding Emotions – Mind and Morals*, London, Routledge, pp. 81- 96.
- Boyle, M. (2016), "Additive theories of rationality – a critique", *European Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 24, issue 3. pp. 527-555.
- Collombetti, G., (2014), *The Feeling Body*, Cambridge MA, MIT Press.

²¹ This would go along the following lines. Moral sensibility is a perceptual capacity. Perception of saliences resist decomposition into pure awareness together with appetitive states. Knowledge constituted by reliable sensibility is a necessary condition for the possession of a virtue. Virtue is an ability to recognize requirements that a given situation imposes on one's behaviour.

Deona, J. and Teroni, F. (2012), *The Emotions – a philosophical introduction*, London, Routledge.

De Caro, M. and D. Macarthur (2004), *Naturalism in question*, Cambridge MA, Harvard UP.

De Caro, M. and D. Macarthur (2010), *Naturalism and Normativity*, New York, Columbia University Press,.

Foot, P. (1978) “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, in P. Foot, *Virtues and Vices*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 157-173.

Goldie, P. (2002), *Understanding Emotions – Mind and Morals*, London, Routledge.

Guyer, P. and Wood, A. (eds.), (1992), *The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Johnson, R. and Cureton, A., (2019) "Kant's Moral Philosophy", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2019 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <<https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/kant-moral/>>.

Kant, I. (1996), *Practical Philosophy*, translated by Mary Gregor, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. (Includes: “An Answer to the Question: What is Enlightenment?”)

Kant, I. (2008), *Anthropology, History, and Education*, translated by Robert Louden and Guenther Zoeller, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

McDowell, J. (1998), *Mind Value and Reality*, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998.

McDowell, J., (1998a) “Values and Secondary Qualities”, in McDowell 1998, pp. 131-150.

McDowell, J. (1998b), “Projection and Truth in Ethics”, in McDowell 1998, pp. 151-166.

McDowell, J. (1998c), “Non-cognitivism and rule-following”, in McDowell 1998, p. 198-218.

McDowell, J. (1998d), “Are moral requirements hypothetical imperatives?”, in McDowell 1998, pp. 77-94.

McDowell, J. (1998e), “Might there be external reasons?”, in McDowell 1998, pp. 95-111.

McDowell, J. (1998f), “Two sorts of naturalism” in McDowell 1998, pp. 167-197.

McDowell, J. (1998g), “Virtue and Reason” in McDowell 1998, pp. 50-73.

McDowell, J. (2009) “Avoiding the Myth of the Given”, J. McDowell, *Having the World in View*, Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press, pp.256-272

Miguens, S. (2019), "Is Seeing Judging? Radical contextualism and the problem of perception". In Eduardo Marchesan and David Zapero, *Truth, Context and Objectivity*. London, Routledge.

Miguens. S. (2018), "Is there a single way for all humans to be human? Some problems for Aristotelian naturalism in contemporary moral philosophy, *Filosofia, Revista da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade do Porto*, 34 (2017) 167-186.

Miguens, S. – S. Cadilha (2014). *John McDowell – uma análise a partir da filosofia moral*. Lisboa, Colibri.

Jacobson, D., (2011), "Fitting Attitude Theories of Value", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/fitting-attitude-theories/> (access: 04.04.2019)

Sánchez Madrid, N., (2013), "Las pasiones y sus destinos el examen de las emociones en las Lecciones de Antropología de Kant", *Ideas y Valores* LXII, 1, pp. 109-132.

Scarantino, A. and de Sousa, R. (2018) "Emotion", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/emotion/>



**Vita come scopo, scopo della vita: riflessioni sui §§ 79-84
della *Critica del Giudizio***
***Life as Purpose, Purpose of Life: Some Reflections on §§ 79-
84 of the Critique of Judgement***

LUIGI IMPERATO*

Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”, Italia

Riassunto

Nel mio articolo propongo una lettura dei §§ 79-84 della *Critica del Giudizio*, parte della sezione *Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico*. Dapprima mi interrogo sul significato di una *Methodenlehre* del Giudizio teleologico, che rintraccio in un’attività metariflessiva del Giudizio; procedo poi ad una lettura analitica del testo nelle sue varie articolazioni, nella quale passo in rassegna le questioni attinenti alla specificità dello statuto epistemologico della teleologia, alla possibile convivenza tra finalismo e meccanicismo nella scienza della natura, all’origine della vita, allo scopo ultimo della natura e allo scopo finale della creazione; approdo, infine, ad un’interpretazione per cui l’intera *teleologia rationis humanae*, che si estende dalla teleologia naturale alla teleologia morale passando per l’antropologia e per la filosofia della storia, viene in questa sezione riarticolata intorno ad un nuovo fulcro concettuale di livello trascendentale, che può garantire l’effettivo collegamento tra queste diverse parti della filosofia proprio perché esso non si esercita in forma di dominio legislativo, ma in forma di riflessione sul molteplice empirico e sulla causalità teleologica propria dell’uomo.

Parole chiave

teleologia, natura, cultura, vita, libertà

Abstract

In my paper I propose some considerations on §§ 79-84 of the *Critique of Judgment*, part of the *Methodology of the Teleological Judgment*. At first I try to make clear the meaning of a *Methodenlehre* of the Teleological Judgment, which I find in a meta-reflective activity of Judgment; I then proceed to an analytical reading of the text in its various articulations, in which I

* Dottore di ricerca presso l’Università degli Studi di Napoli “Federico II”; luigi.imperato2@gmail.com

face the questions concerning the specificity of the epistemological status of teleology, the possible coexistence between finalism and mechanism in the science of nature, the origin of life, the ultimate purpose of nature and the finale purpose of creation; finally, according to my interpretation, the entire *teleologia rationis humanae*, which from natural teleology reaches moral teleology through anthropology and the philosophy of history, in this section is rearticulated around a new conceptual fulcrum of transcendental level, which can realize the effective connection between these different parts of philosophy precisely because it does not give rise to a legislative domain, but to a reflection on experience, and on the teleological causality peculiar to man.

Keywords

teleology, nature, culture, life, freedom

1. Introduzione

La peculiarità dei paragrafi 79-84 della *Critica del Giudizio*, parte della *Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico*, è costituita dalla grande varietà di questioni affrontate, dalla teoria della biologia alle scienze della terra, dall'antropologia alla morale, che può ben risultare disorientante, ove non si riesca a rintracciare un filo rosso in grado di tenere insieme le diverse parti della trattazione in maniera non meramente esteriore.

Nel presente lavoro cercherò di dimostrare che nella *Metodologia* Kant si senta chiamato a riflettere non più soltanto sulla natura organica quale oggetto d'indagine del Giudizio teleologico, ma anche sulla teleologia e sulla sua specifica *Denkungsart* in quanto tali, in modo da poter esaminare nuovamente questioni già discusse in opere precedenti la terza *Critica* articolandole intorno ad un nuovo nucleo concettuale, di livello trascendentale, capace di rideterminare lo statuto epistemologico non solo della teleologia naturale, ma della *teleologia rationis humanae* nella sua interezza, e di ridefinire i contenuti di pertinenza della filosofia naturale e della filosofia morale nella loro distinzione e nelle loro zone di interferenza e di interazione. Analizzerò pertanto il testo mettendo in relazione le argomentazioni di tenore più analitico con il fondamento più squisitamente teoretico che dovrebbe sorreggerle, onde verificare se il nuovo punto di vista offerto dalla scoperta dei principî a priori del Giudizio riflettente riesca davvero, secondo la pretesa kantiana, a tenere in stretto collegamento scienze naturali, antropologia, filosofia della cultura e filosofia morale, nonché se, nonostante la visibile mancanza di unità tematica del testo, la sua composizione possa essere ritenuta il risultato non di una collazione arbitraria di materiali elaborati con intenti diversi, ma di un'esigenza teoretica che coinvolge gli aspetti più decisivi della speculazione kantiana, nei quali la teleologia riveste un ruolo di fondamentale rilievo.

2. La posizione della teleologia nel sistema delle scienze e il suo “diritto” di limitare la pretesa di spiegazione meccanica della natura organica (§§ 79-81)

La *Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico*, presentata da Kant come *Appendice* alla *Critica del Giudizio teleologico*, apre l'ultima parte della *Critica del Giudizio*, che si estende lungo i §§ 79-91 dell'opera. Kant non specifica il ruolo che tale sezione riveste nel quadro della considerazione teleologica della natura, perché probabilmente presuppone come acquisito dalla prima *Critica* il significato di una *Methodenlehre* nell'edificazione di un sapere scientifico; bisogna pertanto riferirsi proprio alla *Critica della ragion pura* per comprendere cosa distingua quest'ultima da una *Elementarlehre*. Egli intende per dottrina trascendentale del metodo «la determinazione delle condizioni formali di un sistema completo della ragione pura» (KrV A 707-708 / B 735-736; tr. it. Kant 2001: 709), dunque non un sapere di *oggetti*, bensì della *struttura* del sapere scientifico. Il fatto tuttavia che la teleologia non possa essere considerata una scienza naturale in senso proprio, considerato che i suoi principî hanno un legittimo *domicilio* nell'esperienza, che costituisce il loro *territorio*, senza potervi costituire un *dominio legislativo*¹, implica che non si possano delineare metodicamente i suoi principî se preliminarmente non si venga in chiaro sull'ambito di afferenza delle sue indagini, che possono ricadere soltanto nella scienza naturale (poiché essa ha come oggetto gli organismi, come esseri naturali) o nella teologia (poiché essa presuppone l'esistenza di un fine della natura, che potrebbe essere stato posto negli organismi da una intelligenza divina).

Poiché gli organismi, pur esprimendo una causalità teleologica, sono parte della natura, la teleologia afferisce all'ambito d'indagine delle scienze naturali; resta tuttavia, una volta che ciò sia assodato, la necessità di chiarire il modo in cui sia possibile abitare il territorio dell'esperienza da parte del Giudizio riflettente, pur senza avervi un dominio, ciò che è icasticamente descritto nelle righe finali del penultimo capoverso del § 79: «L'esposizione dei fini della natura nei suoi prodotti [...] non appartiene propriamente se non alla descrizione della natura composta con un particolare filo conduttore» (KU, AA 05: 417; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 519, traduzione modificata). Questa caratterizzazione restituisce la natura composta della teleologia, che, quanto all'occasione che le dà origine (l'esistenza *de facto* degli organismi), è empirica², ma, quanto al suo procedere, è normativa (un organismo non può essere considerato tale se non obbedisce alla regola della precedenza del tutto rispetto alle parti, dell'autocausalità secondo l'individuo e secondo la specie, della cooperazione e della reciproca produzione delle parti; si veda in proposito il § 65 di KU, AA 05: 369 ff; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 419 ss.); la teleologia è dunque una *Beschreibung* della natura non perché consista in una pura registrazione di dati, ma, in quanto si serve di un filo conduttore, può essere compresa come una *conoscenza secondo principî, ma a partire da un peculiare tipo di dati empirici*, quali sono gli organismi, motivo per cui «come scienza, non appartiene ad alcuna dottrina, ma solo alla critica» (KU, AA 05: 417; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 519). Essa quindi non è una vera conoscenza normativa o razionale, *ex principiis*, ma neanche una mera conoscenza storica, *ex datis*; più propriamente, potrebbe definirsi come una *ιστορία*,

¹ Cf. KU, AA 05: 174; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 17.

² «Questo principio [della finalità interna degli esseri organizzati], se si guarda all'occasione della sua origine, è da ritenersi derivato dall'esperienza, cioè da quell'esperienza istituita metodicamente e che si chiama osservazione» (KU, AA 05: 376; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 433)

qualora si prenda questa parola non nel senso della parola italiana *storia*, ma in quello genuinamente greco di una investigazione, anche di fatti, basata su principî scientifici e conoscitivi.

L'esistenza di principî teleologici della natura pone peraltro il problema della loro coesistenza con l'interpretazione meccanica dei fenomeni della natura organica. Il meccanicismo ha sì la prerogativa (*Befugniß*) di indagare tutti i prodotti naturali, anche quelli organici, dal suo punto di vista, ma non la capacità (*Vermögen*) di giungere ad una spiegazione dei prodotti naturali intesi come fini della natura: se la prima è in se stessa illimitata, la seconda è delimitata «con molta chiarezza dalla natura del nostro intelletto» (KU, AA 05: 417; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 519). È proprio nella differenza tra *diritto* e *forza* che si inserisce la possibilità di una considerazione teleologica della natura, giacché il mancato collegamento tra pretesa “giuridica” e capacità “fattuale” è effetto della specificità del sapere empirico, nella sua diversità rispetto al sapere dei principî, nel quale invece un diritto può sussistere come tale ove sia accompagnato da un effettivo potere di attuazione, per cui, come viene detto nel § D della *Introduzione alla dottrina del diritto* della *Metafisica dei costumi*, non può esservi diritto senza l'unione del principio di legittimità con una forza di coercizione³. Le categorie possono pretendere di racchiudere nei rapporti da loro istituiti tutto ciò che si manifesta nello spazio e nel tempo perché sono dei veri e propri principî *normativi*, nei quali la distanza tra *fatto* e *diritto* viene colmata dalla *Deduzione trascendentale*, che opera la giustificazione della loro pretesa di essere norma non solo di se stesse, ma anche del fenomeno. Ma le categorie, poiché si riferiscono ad un *dato*, possono solo *regolare* i rapporti empirici tra fenomeni, non *dedurre* il contenuto del dato⁴; in questo “spazio vuoto”⁵ tra categorie e dato si apre così la possibilità di un *fatto* cui il *diritto* non riesce a tener dietro.

Il *fatto*, che è qui l'esistenza di esseri organizzati, nei quali la rappresentazione del tutto dispone le parti, non può essere giustificato a partire dalle categorie matematiche, che operano una sintesi in cui il tutto è sempre risultato della composizione progressiva delle parti⁶, né sulla base della categoria della causalità, che è *in linea di principio*, ma non *in linea di fatto* declinabile in forma teleologica, perché essa si applica in forma costitutiva a rapporti di tempo, nei quali l'istante *a*, che contiene la causa, è congiunto *linearmente* e *progressivamente* all'istante *b*, in cui l'effetto si produce, laddove nella causalità finale, di forma *circolare*, è l'effetto ad essere rappresentato come ciò che induce la causa ad agire (cf. KU, AA 05: 372 f.; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 425 s.).

Dal momento, dunque, che la considerazione meccanica della natura ha dalla sua parte principî normativi dell'intelletto, essa reclama in maniera del tutto appropriata e con pretesa non esorbitante il diritto di ridurre a sé anche l'indagine sulla natura organica. In

³ A tal proposito, si veda MS, AA 06: 231; tr. it. Kant 1998: 36.

⁴ Lo metteva in evidenza, sebbene in relazione ai *Principî metafisici della scienza della natura* ed in funzione di una lettura antidealista del problema della scienza della natura in Kant, già Luporini 1961: 338 ss.

⁵ Questo “spazio vuoto” è, in realtà, lo spazio del darsi effettivo dell'esperienza o di quello che Scaravelli 1973: 355 ha chiamato “terzo molteplice”, individuato come problema proprio della *Critica del Giudizio*.

⁶ KrV A 162 / B 203; tr. it. Kant 2001: 239.

particolare, l'*archeologia della natura*, ossia la ricostruzione degli antichi stati della terra, passata dai «più antichi cataclismi naturali» (KU, AA 05: 419; tr. it., Kant 1997a: 523) all'attuale configurazione attraverso diverse e traumatiche modificazioni, si affatica a dimostrare come la presente struttura della natura sia il risultato di cambiamenti spiegabili con leggi meccaniche, senza bisogno di ricorrere ad alcuna predeterminazione finalistica, in maniera da poter interpretare anche la varietà degli esseri viventi sulla base di un *tema* comune sviluppato attraverso una serie di *variazioni*, tale da collegare tutte le specie, «da quella in cui il principio dei fini sembra attuato al massimo grado cioè l'uomo, fino al polipo, e da questo ai muschi e alle alghe, e finalmente al più basso grado della natura, la materia bruta» (KU, AA 05: 419; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 521 s.) e da considerare gli esseri naturali una unica «famiglia di creature» (KU, AA 05: 419; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 523).

Il filo conduttore del meccanismo naturale, spinto oltre un certo segno, cessa tuttavia essere d'aiuto, perché realmente impossibile da compiere è proprio il passaggio che dovrebbe legare la materia bruta alla forma più bassa di vita; se anche si potesse, per questa via, arrivare ad una «madre universale» facendola uscire «dal grembo della terra», si dovrebbe «pure attribuire a questa madre universale un'organizzazione che abbia per iscopo» (KU, AA 05: 419; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 523) tutte le creature viventi, sicché il naturalista che voglia provare un tale esperimento, che Kant chiama «un'ardita avventura della ragione», non avrà fatto altro che spostare un passo più indietro la questione della possibilità del finalismo naturale.

La differenza tra natura inorganica e natura organica non è, infatti, di grado; Kant intende invece tale passaggio come un salto qualitativo, perché l'organizzazione, per quanto questa possa essere elementare, non è una prerogativa della materia inerte, mentre una volta che quel salto dalla materia inerte all'organizzazione sia compiuto si può facilmente immaginare un incremento quantitativo della complessità degli organismi, dal polipo, per l'appunto, fino all'uomo. In quest'ultimo caso non si percorre la via, impossibile, della *generatio aequivoca*, di una vita che nasce dalla mancanza di vita, ma quella della *generatio univoca*, della vita che deriva dalla vita, pur se noi abbiamo testimonianza solo di una *generatio homonyma*, della produzione delle specie non da altre specie, per trasformazione, ma di individui di una determinata specie da individui della stessa specie, sicché, «per quanto si estenda la nostra conoscenza sperimentale sulla natura, non si trova mai la *generatio heteronyma*» (KU, AA 05: 420; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 525). L'accento all'"unica famiglia di creature" e alla possibilità di una *generatio homonyma* testimonia come Kant si riferisca ai generi e alle specie non come concetti puramente scolastici o classificatori, alla maniera di Linneo, ma li consideri come aventi reale valore biologico e ritenga in linea di principio non impossibile una loro costituzione *storica*⁷, per derivazione da un ipotetico, primigenio organismo semplice, a cui si perverrebbe grazie allo studio delle analogie di struttura anatomica tra i diversi esseri viventi.

Ma l'importanza di questa considerazione meccanica degli organismi, che sola ci tiene nei confini della scienza naturale ed è pertanto indispensabile, non elimina l'avversione di

⁷ Sul punto, vedi Düsing 1968: 133 ff.

Kant per ogni forma di abiogenesi. La sua convinzione che mai ci sarà un Newton che possa spiegare l'esistenza anche solo di un filo d'erba «per via di leggi naturali non ordinate da alcun intento» (KU, AA 05: 400; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 483), si spiega con la sua concezione della materia, quale si può ricavare, per esempio, dai *Principi metafisici della scienza della natura*; caratteristica della materia è quella infatti di essere *inerte*, di subire *passivamente* il suo cambiamento di stato, la cui causa «non può essere interna [...] perciò ogni cambiamento di materia si fonda su una causa esterna» (MAN, AA 04: 543; tr. it. Kant 2003: 307)⁸, così che «l'autocrazia della materia [...] è una parola priva di senso» (KU, AA 05: 421; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 527). La ripetizione dello schema cartesiano, posto come argine contro ogni forma di materialismo inteso in senso ontologico, è utile ad opporsi anche ad ogni tendenza di stampo spiritualistico, giacché ipotizzare la presenza di un principio attivo nella materia significherebbe introdurre una forma di animismo o di ilozoismo⁹; ma, d'altra parte, essa è pure la causa della singolare *impasse* della filosofia trascendentale nel dar conto di *un altro* comportamento della materia, non più *passivo*, ma *attivo* perché *tendente alla forma*, e della sua necessità di far ricorso al principio della finalità della natura vivente, sulla cui effettiva consistenza ontologica è costretta a non pronunciarsi¹⁰. La soluzione si attesta, quindi, sul livello epistemologico¹¹: nessuna forma di realismo delle cause finali, che intenda queste ultime come parte della materia, sia nella declinazione propriamente panteistica di una sostanza che incorpora tutto che in quella spinoziana di molteplici determinazioni inerenti ad un'unica sostanza semplice, può risolvere questo problema, perché ciascuna di esse può nominare soltanto la relazione unitaria tra la sostanza e le sue articolazioni, ma non può spiegare il legame tra la sostanza e i suoi effetti come un legame finale, ciò che sarebbe effettivamente indispensabile, data

⁸ Nella *Critica della ragion pura*, nella sezione dell'*Anfibolia dei concetti di riflessione*, Kant scrive: «In tutte le parti dello spazio che essa [la materia] occupa, e in tutti gli effetti da essa esercitati [...] io non ho davvero nulla di assolutamente interno, ma ho soltanto qualcosa di relativamente interno; a sua volta, questo qualcosa sussiste in rapporti esterni. Anzi, ciò che è assolutamente interno [...] alla materia [...] si riduce ad una semplice fisima» (KrV A 277 / B 333; tr. it., Kant 2001: 346-347)

⁹ Cf. KU, AA 05:374; tr. it. Kant 1997a:431.

¹⁰ In McLaughlin 2003 è contenuta un'interessante indagine sulla relazione, nell'approccio kantiano ai problemi biologici, tra paradigma riduzionistico cartesiano, scienza newtoniana (nella quale vengono inclusi i tentativi di rendere 'newtoniana' la biologia da parte dei vitalisti nel XVIII secolo) e concetto di causalità meccanica, insieme con il tentativo di rendere chiari i motivi della 'rigidità' di quest'ultimo, che lo rende di fatto inutilizzabile nelle scienze della vita.

¹¹ Sul punto si veda Zammito 2006:351 ff., il quale ritiene che la concezione kantiana del vivente lo induca, proprio a causa della 'povertà' del suo concetto di legge naturale e di materia, a ipotesi metafisiche (come quella dell'epigenesi, su cui mi intratterò più avanti nel testo), che egli cercherebbe di limitare, rifugiandosi in una soluzione di tipo epistemologico, grazie alla quale egli eviterebbe un impegno ontologico, che invece il suo pensiero gli richiederebbe. Su questa stessa difficoltà della filosofia trascendentale, a sua avviso risolta nell'*Opus postumum*, anche Mathieu 1958:133 ss. All'estremo opposto, Breitenbach 2009 tende ad enfatizzare l'aspetto epistemologico e a risolvere completamente, forse con argomenti non sempre convincenti, la teleologia kantiana nell'analogia, di valore puramente euristico, tra natura e ragione. Sull'utilizzo epistemologico del concetto di finalità un lavoro molto approfondito è Marcucci 1972.

l'indeducibilità da concetti di questo legame finalistico (cf. KU, AA 05: 421; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 527)¹².

Il tentativo di venire in chiaro sul fondamento della finalità interna degli organismi viene messo a punto nel § 81, in cui Kant si confronta con le soluzioni proposte in merito dagli scienziati del suo tempo; il riferimento, diretto o indiretto, al dibattito scientifico-filosofico sull'origine della vita, che aveva visto protagonisti, tra gli altri, Maupertuis, La Mettrie, Needham, Boerhaave, Spallanzani, Maupertuis, C. F. Wolff, Blumenbach, Haller e prima ancora Stahl, Leibniz, Cudworth, oltre a chiarire il punto di vista kantiano, offre anche un interessante spaccato storico sull'emergere di scienze, come la biologia, per le quali il paradigma meccanicistico cartesiano non pareva più sufficiente, ma le cui problematiche, in assenza delle scoperte fondamentali della chimica organica, non potevano essere fronteggiate del tutto adeguata, né sotto il profilo strettamente sperimentale, né sotto il profilo più ampiamente teoretico¹³.

La visione che animava la teoresi kantiana in questo campo restava quella di non abbandonare completamente la spiegazione meccanicistica della natura, ma di integrarla facendo il minor ricorso possibile al soprasensibile, evitando di fare degli organismi esseri al di sopra delle leggi della natura. Si spiega così la simpatia di Kant per la teoria dell'epigenesi, a danno di tutte le altre forme di occasionalismo o di prestabilismo; con l'occasionalismo, che ritiene che il Creatore abbia predeterminato l'esistenza degli esseri organici, ai quali conferisce la vita *in occasione* del concepimento, il quale diventa così un atto che sfugge alle leggi di natura, e con il prestabilismo, per il quale tutto quello che riguarda gli esseri organici sarebbe stabilito da Dio in anticipo, mentre alla natura spetterebbe il solo compito di *sviluppare* per *educazione* qualità già interamente formate, Kant reputa vada perduta ogni applicazione della ragione all'indagine della natura, perché essi rendono i processi naturali completamente *superflui* nella produzione di esseri organizzati. Ma il sistema della preformazione individuale, oltre ad avere un evidente difetto teoretico, è insostenibile anche perché rimane muto al cospetto di alcuni fenomeni naturali: come dar conto, per esempio, della nascita dei bastardi o dei mostri¹⁴, se non si ammette altro che una forma di *accrescimento* di caratteristiche già tutte teleologicamente determinate?

Kant ritiene di dover aderire alla teoria della preformazione generica o epigenesi, secondo la quale le disposizioni sono contenute solo in forma di *germi* e gradualmente portate a maturazione per *produzione*, perché il suo vantaggio sulle altre teorie è duplice: da un lato, riesce a dar conto in misura maggiore di quanto si verifica nell'esperienza (la già citata produzione di bastardi o quella, antifinalistica, dei mostri), perché i *Keime* sono disposizioni poste solo *virtualmente* nell'organismo, e dunque il loro sviluppo è sottoposto a fattori o, al limite, ad ostacoli contingenti; dall'altro, «la ragione sarebbe già

¹² Sul punto occorre vedere anche le già esaustive osservazioni su 'realismo' e 'idealismo' della finalità che si trovano nel § 72, posto nella *Dialettica del Giudizio teleologico*; cf. KU, AA 05: 389 ff; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 459 ss.

¹³ Su questi temi, si veda l'accurata analisi storica contenuta nei capitoli 1-9 di Zammito 2018.

¹⁴ Problema su cui aveva per esempio già insistito Maupertuis 1745: 74 ss.

pregiudizialmente orientata a guardare con maggior favore il suo modo di spiegare, perché questa considera la natura [...] come produttrice per sé [...] e non semplicemente come capace di sviluppare; e in tal modo [...] lascia alla natura tutto ciò che segue al primo incominciamento» (KU, AA 05: 424; Kant 1997a: 533). Kant fa qui evidente riferimento a teorie, come quelle della *vis essentialis* di C. F. Wolff, peraltro non citato direttamente¹⁵, di Maupertuis¹⁶ e, più decisamente, del *Bildungstrieb* di Blumenbach¹⁷, l'unico scienziato ad essere direttamente citato¹⁸.

La propensione di Kant per la teoria della preformazione generica deriva da una certa consonanza tra questa e il suo modo di pensare: essa non indulge alla teoria della *generatio aequivoca*, tuttavia riesce a preservare l'autonomia delle leggi della natura ricorrendo a principî non meccanici solo quando sia l'esperienza stessa a richiederli; per questo, il filosofo ascrive apertamente alla teoria blumenbachiana del *nisus formativus*, l'impulso originario alla forma che si registra negli esseri organizzati, il merito di lasciare «al meccanismo della natura una parte che non si può determinare, ma che non si può neanche disconoscere» (KU, AA 05: 424; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 533)¹⁹, anche se egli non intende *in senso realistico* la tendenza della materia alla forma, sicché egli qui ribadisce che la sua soluzione non pretende di dire una parola definitiva sull'impulso alla forma della natura organica e tende a risolvere sul piano della *pensabilità*, piuttosto che sul piano dell'*essere*, un dato d'esperienza che non poteva fino in fondo essere giustificato dai risultati delle scienze del suo tempo né dai principî propri del suo sistema filosofico.

3. Ostacoli sulla via che conduce alla conoscenza della natura come tutto organizzato: scopo ultimo e finalità esterna (§ 82)

Il § 82 abbandona la questione della finalità interna degli organismi e discute la possibile finalità esterna degli enti di natura non organizzati rispetto a quelli organizzati, ossia la possibilità che la natura, nel produrre gli esseri inorganici, abbia avuto di vista gli scopi propri degli esseri viventi. Della differenza tra finalità esterna, o relativa, e finalità interna della natura Kant aveva già, peraltro, discusso nel § 63, negando che l'esistenza del primo tipo di finalismo potesse rappresentare una occupazione delle scienze della natura; tale problema ritorna nella *Metodologia*, dopo essere stato sostanzialmente abbandonato perché

¹⁵ A proposito della *vis essentialis* si veda Wolff 1764: 160, § 25. Goy 2014 rileva una differenza essenziale tra *vis essentialis* di Wolff e *bildende Kraft* di Kant: la prima sarebbe, a suo avviso, materiale, e ciò farebbe di Wolff un meccanicista, la seconda immateriale. Per l'influenza di Maupertuis su Kant, si confronti Zammito 2006.

¹⁶ Per il discorso relativo alla preformazione e alla sua confutazione, si veda soprattutto Maupertuis 1745: 77-107.

¹⁷ Blumenbach 1781: 12 f.

¹⁸ KU, AA 05: 424; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 533.

¹⁹ Blumenbach ritiene, in maniera abbastanza simile a Kant, che il suo *Bildungstrieb* o *nisus formativus* si distingua nettamente dalla *vis essentialis* di Wolff o dalle tradizionali nature plastiche della tradizione neoplatonico-rinascimentale, rilanciate nel dibattito sulla vita organica da Cudworth perché tale forza si conosce dall'effetto, ignorandosene del tutto la causa, sulla quale egli sceglie di non pronunciarsi; in merito, Blumenbach 1791: 33.

eccedente i limiti di una teleologia che risponda ad una impostazione di tipo metodico e non metafisico, senza essere preventivamente giustificato o introdotto. Il passaggio a questo nuovo livello dell'argomentazione pare motivato dall'intento di saggiare l'idea che l'intera natura possa essere intesa come un sistema globalmente organizzato, nel quale tutte le cose si trovino in collegamento perché poste in un rapporto reciproco di mezzo a fine. Questo intento può essere ritenuto non del tutto arbitrario, se si considera che la questione di una organizzazione teleologica della natura nel suo complesso si trova già nell'*Appendice alla Dialettica trascendentale* della prima *Critica* e che è uno dei motivi a fondamento dell'elaborazione di una ulteriore *Critica*, giusta le affermazioni che si trovano nell'*Introduzione* all'opera

Una finalità esterna della natura può, a parere di Kant, essere pensata solo come posta a vantaggio degli esseri organici, perché questi solo sono possibili in virtù del concetto di scopo, ma la sua esistenza può essere asseverata molto difficilmente, perché l'esistenza dell'organismo non implica che questo *sia in se stesso uno scopo*, ma solo che, per poter sussistere, si debba *configurare come uno scopo*. Certo, la finalità esterna è necessaria, affinché possano aver modo di vivere esseri organici, che devono, a tale scopo, utilizzare ciò che trovano in natura; tuttavia, difficilmente ciò che funge da mezzo per i loro scopi potrebbe considerarsi un vantaggio ad essi *intenzionalmente* riservato. Ciò tuttavia non toglie che Kant ritenga sensato porre la domanda relativa all'esistenza di un ente a cui la natura possa aver riservato il privilegio di essere suo scopo, il quale, se si ritiene riposto all'interno dell'essere naturale, sarà uno *scopo finale*, mentre se lo si ritiene riposto all'esterno, sarà un *mezzo necessario* agli equilibri di un tutto finalisticamente organizzato. L'uomo, in quanto unico essere in grado di porsi fini, ha ben ragione di ritenersi lo scopo ultimo della natura, ma ciò non significa ancora che ne sia lo scopo finale, perché «se noi percorriamo tutta la natura, non troveremo in essa, in quanto natura, alcun essere che possa pretendere al privilegio di essere lo scopo finale della creazione» (KU, AA 05: 426; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 537). Una considerazione non *antropomorfica* della natura, contro cui Kant si era già espresso nella prima *Critica*²⁰, porta infatti a ritenere che nessun essere sia designato come scopo della natura stessa, ma che, al contrario, tutti siano funzionali alla sua esigenza di addivenire ad un equilibrio complessivo, per il quale i singoli vengono sacrificati piuttosto che tutelati. Solo se si ammette che gli uomini debbano vivere sulla terra, Kant lo aveva già precisato nel § 63, non devono mancare i mezzi grazie ai quali possano sussistere come animali, «ma in generale non si vede perché [...] debbano vivere uomini» (KU, AA 05: 369; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 419). In questo quadro l'uomo, che pur deve essere considerato lo scopo ultimo della natura affinché questa possa essere considerata un sistema di fini²¹, non assurge certo al rango di essere eccezionale:

Si potrebbe anche [...] dire che gli animali erbivori esistono per moderare la vegetazione lussureggiante del regno vegetale, da cui parecchie specie sarebbero state soffocate, che i carnivori esistono per porre un freno alla voracità dei primi; e finalmente l'uomo, perché,

²⁰ Cf. KrV A 647 / 675; tr. it. Kant 2001: 696.

²¹ Cf. KU, AA 05: 427; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 539.

perseguitando questi ultimi e scemandoli di numero, stabilisca un certo equilibrio tra le forze produttrici e distruttrici della natura. E così l'uomo, per quanto sotto un certo rispetto sia degno di esser considerato come un fine, non avrebbe, sotto altro rispetto, se non il grado di un mezzo (KU, AA 05: 427; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 539).

Del resto, l'ordine attuale della natura, come già visto nel § 80, potrebbe essersi delineato storicamente sulla base di un principio interamente meccanico, attraverso una serie di distruzioni e catastrofi, alle quali l'uomo, se anche non vi fosse stato coinvolto, non potrebbe dichiararsi estraneo, considerato il suo legame con tutto il resto della natura, che, solo, rende possibile la sua sussistenza²². Non è dunque da escludere che quello che in natura appare conforme alla finalità esterna sia il risultato di rovinose trasformazioni, né tanto meno è lecito ridurre l'*archeologia* della natura, che tenta di ricostruire l'antico stato della terra, alla semplice *storia* della natura, tesa ad una descrizione empirica della condizione attuale della terra²³. Kant è evidentemente influenzato dall'opera dei naturalisti del suo tempo; nel saggio *Sull'impiego dei principî teleologici in filosofia*, per esempio, egli cita il *Manuale di storia naturale* di Blumenbach²⁴, che contiene una descrizione dei cambiamenti subiti dalla natura nel corso del tempo, e, nella *Geografia fisica*, in particolare nella IV sezione della prima parte (cf. PG, AA 09: 296 ff.) si confronta direttamente con quelle teorie che, dalla fine del XVII secolo, avevano cercato di dar conto dei cambiamenti della terra e del ruolo avutovi dalle inondazioni, dall'innalzamento e abbassamento del suolo, della presenza dei fossili marini sulla cima delle montagne, e così via, ripercorrendo, e talvolta confutando, i tentativi di ricostruzione offerti da scienziati come Scheuchzer, Moro, Burnet, Woodward, Whiston, Leibniz, Linneo e Buffon²⁵. Scienze come la geologia e la paleontologia rendevano possibile una nuova visione della natura, non più pensata come un regno di essenze eterne e statiche, ma come il risultato di equilibri mutevoli, che mai conoscono configurazioni definitive, sicché nella *Reflexion* 93 Kant può affermare che «la terra non è dall'eternità», ma che ha una storia, e che «se noi vogliamo indagare la storia della terra dal punto di vista fisico, non dobbiamo [...] rivolgerci alla rivelazione» (Refl 93, AA 14: 573 f.)²⁶. Una tale archeologia della natura, che deve mirare alla costruzione di una scienza che vada «sotto il nome di teoria della terra», per quanto dia luogo solo a congetture e non a certezze, non è «un'investigazione

²² Cf. KU, AA 05: 428; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 541.

²³ La distinzione tra *archeologia* e *storia* della natura è probabilmente introdotta da Kant non solo per richiamare il concetto della conoscenza storica come conoscenza di dati empirici, che non ha quindi necessariamente una connotazione temporale, ma anche per risolvere la difficoltà di delimitare i campi della *descrizione della natura* nella sua attuale configurazione e della ricostruzione della sua *evoluzione*, cui si trova di fronte nel saggio *Sull'impiego dei principî teleologici in filosofia* del 1788; si veda, in proposito, ÜGTP, AA 08:162 f.; tr. it. Kant 1991: 37.

²⁴ Cf. ÜGTP, AA 08: 180; tr. it. Kant 1991: 55.

²⁵ Sulla nascita della geologia e della paleontologia, sulle difficoltà teoriche e sperimentali che esse hanno dovuto affrontare e sulla difficoltà di conciliare le nuove teorie con il racconto della *Genesi*, ma anche sulla importanza che questo ha avuto nella formulazione di alcuni tentativi di ricostruzione dell'antico stato della terra, si veda il classico studio di P. Rossi 2003 (prima edizione 1979).

²⁶ Sul punto, si veda Fischer 2007: 106 ff.

della natura puramente immaginaria, ma [...] uno studio a cui la natura stessa c'invita e ci esorta» (KU, AA 05: 428; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 541).

Ciò che rileva notare è che, per quanto qui si sia nel territorio delle congetture, queste supportano quel che la ragione già autonomamente è in grado di stabilire, ossia che, se si rimane sul terreno della natura, non può trovarsi alcuna conferma dell'esistenza di esseri che essa abbia eletto a suoi favoriti; anzi, emerge da queste pagine una visione profondamente sistemica della natura, per cui tutto quello che vi accade ha ripercussioni su tutti gli esseri viventi, tanto che l'uomo, pur godendo del privilegio di essere l'unico essere razionale sulla terra, non può ritenersi esterno agli equilibri naturali.

La chiave della negazione della possibilità di una finalità esterna, però, non è empirica, ma di principio: della natura, *in quanto natura*, non può mai essere affermato con certezza che agisca sulla base di cause non meccaniche, quindi essa non può produrre uno scopo finale. In altre parole, mai si può affermare l'agire con scopo da parte della natura, ma solo che alcuni esseri sono pensati, a fini conoscitivi, come scopi. E tuttavia né questa considerazione, né l'archeologia della natura, con la sua storia di devastazioni, catastrofi e cataclismi, escludono una spiegazione teleologica degli equilibri naturali, perché, ribadisce Kant, «l'unione di questi due modi di rappresentarsi la possibilità della natura può stare nel principio soprasensibile della natura» (KU, AA 05: 429; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 543): il meccanicismo naturale, infatti, è fondato nelle categorie, ma non è fondato in via *assoluta*, data la sua base fenomenica, e dunque *relazionale*, per cui deve accettare di convivere con la teleologia, con cui è negativamente compatibile.

Il punto di vista che, in ultimo, risulta dal § 82 è dunque ancora una volta negativo: esso elimina tutti gli argomenti contrari alla possibilità della coesistenza tra meccanismo e teleologia, ma di tale coesistenza non si può dire altro se non che la ragione non ci vieta di pensarla. Tuttavia, esso approda anche ad una ulteriore acquisizione, secondo la quale, se si vuole comprendere come la natura possa produrre la vita come suo scopo, bisogna comprendere anche la natura stessa come un sistema di scopi per la cui completezza è necessario uno scopo ultimo, che non può essere rintracciato sulla base di una considerazione meccanica della natura. Ma nel § 82 non è spiegato come possano conciliarsi queste due visioni dello stesso problema, se non, come testé detto, per via puramente negativa; se ne può, pertanto, dedurre che sia da percorrere un'altra via rispetto a quella della finalità esterna e che occorra sottoporre alla riflessione nuovi elementi, che saranno forniti nel § 83.

4. Pensare la natura come un tutto finalistico nei limiti di una ragione finita: lo spostamento del *letzter Zweck* dal fine oggettivo alla facoltà umana di porre fini (§ 83)

Nel § 83 vengono trattati molti temi antropologici e sfiorati argomenti di filosofia della storia e di filosofia politica, ma, e in ciò consiste la sua difficoltà, il collegamento del suo contenuto con quanto precedentemente emerso nella *Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico* non è sempre pienamente perspicuo. In questo paragrafo, come nel precedente, viene

esperito il tentativo di trovare un fine ultimo della natura, che consenta di pensarla come un tutto teleologico, ma questa stessa via è percorsa nei due paragrafi in un senso completamente opposto: nel § 83, infatti, Kant non parte dal considerare la natura come sistema di mezzi e di fini che abbia al suo vertice un fine che sia *nella* e *della* natura, ma da *un* essere, l'uomo, che sia fine ultimo della natura non perché suo favorito, ma in quanto capace di instaurare un ordine globale di mezzi e di fini al quale assoggettare la natura stessa. La capacità dell'uomo di porre scopi, pur segnando una discontinuità con la parte restante della natura, è essa stessa una caratteristica naturale, che solo per questo rientra nella teleologia naturale e così realizza, per altra via rispetto a quella percorsa dalla finalità esterna, lo scopo ultimo *della* natura, dimodoché, si può affermare, l'unità tematica del paragrafo e la sua connessione con i temi della *Metodologia* si trova nell'esplorazione sistematica di questa capacità teleologica come fattore di unificazione del tutto naturale, «in modo che rispetto a lui [l'uomo] tutte le altre cose naturali costituiscono un sistema di fini» (KU, AA 05: 429; tr. it. Kant1997a: 545).

La posizione di fini da parte dell'uomo rappresenta, dunque, il modo di esplicitarsi della sua causalità, in quanto essere naturale dotato di volontà, ed è, al contempo, all'origine dell'articolazione del suo legame con la natura, il quale può essere solo di due specie: o tale che la natura abbia posto l'uomo al centro delle sue cure per soddisfare i suoi fini ovvero che l'uomo stesso possa utilizzare la natura per la soddisfazione dei suoi fini. Il primo modo di intendere il legame tra uomo e natura coinciderà con la felicità; il secondo con la cultura (cf. KU, AA 05: 430; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 545). Kant afferma, con toni quasi drammatici, che la felicità degli uomini non è affatto una preoccupazione della natura:

La natura è tanto lungi dall'averlo adottato come il suo particolare favorito [...] che essa, nei suoi effetti rovinosi, la peste, la fame, l'inondazione, e il freddo, l'ostilità di altri animali grandi e piccoli, e simili, non lo risparmia più di qualunque altro animale; e per di più le contraddizioni delle sue disposizioni naturali lo gettano in pene immaginarie, mentre le tribolazioni proprie della sua specie, con lo spirito di dominazione, la barbarie della guerra, etc., lo riducono in tale miseria, ed egli stesso [...] si adopera tanto per la rovina della propria specie, che [...] questa sulla terra non raggiungerebbe un sistema di felicità, perché la sua natura non ne è capace (KU, AA 05: 430; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 545 s.).

L'uomo dunque «è sempre soltanto un anello nella catena dei fini naturali» (KU, AA 05: 430; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547). E tuttavia, nel negare che la felicità sia lo scopo ultimo della natura, Kant ha di vista anche la circostanza che essa non possa essere considerata una legge della ragione, ma un semplice ideale dell'immaginazione, formato da una mescolanza di due istanze, l'una che proviene dai sensi, l'altra dall'intelletto; essa non è, quindi, né un puro prodotto dell'istinto (di fatto, nessun animale aspira alla felicità, ma solo alla soddisfazione dei bisogni), né una legge identica per tutti gli uomini e in tutte le circostanze, ma la rappresentazione di uno stato duraturo di appagamento di tutti i propri desideri che, in quanto pretende di disporre conformemente ad essa tutti gli stati del proprio vivere, è un'*idea*, ma, in quanto si rivolge a materiale puramente empirico, può

prendere forma in tante maniere diverse ed è così instabile «che, se la natura [vi] fosse sottomessa [...] non potrebbe assolutamente accogliere alcuna legge determinata, universale e fissa» (KU, AA 05: 430; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 545). Se dunque natura è ciò che è conforme a leggi, suo scopo non può essere ciò che non è fondato su leggi rigorosamente intese, mentre, d'altra parte, proprio la rappresentazione di una natura finalisticamente orientata presuppone l'esistenza di leggi che dispongano le parti in ragione del tutto, e non, viceversa, che dispongano il tutto a partire dalla sua consonanza con la mutevolezza di un motivo empirico, quale è il desiderio umano.

La natura non può dunque che produrre il suo scopo ultimo preparando l'uomo, come unico essere in grado di porre scopi, «a ciò che egli stesso deve fare per essere uno scopo» (KU, AA 05: 431; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547). Resta, così, non la materia variabile degli scopi, ma solo la loro forma, «vale a dire la facoltà di porsi fini in generale»; la capacità umana che ne deriva, «di servirsi della natura come mezzo conformemente alle massime dei suoi liberi scopi in generale» costituisce ciò che la natura può fare per preparare l'uomo «allo scopo finale che è fuori di essa, e che può esser riguardato perciò come il suo scopo ultimo» (KU, AA 05: 431; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547). La libera posizione di scopi da parte dell'uomo dipende, quanto alla sua possibilità, dalla facoltà di desiderare, che, stando a quanto si legge nella *Prefazione* alla seconda *Critica*, è il potere, da parte di un ente, «di essere, mediante le sue rappresentazioni la causa della realtà degli oggetti di queste rappresentazioni» (KpV, AA 05: 9; tr. it. Kant 2006: 15). L'essere causa degli oggetti delle proprie rappresentazioni è ciò che rende il modo d'essere umano simile alla natura in quanto essa è produttrice, ossia in quanto la si pensi agire in maniera teleologica; si comprende, pertanto, che l'uomo ha in sé qualcosa che lo distingue da tutte le altre forme di vita, perché egli non è un semplice prodotto naturale, ma *possiede* la logica della natura, nella misura in cui essa ponga scopi. Se è lecito esprimersi in questo modo, negli uomini, quali esseri capaci di porsi fini, la natura o, meglio, il fondamento soprasensibile di essa, che agisce finalisticamente e che pone la natura come un sistema teleologico, si rispecchia; questo è ciò che fa dell'uomo un essere naturale che non è del tutto soggetto ad una natura intesa come un insieme di cause meccaniche, ma che agisce in virtù di un fondamento soprasensibile che è all'origine della stessa natura e che gli conferisce il diritto di definirsi il «ben titolato signore della natura» (KU, AA 05: 431; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547).

La *Herrschaft* dell'uomo sulla natura potrebbe ben essere interpretata come diritto ad usufruirne e ad utilizzarla per gli scopi che più gli aggradano. Ciò pare confermato anche, per esempio, da quanto Kant afferma nello scritto *Inizio congetturale della storia degli uomini*, riferendosi ad una ben precisa prerogativa dell'uomo su tutti gli altri animali, che ha diritto di usare per i suoi scopi:

[L']ultimo passo che la ragione compì, nel sollevare interamente l'uomo al di sopra della comunità con gli animali, fu questo: egli comprese [...] di essere davvero il *fine della natura* [...] La prima volta che egli disse alla pecora: *il vello che tu porti, la natura non te l'ha dato*

per te, ma per me [...] egli ebbe coscienza di una prerogativa che, grazie alla sua natura, aveva su tutti gli altri animali (MAM, AA 08: 114; tr. it. Kant 2004: 107-108).

L'asprezza di questa visione del rapporto tra uomini e natura pare del resto confermata dalla convinzione kantiana, espressa nella *Metafisica dei costumi*, che gli uomini stessi non abbiano doveri, né giuridici né morali, nei confronti degli animali, perché manca un rapporto di reciprocità, dal quale soltanto l'obbligazione può sorgere (cf. MS, AA 06: 241; tr. it. Kant 1998: 49). Tuttavia, tale asprezza può essere mitigata dall'esplicita indicazione kantiana, contenuta ancora nella *Metafisica dei costumi*, che gli uomini abbiano un dovere *indiretto* nei confronti degli animali, che abbiano sì diritto di usarli o di ucciderli per i loro scopi essenziali, ma non di procurar loro del male in forma gratuita, e che anzi spesso si abbia, nei loro confronti, quasi un obbligo di riconoscenza (cf. MS, AA 06: 443; tr. it. Kant 1998: 304 s.). Queste due opposte visioni trovano forse, agli occhi di Kant, giustificazione a partire dai diversi livelli argomentativi sui quali si può svolgere il discorso morale: dal punto di vista dei *principî*, non può, a suo parere, esistere una reciprocità tra uomini e animali, ma da un punto di vista *affettivo* e, indirettamente, anche *etico* (un uomo che incrudelisce sugli animali è un eticamente cattivo), non è ammessa alcuna indifferenza o cattiveria gratuita nei loro confronti²⁷.

Per altro verso, bisogna dire l'indubbio antropocentrismo di Kant non apre ad alcuna forma di 'specialità' della posizione dell'uomo nel cosmo, in quanto semplice essere naturale; piuttosto, è una qualità naturale che pone l'uomo al centro della stessa natura. L'agire sulla base di fini, infatti, nella misura in cui essi ricadano nelle regole tecnico-pratiche (cf. KU, AA 05: 172; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 13), è parte della dotazione naturale dell'uomo, in virtù della quale egli è l'unico animale in grado di *rielaborare* il dato ambientale, come più ampiamente viene spiegato nella *Terza tesi* dell'*Idea della storia universale dal punto di vista cosmopolitico*, dove si afferma che la natura stessa ha voluto che l'uomo fosse da lei indipendente e capace di ricavare da sé, e non di attendere dall'ambiente, ciò che gli occorre (cf. IaG, AA 08: 19; tr. it. Kant 2004: 31). Questa capacità di rielaborazione dell'ambiente non è solo un incremento *quantitativo* di abilità, ma segna anche un *discrimine qualitativo* rispetto agli altri esseri viventi: l'ambiente, rielaborato, non è più *lo stesso* ambiente, e questa circostanza è all'origine del paradosso di un essere che, in virtù della sua dotazione naturale, pone tra sé e la natura una distanza che, una volta aperta, non è più colmabile, rendendo il percorso che va dalla natura alla cultura percorribile, per dir così, in una sola direzione. *Cultura*, dunque, come *azione intenzionale del coltivare*, è, letteralmente, *trasformazione del terreno nel quale si è stabiliti*, ed essa è il prodotto della facoltà produttrici di fini, intesa come facoltà di essere causa della realtà degli oggetti delle proprie rappresentazioni, perché questa trasformazione non può che

²⁷ Korsgaard 2011 ritiene, a questo proposito, che lo spirito dell'etica kantiana, anche oltre la sua esplicita formulazione teorica, sia adattabile ad una visione non completamente antropocentrica della natura e del rapporto con gli altri animali. Le argomentazioni addotte, su cui non è possibile in questa sede ulteriormente dilungarsi, sono a tratti suggestive, a tratti discutibili, in ogni caso sicuramente ulteriormente sviluppabili.

avvenire sulla base di una causalità in grado di dar vita a qualcosa che ancora *non è* o che ancora *non è così*.

L'uomo, tuttavia, come essere naturale, non cessa di essere vincolato all'ambiente, dunque non cessa di essere sistemicamente vincolato a tutti gli esseri organizzati e perfino alla natura inorganica, come Kant aveva del resto esplicitamente riconosciuto nel § 82 (cf. KU, AA 05: 428; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 541). L'antropocentrismo kantiano non si declina allora, se è lecito esprimersi in questo modo, *secondo la materia*, perché la natura è un insieme di connessioni nel quale l'uomo è a pieno titolo inserito, ma *secondo la forma*, perché è la forma finalistica quella con cui l'uomo *si pone* al centro della natura, non certo come suo signore assoluto, ma come essere che, ponendo tra sé e la natura una mediazione, rappresenta al suo interno un ineludibile punto di snodo²⁸.

Vi è, infine, un punto ulteriore sul quale è necessario tentare di gettare luce. La cultura sembra qui pensata sul modello della relazione con le cose di tipo *tecnico*, grazie a cui, producendo, si modificano e/o si portano alla luce oggetti. Ci si può chiedere se tale relazione di tipo *poietico* non si configuri, implicitamente, in Kant, anche come modello della *prassi*. Attestandosi alla lettera del testo, non sembrerebbe che così possano stare le cose; Kant ritiene che soltanto una parte della cultura, che egli chiama *dell'abilità*, sia assimilabile al sapere tecnico, e che il suo limite essenziale consiste nell'incapacità di guidare la volontà nella determinazione dei suoi fini (cf. KU, AA 05: 431; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 549). Gli scopi tecnici sono infatti perlopiù arbitrari, e non possono vincolare la nostra volontà ad alcuna risoluzione; scopi non arbitrari, del resto, a voler prestare ascolto a quanto viene affermato nella *Fondazione*, sono soltanto di due tipi: quelli derivanti dalla *ricerca della felicità*, il cui oggetto è tuttavia contingente, e quelli determinati dalla *legge morale* (cf. GMS, AA 04: 415 f.; tr. it. Kant 1997b:63 s.), ragion per cui, si deve ritenere, gli scopi a cui deve essere subordinato il sapere tecnico devono provenire dall'uno o dall'altro ambito. La cultura dell'abilità è, in questo senso, incapace di promuovere *positivamente* scopi, e pertanto il suo esito più alto è *negativo*, ossia consiste in una mera disciplina delle inclinazioni.

La cecità della cultura dell'abilità rispetto agli scopi è dimostrata anche dalla circostanza che essa sia alimentata dalla diseguaglianza tra gli uomini, cioè da una condizione di ingiustizia che si oppone a quanto comandato dalla legge morale. La condizione dello sviluppo della società civile è infatti l'oppressione di una classe sociale su un'altra, che lavora per il «comodo e il divertimento degli altri, i quali lavorano per gli elementi meno necessari della coltura, la scienza e l'arte», le quali ultime, come attività che portano al massimo grado lo sviluppo delle disposizioni umane, sono «il fine della natura stessa» (KU, AA 05: 432; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 549). Il trionfo della civiltà è tuttavia anche il trionfo di alcune delle disposizioni peggiori dell'animo umano; e Kant non pare tanto lontano dagli accenti drammatici della denuncia dei mali della cultura di Rousseau, quando parla della «miseria dorata» a cui pare che essa inevitabilmente ci

²⁸ In questo senso anche Höffe 2018: 278 ff., il quale parla di un antropocentrismo non meramente 'biologico' e non 'assoluto'; a suo parere, infatti, l'antropocentrismo kantiano è di tipo 'ontologico', fondato su principi, che non porrebbe l'uomo fuori o al di sopra della natura.

destini. Egli però, a differenza di Rousseau, tiene fermo che questa sofferenza provocata dallo sviluppo della cultura sia necessaria per il raffinamento dello spirito, che costituisce la preparazione per la liberazione dal dominio degli appetiti naturali sul nostro animo. La corruzione della cultura può dunque essere accettata solo se essa conduce ad uno stato altro della civiltà, ossia al raggiungimento di «quella costituzione nei rapporti degli uomini tra loro, in un tutto che si chiama *società civile*» (KU, AA 05: 432; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547-549). Solo in una tale costituzione, che deve assumere una dimensione cosmopolitica per evitare i rischi derivanti dalla guerra, è possibile un pieno, non costretto sviluppo della libertà umana. Kant riprende, dunque, in queste poche pagine i temi che aveva trattato con maggiore dovizia di particolari negli scritti di filosofia della storia degli anni Ottanta, nei quali aveva spiegato l'importanza dell'antagonismo tra gli uomini per il raggiungimento di una costituzione civile in grado di tutelare libertà e diritti di tutti, allo stesso modo in cui aveva ritenuto di aver dimostrato che proprio la guerra, per la maturazione della contraddizione che reca in sé, dovesse un giorno indurre gli uomini, per necessità se non per saggezza, a rifuggirla attraverso un'unione cosmopolitica tra gli Stati.

La cultura tuttavia, pur se con il raggiungimento di una costituzione civile e di un ordine cosmopolitico conduce ad una completa “umanizzazione dell'uomo”, non conduce al gradino più alto delle possibilità umane, perché resta vincolata alla condizionatezza della natura; il suo ruolo è soltanto quello di preparare l'uomo, attraverso la disciplina delle inclinazioni e lo sviluppo dei talenti, «alla signoria assoluta della ragione», vale a dire della legge morale, la quale costituisce il vertice della teleologia della ragione umana. Lo “scopo ultimo” apre così alla possibilità di uno “scopo finale”, che non appartiene più al regno della natura, ma della libertà.

5. Scopo finale della creazione e compimento del pensiero teleologico (§ 84)

Il finalismo della natura organica aveva già posto, in sede di *Dialettica del Giudizio teleologico*, la necessità di innalzarsi al concetto di una natura intesa nella sua interezza come sistema di fini e, contestualmente, ad un intelletto archetipico in grado di organizzarla in questo modo. Un sistema di fini è tale se è in se stesso conchiuso, pertanto deve essere posta la questione di uno scopo finale che lo conchiuda e che sia la causa che spinga la causa intelligente del mondo a creare la natura:

Quando si è pensato una sola volta un intelletto, che deve esser considerato come la causa della possibilità di tali forme [finalistiche], quali si trovano effettivamente nelle cose, si deve anche domandare quale principio oggettivo abbia potuto determinare questa intelligenza produttrice ad un effetto di questa specie; principio che poi è lo scopo finale per cui queste cose esistono (KU, AA, 05: 434 f.; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 555)

Lo scopo finale non può quindi in alcun modo essere proprio della natura, giacché essa può sempre essere vista in un modo duplice, o come un sistema di fini, o come un insieme di cause cieche. Solo se si ammette l'esistenza di un essere che è sottoposto anche alla

legislazione della libertà la natura può essere riguardata come il prodotto di una causa intelligente, capace di porvi uno scopo finale²⁹. Sotto questo riguardo, non ci si può del tutto liberare dall'impressione che la cultura come scopo ultimo della natura conservi un certo grado di non oggettività: di fatto, l'uomo è scopo ultimo della natura «sempre condizionatamente, cioè a condizione che sappia e voglia dare alla natura e a se stesso una finalità sufficiente per se stessa e indipendente dalla natura, e che quindi possa essere scopo finale, il quale però non deve essere cercato nella natura» (KU, AA 05: 431; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 547).

Scopo finale è quello «che non ne richiede alcun altro come condizione della sua possibilità» (KU, AA: 05: 434; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 553), e nessuno scopo naturale può essere di questo tipo, poiché «non v'è nulla in natura [...] di cui il principio determinante [...] non sia a sua volta condizionato» (KU, AA 05: 435; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 555). Per Kant gli unici esseri che possano indurre la causa intelligente del mondo alla creazione sono quelli che «si rappresentino la legge secondo cui devono determinare i propri fini, come posta incondizionatamente da loro stessi e indipendentemente dalla condizioni della natura, eppure come in se stessa necessaria. L'essere di questa specie è l'uomo, ma considerato come noumeno» (KU, AA 05: 435; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 555). Lo scopo finale, dunque, è uno scopo della libertà, e solo in questa misura può essere *realmente* finale, anche per la ragione che, come scopo appartenente alla filosofia pratica, origina non dal Giudizio riflettente, ma da principî incondizionatamente validi del Giudizio determinante.

Queste considerazioni aprono lo spazio per un duplice ordine di interrogativi: in primo luogo, come può la morale kantiana innalzarsi ad una considerazione teleologica complessiva del reale, al punto da asseverare la presenza di uno scopo finale della creazione, con il quale si compia il sistema teleologico della ragione umana? In secondo luogo, per quale ragione il concetto di scopo finale, di competenza della filosofia pratica, viene svolto nel contesto di un'opera che si occupa di teleologia naturale e non in un'opera che, come la *Critica della ragion pratica*, abbia specificamente ad oggetto la fondazione della morale secondo i principî della filosofia trascendentale?

In merito al primo problema, si deve mettere in evidenza che tutto il sistema morale kantiano è percorso da una vena teleologica³⁰, che non è estranea alle riflessioni della *Fondazione* e della *seconda Critica* e che è evidente, nel brano sopra richiamato, dal fatto che Kant metta in relazione legge morale ed agire finalistico. Non intendo, con questo, affermare che la morale kantiana sia *tout court* una morale teleologica, che cioè presupponga un *fine* che preceda la legge, o che si fondi su un *bene* che possa determinare moralmente l'arbitrio; ma la ragione, in quanto contiene un principio puro rivolto alla sfera

²⁹ Guyer 2005: 334 f. si chiede se l'idea di uno scopo finale della natura non sia in contraddizione con la precedente negazione che la felicità dell'uomo possa essere lo scopo della natura; egli nota, però, che la centralità dell'uomo nella natura come scopo finale della creazione non allude alla felicità *naturale*, ma all'esigenza di felicità che conclude il sistema morale come parte del sommo bene, legato al compimento del sistema finalistico della morale. Sulla questione del sommo bene e della concordanza possibile tra natura e libertà a partire dal loro comune fondamento soprasensibile avrò modo di tornare nelle pagine finali di questo scritto.

³⁰ Sulla presenza di una teleologia morale nel pensiero di Kant insiste molto Cunico 2001.

pratica, contiene una forma determinante una *molteplicità di interazioni pratiche* che sono di portata teleologica perché costituite da scopi, volizioni, desideri. La legge morale è, precisamente, la forma determinante, interamente apriorica, di questa molteplicità di scopi, volizioni e desideri, i quali, poiché appartengono ad esseri come gli uomini che sono in un rapporto di reciproca influenza, devono essere posti in un legame reciproco, tale da dar vita ad un *mondo pratico*³¹. È questo il senso in cui, nella *Fondazione*, si dichiara che con l'idea del regno dei fini, corrispondente pratico della teleologia naturale, la quale considera la natura effettivamente esistente come un regno dei fini, «ciò che non esiste può [...] diventare reale attraverso il nostro fare ed omettere, e appunto così da attuarlo in modo conforme a quest'idea» (GMS, AA 04: 436; tr. it. Kant 1997b: 107). Questo implica che legge, come connessione di un molteplice, non si può identificare con la *norma*, qualora questa sia intesa come semplice precetto o imperativo³². Di fatto, che il comando sia soltanto un momento *applicativo* e non *fondativo* della legge, risulta in maniera evidente dalla circostanza che questa è valida anche per una volontà santa (per esempio quella di Dio), per la quale non ha alcun senso parlare di un *precetto morale* al quale debba sottoporsi, dato che le sue «massime si accord[a]no necessariamente con le leggi dell'autonomia» (GMS, AA 04: 439; tr. it. Kant 1997b: 113). La legge si pone, cioè, su un livello *trascendentale*, mentre il comando su un livello *antropologico*. D'altra parte, e da diverso punto di vista, si può ancora ricordare che, come ricorda il saggio *Sul male radicale nella natura umana*, il fondamento morale dell'agire non sono il precetto, la regola, il comando, ma la *Gesinnung*, l'adesione del cuore ad un certo ordine ideale, nel quale i rapporti umani siano improntati ad una piena e completa reciprocità. Il *cuore* non può essere giudicato a partire dalle semplici *azioni*, perché il *Sinn* che noi conferiamo al nostro comportamento vale incomparabilmente di più rispetto alla norma a cui pure dobbiamo sottoporlo³³, sicché la legge non contiene soltanto il *fondamento* di ciò che ha da essere, ma è anche il fattore *motivante* la massima soggettiva; se le cose stessero diversamente, sarebbe possibile un'osservanza della *lettera* della legge tale da ignorarne completamente lo *spirito*, dunque, completamente priva di valore morale (cf. KpV, AA 05: 73; tr. it. Kant 2006: 157).

Il livello *trascendentale-pratico* non chiude, ma apre ad una particolare considerazione *pratico-teleologica*, perché il principio puro di determinazione del *mondo pratico*, del mondo degli scopi, dei desideri e delle volizioni, intanto può esistere, in quanto deriva dalla *volontà*, cioè della capacità di agire non in base a leggi, ma in base alla rappresentazione delle leggi (cf. GMS, AA 04: 412; tr. it. Kant 1997b: 55 s.): caratteristica che fa della volontà una facoltà dei fini (cf. KpV, AA 05: 58 f.; tr. it. Kant 2006: 127). La legge, quale legge della volontà autonoma, in grado di connettere sistematicamente gli arbitri dei singoli, non può certo *presupporre* un fine, pena la sua caduta nell'eteronomia,

³¹ Sul punto è assai utile vedere quanto scrive Ivaldo 2012: 25.

³² Lo mette bene in evidenza Paton 1971: 70. È questa la base a partire da cui Vorländer 2003 si contrappone alla convinzione che una concezione formale dell'etica, quale quella kantiana, sia condannata a restare prova di contenuti.

³³ Cf. RGV, AA 06: 30-31; tr. it., Kant 1995:30

ma deve *produrlo*, se deve potersi porre non solo come *norma esteriore*, ma anche come *movente interiore* dell'agente morale; in quanto legge valida incondizionatamente, poi, il fine che essa deve produrre è altrettanto incondizionato, ossia è un *fine in sé*, valido soltanto negativamente, perché esso va soltanto *rispettato* e non *realizzato* (cf. GMS, AA 04: 437; tr. it. Kant 1997b: 109). L'uomo, in quanto essere razionale, trova nella legge morale il fine incondizionato del suo agire, e proprio per questo si sa, egli stesso, fine incondizionato, dimodoché dispone di un oggetto incondizionatamente finalistico del proprio agire, l'uomo stesso, che è tale solo perché egli è anche *soggetto* di questo fine incondizionato, senza che ciò voglia dire che sia l'*origine* della legislazione morale, come si comprende anche dalla circostanza che egli non è solo soggetto *della* legge, ma anche soggetto *alla* legge.

Il *fine in sé* diventa, nella *Critica del Giudizio*, *scopo finale* perché l'angolo visuale dal quale viene osservato è diverso rispetto a quello della *Fondazione*, in forza della circostanza che il compito del pensiero teleologico è quello di comprendere se nella natura intesa come intero finalistico si dia qualcosa come uno scopo finale di un'intelligenza divina. Il punto d'innesto dell'analisi è cioè, in questo caso, empirico (la natura come dato), per innalzarsi solo in una seconda fase ad un punto di vista interamente trascendentale pratico; il concetto di scopo finale è quindi oggetto del Giudizio riflettente, pur essendo un concetto pratico, perché non può non riferirsi alla natura come suo correlato. Il concetto, pratico, di scopo finale, in altre parole, viene svolto nella teleologia naturale perché ad esso si giunge non per la via che va dal principio morale all'azione nel mondo, bensì, direttamente, dal rapporto che unisce una natura teleologicamente intesa, quale luogo favorevole alla realizzazione del principio morale, e uomo, quale essere libero, attraverso la mediazione offerta dalla causalità teleologicamente incondizionata che gli è propria³⁴. È a quest'altezza del discorso, dunque, che il ponte tra filosofia teoretica e filosofia pratica, natura e libertà può dirsi effettivamente edificato; esso però non dev'essere riguardato come una riassunzione dell'una nell'altra, ma come articolazione di un *passaggio* che non può fondarsi su principî legislativi, perché questi, nel dare vita ad un nuovo dominio della filosofia, porrebbero soltanto come una ulteriori confini tra le parti che compongono il sistema del sapere razionale.

Senza il concetto di scopo finale, in definitiva, la teleologia della natura «non avrebbe un vero principio» (KU, AA 05: 435; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 557), perché non è possibile pensare il mondo come un intero teleologico se il complesso delle cause finali non viene riguardato come in sé conchiuso, ed è per questo che di esso «non si può ancora domandare per qual fine (*quem in finem*) esiste» (KU, AA 05: 435; tr. it. Kant 1997a: 555), pena la sua degradazione a mezzo per il fine per il quale esiste. Paradossalmente, però, lo scopo finale, che consente di determinare in maniera oggettiva la catena delle cause finali naturali, non è un essere solo naturale, ma è l'uomo «in quanto soggetto della moralità»

³⁴ Brandt 2007: 485 ff., in merito all'assunzione, nella teleologia naturale, di un concetto determinante pratico come quello di scopo finale, sostiene, con argomentazioni non del tutto opposte, ma nemmeno del tutto sovrapponibili a quelle qui prodotte, il ruolo fondamentale del "Giudizio riflettente pratico", cui Kant accenna in KU, AA 05: 456.

(KU, AA 05: 435; tr. it. Kant 1997a:557), cioè in quanto soggetto ad un'altra legislazione, fondata sulla libertà. Lo scopo finale non può essere uno scopo naturale, perché solo uno scopo incondizionato conferisce senso al finalismo di una natura intesa come un *totalità* che tende all'organizzazione, che tale non potrebbe esser considerata in assenza di un *terminus ad quem* di tutta la sua organizzazione, che funga da riferimento nella sua opera per una suprema causa intelligente del mondo.

6. Conclusioni

È soltanto dopo aver svolto queste considerazioni intorno allo scopo finale della creazione che risulta chiaro perché il concetto di fine non possa essere costitutivo per la filosofia naturale. Il concetto di un mondo sensibile finalisticamente organizzato coinciderebbe con quello di una *volontà* che, nel porre i suoi scopi, li realizzasse sotto forma di *natura*. Poiché però una tale volontà non può essere la nostra volontà, che, in quanto causa naturale, può bensì *trasformare*, ma non *creare* il mondo naturale, e, in quanto causa libera, può bensì essere *incondizionata* nel determinarsi, ma non incondizionatamente potente nella produzione di effetti nel mondo sensibile, questa può essere soltanto una volontà *divina*, collocata in un mondo soprasensibile, al di là di tutte le nostre conoscenze. Kant ha chiamato il mondo soprasensibile, che conterrebbe il legame tra natura e libertà, in modi diversi nelle sue opere precedenti la *Critica del Giudizio: mondo morale*, inteso come un mondo intelligibile nel quale i fini siano posti in unità sistematica, alla maniera di un *regnum gratiae*, nel *Canone della ragion pura*, *regno dei fini* nella *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, *sommo bene* nella *Critica della ragion pratica*. La ricerca del legame tra natura e libertà risponde ad un'esigenza pratica più che teoretica: la legge morale, come forma unitaria di un molteplice, deve poter mirare al concetto di una totalità determinata, cioè a qualcosa che abbia la forma di un *mondo*; ma poiché questo mondo, che non è sensibile, non è, ma *ha da essere*, il punto di passaggio dal teoretico al pratico è oggetto di riflessione e non di piena conoscenza. Le riflessioni kantiane sullo scopo finale della creazione sono proprio per questo seguite da un paragrafo, il § 85, dedicato alla fisico-teologia, e, nei §§ 86-91, da una nuova formulazione di questioni etico-teologiche indispensabili per una piena e completa comprensione non tanto della teleologia naturale, che, come 'speciale' scienza della natura, gode della sua autonomia, ma di una visione compiutamente teleologica del reale, che risalga a Dio come suo fondamento mirante non alla conoscenza, ma alla saggezza³⁵.

L'interrogazione sullo scopo finale della creazione, in definitiva, consente di vedere nel Giudizio riflettente qualcosa di teoreticamente più ricco di un semplice strumento epistemologico per inquadrare nei giusti schemi conoscitivi la natura organica, anche se non permette certo di trovarvi un mezzo col quale estendere la nostra conoscenza alla sfera

³⁵ Goy 2018:234 ff. afferma, in un senso non troppo dissimile, che, sebbene solo regolativamente, la teleologia naturale può essere compresa come momento subordinato della teleologia morale e che a sua volta la libertà umana, in quanto propria di un essere finito, rimane una 'causa seconda' che, per essere pensata come pienamente inserita in un ordine di cause finali, ha bisogno di Dio come causa prima.

del soprasensibile; se vogliamo prestare fede alla lettera del testo kantiano, secondo cui il Giudizio è in grado di collegare, senza fonderle, natura e libertà, bisogna rivolgersi con molta attenzione alle pagine della *Metodologia del Giudizio teleologico*, nelle quali viene delineato il passaggio dalla teleologia naturale alla teleologia morale e, con ciò, viene contestualmente disegnato l'intero orizzonte della *teleologia rationis humanae*, che può essere saldamente fondata solo in grazia di un principio pratico incondizionato, anche se la sua fondatezza di principio non è la garanzia del suo compimento nel mondo, perché costruire un ponte tra natura e libertà non vuol dire che la natura divenga *tout court* conoscibile o esperibile come un regno dei fini. Tuttavia, la *teleologia rationis humanae* può dirsi unitaria nella sua polivocità perché, infine, unitariamente convergente nella sfera del pratico, pur se ad essa non completamente riducibile.

Bibliografia

Fonti

AA = *Kants Gesammelte Schriften*. Herausgegeben von der Königlich Preußischen (poi: Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin: Reimer (poi: De Gruyter), 1902 ff.

KrV A = *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Erste Auflage, Riga: Hartnoch, 1781

GMS = *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, AA, 04, ss. 385-464

IaG = *Idee zu einer allgemeinen Geschichte in weltbürgerlicher Absicht*, AA, VIII, ss. 15-32

MAN = *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*, AA, 04, ss. 465-566

MAM = *Muthmaßlicher Anfang der Menschengeschichte*, AA, 08, ss. 107-124

KrV B = *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, zweite Auflage, Riga: Hartnoch, 1787

KpV = *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, AA, 05 ss. 1-164

ÜGTP = *Über den Gebrauch teleologischer Principien in der Philosophie*, AA, 08, ss. 157-184

KU = *Kritik der Urtheilskraft*, AA, 05, ss. 165-486

RGV = *Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloßen Vernunft*, AA, 06, ss. 1-202

MS = *Die Metaphysik der Sitten*, AA, 06, ss. 203-494

PG = *Physische Geographie*, AA, 09, ss. 151-436

Refl = *Reflexionen*, AA 14-19

Traduzioni delle opere di Kant utilizzate

Kant (1991), *Scritti sul criticismo*, a cura di G. De Flaviis, Roma-Bari: Laterza

Kant (1995), *La religione entro i limiti della sola ragione*, a cura di A. Poggi, revisione della traduzione e introduzione di M. M. Olivetti, Roma-Bari: Laterza

Kant (1997a), *Critica del Giudizio*, a cura di A. Gargiulo, revisione della traduzione di V. Verra, intr. di P. D'Angelo, Roma-Bari: Laterza

CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS

International Journal of Philosophy

N.º 9, Junio 2019, pp. 309-331

ISSN: 2386-7655

Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.3253125

- Kant (1997b), *Fondazione della metafisica dei costumi*, a cura di F. Gonnelli, Roma-Bari: Laterza
- Kant (1998), *La metafisica dei costumi*, a cura di G. Vidari, revisione della traduzione e introduzione di M. Merker, Roma-Bari: Laterza
- Kant (2001), *Critica della ragione pura*, a cura di G. Colli, Milano: Adelphi
- Kant (2003), *Principi metafisica della scienza della natura*, a cura di P. Pecere, Milano: Bompiani
- Kant (2004), *Scritti di storia, politica, diritto*, a cura di F. Gonnelli, Roma-Bari: Laterza
- Kant (2006), *Critica della ragion pratica*, a cura di F. Capra, revisione della traduzione di E. Garin, introduzione di S. Landucci, Roma-Bari: Laterza

Letteratura secondaria

- Blumenbach J. F. (1781), *Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte*, Göttingen: Johann Christian Dieterich
- (1791), *Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte*, Göttingen: Johann Christian Dieterich (zweite Auflage)
- Brandt R. (2007), *Die Bestimmung des Menschen bei Kant*, Hamburg: Meiner
- Breitenbach A. (2009), *Die Analogie von Vernunft und Natur. Eine Umweltphilosophie nach Kant*, Berlin-New York: De Gruyter
- Cunico G. (2001), *Il millennio del filosofo: chiliasmo e teleologia morale in Kant*, Pisa: ETS
- Fisher M. (2007), *Kant's Explanatory Natural History: Generation and Classification of Organisms in Kant's Natural Philosophy*, in Huneman, P. (ed.), *Unedrstanding Purpose: Kant and the Philosophy of Biology* (pp. 102-121) Rochester: Rochester University Press
- Goy I. (2014), Goy, *Epigenetic Theories: Caspar Friedrich Wolff and Immanuel Kant*, in Goy, I. – Watkins, E. (eds.), *Kant's Theory of Biology* (pp. 43-58), Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter
- (2018), *Kants Theorie der Biologie*, Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter
- Guyer P. (2005), *From Nature to Morality: Kant's New Argument in the 'Critic of Teleological Judgement'*, in Guyer, P., *Kant's System of Nature and Freedom. Selected Essay* (pp. 314-342), Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Höffe O. (2018), *Der Mensch als Endzweck*, in Höffe, O. (hrsg.), *Immanuel Kant: Kritik der Urteilskraft*, zweite Auflage (pp. 273-290), Berlin-Boston: De Gruyter
- Ivaldo M. (2012), *Ragione pratica. Kant, Reinhold, Fichte*, Pisa: ETS
- Korsgaard C. M. (2011), *Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account*, in Beauchamp, T. L. - Frey, R. G. (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics*. (pp. 91-118), Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Luporini C. (1961), *Spazio e materia in Kant*, Firenze: Sansoni
- Marcucci S. (1972), *Aspetti epistemologici della finalità in Kant*, Le Monnier: Firenze

- Mathieu V. (1958), *La filosofia trascendentale e l'«Opus postumum» di Kant*, Torino: Edizioni di «Filosofia»
- McLaughlin P. (2003), *Newtonian Biology and Kant's Mechanistic Concept of Causality*, in Guyer, P. (ed.), *Kant's Critic of the Power of Judgement* (pp. 209-217), Oxford: Roman and Littlefield Publishers
- Maupertuis P. L. M. de (1745), *La Venus physique*, La Haye: Jean Martin Husson
- Paton H. J. (1971), *The Categorical Imperative. A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press
- Rossi P. (2003), *I segni del tempo: storia della terra e storia delle nazioni da Hooke a Vico*, Milano: Feltrinelli (I ed. 1979).
- Scaravelli L. (1973), *Scritti kantiani*, Firenze: La Nuova Italia
- Vorländer K. (2003), *Il formalismo dell'etica kantiana nella sua necessità e fecondità*, a cura di G. Mancuso, Milano: Unicopli
- Wolff C. F. (1764), *Theorie von der Generation in zwei Abhandlungen erklärt und bewiesen*, Berlin: Birnstiel
- Zammito J. H. (2006), *Kant's Early Views on Epigenesis. The Role of Maupertuis*, in Smith, J. E. H. (ed.), *The Problem of Animal Generation in Early Modern Philosophy*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2018), *The Gestation of German Biology. Philosophy and Physiology from Stahl to Schelling*, Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press



Kant, el (no)-conceptualismo y los juicios de gusto. Introducción a una discusión

Kant, (non)-conceptualism and judgments of taste. Introduction to a Discussion

MATÍAS OROÑO¹

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

El punto de partida de la discusión que aquí se presenta lo constituye el artículo “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto” que he publicado en el año 2017 en la revista *Con-textos Kantianos*. En aquel artículo presenté una serie de objeciones a la interpretación no conceptualista de los juicios de gusto defendida por Dietmar Heidemann en un trabajo publicado en el año 2016 (“Kant’s Aesthetic Nonconceptualism”).

Gracias a la lectura y a las observaciones realizadas por Silvia Di Sanza (*Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Argentina*), Pedro Stepanenko (*Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México*) y Luciana Martínez (*Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina*) ha sido posible revisar algunas cuestiones que he sostenido en el trabajo que publiqué en el año 2017 en *Con-textos Kantianos*. Los comentarios y críticas realizadas por Di Sanza, Stepanenko y Martínez son de una riqueza inmensa y demuestran que es posible mantener un diálogo filosófico profundo en torno a la filosofía de Immanuel Kant. Afortunadamente, el diálogo sigue en estado de apertura e invita a que sigamos pensando el rol de los conceptos en la teoría kantiana del conocimiento.

Silvia Di Sanza presenta un trabajo titulado “Comentario al artículo “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto” de Matías Oroño”. En su trabajo se revela un conocimiento profundo de la KU. La autora sugiere en su trabajo la posibilidad de fundamentar el conocimiento sobre un fundamento estético (no conceptual). Si bien adhiero a la interpretación sugerida por Di Sanza, considero que ello no implica necesariamente un punto a favor para la lectura no conceptualista.

¹ Universidad de Buenos Aires. E-mail: matiasoro@gmail.com

En “La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una objeción de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemann”, Pedro Stepanenko suscribe y complementa una de las objeciones que he formulado contra Heidemann, a saber: a partir de la irreductibilidad de las intuiciones a conceptos no debemos inferir que las intuiciones pueden representar objetos sin la capacidad conceptual. A partir de las observaciones de Stepanenko, he formulado el esbozo de un argumento que fortalece la interpretación conceptualista de los juicios de gusto a partir de la pretensión de validez universal que caracteriza a este tipo de enjuiciamiento.

Luciana Martínez, en “Kant y el no conceptualismo”, ha presentado una serie de observaciones que me permitieron reflexionar sobre el carácter representacional del juicio de gusto y sobre la irreductibilidad del gusto a un concepto determinado. En mi diálogo con Martínez, considero que ciertamente hay representación en el juicio de gusto y lo bello no puede reducirse a un concepto determinado. No obstante, creo que estos rasgos de la teoría kantiana del juicio de gusto abonan la interpretación conceptualista de la estética kantiana.

Finalmente, quisiera expresar mi profundo agradecimiento a Nuria Sánchez Madrid por haberme invitado a llevar a cabo esta discusión y a mis interlocutores, por su generosa predisposición al diálogo en torno a la filosofía de Kant.



Comentario al artículo “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto” de Matías Oroño

Comment to the paper Kant’s (Non)-conceptualism and judgments of taste of Matías Oroño

SILVIA DEL LUJÁN DI SANZA*

Universidad Nacional de San Martín (UNSAM), Argentina

Resumen

Sobre la base del carácter no cognitivo de los juicios estéticos Matías Oroño plantea una alternativa para mediar el debate entre conceptualismo y no conceptualismo. El autor se propone mostrar que, si bien los juicios de gusto no son juicios de conocimiento, sin embargo, aclaran aspectos relevantes de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento. Para ello, discute algunos tópicos de la interpretación de Heidemann. Consideraremos tres problemas: el carácter no cognitivo de los juicios estéticos; el significado del predicado bello y, finalmente, atenderemos a la propuesta de solución, a saber, la “referencia de los juicios estéticos al “conocimiento en general””.

Palabras clave

Kant-conceptualismo-no conceptualismo- juicios del gusto

Abstract

On the basis of the non-cognitive feature of every aesthetic judgment Matías Oroño proposes an alternative to mediate the debate between conceptualism and non-conceptualism. The author proposes to show that although taste judgments are not knowledge judgments, however they clarify relevant aspects of the Kantian theory of knowledge. Thus, he discusses some topics of Heidemann's interpretation. We will consider three issues: the non-cognitive feature of aesthetic judgments; the meaning of the beautiful as predicate and, finally, we will focus on to the proposed solution, namely, the reference of aesthetic judgments to " knowledge in general ".

* Silvia del Lujan Di Sanza es profesora Asociada a la cátedra de Filosofía Moderna de la Universidad Nacional de San Martín, Argentina. Email: sildisanza@gmail.com

Keywords

Kant- conceptualism-nonconceptualism- judgments of taste

Con base en el debate contemporáneo, entre conceptualismo y no-conceptualismo, en particular atendiendo a aquellos autores que encuentran en el pensamiento de Kant, elementos significativos para alimentar ambas posiciones, Oroño se centra en la teoría kantiana de los juicios de gusto para ofrecer una alternativa dentro del marco de esta discusión. Dicha alternativa se basa en el carácter no cognitivo de los juicios estéticos y se propone mostrar la potencialidad de los mismos en la resolución de esa tensión: conceptualismo/no-conceptualismo. Para ello discute algunos tópicos de la interpretación de Heidemann, tal como se plantean en el artículo *Kant's Aesthetic Nonconceptualism*, analiza el carácter cognitivo aunque no-conceptual que este autor le atribuye a los juicios estéticos y plantea su propia lectura de la teoría kantiana de los juicios de gusto en el marco del debate con el no-conceptualismo. Se propone mostrar que, si bien los juicios de gusto no son juicios de conocimiento, sin embargo, iluminan importantes aspectos de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento.

En este diálogo con el artículo de Oroño, pondremos de relieve algunos temas presentes en las argumentaciones que ofrece el autor a lo largo de su trabajo, particularmente significativas por el rol que juegan en la teoría kantiana de los juicios estéticos.

1. Cuestiones en torno al carácter no cognitivo de los juicios estéticos

1. Frente a la interpretación que realiza Heidemann acerca del carácter cognitivo de los juicios del gusto, Oroño ofrece su posición acerca de la cooperación entre intuiciones y conceptos, como elementos heterogéneos necesarios para la posibilidad del conocimiento. Al respecto señala que “efectivamente, la intuición jamás se reduce al concepto en el marco del idealismo kantiano”. En el caso peculiar de los conceptos empíricos, si bien ellos operan como condiciones de inteligibilidad de lo que el entendimiento deja sin determinar, son productos de la abstracción, por lo que no dan cuenta del singular en su unidad. En el marco de la tercera Crítica considero que la habilitación del descenso hasta el singular y su integración al sistema de la razón se realiza mediante el principio transcendental de conformidad formal a fin, que opera como el principio de la sistematicidad de los conocimientos empíricos y no sólo como la condición de inteligibilidad de los conceptos empíricos. El principio de la afinidad transcendental de los fenómenos para su operatividad epistémica del mundo empírico debe descansar en el principio conformidad a fin, “principio de la legalidad de lo contingente”, que garantiza, en cuanto principio sistemático, la unidad de las leyes empíricas según la forma de un sistema

racional¹ y, con ello, se constituye en la condición de posibilidad del conocimiento de la naturaleza en la unidad de sus leyes transcendentales y empíricas. En esta línea de argumentación destaco la posición de Christel Fricke al respecto. Ella considera, que si bien el principio lógico de conformidad formal a fin –al cual denomina finalidad epistémica– es una condición necesaria y suficiente para la formación de los conceptos empíricos, sin embargo,

esa unidad de la naturaleza contiene más que la mera posibilidad de formación de conceptos empíricos. Contiene, también, la unidad sistemática de los conceptos empíricos, la posibilidad de ordenarlos en una pirámide (dicho metafóricamente), en la que, la extensión mayor o menor de los respectivos conceptos sirve como principio de ese ordenamiento.²

El problema del carácter no cognitivo de los juicios estéticos y, sin embargo, su legalidad regida por el principio transcendental de conformidad a fin, exige resolver la relación entre ambas formas de la finalidad formal: lógica y estética, especialmente, porque Kant indica en el §23 el carácter revelador que posee la belleza con respecto a esa unidad sistemático-formal de la naturaleza, y lo indica mediante el concepto de técnica de la naturaleza. La belleza es una señal o guiño que la naturaleza nos hace respecto a su adecuación con la forma en actúan las facultades de conocimiento, es decir, con los procesos de aprehensión y composición de la imaginación y el entendimiento. Si la belleza es una señal registrada en el ánimo, de la condición subjetiva de todo juicio, a saber, el acuerdo de imaginación y entendimiento considerando la diferencia de sus funciones y, también, de la necesaria integración de ambas funciones para la producción del conocimiento, en este sentido, cabría pensar, más bien, la base estética de todo juicio de conocimiento, más que el carácter cognitivo del juicio estético.³ En el §9 Kant se refiere a la conciencia del fundamento de un juicio estético no como conciencia intelectual sino estética,⁴ cuestión que, por un lado, abona el carácter no conceptual del fundamento en el que se basa el juicio estético, a la vez que, por otro, abre a nuevos problemas. En este punto me parece interesante considerar algunos desarrollos del problema que aportan complejidad al mismo. Andrea Faggion, por ejemplo, se plantea la pregunta *¿Pueden las solas intuiciones representar objetos?* Y la plantea como equivalente a la formulación contemporánea *¿existen contenidos no conceptuales?* El término contenido, considerado como un estado con intencionalidad, se puede pensar, en términos kantianos, como un

¹ Jochen Bojanowski (2008:33) considera que el problema de la sistematicidad y legalidad del conocimiento empírico es el verdadero problema que Kant aborda con el principio transcendental de conformidad a fin y, no en cambio, el de la unidad de la naturaleza en sus leyes transcendentales y empíricas. A mi criterio, ambos problemas son inherentes al principio de conformidad formal a fin como principio de la unidad sistemática. Este tema también lo traté en mi libro *Arte y Naturaleza* (2010:77).

² Christel Fricke (2008:135).

³ Un libro interesante al respecto es el de Fiona Hughes, personalmente consideré su tesis en mi artículo “Kant y Arendt. La facultad de juzgar o el discernimiento después de “la época madura de la historia”. En: *Anuario de Filosofía Jurídica y Social*. Editor Matín Laclau. Asociación Argentina de Derecho Comparado. Sección Teoría General. Editorial Abeledo Perrot. Septiembre 2017.

⁴ KU, AA 05:219.

conocimiento, esto es, una representación con conciencia que refiere a objeto y, en ese sentido, marca el carácter de intencionalidad. Dado que el conocimiento incluye intuiciones y conceptos, admitir un contenido no conceptual sería una afirmación trivial, ya que la intuición es uno de los elementos dentro del género conocimiento. La polémica no se centra en la existencia de un contenido que, en sí mismo, no es conceptual sino en su existencia como un contenido que es independiente del contenido conceptual.⁵ Puesta esta premisa, el autor, presenta la mencionada independencia, según dos posiciones diferentes: el enunciado no-conceptualista y el contenido esencialmente no conceptualista. El autor defiende en el artículo una teoría kantiana del conocimiento conceptualista de caracteres propios y peculiares, que acepta un enunciado no conceptualista, pero no contenidos no conceptuales. También, Joao Carlos Brum Torres, en su artículo *Notas sobre el concepto kantiano de “concepto empírico”*, pone en cuestión la teoría kantiana del concepto como representación recurriendo a la teoría de la posesión de conceptos presente en la reseña que Fodor realiza del libro de Peacocke, *A study of concepts*. De acuerdo con esta última, “lo que hace a un concepto ser el verdadero concepto que es, son las condiciones de su posesión”. El propósito del artículo consiste en mostrar cómo puede ser ubicado el análisis del concepto de “concepto empírico de Kant”, con respecto a los problemas de la cognición conceptual, que son puestos de relieve en las nuevas teorías. A su vez, también, evaluar si corresponde ubicar el análisis que realiza Kant, en la mencionada posición clásica. La complejidad reside en que los juicios estéticos son juicios singulares cuyo sujeto implica la intuición de un objeto individual y tal aprehensión enjuiciada estéticamente es no conceptual, aunque produce intensa actividad conceptual.

2. Si bien, tal como afirma Oroño, “la caracterización kantiana del juicio de gusto implica una clara delimitación entre los juicios estéticos y los juicios de conocimiento”,⁶ debemos reconocer que esa delimitación es, para el mismo Kant un esforzado trabajo que se propone, especialmente, en el primer momento de la Analítica. Allí busca mostrar que “hay juicios estéticos” y la manera de hacerlo es diferenciándolos de los juicios lógicos de conocimiento, tanto respecto a la base en que se fundamentan ambos, como respecto al modo de su referencia al objeto, ya sea directo para determinarlo o indirecto como resultado de la reflexión. Se trata de juicios que no se proponen como juicios lógicos, es decir, que no tienen su fundamento en conceptos del entendimiento, aunque, sin embargo, son juicios y, por ende, señala Kant, “en ellos siempre está contenida, a pesar de todo, una relación con el entendimiento”.⁷ El problema reside en especificar qué significa esa referencia al entendimiento, en el caso de los juicios estéticos, porque sin negar su pertenencia al entendimiento, en cuanto este constituye la facultad de los juicios, sin embargo, no están directamente referido al objeto sino a la actividad que realizan las facultades del sujeto. Lo que sucede es que, en ellos, se desplaza la base del juicio hacia las

⁵ Andrea Faggion (2015:92) “Argumentaré que la teoría kantiana del conocimiento es una teoría conceptualista sofisticada que acepta un estado intencional (*state*) no conceptualista pero no contenidos no conceptuales”.

⁶ Matías Oroño (2017:95).

⁷ KU, AA 05:203. Nota al pie § 1.

condiciones subjetivas de la facultad de juzgar, y este desplazamiento es el que se explicitará a través de los distintos momentos del juicio del gusto. La facultad de los juicios es el entendimiento, pero la facultad de juzgar dictaminará cual será el fundamento en el que se apoyará el entendimiento para formular ese juicio. Por lo tanto, en el caso de los juicios estéticos, la referencia al entendimiento que efectúa la facultad de juzgar no es para la determinación del objeto en cuanto objeto, no es para su conocimiento en cuanto objeto, ni siquiera para el conocimiento de la subjetividad empírica del sujeto que juzga, aun cuando en su juicio se remita a sentir una actividad que acontece en él. En este punto cabe la sospecha que plantea Oroño respecto a la necesaria condición cognitiva de un juicio calificado de no conceptual. A mi criterio forzar a pensar el juicio estético como un juicio de conocimiento, por el hecho de atribuirle un carácter no-conceptual, es, en el marco de la tercera Crítica, una simplificación del problema. Y, sólo centrándonos en la Analítica, sin considerar la dialéctica de la Facultad de Juzgar estética, considero que una interpretación del §35 es decisiva para este punto de la discusión, puesto que allí Kant señala que en el juicio estético no se trata de la subsunción de intuiciones bajo conceptos, sino de la subsunción de la facultad de las intuiciones bajo la facultad de los conceptos, es decir que se trata de una subsunción de actividades bajo la condición subjetiva propia de la facultad de juzgar:

Dado que aquí no hay ningún concepto del objeto en el fundamento del juicio, este sólo puede consistir en la subsunción de la misma imaginación (en una representación por medio de la cual se da un objeto) bajo la condición mediante la cual, en general, el entendimiento va de la intuición a los conceptos” [...] “En tanto que la facultad de juzgar subjetiva, el gusto contiene un principio de subsunción, pero no de las intuiciones bajo conceptos, sino de la facultad de las intuiciones o representaciones (esto es, la imaginación) bajo la facultad de los conceptos (esto es, el entendimiento), en la medida en que la primera coincide en su libertad con el primero en su legalidad.⁸

Esto significa, por un lado, que para dirimir el problema conceptualismo-no conceptualismo, primero hay que desentrañar este núcleo, para evaluar la pertinencia de la lectura que homologa el “sin conceptos” a no conceptos presentes en la intuición del objeto singular, a diferencia de “sin conceptos” como fundamento no conceptual de la síntesis del juicio según una regla indeterminada. Frente al pensar por determinación de objeto, o sea, frente al conocimiento, se introduce con el juicio estético, el pensar por indeterminación, en base al sólo sentir las fuerzas del ánimo. Entonces hay actividad conceptual, y mucha, pero sin determinarse según un concepto que restringiría la actividad a un conocimiento en particular. Por eso, en el juicio estético no es de interés atender al objeto en cuanto tal, saber qué es, por qué es de esa manera, cuál es ese contenido al que refiere la representación, sino el placer en la forma dibujada por la imaginación, siga ella la regla que siga, puesto que, en cuanto se quiere hallar la regla según la cual se determinó esa forma, ya no estamos juzgando acerca de la belleza. Aunque, como bien señala Oroño, las

⁸ KU, AA 05:287.

categorías siempre están actuando de lo contrario nada con sentido se nos haría presente, ese sentido no se decide desde la determinación categorial, puesto que, si se atiende al objeto, el juicio no es estético, o lo que es lo mismo, se pierde la belleza.⁹ El párrafo antes mencionado permite mostrar la inconsistencia de ese forzamiento: si es no-conceptual es cognitivo y, también más allá de eso, muestra una retracción del pensamiento hacia las condiciones de todo juicio. Tal como señala Oroño la pregunta clave es, entonces, “en qué sentido la evaluación estética implica una determinación categorial”, porque el predicado bello se basa en el sentimiento de placer. En la lectura que hace de Heidemann, nuestro autor afirma:

Y este sentimiento sólo puede ser concebido de acuerdo con un ordenamiento categorial, aunque “sin un concepto del objeto” (KU, AA 05: 217), (Cfr. Heidemann 2016, p. 125). Aquí el autor parece referirse al libre juego entre la imaginación y el entendimiento que desempeña un rol crucial en la teoría kantiana sobre los juicios de gusto, pero por el momento no explica en qué sentido la evaluación estética implica una determinación categorial (aunque diferente a la que presentan los juicios lógicos de conocimiento).¹⁰

Al respecto, considero que también la referencia al sentimiento de placer y displacer como concebible de acuerdo con un ordenamiento categorial, conlleva el examen de la pertinencia o no del uso que hace Kant de la tabla de los juicios como hilo conductor de los cuatro momentos del juicio estético.

2. ¿Qué significa el predicado bello en el juicio estético: “este x es bello”?

Con respecto a la conclusión que extrae Oroño en su crítica al segundo argumento¹¹ de Heidemann (el argumento referido a la universal comunicabilidad de ambos tipos de juicios como una característica a favor del carácter cognitivo de los juicios estéticos), en la que señala: “Por tanto, en el caso de un juicio de gusto la universal comunicabilidad no implica una referencia al objeto sobre el cual se expresa tal juicio, sino sobre el estado mental del sujeto”,¹² aunque coincido con su afirmación agregaré un elemento a la discusión.

La peculiaridad de los juicios de gusto, con respecto a su cantidad, es que son juicios singulares del tipo “Este S es P”, en los que se compara al objeto con el sentimiento de placer y displacer inmediatamente y no mediante conceptos (§8). El carácter de inmediatez de dicha referencia marca la diferencia con los juicios lógicos de conocimiento en los que se requiere la mediación conceptual. El problema radica en precisar cómo está presente el objeto en un juicio puro de gusto. El juicio estético es una afirmación que se efectúa directamente sobre el sujeto, sobre la disposición de las facultades y, sólo indirectamente sobre el objeto. Sin embargo, para algunos autores, el juicio estético se

⁹ KU, AA 05:215: “Si se juzgan los objetos sólo mediante conceptos, entonces se pierde toda representación de la belleza”.

¹⁰ Matías Oroño (2017:97).

¹¹ Punto 2.2. “Sobre el pretendido carácter cognitivo de los juicios de gusto”.

¹² *Ibid.*

refiere expresamente a un objeto “este x es bello”, y sólo a “este”, por eso, constituye un juicio sobre el objeto, el que, a la vez, remite a “otro juicio” implícito en el predicado, que refiere al conjunto de los sujetos juzgantes:

Este *segundo juicio*, incrustado, por así decirlo, en el primero (o en el predicado del primero), y que solo la crítica del gusto trae a la claridad discursiva, es un juicio ya no sobre el objeto, sino sobre los sujetos que juzgan, es decir, los sujetos que aprueban el juicio.¹³

Con esta afirmación se defiende una teoría del “doble juicio” constitutivo del juicio estético, cuya justificación reside en la Analítica, puesto que el objetivo de Kant, a través de los distintos momentos, es el de determinar el significado del predicado “bello”. A nuestro criterio el problema de la atribución del predicado bello a un objeto, en un juicio afirmativo del tipo “S es P”, está vinculado al lenguaje, puesto que, según Kant, lo bello es atribuido al objeto sólo de forma indirecta, como reflejo de lo que acontece en las facultades de representación del sujeto, y esta atribución al objeto está planteada como una especie de subrepción del lenguaje. Por eso, en el §6 Kant dice que: Hablará, por lo tanto, de lo bello, como si la belleza fuera una cualidad del objeto y el juicio fuera lógico (como si constituyera, mediante conceptos del objeto, un conocimiento del mismo), aunque sólo es estético y no encierra más que una relación de la representación del objeto con el sujeto.¹⁴ Dicho de otra manera, el hablar de la belleza como una propiedad del objeto es la consecuencia del modo en que el lenguaje opera la referencialidad entre los términos, puesto que debe mencionar objetivamente, aún aquello que no es un atributo inherente al concepto del objeto. Oroño remarca que, Heidemann identifica contenidos no conceptuales con representaciones que conllevan una referencia a objetos sin presuponer actividad conceptual. Al respecto, consideramos que, si el predicado bello, se contara entre este tipo de representaciones, quedaría directamente vinculado al objeto y no, tal como señala Kant, indirectamente, mediante un sentimiento que surge de la apreciación inmediata del juego de las facultades. De ahí que se debe pensar la función del predicado “como si” se atribuyera al objeto.

Una cuestión que quiero señalar en este punto, pero que es aplicable también a todo el artículo, es la opción de traducción que toma Oroño, con respecto al término alemán “*Gemut*”. A mi criterio, en la tercera Crítica y, especialmente en el contexto de esta discusión acerca del conceptualismo y el no-conceptualismo, traducirlo por mente, hace perder el carácter integrador del sentir, el pensar y el querer, que posee el término “*Gemüt*” y tiende a indicar una función más bien cognitiva, con la pérdida semántica que tal reducción conlleva, particularmente en la discusión que emprende Oroño en su artículo.

Con respeto al tercer argumento, nuestro autor, se inclina por diferenciar “validez universal” de “pretensión a la validez universal”, cuestión que me parece correcta, pero,

¹³ *Ibid*

¹⁴ KU, AA 05:211.

además, entiendo que lo que está en juego es el concepto de universalidad subjetiva o estética, que es un concepto novedoso y extraño a la vez, el cual es propuesto a diferencia de la universalidad lógica u objetiva, propia del conocimiento científico.

3. La propuesta de solución en el contexto del (no)-conceptualismo: la referencia de Kant al “conocimiento en general”.

Para abrir una brecha en el debate del no conceptualismo y mostrar su propuesta acerca de la función de los juicios estéticos en ese debate, Oroño recurre a la noción de libre juego de las facultades (puesta de relieve por Kant para indicar la dinámica referencial de las representaciones en el juicio estético) para marcar su relación con la idea de “conocimiento en general”:

Hasta aquí he señalado los motivos por los cuales no estoy de acuerdo con la interpretación no-conceptualista de Heidemann sobre los juicios de gusto. Sin embargo, creo que la teoría kantiana sobre lo bello puede arrojar cierta luz sobre el debate en torno al (no)conceptualismo. En este sentido, considero crucial la explicación kantiana del libre juego y su vínculo con lo que se denomina conocimiento en general.¹⁵

El autor, en su argumentación sostiene la idea de la universal comunicabilidad como fundamento del juicio estético y se apoya para ello en el §9. Una primera cuestión, es considerar que esta idea aparece por primera vez allí, sin previa explicación,¹⁶ o al menos no está presente en los párrafos anteriores, y requiere al menos una justificación. Considero que es orientador pensarla como una consecuencia del significado del par: validez privada-validez pública. El vínculo entre publicidad, comunicación y conocimiento lo encontramos planteado en la tradición filosófica ya desde Aristóteles, y por el mismo Kant, en “Respuesta a la pregunta: ¿qué es la ilustración? También reafirma en los §§ 39 y 40, de la Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar, pero no antes. Se trata de una analogía entre la comunicabilidad de los juicios de conocimiento y la de los juicios estéticos, o sea de la comunicabilidad de una representación cuya regla no es un concepto. Entendemos que, por eso, Oroño propone al juicio estético como una alternativa dentro de la no-conceptualidad, claro que, como se ve en su artículo, por razones diferentes a las del autor que él mismo ha comentado.

Dado que la idea de comunicabilidad universal tiene como modelo al conocimiento, la misma analogía tiene que conducir a mostrar la semejanza perfecta de la relación que se plantea mediante la comparación entre ambos tipos de juicios. Ahí es donde adquiere relevancia la idea de “conocimiento en general”, en la medida en que tal noción prescinde de la determinación a un conocimiento y sólo se piensa la pura relación, como requisito de

¹⁵ Matías Oroño (2017:101).

¹⁶ Recogí esta observación de Allison en mi trabajo “Kant ¿una estética negativa? Reflexiones sobre la función de la negación en el primer y segundo momento de la *Analítica de lo bello* en la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética* de I. Kant” (2018:190): “Tal como se señala en la literatura que aborda la cuestión, este concepto no tiene antecedentes en los momentos anteriores, más bien irrumpe aquí, pero al hacerlo abre otra línea de fundamentación de la universalidad “sin concepto” que se centrará en la concordancia de todos los juzgantes en la idea de un sentido común”.

todo juicio. La pura relación que se piensa es la de una facultad activa (Oroño señala que se trata de la facultad de los conceptos) y una facultad receptiva (del material intuitivo), actividad concordante que determina la posibilidad del conocimiento. Entonces, con el concepto de “conocimiento en general vinculado” a la concordancia de las facultades ¿se buscaría desplazar el hallazgo de Kant acerca de los juicios estéticos a la teoría del conocimiento, una suerte de camino inverso al empleado por el filósofo, al plantear la analogía entre juicios lógicos y juicios estéticos? Oroño expresa: “En suma, la noción kantiana de conocimiento en general que encontramos a la base de la crítica de gusto constituye un momento crucial para responder a la pregunta sobre el (no)conceptualismo en la teoría kantiana del conocimiento”. Y su respuesta final es que:

el libre juego entre la imaginación y el entendimiento que se requiere para todo conocimiento en general revela que Kant está lejos de ser no-conceptualista. Es cierto que lo bello no reposa sobre conceptos determinados. No obstante, un análisis detenido nos muestra que su teoría sobre los juicios de gusto no nos conduce a una posición no-conceptualista.¹⁷

Entonces, mostrar que es inviable el no-conceptualismo de Heideman ¿deja como decantado, que en los juicios estéticos encontraríamos una razón para el conceptualismo kantiano, razón que podría desplazarse a la teoría del conocimiento? Pero sin llegar a esto y dentro de la misma lógica del artículo, atendiendo al señalamiento de Oroño al final del mismo: “Asimismo, he indicado que la solución a la clave de la crítica del gusto revela aspectos de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento que se sitúan lejos del no-conceptualismo, pues todo conocimiento en general supone la colaboración entre entendimiento e imaginación, es decir, entre conceptos e intuiciones”,¹⁸ considero que en el debate con el no-conceptualismo, y también con el conceptualismo, la concepción de la imaginación productiva es una clave necesaria a desentrañar. Primero, porque en los juicios de gusto es la imaginación la que pone al entendimiento bajo su dirección y, segundo, porque la actividad libre de la imaginación -ella es mencionada por Kant como autoactiva (*Selbsttätig*)¹⁹ en la composición de formas- provoca la producción de reglas que no existen como previamente dadas. El aporte que puedan hacer los juicios estéticos puros a la teoría kantiana del conocimiento depende de una inversión de la analogía usada por Kant y de la pertinencia o no de plantear en el pensamiento de Kant la existencia de una fundamentación estética del conocimiento.²⁰ Pero no sabemos si esto resuelve u oscurece la posibilidad del debate conceptualismo no-conceptualismo, en la teoría kantiana del conocimiento.

¹⁷ Matías Oroño (2017:102).

¹⁸ Matías Oroño, (2017:103).

¹⁹ KU, AA 05: 240.

²⁰ Fiona Hughes (2007) ha considerado relevante esta hipótesis y ha expuesto las razones de su plausibilidad.

Bibliografía

Edición Académica: *Kant's gesammelte Schriften*. Hrsg. von der Königlich Preußischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Walter de Gruyter, Berlín und Leipzig, desde 1902.

Allison, Henry (2001) *Kant's Theory of Taste. A Reading of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*. Cambridge University Press.

Böhme, Gernöt (1999) “Pfeffergärten auf Sumatra”. En: *Kants Kritik der Urteilskraft in neuer Sicht*, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main.

Bojanowski, Jochen (2008) “Kant über das Prinzip der Einheit von theoretischer und praktischer Philosophie (Einleitung I-V)”. En: *Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Hrsg. Otfried Höffe, Berlín, Akademie Verlag.

Brum Torres, Joao Carlos (2015) “Notas sobre el concepto kantiano de “concepto empírico””. En: *Kant's Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen*. Edited by/ Herausgegeben von Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden y Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Berlín-Boston, Walter de Gruyter, pp. 73-90.

Di Sanza, Silvia del Luján (2010) *Arte y Naturaleza. El concepto de Técnica de la Naturaleza en la Kritik der Urteilskraft de I. Kant*, Buenos Aires, Ediciones del Signo.

Di Sanza, Silvia del Luján (2017) “Kant y Arendt. La facultad de juzgar o el discernimiento después de “la época madura de la historia””. En: *Anuario de Filosofía Jurídica y Social*. Editor Matín Laclau. Asociación Argentina de Derecho Comparado. Sección Teoría General. Editorial Abeledo Perrot.

Di Sanza, Silvia del Luján (2018) “Kant ¿una estética negativa? Reflexiones sobre la función de la negación en el primer y segundo momento de la *Analítica de lo bello* en la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética* de I.Kant. En: *Los Rostros de la Razón: Immanuel Kant desde Hispanoamérica*, Volumen III: *Filosofía de la Religión, de la Historia y Crítica de la Facultad de Juzgar: Estética y Teleología*. Coeditores Gustavo Leyva (UAM-Iztapalapa). Álvaro Peláez (UAM-Cuajimalpa), Pedro Stepanenko (UNAM–Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas), México, UAM-Iztapalapa. México, Grupo Editorial Siglo XXI, pp.177-200.

Fricke, Christel (2008). Kants Deduktion der reinen ästhetischen Urteile (§§30-38). En: *Immanuel Kant. Kritik der Urteilskraft*, Hrsg. Otfried Höffe, Berlín, Akademie Verlag.

Faggion, Andrea (2015) “¿Pueden las solas intuiciones representar objetos?”. En: *Kant's Lectures/Kants Vorlesungen*. Edited by/ Herausgegeben von Bernd Dörflinger, Claudio La Rocca, Robert Louden y Ubirajara Rancan de Azevedo Marques, Berlín-Boston, Walter de Gruyter, pp. 91-103.

Hughes, Fiona (2007) *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology. Form and World*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Oroño, Matías (2017) “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto”. En: *Con-Textos Kantianos. International Journal of Philosophie*. Nro. 6, ISSN 2386-7655, pp. 93-105.



**La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una
objección de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemann**

*The persistence of concepts. A commentary on a Matías Oroño's
objection against Dietmar Heidemann*

PEDRO STEPANENKO*

Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México

Resumen

Después de hacer un breve recuento del origen y de las confusiones del debate acerca del contenido no-conceptual de nuestra experiencia tanto en la tradición analítica como en las interpretaciones de la filosofía teórica de Kant, suscribo y complemento una de las objeciones de Oroño 2017 al no-conceptualismo de Heidemann 2016: que no debemos inferir a partir de la irreductibilidad de las intuiciones a conceptos que las intuiciones puedan representar objetos sin la actividad conceptual.

Palabras clave

Representación, contenido, concepto, intuición, Kant

Abstract

After providing a very brief survey of the origins and confusions, both in Analytic Philosophy as well as in Kantian Philosophy, regarding the debate of the nonconceptual content of our experience, I endorse and complement one of Oroño's (2017) objections to Heidemann's (2016) nonconceptualism, namely, that we should not infer from the irreducibility of intuitions to concepts that intuitions can represent objects without conceptual activity.

Keywords

* Pedro Stepanenko es investigador titular del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México y director del Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas de la UNAM. E-mail de contacto: pedrostepanenko@gmail.com

Representation, content, concept, intuition, Kant

Desde la publicación de *Mind and World* de John McDowell en 1994 ha tenido lugar un debate muy importante para quienes estudiamos la filosofía teórica de Kant. A pesar de que McDowell no era un experto en Kant cuando escribió ese libro, ni se convirtió en uno de ellos cuando rectificó algunas objeciones en contra de Kant en las Woodbridge Lectures, su pensamiento estaba claramente influido e incluso inspirado por dos grandes filósofos que reinterpretaron a Kant desde la metafísica, la epistemología y la filosofía de la mente contemporáneas: Peter F. Strawson y Wilfrid Sellars. McDowell recurrió a Kant en *Mind and World* para hacer comprensible la relación de justificación entre percepciones y creencias, las cuales deben poder expresarse en forma de juicios, para utilizar los términos de Kant. ¿Cómo es posible que cosas tan distintas como una percepción y un juicio tengan una relación de justificación? ¿Qué es lo que comparten y le permite a la percepción ser una razón para aceptar el juicio? La respuesta de McDowell es que la percepción ya está articulada conceptualmente, de suerte que ya forma parte de lo que Sellars llamaba “el espacio lógico de las razones”, el espacio en el cual damos y pedimos razones. Por ello, las percepciones pueden ser razones para aceptar creencias.

Las críticas de los filósofos de la tradición analítica a la manera en que McDowell aborda ahí la relación de justificación entre percepciones y creencias no se dejaron esperar debido a que muchos de ellos se encontraban defendiendo, desde hacía algunos años, la idea de que las percepciones pueden representar estados de cosas en el mundo sin hacer uso de conceptos.¹ La manera en que McDowell presenta la relación de justificación entre percepciones y creencias podía entenderse, entonces, como una maniobra para ofrecer un argumento en contra de esa posición, un argumento en el debate sobre el alcance de los conceptos en los procesos cognitivos. Este debate es, de hecho, el contexto en el cual surge la poco afortunada expresión “contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia”.² Mucha tinta ha corrido desde entonces en torno al asunto de si las percepciones y en general la experiencia requieren conceptos para representar. Sin embargo, la discusión se ha ido enfocando, afortunadamente, en un problema específico: si hay estados mentales cuyo contenido represente el mundo de cierta manera aún cuando la persona a quien se atribuyen esos estados mentales no tenga los conceptos que le permitan determinar ese contenido. (Bermúdez y Cahen 2015)

La reacción de los kantianos a la posición de McDowell en *Mind and World* tardó más en ocurrir. Después de todo, el conceptualismo que defendía era una interpretación de Kant respaldada en el ámbito anglosajón por figuras de la talla de Peter F. Strawson o Wilfrid Sellars. Pero en 2005, Robert Hanna, quien había publicado un libro muy interesante sobre los orígenes kantianos de muchas de las preocupaciones de la filosofía analítica (Hanna 2001), publicó un artículo (“Kant and Nonconceptual Content”) en donde

¹ Una excelente selección de trabajos sobre este asunto se encuentra en Gunther 2003

² Digo que se trata de una expresión poco afortunada porque ha propiciado la confusión entre aquello que es representado por una entidad mental y los elementos con los cuales cuenta esa entidad para representar algo. Al respecto, véase: Stalnaker 2003

presenta una serie de razones que la filosofía de Kant puede ofrecer a favor de una posición no-conceptualista, más o menos relacionada con la posición correspondiente del debate contemporáneo. Hanna reconoce que tanto la posición conceptualista como la no-conceptualista pueden inspirarse en la filosofía de Kant, de suerte que el debate mismo se remonta a las distintas interpretaciones que pueden obtenerse de esta filosofía. Sin embargo, él adopta una posición definitivamente no-conceptualista, apelando principalmente a la inmediatez y a la singularidad de las intuiciones. También presenta variaciones del no-conceptualismo dependiendo del grado de autonomía que se le otorgue a las intuiciones frente a los conceptos. No tiene caso comentar aquí esta diversidad. Sólo me interesa señalar que a partir de la publicación de ese artículo se han sucedido muchas colaboraciones que han enriquecido la pluralidad de posiciones tanto del no-conceptualismo como del conceptualismo en el marco de las interpretaciones de Kant. (véase Allais 2016) Desgraciadamente, se han generado también muchas confusiones por traer y llevar argumentos de una tradición a otra, de suerte que uno tiene la impresión de que es necesario revisar constantemente nociones básicas como las de contenido, representación, percepción, experiencia y, por supuesto, las de intuición y concepto. Una desventaja de esta discusión frente al debate en la filosofía analítica contemporánea es que el problema a tratar no se ha circunscrito lo suficiente y su planteamiento se ha quedado en términos muy generales: si las intuiciones, las percepciones o la experiencia requieren la intervención de los conceptos para representar, sin especificar si nos referimos a cualquier concepto, a los conceptos empíricos, a las categorías o a los que necesitaría la persona para determinar el contenido de sus percepciones.

Uno de los participantes más activos de este debate kantiano ha sido Dietmar H. Heidemann, profesor de la Universidad de Luxemburgo, quien ha editado un libro con artículos en torno a la posición de Hanna, publicados mayoritariamente en *International Journal of Philosophical Studies*. También ha colaborado en otra colección de textos sobre no-conceptualismo kantiano, editada por Dennis Schulting en 2016. En esta contribución, Heidemann se propone defender el no-conceptualismo a partir del análisis de la experiencia estética o del juicio de gusto. Este texto ha sido comentado y, desde mi punto de vista, criticado de manera acertada por Matías Oroño de la Universidad de Buenos Aires, en el No. 6 de la revista *Con-textos Kantianos*. Lo que me parece más importante de su crítica es un asunto básico relativo a la relación entre intuiciones y conceptos.

Heidemann considera en ese texto que los contenidos no-conceptuales deben estar estructurados judicativamente para ser cognitivamente relevantes, ya que la discusión con el conceptualista no tiene que ver con aceptar la existencia de procesos causales al nivel sensorial de nuestra percepción, en los cuales no intervienen los conceptos. Ni siquiera los conceptualistas negarían esto último. (Heidemann 2016, pp. 121-122) A pesar de ello, a pesar de reconocer que cualquier elemento cognitivo debe estar estructurado judicativamente, Heidemann sostiene que la pluralidad de intuiciones sensibles conserva su naturaleza no-conceptual y refiere a sus objetos de manera directa y singular. (Heidemann 2016, p. 123) A esto replica Oroño correctamente que del hecho de que las intuiciones no

se puedan reducir a conceptos, es decir, de que conserven su naturaleza no-conceptual, no debe inferirse en la filosofía de Kant que “la referencia inmediata y singular que opera al nivel de la intuición sensible pueda prescindir de la actividad conceptual (*i. e.* el operar de las categorías y los conceptos empíricos).” (Oroño 2018, p. 96)

La verdad es que me resulta difícil entender la posición de Heidemann, ya que, por un lado, sostiene que “el contenido no-conceptual no puede ser cognitivamente relevante con independencia del juicio” (Heidemann 2016, p. 121); por el otro, se considera a sí mismo un no-conceptualista porque a pesar de lo anterior sostiene que “la pluralidad sensible dada en la intuición conserva su naturaleza no-conceptual en términos de una representación singular”. (Heidemann 2016, p. 123) Cada quien puede definir como quiera lo que entiende por no-conceptualismo, pero al menos hay que hacer notar aquí una confusión al parecer frecuente entre quienes se declaran no-conceptualistas: la confusión entre la naturaleza de las intuiciones y su contenido.³ En efecto, Heidemann parece considerar que las intuiciones tienen contenido no-conceptual porque a pesar de estar estructuradas judicativamente o conceptualmente conservan su naturaleza no-conceptual. Si conservan su naturaleza no-conceptual –sostendría Heidemann– entonces tienen contenido no-conceptual. Pero, mientras no se ofrezca una caracterización peculiar de lo que se entiende por contenido, esta inferencia es incorrecta. Me parece que en ausencia de esa caracterización, uno debe entender por “contenido” aquello a lo que refiere una entidad mental. Si esto es así, entonces está claro que entidades mentales de distinta naturaleza (intuiciones y conceptos, por ejemplo) pueden referir a un mismo objeto y por ello tener el mismo contenido.

¿Qué quiere decir, pues, que un contenido sea conceptual? ¿Que aquello a lo que apunta o refiere la entidad mental correspondiente es un concepto? Si este es el caso, entonces los no-conceptualistas tienen razón al insistir en que el contenido de nuestras percepciones no es conceptual, puesto que no percibimos conceptos. Pero también habría que decir, entonces, que el contenido de la mayoría de nuestros pensamientos y juicios no es conceptual, puesto que la mayoría de las veces no estamos hablando de conceptos, sino de cosas en el mundo. A pesar de esto, los no-conceptualistas sostienen que el contenido de los juicios y de los pensamientos en general es conceptual. Quizás los no-conceptualistas kantianos entiendan de otra manera el contenido: no como aquello a lo que apuntan o refieren las entidades mentales, sino como aquello de lo que están hechas, como su material. En este sentido, los pensamientos estarían compuestos de conceptos y por ello su contenido sería conceptual, mientras que el contenido de las percepciones serían intuiciones, entidades mentales singulares. Pero, si esto es lo que quieren decir los no-conceptualistas kantianos, entonces no tiene por qué haber un debate. Debe estar claro para cualquiera que haya leído algo de la filosofía teórica de Kant que las intuiciones y los conceptos son irreductibles entre sí. Kant enfatiza con frecuencia que una de las cosas que distingue su filosofía de la filosofía de sus predecesores es este aspecto irreductible que le atribuye a estos dos tipos de representaciones. (KrV, A 44/ B 61-62; A 271/ B 327) Ningún

³ Con respecto a esta confusión, véase mi crítica a Lazos en: Stepanenko 2016, pp. 238-241

conceptualista, que yo sepa, ha sostenido que las intuiciones en Kant están compuestas de conceptos.

Es probable que el debate entre kantianos se deba en parte a la ambigüedad de la palabra “contenido” que he destacado. Pero, ¿qué debería significar “contenido conceptual” si hay algo más que una confusión de palabras, si hay algo más sustantivo? Puede significar aquello a lo que se refieren los conceptos, es decir, propiedades que comparten los objetos o los hechos, en contraste con los contenidos de las intuiciones que serían objetos o hechos singulares. En este caso, la disputa, la cuestión sería si podemos representar objetos o hechos singulares sin representar propiedades que compartan con otros objetos o hechos. Pero lo cierto es que la discusión entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas, kantianos o analíticos, se ha desarrollado de tal manera que tiene más que ver con nuestra capacidad de representar con o sin el auxilio de conceptos y, por ello, se ha introducido la idea de conceptualismo o no-conceptualismo de estado en lugar de conceptualismo o no-conceptualismo de contenido. (Bermúdez y Cahen 2015, sección 3) Sin embargo, la retórica del contenido conceptual o no-conceptual ha persistido. ¿Qué debemos entender, a pesar de todo, por “contenido conceptual”? He aquí una propuesta: “contenido conceptual” es aquello que es representado o aquello a lo que se refiere una entidad mental cuando ésta requiere el uso de conceptos. El debate entre kantianos debe centrarse, entonces, en la posibilidad de que las intuiciones representen o refieran a objetos y hechos sin la cooperación de conceptos. Al respecto, estoy del lado de Oroño: aunque las intuiciones tengan distinta naturaleza que los conceptos, necesitan de ellos para “referirse cognitivamente a un objeto” (Oroño 2018, p. 96).

El famoso *dictum* kantiano de acuerdo con el cual “las intuiciones sin conceptos son ciegas” (KrV, A 51/ B 75) le da de entrada la razón al conceptualista. La metáfora de la ceguera indica que las intuiciones sin conceptos no se dirigen a nada, aunque al tenerlas seamos sensibles. Es decir, si tenemos intuiciones sin conceptos, podemos ser conscientes de ellas al sentir las y sin embargo no representar nada con ellas. El no-conceptualista podría replicar que el hecho de que las intuiciones sean un tipo de representaciones permite decir que por sí mismas representan. Para sostener esto se apoya principalmente en el uso que Kant le da al término alemán *Vorstellung*. Pero ningún lector cuidadoso debe pasar por alto el hecho de que Kant utiliza este término para referirse a cualquier entidad mental y por ello no debe inferirse nada acerca de sus propiedades representativas. El no-conceptualista puede también apelar a esa controvertida afirmación de la *Crítica de la razón pura* conforme a la cual el entendimiento lleva a conceptos lo que la imaginación ya ha sintetizado, pero cualquier lector cuidadoso también recordará que para Kant la imaginación está guiada por los esquemas trascendentales derivados de las categorías, de suerte que esa afirmación no debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la imaginación pueda operar al margen de cualquier concepto. En todo caso, deberá interpretarse como respaldando la posición intermedia que haga depender a la imaginación de ciertos conceptos, pero que se adelante a la formación de otros.

Además del famoso *dictum* que exige la cooperación de intuiciones y conceptos para que podamos hablar de representaciones en sentido estricto, la Deducción trascendental de los conceptos puros del entendimiento, ese capítulo esencial de la propuesta filosófica desarrollada por Kant en la *Crítica de la razón pura*, deja en claro que sin estos conceptos las intuiciones no representan nada, ya que la función misma que nos hace pensar en un contenido o en un objeto distinto a las intuiciones es algo que introducen esos conceptos. Esta es la estrategia que le permite a Kant garantizar la objetividad de esos conceptos: mostrar que la capacidad representativa de la sensibilidad, de la capacidad de ser afectados, depende del concepto mismo de un objeto distinto a las propias representaciones. Y ese concepto, que Kant llama “objeto trascendental =x” porque no puede identificarse con ninguna representación en particular, es algo que pensamos gracias a las categorías, a los conceptos que nos permiten articular la pluralidad sensible de la intuición en una visión objetiva del mundo. (KrV, A104-110) Cuando Kant sostiene en la Deducción metafísica que las categorías introducen un contenido trascendental, apunta también en esta misma dirección: que el concepto de algo que es representado no nos viene dado, sino que lo introduce el entendimiento. (KrV, A 79/ B 106) Gracias a la facultad de los conceptos podemos, pues, concebir algo distinto de las entidades mentales singulares que son las intuiciones y hacer de ellas representaciones en sentido estricto, representaciones singulares que además de representar algo pueden, en cuanto entidades singulares, mantener una relación de causalidad con lo representado. Cierto, no necesitamos conceptos para ser sensibles. Las intuiciones por sí mismas se sienten de alguna manera, pero no por ello representan algo. Para que representen debe intervenir el entendimiento, al menos con el concepto general de un objeto representado, de un objeto al que apuntan o refieren las intuiciones mismas. En un pasaje del capítulo sobre la distinción entre fenómenos y nóúmenos, también de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, Kant llega incluso a caracterizar el pensamiento en general como “la acción de referir a un objeto una intuición dada” (A 247/ B 304). Esta afirmación muestra hasta qué punto la relación entre conceptos e intuiciones era para Kant constitutiva de la intencionalidad de las intuiciones.

Sin embargo, lo anterior no debe atentar en contra de la referencia inmediata y singular de las intuiciones sensibles a sus objetos. Condicionar el carácter intencional de las intuiciones a la operación y colaboración con los conceptos no debe significar que el aporte de las intuiciones a la representación quede anulado o asimilado a la manera en que los conceptos refieren. La manera en que una intuición, en cuanto entidad mental singular, representa sus objetos tiene que ser mucho más rica que la forma en que lo hace un concepto. Se puede incluso recuperar la metáfora de la representación analógica de Fred Dretske para las intuiciones en contraste con la representación abstracta de los conceptos (Dretske 2003, pp. 25-32). También se debe enfatizar el carácter directo de la relación entre las intuiciones y sus objetos, la cual tiene que ver sobre todo con la existencia del objeto representado. No debe olvidarse que, de acuerdo con el segundo postulado del pensar empírico, es efectivamente real aquello que está interconectado con las condiciones materiales de la experiencia, es decir, con la sensación, con las intuiciones empíricas. (KrV, A 218-226/B 265-274) En la medida en que las intuiciones sensibles son singulares

y tienen relaciones de causalidad con sus objetos son el contacto más directo que podemos tener con los objetos reales representados. Pero nada de esto debe significar que los conceptos aún no entran en escena cuando las intuiciones ya representan sus objetos de manera directa e inmediata. Sin las categorías seguramente persiste la relación de causalidad, pero desaparece la relación de representación. Por ello, coincido plenamente con la observación de Oroño de acuerdo con la cual la inmediatez y la singularidad que caracterizan la relación de las intuiciones con sus objetos no deben significar que se puede prescindir de los conceptos cuando de lo que se trata es de representar objetos en el mundo.

Bibliografía

- Allais, Lucy (2016), "Conceptualism and Nonconceptualism in Kant: A Survey of the Recent Debate" en D. Schulting, *Kantian Nonconceptualism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Londres, pp. 1-25
- Bermúdez, José and Cahen, Arnon (2015), "Nonconceptual Mental Content", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Fall 2015 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/content-nonconceptual/>
- Dretske, Fred (2003), "Sensation and Perception" en Y. H. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 25-41
- Evans, Gareth (2003), "Demonstrative Identification" en Y. H. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 43-74
- Gunther, York H. (2003), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass.
- Hanna, Robert (2001), *Kant and the Foundations of Analytic Philosophy*; Oxford University Press, Oxford-Nueva York
- (2005), "Kant and Nonconceptual Content", *European Journal of Philosophy* 13:2, pp. 247-290
- Heidemann, Dietmar H. (2013), *Kant and Non-Conceptual Content*, Routledge, Londres-Nueva York
- Kant, Immanuel (2009), *Crítica de la razón pura*, edición bilingüe, traducción de M. Caimi, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Ciudad de México (citada como: KrV)
- Lazos, Efraín (2014), *Disonancias de la Crítica*, UNAM, Ciudad de México.
- McDowell, John (1994), *Mind and World*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass.
- Oroño, Matías (2017), "El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto", *Con-Textos Kantianos*, no. 6, pp. 93-105
- Peacocke, Christopher (2003), "Scenarios, Concepts and Perception" en Y. H. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 107-132
- Schulting, Dennis (2016), *Kantian Nonconceptualism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Londres-Nueva York
- Stalnaker, Robert (2003), "What Might Nonconceptual Content Be?" en Y. H. Gunther (ed.), *Essays on Nonconceptual Content*, MIT, Cambridge, Mass., pp. 95-106
- Strawson, Peter F. (1989), *The Bounds of Sense*, Routledge, Londres-Nueva York
- Stepanenko, Pedro (2016), "Contenidos no-conceptuales en la filosofía de Kant", *Praxis Filosófica*, no. 43, pp. 225-242



Kant y el no conceptualismo
Kant and non-conceptualism

LUCIANA MARTÍNEZ^{1*}

Universidad de Buenos Aires/CONICET, Argentina

Resumen

En este artículo discuto la contribución de Matías Oroño, intitulada “El (no-)conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto”. Esta contribución, en lo esencial, es una crítica a la tesis según la cual es posible encontrar una fundamentación del no-conceptualismo kantiano en el tratamiento de los juicios de gusto. Esta tesis es defendida por Dietmar Heidemann en un artículo que Oroño refuta. En el presente artículo se sostiene que la interpretación de Oroño es acertada, con algunos reparos. Sin embargo, me parece importante señalar que Oroño no cuestiona dos premisas del no-conceptualismo sostenidas por Heidemann que necesitan ser revisadas. Estas premisas son: (i) los elementos no-conceptuales que interesan tienen valor cognitivo, (ii) esos elementos son (a) fenoménicos, (b) intencionales, (c) representacionales.

Palabras clave

No-conceptualismo, juicios de gusto, *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar*, Oroño, Heidemann.

Abstract

In this paper, I discuss Matías Oroño’s contribution that is entitled “Kant’s (Non)-conceptualism and judgments of taste”. In substance, this contribution criticizes the thesis according to which it is possible to find a basis for Kantian non-conceptualism in the analysis of judgments of taste. This thesis is defended by Dietmar Heidemann in the paper refuted by Oroño. In the present paper, I support Oroño’s interpretation, with some reservations. Oroño does not query two premises that are to be checked. These premises are following: (i) the interesting non-conceptual elements have cognitive value, (ii) these elements are (a) phenomenal, (b) intentional, (c) representational.

Keywords

* Universidad de Buenos Aires, CONICET. E-mail: luciana.mtnz@gmail.com The project leading to this contribution has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under the Marie Skłodowska-Curie grant agreement No 777786.

Non-conceptualism, judgments of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, Oroño, Heidemann.

Introducción

En esta contribución, intentaré comentar algunos aspectos del artículo “El (no-)conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto”, publicado por el Dr. Matías Oroño². Pienso que la interpretación de la “Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética” que está en el suelo del paper de Oroño está explicada con una claridad notable y hace que el texto de Kant sea más comprensible. Oroño sostiene que “los juicios de gusto no poseen valor cognitivo, pero permiten comprender aspectos centrales de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento” (Oroño, 2017: 93, resumen). Los juicios de gusto tienen la forma “a es bello”, donde “a” es un objeto singular. El predicado de ese juicio, que enuncia: “es bello”, no proporciona conocimiento sobre “a”, ni lo pretende. En este sentido, me parece difícil de cuestionar la primera parte de la tesis principal de Oroño. Además, como ha sido indicado, para Oroño los juicios de gusto permiten comprender aspectos centrales de la teoría del conocimiento de Kant. Me parece, una vez más, que esta tesis es acertada. Sin embargo, no estoy de acuerdo con algunas de las razones desarrolladas por el autor. Por este motivo, considero conveniente recorrer sus argumentos y exhibir los elementos que, a mi juicio, pueden no ser adecuados para comprender el texto kantiano.

El marco teórico general de la interpretación de Oroño es una discusión que excede los límites de la interpretación de la crítica kantiana del gusto e, incluso, de la investigación de la filosofía de Kant en general. Se trata, a saber, del debate del conceptualismo y el no conceptualismo. Oroño define el conceptualismo en los siguientes términos: es “la posición según la cual un sujeto cognoscente puede tener representaciones de objetos sólo si posee los conceptos adecuados mediante los cuales puede especificar el contenido de sus representaciones” (Oroño, 2017: 94), en tanto que para el no-conceptualismo “las representaciones de objetos no presuponen necesariamente conceptos por medio de los cuales pueda ser especificado el contenido de lo que es representado” (ídem).

Oroño se refiere a la poca atención que, en relación con el debate sobre el conceptualismo, ha recibido el tratamiento kantiano de los juicios de gusto. Dietmar Heidemann³ se presenta como parte de una excepción al respecto y es por esto que Oroño se ocupa especialmente de sus argumentos. Heidemann pretende argumentar el no conceptualismo kantiano por medio del análisis de su tratamiento de los juicios de gusto. La tesis de Heidemann es que, en palabras de Oroño, “los juicios sobre lo bello tal como son presentados en la KU proveen herramientas que permiten atribuirle a Kant una posición no-conceptualista sobre la naturaleza del conocimiento” (Oroño, 2017: 94). El Dr. Oroño sostiene que la argumentación de Heidemann para fundamentar esa tesis es insatisfactoria y propone una interpretación propia.

La tesis de Heidemann, a mi juicio, tiene numerosos problemas. El autor, en primer lugar,

² Oroño, M. (2017).

³ Heidemann, D. H. (2016).

supone una serie de premisas del no-conceptualismo que no fundamenta y que tornan inaceptable su lectura no-conceptualista de la filosofía kantiana. Además, pretende que los juicios de gusto son juicios de conocimiento, contra la letra kantiana. Por último, desarrolla una interpretación de la concepción kantiana de los juicios de gusto que la aísla de la investigación de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante. Como consecuencia de esto, Heidemann no consigue dar cuenta del significado sistemático que tienen los juicios de gusto, ni de su relación con la doctrina del genio.

A continuación, intentaré ilustrar mis inquietudes sobre la argumentación de Oroño y tornar evidentes los puntos en los que creo que Heidemann se equivoca. Para ello, en primer lugar analizaré la estructura argumentativa del texto de Heidemann. Luego analizaré las críticas de Oroño. Por último, me referiré a las premisas del no-conceptualismo propuesto por Heidemann.

1. La defensa del no conceptualismo estético por parte de D. H. Heidemann.

La tesis de Heidemann es que en la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar* se encuentran algunos elementos favorables a la interpretación no-conceptualista de Kant (Heidemann, 2016: 118). Heidemann se refiere, en particular, a la “Crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética”, en la que identifica dos momentos, uno referido al gusto y uno referido a la producción de objetos bellos. Según el autor, la teoría de los juicios de gusto apoya una interpretación no-conceptualista de Kant, en tanto que esto no sucede con la teoría del genio estético. Me parece que un elemento significativo en la propuesta de Heidemann es que él encuentra dos teorías que coexisten en la crítica de la facultad de juzgar estética y no explica cómo es que ellas se vinculan en la empresa kantiana. La doctrina del genio aparece en esta interpretación como un elemento aislado, difícilmente comprensible en el contexto de la crítica del enjuiciamiento reflexionante.

El núcleo argumentativo del texto se presenta en tres secciones. La sección 6.2. se ocupa del carácter cognitivo de los juicios de gusto, y sostiene que i) el carácter cognitivo de los juicios es condición de su no-conceptualismo, y que ii) los juicios de gusto satisfacen ese requisito pues son cognitivos en varios aspectos; la sección 6.3, del elemento no conceptual de esos juicios; en la sección 6.4, Heidemann argumenta que la doctrina del genio no ofrece un argumento para el no-conceptualismo; y en la conclusión sostiene que el no conceptualismo que pretende haber demostrado en 6.2 y 6.3 no es compatible con un conceptualismo de la doctrina del conocimiento en sentido estricto. La argumentación de este último punto, prometida desde la introducción del texto, no se encuentra desarrollada. Las dos tesis que Heidemann pretende fundamentar en 6.2 son polémicas. Nos concentraremos aquí en la segunda de ellas, y retomaremos la primera, según la cual el contenido cognitivo es condición del no-conceptualismo, en el último apartado de este artículo. Aquí revisaremos la segunda, según la cual los juicios de gusto tienen valor cognitivo. En el análisis de la crítica del gusto, Heidemann comienza con una tesis que intenta justificar con diversos argumentos. Afirma que la experiencia estética es

conocimiento (*cognition*) de algún tipo⁴ y menciona una “apreciación cognitiva de lo bello” (Heidemann, 2016: 118). A lo largo del texto, no hay referencias al texto kantiano que justifiquen esta terminología. Este detalle es importante en la medida en que el autor circunscribe el problema del conceptualismo/ no-conceptualismo al ámbito del conocimiento. Me parece que, interpretada como una estética, y no como una parte del examen de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, no debería esperarse que la KU proporcione elementos para pensar el problema del conocimiento. Analizaremos los argumentos de Heidemann en el siguiente apartado, pues son el eje de la crítica de Oroño. Por el momento, sólo recordaremos que esos argumentos son tres y están basados en una identificación de la estructura judicativa como una *conditio sine qua non* del conocimiento. Los pilares de la argumentación de Heidemann son los siguientes: i) los juicios de gusto están determinados por las categorías, ii) los juicios de gusto son universalmente comunicables, iii) los juicios de gusto tienen validez objetiva. Para el autor, estos tres pilares exhiben una semejanza de los juicios de gusto con los juicios de conocimiento en sentido estricto y permitirían justificar que hay un valor cognitivo en ellos.

Yo pienso que, además de que estos argumentos, como señala Oroño, presentan dificultades interpretativas, constituye un error pretender que los juicios de gusto sean considerados como juicios de conocimiento, o incluso que la experiencia estética envuelva algún tipo de cognición. El concepto de lo estético que Kant utiliza en la KU es ya una clave para comprender este error⁵. Los juicios de gusto no se refieren a la naturaleza del objeto⁶, como expresa Oroño con claridad⁷. Me parece que el hecho de que los juicios de gusto no son de carácter cognitivo no se debe a que son un producto de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante. Otros tipos de juicios producidos por esta facultad como los juicios teleológicos, sí podrían proporcionar algún tipo de conocimiento. Pero justo los juicios de gusto no pretenden proporcionar conocimiento sobre los objetos. En cambio, estos juicios, que son un producto de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante y que son estéticos, i.e. subjetivos y no objetivos, se refieren al modo como somos afectados por los objetos. Cuando decimos de algo que es bello, hablamos del modo como nos afecta, y no, en cambio, de su constitución.

En la sección siguiente del artículo, es decir, en la sección 6.3, Heidemann pretende argumentar que los juicios de gusto tienen un contenido no conceptual. Esta tesis podría ser evidente en el contexto de la propuesta kantiana, En efecto, los juicios de gusto son un producto de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, en la que no se produce la determinación de una representación por medio de un concepto dado. Para fundamentar la tesis de los

⁴ En la introducción de su trabajo, Heidemann expresa esta premisa con las siguientes palabras: “De acuerdo con Kant, la experiencia estética es conocimiento (*cognition*) de un tipo especial que no tiene que ver con actividades conceptuales”. Heidemann, 2016: 118. El autor no indica cuáles son las fuentes en las que se basa esa interpretación.

⁵ Cf. KU, AA 5: 188, 203.

⁶ Kant lo señala expresamente en la KU, una y otra vez. En una anotación de la deducción de los juicios de gusto, se lee lo siguiente: “la belleza no es un concepto del objeto, y el juicio de gusto no es un juicio de conocimiento” (KU, AA 5: 290).

⁷ Oroño, 2017:95.

contenidos no conceptuales de esos juicios también podría repararse en lo que esos juicios expresan, que es una referencia a la disposición del sujeto. Éste es el camino argumentativo elegido por Heidemann. Sólo que su argumentación se complica por la decisión de añadir algunas especificaciones terminológicas.

En primer término, como hemos visto, Heidemann asume que tener un valor cognitivo es condición para tener contenidos conceptuales. Revisaremos la argumentación de Heidemann para mostrar eso en la tercera parte de este artículo. Por ahora, basta con recordar que es cuestionable que Heidemann haya mostrado que los juicios de gusto satisfagan esa condición, es decir: dista de ser evidente que Heidemann haya mostrado que los juicios de gusto tienen valor cognitivo.

Por otro lado, Heidemann menciona tres condiciones de la no-conceptualidad. Para que un contenido mental cuente como un contenido no conceptual, “ese contenido debe ser fenoménico, intencional y representacional” (Heidemann, 2016: 121). El contenido de los juicios de gusto que Heidemann propone como contenido no conceptual es el sentimiento de placer/displacer al que esos juicios se refieren. El autor considera que este sentimiento satisface los tres criterios. Como veremos, para Oroño los juicios de gusto no satisfacen el tercer criterio. Pienso que en el artículo de Heidemann falta una explicación de qué significa cada uno de ellos y por qué son condición necesaria para que podamos considerar que un contenido mental es no conceptual.

En la sección 6.4, Heidemann analiza la cuestión de si el tratamiento del genio proporciona elementos que den fundamento al no conceptualismo. Lamentablemente, la argumentación presente en esta sección es significativamente menos detallada que la argumentación de las secciones previas. El autor parte, como hemos señalado, de una suerte doble perspectiva en el tratamiento de la “estética” kantiana. Por un lado, encontramos la perspectiva de la apreciación y por el otro lado, encontramos la perspectiva de la producción. Como comentamos, el autor omite cualquier tipo de referencia al hecho de que esa “estética” con sus dos perspectivas es en rigor parte de la crítica de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante. La doctrina del genio es para él una teoría de la producción en la que no se desarrolla un “saber que”, sino un “saber cómo” mediado por ciertas representaciones, que son las ideas estéticas. La argumentación de Heidemann se reduce a discutir si las ideas estéticas verifican los tres requisitos de la no conceptualidad y señalar una suerte de paradoja relativa a la cuestión de si esas ideas son representaciones. El hecho de que la doctrina del genio se desarrolle en la deducción del principio a priori de los juicios de gusto y que sea funcional en la sección de la dialéctica me parece una razón suficiente para considerarla como un componente de la argumentación kantiana acerca de los juicios de gusto⁸, que es un momento de la investigación de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante. Y considero que es esta facultad la que debe ser examinada, si queremos discutir la posibilidad de que la filosofía kantiana dé soporte al no-conceptualismo.

⁸ Esta interpretación se fundamenta en: Martínez, L. (2015).

2. Sobre las objeciones de Oroño a la tesis de Heidemann.

La tesis de Heidemann que Oroño discute es que en el análisis kantiano de los juicios de gusto se encuentran elementos para una interpretación no-conceptualista de la filosofía kantiana. Esta tesis implica otras dos, que son, a saber: i) los juicios de gusto tienen valor cognitivo, ii) los juicios de gusto son no conceptuales. La refutación de Oroño consiste en exhibir las deficiencias en la argumentación por medio de la cual Heidemann propone fundamentar cada una de esas tesis.

Oroño encuentra tres líneas de argumentación por medio de las cuales Heidemann defendería (i) el carácter cognitivo de los juicios de gusto. La primera línea adscribe el carácter categorial a esos juicios. Oroño señala acertadamente que las determinaciones categoriales de los objetos a los que se refieren los juicios de gusto es irrelevante en el enjuiciamiento estético. Pienso que la tesis de Oroño es acertada, pero su argumentación me parece vaga. Entiendo que, en la filosofía de Kant, la determinación categorial de la rosa es *conditio sine qua non* de toda experiencia, luego también de la experiencia estética. Pero el análisis kantiano en la KU procura hallar el suelo a priori de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, que se expresa en los juicios de gusto. Por esta razón, Kant suspende analíticamente ese carácter categorial de la experiencia y se concentra en los rasgos de ella que conducen la investigación al Juicio reflexionante.

Oroño reconstruye el argumento de Heidemann de la siguiente manera: “en el juicio 'esta flor es bella'... podríamos concentrarnos en la flor en tanto objeto físico ordinario y determinarla según las categorías” (Oroño, 2017: 97). La respuesta de Oroño da en el blanco: si nos concentramos en la flor como objeto físico, entonces nos apartamos del juicio de gusto y todo lo que concluyamos será irrelevante para el análisis de éste. Pero me parece que su argumentación es un poco precipitada y por esta razón no consigue exhibir la complejidad del problema.

Pienso que la determinación conceptual de la flor, al margen del juicio de gusto, es transcendental y empírica. Oroño no establece con claridad en su artículo la diferencia entre estas dos clases de determinaciones (Cf. Oroño, 2017: 97). En la KU, Kant aísla los juicios de gusto de los juicios de conocimiento que atribuyen al objeto sus predicados empíricos: “esto es una flor”, “esto es una rosa” “esta rosa tiene cuatro pétalos”. Esto es correctamente señalado por Oroño. Pero no parece ser este tipo de determinación la que mienta aquella determinación *categorial* referida por Heidemann. La determinación categorial es la que constituye a la flor como *mi objeto*, como un objeto que pertenece a mi experiencia. Esta determinación es parte constitutiva de mi vínculo con la rosa, pero ella no involucra a la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, que es la facultad cuyos principios investiga Kant en la KU. Para el análisis de los juicios de gusto, con el fin de identificar un principio a priori del Juicio reflexionante, ignoramos la constitución del objeto y nos ocupamos sólo del peculiar sentimiento de placer que suscita en nosotros. La constitución del objeto es irrelevante si lo que interesa es analizar la naturaleza de los juicios de gusto.

Me parece que la argumentación de Oroño acierta al separar los juicios de gusto de los juicios de conocimiento y concuerdo con el autor en que este aspecto del razonamiento de

Heidemann no permite concluir que los juicios de gusto tengan valor cognitivo. Sólo me parece conveniente enfatizar en la diferencia entre los juicios con contenido empírico, de los juicios con contenido transcendental. Kant ilustra los juicios de gusto con este ejemplo: “esta flor es bella” (KU, AA 5: 281, ctd. en Oroño, 2017: 17). En rigor, este juicio es complejo e incluye dos predicaciones, que son, a saber: “esto es una flor” y “esto es bello”. La primera predicación incluye un predicado empírico. Pienso que el análisis de los juicios de gusto puede prescindir de esa predicación y reducirse a la segunda, que dice: “esto es bello”. En esta reducción renunciamos a los predicados empíricos de la cosa, pero no renunciamos con ello a sus predicados transcendentales. “Esto” pertenece a mi experiencia y está por lo tanto *ya* determinado por los predicados que genera el entendimiento para organizarla y constituirla. La reducción analítica que necesita hacer Kant para analizar los juicios de gusto y encontrar en ellos los principios a priori de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, lo cual parece ser el objetivo de la KU, resulta más complicada de lo que aparece en la discusión de Oroño con Heidemann.

El segundo argumento de Heidemann para sostener el valor cognitivo de los juicios de gusto se refiere a la universal comunicabilidad que ellos compartirían con los juicios de conocimiento. Heidemann atribuye esa comunicabilidad, además, a una referencia de ambos tipos de juicios al objeto. Pienso que la respuesta de Oroño a esta segunda tesis es acertada, pues los juicios de gusto no se refieren a los objetos, sino al sujeto mismo. Pero pienso que hay una imprecisión en la objeción de Oroño a la primera parte de la tesis. Oroño concede que los juicios de gusto y los juicios de conocimiento comparten una comunicabilidad universal. Y afirma que si negáramos la comunicabilidad universal de los juicios de gusto, *entonces* “no podríamos fundamentar el gusto sobre principios transcendentales” (Oroño, 2017: 98). Ahora bien, a mi juicio, este argumento no se sigue de la propuesta de Kant, ni está supuesto por ella. Según entiendo, la argumentación kantiana indica que los juicios de gusto son comunicables y discutibles *en virtud de que* se fundan en principios a priori del sujeto. Estos principios son descubiertos por el filósofo a partir del análisis de aquellas características ostensivas⁹ pero no están condicionados por ellas.

El tercer argumento de Heidemann sobre el valor cognitivo de los juicios de gusto está vinculado con la noción de su validez. Pienso que la explicación y las objeciones contra este argumento presentadas por Oroño son claras y acertadas. Oroño afirma que

en este argumento Heidemann parece confundir ‘validez universal’ con ‘pretensión de validez universal’. Es decir, una lectura detenida de la teoría kantiana sobre los juicios de gusto permite concluir que tenemos razones para esperar que otros sujetos estén de acuerdo con nuestro juicio sobre algo como bello, pues el fundamento de nuestro juicio de gusto reposa sobre facultades cognitivas que son universalmente válidas. Pero esta pretensión de validez universal bajo ningún

⁹ El análisis de la comunicabilidad universal se encuentra desarrollado en el segundo momento de la “Analítica de lo Bello”. Pienso que los elementos que dan sustento a la interpretación propuesta se presentan en el §6, KU, AA 5: 211.

punto de vista se identifica con la validez universal que posee un juicio de conocimiento. (Oroño, 2017: 98)

Una vez que objetó los argumentos de Heidemann para fundamentar su tesis según la cual los juicios de gusto tienen valor cognitivo, Oroño se ocupa de los argumentos con los que Heidemann pretende sustentar la concepción no conceptual de esos juicios. La primera línea de argumentación se centra en el *sentimiento* de placer o displacer, que sería el contenido no conceptual de los juicios de gusto, según Heidemann. Las objeciones de Oroño se centran en la afirmación de Heidemann según la cual (A) “un contenido mental es no-conceptual sólo si es ‘fenomenal, intencional y representacional’” (Oroño, 2017: 99, cita a Heidemann). Yo estoy de acuerdo, repito, con las tesis de Oroño. Pero su argumentación en este punto me parece insatisfactoria. Para Heidemann, los juicios de gusto son representacionales porque “el sujeto representa la relación armónica entre imaginación y entendimiento” (Oroño, 2017: 99, Oroño parafrasea a Heidemann). Oroño pretende refutar que hay representación y concluye que “el argumento de Heidemann fracasa en su intento por caracterizar al juicio de gusto como no-conceptual, pues no logra demostrar que el sentimiento en tanto ‘contenido no conceptual’ del juicio de gusto sea poseedor del *carácter representacional*, que según él mismo, es un requisito de la no-conceptualidad” (Oroño, 2017: 100).

Me parece que, incluso concediendo la argumentación de Oroño sobre el carácter no representativo del sentimiento estético, no se sigue de ello que los juicios de gusto no sean no-conceptuales. Lo que se sigue es que en el fundamento de los juicios de gusto no hay representaciones. Considero que la argumentación de Oroño supone (A), una premisa que toma del adversario y no justifica, ni objeta. Si los juicios de gusto favorecieran una lectura conceptualista de Kant, entonces sí sería esperable que en ellos el predicado contuviera una representación, pues los conceptos *son* representaciones¹⁰. Pero la tesis de Heidemann es que en los juicios de gusto se pone de manifiesto algún aspecto no conceptual de la experiencia cognitiva. Me parece que requiere una explicación el hecho de que la refutación del carácter representacional de esos juicios sea al mismo tiempo una refutación de Heidemann, y que por lo tanto (A) necesita ser explicada para que la argumentación de Oroño (así como, desde luego, la de Heidemann) sea comprensible.

La propuesta argumentativa de Oroño contiene dos momentos que ameritan un minucioso debate. Se trata, a saber, de 1) la objeción a la concepción *representacional* del juicio de gusto que sostiene Heidemann y que resulta inaceptable para Oroño, y 2) la descripción del sentimiento estético y su posición como el fundamento determinante de los juicios de gusto.

En cuanto a (1), Oroño se sitúa en el marco de un problema difícil: ¿involucran una representación los juicios de gusto? ¿nos *representamos*, en ellos, el libre juego de las facultades? ¿de qué naturaleza es el sentimiento de placer expresado en estos juicios?

¹⁰ Una discusión satisfactoria de esta cuestión, por otro lado, requiere especificar qué entendemos, en el contexto de la discusión de la filosofía kantiana, por “representación”. Quizás el estudio (histórico-evolutivo y sistemático) más completo sobre este tema se encuentre en: Rumore, P. (2007).

¿Cuál es la relación entre el sentimiento y nuestros juicios?¹¹ La respuesta de Oroño es que en “el juicio de gusto no hay una *representación* de la armonía entre la imaginación y el entendimiento” (Oroño, 2017: 99). Esta armonía estaría en la base del sentimiento estético, según el autor (ídem), y es por esta razón que enfrenta la tarea de analizar ese sentimiento, como hemos visto en (2). Para Oroño, el sentimiento es “una capacidad, una receptividad que supone ciertas representaciones, pero él mismo no es una representación” (Oroño, 2017: 100). Entiendo que hay pasajes de Kant que pueden nutrir esta interpretación y creo que sería interesante que Oroño exhiba una referencia a ellos y su análisis. Por otro lado, el concepto de representación es tan amplio, tan general en el contexto de la filosofía kantiana, que me resulta difícil concebir que algo suceda en nuestra conciencia, sin consistir en algún tipo de representación.

La segunda línea de argumentación por la que, según Oroño, Heidemann defiende el contenido no conceptual de los juicios de gusto se vincula con la autonomía de ese enjuiciamiento estético. La objeción de Oroño dice que el hecho de “que el juicio de gusto sea fundamento de una estética autónoma y remita a una suerte de *experiencia* que sólo se puede llevar a cabo en *primera persona* es un motivo insuficiente para inferir el pretendido carácter no-conceptual” (Oroño, 2017: 100). Me parece que en este punto, es necesario discutir si la necesaria autonomía del enjuiciamiento de gusto no implica ya que esos juicios no están determinados por conceptos. Si el juicio de gusto predicara de un *algo* un concepto determinado, entonces seríamos capaces de comunicar esos juicios y de determinar, sin la necesidad de una experiencia en primera persona, si el predicado corresponde al sujeto. Es decir, no sería necesaria la experiencia en primera persona para decidir si el “esto” es bello. Pero esa experiencia es necesaria cada vez para que haya juicio de gusto. Luego, el juicio de gusto no está determinado conceptualmente. El contenido de los juicios de gusto no es conceptual, y los juicios de gusto expresan un contenido. ¿Esto no significa que hay un contenido no conceptual en los juicios de gusto?

La razón por la que Oroño considera que ese rasgo de los juicios de gusto no resulta suficiente para justificar su contenido no conceptual es que en los juicios de gusto no se expresa una referencia a un objeto. En cambio, señala Oroño, el “juicio de gusto tan sólo expresa un sentimiento subjetivo, pero no una *representación* de un objeto” (Oroño, 2017: 100). Me parece evidente que el contenido de los juicios de gusto no incluye la representación de un objeto, pero creo que la afirmación de que esos juicios “tan sólo” expresan un “sentimiento subjetivo” requiere una aclaración: no se trata de cualquier sentimiento, pues el juicio de gusto no es un juicio de mero agrado. El sentimiento de placer que se expresa en los juicios de gusto se arraiga en un aspecto de la subjetividad que no es idiosincrático, de modo que los juicios de gusto tienen pretensiones de universalidad. Luego de objetar los argumentos de Heidemann y de concluir que ellos son insatisfactorios para postular un no-conceptualismo kantiano a partir del análisis del tratamiento de los

¹¹ Se ha escrito mucho sobre estos temas, especialmente en el ámbito de la literatura norteamericana. Las preguntas mencionadas pueden ser consideradas los ejes de la discusión entre Allison y Guyer. (Cf. Guyer, 1979: Chapter 3; Allison, 2001: Part ii; y una síntesis de algunas diferencias entre ellos en Allison, Guyer, 2006, esp. p.117s.)

juicios de gusto, Oroño propone una interpretación propia del texto kantiano, que pretende proporcionar algunas indicaciones para la discusión sobre el conceptualismo. Lamentablemente, esta sección del artículo es breve y pienso que podría ser más desarrollada.

El punto de partida del autor parece ser que aquello que es expresado en los juicios de gusto es una armonía de las facultades, que es condición del conocimiento en general. Oroño pone el énfasis en este rasgo del conocimiento y considera que hay que reparar en el “contraste entre el *conocimiento en general* ... y el *conocimiento particular*” (Oroño, 2017: 101). Me parece que la argumentación de Oroño resultaría más comprensible, si explicara este contraste y cómo es significativo en la dilucidación de los juicios de gusto.

Por lo demás, la conclusión del paper de Matías Oroño me parece precisa y arroja luz a un texto exigente de Kant. El estudio de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante estética no proporciona los elementos para sostener un no-conceptualismo, en la medida en que involucra “una concepción de la mente en la cual *todo conocimiento en general* supone la colaboración necesaria de conceptos e intuiciones sensibles” (Oroño, 2017: 103). El estudio de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante, en otras palabras, no constituye una objeción a los resultados de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, que ha mostrado cómo el entendimiento determina la experiencia en general, sino un complemento de ella.

3. Acerca del no conceptualismo.

Ahora bien, hasta aquí nos hemos centrado en la interpretación de la filosofía de Kant por parte de Heidemann y de Oroño. Pienso que la posición de Heidemann se basa en dos tesis que requieren una explicación y que, como ya he señalado, Matías Oroño no objeta. Según (I) la primera de esas tesis, el no-conceptualismo supone el carácter cognitivo de las representaciones que no son conceptos y que son relevantes para la constitución del conocimiento. En particular, para Heidemann, si han de constituir pruebas a favor del no-conceptualismo kantiano, los juicios de gusto deben tener valor cognitivo. Pienso que esta premisa involucra varias dificultades. Mencionaré dos. La primera concierne a su claridad. Heidemann, como hemos visto, supone que los juicios de gusto son de carácter cognitivo, contra la letra kantiana que expresa que esos juicios no son juicios de conocimiento. Pues bien, en ese caso es conveniente interrogar acerca de lo que Heidemann entiende por “valor cognitivo” (Heidemann, 2016: 121). Otra dificultad de la premisa (I) es que podría constituir una restricción prescindible en la búsqueda de convicciones no-conceptualistas en la filosofía kantiana. Pienso que esta restricción, por ejemplo, deja fuera de juego un tipo de representaciones que sin contener conocimiento, contribuye, sin embargo, en el conocer. Me refiero, a saber, a las representaciones oscuras. Estas representaciones no son de carácter conceptual, ya que los conceptos son representaciones *claras* informadas por el entendimiento. Sin embargo, para Kant las representaciones oscuras contribuyen en el proceso de conocimiento, en la medida en que, por ejemplo, despiertan las inquietudes que

orientan la investigación.¹²

La segunda premisa del no-conceptualismo de Heidemann es que (II) todo contenido no-conceptual es (a) fenoménico, (b) intencional, (c) representacional. Heidemann no explica el sentido que tienen estos tres requisitos ni por qué son necesarios en la discusión del no-conceptualismo. Si ser (a) fenoménico significa algo así como pertenecer a la conciencia, “aparecer”, formar parte de las representaciones del sujeto, esta condición es restrictiva y excluye, por ejemplo, las representaciones oscuras. En la filosofía de Kant, por lo demás, la tesis de la posibilidad de representaciones fenoménicas que no estén determinadas conceptualmente parece requerir una detallada exégesis de la deducción trascendental de la Primera Crítica. En esta deducción, las categorías se presentan como condiciones de la experiencia en general. En segundo término, si la (b) intencionalidad involucra algún tipo de referencia al objeto, entonces es necesario discutir en detalle si los juicios de gusto, que son los que interesan a Heidemann, verifican este requisito. Las clásicas discusiones de Guyer y Allison¹³ muestran que la relación de los juicios de gusto con los objetos dista de ser comprensible de suyo. En otras palabras, no es perfectamente claro cómo es que los juicios de la forma “esto es bello” se relacionan con aquello señalado por “esto”. El problema del carácter (c) representacional también exige un cuidadoso estudio de las tesis críticas y una elucidación de lo que ha entenderse por “representar”, antes de decidir si los juicios de gusto satisfacen el requisito. Las dificultades de (c) han sido señaladas en nuestra revisión de la argumentación de Oroño.

Como se ha hecho evidente, ambas premisas, no explicadas ni fundamentadas por el autor, son el suelo sobre el que se erigen las objeciones de Matías Oroño. Este autor, insistimos, no objeta estas premisas, sino que argumenta que Heidemann fracasa en el intento de demostrar que los juicios de gusto las satisfacen. A partir de esta argumentación, Oroño concluye que estos juicios no constituyen una prueba del no-conceptualismo de Kant, contra las pretensiones de Heidemann.

La investigación del gusto y el hallazgo de un principio a priori en el enjuiciamiento estético proporciona a Kant un acceso a la investigación de una capacidad de juzgar que no había sido contemplada en la *Crítica de la razón pura*. En este sentido, la investigación de los juicios de gusto proporciona conocimiento acerca de las facultades del sujeto y complementa la investigación crítica. Pienso que inscribir el análisis del gusto en la investigación de la facultad de juzgar reflexionante es crucial para comprender el texto kantiano y es algo que falta en el artículo de Heidemann.

Por otro lado, me parece que en la propuesta crítica kantiana los juicios de gusto no contribuyen, ellos mismos, a la ampliación del conocimiento que tenemos. Además de que, como he señalado, las dos premisas de la determinación del no-conceptualismo me parecen confusas, pienso que no es acertado buscar en los juicios de gusto, tal y como los entiende Kant, elementos que amplíen nuestro conocimiento de las cosas. Los juicios de gusto parecen hablar, más bien, sobre algunas condiciones de un sujeto que es capaz de tener

¹² Puede encontrarse una descripción detallada de este tipo de representaciones, así como de las funciones que cumplen en la vida de los hombres en Martínez (2014).

¹³ Cf. nota 10 supra.

experiencias estéticas que trascienden la mera fisiología.

En pocas palabras, pienso que las objeciones de Matías Oroño al intento de defensa del no-conceptualismo kantiano a partir del análisis de los juicios de gusto efectuado por Dietmar Heidemann pueden fortalecerse con los argumentos esgrimidos aquí. Además, como he sugerido en las menciones de las representaciones oscuras, pienso que esas objeciones no cancelan la posibilidad de hallar en la filosofía de Kant elementos para algún tipo de no-conceptualismo. Pero esos elementos, así como las premisas del no-conceptualismo, necesitan ser examinados.

Bibliografía

- Allison, H. (2001), *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, Estados Unidos.
- Allison, H., Guyer, P. (2006), "Dialogue: Paul Guyer and Henry Allison on Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*", en: Kukla, R., *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Estados Unidos, pp. 111-137.
- Guyer, P. (1979), *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, Estados Unidos.
- Heidemann, D. H. (2016), "Kant's Aesthetic Nonconceptualism", en: Schulting, D. (comp.), *Kantian nonconceptualism*, Palgrave Macmillan, Inglaterra, pp. 117-145.
- Martínez, L. M. (2014), "Las nociones de claridad y oscuridad en los Apuntes de Lecciones de Antropología de la 'década silenciosa' de Kant", *Studia Kantiana*, 17, 27-50.
- Martínez, L. (2015), "Una función del genio en la deducción del principio a priori de los juicios de gusto", en: Órdenes, P., Alegría, D. (comp.), *Kant y el Criticismo*, Editora Phi, Brasil, pp 142-153.
- Oroño, M. (2017), "El (no) -conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto", *Con-Textos Kantianos*, 6, 93-105.
- Rumore, P. (2007), *L'ordine delle idee. La genesi del concetto di "rappresentazione" in Kant attraverso le sue fonti wolffiane (1747-1787)*, Casa Editrice Le Lettere, Italia.



**El conceptualismo de Kant: una lectura del juicio de gusto.
Respuesta a mis críticos**

*Kant's Conceptualism: a Reading of Judgments of Taste.
Reply to my Critics*

MATÍAS OROÑO*

Universidad de Buenos Aires, Argentina

Resumen

En este trabajo presento una respuesta a mis críticos (Silvia Di Sanza, Pedro Stepanenko y Luciana Martínez) a "El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto". Mi objetivo principal es defender una lectura conceptualista de la teoría kantiana del juicio de gusto. En primer lugar, sugiero que el *conocimiento en general* que aparece que el marco del juicio de gusto no implica una ausencia de conceptos. En segundo lugar, indico que sin algún tipo de actividad conceptual, sería imposible fundamentar la universalidad del juicio de gusto. En tercer lugar, afirmo que el carácter representacional del juicio de gusto no implica un compromiso con el no conceptualismo. Finalmente, sostengo que la irreductibilidad del juicio de gusto a un concepto determinado no conduce necesariamente al no conceptualismo.

Palabras clave

Juicio, gusto, conceptualismo, universalidad, Kant

Abstract

In this paper, I present a reply to my critics (Silvia Di Sanza, Pedro Stepanenko y Luciana Martínez) to "Kant's (Non)-conceptualism and judgments of taste". My main goal is to defend a conceptualist

* Universidad de Buenos Aires. E-mail: matiasoro@gmail.com

reading of Kant's theory of judgments of taste. First, I suggest that *knowledge in general* that appears in the framework of judgments of taste does not imply an absence of concepts. Second, I indicate that without some kind of conceptual activity, it would be impossible to ground the universality of judgments of taste. Third, I affirm that the representational character of judgments of taste does not imply a commitment to non-conceptualism. Finally, I argue that the irreducibility of judgments of taste to a determinate concept does not necessarily carry to non-conceptualism.

Keywords

Judgment, taste, conceptualism, universality, Kant

1. Introducción

En este trabajo retomaré algunas observaciones efectuadas por Silvia Di Sanza, Pedro Stepanenko y Luciana Martínez en torno al artículo que he publicado en *Con-textos Kantianos*, titulado “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto” (Oroño, 2017). Allí he formulado una serie de objeciones a la interpretación no conceptualista de los juicios de gusto sostenida por Dietmar Heidemann (2016). Esta discusión es relevante en la medida en que revela la potencialidad de la teoría estética desarrollada en la *Kritik der Urteilskraft* para reflexionar sobre la concepción kantiana del conocimiento. Asimismo, se trata de una polémica que permite incorporar la estética de Kant al debate entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas.

A partir de las observaciones de Di Sanza, Stepanenko y Martínez desarrollaré una nueva defensa del conceptualismo implicado en la teoría kantiana del juicio de gusto, lo cual implica nuevamente un distanciamiento y rechazo de la interpretación desarrollada por Heidemann. En primer lugar, abordo algunas ideas sugeridas por Di Sanza y señalo que si bien el juicio de gusto ofrece un camino para fundamentar estéticamente el conocimiento, esto no implica un compromiso con el no conceptualismo, sino que revela la actividad conceptual indeterminada que subyace a todo conocimiento posible. En segundo lugar, retomo algunas reflexiones de Stepanenko y postulo que sin algún tipo de actividad conceptual no sería posible dar cuenta de la pretensión de validez universal que caracteriza a los juicios sobre lo bello. En tercer lugar, suscribo parcialmente a la lectura de Martínez: el juicio de gusto posee en algún sentido un carácter representativo; sin embargo, considero que esta representatividad que puede atribuirse al juicio estético puro no implica asumir una posición no conceptualista. Hacia el final del trabajo, indico que si bien el juicio de gusto expresa un sentimiento que es irreducible a los conceptos, presupone una armonía entre imaginación y entendimiento que es difícilmente compatible con la negación de toda actividad conceptual.

2. El conocimiento en general y la fundamentación estética del conocimiento

Silvia Di Sanza (2019) sugiere que en la KU hay elementos para elaborar una fundamentación estética del conocimiento en el idealismo trascendental kantiano. Los juicios estéticos revelarían un fundamento estético del conocimiento: la belleza se revelaría

como una señal de la condición subjetiva de todo juicio. Esta condición remite al acuerdo entre la imaginación y el entendimiento, así como a la cooperación entre ambas facultades para dar cuenta del conocimiento. Ciertamente, el juicio estético no es cognitivo, pues mediante él no se refieren las representaciones al objeto. No obstante, el juicio estético parece revelar un fundamento subjetivo (estético) de los juicios de conocimiento.

En este breve trabajo revisaré, en primer lugar, algunos aspectos de la interpretación de Fiona Hughes (2007), sugerida por Silvia di Sanza. Según esta interpretación, es plausible defender la tesis de un fundamento estético del conocimiento. En segundo lugar, brindaré algunos argumentos que permitan defender una interpretación conceptualista de este fundamento estético del conocimiento.

El comentario que aquí ofrezco se limita a algunas tesis presentes en el “Capítulo 4: La estructura profunda de la síntesis” del libro de Hughes (2007, p. 112 ss.). Con base en el análisis de la “Doctrina de la triple síntesis” (KrV, A 94-114), la autora sostiene que hay tres condiciones del conocimiento: primero, algo debe ser dado; segundo, debemos ser receptivos a esto que es dado; tercero, debemos ser capaces de unificar lo dado bajo un concepto. Hughes subraya que en la KrV la síntesis obedece a un fin determinado (un concepto), mientras que en el juicio estético emerge una actividad sintética que no es simplemente un medio para un fin exterior (un concepto), sino un fin en sí mismo. Según la autora, el estatuto sintético de los juicios estéticos reflexionantes es expresado en el siguiente pasaje:

Cabe ver fácilmente que los juicios de gusto son sintéticos, porque van más allá del concepto, incluso de la intuición del objeto, y le añaden como predicado algo que ni siquiera es conocimiento, a saber, el sentimiento de placer (o displacer). Pero que a pesar de que su predicado (del *propio* placer ligado con la representación) sea empírico, los juicios de gusto son juicios *a priori* o quieren ser tenidos por tales en lo que concierne a la exigida adhesión *de todo el mundo*, es algo que asimismo ya está contenido en las expresiones de su pretensión. De manera que esta tarea de la crítica del discernimiento forma parte del problema general de la filosofía trascendental: ¿cómo son posibles los juicios sintéticos *a priori*? (KU, AA 05: 288-89)

El juicio de gusto revela, según Hughes, un aspecto de la síntesis que excede el mero concepto de un objeto. Mientras que en el juicio de conocimiento hay un vínculo entre el concepto y la intuición, en el juicio de gusto se mantiene una especie de abismo entre la intuición y los posibles conceptos que son capaces de unificar el múltiple sensible. En el juicio estético emerge la conciencia del proceso sintético mismo que permite subsumir las intuiciones bajo conceptos determinados. Se trata de una conciencia (a través del sentimiento) del movimiento o actividad que permite enlazar los dos polos que intervienen en el conocimiento de un objeto: la facultad de las intuiciones y la facultad de los conceptos. El sentimiento mediante el cual tomamos conciencia de este movimiento, que permite descubrir la cooperación necesaria entre imaginación y entendimiento, no es un sentimiento privado, sino que posee una pretensión de validez universal. Por este motivo, el juicio de gusto pertenece a la filosofía trascendental, pues es un juicio que exige

adhesión universal y conduce a la pregunta: ¿cómo son posibles los juicios sintéticos *a priori*? Es decir, cómo es posible que con independencia de la experiencia se pueda añadir algo de manera universal a un objeto dado. En el caso de los juicios de gusto, lo que se añade al objeto no es un conocimiento, sino un sentimiento de placer que sólo puede ser universal bajo la condición de que todos los sujetos sean poseedores de las mismas facultades cognitivas.

En suma, el juicio de gusto revela, a través del sentimiento, las condiciones subjetivas universales que subyacen a todo conocimiento particular. En este sentido, puede afirmarse que el juicio estético revela una armonía entre la imaginación y el entendimiento que es previa a la síntesis de un múltiple según conceptos determinados (sean puros o empíricos). Podemos afirmar, siguiendo en este punto la interpretación de Hughes, que la armonía o el libre juego entre imaginación y entendimiento que emerge en el juicio de gusto es una expresión genérica de la coordinación entre intuiciones y conceptos que es necesaria para el conocimiento particular de todo objeto. Si esto es así, el juicio estético revela una condición subjetiva que es fundamento del conocimiento objetivo.

Ahora bien, debemos preguntarnos si este fundamento (el *libre juego* entre las facultades) que se revela a través de un sentimiento y excluye todo concepto determinado permite inferir un fundamento no conceptual del conocimiento en Kant. Considero que la respuesta es negativa: si bien es cierto que el sentimiento de placer implicado en el juicio de gusto es una vía de acceso no conceptual a la armonía entre imaginación y entendimiento que subyace a todo conocimiento, este sentimiento de placer supone el vínculo entre una legalidad indeterminada y una capacidad de la imaginación para adecuarse a la legalidad. *Legalidad indeterminada* no implica ausencia de legalidad, sino en el mejor de los casos, la posibilidad indeterminada que subyace a la adopción de conceptos determinados que restringen el operar de la imaginación. El concepto indeterminado que emerge en el juicio de gusto no implica la ausencia de todo concepto, sino por el contrario, la referencia a todo concepto posible, entendido como representación universal y no singular. En el juicio de gusto no es posible determinar el concepto, pues ello implicaría convertir el juicio de gusto en un juicio de conocimiento. Ahora bien, contra las lecturas conceptualistas, la indeterminación del concepto revela un nivel de universalidad que no se limita a ningún concepto, sino que revela una facultad para los conceptos (sea cual fuere este concepto).

En suma, el juicio estético revela, a través del sentimiento, una condición subjetiva sin la cual el conocimiento mediante juicios lógicos no sería posible. Todo concepto determinado supone una facultad subjetiva para los conceptos y una facultad que permita recibir las intuiciones. Eliminar la condición conceptual (indeterminada) que subyace al juicio de gusto implicaría negar la noción misma de *armonía de las facultades*, y con ello, se desmoronaría la teoría kantiana del juicio de gusto. El juicio estético expresa un sentimiento irreductible al concepto, pero este sentimiento no es más que el resultado de la cooperación entre el entendimiento (la facultad de los conceptos) y la imaginación (entendida como facultad de las intuiciones). El juicio de gusto no es conceptual, pero supone algún tipo de actividad conceptual (así sea indeterminada). Creo que es legítimo

afirmar que el análisis de los juicios de gusto revela un *conocimiento en general* que no supone ausencia de conceptos, sino conceptos indeterminados. Es decir, el *conocimiento en general* remite a un estadio en el cual lo múltiple sensible debe ser apto para subsumirse bajo algún concepto; esto es posible si la imaginación se subsume bajo el entendimiento. El *conocimiento en general* nos señala que el *conocimiento determinado* es posible en la medida en que las facultades del conocimiento se hallan en armonía. Por otro lado, si bien es posible hablar de una *fundamentación estética del conocimiento*, en el sentido de que somos conscientes de la armonía de las facultades a través de un sentimiento (y no de manera conceptual), ello no implica que sea legítimo inferir un fundamento no conceptual de la teoría kantiana del conocimiento. La conciencia implicada en el juicio de gusto es el sentimiento de una armonía de las facultades que incluye la presencia ineludible de la facultad de los conceptos. Para finalizar, quisiera citar unas palabras de Silvia Di Sanza que abonan la lectura conceptualista que estoy sugiriendo:

Frente al pensar por determinación de objeto, o sea, frente al conocimiento, se introduce con el juicio estético, el pensar por indeterminación, en base al sólo sentir las fuerzas del ánimo. Entonces *hay actividad conceptual, y mucha, pero sin determinarse según un concepto que restringiría la actividad a un conocimiento en particular.* (Di Sanza, p. 2019, *el subrayado es propio*)

3. El contenido conceptual del juicio de gusto

En “La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una objeción de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemann”, Pedro Stepanenko (2019) realiza una serie de observaciones sobre la tesis que indica que si bien las intuiciones son irreductibles a los conceptos, no debemos inferir de ello que las intuiciones puedan representar objetos prescindiendo de la actividad conceptual. De esta manera, el autor manifiesta su acuerdo con una de las tesis que he defendido en mi crítica a la posición no conceptualista de Heidemann en torno a los juicios de gusto (Oroño, 2017).

Stepanenko subraya acertadamente que la expresión “contenido no-conceptual de la experiencia” es poco afortunada, pues ha propiciado la confusión entre aquello que es representado por una entidad mental y los elementos con los que cuenta esa entidad para representar algo. Considero que esta observación es de suma importancia para el análisis del juicio de gusto y su pretendido contenido no conceptual (véase Heidemann, 2016). Es decir, cuando un sujeto formula un juicio del tipo “X es bello” deberíamos distinguir lo representado (el sentimiento de placer que siente el sujeto y que comunica mediante su enjuiciamiento) de aquellas entidades presupuestas para que dicho sentimiento sea posible. Es verdad que el sentimiento, en tanto estado mental, no es conceptual, pero ello no implica que dicho estado mental pueda prescindir de la actividad conceptual. En relación con esta cuestión, Kant sostiene:

En tanto que discernimiento subjetivo, el gusto contiene un principio de subsunción, pero no de las intuiciones bajo *conceptos*, sino de la *capacidad* de las intuiciones o representaciones (esto es, la imaginación) bajo la *capacidad* de conceptos (esto es, el

entendimiento), en la medida en que la primera coincide *en su libertad* con el primero *en su legalidad*. (KU, AA 05: 287)

Considero que este pasaje es crucial, pues subraya que en el juicio de gusto no se subsumen intuiciones particulares bajo conceptos determinados, sino la facultad misma de las intuiciones (imaginación) bajo la facultad de los conceptos (el entendimiento). Esta subsunción se lleva a cabo *libremente* (sin suponer conceptos determinados). Si bien es legítimo afirmar que el juicio de gusto expresa un sentimiento (el cual no es una entidad conceptual), dicho sentimiento sólo es posible si se supone una relación entre la facultad de los conceptos y la facultad de las intuiciones. En suma, sin facultad de los conceptos, el sentimiento de lo bello sería inexplicable. La posición de Heidemann confunde, como bien señala Stepanenko, lo representado por una entidad mental con los elementos con los que cuenta dicha entidad mental para representar algo. Es decir, Heidemann confunde el sentimiento de placer (irreducible al concepto) con las capacidades mentales (entendimiento e imaginación) que permiten que dicha representación estética de lo bello tenga lugar en la conciencia de un sujeto.

Stepanenko sugiere que en el debate entre kantianos, la expresión “contenido conceptual” debe entenderse como aquello que es representado o aquello a lo que se refiere una entidad mental cuando ésta requiere el uso de conceptos. Tomando en consideración esta propuesta de Stepanenko, intentaré señalar que el juicio de gusto (en tanto entidad mental) posee contenido conceptual, puesto que requiere el uso de conceptos (si bien indeterminados) para fundamentar la posibilidad del placer universal que es representado mediante expresiones del tipo “X es bello”.

Lo que persiste en el juicio de gusto no es un concepto determinado (sea puro o empírico), sino la capacidad de los conceptos (el entendimiento). El juicio de gusto pone de relieve una armonía entre la imaginación y el entendimiento que no requiere la persistencia de conceptos determinados, sino la capacidad de conceptualizar. Sólo de este modo la imaginación es libre, pues no se halla limitada por la regla de un concepto determinado, sino que encuentra cierta unidad indeterminada en su recorrido de un múltiple sensible. Esta unidad indeterminada con la legalidad general del entendimiento y de los conceptos.

Lo que persiste en el juicio de gusto no es un contenido conceptual determinado, sino una capacidad para la *conceptualidad*. Es decir, una capacidad para que la multiplicidad empírica sea conforme con el entendimiento, sin presuponer un concepto determinado. Considero que esta *conceptualidad* que subsiste en el juicio de gusto remite en última instancia a la validez universal que pretende un juicio del tipo “X es bello”:

Pues solo es un juicio del gusto aquel juicio por medio del cual encuentro bello un tulipán particular dado, esto es, por medio del cual encuentro mi satisfacción en él válida universalmente. Cuya peculiaridad consiste precisamente en que aunque tiene validez meramente subjetiva, la pretende sin embargo para *todos* los sujetos, de modo tal como solo podría suceder si fuera un juicio objetivo que descansa en fundamentos cognoscitivos y que podría forzarse mediante una demostración. (KU, AA V: 285)

Sin pretensión de validez universal, el juicio de gusto no podría constituirse como tal y sería meramente un juicio sobre lo agradable. El juicio de gusto presenta aquí dos aspectos inescindibles: por un lado, remite a un aspecto meramente subjetivo e individual (se trata del placer que *yo* siento ante un tulipán particular dado); por otro lado, el juicio de gusto pretende que este placer sea válido para *todos* los sujetos (*como si* fuese un juicio cognoscitivo). ¿Dónde reposa la *conceptualidad* del juicio de gusto? ¿En qué sentido podemos hablar de un contenido conceptual del juicio de gusto? Creo que hay al menos dos respuestas posibles: en primer lugar, podríamos hablar de un contenido conceptual *residual* que resulta de una analogía con el juicio cognoscitivo. Es decir, el juicio de gusto supone una validez universal *como si* estuviese fundamentado en un concepto. Sin embargo, esta primera respuesta es débil, pues un no conceptualista podría aducir que en los juicios sobre lo bello emerge un sentimiento que en su fundamento no supone ninguna actividad conceptual y que la referencia al concepto resulta de una mera analogía con los juicios cognoscitivos. Es decir, un no conceptualista podría afirmar que en el juicio de gusto nos encontramos frente a un hecho singular (el sentimiento estético) que solo mediante una reflexión *a posteriori* es pensado *como si* fuese un juicio cognoscitivo con validez universal. Es como si afirmáramos que al momento de formular un juicio de gusto no se encuentra involucrada ningún tipo de actividad conceptual, siendo la *conceptualidad* un mero efecto *residual* de una analogía con los juicios de conocimiento. En el fundamento del juicio de gusto habría una pura sensación que coloca al sujeto en relación con algo que es juzgado como bello. Creo que este modo de razonar es incorrecto y no responde a la teoría kantiana sobre los juicios de gusto. Por este motivo, es necesario dar lugar a la segunda respuesta a la pregunta que he formulado. Un juicio de gusto posee *conceptualidad*, ya que sin dicha *conceptualidad* no sería posible dar cuenta de la pretensión de validez universal que subyace al enjuiciamiento del tipo “X es bello”. La pretensión de validez universal no es un mero *efecto residual* de una analogía que es posterior al juicio de gusto, sino que el juicio de gusto supone en su fundamento una referencia a una actividad conceptual indeterminada. Ahora bien, un no conceptualista podría preguntar legítimamente: ¿En qué consiste una actividad conceptual indeterminada? Creo que la respuesta se encuentra implícita en el siguiente pasaje kantiano:

[...] en un juicio del gusto no se representa el placer, sino *la validez universal de este placer*, que se percibe como enlazada en el ánimo con el mero enjuiciamiento de un objeto, el cual se representa *a priori* como regla universal para el discernimiento válida para todo el mundo. Es un juicio empírico: que percibo y enjuicio un juicio con placer. Pero es un juicio *a priori*: que lo encuentro bello, esto es, que esta satisfacción puedo exigirla necesariamente de todo el mundo. (KU, 05: 290)

Vemos aquí que el juicio de gusto posee una doble naturaleza. Por un lado, es un juicio empírico que remite a la mera sensación subjetiva, singular e individual. Por otro lado, es un juicio *a priori* que posee pretensión de universalidad. En el juicio de gusto no podemos

prescindir de ninguno de estos aspectos. Es probable que el no conceptualista reduzca el juicio de gusto a su aspecto meramente empírico y pretenda encontrar allí un suelo firme para argumentar acerca de un encuentro singular con un objeto, sin presuponer ningún tipo de actividad conceptual. Ahora bien, esta reducción del juicio de gusto a la validez privada e individual es incompatible con la teoría kantiana del juicio de gusto. Es preciso tener en cuenta el aspecto *a priori* del juicio sobre lo bello. Este aspecto *a priori* remite a la exigencia de que todo el mundo esté de acuerdo con mi enjuiciamiento. Tal vez sea esta la vía para pensar la *actividad conceptual indeterminada* que subyace al juicio de gusto. Es necesario superar el momento de mera sensación singular y exigir que el mismo sentimiento singular que es experimentado en mi conciencia individual sea experimentado por otros sujetos. Este salto de lo individual a lo universal sólo es posible si opera una capacidad para operar conceptualmente, es decir, para tener representaciones universales y mediatas (en este caso, de otros sujetos). En el juicio de gusto no importa si la multiplicidad sensible obedece a tal o cual concepto (sea empírico o puro), sino la exigencia de que mi enjuiciamiento sea válido para *todo* sujeto. Esta referencia a *todo* sujeto sólo es posible si aceptamos una actividad conceptual indeterminada, pues la mera sensación singular es insuficiente para conceptualizar (para representar de manera mediata y universal) el sentimiento que se exige en *todo* sujeto.

En suma, el contenido conceptual del juicio de gusto reside en la actividad conceptual necesaria para colocarse en el lugar de *todo* sujeto y salir del solipsismo involucrado en la mera sensación de lo agradable.

4. El juicio de gusto es representacional y no conceptual

El trabajo de Luciana Martínez, titulado “Kant y el no conceptualismo” (2019), presenta una serie de reflexiones que permiten explicar con mayor detalle las objeciones que he formulado (Oroño, 2017) contra la interpretación no conceptualista de los juicios de gusto sostenida por Heidemann (2016). Este autor subraya tres condiciones para que un contenido mental cuente como contenido no conceptual: “ese contenido debe ser fenoménico, intencional y representacional” (Heidemann, 2016, p. 121). He sostenido (Oroño, 2017) que el sentimiento de placer/displacer no satisface el tercer criterio, en la medida en que el juicio de gusto no implica una representación de la armonía de las facultades de conocimiento. Ahora bien, gracias a las observaciones realizadas por Martínez, intentaré proveer una posible línea de interpretación que indique en qué sentido el juicio de gusto podría ser representacional y por qué esta manera de entender el carácter representacional del juicio de gusto no es suficiente para comprometer a Kant con algún tipo de no conceptualismo.

¿En los juicios de gusto nos representamos el libre juego de las facultades? Como señala Martínez, esta pregunta ha sido abordada por la literatura norteamericana y fue uno de los ejes de discusión entre Allison y Guyer (véase: Guyer, 1979: Chapter 3; Allison, 2001: Part ii; Allison, Guyer, 2006, 117 s. Cit. por Martínez, 2019). He sostenido que el sentimiento es “una capacidad, una receptividad que supone ciertas representaciones, pero él mismo no

es una representación” (Oroño, 2017, p. 100). Esta afirmación encuentra sustento en la KU. Ya en el §1 de la KU Kant afirma que el sentimiento de placer y displacer consiste en una relación de las representaciones:

[...] por medio de la cual no se designa absolutamente nada en el objeto, sino que en ella el sujeto se siente a sí mismo tal y como es afectado por la representación. (KU, AA V: 204)

Es decir, mediante el sentimiento de placer y displacer el sujeto se siente a sí mismo en la medida en que es afectado por una representación. Este aspecto permite dar sustento a la afirmación según la cual el sentimiento supone cierta representación. Ahora bien, mediante el sentimiento no se designa nada en el objeto. Este aspecto permite concluir que el sentimiento de placer y displacer no implica una referencia objetiva. Esta cancelación de la referencia objetiva es uno de los elementos que permite diferenciar el juicio estético de lo bello, de los juicios de conocimiento. En suma, el sentimiento supone una representación que afecta al sujeto, pero mediante el sentimiento no se representa objetivamente ninguna propiedad del objeto. Kant mismo subraya que:

[...] bajo el nombre de sentimiento de placer o displacer la representación se refiere aquí enteramente al sujeto y, ciertamente, a su sentimiento vital, lo cual fundamenta una capacidad muy peculiar de diferenciación y de enjuiciamiento que nada aporta al conocimiento, sino que sólo mantiene en el sujeto la representación dada frente a la capacidad total de las representaciones de las que el ánimo es consciente en el sentimiento de su estado. (KU, AA V: 204)

Una vez más, es posible corroborar que el sentimiento de placer y displacer no implica una representación objetiva, aunque supone una representación que afecta al sujeto. Martínez (2019) sugiere que el concepto de representación es muy amplio en el marco de la filosofía kantiana y afirma que es difícil aceptar que algo sucede en nuestra conciencia sin consistir en algún tipo de representación. Creo que la observación de la autora es oportuna, ya que permite formular la siguiente pregunta: ¿Hay algún tipo de representación *no objetiva* en el juicio de gusto? Considero que la respuesta es afirmativa. El sentimiento es una representación, pero se trata de una representación meramente subjetiva mediante la cual el sujeto se siente a sí mismo. En el caso del juicio de gusto, se representa no solo el placer individual, sino la exigencia de validez universal (rasgo que permite que el juicio de gusto se distinga del juicio sobre lo agradable):

[...] en un juicio del gusto no se representa el placer, sino *la validez universal de este placer*, que se percibe como enlazada en el ánimo con el mero enjuiciamiento de un objeto, el cual se representa *a priori* como regla universal para el discernimiento válida para todo el mundo. (KU, AA 05: 289)

Es decir, el sentimiento de placer consiste en una representación de un estado de placer que posee pretensión de validez universal. En este punto de la argumentación cabe destacar que

el no conceptualismo requiere que encontremos algún tipo de representación que ofrezca conocimiento (referencia objetiva) sin apelar a algún tipo de actividad conceptual. Dado que el sentimiento no implica referencia a objetos, la representación involucrada en el sentimiento de placer es irrelevante en el debate sobre el no conceptualismo y no ofrece sustento alguno a la posición de Heidemann.

Por otro lado, Martínez (2019) se pregunta si la necesidad de realizar una suerte de experiencia en primera persona cada vez que se afirma “esto es bello” no implica un punto a favor del no conceptualismo. Mi respuesta es negativa. Es cierto que el juicio “X es bello” no está determinado conceptualmente, pues si así lo estuviera, no sería necesaria la formulación en primera persona del juicio estético puro. Dicho en otros términos, si el juicio de gusto estuviera determinado conceptualmente, entonces podríamos prescindir de la experiencia en primera persona, ya que mediante una representación conceptual estaríamos en condiciones de acceder al sentimiento de lo bello. El siguiente pasaje permite ilustrar la irreductibilidad del gusto al concepto (*i.e.* del juicio estético al juicio lógico):

Parece que esta es una de las causas principales por las que a esta capacidad de enjuiciamiento estético se le ha puesto el nombre de gusto. Pues, aunque alguien me cuente todos los ingredientes de un guiso y me haga notar de cada uno de ellos que me tienen que resultar agradables, y aunque con justicia elogie lo saludable de esta comida, soy sordo frente a todos estos motivos y pruebo el guiso con mi lengua y mi paladar y emito mi juicio según una y otro (no según principios universales). (KU, AA 05: 285)

Ahora bien, esta irreductibilidad de la *experiencia estética* (la cual debe llevarse a cabo en primera persona) al concepto, no implica un carácter no conceptual del juicio de gusto. En la medida en que los juicios estéticos puros suponen una armonía entre la imaginación y el entendimiento, debemos admitir la presencia al menos *indeterminada* de la actividad conceptual. Esto significa que el juicio “X es bello” no supone ningún concepto determinado (ya sea empírico o puro) sobre X, pues en el juicio de gusto la imaginación es libre y recorre el múltiple *como si* obedeciera una regla (*i.e.* a una ley). El juicio de gusto no supone un concepto determinado, sino la *legalidad* que es propia de todo concepto. Esta *legalidad* en general (propia de todo concepto) es la que permite que el juicio de gusto sea incompatible con una lectura no conceptualista que pretende dar cuenta de ciertos estados mentales que poseen algún tipo de referencia sin suponer ningún tipo de actividad conceptual. El *libre juego* entre la imaginación y el entendimiento que caracteriza al juicio de gusto revela que la teoría kantiana sobre lo bello no puede ser caracterizada como no conceptualista, pues si bien aquí no se supone un concepto determinado, es preciso suponer la facultad de los conceptos y los conceptos indeterminados, es decir, cualquier concepto. Tal vez en el juicio de gusto “X es bello”, X pueda ser determinado sucesivamente como una flor, como una nube, como un animal, como sustancia, como accidente de una sustancia, como posible, como necesario, etc. En el juicio de gusto no importa qué es el objeto, sino que la imaginación recorra la multiplicidad libremente *como si* obedeciera a

conceptos indeterminados (*i.e.* a ningún concepto en particular y a todo concepto posible). Por último, quisiera esbozar una breve reflexión sobre el contraste entre el *conocimiento en general* que emerge en el marco del juicio de gusto y el *conocimiento particular*. Este contraste es abordado por Kant en el §9 de la KU:

Las capacidades cognoscitivas que se ponen en juego por medio de esta representación están aquí en un libre juego, puesto que ningún concepto determinado las limita a una regla cognoscitiva particular. Así pues, el estado de ánimo en esta representación del sentimiento del juego libre de las capacidades de representación debe convertirse en una representación para un conocimiento en general. Ahora bien, la *imaginación* para la combinación de lo múltiple de la intuición, así como el *entendimiento* para la unidad del concepto que unifica las representaciones, forman parte de la representación por medio de la cual se da un objeto para que a partir de aquí surja, en general, conocimiento. Este estado de un *juego libre* de las capacidades cognoscitivas en una representación por medio de la cual se da un objeto debe poder comunicarse universalmente, pues el único tipo de representación que vale para todo el mundo es el conocimiento en tanto que determinación del objeto con la que deben coincidir las representaciones dadas (sea en el sujeto que sea). (KU, AA 05: 217)

En este pasaje podemos elucidar los siguientes aspectos: 1. el *conocimiento en general* es la relación entre imaginación y entendimiento que Kant denomina *libre juego*, en la medida en que no hay una regla determinada que oriente la actividad de la imaginación; 2. se trata de un *conocimiento en general*, puesto que revela las condiciones subyacentes a todo *particular* (*i.e.* todo conocimiento particular supone una armonía entre la imaginación, en tanto facultad de las intuiciones, y el entendimiento, en tanto facultad de los conceptos); 3. ningún objeto podría ser dado si la imaginación y el entendimiento no estuviesen en este estado de *libre juego*.

La posibilidad de afirmar juicios de conocimiento particular (como: “este trébol tiene tres hojas”) supone la aplicación de las categorías a un material que es dado a la sensibilidad, así como la aplicación de conceptos empíricos como “trébol”, “hojas” y conceptos matemáticos como “tres”. Kant parece afirmar en el pasaje recién citado que dicha aplicación de conceptos particulares (tanto puros como empíricos) supone un juego libre de las facultades de la imaginación y el entendimiento. Si estas facultades no estuviesen en cierta armonía, previa incluso a la aplicación de las categorías, el *conocimiento particular* no sería posible, pues no sería posible vincular las representaciones conceptuales con las representaciones intuitivas. Al parecer, la posibilidad de subsumir intuiciones bajo conceptos, supone una subsunción de la facultad de la imaginación bajo la facultad de los conceptos. En este sentido, el esquematismo objetivo de la KrV (A 137/B176 - A147/B187) supone una esquematización sin concepto, en la cual la imaginación es conforme a la legalidad del entendimiento, sin que opere algún concepto determinado. ¿Significa esto que el *libre juego* conlleva algún tipo de no conceptualismo? Considero que no, pues en última instancia, se revela que las facultades que presentan intuiciones son conformes a la facultad de los conceptos, incluso si hacemos abstracción de todo concepto determinado.

5. Conclusiones

Pasemos revista a los momentos desarrollados en este trabajo: 1. El juicio de gusto presenta elementos que permiten fundamentar estéticamente el conocimiento, pero esta fundamentación estética lejos de conducir al no conceptualismo, revela que la *indeterminación conceptual* no es *ausencia de conceptos*, sino la potencialidad para todo concepto. En el juicio sobre lo bello hay actividad conceptual y mucha; 2. En el juicio de gusto hay una persistencia de la actividad conceptual (aunque indeterminada), sin la cual no sería posible superar el mero sentimiento de lo agradable y ascender a la universalidad que es exigida en todo juicio de gusto. La posibilidad de representar la pretensión de validez universal supone una actividad conceptual sin la cual un sujeto no sería capaz de representarse la *intersubjetividad* involucrada en el juicio de gusto; 3. Si bien el juicio de gusto implica una representación, lo representado es el propio estado subjetivo (el sentimiento de placer con pretensión de validez universal) sin que esto implique referencia a objetos. Dado que el no conceptualista requiere que el sentimiento represente objetos sin presuponer conceptos, la representación implicada en el juicio de gusto no es suficiente para asumir una lectura no conceptualista. Asimismo, el gusto es irreducible a conceptos, pero revela una armonía entre imaginación y entendimiento que lejos de conducir al no conceptualismo, subraya la necesaria actividad conceptual (indeterminada) que subyace a los juicios de gusto.

Bibliografía

Allison, H. (2001), *Kant's Theory of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, New York.

Allison, H., Guyer, P. (2006), "Dialogue: Paul Guyer and Henry Allison on Allison's *Kant's Theory of Taste*", en: Kukla, R., *Aesthetics and Cognition in Kant's Critical Philosophy*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Guyer, P. (1979), *Kant and the Claims of Taste*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

Di Sanza, S. (2019), "Comentario al artículo 'El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto' de Matías Oroño", *Con-textos Kantianos*, 9.

Heidemann, D. (2016), "Kant's Aesthetic Nonconceptualism", en: Schulting, D. (comp.), *Kantian Nonconceptualism*, Palgrave Macmillan, London – New York.

Hughes, F. (2007), *Kant's Aesthetic Epistemology. Form and World*, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh.

Kant, I. (2007), *Crítica de la razón pura [1781/1787]*, Traducción de Mario Caimi, Colihue, Buenos Aires.

----- (2016), *Crítica del discernimiento* [1790], Traducción de Roberto Aramayo y Salvador Mas, Machado Libros, Madrid.

Martínez, Luciana (2019), “Kant y el no conceptualismo”, *Con-textos Kantianos*, 9.

Oroño, Matías (2017), “El (no)-conceptualismo de Kant y los juicios de gusto”, *Con-textos Kantianos*, 6, 93-105.

Stepanenko, P. (2019), “La persistencia de los conceptos. Un comentario sobre una objeción de Matías Oroño a Dietmar Heidemann”, *Con-textos Kantianos*, 9.

----- (2016), “Contenidos no-conceptuales en la filosofía de Kant”, *Praxis Filosófica*, 43, 225-242.



Epistemic and Ontological Value of the Ideas and Principles of Reason

Valor epistemológico y ontológico de las ideas y de los principios de la razón

LARA SCAGLIA[•]

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, España

Review of: Meer, R., *Der transzendente Grundsatz der Vernunft. Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2018. ISBN-13: 9783110623161

The work of Rudolf Meer *Der transzendente Grundsatz der Vernunft. Funktion und Struktur des Anhangs zur Transzendentalen Dialektik der Kritik der reinen Vernunft* focuses on the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic.

The Appendix has often been regarded as a controversial addendum to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, insofar as it seems incompatible with the results of the Transcendental Analytic and of the second book of the Transcendental Dialectic, according to which the ideas of reason have no cognitive validity. Moreover, the text has a fragmentation structure, which generates considerable difficulties to provide a comprehensive and unitary understanding of it. Meer, on the contrary, has given his book a clear and systematic structure, which helps in the comprehension of Kant's text.

Firstly, he analyses the Appendix, aiming to present the main problem of the inquiry, namely, the ontological and methodological value of Kant's distinctions between reason in its regulative use and its constitutive one. Secondly, the author deepens his analysis of the problem, differentiating three main questions concerning: 1) the origin of the concepts (ideas, principles) of reasons; 2) the relationships among concepts of reasons, purposiveness and systematicity; 3) the possibility of a transcendental deduction of the

[•] Doctora en Filosofía, colaboradora en el CEHIC de la UAB. E-mail de contacto: lara.scaglia@gmail.com

concepts of reason. Lastly, Meer applies the results obtained, providing particular examples to show the use, according to Kant's account, of the concepts of reason in chemistry, physiological anthropology, astronomy, and theology.

The leading thread of the book is given by the mirror-metaphor: it is not possible to avoid that when we stare at a mirror, we see objects as if they were just in front of us, just behind the mirror. In a similar way, we cannot avoid the transcendental illusion of reason, which takes place when the understanding unknowingly oversteps the bounds of our understanding, trying to apply the categories beyond the sphere of objects of possible experience. However, what is important, is to clarify the status of the objects beyond possible experience, i.e. the unconditioned objects, and the concepts of reason referred to them. In this sense the ideas of reason have to be regarded as the forms of the objects behind the mirror and the principles of reason (homogeneity, specification, continuity) as the transcendental functions used to make conclusions in judgements concerning the unconditioned.

Once clarified this point, Meer focuses on the most controversial question of the Appendix: the possibility of a transcendental deduction of the ideas and the principles of reason. Is a deduction of the forms of the unconditioned objects possible? The author provides (in chapter 5) an original and clear contribute to the critical debate among Kantian scholars. In contrast to the transcendental deduction of the categories, the question regarding the legitimacy of the functions of reason is not clearly formulated by Kant, who only alludes to the objective validity of ideas (A 664/B 692; A 669/B 697). To argue his interpretation, according to which a deduction is possible, Meer relies on several passages of the Appendix (e.g. A 670/B698 – A 680/B708; A650/B678; A651/B679, A664/B692) where Kant stresses the validity of ideas, analogous to the schemata, as functions of the unity of cognition. The justification of the objective validity of the regulative use of reason, however, is not ostensive and direct, but indirect and should be intended in two senses: epistemological-methodical and metaphysical-ontological. In the first sense the deduction justifies the compatibility between concepts of reason and the conditions of possibility of objects of possible experience, whilst in the second sense, the justification aims to legitimate the thought of objects of reason, i.e. objects in the idea (*Gegenstände in der Idee*). Then, constitutive and regulative principles are neatly separated and compatible: the former constitute the objects of cognition, the latter provide unity to cognition and in this sense (chapter 6) they do not deal with nature, rather with the method in which reason itself is at work when it inquires nature. For instance, the principle of affinity plays a fundamental role in the classification of the chemical elements, while the principle of continuity is at the basis of the physiological anthropology. Moreover, according to the mirror-metaphor, it is possible to clarify the movements of celestial bodies in terms of circles or parabolas regarded as objects behind the mirror. Finally, God might be regarded as a sort of highest object in the idea, as an ideal of reason, compatible with the limits of cognition, to which it serves as a rule in order to build a unitary system.

The book has a clear aim, it provides a useful contribution to the understanding of an almost neglected part of the *Critique of Pure Reason* and prepares the ground for further possible inquiries. For instance, it would be interesting to understand the historical background of Kant's account of the regulative use of reason, as well as to define, once again and in light of the results of the book, core notions such as 'a priori', 'transcendental', 'objects'. Besides, what are (if any) the consequences of the legitimation of a transcendental deduction of the ideas? Does it provide an argument on behalf of a constructivist interpretation of Kant's theoretical and practical theory? What are the limits between constitutive and regulative principles?

To conclude, the book of Meer provides not only a valuable contribution to understanding the Appendix but it also concerns (although, unfortunately, the author does not stress enough this point) topics interesting for the on-going ontological and epistemological debate.



¿Derivación lógica o prueba jurídica? Sobre el sentido kantiano de la Deducción Trascendental de las categorías

Logical derivation or juridical proof? About the Kantian sense of the Transcendental Deduction of the categories

ALBERTO LÓPEZ LÓPEZ*

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

Reseña de: Schulting, D.: *Kant's deduction from apperception. An essay on the transcendental deduction of the categories*, Berlin/Boston, De Gruyter, 2019, 343 pp. ISBN: 978-3-11-058269-7.

El lector encontrará en esta obra un estudio de la Deducción Trascendental de la *KrV* y, más concretamente, de la primera parte de la edición B de este pasaje. En esta obra, Dennis Schulting propone una lectura donde retoma la crítica postkantiana orientada a mostrar, entre otras cosas, una presunta deficiencia del planteamiento trascendental de Kant: la ausencia de un principio genético o deductivo. En este sentido, el objetivo general de la obra es mostrar que la Deducción Trascendental, acotada textualmente de la manera señalada, ofrece un principio a partir del cual pueden deducirse, en sentido lógico-derivativo, las cuatro tríadas de categorías, a saber: la apercepción trascendental. No obstante, si bien es verdad que el autor otorga un carácter lógico-derivativo a la Deducción Trascendental y asume de este modo una de las demandas postkantianas, también lo es, sin embargo, que esta asunción no deja de ser parcial y que tiene como propósito, ante todo, delimitar una determinada línea de lectura frente a las recepciones clásicas de esta problemática.

En efecto, en el primero de los capítulos, reservado para la introducción general a la obra, Schulting circunscribe su planteamiento confrontándolo con lecturas en cierta medida opuestas entre sí, como son las de Stephen Houlgate, quien hace eco de la crítica de Hegel

* Profesor ayudante investigador (contratado predoctoral FPU) en la UCM. Contacto: alberl02@ucm.es

y pretende, por tanto, evidenciar como deficiente la ausencia de un principio de génesis interna, o Lorenz Krüger, quien objeta que no hay lugar para esta crítica, pues precisamente la ausencia de un principio genético o deductivo es un rasgo pretendidamente definitorio de la filosofía trascendental. Dentro de este marco problemático, Schulting circunscribe su propuesta rechazando la lectura de Houlgate, pero tal rechazo no se apoya, como en el caso de Krüger, en una determinación del carácter trascendental (y, por tanto, no deductivo sino epagógico) de la filosofía de Kant, sino más bien en la tesis de que sí es posible encontrar dicho principio en la unidad de apercepción. A partir de esta propuesta el resto de la obra se endereza, por tanto, a llevar a cabo esta deducción y, teniendo a la vista esta orientación general, los capítulos segundo, tercero, cuarto y quinto pretenden allanar el terreno para realizar tal propósito.

Debido a la línea de interpretación que se ha propuesto, Schulting tiene que dar razón del hecho de que Kant determina la significación del término «deducción» por analogía con una prueba *jurídica* cuyo proceder, por tanto, no es compatible con el carácter lógico-derivativo mencionado. Así pues, tras un segundo capítulo titulado «*The Herz question*», donde el autor toma apoyo en la carta de 1772 escrita a Marcus Herz para sopesar el descubrimiento inicial, por parte de Kant, de la necesidad de una Deducción Trascendental, se aborda la problemática de la metáfora jurídica en el capítulo tercero, el cual lleva por título «*The Quid Juris*». Para medir la compatibilidad de su propuesta en relación con esta analogía Schulting evalúa, a través de una discusión con Dieter Heinrich, si el tipo de argumento que se expone en la Deducción Trascendental es una justificación o una prueba. Como se anuncia desde un comienzo, a través de esta discusión el autor apuesta por una deducción en sentido lógico-derivativo, una apuesta cuya viabilidad Schulting encuentra probada en el capítulo cuarto, donde determina no solo el tipo de argumento que se desarrolla en la Deducción Trascendental, sino también el orden en que procede y la meta que consigue alcanzar.

«*The Master Argument*» es el título del cuarto capítulo, donde el lector encontrará una lectura del argumento central de la Deducción Trascendental, que Schulting localiza en la primera parte de la edición B. Frente a aquellas lecturas que encuentran un corte en la argumentación cuando Kant visibiliza la relación entre la unidad sintética de apercepción y la unidad del objeto en general, Schulting localiza una continuidad que se apoya en la identidad entre ambas y, a partir de ella, precisa el tipo de correlación que se da entre la unidad de apercepción y la unidad de un objeto en general –unidad que es lo mismo que la objetividad–. Esta continuidad entre la autoconciencia y la objetividad, unida al apoyo que le brinda la interpretación de Henry Allison, permite a Schulting además localizar una reciprocidad en el orden de la argumentación, en virtud de la cual el argumento central de la Deducción Trascendental pasa a caracterizarse como el “argumento recíproco”. Debido a esta reciprocidad, este pasaje de *KrV* admitiría, según el autor, una lectura progresiva, que partiría de la unidad de apercepción y concluiría con la objetividad de la experiencia, y a su vez una lectura regresiva, que procedería en el orden inverso. Con vistas a confirmar la derivabilidad de las categorías a partir de la apercepción trascendental, Schulting ofrece

aún, no obstante, un quinto capítulo, titulado «*The Unity of Thought: On the Guiding Thread*». En este capítulo el autor se centra en la Deducción Metafísica (no ya trascendental) de las categorías y, más concretamente, intenta localizar en ella apoyo textual para su lectura, un apoyo que encuentra atendiendo a la función de unidad que se modaliza en los distintos tipos de juicios y a cómo las categorías se deducen a partir de los mismos. En efecto, puesto que los juicios no son sino distintos momentos de una misma función de unidad, que es la unidad analítica de la conciencia (es decir, la apercepción trascendental o “Yo pienso”), y puesto que las categorías se deducen metafísicamente a partir de las funciones lógicas de los juicios, se sigue, para Schulting, que los conceptos puros del entendimiento son lógicamente derivables, en último término, a partir de la unidad de apercepción. Es más, puesto que la unidad analítica de la conciencia, determinada ya como unidad sintética, es la premisa de la que parte la argumentación que previamente se ha fijado en el capítulo cuarto, Schulting encuentra retrospectivamente en la Deducción Metafísica de las categorías una suerte de confirmación de su interpretación.

Una vez que da al término «deducción» un sentido lógico-derivativo (capítulo tercero), que muestra que la argumentación en la Deducción Trascendental procede a través del denominado “argumento recíproco” (capítulo cuarto), y que localiza en la Deducción Metafísica de las categorías un sólido apoyo textual, Schulting dispone del suelo necesario para asentar el cuerpo del libro, que queda trazado entre los capítulos sexto y noveno. En efecto, en estos capítulos el autor realiza la anunciada derivación de cada tríada de categorías a partir del principio de unidad de apercepción trascendental y, por ello, los capítulos sexto, séptimo, octavo y noveno llevan por título, coherentemente, «*Apperception and the Categories of Modality*», «*Apperception and the Categories of Relation*», «*Apperception and the Categories of Quality*» y «*Apperception and the Categories of Quantity*» respectivamente.

Así pues, el lector encontrará en el sexto capítulo la deducción de las categorías de la modalidad a partir de la unidad de apercepción trascendental, para lo cual Schulting establece una tricotomía entre el “Yo pienso” como acto de *determinación*, el “Yo soy” como la posición de existencia indeterminada que ha de ser *lo determinado* por este acto de determinación, y la *regla* que establece la conexión entre lo determinado (el “Yo soy”) y el acto de determinación (el “Yo pienso”), a saber, que el “Yo pienso” necesariamente acompaña a todas las representaciones. A partir de esta tricotomía, Schulting deduce las categorías de la modalidad argumentando que, puesto que el “Yo pienso” es el acto de pensamiento que circunscribe la *posibilidad* lógica de todas las representaciones, y puesto que en el acto de pensamiento “Yo pienso” está ya dada la propia *existencia*, se sigue que en la medida en que se tenga conciencia de la propia existencia el “Yo pienso” tiene que acompañar *necesariamente* a todas mis representaciones (estableciéndose así una necesidad hipotética o condicionada). En el séptimo capítulo, Schulting establece las siguientes correlaciones entre los rasgos de la unidad de apercepción o “Yo pienso” y las categorías de la relación: la identidad del “Yo pienso” frente al cambio del resto de estados psíquicos sería el correlato de las categorías de *sustancia-accidente*, la determinación que el “Yo pienso” ejerce en su espontaneidad sobre la sensibilidad sería el correlato de las

categorías de *causa-efecto*, y la unidad sintética de varias representaciones heterogéneas entre sí sería el correlato de la categoría de *comunidad*.

En el octavo capítulo, Schulting deriva las categorías de la cualidad a partir de la apercepción atendiendo, fundamentalmente, a las Anticipaciones de la Percepción. El autor precisa que la *realidad* de los objetos de experiencia radica en que estos se dan siempre a través de la sensación que, a su vez, aparece en un cierto grado o magnitud intensiva. Por consiguiente, toda representación es incorporada a la conciencia empírica en un cierto grado de magnitud intensiva y comporta, consiguientemente, el establecimiento de un límite o *limitación* entre la realidad (determinada en tal grado de intensidad) y la *negación* (interpretada como ausencia de intensidad). Dentro de este marco conceptual, Schulting considera que la apercepción, en cuanto representación simple, es una conciencia vacía de sensación (y, por tanto, de realidad), y que es a partir de ella, por tanto, como puede formarse el concepto de negación. En este sentido, la apercepción trascendental es vista como el correlato de la categoría de negación y, consiguientemente, como fuente posibilitante de toda limitación de la magnitud intensiva en la donación de lo real a la conciencia empírica. Finalmente, para abordar las categorías de la cantidad Schulting se pregunta por la relación que guardan entre sí la unidad, la pluralidad y la totalidad con la unidad de apercepción de cara a la construcción de totalidades perceptivas. Para ello, el autor comienza por localizar en Kant dos sentidos de unidad, a saber, la unidad de que dispone cada representación a diferencia de la unidad que guardan entre sí distintas representaciones. Ello le permite precisar el concepto de combinación (síntesis) expuesto en el §16 de la Deducción Trascendental y, por tanto, el de una de sus modalidades: la síntesis agregación involucrada en la construcción de las totalidades perceptivas como magnitudes extensivas. Una vez que ha precisado este concepto, Schulting distingue a su vez dos tipos de “acompañamiento” por parte del “Yo pienso” con respecto a las representaciones, a saber: acompañar a *todas* las representaciones y acompañar a *cada* representación. Son estas distinciones previas las que permiten al autor mostrar que el tipo de unidad necesaria para construir una totalidad perceptiva como agregado de una pluralidad previamente dada es precisamente la unidad de apercepción y que, por tanto, la inteligibilidad de las categorías de la cantidad se deriva del concepto de combinación mencionado. No obstante, si bien es verdad que tras mostrar la derivabilidad de las cuatro tríadas de las categorías a partir del principio de unidad de apercepción trascendental esta obra alcanza su fin, no lo es, sin embargo, que llegue a su final.

Tras vertebrar el cuerpo principal de la obra Schulting nos ofrece en un décimo capítulo, titulado «*From Apperception to Objectivity*», un análisis más detallado del denominado “argumento recíproco” analizado previamente en el cuarto capítulo. Para mostrar con una mayor claridad esta reciprocidad, Schulting desdobra el argumento en dos niveles, situando en el primero de ellos el carácter progresivo del argumento, que parte de la unidad de apercepción y arriba a la objetividad, y localizando en el segundo el correlativo carácter regresivo, donde se parte, en sentido inverso, de la objetividad de la experiencia y se reconstruye el proceder argumentativo mostrando la naturaleza deductiva

de la Deducción Trascendental. De este modo, el autor cierra su lectura de la primera parte de la edición B de la Deducción Trascendental, pero pese a esta acotación textual, el lector encontrará en esta obra un último capítulo donde se esboza cómo a partir de la argumentación expuesta habría de orientarse una lectura de la segunda parte de la edición B de la Deducción Trascendental. Así, en el capítulo once, titulado «*On the “Second Step” of the B-Deduction*», se abordan temas como la conexión de la síntesis de aprehensión con la unidad sintética de apercepción, el problema de la autoafección pura, o el sentido y la función de la síntesis figurativa (*synthesis speciosa*).

Como habrá podido apreciarse es esta una obra con una estructura bien definida, lo cual, unido a la coherencia en la argumentación, a la precisión constante de los objetivos parciales en relación con el objetivo general y a la claridad en la expresión, hacen de este libro una lectura recomendable para aquel que esté interesado en abordar la Deducción Trascendental. En efecto, más allá de la concordancia o discrepancia con la interpretación que Schulting propone, es preciso reconocer en esta obra un esfuerzo serio por aportar luz a un pasaje que, como el propio Kant señala, no deja de estar envuelto en oscuridades. Por ello, obras como esta, edificadas sobre una intención de rigor y claridad, y sobre un diálogo explícito con los autores que previamente se han dedicado al estudio de las mismas cuestiones, son algo sin duda a tener en cuenta por el lector de la obra de Kant.



¿Qué espacio deja, si es que deja alguno, la filosofía de Kant a la teología?

What room, if any, does Kant's philosophy leaves for theology?

GUILLERMO LÓPEZ MORLANES*

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

Reseña de: Chris L. Firestone, Nathan A. Jacobs, James H. Joiner (eds.), *Kant and the Question of Theology*, Nueva York, Cambridge University Press, 2017, 270 pp.

¿Qué espacio deja, si es que deja alguno, la filosofía de Kant a la teología? Con esta frase se abre el libro *Kant and the question of theology*, donde, ante el creciente interés por el tratamiento kantiano del problema de Dios, de la teología y de la religión en el mundo de habla inglesa, se reúnen diversas contribuciones sobre esta problemática escritas por algunos de los más actuales comentaristas y estudiosos kantianos, así como por algunos filósofos y teólogos que no pertenecen estrictamente al ámbito de los estudios sobre Kant en esa lengua. El libro está dividido en tres partes que abordan la relación del pensamiento kantiano con tres elementos: Dios, la religión y la redención.

En la primera parte, “Kant y Dios”, el lector encontrará nada más comenzar el artículo “El conocimiento práctico de Dios” (“Practical Cognition of God”), donde James J. DiCenso estudia la apertura kantiana del camino práctico que permite usar válidamente los conceptos suprasensibles (y más concretamente el concepto de Dios), camino que deja a un lado tanto a la teología dogmática como al materialismo científico. Se inicia entonces a esbozar un complejo diseño arquitectónico en el que la clave de bóveda será la autonomía moral del sujeto y en el que entrarán conceptos no mecanicistas como *Dios*, *libertad* o *esperanza*, conceptos que, como advierte DiCenso, han de ser detenidamente analizados. El autor recuerda primero los límites al conocimiento especulativo tal como son establecidos por Kant en la primera *Crítica*, límites que finalmente llevarán a rechazar

* Estudiante del Doble Grado en Derecho y Filosofía en la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. Contacto: guillermo.lopez.morlanes@gmail.com

toda prueba intelectual de la existencia de Dios al modo en que era planteada por la teología tradicional. El curso de la argumentación le lleva entonces a analizar el uso regulativo y práctico de las ideas: estas van a servir como principios que guían la actividad ética del sujeto, y a partir de aquí, como demuestra DiCenso, será ya posible afirmar un conocimiento práctico de las leyes morales y, consecuentemente, la postulación de conceptos suprasensibles como *Dios*, plenamente operativos en el sistema crítico kantiano.

A continuación, nos topamos con el capítulo “El nacimiento de Dios y el problema de la historia” (“The birth of God and the Problem of History”), a cargo de Pablo Muchnik, donde se explora el problema de la teodicea en la filosofía de la historia kantiana a partir del famoso texto de 1784 *Idea para una historia universal en clave cosmopolita*. Este texto establece una clara conexión con el anterior, pues frente a una interpretación del título del opúsculo kantiano donde *idea* es entendido en sentido teórico, especulativo, Muchnik va a defender una interpretación en clave práctica que sitúe al texto en un nuevo horizonte de inteligibilidad: el de la moral. Por otra parte, se va a resaltar la función *terapéutica* que la idea de historia tiene para Kant, algo que permite reinterpretar la noción de *providencia* y el lugar asignado a esta: emerge entonces lo que Muchnik llama “el nacimiento de Dios”, expresión que recoge el proceso de internalización de la providencia, de la naturaleza, como un objetivo o fin nuestro, propio. De esta forma Kant revoluciona la manera en que el ser humano se comprende con respecto a la divinidad y abre la posibilidad de instaurar una “religión racional”.

De nuevo en clave práctica encontramos el análisis del estatuto que el concepto de *summum bonum* tiene en la articulación de la moral en Kant. El objetivo, entre otros, de esta contribución de James H. Joiner titulada “El *summum bonum* kantiano y las exigencias de la razón” (“The Kantian *Summum Bonum* and the Requirements of Reason”), es sacar a la luz las tensiones existentes a lo largo de todo el corpus crítico kantiano que emergen al desentrañar la argumentación moral que requiere el concepto de *sumo bien*. Esta problematización de las premisas del razonamiento permite así a Joiner mostrar fisuras en el edificio ético de Kant. Cierra esta primera parte un escrito de David Bradshaw (“Kant and the experience of God”) sobre la firme afirmación kantiana de la imposibilidad de la experiencia de Dios, en el que analiza y discute las demostraciones de Kant sobre la (im)posibilidad de los milagros, la revelación y otras experiencias de la divinidad. Es convicción de Bradshaw que hay en el argumentario de Kant una cierta miopía y confusión a la hora de distinguir entre experiencias de Dios y creencias sobre Dios, algo que intenta mostrar recurriendo a textos de la tradición religiosa occidental.

Se abre la segunda parte (que está vertebrada, como dijimos, por la relación de Kant con la religión) con el estudio de Lawrence Pasternak sobre el asentimiento religioso y la teología, que lleva por subtítulo “Haciendo espacio a la fe histórica” (“Religious Assent and the Question of Theology. Making Room for Historical Faith”), en referencia a la afirmación del prólogo a la edición B de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, según la cual el establecimiento de los límites del saber fue necesario para dejar un espacio propio a la fe. El estatuto de la fe racional pura es cuestionado por Pasternak y comparado con el de la fe histórica, de las religiones determinadas en el espacio y en el tiempo, abordando para ello

los textos kantianos de la década de 1790. Tras hacer un riguroso estudio del lugar de la creencia/fe [*Glaube*] junto al conocimiento [*Wissen*] y a la opinión [*Meinung*] en la primera *Crítica*, Pasternak entra de lleno en *La Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*, libro en el que disecciona las afirmaciones kantianas sobre la religión positiva, histórica, revelada y su relación con la teología y la fe racional pura, para lo que tiene que abordar de nuevo el problema del *sumo bien*, del que hablábamos a propósito del artículo de Joiner.

Si el anterior artículo hablaba, en general, de la fe histórica, el que le sigue, escrito por Leslie Stevenson, se va a centrar en una fe histórica concreta, el cristianismo. En “Kant versus el cristianismo” (“Kant versus Christianity”) encontramos un análisis de algunos de los dogmas o principios fundamentales del cristianismo y su recepción y crítica por parte de Kant. El capítulo aborda conceptos como revelación, encarnación o salvación, y consulta para ello fuentes tanto del canon kantiano como de la tradición cristiana. Está, además, escrito de forma muy original, casi como la estructura de un debate tesis-respuesta, intentando ejemplificar, como dice el propio autor, ese diálogo entre teólogos y filósofos que Kant recomendaba en su *El conflicto de las facultades*.

El capítulo séptimo del libro, escrito por William J. Abraham (“Agencia divina y acción divina en Immanuel Kant”, “Divine Agency and Divine Action in Immanuel Kant”) realiza una labor de análisis conceptual de términos de la tradición cristiana similar a la que llevaba a cabo Stevenson, si bien en este caso desde una perspectiva teológica se va a criticar duramente la propuesta kantiana, tildada de moralista y de la que, dice Abraham, la teología cristiana ha de desprenderse. En base a la distinción kantiana de acción divina y agencia divina, el autor argumenta que, lejos de suponer una ayuda, la propuesta de Kant es un obstáculo para la fe cristiana en la sociedad contemporánea, pues no hace sino despojar de todo su contenido religioso a todos los conceptos fundamentales de la tradición sometiéndolos al imperio de la moral (kantiana). En el proyecto de Kant, argumenta Abraham, el cristianismo se ve jibarizado en favor de un teísmo moral racional que, lejos de ser un soporte de la fe, como algunas lecturas generosas pueden ver, supone su misma negación.

En esta misma línea crítica se encuadra el siguiente capítulo del libro, que aborda la cuestión de la revelación a la vez que critica la postura adoptada por Kant frente a esta desde la lectura de los textos de algunos Padres de la Iglesia (“Kant and the Problem of Divine Revelation. An Assessment and Reply in Light of the Eastern Church Fathers”). El autor, Nathan A. Jacobs, comienza analizando la afirmación reiterada por Kant según la cual, si bien nadie puede negar con certeza la posibilidad de la revelación divina, nadie podría tampoco reconocerla como tal revelación en caso de que ocurriera (afirmación que nos permite, dice Jacobs, catalogar a Kant como “agnóstico dogmático”) para después contraatacarla desde algunos escritos del cristianismo temprano. Las sorprendentes (y, como confiesa, pretendidamente provocadoras) conclusiones a las que llega su investigación son, por un lado, que la comprensión kantiana de la revelación es tan diferente a la de los Padres de la Iglesia que los argumentos del primero son “irrelevantes”

desde la perspectiva de los últimos. Por otro lado, aunque Kant quiera dejar abierta la puerta a la posibilidad *óptica* de la revelación a la vez que cierra la *epistemológica*, no puede hacerlo si por revelación entendemos lo que ciertos primeros cristianos entendieron por tal: en ese caso, ninguna de las puertas puede cerrarse.

Jacqueline Mariña nos abre la puerta a la tercera parte del libro, que gira en torno al concepto de *redención*. Queda clausurada así la segunda parte exclusivamente en cuanto a la ordenación del libro, no en lo que respecta a temática y método. Aunque hayamos entrado de lleno en la última sección, el artículo de Mariña “Lo que la perfección exige. Un relato Ireneo de Kant sobre el mal radical” (“What Perfection Demands. An Irenaean Account of Kant on Radical Evil”) continúa en la senda dibujada por los escritos anteriores: en este caso, la autora aborda la tesis kantiana del mal radical desde una lectura que pretende superar las interpretaciones que parten de San Agustín y ven una contradicción en las premisas del argumento de Kant acerca del mal radical en la naturaleza humana en favor de otras a las que denomina “del desarrollo” o “del progreso”, esto es, “ireneas”, que arrojan una nueva luz sobre el texto *La Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón* y que permiten salvar la (desde esta nueva óptica, ahora aparente, no real), contradicción en el planteamiento kantiano. Algunas reflexiones sobre la expiación y la gracia (“Atonement and Grace in Kant. Some reflections”) le sirven a Keith Yandell para criticar el tipo de lectura de Mariña y afirmar que algunas argumentaciones kantianas (que se dedica a formalizar lógicamente) son insuficientes en sus intentos por reflexionar acerca de la positividad de la gracia, así como por construir una teoría de la expiación.

El penúltimo artículo del libro prosigue con la reflexión sobre la expiación a la vez que se pregunta sobre la relación de Kant, la cristología y el problema de la encarnación (“Christology... within the Limits of Reason Alone? Kant on Fittingness for Atonement”). El capítulo, a cargo de Thomas H. McCall, arranca con un análisis de las afirmaciones kantianas sobre “el hijo de Dios” y la problemática sobre la posibilidad de que una persona divina y, por tanto, buena pueda llegar a ser un auténtico ejemplo moral. Tomadas en serio estas afirmaciones, dice McCall, Kant no puede llegar a ser considerado como un auténtico defensor de la cristología tradicional, pues algunas de sus tesis se posicionan en contra y otras son ambiguas y no le permiten afirmar taxativamente su sintonía u oposición. No obstante, tras el estudio comparativo con algunos autores de la tradición cristológica, se puede concluir que Kant no supone tampoco una gran amenaza para ella.

Cierra el libro la contribución de Chris L. Firestone acerca de la fe en la resurrección de los cuerpos (“Rational Religious Faith in a Bodily Resurrection”) y el lugar que puede ocupar esta creencia cristiana en las coordenadas de la razón práctica tal como es presentada por Kant, pese a que no fuera tratada explícitamente en sus reflexiones sobre la religión. En un intento por aunar la fe positiva con la racional, Firestone intenta, a través de sutiles argumentos, defender que la encarnación del alma en el cuerpo, así como la resurrección carnal tras la muerte, son perfectamente compatibles con el sistema kantiano. Sólo asumiendo estas afirmaciones y sus consecuencias, puede Kant en última instancia salvar su defensa de la moral sin caer en el absurdo práctico al que ciertos dilemas parecen

abocar a la razón. El concepto de fe racional pura práctica entra aquí en juego para posibilitar toda esta argumentación que permite a Firestone finalmente decir que, sin haber defendido Kant esta tesis de la resurrección de los cuerpos, podría haberlo hecho.

Una extensa recopilación bibliográfica sobre las contribuciones en inglés tanto clásicas como más actuales sobre la conexión entre el pensamiento kantiano y los problemas tratados en el libro (religión, Dios, moral...) es el broche final de este tomo y constituye uno de sus puntos fuertes. Sin duda es un volumen interesante para todo aquel que quiera adentrarse al pensamiento de Kant sobre Dios y la religión desde la filosofía analítica y, en general, en pensamiento en lengua inglesa. Igualmente constituye una buena referencia para quien desee indagar en estos asuntos desde una perspectiva interdisciplinar: como hemos intentado mostrar, este libro bucea en la filosofía kantiana desde perspectivas extra-filosóficas, sobre todo desde la teología. En ese sentido, hay que destacar que el libro no trata tanto de la relación de Kant y la teología como de la manera en que desde la teología puede abordarse a Kant. Por otro lado, lo que más se trabaja en este volumen es la cuestión de la religión, más que la de la teología. Para ello se analizan sobre todo la *Crítica de la razón pura* y *La Religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*: sin despreciar la relevancia y centralidad de estos textos, sin duda se echa a veces en falta un análisis más profundo de otros textos kantianos como son *El conflicto de las Facultades*, *El fin de todas las cosas* o *Probable inicio de la historia humana*, escritos fundamentales que pueden aportar mucha luz a este asunto. Pese a todo, el volumen está bastante equilibrado y da buena cuenta del pensamiento kantiano en torno a Dios, la teología y la religión y tiene la ventaja de que, al ser artículos independientes, se pueden consultar por separado, en función de las necesidades del lector: bien sean los más estrictamente filosóficos, los que leen a Kant desde la teología o los que confrontan el pensamiento kantiano con textos extra-filosóficos (teológicos o pertenecientes a la tradición cultural cristiana occidental). Sería interesante que se hubiera incluido alguna contribución en que se analizaran las referencias a otras religiones, así como una confrontación con otros grandes pensadores de la religión contemporáneos a Kant como puedan ser Schleiermacher o Hegel. Pero eso, claro, sería ya otro libro.



Interés por el desinterés en la *Crítica del juicio estético*
Interest for the desinterest in the Critique of Aesthetic
Judgement

GUILLERMO MORENO TIRADO*

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

Reseña de: Fan, D., *Die Problematik der Interesselosigkeit bei Kant. Eine Studie zur »Kritik der ästhetischen Urteilskraft«*, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2018, pp. 174. ISBN: 9783110544893.

El trabajo de D. Fan es el resultado de una versión revisada de su «Disertación» (el equivalente a nuestras Tesis doctorales) de 2016 en la Universidad de Tubinga, por consiguiente, el texto *guarda las formas (académicas)*. El trabajo consiste en una lectura concienzuda de algunas de las partes fundamentales de la «Crítica del juicio estético» (o: Crítica de la facultad estética de juzgar) valiéndose de la *cuestión del desinterés* en Kant como hilo conductor del texto. La tesis principal, con la que estamos de acuerdo, es que la complacencia o satisfacción sin ningún interés (*das Wohlgefallen ohne alles Interesse*) o aquello que complace sin interés alguno, que subyace al juicio de gusto, fundamenta el análisis crítico de toda la analítica de la facultad estética de juzgar. Fan muestra que, en los tramos principales del texto, este «hilo conductor» no se pierde, de modo que, como se defiende en este trabajo, el *desinterés* de la satisfacción es, por así decir, el «criterio de discernimiento» para el intérprete de esta sección de la *Crítica de la facultad de juzgar* (en adelante *KU*); agarrando este hilo (y tirando suavemente de él), tendremos un camino para salir del laberinto. El texto logra mostrar los rendimientos hermenéuticos de su hipótesis de lectura y es sin duda un texto de consideración obligada tanto para el estudioso de la *KU* (y de Kant, en general), como para quien busca un texto expositivamente claro y detallado de los puntos fundamentales del texto kantiano atravesados por este problema.

* Doctorando de la Universidad Complutense de Madrid. E-mail: guigom01@ucm.es

Este *desinterés* pertenece a un *juicio* que, siendo efectivamente un *juicio*, esto es, siendo la composición de una pluralidad de sensaciones dadas o de la representación dada de una pluralidad de sensaciones en una unidad, acontece solamente mientras no se encuentra *concepto*, o sea, *regla para la construcción de figura*, digamos, *regla* que, como universal, discriminaría qué particulares quedarían subsumidos bajo ella; este *juicio*, siendo siempre contingente, es, por así decir, *irreductible* a equivalente alguna, o sea, radicalmente *subjetivo* y, al mismo tiempo, exigente de un reconocimiento (por supuesto, *subjetivo*) universal. Ningún *interés* hay en la complacencia que nos mueve a emitir el *juicio* «esto es bello», es decir, no reporta más que la complacencia misma con la forma del objeto o su representación dada espontáneamente; así, a esta *complacencia desinteresada* la designa Kant como *favor* (*Gunst*), el cual es la *única complacencia libre*. Fan defiende, con cierto éxito, a mi juicio, que este carácter «libre» de la *complacencia* es el mismo del que disfruta el «libre juego de las facultades» en la medida en que no está restringido por ningún concepto determinado, es decir, porque mientras *falte* el concepto —a pesar de (tener que) seguir y seguir siempre buscándolo, por tanto *interpretando* con serio empeño en «resolver»—, el grato encuentro entre la imaginación y el entendimiento solo dará *gratitud*, o sea, *gracia, favor*, o el «ingrato» encuentro entre la imaginación y la razón solo dará *harmonía* entre ambas facultades.

Este «faltar concepto», esta *ausencia*, avía un lugar en el que «se guarda» un aspecto puro del juicio que la sistemática todavía no había desvelado. A este lugar sistemático pertenece todo aquello que no cabe ni en el discurso cognoscitivamente válido (la ciencia), ni en el discurso práctico válido (la moral) y que, sin embargo, viene a *mostrar* por qué para ambos ámbitos de validez siempre tiene que haber *regla para la construcción de figura*. Lo *muestra* fenomenológicamente, sin duda, y, precisamente, porque, en cierta medida, pone a ambas «gramáticas» en fuga. A pesar de que, de tanto «tensar la cuerda casi la rompe (para ambos ámbitos)», la «Crítica de la facultad estética de juzgar», pone de manifiesto la necesidad de la *validez universal* por medio del *interés en la comunicabilidad universal del sentimiento* que revela este *desinterés* de la complacencia. Hay, por tanto, *interés* en el *desinterés*.

D. Fan organiza su texto en una introducción, donde se plantea el problema y el programa de investigación, y tres partes. La primera parte, en la que se agrupan varios temas bajo el título de «Desinterés del juicio de la facultad estética de juzgar» (*Interesselosigkeit des Urteils der ästhetischen Urteilskraft*), se ocupa, en primer lugar, de la distinción temática entre el desinterés y el interés (capítulo 1). A continuación, aborda una interpretación del primer momento de la «analítica de lo bello» y una discusión histórica sobre el problema del desinterés de la complacencia que subyace al juicio de gusto (capítulo 2), poniendo en primer plano la discusión (o sea, el «contexto histórico») en la que interviene Kant. Finalmente, se ocupa de explicitar el marco de la tesis kantiana sobre el desinterés (capítulo 3) y de dar una interpretación del juicio sobre lo sublime (capítulo 4). Este último

capítulo, aunque sintético, aborda el lugar del desinterés en la analítica de lo sublime desde la interpretación no idealista de la *UK*.

La segunda parte, «Desinterés, comunicabilidad universal y facultades del conocimiento» (*Interesselosigkeit, allgemeine Mitteilbarkeit und Erkenntnisvermögen*), que investiga el vínculo entre el desinterés y otros momentos del texto kantiano, empieza con una interpretación detallada del parágrafo 9 de la *KU* (capítulo 5). A partir de aquí, expone el modo como el desinterés de la complacencia se relaciona con el libre juego de las facultades del conocimiento (capítulo 7) y dedica el capítulo 8 a la cuestión de si el concepto de *idea estética* merma la tesis del desinterés. Estos dos capítulos son, a mi juicio, uno de los nervios del texto; estas páginas son quizá, las más problemáticas y complicadas y, por ello mismo, unas de las más interesantes. Además, en esta segunda parte, el capítulo 6 está dedicado a una confrontación con Guyer y Ginsborg que, siendo crítica con las posturas de ambos especialistas, es, sin embargo, bastante justa en agradecer y reconocer la deuda que la investigación guarda con ellos. Como se sabe, aquello con lo que uno discute es, precisamente por eso, *digno de atención*.

Finalmente, en la última parte, «Desinterés, modo de pensar y fundamentación moral del gusto» (*Interesselosigkeit, Denkungsart und moralisch bezogene Begründung des Geschmacks*), se exponen varias cuestiones acerca de cómo se relaciona el desinterés con el interés de la razón. En esta tercera parte, D. Fan interpreta los parágrafos 41 y 42 en el capítulo 10, tratando de mostrar que, aunque el interés intelectual no forma parte del juicio de gusto, con la exposición de este interés, Kant habría pretendido revelar el lugar del gusto en el sistema de las facultades emocionales (*Gemütsvermögen*). En el capítulo 11 se emprende un comentario a la *dialéctica* de la *KU* que tiene como resultado la aclaración de que la moral no está directamente implicada en el juicio de gusto, sino que, solo de manera indirecta, encuentra un papel en este; a saber, allí donde se emprende la reflexión sobre la analogía entre la moral y la belleza. Por último, el capítulo 12 consiste en una reflexión acerca de cómo se relaciona la autonomía estética basada en el desinterés con la primacía de la razón práctica.

A pesar de la claridad y la limpieza del texto, dado su «origen», hay desarrollos que responden a la naturaleza de un trabajo de doctorado (alemán) que, quizá, pudieran resultar áridos; sin embargo, el cuidado de la exposición permite superar este escollo del estilo estrictamente académico de algunos pasajes. Como resultado, todo el texto merece la pena ser leído con detenimiento, no solo por el grado de claridad de las exposiciones de los problemas de la sistemática kantiana que son objeto de investigación, sino porque ofrece una lectura crítica de la bibliografía especializada (presentada de un modo original) que coloca al lector en el centro de la discusión sobre el *desinterés*. Es notorio que, como se suele decir, el autor «hizo sus deberes», pues otros tramos del texto, sin *perder las formas* —y logrando sintetizar pasajes importantes de la sistemática kantiana, elaborando las argumentaciones, conclusiones y posicionamientos interpretativos del autor en un tono asequible y comunicativo—, consiguen que la lectura sea fluida e incluso hacen del texto un

excelente trabajo para ser leído como «texto de estudio» para la «Crítica del juicio estético» de la *UK*. Esto ocurre, especialmente, en los capítulos de la primera parte y los capítulos 9 y 10 de la tercera parte, dedicados al «Juicio de gusto y el modo de pensar: Interpretación del § 40» (*Gesmacksurteil und Denkungsart: Interpretation zu § 40*) y «El interés empírico e intelectual en lo bello» (*Das empirische und intellektuelle Interesse am Schönen*).

Si bien el trabajo presupone el estudio de la sistemática kantiana o, al menos, de las otras dos *Críticas*, en los capítulos donde se tratan aspectos específicos de estas que intervienen en la exposición de Kant de la tercera *Crítica*, el autor acude a los lugares concretos, de manera que el lector siempre sabe dónde se está moviendo la discusión. Esta confrontación con las otras dos *Críticas* es mucho más notable con respecto a la *Crítica de la razón práctica*, ya que es en ella donde también encontramos la cuestión del *desinterés* asociado a cómo uno se reconoce determinado por la ley. Así, como se lee en el capítulo sobre los «motores de la razón pura práctica», el reconocimiento del vínculo o la determinación a la ley moral está dado también sin interés, siendo este reconocimiento el que permite «descubrir» un interés completamente diferente al que se ha dejado atrás; este, producido subjetivamente, es «puro práctico y libre» (*reinen praktisch und frei*), de modo que queda desconectada la posibilidad de que alguna inclinación fuese la responsable de que se decidiese (obligatoriamente) por una acción o conducta. Este otro interés (producido subjetivamente) por tomar o decidir obligatoriamente una acción o conducta es algo que ordena y produce la razón por medio de la ley práctica, o sea, por medio de su reconocimiento, que está motivado por lo que Kant llama sentimiento de *respeto*. Este sentimiento no ordena o da la ley, pero sí nos mueve a *decidir decidir*.

En el tomo primero del *Nietzsche* de Heidegger, que el autor cita en la introducción, se hace notar que la razón por la cual ni Schopenhauer, ni Nietzsche (a juicio de Heidegger) llegan a hacerse cargo de la potencia de la tercera *Crítica* kantiana y, así, del lugar que ocupa la estética en la investigación *transcendental*, es a no haber comprendido la noción kantiana de *desinterés* en la *KU*. Heidegger habla muy poco, explícitamente, de la tercera *Crítica*, a pesar de que su presencia en su obra es prácticamente parasitaria (espectral o fantasmagórica, como diría Derrida); pero es un argumento a favor de la relevancia del estudio de Fan, que sea precisamente este tema el que sí está mencionado de modo explícito en uno de los autores que mejor nos han ayudado a entender a Kant. Léase, y no perdamos la pista de este investigador que, sin duda, todavía tendrá a bien ofrecernos más trabajos a la altura de este.





CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS.
International Journal of Philosophy
N.º 9, Junio 2019, pp. 394-401
ISSN: 2386-7655
Doi: 10.5281/zenodo.3256649

**Las Lecciones de Metafísica como clave de interpretación de la
evolución del pensamiento kantiano**

***The Lectures on Metaphysics as Interpretative Key of the
Evolution of Kant's Thought***

ALBA JIMÉNEZ RODRÍGUEZ*

ALBERTO MORÁN ROA**

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

UNED, España

Reseña de: Courtney D. Fugate (ed.), *Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics. A Critical Guide*, Cambridge Critical Guides, Cambridge University Press, 2018, 251 pp., ISBN.: 978-1-107-17698-0

Pocos textos resultan tan útiles para releer los pasajes clásicos del corpus kantiano desde nuevas claves de interpretación como los apuntes de sus lecciones de metafísica. En estas *Vorlesungen* se aprecia con particular claridad el contexto de descubrimiento de alguno de los hitos más idiosincráticos de la ontología kantiana a través del diálogo que mantiene con muchos de sus interlocutores habituales: Baumgarten, Meier, Wolff, Leibniz o Hume. El estudio goza de gran valor como herramienta para reevaluar el estatuto de la metafísica y las profundas transformaciones padecidas por el concepto de ontología en el marco de la filosofía trascendental. Asimismo, constituye un eficaz instrumento de divulgación, especialmente en el ámbito anglosajón, de la traducción que Karl Ameriks y Steve

* Alba Jiménez Rodríguez. Dpto. de Lógica y Filosofía Teórica. Facultad de Filosofía. Universidad Complutense de Madrid (UCM). E-mail de contacto : albjim04@ucm.es

** Alberto Morán Roa. Facultad de Filosofía. Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (UNED). E-mail de contacto : amoranroa@gmail.com

Naragon realizaron de los *Mitschriften* de las lecciones en el año 1977, habida cuenta de la complejidad de este tipo de materiales conservados con constantes interpolaciones del latín, redactados en un alemán arcaico y de modo algo fragmentario y entrecortado.

El volumen editado por Courtney D. Fugate recoge diez ensayos sobre diversos aspectos teóricos de gran relevancia expuestos en estas lecciones. En el primero de los capítulos, John H. Zammito traza un particular recorrido sobre la figura de Herder como intérprete de Kant. Entre las muchas mediaciones que cabe contar en la recepción de un material tan rico y complejo como el que constituyen los apuntes de las lecciones del profesor Kant, hay que contar naturalmente con los desplazamientos provocados por la propia recepción de los estudiantes que recopilaban las notas. En ese sentido, la versión de Herder resulta especialmente productiva para propiciar un diálogo fecundo en torno a los problemas metafísicos planteados. Este capítulo tiene la virtud de situar dicho diálogo en la estela de la polémica suscitada entre Wolff y Crusius a propósito de la distinción entre lo real, lo formal y lo material. Asimismo, se pone de relevancia la importancia de la dilucidación del método desde el período precrítico. En esta línea, uno de los motivos de mayor interés del estudio de estas lecciones, a nuestro juicio, tiene que ver precisamente con la reflexión sobre la cuestión del método y la evolución del problema desde MonPh o GSK hasta alguno de los pasajes más destacados de KrV donde se delinea el concepto de construcción. El capítulo de Karin de Boer se circunscribe a la primera parte de las lecciones titulado en distintas versiones tal como el manual de Baumgarten que sirve de base al curso. En los *Prolegomena*, ya se tratan interesantes cuestiones sobre el lugar de la metafísica y su relación con otras disciplinas. El capítulo ofrece un recorrido muy completo sobre la influencia de Wolff y Crusius en la temprana delimitación de la metafísica en el pensamiento kantiano y la evolución de la posición kantiana pasando por algunos hitos fundamentales como el viraje fundamental que tendrá lugar a partir del escrito de habilitación de 1770.

Se analiza así el rendimiento de distinciones como la diferencia entre metafísica pura y aplicada o la diferencia entre metafísica, ontología y filosofía trascendental tal como se aborda en V-Met/Mron. Mientras Wolff aspira a aclarar conceptos generales, defendiendo que el fundamento de nuestro conocimiento de las cosas es al mismo tiempo el fundamento de las cosas en sí, Baumgarten seguirá sus pasos con un enfoque más epistemológico, indagando sobre los primeros principios y los predicados de un ser y recibiendo la crítica de Crusius por usar sin reparo el principio de razón suficiente. A este respecto y como indicamos, Kant advierte de los problemas que puede deparar la indefinición de los límites de la metafísica: así, además de matizar a Crusius —como hemos visto en el capítulo anterior—, criticará a Wolff por considerar que el método demostrativo o matemático se aplica a todas las ciencias, incluso la metafísica. La tesis quedará así dispuesta: los principios que emanan de la cognición sensible no deben rebasar sus límites hasta adentrarse en cuestiones metafísicas y afectar a los conceptos intelectuales. Para Kant, en

suma, la metafísica debe dedicarse al tratamiento puramente racional de conceptos. El tercer capítulo corre a cargo de Huaping Lu-Adler y tiene como objeto la ontología como filosofía trascendental. Como es sabido de todos en KrV Kant define a la ontología precisamente como filosofía trascendental. En este capítulo, el autor evalúa pormenorizadamente esta equivalencia en diálogo con autores como Gualtiero Lorini, que trabajó esta cuestión exhaustivamente en *Kants metaphor by analogy between ontology and transcendental philosophy*. A lo largo del capítulo se pone de manifiesto la recepción kantiana del problema de la definición y la transformación del sentido de la ontología desde su primera aparición en el *Lexicon philosophicum* de Rudolph Goclenius y en general desde su recepción en la temprana filosofía de escuela alemana. El presente capítulo constituye un valioso documento para comparar las distintas definiciones de la ontología que aparecen en los diversos manuscritos de las lecciones kantianas. El cuarto capítulo titulado *A Guide to Ground in Kant's Lectures on Metaphysics* resulta también de especial interés porque centra su atención en un concepto tan importante como poco estudiado en la ontología kantiana: el concepto de fundamento. El autor retrotrae la importancia de esta noción a la recepción de Kant del principio de razón suficiente leibniziano. El capítulo de Nicholas F. Stang delimita con gran precisión los distintos sentidos del término “fundamento” y traza las coordenadas más importantes de la reflexión filosófica en torno al problema de la causalidad y de la fundamentación. La mención en este capítulo, aunque sea de soslayo, a los problemas mereológicos que encierra este análisis y a la relevancia del término “*nexus*” como el modo paradigmático de enlace de los elementos dinámicos del conocimiento, es a nuestro juicio un síntoma claro de la importancia de estas lecciones para rastrear las soluciones kantianas a problemas como el del continuo y la divisibilidad o para resolver algunas cuestiones que en la formulación canónica de la *Analítica de los principios* resultan algo oscuras a propósito de la diferenciación entre las magnitudes extensivas e intensivas bosquejada en los dos principios matemáticos del entendimiento puro: los axiomas de la intuición y las anticipaciones de la percepción. El capítulo quinto trata el problema del espacio y el tiempo en las lecciones de metafísica en las que se están construyendo las definiciones fundamentales que después permitirán a Kant definir las intuiciones formales en la *Estética trascendental*, así como la función del tiempo como determinación trascendental en el seno de la *Schematismuslehre*. El autor hace un recorrido previo por los planteamientos de Wolff, Baumgarten, Meier y Crusius para después confrontar directamente las diversas alusiones de las lecciones al problema del espacio y el tiempo. El capítulo de Courtney D. Fugate sobre la cosmología, los milagros y la autonomía de la razón, presenta con brillantez una ventana al origen y evolución de la filosofía de madurez de Kant. En primer lugar, se expone una definición de «cosmología» a partir de las fuentes kantianas: la noción de mundo de Wolff como interconexión; la distinción de Baumgarten entre cosmología empírica y racional y su defensa de cierta interpretación de la armonía preestablecida en línea de lo que Kant y Crusius entendían como conexión real; la lectura de Crusius, para el que la cosmología es parte de la metafísica que se ocupa a su vez de la

esencia necesaria del mundo entendido como un todo unido por la conjunción real de sus partes. A partir de estos, Kant emprenderá una cosmología racional que pretende superar la cosmología empírica wolffiana. En lo que respecta al concepto de mundo y sus interconexiones, Kant rechazará que dos cosas se relacionen entre ellas por virtud de su existencia, apuntando que la relación real requiere de una mutua dependencia: el mundo, frente a Baumgarten, se entenderá como un *totum substantiale* cuya realidad está inmediatamente implicada en su sustancialidad, pero no al revés. Después de apuntar a las antinomias cosmológicas, Kant distinguirá entre las necesidades de la razón con respecto a la comprensión por un lado y las condiciones objetivas de las cosas por otra, con el fin de determinar la causa primera del mundo.

Baumgarten concebirá el mundo como formado por sustancias simples desde un enfoque deudor de la monadología leibniziana. Kant partirá de Baumgarten para plantearse, en los apuntes de Herder y en *Metaphysics L*, cuestiones concernientes a la divisibilidad de la materia y la interacción de sustancias. Como ya hemos sugerido, el material de las lecciones de metafísica resulta sumamente interesante a nuestro entender para evaluar la evolución del pensamiento kantiano en torno a los problemas de la divisibilidad, la continuidad o la relación de las partes y el todo y explicar el desarrollo de sus posiciones desde algunos textos claves precríticos como MonPh hasta las conclusiones por ejemplo de la segunda antinomia en KrV. En efecto, desde el principio, Kant tendrá que conciliar la aceptación de la simplicidad de las sustancias o la existencia de los *indivisibilia* con la posibilidad de la divisibilidad al infinito del espacio en el que se encuentran las sustancias, tesis que mantendrá hasta la exposición metafísica de los conceptos de espacio y tiempo en la *Estética trascendental* de KrV y que sostiene en términos muy parecidos de los que lo afirmarían autores como Kiell. Este problema se conecta de inmediato con el hecho de que si las partes del espacio son extensas e infinitamente divisibles, pero a su vez el espacio es un *totum* y no un agregado (como Kant recuerda en diferentes ocasiones) y sus elementos están dados con anterioridad a su propia composición, entonces tenemos que reconocer que lo finito alberga un infinito. En efecto, el paso por la *Monadología Física*, parece obligado si se quiere fijar cuál es el punto de partida de la discusión kantiana que le llevará hasta la formulación madura de la segunda antinomia. Nuestra tesis básica es que algunos planteamientos de las lecciones de metafísica impartidas por Kant según el manual de A. G. Baumgarten desde el semestre de invierno de 1755-1756 hasta 1796 son de sumo valor para analizar el desarrollo del pensamiento kantiano en torno a cuestiones como la divisibilidad, la continuidad o la relación de las partes con el todo. Estas cuestiones, además, cumplen una función sistemática clave, en uno de los capítulos de la ontología kantiana tan importantes como la *Analítica de los Principios* de KrV. Respecto de la consideración kantiana de los milagros, se contrapone la posición de Baumgarten que basa la prioridad del mundo natural y la existencia de eventos suprasensibles en el principio ontológico de perfección a la tesis kantiana que remite las máximas de la necesidad subjetiva de la razón con respecto al mundo a principios subjetivos que surgen —no de la constitución del objeto— sino del interés de la razón con respecto a una posible perfección

de la comprensión de ese objeto. El esquema cosmológico de perfección, por tanto, según la lectura del autor, sería un corolario de la autonomía de la razón pura: en un giro característicamente moderno, Kant reemplazará la libertad y autonomía del acto divino de la creación por la libertad y autonomía de la razón de crear y asumir una imagen del mundo apropiada a su uso convirtiendo el principio del «mejor mundo posible» en un principio trascendental y práctico del uso del entendimiento. El séptimo capítulo emprende por su parte la tarea de evaluar el tratamiento de la nascente disciplina de la Estética en las lecciones de metafísica. El autor retrotrae su reflexión y análisis del tratamiento del problema de lo bello y del juicio estético en la *Metafísica* de Baumgarten, al estudio del manuscrito *Metaphysik L1* publicado por Pölitiz en 1821, así como a las anotaciones del polaco Mrongovius y su repercusión en la *Analítica de lo bello* de KU. El capítulo de Heiner Klemme presenta una audaz reflexión sobre la metafísica kantiana de la libertad. Tanto Kant como Baumgarten afirmarán que todas nuestras acciones dependen de estímulos o motivos. Pero, mientras Baumgarten deriva el grado de libertad del grado de nuestro conocimiento, como haría Platón, Kant habla desde un claro trasfondo estoico — como se aprecia a lo largo de Mrongovius II—: así, nuestra libertad aumenta con el tamaño del obstáculo que somos capaces de superar mediante el esfuerzo virtuoso. Donde Baumgarten prescribe una mejora de nuestra cognición para actuar de una manera moralmente buena, Kant describe esta elección como una cuestión volitiva, por cuanto los estímulos no pueden transformarse en motivos mediante el ejercicio de la razón: tenemos que *querer* ser virtuosos.

Kant continuará su indagación distinguiendo entre necesidad problemática, pragmática y moral, así como entre deber e imperativo; se planteará la cuestión del origen de la espontaneidad —que Baumgarten ubica en el «sentido interno»— y abordará distintos conceptos de libertad. Sus investigaciones llevarán a analizar la relación entre libertad práctica y trascendental. A lo largo de las V-Moral/Mron II, Kant centrará sus esfuerzos en explicar sus propios planteamientos acerca de la libertad: caracterizada como libertad trascendental, se desvinculará de la psicología racional para entenderse como idea, un concepto de la razón y no del entendimiento. Tras revisar en profundidad su doctrina del yo expuesta en *Metaphysics L*, Kant defenderá que la libertad no es una propiedad que aprendamos de la experiencia, por cuanto ni siquiera somos inmediatamente conscientes de ella. ¿Cómo podemos saber de ella, entonces? Porque, aunque no es demostrable por la vía teórica, su realidad práctica es indiscutible. En lo tocante a la antropología, el ser humano es libre, pero puede verse determinado a actuar de acuerdo con la naturaleza por influjo de sus inclinaciones. A este respecto, la libertad adquiere dos significados: pertenece a la naturaleza de nuestra voluntad, pero podemos actuar de una manera que es no-libre cuando seguimos la ley de la naturaleza en lugar de la ley moral. La espontaneidad, por otra parte, es nuestra capacidad de ser el fundamento o causa del pensamiento y la volición, pues la naturaleza práctica de la libertad hace que nos veamos como causa de todas las representaciones. Pero la espontaneidad de la voluntad no es la libertad: la espontaneidad remite al sujeto de imputación, el autor de la acción; la libertad indica la manera en la que el sujeto, el autor, se determina a sí mismo como causa de una acción.

El propósito de Mensch es indagar en la perspectiva kantiana acerca de la psicología racional en las *Lecciones* —más allá de sus conocidas afirmaciones a este respecto en KrV—. Describas las posiciones de Wolff y Baumgarten —el primero abierto a incorporar la observación a las investigaciones de lo *a priori*, más celoso de esta concesión empirista e inclinado al enfoque metafísico y religioso el segundo—, Mensch parte del curso de antropología impartido por Kant en 1772 para situarnos en pleno envite de la escuela escocesa sobre la metafísica, disciplina a la que, como se ha mencionado anteriormente, Kant atribuye un problema de método. El curso incorporará un viraje hacia la geografía política y la moral que cristalizará en el particular enfoque antropológico kantiano. Su contenido resultará de una combinación de temas extraídos del análisis de Baumgarten sobre el alma. Dos serán los aspectos analizados: lo que la naturaleza ha hecho de la humanidad en lo que respecta a sus predisposiciones, aptitudes, temperamento y fisionomía, y qué podía hacer de sí misma la humanidad, dado el libre desarrollo de su carácter. El propósito será describir las condiciones subjetivas que ayudaron o previnieron al ser humano a alcanzar sus obligaciones morales y, a través de ejemplos, demostrar el grado al que la humanidad era capaz de un comportamiento genuinamente moral. El regiomontano aspira, como cita en una conocida carta a Markus Herz, a revelar las fuentes de todas las ciencias prácticas, los fenómenos y sus leyes, y construir así una antropología sociológica o práctica construida por diferencia de la de Planter, Tetens o el propio Herder. El curso concluirá con la afirmación de que la psicología empírica no pertenece a la metafísica. Aún dispuesto a reasignar partes de la psicología empírica a la antropología, Kant se muestra decidido a insistir en que sus planteamientos no tenían nada que ver con la psicología antropológica promovida por sus contemporáneos. Pese a mostrarse crítico con la psicología empírica, incluye la fisiología racional como parte de una descripción de la naturaleza fundamentada trascendentalmente, para reorientar la psicología racional como la única vía segura hacia la aplicación práctica de las ideas referidas al alma: una tarea no exenta de complicaciones toda vez que Kant repara en que el enfoque tradicional de la psicología debe replantearse por entero.

El último trabajo del volumen escrito a cuatro manos y titulado *Baumgarten and Kant on Rational Theology: Deism, Theism and the Role of Analogy* se ocupa del papel teórico de la religión en el *corpus* de la KrV, así como de los elementos de la teología racional kantiana proyectados a partir de la cuarta parte de la *Metafísica* de Baumgarten. Este último, se explica, se adhiere al método filosófico popularizado por Wolff para elaborar una definición correcta y real de Dios. Contrariamente a las tradiciones teológicas, Baumgarten afirmará que Dios es concebible en sí mismo por los seres humanos. Se trata, hay que subrayarlo, de un conocimiento parcial. Aunque podemos tener una concepción cabal de los atributos de Dios, como sus primeros conceptos son infinitos, Dios resulta *a fortiori* incomprensible. Pese a todo, afirma Baumgarten, podemos tener una definición correcta y real de Dios en muchos sentidos. En cuanto al método de trabajo, Baumgarten reconoce el valor de la analogía en la teología filosófica, mediante la cual podrían entenderse atributos de un ser necesario como análogos de aquellos pertenecientes a los seres contingentes.

Kant, por su parte, partirá de la conocida distinción entre teología trascendental y natural para abordar finalmente el problema de la religión moral. Cree así necesario progresar desde la primera, capaz de reconocer a Dios mediante conceptos de la razón pura, a la segunda. Kant entiende la teología trascendental como una consecuencia de la búsqueda de

lo incondicionado, de modo que el concepto de Dios corresponde a lo incondicionado para cada rúbrica categorial: cantidad, cualidad, modalidad y relación. Al carecer de información sobre lo condicionado, la teología trascendental no tiene recursos para desarrollar el concepto de Dios empleado en la teología moral o natural —esto es, Dios como autor y soberano de la naturaleza—. La teología trascendental, por tanto, se presenta aquí como una silueta de la teología y su concepción de Dios estéril. La crítica de Kant a la cuestión deísta se enmarca en el contexto del enfrentamiento del deísmo británico por parte de los wolffianos y los teólogos pietistas. Pese a criticar el deísmo, esto no supondrá la adherencia por parte de Kant a cualquiera de sus opositores. Así, el modelo wolffiano de razón recibirá una intensa crítica por su perspectiva analítica incapaz de proporcionar conocimiento nuevo y su uso de la razón pura, que queda yerta de contenido sin lo empírico. Kant defenderá por ello la importancia de avanzar del deísmo de la teología trascendental al teísmo de la teología natural, describiendo la segunda como una propuesta más robusta: frente a la concepción mecanicista del universo deísta, el de la teología natural se desarrolla de acuerdo no solo a la Providencia, sino a milagros y revelaciones de los que Dios es causa proximal; no se limitan a conceptos empíricos, sino que tienen acceso a las propiedades esenciales de Dios, y lo que hace en y para el mundo.

Kant observará que necesitamos una garantía mediante la cual aproximarnos a la naturaleza como si gozase de esa unidad sistemática, como si hubiese afinidad entre los arreglos de la naturaleza y los intereses de la razón. Para Kant, dado que la razón nos hace considerar toda conexión en el mundo según los principios de la unidad sistemática, debemos pensar en ellos como surgidos de un único ser que lo abarca todo. Concebir la naturaleza como una unidad sistemática nos impele a ver la naturaleza «como si» hubiese sido creada por un sabio autor. Es así como hacemos comprensible el fundamento del orden natural. Pero esto no prueba la existencia de Dios: se trata de una apelación a la idea simbólica, heurística, imaginaria de un autor. Por eso, piensa de 1770 a 1780, no podemos dejar de pensar así. Sin Dios, la razón se encontraría ante un problema: pretendiendo una unidad sistemática de la naturaleza y sin ningún principio en el que fundamentar esa sistematicidad. La teología natural sí puede sustentarse en mayor grado en lo empírico, pero no está exenta de problemas: transferir conceptos empíricos a Dios transgrede sus límites epistémicos y aboca a un antropomorfismo dogmático. La analogía es válida cuando se comparte género, pero entre Dios y el hombre no hay concepto genérico común. Kant no prohíbe la analogía, pero introduce una modificación: pasar de similitudes imperfectas entre ambos a la similitud perfecta entre dos relaciones de cosas completamente disimilares. Así, en los *Prolegómenos* traza una analogía entre la relación legal de las acciones humanas y la relación mecánica de las fuerzas motoras. La analogía típica, de similitud imperfecta, buscaría los aspectos comunes y los extrapolaría de lo conocido a lo por conocer, el objetivo: frente a ello, se propone pensar que la fuente y el objetivo tienen la misma estructura relacional. «Derecho» y «fuerza motriz» son disimiles, pero hay una similitud perfecta en que ambos reflejan la estructura relacional formal de la reciprocidad. En lugar de atribuir a Dios atributos basados en la similitud imperfecta de aspectos humanos, el teólogo se orienta por el principio de fundamento/consecuencia: consecuencias sabidas de fundamentos conocidos (el hombre) o desconocidos (Dios). Se trata, al fin y al cabo, de pensar en Dios sin transferirle aspectos del mundo, desde una teología natural distanciada del antropomorfismo dogmático y que no quiebre los límites del idealismo trascendental.

Con este capítulo se cierra el volumen articulado en torno a una selección muy representativa de temas que ayudan al lector a conocer un material tan importante como el de las lecciones de metafísica. Desde luego, los problemas y vías para pensar cuando se trata de un texto tan rico como el de las lecciones de metafísica son casi infinitas, pero estamos seguros de que la lectura de este libro constituye una guía insustituible para el acercamiento a esta inagotable fuente.



**Legalidad y síntesis: una apropiación sistemática de
la filosofía kantiana desde la Teoría de la Normatividad**

*Legality and synthesis: a systematic appropriation of Kant's
philosophy from Theory of Normativism*

JOSÉ RAMÓN SUÁREZ VILLALBA*

Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España

**Reseña de: K. Pollok, *Kant's Theory of Normativity. Exploring the Space of Reason*,
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2017, pp. 426. ISBN: 978-1-107-56722-1**

No es muy común en la literatura académica encontrar un estudio que, abordando un problema particular, a un tiempo proporcione una interpretación sistemática y exhaustiva del conjunto de la filosofía de un autor, sin caer con ello en omisiones u olvidos más o menos oportunos para la propuesta en cuestión. Precisamente ésta es una de las virtudes que encontramos en la investigación de Konstantin Pollok, que partiendo de un núcleo problemático inicial, a saber, el novedoso reconocimiento kantiano de la primacía normativa del juicio y la interpretación de los *synthetic a priori principles* como normas fundamentales de la sintaxis de la experiencia, elabora una teoría unitaria de la normatividad, sistemáticamente construida en un recorrido a lo largo de las tres *Críticas* kantianas.

La tesis central de Pollok defiende pues que, en la filosofía de Kant, los juicios sintéticos a priori estructuran la normatividad del espacio de la Razón y determinan la validez de nuestros juicios particulares. Tales juicios, como principios, son así constitutivos de nuestras prácticas epistémicas, éticas y estéticas, sentando las condiciones de lo que constituye un enunciado significativo en tales áreas; pero son también normativos, en tanto los juicios particulares que hacemos pueden ser correctos o incorrectos según si apliquemos satisfactoriamente o no tales principios (lo cual presenta ciertos problemas que abordaremos al final de nuestro comentario). En el desarrollo de esta

* Estudiante de posgrado de la Facultad de Filosofía de la UCM. Email de contacto: joserasu@ucm.es

tesis, Pollok demuestra un conocimiento erudito de la obra kantiana. El trabajo de selección y reunión de pasajes del *corpus* kantiano relevantes para una teoría de la normatividad es exhaustivo, así como la novedad en la interpretación de los mismos. En su recorrido, Pollok aborda cuestiones que son de gran relevancia para el debate contemporáneo sobre la Normatividad, ofreciendo tesis y argumentos kantianos como respuesta a estos problemas. Con ello recupera desde el prisma de la normatividad un pensamiento kantiano en diálogo con autores como John MacFarlane, Michael Fierdman o Christine Korsgaard.

La estructura del volumen está coherentemente articulada en tres partes. En la primera de ellas (“From the clarity of ideas to the validity of judgments”), Pollok da cuenta del cambio en el plano de la normatividad que tiene lugar en el paso de la primera Modernidad y el Racionalismo de raigambre cartesiana a la filosofía trascendental kantiana. En el primer capítulo, Kant es puesto en diálogo con Descartes, Leibniz Wolff, y Baumgarten. De este modo, el autor presta atención a la radical naturaleza de lo comúnmente llamamos el giro copernicano de Kant. Es imposible percibir su sentido último si lo tomamos como un simple paso de lo ontológico a lo epistemológico (15). Lo que en la filosofía kantiana tiene lugar va mucho más allá. Se trataría del desplazamiento definitivo de la perfección divina de su rol tradicional como fuente única y última de normatividad (23). Por supuesto, esto no se puede reducir a reemplazar un hipostasiado concepto de perfección por otro de normatividad igualmente hipostasiado. Los conceptos por sí solos no constituyen experiencia de ningún tipo. No podemos hacer nada con ellos. En la planteamiento kantiano, la unidad más elemental de la significatividad normativa será el juicio (56). Por tanto, lo que está en juego en eso del giro copernicano es más bien una identificación del espacio de lo normativo con el de la síntesis a priori, entendiendo que lo esencial para la consistencia de la totalidad de nuestra experiencia es la legitimidad de la relación de nuestras ideas y no, como parecía pensar el Racionalismo moderno, la realidad de las mismas, determinada por criterios de claridad y distinción. Así, si tomamos como ejemplo la consideración de la realidad de una idea cualquiera, de acuerdo al racionalismo ésta depende de cuán clara y distinta sea la representación de la misma idea. Kant abandona esta comprensión. El giro crítico supone que la validez de una representación es el resultado de un juicio cuya legitimidad depende de su acuerdo a principios trascendentales puros.

Una vez sentado esto, el segundo capítulo delinea una comprensión general de este mínimo normativo que es el juicio. A partir del párrafo 22 de los *Prolegómenos* de Kant, Pollok caracteriza todo juicio como unificación de diferentes representaciones en una conciencia. El autor explica aquí como la apercepción trascendental se instaure como fundamento de toda síntesis, ya que al juzgar se nos exige ir más allá de nuestro yo empírico y adoptar la punto de vista del impersonal *Yo pienso*. Habiendo destacado el especial carácter normativo del juicio, Pollok pasa a compilar y categorizar las variedades del mismo. A través de un conciso argumento, Pollok muestra que la posibilidad de objetos de experiencia deriva de principios del Entendimiento, la necesidad práctica requiere los principios de la Razón pura práctica y la actualidad de ciertos sentimientos necesita del

principio de la Facultad de Juicio reflexionante. La última parte del capítulo clarifica como la distinción entre diferentes principios sintéticos va a la par con la división del conocimiento racional. El autor traza una coherente y precisa taxonomía de todos los juicios distinguiéndolos según su forma o contenido. Esta tarea queda detalladamente cumplida en el tercer capítulo.

Una vez hemos comprendido que todo orden de experiencia encuentra la fundamentación de su consistencia en la legalidad última de los principios sintéticos a priori, en la segunda parte de la obra (“Kant’s transcendental hylomorphism”) Pollok caracteriza esta legitimidad en términos hilemórficos. La validez normativa de la síntesis se concreta en las estructuras generales de la relación entre forma y materia del juicio. Aunque el libro se centra en problemas filosóficos internos a la filosofía crítica, el autor a menudo enriquece sus análisis con la explicación de la evolución histórica de conceptos relevantes. Esto mismo ocurre con la noción de hilemorfismo, que Pollok debe cuidadosamente diferenciar de su caracterización previa en Platón, Aristóteles o Santo Tomás. Así, el autor caracteriza la distinción kantiana entre materia y forma como un dualismo metodológico, una herramienta analítica para describir la posibilidad de afirmaciones sobre el ser y el deber ser de los objetos (118). Pero lo que fundamentalmente distinguiría el hilemorfismo kantiano es que éste se extiende hacia el espacio de lo trascendental. Para Kant sería el aspecto formal, o la estructura legal de nuestras facultades, aquello que tornaría el contenido de la síntesis en normativamente visible. Todo orden de experiencia queda constituido en la determinación a priori de una materia determinable dada a la sensibilidad. Pero esas formas de nuestras representaciones no deben ser entendidas simplemente como estructuras lógicas que podamos abstraer de las propias representaciones. Más bien, son aquello que hace siempre ya posible la representación en primer lugar, siguiendo el *dictum* escolástico *forma dat esse rei*. El autor insiste en que dichas formas no son innatas ni abstraídas a partir de las propias representaciones, sino que están disponibles gracias a lo que llama la *adquisición original*, una noción que, según Pollok, Kant habría tomado de la tradición del Derecho Natural.

Ya en el quinto capítulo, tiene lugar un intento de proporcionar una explicación sistemática de las diferentes configuraciones hilemórficas de lo que se denomina “rational structures” (119): Conceptos, Juicios, Razonamientos y el Sistema completo del Conocimiento (teórico y práctico). Aunque Pollok no hace mención entre esas estructuras a la Intuición, es precisamente con ella con la que accedemos en primer lugar al hilemorfismo trascendental. El argumento más importante de la sección sobre la Intuición es la doctrina *forma non afficit*. Nuestra sensibilidad no puede intuir formas. Esto implica que sólo la materia del objeto permite al sujeto acceder a la representación. Pollok completa esta doctrina con la tesis kantiana según la cual una intuición sin ninguna determinación formal no juega ningún papel en la experiencia. En mi opinión, en este apartado el autor apenas enfatiza la legalidad intrínseca a toda intuición sensible, la cual no deriva por tanto de la actividad de la forma sobre la materia. Que la misma intuición sensible trae consigo una normatividad en la pasividad de su recepción es una verdadera

novedad que el pensamiento kantiano trae consigo y que, sin embargo, Pollok no considera en la misma medida (ni extensión) en que sí valora la estructura normativa que la espontaneidad del concepto traza sobre el contenido.

En la tercera y última parte del libro (“The legislation of pure reason”), Pollok procede a mostrar cómo se concreta la estructura general de la normatividad anteriormente descrita, en cada uno de los tres dominios de la actividad racional. Tras un breve capítulo introductorio, tres extensos análisis dan cuenta de la normatividad de los juicios de experiencia (conocimiento), de los juicios prácticos (voluntad) y de los juicios de gusto (juicio estético), siguiendo claramente la secuencia de las tres *Críticas* de Kant. Lo que unifica los tres análisis es la tesis central del autor de que los *synthetic a priori principles* son el núcleo de la teoría kantiana de la normatividad, presentándolos como el lugar desde el que los seres racionales finitos se abren a toda experiencia. En cada uno de los ámbitos del orden racional, se describe cómo los principios sintéticos a priori del Entendimiento, el imperativo categórico y el principio de finalidad son constitutivos y normativos para los ámbitos teórico, práctico y estético respectivamente.

Así, en lo que respecta al ámbito teórico, el autor destaca que la deducción de las categorías prueba que sólo los conceptos puros hacen la experiencia posible, mientras que los esquemas y los principios no serían sino la realización de tal posibilidad (244). Resumidamente, la síntesis a priori alcanza su fin sólo una vez que las intuiciones son unificadas por conceptos a través de juicios. En lo que respecta a los juicios prácticos, merece la pena detenerse a ver cómo Pollok, argumentando contra Korsgaard, muestra que los imperativos hipotéticos y categóricos no comparten el mismo fundamento de determinación. Mientras los primeros establecen sus fines de forma arbitraria, los segundos obligan a actuar siempre por la sola razón de la ley moral. En otras palabras, aunque sobre ambos tipos de imperativos descansa la autoridad de la Razón pura práctica, el fundamento de determinación de la ley moral se desentiende por completo de cualquier fin ajeno a la propia ley. Por último, el concepto de la *heautonomía* estética es el centro del último capítulo de la obra. Pollok plantea aquí lo que puede entenderse como un paso estético entre los dominios de la Naturaleza y la Libertad. El juicio puro de gusto, que tiene una legalidad propia, a un tiempo salva el abismo abierto entre el mundo sensible y lo suprasensible (entendido aquí en un sentido práctico). Ante lo bello no acontece simplemente una experiencia estética. También tiene lugar la apertura de un vínculo entre el mundo sensible y el suprasensible esto es, entre la experiencia sensible y la idea de una cierta finalidad sin fin. Más allá, el epílogo que cierra el libro tiene cierto interés. Aunque principalmente está dedicado a repasar los temas principales del libro, hace además referencia de un modo más o menos velado a lo que podríamos considerar el siguiente paso de la investigación ya concluida, esto es, el pensamiento político de Kant. Este siguiente paso podría concretarse en una investigación en torno a la consideración kantiana de la normatividad jurídica y política.

Me gustaría concluir con un par de observaciones este comentario a la obra de Pollok. Lo cierto es que su recuperación de la filosofía crítica desde la Normatividad es sin duda alguna valiosa y marca una firme resistencia frente a interpretaciones de Kant, que

con su comprensión naturalista del juicio, ciegan toda posibilidad coherente de fundamentación de su dimensión legal. Más allá, debe ser destacado el acertado énfasis que el autor pone sobre la naturaleza pública de la razón y de los límites legales compartidos a los que estamos sujetos en la discusión pública. Sin embargo, un par de aspectos de la lectura del pensamiento kantiano que la obra presenta me inquietan. Fundamentalmente, en lo que respecta a lo que Pollok denomina *laws of reason*, sería importante aclarar de qué tipo de ley estamos hablando y qué clase de norma es por ella generada. Pollok cita un análisis previo de MacFarlane sobre la teoría de la lógica Kantiana, en el cual éste autor defiende que cuando Kant dice que las leyes de la lógica son generales, lo que pretende decir es que son constitutivas del pensamiento como tal, esto es, que no podemos pensar sin ellas. Las leyes de la lógica serían necesarias en un sentido último. Pero curiosamente (y este es el aspecto problemático), estas leyes son también normativas. En su obra, Pollok de algún modo realiza una extensión de esta tesis de MacFarlane sobre la lógica general y la normatividad, al conjunto de las tres *Críticas* y sus principios sintéticos a priori.

Esto nos lleva a preguntarnos sobre cómo debe ser entendido este último carácter normativo de esos principios en su relación con el constitutivo. Parece que ese doble carácter puede ser entendido de dos formas: o bien es imposible participar de ninguno de esos tres órdenes de experiencia sin conformidad a esos principios, en tanto constituyen la experiencia misma de los respectivos órdenes, o bien no es posible participar de ellos sin ser susceptibles de evaluación según dichos principios (es decir, podemos participar de ellos en incumplimiento de ciertos aspectos de dichos principios). Entre una y otra posibilidad hay, como es evidente, una diferencia más que relevante. Pues bien, es la segunda opción la que parece secundar Pollok. Sin embargo, esto resulta difícilmente reconciliable con el tono de otros momentos de su propia lectura. Por ejemplo, si recordamos la tesis hilemórfica según la cual en la síntesis de intuición y concepto acontece la determinación de la materia por la forma, de modo que de ello resulta lo que llamamos experiencia (en cualquiera los tres sentidos delineados), es difícil entender qué experiencia sería la constituida más allá de los márgenes de esa normatividad. Aún más, una tesis de la filosofía crítica a la que Pollok se refiere como “Kant’s blindness thesis”, afirma que no es posible pensar algo así como una sensación no determinada por concepto. Sin embargo, si la comprensión de la normatividad deja espacio a un incumplimiento de la norma, parece que quedaría una puerta abierta a una experiencia ajena a la normatividad de la forma.



Listado de evaluadores / Reviewers List

Ana María Andaluz (UPSA, Spain)
Cassandra Basile (Univ. degli Studi di Pisa, Italy)
Lubomir Bélas (Univ. Presov, Slovakia)
César Casimiro Elena (CEU-Cardenal Herrera, Spain)
Rubén Fasolino (UCM, Spain)
Serena Feloj (Univ. di Pavia, Italy)
Luca Filieri (Univ. degli Studi di Pisa, Italy)
Marina García-Granero (UV, Spain)
Ana Marta González (UNAV, Spain)
Jesús González Fisac (UCA, Spain)
Ricardo Gutiérrez Aguilar (UCM, Spain)
Alexandre Hahn (Univ. of Brasilia, Brazil)
Laura Herrero Olivera (UCM, Spain)
Francesca Iannelli (Univ. di Roma Tre, Italy)
Alba Jiménez (UCM, Spain)
Tomasz Kúps (Univ. Torun, Poland)
Natalia Lerussi (UBA/CONICET, Argentina)
Dorota Leszczyna (Univ. Wroclaw, Poland)
Gualtiero Lorini (Univ. Cattolica di Milano, Italy)
Sasha Mudd (Pontificia Univ. de Chile, Chile)
Pablo Muchnik (Emory College, USA)
Roberto R. Aramayo (IFS/CSIC, Spain)
Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Univ. Complutense of Madrid, Spain)
Lara Scaglia (UAB, Spain)
Fernando Silva (CFUL, Portugal)
Martin Sticker (Univ. of Bristol, UK)
Pedro J. Teruel (UV, Spain)
Lydia de Tienda (UV, Spain)





Política Editorial

Este proyecto editorial sólo podrá salir adelante propiciando una nutrida participación presidida por la más absoluta pluralidad y obviando exclusiones de ningún tipo.

Se trata de una revista electrónica en torno a los estudios kantianos que tendría una periodicidad bianual y alternará los números monográficos (al cuidado de uno o dos editores invitados) con otros donde se publicarán los trabajos que obtengan informes favorables por el sistema de par ciego. El español será el idioma principal, pero también se podrán publicar trabajos en inglés, alemán, francés, italiano y portugués.

Los manuscritos deberán ser originales inéditos en cualquier idioma, que no estén bajo consideración en ningún otro lugar. Deberán remitirse por correo electrónico en Word a:

contextoskantianos@gmail.com

Preparación del Manuscrito

La extensión de los artículos no deberá exceder las 12.000 palabras, la de las discusiones 8.000 palabras las críticas de libros 4.000 palabras. En caso de que el interés y calidad del manuscrito lo aconseje, el equipo editorial podrá tomar en consideración la publicación manuscritos de una longitud mayor o menor.

Tanto los artículos como las discusiones deberán incluir un resumen en la lengua en que estén redactados y en inglés de unas 150 palabras. Igualmente deberán incluir tres o cinco palabras clave en ambas lenguas, adjuntando además el título del trabajo en inglés. El título del artículo, en la lengua en que esté redactado y en inglés, y el nombre y apellidos del autor, que estará en VERSALES, constarán en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 16, apareciendo únicamente el título en **negrita**. La vinculación institucional aparecerá en letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 14. El resumen y palabras clave, en la lengua del artículo y en inglés, aparecerán en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11. Si la lengua del trabajo es el inglés, título, resumen y palabras clave aparecerán también en traducción al español.

Las reseñas llevarán un título, en la lengua en que estén redactadas y en inglés, relativo a su contenido y describirán la obra reseñada del siguiente modo: Autor, *título*, lugar, editorial, año, número de páginas.

En todos los casos los autores deberán adjuntar unas breves líneas curriculares (250 palabras) donde, aparte de consignar su adscripción institucional, den cuenta de sus principales publicaciones y reflejen igualmente los ámbitos temáticos cultivados, sin dejar de proporcionar una dirección de contacto electrónica. Por favor prepare el manuscrito para un referato ciego quitando toda auto-referencia.

Estilo

Todas las contribuciones han de emplear tipo de letra *Times New Roman*, tamaño 12 y espaciado 1,5 (texto y notas). Las notas deben estar numeradas consecutivamente (números volados, no entre

paréntesis) y aparecer como notas a pie, usando la fuente *Times New Roman*, tamaño 10 y espaciado simple. El número de nota que remite a la información contenida en la nota a pie aparecerá directamente después del signo de puntuación que cierra la cita en el cuerpo del texto. Las palabras y sintagmas que el autor considere necesario recalcar, irán en *cursiva*, nunca en **negrita**.

Citas y referencias

Las referencias a autores y publicaciones en el cuerpo del texto aparecerán entre paréntesis, incluyendo el apellido del autor, el año de publicación de la obra y las páginas citadas. Ejemplo: (Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Los pasajes de obras citados a lo largo de los artículos aparecerán, con justificación a la izquierda de 1,5, en *Times New Roman*, tamaño 11, sin dobles comillas. Las reseñas no extraerán pasajes con justificación: en caso de que el autor desee citar extractos de la obra reseñada lo hará entre dobles comillas en el cuerpo del texto y respetando su tamaño, empleando la modalidad indicada de referencia entre paréntesis al autor, año de la publicación y página.

Las partes omitidas en citas se señalarán con tres puntos entre paréntesis cuadrados — [...]—, separados por un espacio simple de la palabra anterior y siguiente.

* Las referencias de las obras de Kant deberán hacerse según las pautas fijadas por la Edición de la Academia:

http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf

* La bibliografía se debe organizar alfabética y cronológicamente al final del texto. Si se citan varias obras del mismo autor, éstas deben ordenarse de manera cronológica, de la más reciente a la más antigua.

Ejemplos:

Libro:

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

Artículo:

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

Capítulo en una obra colectiva:

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), "Kant y la filosofía de la religión", en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón"*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

Trabajos disponibles en la web:

Waldron, J. "The Principle of Proximity", *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp, acceso mes, día y año).

Editorial Policy

We would like to acquaint you with a journal project that can only go forward with the greatest possible participation of Kant scholars, without exclusions of any kind.

CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS

International Journal of Philosophy

N.º 9, Junio 2019, pp. 408-411

ISSN: 2386-7655

This periodical will be a biannual electronic journal in Kantian studies, which will alternate between open-submission issues and single-topic issues coordinated by one or two editors. All submitted manuscripts would undergo peer review.

Though Spanish is the Journal's primary language, manuscripts in English, German, French, Italian, and Portuguese are also welcome.

Submissions must not have been previously published, nor should they be under consideration anywhere else in any language. Please send your manuscript as a Word attachment to the following e-mail address:

contextoskantianos@gmail.com

Manuscript Preparation

Articles must not exceed 12.000 words, discussions 8.000 words, and book reviews 4.000 words (including footnotes and bibliography in all cases). Longer manuscripts could also be considered by the editorial team, if the interest and quality of the contribution justifies its acceptance.

Articles and discussions should include an abstract both in the language of the submitted paper and in English that should not exceed 150 words as well as three to five keywords, with the title also in English. The title of articles, in the language of the submitted text and in English, and the author (in SMALL CAPS) will appear in *Times New Roman* 16 and in **bold type**. The institutional affiliation will have font *Times New Roman* 14. The *abstract* and *key words*, also in the language of the submitted and in English, will have font *Times New Roman* 11. If the language of the article or discussion is English, the title, abstract and key words will be also translated into Spanish.

Book reviews should have a title both in the language of the submitted paper and in English. They should also refer to the work under review as follows: Author, *title*, place, publishing house, year, and number of pages.

Please include a brief biographical note (250 words) that includes institutional affiliation, the titles of some publications, areas of specialization, and an e-mail address. Please prepare the manuscript for blind review deleting all self-references.

Style

For any contribution, the author should use letter type *Time New Roman* 12 and lines should be spaced 1.5 (text and notes). Notes should be numbered consecutively (superscript, no brackets) and appear as footnotes, using *Times New Roman* 10. The number of the annotation which points to the bibliographic information contained in the footnote has to appear directly after the quotation mark closing the citation.

Stress required in the text should be done through the use of *italics*, never in **bold type**.

Citations and references

References without excerpting throughout the manuscript must appear in parenthesis in the main text with the following information: author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Example:

(Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Excerpts cited throughout articles will use *Times New Roman* 11, without quotation marks and 1,5 left indented. Reviews shall not include indented excerpts, only brief citations, if necessary, with

quotation marks and the reference in parenthesis of author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Omissions in citations are marked by three dots placed in square brackets which are separated from the preceding and the following word by a single space.

When citing Kant's Complete Works the usage within the *Akademie Edition* is mandatory http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf

*Bibliography must be included at the end and organized alphabetically. Several works by the same author must be ordered chronologically beginning with the most recent one.

Examples:

Book:

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

Article:

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

Chapter in a collective work:

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), "Kant y la filosofía de la religión", en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón"*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

Paper available in websites:

Waldron, J. "The Principle of Proximity", *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19 http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp, accessed month, day year).

