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## **Editorial CTK 13**

El número 13 tiene mala fama y esa fila no se cuenta en los aviones que fabrican algunos países. Pero esto no rige para *Con-Textos Kantianos*, que sigue su andadura, gracias al compromiso de sus colaboradores, de su equipo editor y al trabajo de la coeditora principal, que también ejerce como Secretaría ejecutiva, Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España).

CTK presenta en este número una discusión entre Claudio Corradetti (Università di Roma “Tor Vergata”, Italia) y Allen Wood (Stanford University and University of Indiana at Bloomington, USA) sobre la teoría política internacional de Kant, así como un dossier sobre *Madness and Kant’s Philosophy*, coordinado por la editora invitada Mariannina Failla (Università di Roma Tre, Italia), que cuenta con cuatro autorías italianas, una española y una mexicana. También se presenta una segunda carpeta de trabajos titulada *Kant contemporáneo/Kant subterráneo*, coordinada en este caso por la editora invitada Macarena Marey (Universidad de Buenos Aires/CONICET), que reúne trabajos procedentes de Brasil, España, USA y Venezuela/Suiza. Todo ello se completa con ocho artículos, llegados de Alemania, Brasil, Colombia, Uruguay, Italia, España, Polonia. Por su parte, la sección de reseñas presenta cinco aportaciones relativas a estudios de la obra y legado conceptual kantiano de reciente aparición.

Queremos recordar que admitimos también ediciones de breves textos kantianos y traducciones de documentos relevantes que no sean fácilmente localizables. Tenemos pendiente publicar la entrevista que los dos coeditores principales han realizado a María Julia Bertomeu (CONICET, Argentina), que será publicada en breve.

Como de costumbre os recordamos también que asociada con la revista tenemos una *Biblioteca Digital de Estudios Kantianos CTK E-Books* en acceso abierto y a la se pueden mandar distintos tipos de originales (monografías, volúmenes colectivos y traducciones de obras kantianas, en y a cualquier de los idiomas admitidos por la revista, es decir, alemán, español, francés, inglés, italiano y portugués), utilizando por ejemplo este correo: [aramayo.roberto@gmail.com](mailto:aramayo.roberto@gmail.com)



Roberto R. Aramayo  
Bahía de Txingudi, mayo 2021

## Editorial CTK 13

Number 13 has not a good reputation and even such a row does not exist in some airlines. But this is not the case of *Con-textos Kantianos*, which goes ahead thanks to the commitment of contributors, the editorial team and the devotion of the main co-editor, Nuria Sánchez Madrid (Universidad Complutense de Madrid, España).

CTK displays in this issue a discussion on Kant's international political theory by Claudio Corradetti (Università di Roma "Tor Vergata", Italia) and Allen Wood (Stanford University and University of Indiana at Bloomington, USA). The issue also contains one first dossier —*Madness and Kant's Philosophy*—, whose guest editor is Mariannina Failla (Università di Roma Tre, Italia), which puts together four papers by researchers from Italy, Spain and Mexico. It also contains a second dossier —*Contemporanean Kant/ Subterranean Kant*—, with Macarena Marey (Universidad de Buenos Aires/CONICET) as guest editor, which puts together papers from researchers from Brazil, Spain, USA and Venezuela/Switzerland. A section of miscellaneous papers completes CTK issue 13 with 8 papers by researchers from Germany, Brazil, Colombia, Uruguay, Italy, Spain and Poland. Finally, the book reviews section contains 5 contributions focusing on recent Kant-related publications.

The editorial team reminds that the journal also accepts editions of short Kant's writings and translations of hard-to-find documents, of interest for the Kantian studies. In our next issue we will publish an interview that the main co-editors of the journal made to María Julia Bertomeu (CONICET, Argentina).

As usual, CTK editorial team also wishes to highlight that the journal is linked to the open access *Digital Library of Kantian Studies CTK E-Books*, which accepts different kinds of proposals (essays, collected volumes and translations of Kant's writings) in any of the 6 languages admitted by the journal. Proposals may be submitted to the following email: [aramayo.roberto@gmail.com](mailto:aramayo.roberto@gmail.com)



Roberto R. Aramayo  
Txingudi's Bay, May 2021

**Kant or not Kant? Arguing on Kant's Ultimate Political Design  
for Global Governance and Cosmopolitanism.  
An Exchange between Claudio Corradetti and Allen Wood**

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**Abstract**

In the following reflection Claudio Corradetti and Allen Wood engage in a controversy concerning the possibilities and the limits of textual interpretation. Should an interpreter still be authorized to call an author's interpretation the logical stretch of text beyond its black printed letters? The authors offer two different standpoints on what can still be defined as textual interpretation. Whereas for Allen Wood a clear-cut separation must be kept between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual exegesis in so far as the interpreter's conclusions follow a logical pattern of justification starting from evidential hints.

**Key words**

Kant, Cosmopolitanism, World Republic, Regulative Ideal

In occasion of the publication of the monograph Claudio Corradetti, *Kant Global Politics and Cosmopolitan Law. The World Republic as a Regulative Idea of Reason*, Routledge, London-New York 2020, the book author and Allen Wood engage in a

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controversy concerning the possibilities and the limits of Kant's textual interpretation. Should an interpreter be authorized to stretch a text beyond its black printed letters even if in the 'spirit' of the author? Is it possible to draw a clear distinction between textual evidences and the interpreter's additions? Is there a middle ground? Allen Wood and Claudio Corradetti offer two different standpoints on how to approach Kant's exegesis of global politics and cosmopolitan law. Whereas for Allen Wood there must be a clear-cut separation between what a text shows and what an interpreter argues starting from the text, for Claudio Corradetti such distinction remains internal to textual analysis in so far as the interpreter's conclusions follow a logical pattern of justification. There are two main points around which this exchange unfolds: 1) the meta-questions concerning what a textual interpretation is and what its limits and possibilities are; and, following from this, 2) a disagreement on what the ultimate design and rationale of Kant's international relations is.

**Allen Wood** Kant conceives a progression in conditions of international right. Corradetti seems to think (I am skeptical about this) that Kant has a definite conception of the progression of rightful international orders, culminating in a World Republic. My view is that Kant does have a plurality of distinct conceptions of how a rightful international order might be constituted, which include a voluntary international federation, and its possible growth to include new states, such a federation with provisions for enforcement of its laws and decrees over its members, and finally a state of nations, whose members are themselves sovereign states. I do not see Kant as projecting a progression in history here, as if nations should first adopt one model and then a more demanding one. I think he is hoping that nations will do something to lessen the frequency and the danger of war between them, and to lessen their addiction to the preparedness for war, which Kant sees as a mortal threat to the political and even moral progress of humanity. But I do not see him as having even a clear favorite among the models. He is simply hoping that nations will agree on something that works. Perhaps he does favor the idea of a state of nations, since it comes closest to an international order that would resemble a condition of right among individuals. But I do not see him as projecting any future historical progression leading to that. It looked to me as if at times Corradetti was trying to use the idea of a regulative

principle in Kant to construct such a future course of history on Kant's behalf. I do not see that in Kant.

I certainly think Kant never entertains the thought of a world republic whose members are human individuals -- a single world-state encompassing all human beings. On the contrary, he regards that as a dystopian horror-vision, the worst form of tyranny and "the graveyard of freedom." The state of nations he favors would retain the internal sovereignty of separate states and have these states as its members. This would limit the capacity of such a state of nations to enforce its decrees, since if its members are to retain internal sovereignty and control over their own resources and enforcement capacities, it could not require them to go to war in order to enforce a rightful international order. At most, it could give its members permission to join in the enforcement of its laws and decrees against one of its members. It was not always clear to me that Corradetti did not see clearly Kant's rejection of the idea of a single all-encompassing world-state. But that may be either because he did not express himself unambiguously or because I am at fault in not understanding him correctly.

I also found a bit obscure Corradetti's discussion of *lex latae* or *lex permissiva*. This is, admittedly, a difficult and obscure concept in Kant's theory of right itself, about which nobody can be too sure what it is or exactly where it fits. Or at least that's true of me. There was an interesting paper about 20 years ago written by Brian Tierney, arguing that Kant's notion of permissive law constitutes an unsolved (maybe insoluble) problem in his theory of property. Tierney comes at this through his work on medieval canon law theories of property (B.Tierney, 2001, pp.301-312), such as those involved in the Franciscan claims to own nothing while having become a scholarly order that needed books and manuscripts that were, in effect in that society, like highly scarce and valuable works of art.

The main application of the concept of permissive law, as I understand Kant, is to resolving the theoretical problem within his theory of property - the transition from provisional to peremptory property. (I don't agree with Tierney that this represents an insoluble problem.) And then its role is that in a state of nature we are permitted (what we otherwise would not be allowed according to right) to compel others to join a condition of right in which provisional possession becomes peremptory possession and a right of property. Who owns what would be settled by a public authority which would also enforce

property rights. Is there something analogous that in Kant's view does (or could) operate on the international level? Could sovereign states be permitted to coerce others into an international order? I doubt it. All the models of international right I see Kant as entertaining presuppose the sovereignty of individual states, and the international order (however it is conceived) would have to be entered into voluntarily by them. One issue on which Kant's texts might give different verdicts is whether an international order would have to be such that any state could withdraw from it. Could voluntary membership be revoked at will, or would there be a true federation that is permanent? In the *Rechtslehre* (6:351) Kant seems to suggest that the most there could be is a voluntary congress with right of withdrawal at any time (Kant, 2006 [1797]). But is he merely describing that arrangement, or is he claiming (as some, such as Susan Shell, maintain) that nothing stronger than such a congress is rightfully possible? That would contradict what he seems to say in *Perpetual Peace*. Corradetti may be alluding to this late in the paper and trying to use regulative ideas to resolve the apparent conflict. I prefer to see Kant as merely describing what a Congress of nations is (one model for international right), not setting limits on what states could do. (Incidentally, Kant alludes here to the USA as a federation not permitting voluntary withdrawal -- thus anticipating by a half century the issue in our Civil War and taking the Union side.)

**Claudio Corradetti** At the top of Kant's practical philosophy is the regulative idea of transcendental freedom. In so far as freedom solves the dialectical opposition of **necessity and freedom** (as thesis and antithesis), its regulative property derives from its being an Idea of reason (Kant, I. 2000 [1781-7], A338/B396, p.409 ff.). The world republic represents a political regulative counterpart to the metaphysical idea of the republican view of freedom as non-domination. The world republic as an idea of reason expresses merely a **cognitive function** rather than a form of knowledge. Because ideas have a hypothetical character, the world republic provides us with a cognitive model for judging 'transitional' progressions in current politics. It does not represent an objective historical finality of world history, but a conceptual resource for its judgement.

Let me just add two things: 1) the regulative idea of the *Welt Republik/Völkerstaat* (these are for me analogous terms) is something we can textually reconstruct from several passages which are all connected to freedom as a regulative idea.

The reading I propose thus reinforces the assumption that, for Kant, law and politics are legitimate in so far as they reflect the ideals of moral freedom. Since freedom according to the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an idea of reason (and thus it is regulative),<sup>1</sup> I conclude that the world (state) republic — in so far as it institutionalizes freedom for global politics — is also an idea of reason that thereby holds a regulative function.

Let us reconsider this conceptual puzzle by referring to the famous paragraph in *Toward Perpetual Peace* where Kant draws a distinction between what is right in theory (*in thesi*) — as with the desirability of a world republic/multistate confederation (note that here Kant uses the term *Weltrepublik*) — and what is instead right in practice (*in hypothesi*), as with the realization of the federation/league of states seen as a negative, second best, surrogate.

If, according to the ideal standard of practical reason, the world (state) republic is the solution to adopt but nations “in accordance with their idea of the right of nations [...] do not at all want this, thus rejecting *in hypothesi* what is correct *in thesi*” (Kant, I., 2006 [1795], 8:357, p.328), then, a suboptimal solution becomes legitimate only in so far as it stays compatible and open to the normative improvements demanded by the defined ideal. In other words, states’ practical rejection of the ideal standard of global politics (the world republic) is justifiable *pro tanto* only if it shows that the second-best solution does not

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<sup>1</sup> According to P. Keating: “Thus, there is an important disanalogy between the laws of nature and the laws of freedom, because the latter are regulative and not determinative, that is, action guiding and not action determining... This explains Kant’s strange passage in the second edition Preface about how the human soul is both free and determined. (Bxxvi-xxx) The soul is thus free, not because it is capable of a dualism, but rather, because it is the site of unification for the laws of freedom with the laws of nature. Kant gives the example of a free action in the conditional: If (for example) I am now entirely free, and get up from my chair without the necessarily determining influence of natural causes, then in this occurrence, along with its natural consequences to infinity, there begins an entirely new series ... For this decision and deed do not lie within the succession of merely natural effects and are not a mere continuation of them ... (A451/B479) So when we view ourselves as capable of freedom (the intelligible standpoint) we assign free choice to our actions”. P. Keating, 2007, pp.63-64.

contradict the ideal of the practical demands of reason. The normative demand for a *formal congruence* between theory and practice persists.

Accordingly, just as the league of states, in order to result as a normatively significant entity (not just as a brute fact!) must incorporate within its suboptimal institutional arrangement the normative ideal of the world (state) republic, similarly, the concept of a global arrangement of world politics must be turned into a regulative ideal. It is exactly at this textual juncture that Kant's elliptic introduction of the conceptual possibility for the idea of the league of states 'as if' it were a world (state) republic should be seen. But this, in Kantian terms, requires a consideration of the relation between the league of states and the world (state) republic in a way similar to the relation between the regulative ideas of reason and the empirical occurrences of experience.

Such point opens the problematic issue of how to conceive the relation between theory and practice in Kant's global politics. Some passages are indicative of this difficulty.

First, in the aforementioned text of *Toward Perpetual Peace*, just before the introduction of the distinction between theory and practice Kant explains that the international state of nature among nations cannot be abandoned in any other way "but war" (Kant, I. 2006 [1795], 8:357, p.328), similarly to the way in which individuals are forced to leave "their savage (lawless) freedom" (Ibid.).

Yet, the possibility that "an (always growing) *state of nations (civitas gentium)*" (Ibid.) would arise and "finally encompass all the nations of the earth" (Ibid.) is prevented by the will of states who will never freely subordinate themselves to a superior power. Therefore, one might conclude, "if all is not to be lost" (Ibid.), the world (state) republic can be assumed only as a conceptual guidance for the arrangement of interstates relations. The distinction Kant draws between what is correct *in thesi* and what is instead feasible in practice should be interpreted in relation to a regulative role of the idea of theoretical correctness.

By suggesting the view that the world state republic provides a practical guidance to the structuring of international relations, Kant safeguarded the unity of theory and practice through the hope that peace among nations is an achievable ideal. This is not to exclude the possibility that a universal state – not a republic – could be brutally brought about through force.



In the writing *On the Common Saying*, Kant had already affirmed that: “such a universal state of nations [...]is possible *{in praxi}* and [...]can be” (Kant, I. 2006 [1793], 8:313, p.309). Yet, in *Toward Perpetual Peace*, he reminds us that only by subordinating politics to public right under the guidance of the world (state) republic can we hold “a well-founded hope [that] *perpetual peace* [...] is no empty idea but a task that, gradually solved, comes steadily closer to its goal” (Kant, I. 1795, 2006, 8:386, p.351). 2) regarding the *leges latae*, they are adopted by Kant in different contexts and not only in private law contexts (which I do mention, by the way). More interestingly for my purposes is Kant's indication of the preliminary articles 2-3-4 of *Toward Perpetual Peace* in terms of *leges latae*. Within it, Kant refers to the provisional, but not rightful, toleration of royal inheritance of states (which contradicts the self-determining will of the people), state financial debts with other countries, and finally (and perhaps more importantly) the standing armies to be adopted to solve interstate conflicts. All of these concessions tolerate transitional phases towards a rightful international order.

**Allen Wood** My chief reservation about the later version of your paper -- which was much clearer (at least to me) than the earlier version -- have to do with whether your project really involves an interpretation of Kant or is really about contemporary international relations. There is no doubt that Kant is an important source for anyone thinking about these questions and represents an earlier stage in offering proposals for how nations ought to relate to one another with the aim of keeping peace between them. But I would resist using the word 'interpretation' (of Kant) for ideas that are suggested to you by Kant but are not in Kant himself. I think you need to keep the distinction between these two kinds of ideas sharp and not blur it. Kant offers a series of models for possible future international relations - organizations or agreements between nations with the aim of securing a peaceful relation. Here are the ones I would distinguish, beginning with the least ambitious and going on from there:

1. A peace pact between two or more nations, concluding a war (Kant, I. 2006 [1795], 8:356).

2. A congress of nations with longer duration, but entered into voluntarily and with the proviso that any nation may withdraw from it unilaterally at any time (Kant, I. 2006 [1797], 6:351).

3. A federation of nations (*Völkerbund*) organized with the aim of keeping a just peace between them, to which the member nations commit themselves to remain a party (Kant, I. 2006, [1795], 8:356 and 8:311; Kant, I. 2006 [1797], 6:351; Kant, I., 2012, 8:24, pp.107-120).

4. A state of nations (*Völkerstaat*), with a permanent constitution, of which sovereign states are the members.

(4) but not (3) would have coercive enforcement mechanisms to be used against states (whether members or not) that resist the rule of international law and attack member states of the state of nations. But for the sovereignty of member states to be maintained, the state of nations could not rightfully coerce its members to participate in such a war, but could only permit them to do so if their internal sovereignty led to their decision to participate. Each of (2)-(4) Kant hopes will expand its membership. If (as Kant considers highly unlikely though desirable) that membership encompassed all the nations of the earth, this would result in:

5. A world republic, whose members are states

Kant rejects the idea of a:

6. World monarchy, abolishing the sovereignty of individual nations.

As I read Kant, he views this list (excluding (6) of course) as a list of possible models of international co-operation. He is hopeful that nations will eventually choose one model or another to promote peace and if possible make it perpetual. Which of the models nations should adopt is not something Kant proposes to decide. It would depend on pragmatic considerations. He might prefer (4) or even (5) to (3) and (3) to merely (2). But Kant DOES NOT view this list as a progression (or to use your word, "transition") moving from (2) to (3) to (4). This would suggest a speculative historical teleology which is no part at all of Kant's thinking about international relations.

As I read your paper, it seems on the contrary to suggest precisely that - this is how I understand your term 'transitional'. And you are offering this way of understanding the models of international co-operation as (in your words) an interpretation of Kant. This is where I must disagree strongly with you. It would be an abuse of the word 'interpretation'

to attribute to Kant the thought that there will be, or even ought to be, a progression from (3) to (4) to (5) and even to (6). An interpretation of a philosopher ought to be an attempt to state clearly and accurately what the philosopher's views are. But in that case, the 'transitional interpretation' of Kant would be simply a wrong interpretation of him. Perhaps this historical teleology is something you find appealing, which you wish would occur and whose occurrence you might like to advocate. That thought (of a progression with a historical teleology) may even have been suggested to you by reading Kant. But it is not in Kant. Not at all. He does not believe in such a teleology of international relations and is not arguing for one. It is at most a thought suggested to your mind by what he thought and wrote. But it is not his thought at all. A thought that bears this relation to a historical philosopher is not an interpretation of that philosopher, as I understand the word 'interpretation'. I think there are indications in your paper that you realize that what I have just said is true. But you nevertheless want to continue to speak of your idea of a 'transition' from (2) Perhaps I have misunderstood you. If so, I'd appreciate your explaining your view more.

So let me complete my thought briefly.

As I understand you, you are attracted by the idea of a historical transition from (2) a congress of states, through (3) a federation of states, to (4) a state of nations and then even to (5) a world republic. But I think you realize this idea is not in Kant. He does not advocate such a developmental process. It is an abuse of his notion of the regulative to suggest that he is thinking of this progression and the notion of a world republic 'regulatively.' I think you are aware of all this. But nevertheless you want to call YOUR idea of a "transition" from (2) to (5) an 'interpretation' of Kant, and want to appeal to his idea of the regulative to suggest that (5) is a regulative idea governing the transition. Whatever appeal the notion of a 'transition' may have for you, you should not use the term "interpretation" to describe its relation to Kant. That is my objection to your paper, as I understand it. The only element of your view that I find in Kant is the thought that whatever model of international co-operation nations may choose to adopt (whether (2), (3) or (4)), it would be a good thing if the membership were to expand and more states to join. But this falls well short of your conception of the 'transition'. So your "transitional interpretation" of Kant should not be called an "interpretation". To do so is to abuse the word 'interpretation'.

Perhaps I have misunderstood you. If so, I would be grateful if you would correct me, and explain your view more.

**Claudio Corradetti** So here are my replies to your replies:  
- 'transition' is used with reference to 'approximation to peace' as it appears from the same use of 'zu' in the title of *Towards Perpetual Peace*, but also in later passages.  
- I believe you misunderstand me when you consider that at some point I see the world republic as realizable. I never say that. What I claim is that the world republic is a way 'to think the unity' of international law. This is why it is a 'regulative' idea as they are described in the *Dialectic of Reason*.

- progression 1 (as inter-transnational-political-entities shifts) is desirable but it is not an objective teleological direction we can reconstruct in history. Yet, it is a benchmark (of a cosmopolitan kind) we can use to judge history according to a cosmopolitan perspective. This does not mean though that the plurality of the shift from the *Kongreß* to the *Völkerbund* etc. is nullified by historical progression. On the contrary: the plurality of these institutional options available at the international level remains, BUT, their external constitutional arrangements (their external relations) must approximate the ideal of a world republic as well as of the cosmopolitan right to visit (the 2nd and the Third definitive article).

As states must be republican, similarly transnational entities must approximate a republican ideal for a reciprocal arrangement of international affairs.  
-progression 2, I believe it is a fair interpretation of Kant's Enlightenment and ideal of human emancipation to make sense of his understanding of history according to a 'cosmopolitan point of view'. It is Kant himself who devotes an entire work to explaining how we can look back on history and judge it according to a cosmopolitan progression. The idea of a 'cosmopolitan constitution' serves precisely as a standpoint for adjudicating empirical progression in that respect through the advancement of the constitutionalization of domestic, international and cosmopolitan law (the three constitutional layers Kant mentions in a footnote of *Perpetual Peace*).

**Allen Wood** I accept that you do not think of a world republic as realizable in Kant's view. And I agree that this the way you describe his use of ideas in the *Dialectic* is the way

Kant thinks of ideas in the Dialectic of *Critique of Pure Reason*. But he never applies it to international law in the way you do in this paper. It is a misinterpretation of Kant to read him that way. Kant does use the word 'idea' in relation to history in his 1784 essay. But there he is seeing the idea of a perfect civil constitution as an idea to be approximated in reforming the constitutions of individual states. One thing he thinks will assist this process of political progress is the creation of a federation of states seeking peace. But in that essay he does not entertain a plurality of models of international co-operation. Still less does he entertain the thought that there might be a regulative idea relating different models. When you apply the notion of regulative ideas to a progression of such models, you are extending Kantian ideas in a way Kant never does, and you should not call such an extension an 'interpretation' of Kant.

I am not clear whether in the above you are intending to describe Kant's views or are merely putting forth your own views. This is what I wish had been made clearer in your paper. I see nothing whatever in Kant to suggest a transition between different models of international co-operation is anything Kant intends to put forward or to entertain. If offered as an interpretation of Kant, it is without textual support and should be rejected as an interpretation of Kant's thoughts about how we should think about the quest for world peace. In *Idea* (1784) he presents such an idea toward which states might progress as a way of thinking about political progress. In *Religion* (1793-4) he entertains the idea of an ethical community along with hopes that existing churches should make progress toward that idea. But nowhere do I find Kant suggesting a progression from treaties, to a congress of nations, to a federation, to a state of nations as a progression (or 'transition') in terms of which we should think about the efforts toward perpetual peace that he is advocating. Again, in *Idea* (1784) he thinks this way about the progress of individual states toward an ideally just constitution. I never see any evidence of the same way of thinking about the efforts toward world peace. In your paper I saw various signs that you are aware of this, and realize that what you call a "transitional interpretation" (of Kant) is not a textually defensible interpretation of Kant, but instead is a way of looking at his models of international co-operation that apparently appeals to you, and can be constructed using an innovative (never used by Kant) application of the Kantian notion of a regulative idea. You are extending Kant's conceptions in ways he never does. He uses the idea of a just constitution in *Idea* (1784) in this way when discussing political progress in individual

states (domestic right), but he never applies the same pattern of thinking to international or cosmopolitan right. Perhaps the extension of that way of thinking to these two international realms seems attractive to you, but that it appeals to you is not a ground for attributing it to Kant or offering it as an interpretation of Kant.

[Follow-up comments]

**Allen Wood** Let me try to discuss what appears to be our disagreement over how to read Kant on international right and peace, and explain why I read him as I do. We may simply have a disagreement (common enough among scholars) about how certain texts or passages are to be read. But I also suspect that your position is not merely (or not entirely) about how to read Kant. So below I will also make a suggestion regarding how I understand the motivation behind your paper, and see if you think it is correct.

The issue of Kant-interpretation. As I read the main texts in which Kant discusses international right and what nations might do to secure perpetual peace, I do not see him as ever proposing that we move from more modest models of international co-operation to more ambitious ones. In *Idea* (1784) he never proposes anything stronger than a peaceful federation (*Völkerbund*) (Kant, I. 2012, 8:24, pp.107-120). As I read him, this is the only model he suggests in that text, so it cannot support the claim that he envisions a "transition" from weaker to stronger international organizations (from a congress to a federation to a state of nations). He does suggest here, as he does everywhere about any international organization that he hopes it will expand over time to include more nations as members. This is the only developmental or 'transitional' claim I see him ever making. In this work, Kant is indeed interested in a regulative idea. But it is a regulative theoretical idea for understanding human history. It is not even a practical idea, though towards the end it converges with one, and it is an idea that would be helped by an international peaceful federation. But this is not an idea used regulatively in international relations, but only an idea citizens and rulers might use in perfecting the civil constitution of individual states.

His next discussion of this idea occurs in the third section of Kant's *Theory and Practice* (1793). Here he proposes a new model: a cosmopolitan constitution which I take to be a version of the *Völkerstaat* (Kant, I. 2006, 8:310-311). It would be an organization having coercive power to preserve peace and justice among nations. But no sooner does Kant propose it than he considers that it might be "more dangerous to freedom than the

lawless condition in which states find themselves; this leads him to back off to the model of a federation of nations.

In *Toward Perpetual Peace*, there is this same conception, with perhaps a more favorable attitude toward the state of nations, but nevertheless the same thought, at 8:357. He suggests that nations might choose to give up their lawless freedom (analogous to the way individuals do in entering into a condition of right) and form a state of nations. He again suggests that such an organization might be ‘always growing’ -- that over time, more and more nations might join it. But then as he did before he pulls back from supporting this model as a practical alternative, suggesting that existing states do not want to lose their lawless freedom, and that in accordance with their idea of international right, they reject ‘in hypothesi’ what might be correct ‘in thesi’ - refusing to form a state of nations. Kant then retreats once more to the idea of a peaceful federation instead of the quest for a world republic (which is what the state of nations would become if it included all states as members). It is interesting that the only use of ‘idea’ in this context is that of the ‘idea of international right’ that existing states possess, and it is one that would lead them to resist a state of nations. Still, by proposing that a state of nations is correct ‘in thesi’ I think he is voicing support for such a stronger model, while doubting its practicality and offering the weaker model of a federation as the most realistic likely alternative.

Finally, in the discussion of international right in *Rechtslehre*, he distinguishes a “permanent congress of states” (with states free to leave it at any time), from a federation based on a constitution. Susan Shell thinks he is abandoning the stronger conception of a federation in favor of the weaker conception of a mere congress. I don’t read him that way, but merely suggesting the weaker idea as one states might consider if even a federation is too strong for them. Again, Kant's pattern of thinking is to suggest something stronger (which he might himself favor if it were practicable) but then back off and suggest something weaker that states might be willing to accept.

If you ask about the various models of international organization which ones Kant favors, I think it would be correct to think of him as wishing for the stronger ones - a state of nations growing toward a world republic or a federation instead of a mere voluntary congress. But he is always doubtful that states would accept the stronger models. And he thinks only the weaker ones would accord with the ‘idea of international right’ that existing

states have. In *Theory and Practice*, he even suggests that the stronger model of a cosmopolitan constitution (i.e. a state of nations) might be a danger to freedom.

In no text does Kant offer us the suggestion that there might be, or that there should be, or that we should even think in terms of, a historical development from weaker models of international co-operation towards stronger ones. Thus I see your idea of a ‘transition’ (if I understand it) as absent from his writings about international right and the striving toward perpetual peace. This is why I think a ‘transitional interpretation’ of Kant on these matters is not a textually supportable interpretation.

My question about the deeper intention of your paper. But now I have a question for you about your intention in this paper (and perhaps in your book, which, however, I have not had time to read). You speak in the paper's title of Kant's ‘legacy’ You say you will defend the transitional interpretation as one Kant ‘relies on’; and you say you will ‘reconstruct and explain’ how the international entities Kant talks about ‘are to be considered part of a single pattern’. A bit later you distinguish a long-term standard from a ‘short term feasibility standard’. Passages in your paper like these lead me to offer the following suggestion as to what you might intend in this paper. I'd like to know how far you might agree with my characterization of your intentions.

What I suggest, then, is this: You are not offering the ‘transitional interpretation’ as an account of what Kant actually thought or wrote. You are instead extending Kant's ideas in a direction he did not, and therefore intending to use what Kant thought like a legacy (something inherited from him, which might then be employed for ends he did not himself propose, as an heir might use inherited resources to fund some enterprise or cause which was not among the activities of the person from whom the resources were inherited, but at most could be thought of as something that person might have approved. You could accept what I have said above about Kant's intentions in his texts, and say: “Yes, he was focused more on short term feasibility standards than on long term goals, which he might not have thought practicable”. As Fichte did with many Kantian doctrines, you might be consciously revising Kant in a direction you think attractive and which you think further some deeper (but never explicitly expressed) intentions of the spirit of Kant's philosophy.

In that case, what you are calling your ‘interpretation’ (a term I regard as inappropriate if my suggestion is right) is not to be judged by the standards of accuracy to his texts, but perhaps by standards of desirability as a way of thinking about international



relations today or in the future. Your references to later thinkers such as Klabbers, Habermas and Benhabib lead me to conjecture that this is your real aim. Then my thought is that perhaps Kant was right to limit himself to more modest and short term suggestions, and that this is especially plausible now that we live in an age when, sadly, the whole idea of international co-operation appears to be in decline and tribes and nations seem to be retreating behind their cultural walls and military power. I might wish your suggestions were practicable, but fear they are unrealistic for the near (perhaps even the foreseeable) future, and I might even fear that Kant was right in pulling back from your extension of him. Kant might have considered you, and also Fichte, as what he sometimes called a ‘visionary’ (*Phantast*), a person morally admirable but not practically wise. And he might have called a politician who tried to implement your ideas under conditions where they are not practical a ‘despotizing moralist’, who does not unite morality with politics in the right way because he goes against political prudence, through “measures prematurely adopted or recommended” (Kant, I., 2006 [1795], 8:373).

This, I suggest, is what Kant might have thought of your interpretation of him. And it is a further reason for rejecting your ‘transitional interpretation’ as an interpretation of Kant. But I am not necessarily in agreement with Kant here. I am myself a big fan of Fichte [redacted]. So if your project is like his, I might still be sympathetic with it even if Kant’s more cautious attitudes led him to resist it. Sometimes Fichte extends Kantian ideas in ways that he claims are more consistent than Kant’s own development of those same ideas. Perhaps you might defend your ‘transitional’ interpretation in that way. But what I would like to know from you is whether my guesses about your intention in this paper are correct. You do not really intend the transitional interpretation as an interpretation of Kant’s meaning, but instead as an extension of some of Kant’s ideas in a direction Kant himself was perhaps too cautious or conservative to extend them. This is my most sympathetic take on your paper. I wonder if you think it is correct.

**Claudio Corradetti** Let me preface this by saying that I do agree with both your Kantian texts’ observations in the first part of your comments, as well as in understanding my interpretation of Kant as a way of ‘filling in the gaps’ of his reasoning. It might be pretentious but at least it is a useful attempt particularly for current times. I don’t find

myself to be a naive political thinker by defending this overall picture, I do take the realistic point of what is feasible in *hypothesi* as something valuable.

It is in this respect that I propose a ‘transitional’ reading of Kant’s global politics. What does it mean to progress towards peace? It means to take seriously the ‘transitional’ movement of the political approximation towards peace and the realization of the ‘cosmopolitan constitution’ which Kant mentions in different ways along several writings. Here are some examples: “a cosmopolitan constitution” (*Weltbürgerliche Verfassung*) (Kant, I. 2006 [1795], 8:358, p.329 and Kant, I. 2006 [1793], 8:307, p.304), a “cosmopolitan commonwealth” (*Weltbürgerliches gemeines Wesen*) (Kant, I. 2006 [1793], 8:311, p.308), or, even, in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, “a cosmopolitan whole” (*Weltbürgerliches Ganze*) (Kant, I. 2000 [1790], 5:432, p.300).

Kant titled his philosophical sketch *Towards Perpetual Peace*. He adopted the prefix ‘zu’ with the idea of indicating a meaning of ‘movement towards’.

Peace is for Kant an asymptotic concept. Asymptotic concepts in mathematics are values which can be approximated along an infinite series of numbers, that is, a value containing a variable tending to infinity.

The possibility of progressing towards peace occurs through steps approximating a never empirically realizable world (state) republic. In *Toward Perpetual Peace* Kant distinguishes what is ideally desirable (a world republic/*Völkerstaat*) and what is instead empirically feasible, namely the *foedus pacificum* (*Völkerbund*). The never-ending process of approximation is what I call the ‘transitional’ condition of Kantian cosmopolitanism.

How do we measure our progression towards peace? Institutional arrangements are relevant only in so far as they point to a progressive legalization of international relations. For Kant, it is the overcoming of the international state of nature that we have to pursue by means of the regulative function of the world republic. This means that peace becomes a realistic utopia only when international relations are arranged on the basis of an overall system of public law.

The final destination of this journey is the realization of what Kant calls in various writings ‘the cosmopolitan constitution’. It is a system of global public law principles that should govern international relations, subjecting both states and supranational entities to itself.

Indeed, Fichte in his *Review of Toward Perpetual Peace* affirmed that “[...] the federation of nations [*Völkerbund*] proposed by Kant for the preservation of peace is no more than an intermediary condition [...] (Emphasis added)” (Fichte, G. 2001 [1795, 1796], p. 319).

So, you are right in noticing that I think - as Fichte did - that there are missing elements in Kant's overall argument on global peace. This is why I believe we should resort to the world republic in terms of a regulative idea (specifically the problematic appreciation of Kant of Plato's ideas as Plato's Republic is interesting here).

What I do not agree with is that you claim that my interpretation has no Kantian textual reference whatsoever. I reject this and I invite you to re-read (besides all other passages that we already mentioned and particularly the unfulfilled theory/practice gap between the *in thesi/hypothesi* lines of *Toward Perpetual Peace*) a text from the *Religion* and the *Preparatory* work of the *Rechtslehre*. I'll reconsider these shortly. Secondly, the ‘transitional’ interpretation claims that we can formulate judgments on history by reconstructing possible trajectories of approximation towards the ideal of perpetual peace. These remain subjective standpoints but never objective steps, as it will be later for Hegel, in which we can see an ‘unconditioned’ to redeem the conditionality of contingency.

Here is the text from the *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*. Within it Kant draws an analogy between the objective unity of religion as a rational idea and “the political idea of the right of a state [*der politischen Idee eines Staatsrechts*] insofar as this right ought, at the same time, to be brought into line with an international law which is universal and endowed with power” (Kant, I. 1998 [1793], 6:124, p.129).

For Kant we cannot have much ‘hope’ for the empirical peaceful realization of such trajectory. As he immediately exemplifies, whenever we look back at history and how any state has ever tried to approximate such ideal, one cannot help but notice that this has been through “subjugati[ing] all others to itself and achiev[ing] a universal monarchy” (Ibid.). Yet, soon after, this empirical unity proved not to last very long and disintegrated “to split up from within into smaller states” (Ibid.).

Similarly, Kant affirms, we cannot nurture much hope for achieving the empirical unity of the church, that is, a unity realized within one single “visible church” (Ibid.). Rather, in both cases, such unity should be conceived in terms of an “idea [...] of reason

[*eine Idee ... der Vernunft*] [emphasis added]” that is, as a “practical regulative principle [*als praktisches regulatives Prinzip*]” (Ibid.).

And again, noumenal unity is connected to the visible church in so far as it provides its same normative presuppositions. The phenomenal unity of state and international law appears along interstate relations in the unfolding of the different stages of approximations to the ideal.

This connection is testified also in the preparatory drafts of the *Rechtslehre – Reflections on the philosophy of right* [1764-] – where Kant asserts that “there is no salvation outside the republic. – A world republic [is] one where no individual state would have enough forces to fight the great republic if necessary” (Kant, I. (2016 [1764-] §807, p.68). Clearly, the relation between the noumenal and the phenomenal world remains in a perennially unsolved tension: the phenomenal can never exhaust the noumenal. This point is raised again for the domestic domain in the writing of *The Conflict of the Faculties*. Here Kant observes that: “The Idea of a constitution in harmony with the natural right of man [...] signifies a Platonic Ideal (*respublica noumenon*) [and] is not an empty chimera” (Kant, I. 1979 [1798], pp.163-5).

**Allen Wood** I was not accusing you of being a *Phantast* or a ‘despotizing moralist’. I was saying only that this is how I think Kant would regard the position you want to ascribe to him. Keep in mind that I do not automatically agree with every position I find in Kant. I read Kant according to what Kant says, not according to what I think is true or what I might wish Kant had said.

I do not dispute that Fichte would like to read Kant on international right the way you would like to read him. If your ‘transitional interpretation’ were applied to Fichte, I think it would be correct. I might even favor Fichte's position over Kant's. My only point here is that this would not be a correct reading of Kant. All the textual evidence is against it.

If you presented your transitional interpretation as ‘thinking beyond Kant’ I would accept it as that. What it does not do is think ‘with’ Kant, in the sense of agreeing with what Kant thought.

What does it mean to ‘resort to the world republic in terms of a regulative idea?’ This vague formulation, using Kantian terminology in a context, and in a way, that Kant never uses it, remains very unclear.

One might think it means: We should seek to approximate as far as possible in reality the world republic. Kant seems to think that would be ideally desirable but not feasible and he does not in the end recommend it.

So this is not Kant's position and not a correct interpretation of Kant. Or does this phrase mean something else? If it means something else, please tell us what.

In my previous message I have said what the ‘*in thesi/in hypothesi*’ distinction in *Toward Perpetual Peace* means. It means that Kant would approve of it if nations could form a world republic but does not think they will accept that, so he recommends a peaceful federation instead. Nothing in *Theory and Practice* takes a different position from this. In *Theory and Practice* he even offers a reason why states might not accept a world republic -- they fear a loss of freedom.

Here again, it is unclear what you mean. It seems clear from this remark that you do not believe history will move toward a world republic, and of course Hegel would not believe any such thing as that either. But what does it mean to adopt a ‘subjective standpoint’ which reconstructs possible trajectories of approximation? If it does not mean to seek to bring about in the real world actual approximations to a world republic, then what does it mean? Is it simply the approval of subjective fantasies (about ‘possible historical trajectories’) that you find pleasing? I don’t think Kant favors that either, and it is never what he means by the regulative use of ideas.

The text you cite does not say what you wish it said. Kant does favor the unification of churches and faiths, though also without expecting it to happen. But he does definitely favor it, as he never does regarding approximations to a world republic. But this passage does not say specifically that there should be a world republic. It says only that there should be some organization with the right of a state under international right. We know from other texts that Kant thinks the idea of international right that states have is not compatible with a state of nations. And whatever he might have meant here, he immediately goes on to say that ‘experience refuses to allow us any hope in that direction’. Kant's views about the voluntary ethical commonwealth (the church) are quite different from his views about international right and the coercive power that belongs to states. The

footnote on 6:124 is in any case about the church (Kant, I. 1998 [1793], footnote at 6:124), and its vague reference to the right of a state and international right is used only to explain that. As it happens, I have just discussed this difference myself in a book that is in press. Here I discuss the difference between voluntary ethical community (the church) and coercive rightful community (the state).

Noumenal unity is connected to the visible church in so far as it provides its same normative presupposition. The phenomenal unity of state and international law appears along interstate relations in the unfolding of the different stages of approximations to the ideal. We have other passages in Kant's writings, especially in *Toward Perpetual Peace* 8:357, where he indicates his favorable attitude toward a state of nations that might grow toward a world republic. But there he makes it clear, as he does in other such passages, that we cannot expect existing nations to accept this arrangement. That he omits this further thought in the Reflection does not mean he repudiates it. On the contrary, one must read this unpublished reflection in light of parallel passages in the published writings where he says the same thing, and then it is quite clear that this Reflection would not support your 'transitional reading' as an interpretation of Kant. The phenomenal/noumenal distinction is one of the most misunderstood and most abused parts of Kant's philosophy. It seems to invite obscurantism and fantasy. I prefer to avoid it unless I can explain very clearly what it means in that specific context. I understand 'noumenal' to mean: as thought by the understanding (or reason) and 'phenomenal' to mean: as cognized theoretically by the understanding and the senses together. I can't make sense of the claim that the phenomenal does not exhaust the noumenal. I hope it does not mean something like: "Reality does not exhaust our wishes, and our wishes have some higher reality than reality". That is just nonsense (*Schwärmerei*).

[Regarding Plato's ideal of a *respublica noumenon*], here Kant is talking not about any international organization but about progress toward an ideal civil constitution in individual states. So again, this passage is not about what you are discussing and does not say what you wish it said.

So I do not see in any of the passages you now cite any real support for your interpretation. But even if they did support it, or even if you found in some other Reflection or footnote in some work on another subject, some slight evidence for it, we should agree with David Hume: "a wise man proportions his belief to the evidence". I see

no evidence at all that supports your interpretation. But even if some stray bits of evidence from this footnote or that reflection did support your interpretation, the overwhelming evidence in Kant's published writings on the topic of international right goes directly against it. We should not interpret texts in philosophy according to what we wish they said, but according to what they do say.

**Claudio Corradetti** I think we have come close or even covered all the issues of our disagreements. Certainly your critical remarks will be very useful in my second step, namely, in developing a contemporary theory of international relations. Let me just state this: even if I concede that, there may not be clear evidences as you said about what I defend as 'filling in the gaps' in Kant's argument, it is the case that there is no counterevidence to what I'm claiming in any of Kant's texts. We interpret differently some key political notions starting from the terminology Kant uses. When he claims that there are undesirable international arrangements, he refers only and consistently to the *Weltmonarchie* but never to the *Völkerstaat/Weltrepublik*. Should we just be content with a suboptimal political arrangement as the *Völkerbund* is? I don't think that this conclusion would be Kantian in any normatively significant way. Anyhow I enjoyed this exchange and I thank you for this.

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## **Madness and Kant's Philosophy: The Importance of Philosophy to Medicine**

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### **Abstract**

The introduction to the Dossier on mental disorder in the work of Kant considers the relationship between philosophy and medicine. Its brief suggestions are linked to only one form of pathology: hypochondria, on the one hand; to a highly particular aspect of mental disorder: its relationship with criminal accountability or, if we wish, the legitimacy of punishment, on the other hand.

### **Key words**

Dietetics, Body, Hypochondria, Abstraction, Blame, Care

The Dossier on "Madness and Kant's Philosophy" features essays from the fields of psychoanalysis, of the modern psychiatric science, aesthetics (for example the theory of emotions, disgust, melancholy and pathologies of the imagination) and moral philosophy (social questions of mental disorder and moral issues related to mental pathology and its treatment). They range across Kantian philosophy with an interdisciplinary spirit, without restriction to those fields that directly thematise the phenomenon of mental disorder. To offer a scenario suitable to the interweaving of disciplines present in the Dossier I would like to present a few brief considerations on the relationship between philosophy and medicine<sup>1</sup>. This relation appears in the final part of the precritical text from 1764 (*Versuch*

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<sup>1</sup> The relationship between philosophy and medicine must be understood in a very broad sense and not strictly related to the taxonomy of diseases (Frierson, 2009: 267-289) or to Kant's psychiatric interpretations (Kriske, 1957: 17-28).

*über die Krankheiten des Kopfes*) and returns in at least two later works from 1798 (*Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht* and *Streit der Fakultäten*).

Considerations on philosophy's contribution to medicine – biting ironic and lashing in the precritical text from 1764 – later shed their sarcastic tone and raised at least two very important questions: the first regards the body-psyche relationship<sup>2</sup>; the second involves the legal aspects of mental disorder<sup>3</sup>. I am referring to the collaboration among philosophy, medicine and law, hoped for in the *Anthropologie*, to confront the theme of punishment in the event of crimes committed by the mentally ill<sup>4</sup>.

We can begin with the first question: the body-psyche relationship. From the text *Gedanken von der wahren Schätzung der lebendigen Kräfte* (*Living forces*, Kant's first published work. Written in 1744–46 and published in 1749) there is a recurring question about the relationship between matter and immaterial substance. This theme was strongly influenced by debate, during the 1740s, on the monad and the correlated Leibnizian conviction of the presence of the simple immaterial substance in material “*compositum*” (*le composé*). It should come as no surprise that the precritical texts many times addresses the theme of the localisation of the psyche. In *Träume eines Geistersehers*, released two years after the *Versuch*, Kant defends the idea of the presence of the soul in the entire sentient body against the hypothesised existence of a specific part of the body in which the immaterial element resides. Asking ‘where’ the soul ‘lives’ is entirely specious and misleading, as it presupposes that the body features a particular area destined to host it (Kant, TG, 02: 324). The corporeal body is not made of disjointed parts; the error of choosing one part as home to the soul, separate from the others, can largely be ascribed to the physical-corporeality vision of Descartes. Against the interpretation of the soul incorporated in a particular part of the body, distinct and isolated from the others, Kant hypothesised a soul whose dynamics pervade the body and extend into all of its organs (Kant, TG, 02: 324-325). In decisively anti-Cartesian tones, he reminds us that to consider the localisation of the psyche we must suppose it to be everywhere the body feels; it is not a question, therefore, of identifying a cerebral point from which the ego sets the bodily machine in motion or by which it is modified. What occurs, then, in the case of mental disorders?

In *Versuch* the body is interpreted as the seed site of mental disorder and positioned at the base of its genealogy: the body is the first (*zuerst*) to suffer a mental disturbance, often unconsciously (*unvermerkt*) and therefore ignored (Kant writes in VKK, 02: 270). Precisely for this neglect, for the obscure and confused action (imperceptible and indeterminate) of a disturbance in the body, this latter becomes the *humus* in which cognitive psychic disturbances grow and complicate. The body, while it may not be the

<sup>2</sup> For the interweaving of philosophy, medicine and the body (Fabrizzi, 2012: 137-168); for forward-looking works on body in Kant (Svare, 2006; Nuzzo 2008).

<sup>3</sup> A reference to this issue can be found in (Sanchez Madrid, 2018: 147-162).

<sup>4</sup> The social aspects of mental illness in Kant have been usefully analysed with a linguistic-communicative perspective in (Fantasia, 2019: 17-45) and with a practical-moral view in (Frierson, 2009: 267-289).

cause or aetiological origin<sup>5</sup>, is anything but an inert element in the gestation and manifestation of cognitive psychic illness (Kant, VKK, 02: 270-271). Despite its passivity, the body is the fermenting seed that plays a role related to man's psychic affectivity, feelings and practical habits. The warning present in Kant's words appears to be: without clarifying and distinguishing the dynamics of the body in which psychic disturbances nest, we risk to allow the cognitive faculties and practical behaviour associated with them to degenerate. Caring for the body is, therefore, also therapy for the soul, while caring for the soul implies a therapeutic influence on the body. This latter affirmation can be easily extracted from the comment on Hufeland's medical treatise found in the late writing *Streit der Fakultäten*. In this text Kant appears to complete the practical idea of the rooting of the psyche in corporeality, convinced that the psyche itself possesses a transformative, one could say diagnostic and therapeutic, power with respect to the body. This is the direction of dietetics and self-observation, implemented to offer the field of medicine a diagnostic and transformative practice for physical and psychic practices. In *Streit*, the collaboration between philosophy and medicine focuses on a particular type of medical practice, that destined to prevent illnesses by favouring longevity. In this context, however, I am interested in capturing the combined diagnostic and therapeutic value of self-observation<sup>6</sup>, directed above all toward the mental disturbance of hypochondria. Kant himself claimed to have a natural tendency toward hypochondria owing to a very narrow thoracic cage that favoured neither his heartbeat nor his ability to breathe normally (Kant, SF, 07:104). Together with this bodily diagnosis, he indicated how the mind could come to dominate and care for this psychic-cognitive disturbance: by distracting attention (*Abkehrung der Aufmerksamkeit*) from oneself and in particular from one's imaginary fabrications, which Kant here refers to as *Gefühle*, in a very general sense (Kant, SF, 07: 104). He draws on the coupling of the opposites "attentio" and "abstractio", already present in the section dedicated to the intellect in *Psychologia empirica* by Baumgarten. This coupling is capable of explaining the opposing movement brought about by the treatment of hypochondria, as proposed by dietetics. The process of subjectification of the self, in which the objective world is engulfed by and in the production of symptoms and disturbances, is opposed by self-observation with the movement of the objectification of the self, which abstracts and separates the self from the raving psyche (suffering from pathogenic anxieties provoked by the body), by distracting it. Abstraction is thus propaedeutic to distraction: "[...] Abstractio animi distracti a perceptionibus heterogeneis pluribus, qua attentio ad certum obiectum augetur, est ANIMI COLLECTIO\*\* [...]", Baumgarten affirms in his *Psychologia* (Baumgarten, 1963: § 638: 234). These assertions appear to dialogue with Kant's anthropological reflections dedicated to the 'abstractio', denoted as a therapeutic technique of stoic origins that, if opportunely cultivated, permits us to cure disturbances seeded in

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<sup>5</sup> Costantini's contribution on the corporality as a source of mental illness is distanced from the aetiological interpretation, (Costantini, 2018: 234-251).

<sup>6</sup> The use of the method of self-observation was announced by Kant to Hufeland one year before the publication of *Streit der Fakultäten* in a letter dated 15 March 1797 (Kant, Br, AA 12: 148).

corporeality (Kant, HN AA 15: Refl. § 161: 58-59), as demonstrated, in the end, by Kant's self-observation<sup>7</sup>.

Beside this contribution of philosophy to medicine, which transforms the very concept of medicine by indicating mental techniques for the prevention of psychi-corporeal disorders, I wish to consider another problematic node that, however, involves not only medicine and philosophy, but also law. I am alluding to the legal implications of criminal actions committed by the mentally ill.

The theme of punishment, of legal accountability for a crime, guides the very brief, though interesting anthropological considerations on crimes committed by the insane. First and foremost, there is a need to establish effective legal accountability in the case of acts committed by someone presumed to be insane. To evaluate whether a person has committed a crime contrary to the law in the absence or presence of mental competency, the judge cannot turn to the faculty of medicine, but must look to philosophy. In other words, forensic medicine (*medicina forensis*) is wholly unsuited to establishing the effective mental state of the perpetrator of a crime, as a similar evaluation is an exclusively psychological question (*ist gänzlich psychologisch*). The observation of physicians and physiologists cannot delve in great depth into the 'mechanism' of the human soul (*das Maschinenwesen im Menschen*), (Kant, Anth AA 007: 214), that is, into the ordered and disordered organisation of human faculties. Only philosophy can do this, and in view of the application or non-application of punishment. This involves the Kantian legal reflection on the legitimacy and measure of punishment. If punishment derives its legitimacy from being the subjective reason for respecting the law, a reason immediately provided by law itself (Kant, MS, AA 06: 218), it can be said that legitimising punishment has the value of preventing illegal actions. I would be tempted to say that the legitimacy of punishment was considered by Kant as a sort of legal dietetics that serves to preventively distract attention from criminal actions, guaranteeing the safety and therefore the longevity of the State. The measure of punishment, for its part, is accompanied by its categoricalness and recalls, if not literally, certainly the spirit of *jus talionis* based on the perfect equivalence between crime and punishment. Any harm made to another is also made to oneself: if we mock others, we mock ourselves, if we harm others we harm ourselves, if we kill others we kill ourselves; this latter passage contains the Kantian justification of the death penalty. It is therefore the objectivity of the crime perpetrated that decides the measure and quality of punishment without any regard for the sensibility or social class of the person who commits the crime (Kant, MS, AA 06: 332-333), that is, without any consideration of the subject of the crime. How then are we to reconcile the retributive severity of punishment, briefly described here, with the anthropological reflections employed by Kant to entrust philosophical psychology, that in-depth look at organic and balanced relations among the faculties, with the role of considering the subject of punishment and no longer its object? Certainly, in Kantian legal philosophy the reference to subjectivity is present and deals with the necessity not to offend humanity, or better yet, not to damage the moral idea of

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<sup>7</sup> Brandt (1999: 306).

the humanity of the accused. All the same, this reference belongs to the field of regulating crimes against humanity. They appear to set a limit on the rigorous and literal application of *jus talionis*: those who carry out crimes against humanity (horrendous crimes such as torture, rape, paedophilia) cannot be subjected to the same action as this would violate the idea of humanity, making it guilty of the same crime it intends to punish<sup>8</sup>. However, this type of consideration of a subject who can be held accountable and punished is not, however, the reference for considerations of the criminal presumed to be insane treated in *Anthropologie*. In the note on the page dedicated to legal medicine and its limits, Kant speaks of a judge who declared a woman who had killed her child after learning she had been sentenced to the penitentiary to be insane. The judge based his ruling on the claim that anyone who draws true conclusions from false premises is mentally insane. What is important to recall here from the comment in the note on the judge's reckless and unfounded ruling is not the regret at having spared a lucid and sane of mind guilty individual the death penalty, as this regret perfectly belongs to the idea of the measure of punishment as objective recompense for a crime committed; important, instead, are the words dedicated to an assassin who was truly insane. For an insane criminal, punishment consists, in objective terms, in social blame, which could have the aim of guaranteeing the stability of the social fabric and preventing other deviated behaviour; in subjective terms punishment is transformed into care for the insane, care which cannot ignore the philosophical understanding of the depths of the human soul. Here we are very far from the legal problems of *jus talionis* and the categorical nature of punishment. The objective equality (*Gleichheit*) between crime and punishment is supplanted by the preventative attention toward the wellbeing of the community and, *ex post*, the possible wellbeing of the individual who has committed the crime. With this brief example Kant appears to lead us into the heart of the pragmatic consideration of punishment<sup>9</sup>, adding the word 'care' to those of warning and isolation, already employed in some of the *Reflexionen von Moralphilosophie*.

My reflections, though brief, wish to emphasise the richness also of the minor passages in Kant's thinking, and the strong interdisciplinary base that transpires from his anthropological considerations. A base that the authors of the *Dossier* have managed to honour to great effect and with much innovation.

### Abbreviations for Kant's Works

Anth	<i>Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Bd. VII, G. Reimer, Berlin 1973.
Br	<i>Briefwechsel</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Bde. X-XIII, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.

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<sup>8</sup> Fantasia (2021: forthcoming).

<sup>9</sup> Very interesting in this regard is the essay being written by Fantasia (2021: forthcoming).

- HN *Handschriftlicher Nachlass, in Gesammelte Schriften, Bde. XIV-XXIII, De Gruyter, Berlin 1925-1938.*
- MS *Metaphysik der Sitten, in Gesammelte Schriften, Bd. VI, De Gruyter, Berlin 1914.*
- TG *Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik, in Gesammelte Schriften, Ab. I, Bd. II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.*
- VKK *Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes, in Gesammelte Schriften, Ab. I, Bd. II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.*
- SF *Der Streit der Fakultäten, in Kant's Gesammelte Schriften Bd. VII G. Reimer, Berlin 1973.*

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## **Naturaleza, conflicto y locura en Kant: el concepto de sinrazón positiva**

*Nature, conflict and madness by Kant: the concept of positive  
unreason*

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Del profesor al maestro dista lo que del conocimiento a la sabiduría.  
A Eugenio Moya Cantero *in memoriam*. Maestro, sabio, amigo.

### **Resumen**

Este artículo pretende indagar en la concepción de la locura desarrollada por el filósofo Immanuel Kant a lo largo de su trayectoria intelectual. Para llevar a cabo esta indagación el autor adopta una interpretación naturalizada del trascendentalismo kantiano desarrollada por Eugenio Moya Cantero en sus trabajos sobre el pensador alemán. Se pretende con ello conciliar dos planos de la investigación kantiana que han sido tradicionalmente contrapuestos: *facticidad* y *transcendentalidad*, *quid facti* y *quid juris*. Este planteamiento ofrece una razón humana situada en el seno de la naturaleza y de su historia (evolución) y constituida como entidad compleja, heterogénea y dinámica, concepción desde la que la locura aparece como un conflicto de la propia razón consigo misma. El artículo concluye exponiendo el concepto kantiano de sinrazón positiva como la forma más grave de locura y mostrando la influencia y utilidad que dicho concepto ha tenido en otras disciplinas científicas como la psiquiatría contemporánea.

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**Palabras clave**

Kant, naturalización, razón, conflicto, locura, sinrazón positiva

**Abstract**

This paper researches Immanuel Kant's conception of madness developed during his intellectual lifetime. In order to achieve satisfactory results in this task, the author adopts a naturalized interpretation of Kant's transcendentalism developed in the works about this German philosopher of the Prof. Dr. Eugenio Moya Cantero. From this methodological point of view the author tries to reconcile two different and traditionally opposed research levels by Kant, i.e the *empirical* and the *transcendental* ones, the *quid facti* and the *quid juris*. And this reconciliation offers a picture of the human reason located in the nature and its history (evolution) and characterized by complexity, heterogeneity and dynamism, and in which madness appears, consequently, as a conflict of the reason with itself. The article concludes explaining the Kantian concept of positive unreason as the most serious kind of mental illness and showing both the influence and use of this concept in other scientific fields, like contemporary psychiatry.

**Key words**

Kant, naturalization, reason, conflict, madness, positive unreason

**1. Introducción**

El tema de la locura en la trayectoria intelectual de Kant ha pasado desapercibido entre los intérpretes del filósofo, máxime cuando del análisis de su obra crítica se trataba, frente a los textos empíricos precríticos y a los antropológicos. El trabajo publicado por Michel Foucault (2008) en 1964 en torno a la *Antropología* kantiana abrió camino para un estudio sistemático de la locura en Kant, al conectar los planos crítico-trascendental y empírico-antropológico en el sujeto. Foucault defendió allí la idea de que la *Antropología* repite la *Crítica*, esto es, que el análisis empírico-psicológico del hombre realizado por Kant en su *Antropología* lo lleva a cabo a partir del sujeto puro de la *Crítica*. El sujeto, que en la *Crítica* es ajeno al decurso del tiempo, se presenta como individuo aislado y permanece al margen del lenguaje, aparece en la *Antropología* sometido al dominio del tiempo en la duración, ya integrado en una sociedad e inmerso en una lengua concreta. A pesar de estas distancias, en su análisis de la realidad y capacidades del hombre concreto en este nivel empírico Kant presupone en todo momento las estructuras transcendentales estudiadas en la *Crítica*. Esta tesis de Foucault sobre las relaciones crítico-antropológicas permite al autor de este artículo plantear la idea de que el sujeto puro de la *Crítica* es pensado por Kant como modelo de normalidad (salud) mental a partir del cual es posible analizar los problemas patológicos del hombre concreto.

A partir de esa investigación foucaultiana en torno a la *Antropología* de Kant han surgido investigaciones sobre el tema de la locura en Kant. Un caso destacable es el del trabajo desarrollado por la filósofa y psicoanalista francesa Monique David-Ménard (1990).



Siguiendo la senda abierta por Foucault, David-Ménard ha comparado textos empíricos precríticos kantianos con la misma *Crítica de la razón pura*, planteando continuidad de intereses y conexiones temáticas entre ellos. La filósofa francesa considera los *Sueños de un visionario explicados por los ensueños de la Metafísica* de 1766 cruciales para el desarrollo de la primera *Crítica*, pues el caso de las visiones y conocimientos privilegiados del mundo de los espíritus que afirma tener el teósofo sueco Emmanuel Swedenborg, protagonista de la obra de 1766, y su equiparación a la metafísica condujeron a Kant a la necesidad de distinguir entre meras fantasías imposibles de contrastar con la experiencia y aquello que es transmisible y comunicable entre los sujetos y, con ello, a la idea de *limites* del conocimiento y de la razón. El plan mismo y la organización de la primera *Crítica* deben ser comprendidos como la contraposición entre los pensamientos delirantes sobre la idea de mundo y la constitución de objetos reales para el conocimiento. En tanto que la metafísica es asimilada a la locura en los *Sueños*, la dialéctica trascendental viene a traducir una disposición natural de la razón hacia la enfermedad mental.

En este artículo el autor va a defender la tesis de que la locura consiste para Kant en un conflicto de la razón consigo misma, que en los casos más graves desemboca en lo que Kant denomina una *sinrazón positiva*. Ahora bien, esta tesis se va a fundamentar en la concepción desarrollada por el mismo Kant de la razón como una entidad instituida por la naturaleza (*Naturanstalt*) y, debido al modo de esta institución, caracterizada por la complejidad, la heterogeneidad modular y por un carácter dinámico. Y es que, aunque en continuidad con los planteamientos de Foucault y David-Ménard, este artículo va más allá de ellos y se basa en el trabajo de investigación de Eugenio Moya Cantero (2003) (2008), cuya interpretación de Kant supone un punto de inflexión en la *Wirkungsgeschichte* del pensamiento del filósofo prusiano.

En su investigación Moya ha planteado una interpretación naturalista del trascendentalismo kantiano. Se trata de un naturalismo débil, de mínimos, que recogería dos tesis básicas planteadas por A. Shimony (1987) en su introducción a *Naturalizing Epistemology*: 1. Los seres humanos, incluidas sus estructuras cognitivas, son simples entidades de la naturaleza e interactúan con otras entidades que son objeto de las ciencias; y 2. los resultados de las investigaciones científico-naturales sobre esos seres y esas estructuras (de la psicología empírica y de la embriología en el caso de Kant) son pertinentes e incluso cruciales para la empresa epistemológica. La gran ventaja de esta interpretación naturalista del criticismo kantiano consiste en la reconciliación que permite entre esos dos planos de la investigación tan difíciles de aunar en Kant: el de la *facticidad* y el de la *trascendencia*, el de la *quid facti* y el de la *quid juris*.

La *Crítica de la razón pura* está atravesada por un problema epistemológico crucial que Kant ya había planteado a su discípulo Marcus Herz en una carta de 21 de febrero de 1772 (Br, AA 10: 131) y que Ernst Cassirer elevó a la categoría de problema crítico fundamental (1993, p. 142): ¿cómo es posible obtener conocimiento *a priori* —universal y necesario— de la naturaleza sin derivar tal conocimiento de ella, de la experiencia? La respuesta que ofrece Kant en la *Crítica* es que podemos conocer esas leyes generales de la naturaleza

porque ésta es una construcción de nuestra razón realizada mediante la aplicación de sus formas puras *a priori* —intuiciones puras de la sensibilidad y categorías del entendimiento— sobre la materia dada sensible. Las categorías constituyen el fundamento originario de la legalidad universal y necesaria de la naturaleza: «la legislación suprema de la naturaleza debe residir en nosotros mismos, esto es, en nuestro entendimiento» (Prol, AA 04: 319)

Para resolver el problema crítico, Kant lleva a cabo una investigación en la que se plantea tres objetivos fundamentales: i) establecer las distintas fuentes subjetivas de las representaciones; ii) demostrar que ciertas representaciones son *a priori*; y iii) determinar la validez objetiva de las mismas. El primer objetivo pertenece a una dimensión empírico-psicológica y constituye el plano de la *facticidad* del conocimiento, al mostrar como, *de hecho*, funciona la razón a la hora de conocer; los dos últimos objetivos constituyen el plano de la *transcendentalidad*, marcado por la normatividad o prescriptividad de las representaciones *a priori*, pues con ella tales representaciones establecen cómo *debe* funcionar la razón para hacer posible el conocimiento.

Es conocido que Kant plantea su investigación transcendental en un plano desligado del análisis empírico-psicológico (KrV, A XVI-XVII) y que esta visión ha marcado el canon de la interpretación histórica del kantismo. Sin embargo, hay razones fundadas para poner este planteamiento en cuestión, como ha señalado Moya (2003). A partir de la década de 1750 la psicología alemana comenzó a distanciarse de la psicología racional de Christian Wolff, exigiendo un peso propio para la experimentación y la atención a lo empírico. Kant tomó buena nota de este proceso y se interesó por el trabajo de investigadores como Johann Christian Lossius y Johannes Nikolaus Tetens, dedicados a la investigación de la naturaleza del alma. Lossius planteó una teoría de la razón de orientación fisiologista, en la que proponía una naturalización fuerte de la epistemología al plantear el reemplazo del estudio de la lógica —con el que los filósofos investigaban la naturaleza del pensamiento— por el de la fisiología del cerebro. En línea de continuidad con él, Tetens planteó un método de investigación que hizo suyo el mismo Kant: clasificar los conceptos teniendo en cuenta el órgano que los produce. Hay que destacar, en relación con ello, i) que Kant recurrió a una *tópica transcendental* (KrV, A 268 / B 324), como parte de su investigación transcendental, para distinguir fuentes subjetivas del conocimiento sensibles y intelectivas asignarles a cada una sus correspondientes representaciones y ii) que dicha tópica, presenta ya en su *Dissertatio* de 1770, devino esencial para resolver el problema crítico.

A esta interpretación naturalista del transcendentalismo kantiano en torno a la psicología, Moya ha sumado otra relativa a la emergente ciencia de la embriología (2008). Y es que en el párrafo §27 de la segunda edición de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, que trata de resumir lo que constituye la clave de bóveda de la Deducción transcendental de las categorías y la resolución del problema crítico, Kant contrapone su modelo del conocimiento al de Leibniz recurriendo a los términos propios de los dos paradigmas en disputa en el interior

de la embriología: su *sistema de la epigénesis de la razón pura* frente al *sistema leibniziano de la preformación de la razón pura*. Moya explora esta idea a partir de una hipótesis básica según la cual Kant, junto con Leibniz, habría pensado, desde principios de la década de 1770, que los problemas epistemológicos podían ser vistos como una extensión de los problemas que se planteaban los embriólogos al preguntarse por la morfogénesis y funcionamiento de los organismos vivos. Esta naturalización del criticismo también tiene su traducción en la reconciliación de los planos de la *facticidad* y *transcendentalidad*, pues al entender las formas puras *a priori* de la razón como productos epigenéticos, se hace inteligible que una forma factual y contingente (cognitivo-biológica) de estar en el mundo genere productos normativos que prescriban al mundo una legalidad, esto es, como debe comportarse.

Esta interpretación naturalizada de Kant es relevante para la defensa de la tesis propuesta por el autor de este artículo y para justificar la estructura y desarrollo del mismo, pues el modelo de la locura planteado por el filósofo prusiano sólo puede entenderse atendiendo a la posición en la que éste sitúa al hombre y su razón en la naturaleza y al desarrollo histórico de ambos.

El artículo despliega su argumento con un primer apartado (punto 2) dedicado a la reflexión metacientífica kantiana en torno al principio teleológico y su relación con el principio de la determinabilidad, para mostrar como los propios límites críticos del conocimiento permiten la investigación tentativa mediante analogías como recursos heurísticos en aquellos ámbitos que escapan a la investigación meramente mecánica: el de la vida, el de la consciencia y su relación con el mundo y el de la historia de la naturaleza. El segundo apartado (punto 3) expone la indagación de Kant en el terreno de la vida, mostrando su preferencia por el modelo de la epigénesis en el debate embriológico del S. XVII entre preformistas y epigenetistas. El tercer apartado (punto 4) muestra la indagación que realizó Kant en el ámbito de la historia de la naturaleza, planteando la hipótesis de que el filósofo alemán recurrió a la noción de epigénesis para implementar una idea evolutiva de la naturaleza ya planteada en su temprano ensayo *Historia general de la naturaleza y teoría del cielo*. El cuarto apartado (punto 5) expone cómo esa idea evolutiva de la naturaleza alcanza, mediante el mecanismo de la epigénesis, a la emergencia del alma o de la razón (*Gemüt*) misma a partir de los cuerpos orgánicos, así como a su configuración como una instancia compleja, heterogénea-modular y dinámica, abriendo las puertas al conflicto y la locura. Finalmente, el quinto apartado (punto 6) concluye el artículo, precisando la concepción kantiana de la locura, exponiendo el concepto de *sinrazón positiva* y mostrando el provecho científico que, desde el ámbito de la psiquiatría, se está haciendo de las investigaciones kantianas en ese punto.

## **2. La reflexión metacientífica kantiana en torno al principio teleológico**

Kant mostró interés pronto por los descubrimientos de la ciencia moderna. A través de sus profesores C. H. Rappolt y J. G. Teske entró en contacto con la filosofía experimental inglesa (Kuehn 2002, pp. 76-77). En su reforma del saber escolástico Francis Bacon (1561-

1626) había elaborado un nuevo método experimentalista que debía basarse en un «encuentro de la mente del hombre y la naturaleza de las cosas» (Bacon 1861-74, v.1, p. 120). En su *Novum Organum* planteó, frente a Aristóteles, su nuevo método propiamente moderno (Rossi 1990a, p. 76), la *Interpretation of Nature* (Bacon, *NO I*, 26), constituida por 2 elementos: la experiencia-experimento (Bacon, *NO II*, 10) y las leyes o principios inferidos a partir de ellos, cuya validez dependía también de su confirmación en nuevas experiencias futuras (Bacon, *NO I*, 82). Bacon polemizaba así contra la metodología errada de los “empíricos”, hormigas que únicamente acumulaban experiencias obtenidas ciegamente, sin la guía de principios, y contra los racionalistas, arañas que se limitaban a elaborar teorías extraídas completamente del interior de su mente (Rossi 1990b, p. 96). Para el Barón de Verulam sólo la experiencia que era sistemáticamente buscada mediante principios, el experimento, podía considerarse como la fuente del verdadero conocimiento (Bacon, *NO I*, 86).

La nueva filosofía experimental fue continuada por Isaac Newton. Siguiendo a Bacon, Newton distinguió claramente entre los fenómenos o cualidades manifiestas de las cosas, accesibles a través de los sentidos, y sus causas o cualidades ocultas, que la tradición había atribuido a unas supuestas sustancias subyacentes. Tales fenómenos, como diría David Hume, «surgen en el alma de causas desconocidas» (Hume, *Teatrise I*, 1, 2). Y tal desconocimiento hacía de esas causas cualidades ocultas e inaccesibles. Por ello, había que renunciar al empeño de conocerlas y plantear la búsqueda de coherencia entre los mismos fenómenos para inferir principios de validez empírica. Fue esta la posición de Newton en sus *Principia* (Newton 1729, p. 392) y en su *Óptica* (Newton 1718, pp.376-377).

Kant dedicó su *Crítica de la razón pura* a Bacon, otorgándole el título de creador de la ciencia moderna. Y en ello tuvo su importancia la actitud baconiana hacia la función y la posición del experimento (Kuhn 1983, pp. 69-71). Sobre esta base Kant realizó un doble movimiento conceptual: una modificación del concepto metafísico tradicional de «objeto» y una reformulación de la noción de «objetividad» del conocimiento. Siguiendo la distinción entre fenómenos y sus causas ocultas, Kant declaró la incognoscibilidad de la cosa en sí y realizó una justificación crítico-transcendental de la objetividad del conocimiento en la que el objeto, la experiencia ya no eran considerados como algo dado, sino como algo que debía ser realizado, construido.

En la primera *Crítica* expuso y demostró el proceso crítico-transcendental mediante el que el sujeto construía los objetos de conocimiento en la experiencia, esto es, la naturaleza. La mente aplica sus intuiciones puras y categorías a la materia de los sentidos mediante los principios puros del entendimiento. Ellos son producidos por éste y prescriben las condiciones generales que ha de tener toda experiencia posible de objetos, por lo que constituyen las leyes generales de la naturaleza, de validez estrictamente universal y necesaria. Tales leyes estarían regidas por el principio general de la determinabilidad o mecánico-causal, según el cual todo fenómeno se sigue de algún otro, según lo establecido por ley causal.

Ahora bien, los principios del entendimiento no pueden determinar los fenómenos en su concreción, pues estos son diversos y heterogéneos (KU, AA 5: 179). Son las leyes empíricas de las ciencias las que lo hacen, las cuales poseen una universalidad meramente comparativa y son contingentes. Y mientras que los principios están dotados de una unidad sistémica proporcionada por el entendimiento, las leyes empíricas carecen de esa unidad interna, ya que son producidas por la mente en su interacción con el mundo. A pesar de ello, tendemos a su ordenación sistemática «como si un entendimiento (aunque no sea el nuestro) la hubiese igualmente dado para nuestras facultades de conocimiento, para hacer posible un sistema de la experiencia según leyes particulares de la naturaleza» (KU, AA 5: 180). Es el Juicio reflexionante el que realiza esta ordenación a través de un principio transcendental propio: el de la finalidad formal de la naturaleza (KU, AA 5: 181). Si la facultad del Juicio consiste en pensar lo particular como contenido en lo universal, en su uso reflexionante busca lo universal para subsumir lo particular ya dado. El principio teleológico permite así pensar las leyes particulares —u objetos, como los organismos— bajo la idea de finalidad y subsumir unas en otras, estableciendo orden y jerarquía. Él nos permite así ordenar los fenómenos y conocimientos empíricos particulares en nuestra reflexión; regula, por tanto, su uso, pero no constituye, como hace el entendimiento, las condiciones generales de la experiencia. Es pues una forma de nuestra reflexión subjetiva sobre la naturaleza y no una forma propia de ella (KU, AA 05: 196-197). Tiene, por tanto, el carácter de una máxima, de un principio subjetivo (AA 05: 184) (Marcucci 2005, p. 289).

El Juicio reflexionante puede realizar dos operaciones distintas: descubrir la ley empírica a partir de los objetos o fenómenos concretos dados (*Schluß nach Induktion*); y atribuir ciertas propiedades a algunos objetos o fenómenos a partir del parecido que muestran con otros que ya conocemos y que, de hecho, las poseen (*Schluß nach Analogie*). En ambos casos el Juicio, guiado por la razón, tiende a la totalidad y al sistema: guía y da coherencia a nuestra reflexión sobre los objetos y leyes particulares al ensayar reglas que se aplicaran a casos no dados, tratando la simple universalidad comparativa y la contingencia de tales reglas como si fuese universalidad y necesidad estrictas, «como si un entendimiento encerrase la base de la unidad de lo diverso de sus leyes empíricas» (KU, AA 05: 181).

La reflexión crítica del concepto de fin rechaza toda antinomia entre el principio general de la determinabilidad del entendimiento y el teleológico del Juicio (KU, AA 05: 387-388). Causalidad y finalidad se refieren a dos órdenes distintos de problemas: el de la sucesión del acaecer en el tiempo y el de la estructura de aquello conformado por una infinita diversidad de leyes empíricas particulares. El criticismo únicamente autoriza en la investigación el uso de fines «que podamos llegar a conocer mediante la experiencia» y siempre allí «donde la teoría nos falla» (ÜGTP, AA 08: 159). La crítica obliga a la razón a explicar todos los productos y acontecimientos de la naturaleza —incluso los máximamente teleológicos— mecánico-causalmente tan lejos como sea posible, reservando el uso del concepto de fin únicamente cuando aquellos no puedan ser sometidos a examen sin contar con él y sólo como guía para la investigación mecánico-causal (KU,

AA 05: 415) (Caponi 2012). El concepto de fin y el recurso a la analogía que lleva aparejado conducirán a Kant a emplear ideas científico-naturales como recurso con valor heurístico para investigar aquellos territorios de la investigación que, por sus características específicas, escapan al dominio del mecanicismo: el de la vida, el de la consciencia y su relación con el mundo y el de la historia de la naturaleza (Moya 2008, pp. 35-36).

### 3. El debate moderno entre preformistas y epigenetistas

El siglo XVII fue testigo del surgimiento del debate interparadigmático entre preformistas y epigenetistas en el seno de la emergente embriología. Marcelo Malpighi, biólogo y anatomista boloñés considerado el padre de la histología por sus investigaciones sobre células y tejidos, ofreció la primera entrega del preformismo, en tanto que teoría embriológica. Fue, sin embargo, el anatomista y zoólogo holandés Jan Swammerdam el que estableció su formulación más exitosa en su *Biblia Naturae* (1669), presentando allí su teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes (Cobb 2000, pp. 122-128), según la cual Dios había creado en un mismo instante inicial los gérmenes de todos los seres que en adelante debían nacer en el mundo. De esta forma, la morfogénesis de los seres vivos no consistía sino en un autodespliegue (edución) de las formas que se hallaban ya dispuestas (*emboîté*, encajadas) en los gérmenes inicialmente implantados.

La teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes estuvo motivada por la doctrina agustiniana de las razones seminales y por el refuerzo que recibió a partir de los descubrimientos realizados por los microscopistas del siglo XVII. Agustín de Hipona había defendido en *De Genesi ad litteram* y en *De Trinitate* que Dios creó a todos los seres simultáneamente, aunque no dotados de una forma esencialmente perfecta y completa, sino con una entidad virtual consistente en sus gérmenes o *rationes seminales*, que se desarrollarían con el tiempo a medida que encontrarán las circunstancias propicias. Estos gérmenes se encontrarían infundidos en la misma materia y cuando esas circunstancias se presentasen, surgirían a la vida los seres ínsitos en ellos de forma propiamente actual y formal (San Agustín, *De Trinitate*, III, c. 8, 13).

La doctrina agustiniana se vio históricamente reforzada por los descubrimientos realizados bajo la innovación técnica que supuso la construcción del microscopio compuesto. Si bien los antiguos ya conocían que los espejos curvos y las esferas de cristal llenas de agua aumentaban el tamaño de las imágenes, no fue hasta comienzos del siglo XVII cuando se desarrolló el empleo de lentes para obtener el mayor aumento posible en contextos experimentales. Así, las primeras publicaciones importantes en el campo de la microscopía aparecieron en la década de 1660, cuando Malpighi probó la teoría de la circulación sanguínea del médico inglés William Harvey al observar al microscopio los capilares sanguíneos; o cuando Robert Hooke desveló la estructura microscópica del corcho. Tras la publicación de las observaciones de Hooke en su *Micrographia* de 1665, el comerciante holandés de tejidos Antonius Leeuwenhoek construyó sus propias lentes y microscopios con los que logró describir una gran variedad de estructuras y organismos como bacterias, hongos, protozoos y espermatozoides (Mazliak 2006, cap. 1).

Los descubrimientos realizados por Leeuwenhoeck y otros microscopistas condujeron a los embriólogos preformistas a buscar bajo el microscopio al individuo preformado, aunque en miniatura, hasta el punto de creer ver en el líquido seminal al *nasciturus* ya completo. Respecto a los seres humanos, todas las generaciones se encontrarían, a juicio de Swammerdam, en tamaño constante «preformadas y encajadas en los ovarios de Eva» (Swammerdam 1682, p. 48). Los rasgos físicos y espirituales de todos los seres humanos futuros estarían así ya contenidos en las células sexuales y la morfogénesis de los organismos consistiría en la expansión o despliegue de las partes ya formadas y preexistentes.

Estos descubrimientos producidos con el desarrollo del microscopio supusieron un impulso para el preformismo embriológico y constituyeron una base para su extensión desde el terreno de la biología al de la metafísica y la epistemología, pues pensadores como el teólogo francés Nicolás de Malebranche o Leibniz tomaron buena nota de ello. Malebranche se hizo eco de la teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes en su *Recherche de la Verité* (1675-1678, vol. 1, pp. 242 y ss.):

Yo diría que las hembras de los primeros animales estaban creadas, quizá, con todos aquellos individuos de la misma especie a los que había de traer al mundo y todos los que éstos, a su vez, fueran a traer también a él hasta el fin de los tiempos.

Leibniz, por su parte, también se posicionó del lado de la teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes, extendiéndola al terreno metafísico en su *Système nouveau de la nature* (1704, vol. 4, p. 479):

Las transformaciones de Swammerdam, Malpighi y Leeuwenhoeck, sobresalientes observadores de nuestra época, me ayudaron aquí a admitir que el animal y toda otra substancia organizada no comienza en absoluto cuando creemos y que su generación aparente es sólo un despliegue y una especie de aumento.

Consideró así el filósofo de Leipzig que el preformismo embriológico, además de ser compatible con su teoría de la armonía preestablecida, era una buena solución al problema del origen de las formas del mecanicismo cartesiano. Descartes, a través de su concepción mecanicista del mundo, había pensado la realidad material en base a los conceptos de extensión, causa-efecto y movimiento local. El mundo y los seres que lo habitan eran así concebidos como autómatas, como máquinas capaces de funcionar autónomamente, en analogía con el mecanismo de un reloj (Descartes 1641-1642, vol. 8, 3, p. 27). Así, con la reserva de haber dividido la realidad en dos substancias distintas, la substancia pensante y la extensa-material, Descartes consideró que los cuerpos orgánicos, incluidos el de los hombres, eran simples máquinas y que toda la realidad física –incluida la biológica– podía y debía explicarse a partir de las leyes de la mecánica. Todos los seres materiales, incluidos los seres vivos, fueron concebidos como agregados, como una suma de meras partes componentes. El filósofo francés consideró, por ello, que conocer las cosas no era sino analizarlas, descomponer el conjunto que las constituye en sus partes componentes, en elementos simples.

A pesar de que el mecanicismo cartesiano se convirtió en una orientación metodológica exitosa, resultó insuficiente para explicar los problemas de la vida. Aunque era capaz de explicar la naturaleza y conservación de las formas existentes, no podía dar cuenta de su origen. El problema radicaba en que los organismos vivos no podían ser satisfactoriamente explicados como simples agregados, descomponiéndolos en sus partes simples, pues las relaciones o correlaciones entre ellas resultan decisivas para el todo. Un organismo es, más bien, un sistema, un todo integrado en el que cada parte sólo es posible gracias al todo y viceversa, de tal manera que no puede ser explicado mediante una causalidad lineal  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D \dots$ , sino que aparece dominado por relaciones causales complejas donde una misma parte componente es a su vez causa y efecto de otras  $A \rightarrow B \rightarrow C \rightarrow A \rightarrow D \dots$  (KU, AA 05: 372-373). Para dar cuenta de los organismos, especialmente de su morfogénesis, pareció necesario trascender la causalidad eficiente del mecanicismo y acudir a la idea de finalidad, a un principio o fuerza vital que pautase y ordenara el desarrollo embriológico de los individuos, e incluso el de las especies<sup>1</sup>.

Debido a la especificidad de lo orgánico en el conjunto de los cuerpos físicos el mecanicismo cartesiano fue incapaz de explicar el origen y la morfogénesis de los cuerpos vivos. Sin embargo, la teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes permitió a Leibniz solucionar este problema cartesiano del origen de las formas. Así, el mecanicismo bastó para producir los cuerpos orgánicos de los animales con tal que se añadiese «la preformación orgánica ya completa en los gérmenes de los cuerpos que nacen, contenidos en los de los cuerpos de que ellos han nacido, hasta llegar a los gérmenes primeros; lo cual sólo puede proceder del autor de las cosas», como señala en el prefacio de sus *Essais de Theodicee* (1978, vol. 6, p. 40). Leibniz tomó la distinción escolástica entre *fulguratio* y *evolutio* para diferenciar entre la génesis primitiva de una nueva forma de vida —la *fulguratio* que sólo puede emanar de Dios—, y su desenvolvimiento —*evolutio*— posterior de los caracteres originaria y sobrenaturalmente preformados. Embriología y metafísica constituían así una alianza rentable para la comprensión del universo según sus *Principes de la Nature et de la Grace* (1978, vol. 6, p. 601):

Las investigaciones de los modernos nos han enseñado, y la razón lo prueba, que aquellos seres vivientes cuyos órganos conocemos, es decir, las plantas y los animales, no provienen en absoluto de una putrefacción o de un caos, como han creído los antiguos, sino de simientes preformadas y, por consiguiente, de la transformación de los seres vivientes preexistentes.

<sup>1</sup> Los seres orgánicos —señala Kant en los §§65-66 de la *Crítica del Juicio*— son aquellos en que todo es fin y, a la par y recíprocamente, medio. Tales cuerpos presentan una unidad y una estructura, en la que, como el todo determina la naturaleza y las cualidades de las partes, cualquier análisis mecánico-causal elimina lo propio de su objeto. Más que agregados mecánicos parece que encontramos sistemas. Y aquí interviene la teleología. Las partes parecen haber sido conjuntadas según un plan y con vistas a un fin.



Para Leibniz, tanto las almas como las formas orgánicas son ingenerables e imperecederas. Ellas sólo llegan «a desarrollarse, envolverse, revestirse, despojarse, transformarse» (1978, Vol. 4, p. 481):

Puede considerarse —dice Leibniz en *Vindicación de la causa de Dios*— que en los gérmenes preexistentes ya habían sido preestablecidos y preparados por Dios no sólo el organismo humano, sino la racionalidad misma mediante el ejercicio de un acto, por así llamarlo, sellado. (1978, vol. 6, p. 451)

Las formas son para Leibniz ingenerables e imperecederas. Frente a la cosmogonía los antiguos, en la que todo surgía de un caos de materia informe y volvía a él tras la muerte, Leibniz consideró que tanto los cuerpos orgánicos como las almas que los animan se conservan, aunque «la destrucción de las partes menos delicadas lo haya reducido a una pequeñez que escapa a nuestros sentidos, como ocurrió con la que tenía antes de nacer»:

Es pues natural que como el animal siempre ha sido viviente y ha estado organizado (como comienzan a reconocerlo personas de gran perspicacia) también lo será y lo estará siempre. Y puesto que de ese modo no hay primer nacimiento ni generación completamente nueva del animal, se sigue de ello que en rigor metafísico no habrá extinción final ni muerte completa; y que, por consiguiente, en vez de transmigración de las almas sólo ocurre la transformación de un mismo animal, según estén los órganos plegados de un modo diverso y más o menos desarrollados. (1978, vol. 4, pp. 480-481)

Los gérmenes de todos los organismos pasados, presentes y futuros habrían existido siempre desde la Creación divina. Los fetos que debían nacer en todo tiempo estarían completamente preformados, de tal manera que, una vez nacidos, sólo diferirían en su talla. La teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes permitía así dar cuenta del concepto lógico de «especie», pero, como vemos en Leibniz, implicaba un universo sin novedad, en el que, en última instancia, las formas naturales no serían obra de la naturaleza, sino de un Dios que habría dispuesto todo para que funcionara como un mecanismo de relojería. Frente a Malebranche, que había basado el origen de los cuerpos orgánicos —así como las relaciones entre el alma y el cuerpo, concebidos bajo el dualismo metafísico cartesiano— en la intervención divina continua como su causa ocasional, Leibniz pensó el mundo en sus *Essais de Theodicee* como la obra de un Dios-Relojero que habría preestablecido todo el orden pasado, presente y futuro en el origen de la Creación:

A menos que se diga que Dios forma, él mismo, los cuerpos orgánicos por un milagro continuo, o que dé el encargo de hacerlo a inteligencias cuyo poder y cuya ciencia sean casi divinas, es imprescindible creer que Dios ha preformado las cosas de manera que las organizaciones nuevas sean sólo un resultado mecánico de una constitución orgánica precedente, como cuando las mariposas nacen de los gusanos de seda, en lo cual M. Swammerdam ha demostrado que no hay más que una transformación [*development, desenvolvimiento*] [...]

Pero yo no admito lo sobrenatural, sino en el comienzo de las cosas, respecto a la primera formación de los animales, o respecto a la constitución originaria de la armonía preestablecida entre el alma y el cuerpo; después de lo cual, sostengo que la

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formación de los animales y la relación entre el alma y el cuerpo son tan absolutamente naturales al presente, como las demás operaciones ordinarias de la naturaleza. (1978, vol. 6, pp. 41-42).

William Harvey entró en abierta disputa con el preformismo embriológico<sup>2</sup> introduciendo el paradigma de la «epigénesis» en sus *Exercitationes de generatione animalum* de 1651. A partir de la observación de híbridos, injertos o monstruos; de la regeneración de la cola de las lagartijas y de las pinzas de los cangrejos; y del nacimiento de pollos o gusanos de seda, Harvey argumentó que ni la morfogénesis general de los organismos ni, en general, su desarrollo, estaban preformados en la dotación germinal, sino que se adquiría gradualmente a partir de sustancias inductoras del medio. Harvey defendió la procedencia de *omne vivum ex ovo*, es decir, de todo lo orgánico a partir de una progresiva emergencia desde formas iniciales indiferenciadas.

Ahora bien, la consolidación definitiva del paradigma embriológico de la epigénesis se produjo a partir de las investigaciones llevadas a cabo por Lazzaro Spallanzani y Caspar Friedrich Wolff. Utilizando las nuevas técnicas del microscopio compuesto, ambos investigadores trataron de demostrar que tanto los productos sexuales masculinos como los femeninos eran necesarios para la iniciación del desarrollo embrionario y que, por tanto, la estructura de cualquier ser vivo adulto no se encontraba preformada en la sustancia seminal o en el huevo, sino que se organizaba poco a poco, a consecuencia de plegamientos, abultamientos e hinchazones, en definitiva, a través de una serie de secuencias, de operaciones dinámicas y endógenas inducidas por el entorno.

Albrecht von Haller, uno de los últimos grandes preformistas, había negado la idea de epigénesis embriológica sobre la base de sus investigaciones en torno a la formación del pollo, realizadas en la primera mitad de la década de 1750. En su obra *Sur la formation du coeur dans le poulet*, publicada en 1758, afirmó que la única razón para que las partes del adulto no pudieran ser observadas en el embrión de pollo, a pesar de estar ya allí preformadas, era que éstas eran demasiado fluidas y transparentes en esas primeras fases del desarrollo. Wolff argumentó que tal tesis sería admisible con tal de que las estructuras del embrión, invisibles al ojo desnudo, aparecieran ya diferenciadas cuando creciera lo suficiente para hacerse visible al microscopio. Pero esto era algo que no ocurría bajo la observación minuciosa experimental. Estudiando el desarrollo de los vasos sanguíneos del embrión de pollo, Wolff observó que éstos se generaban por fusión de «islotos de sangre» inicialmente independientes, por lo que pudo concluir que la formación [*Bildung*] del pollo no consistía en un mero crecimiento, sino también en una generación [*Differenzierung*]. En su *De formatione intestorum*, publicado en las *Mémoires de l'Académie des Sciences de Saint-Pétersbourg* en 1768-1769 (2003) describió como el intestino de pollo no aparecía ya formado en las primeras fases visibles del crecimiento embrionario, sino que se iba desarrollando progresivamente mediante el plegamiento de una lámina de tejido sobre la superficie ventral del embrión. Por todo ello, Wolff concluyó que los embriones procedían

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<sup>2</sup> La disputa entre ambos programas de investigación puede verse en Roe (1981).

de una sustancia indiferenciada, secretada por los órganos genitales de los padres, y que, como consecuencia de la fecundación, se organizaban bajo la dirección de una *vis essentialis* o fuerza vital, intrínseca a los cuerpos materiales y capaz de producir órganos especializados, de carácter análogo (físico, mecánico) a las que operan en la constitución de los cristales naturales o de las formaciones metálicas y cuya función sería básicamente nutritivo-metabólica (1774, I, §4).

La concepción de la fuerza vital y de la misma noción de epigénesis fue, sin embargo, heterogénea entre los epigenetistas del siglo XVIII. Por ello, habría que diferenciar entre la concepción de la fuerza vital mecánico-experimentalista mantenida por Wolff y la teleomecanicista o material-vitalista defendida por el naturalista alemán Johann Friedrich Blumenbach y por Kant (Moya 2008, pp. 123-129) (Duchesneau 2006). La *vis essentialis* de Wolff aparece como una fuerza emergente de carácter arquitectónico: ella dirige la formación de estructuras anatómicas y las operaciones de los procesos fisiológicos del organismo, de modo que las diferentes partes nacerían y funcionarían interactivamente para alcanzar los fines de la especie. Pero en su oposición al preformismo y a la teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes, Wolff no sólo rechazó la idea de preformación o preexistencia, sino también la misma idea de germen, de algún tipo de organización al comienzo del desarrollo de los organismos, con lo que hizo difícilmente explicable el mecanismo por el que la *vis essentialis* producía un pollo a partir de otro y no una planta, o un cierto órgano en un lugar determinado y no en otro. Por ello, a pesar del punto de partida experimentalista de Wolff, su modelo embriológico acababa adoptando un compromiso con la metafísica.

En la primera edición de su *Über den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäft* (1781) Blumenbach defendió que la organización de los cuerpos vivos y sus partes mecánicas serían inexplicables sin recurrir a un principio directriz —que denominó *Bildungstrieb o nisus formativus*— que representase un plan inmanente prefigurado y que en función de las circunstancias del entorno fuera capaz de generar y diferenciar estructuras, y de dar soporte a las funciones orgánicas. Ese principio consistiría así en una *Lebenskraft* o fuerza vital cuya direccionalidad morfogenética estaría guiada por ciertos gérmenes y disposiciones originarios de la especie y cuyo carácter sería no mecánico, sino teleológico, dirigido según fines.

A pesar del intercambio de ideas y de la influencia intelectual mutua entre Kant y Blumenbach, no habría que soslayar las diferencias que mantuvieron entre ambos en torno a la idea de *Lebenskraft*, al menos durante parte de sus periodos de pensamiento. Según ha defendido E.-M. Engels hubo dos usos distintos del concepto de *Bildungstrieb* en el siglo XVIII: el de aquellos que, como Blumenbach a principios de 1780, lo emplearon como un constructo metafísico y el de los que, como Kant, lo utilizaron como un simple constructo metodológico ante las limitaciones encontradas en las explicaciones mecánicas de los cuerpos vivos (Engels 1994, pp. 127 y ss.). También lo ha señalado Robert J. Richards (2000) contra Timothy Lenoir (1989): a pesar de que la *Bildungstrieb* tenía el mismo carácter arquitectónico en Blumenbach y en Kant, en cada uno de ellos fue concebida bajo

interpretaciones metacientíficas distintas, pues si para el primero la *Bildungstrieb* consistió, al menos en sus primeras etapas de pensamiento, en una fuerza constitutiva de la naturaleza, para el último no se trató más que de un principio heurístico para indagar territorios esquivos a la investigación mecánico-causal.

En cualquier caso, Blumenbach trató de encontrar una fuerza organizadora universal de la materia viva que pudiera construir un modelo explicativo de las regularidades observadas. De esta forma, pensó en la necesidad científica de reconstruir la *Bildungstrieb* para cada especie unificando, bajo leyes, las regularidades encontradas en la reproducción, la generación y la nutrición. Es lo que, con muchas reservas críticas, y apelando a la configuración de nuestras facultades mentales —en especial a la del Juicio y su noción *a priori* de fin— había mantenido Kant cuando apeló a los gérmenes y disposiciones originarios a mediados de la década de 1770. Estos gérmenes y disposiciones originarios vendrían a ser una suerte de idea directriz y rectora que guía y limita a la *Bildungstrieb*. Como afirmó en el parágrafo §64 de la *Crítica del Juicio*, un árbol genera siempre otro árbol, y el árbol que él genera es de la misma especie, con lo que, en realidad, «se genera a sí mismo según la especie» (KU, AA 05: 371). Toda transmisión, incluso la casual, dice Kant, «nunca puede ser el efecto de otra cosa que la de los gérmenes y disposiciones originarias que residen en la especie misma» (Bestimmung, AA 08: 97)

Kant acabó así posicionándose del lado de la epigénesis en el debate embriológico moderno y asumiendo este modelo para el mundo biológico (Moya 2011). Es posible rastrear la afinidad kantiana por la epigénesis desde la década de 1750, a partir de sus lecturas de los naturalistas franceses Maupertuis y Buffon (Zammito 2006), aunque no fue hasta mediados de la década de 1780 cuando, estimulado por la polémica con J. G. Herder y G. Forster (Galfione 2014) y la recepción de las hipótesis de J. F. Blumenbach, tenga un modelo estructurado de la epigénesis<sup>3</sup>. Es lo que refleja en el §81 de la *Crítica del Juicio*, cuando Kant, frente a la teoría de los gérmenes preexistentes, el fijismo de las especies y el preformismo metafísico de Leibniz, defiende, más allá de las objeciones empíricas contra el preformismo (la existencia de monstruos, híbridos, herencia doble o regeneración de partes amputadas de animales), el plus de valor científico que presenta el modelo de la epigénesis, ya que ella «considera la Naturaleza, el menos en lo que atañe a la generación, como productora de suyo y no sólo como capaz de desarrollo, por lo que deja a su cargo todo cuanto acontece a partir del primer comienzo, recurriendo lo menos posible a lo sobrenatural» (KU, AA 05: 424). La epigénesis, que consiste en la capacidad de los sistemas biológicos de interactuar con el medio y, en función de ello, ganar estructura (complejidad, organización y autonomía) a lo largo de la vida (Moya 2008, 34-35), sirve también a Kant para plantear, con la ayuda de la *Bildungstrieb* de Blumenbach (Zammito 2018a, pp. 186-214) y los conceptos de gérmenes y disposiciones originarias

<sup>3</sup> Ese modelo estructurado de la epigénesis contaría con una concepción funcional precisa de las nociones de germen y disposición naturales.

(*ursprüngliche Keime und Anlagen*) (VvRM, AA 02 427-444)), la idea de la evolución de las especies (Moya 2008, pp. 159 y ss.).

#### 4. Epigénesis y evolución (historia) de la naturaleza

El preformismo biológico y metafísico moderno había planteado la idea de una naturaleza prefijada por Dios desde la creación, capaz de desenvolverse según el plan preestablecido por el Creador, pero sin posibilidad de aparición de novedad alguna en el mundo. Frente a esta imagen, la idea de epigénesis sirvió a Kant para pensar en una naturaleza autoprodutiva, encargada, a partir del primer comienzo y en virtud de determinadas leyes, de su propia evolución (*Naturentwicklung*) y dotada, por tanto, de una historia propia marcada por la contingencia (Müllers-Sievers 1989, pp. 4-5) (Zammito 2018b). Es lo que, como ha señalado Eugenio Moya (2008, p. 149), revela Kant en el §81 de la *Crítica del Juicio* citado arriba, al elevar la idea de epigénesis desde el campo de la embriología —de los problemas de la generación y la morfogénesis— al territorio de la naturaleza toda. A ello ayudó, sin duda, la temprana lectura de los naturalistas franceses (Zammito 2006) (Zammito 2018b), como Maupertuis, Buffon o Diderot, que contribuyeron a la consolidación del materialismo y a captar la continuidad de la naturaleza más allá de su aparente variedad.

En su investigación sobre fenómenos como la herencia doble de caracteres (del padre y la madre), Maupertuis argumentó contra el preformismo y defendió que cada nuevo nacimiento era una verdadera génesis y no un simple aumento o crecimiento de un ser preexistente (Roe 1981, pp. 13-15). Su teoría de la generación, llevada a cabo en su *Venus Física* (1745) y en su *Sistema de la naturaleza* (1768) le permitió introducir los conceptos biológicos clave de herencia y variación en el marco de su materialismo. Según dicha teoría el embrión se formaba como resultado de la combinación mecánica de un gran número de partículas vivas (*particules vivantes*) a modo de unidades elementales de los seres organizados, derivadas normalmente de ambos progenitores, y que tendrían una memoria orgánica (*Venus Física*) o psíquica «de désir ou d'aversion» (Maupertuis 1768, 149) de la vida del organismo al que perteneció. La embriogénesis sería así para Maupertuis un proceso de yuxtaposición de tales partículas sometido a leyes mecánicas. Toda esta reflexión teórica le condujo finalmente a plantear la idea de una tendencia constante en los animales a la variación a lo largo del tiempo como consecuencia de la herencia doble o el azar y, consecuentemente, a la hipótesis de que todas las especies pudieron haber surgido de una pareja primitiva inicial a través de la acumulación gradual y transmisión de variaciones divergentes. Cada grado de desviación habría provocado una nueva especie, hasta alcanzar la inmensa diversidad de animales existentes en nuestros días.

Buffon coincidió con el planteamiento de Maupertuis en su *Historia natural de los animales*, denominando aquellas unidades elementales de los seres vivos como *molécules organiques* y planteando la idea de molde interno (*moule intériur*) para explicar su memoria (Buffon, 1774-1779, p. 51) Para ambos, esos “átomos” de la vida se asociarían y

se disociarían en los procesos de reproducción y de muerte en función de determinadas fuerzas mecánicas, como la de atracción de la física o las de afinidad de la química. La reproducción no sería tanto un proceso de preservación de formas preexistentes como de adición de partes afines de las que emergen nuevas formas. Consistiría así en un proceso de epigénesis que, sin recurrir a la idea de gérmenes preformados, no implicaría tampoco partir en cada generación de un caos material.

En este marco, en el que se produce el declive de las taxonomías y el auge de la anatomía comparada, Diderot desarrolló una idea unitaria de la naturaleza en la que ésta aparecía como un gran animal, compuesto de partes que eran, a su vez, animales —incluido el hombre—, compuestos, finalmente, por partículas vivas. En sus *Pensées sur l'Interprétation de la nature* trató de superar el mecanicismo y atomismo de los newtonianos incorporando lo vivo en el mundo físico y ofreciendo un mecanismo explicativo dinámico y holista capaz de dar cuenta de la emergencia de la vida —e incluso del espíritu— a partir de la materia (Diderot 2005, §58,2):

¿No habrá que suponer que las especies, lo mismo que los individuos, nacen, crecen, duran y desaparecen? ¿No habrá que suponer que los elementos de animalidad, esparcidos antes en la masa material, llegaron a unirse para formar el embrión, y que este embrión recorre infinitas etapas de desarrollo, avanzando desde el movimiento a la sensación, de ésta a la representación, y de aquí hasta el pensar consciente y la reflexión? Millones de años pueden extenderse entre todos estos desarrollos y acaso se preparan otros.

Diderot concibió la naturaleza como un juego semiorganicista en el que se producía la metamorfosis de lo inanimado en animado con la correspondiente relación circular entre ambos estados. En sus *Éléments de physiologie* fue más allá, extendiendo esa misma idea al ámbito de lo psicológico y defendiendo una ley de continuidad de los estados propios del ser sensible, viviente y organizado (Roger 1993).

Con las debidas reservas críticas ante el intento de reducir lo orgánico (y lo psíquico) a lo mecánico Kant se vio atraído por el esfuerzo de estos naturalistas por unificar los seres mecánicos y los orgánicos en un sistema universal de los seres. En los párrafos §80-81 de la *Crítica del Juicio*, Kant, adoptando la posición de arqueólogo de la naturaleza, apuntó hacia ese sistema. La anatomía comparada del momento mostraba a los contemporáneos la concordancia de muchas especies animales en un esquema común que estaba a la base tanto de su esqueleto como de la disposición de sus partes (KU, AA 05: 418), con lo que Kant acaba considerando a la naturaleza como madre común de las distintas especies animales, las cuales, surgidas del seno maternal de la Tierra, deben ser vistas como una gran familia de criaturas. O sea, que Kant plantea como una audaz aventura de la razón (KU, AA 05: 419) la hipótesis de que, a partir de un caos material y en virtud de su fuerza formativa (*Bildungskraft*), las especies habrían emergido unas de otras, y cada una de ellas generaría a sus miembros en virtud de su autoorganización y principio interno:

Esa analogía de las formas, en cuanto, a pesar de toda la diversidad, parecen ser producidas según un prototipo común, fortalece la sospecha de una verdadera afinidad de las mismas en la producción de una madre común primitiva, por medio de la aproximación gradual de una especie animal a otra, desde aquella en que el principio de los fines parece más guardado, a saber, en el hombre, hasta el pólipo y de éste, incluso, hasta los musgos y los líquenes, y finalmente, hasta la escala inferior que podemos observar en la naturaleza, la materia bruta, de la cual y de cuyas fuerzas, según leyes mecánicas (iguales a las que siguen la producción de los cristales), parece provenir toda la técnica de la naturaleza, que en los seres organizados nos es tan incomprensible que nos creemos obligados a pensar para ellos otro principio (KU, AA 05: 418-419).

Esa idea de emergencia de nuevos órdenes de realidad en la naturaleza a partir de ciertos sistemas, que Kant ya había manejado en su temprano ensayo *Historia general de la naturaleza y teoría del cielo*, serviría también para explicar el surgimiento por epigénesis del alma misma a partir del cuerpo organizado (Moya 2004, p. 127):

Tenemos que aceptar, junto a la epigénesis, que el alma pertenece al mundo inteligible; que ella no está en ningún lugar en el espacio; que, cuando un cuerpo organizado ha emergido [*entstanden*] por generación, tiene en sí la condición de ser animado por un principio animante de carácter inteligible; y que en el cuerpo mismo el alma no tiene presencia local, sino virtual (Refl, AA 18: 189-190).

Para conciliar las ideas de epigénesis y continuidad de una naturaleza unitaria Kant habría recurrido a la imagen de la escalera de los seres de Charles Bonnet (Moya 2004, p. 128). Éste había considerado que la naturaleza era continua, pero escalonada, de tal forma que, desde el pólipo hasta el hombre la naturaleza habría obrado formando, debido a grandes catástrofes, una serie de escalones que presentarían, a su vez, una serie de peldaños. En la *Crítica de la razón pura* escribe Kant:

Cuando veo personas inteligentes que discuten entre sí sobre las características de los hombres, los animales o plantas, o incluso de los cuerpos del reino mineral [...], sólo necesito considerar la naturaleza del objeto para comprender que ésta se halla demasiado oculta para que puedan hablar basándose en el conocimiento de la misma... Lo mismo puede decirse sobre la defensa o impugnación de la conocida ley de la escala graduada continua de las criaturas, puesta en circulación por Leibniz y tan certeramente apoyada por Bonnet. Esta ley no indica otra cosa que la puesta en práctica del principio de afinidad fundado en el interés de la razón, y, como aserción objetiva, no puede proceder de la observación y conocimiento de la estructura de la naturaleza. Los peldaños de esa escalera, tal como la experiencia puede ofrecerlos, se hallan demasiado separados unos de otros, y las diferencias que nosotros suponemos pequeñas suelen ser en la naturaleza simas tan enormes, que no podemos contar con que tales observaciones (especialmente en el caso de una gran variedad de cosas, donde siempre será fácil encontrar semejanzas y aproximaciones) revelen intencionalidad en la Naturaleza (KrV A 667-668 / B 695-696).

La *escala naturae* kantiana incluiría como escalones la materia no organizada (*rohe Materie*), la materia organizada (*organisierte Materie*), los organismos vegetales, los

organismos animados y los animales racionales (Moya 2004, p. 129); e incluso, las formaciones sociales<sup>4</sup>. La evolución orgánica consistiría para Kant en la emergencia de formas de organización y autoorganización cada vez más complejas en las que la fuerza organizadora (*Bildungstrieb*) garantiza la continuidad y la interacción de los gérmenes y disposiciones originarias constitutivas de cada especie orienta la dirección (RezHerder, AA 08: 62-63). Y esa evolución biológica no estaría desvinculada ni del proceso de desarrollo físico-cósmica del universo y de la Tierra ni del del ser humano, incluida su cognición (Moya 2019, p. 49) y su dimensión moral (Conill 2016, p. 11), pues como señala en el §65 de la *Crítica del Juicio*:

La naturaleza se organiza más bien a sí misma y en cada especie de sus productos organizados siguiendo globalmente un mismo modelo, pero también con las oportunas divergencias que exige la propia conservación, según las circunstancias (KU, AA 05: 374).

La idea de epigénesis le habría servido a Kant para implementar esa noción de evolución general de la naturaleza que ya había planteado en *Historia general de la naturaleza y teoría del cielo* de 1755. Ahora bien, el fundamento de tal evolución y la base de su enlace con la epigénesis habrían sido los conceptos kantianos de fuerza e interacción recíproca, así como la idea de sistema, derivada de ambos (Moya 2004, p. 121), que fueron desarrollados por Kant en su reflexión sobre el mecanicismo cartesiano y la revisión que, de él, realizó Leibniz.

La relectura leibniziana del mecanicismo cartesiano condujo a Kant, en su *Estimación de las fuerzas vivas* (1746), a considerar que la materia no podía ser definida por la simple extensionalidad y, con ello, a introducir junto con Leibniz el concepto metafísico de fuerza viva o activa, diferenciándolo del de fuerza motriz o pasiva. (GSK, AA 01: 28). La fuerza motriz o pasiva haría posible que un cuerpo resistiera a la penetración y al movimiento en función de su cantidad de materia, y de ella se derivarían otras fuerzas como la de atracción, repulsión, elasticidad, etc. La fuerza viva o activa sería una fuerza interna y formativa que presupondría no sólo una receptividad de la acción, sino un conato o tendencia a la acción y se vería incrementada «por la acción de cualquier movimiento externo» (GSK, AA 01: 140).

Es el planteamiento que aparece en su *Historia general de la Naturaleza*, en cuyo prefacio, después de dejar a un lado las explicaciones antropomórficas y las divinas, propone Kant una teoría de la evolución general del universo, según la cual la masa informe y heterogénea inicial comenzó a organizarse, impulsada por fuerzas de atracción y repulsión (NTH, AA 01: 234). En la nebulosa inicial comenzaron a producirse condensaciones, atrayendo a los materiales del entorno y organizándose en forma de sistema en equilibrio dinámico (NTH, AA 01: 269). La fuerza activa ínsita en la materia, dotaría a esta de una

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<sup>4</sup> Kant extiende la idea de organización y autoorganización de los productos de la naturaleza a las formaciones sociales en una nota que sigue a su reflexión sobre las constantes del modelo evolutivo de la naturaleza (KU, AA 05: 375).



inagotable fuerza formativa (*Bildungskraft*), capaz de generar la emergencia (*Entstehung*) de nuevos órdenes de realidad.

Kant, sin embargo, fue más allá de Leibniz y posteriormente añadió la fuerza vital (*vis vivifica*, *Lebenskraft*, *Bildungstrieb*), que a diferencia de las anteriores sería orgánica y autoorganizadora (OP, AA 21: 264 y 643) (OP, AA 22: 189 y 210). «Los cuerpos orgánicos —dice Kant— son aquellos que poseen fuerza vital» (HN, AA 23: 484). Con las debidas reservas a las implicaciones hилоzoístas de sus tesis (Zammito 2003), Kant consideraría que a través de las fuerzas pasiva y activa emergerían de la materia los cuerpos y sistemas físicos, y por medio de la fuerza vital emergerían, en circunstancias diferentes, nuevos cuerpos orgánicos que, en circunstancias preservadas, serían capaces de «reproducirse a sí mismos según la especie», es decir, de «existir para sí y por mor de sí mismos» (OP, AA 22: 193). Una fuerza vital que sería, a su vez, responsable, junto con la organización sistémica de diferentes partes orgánicas del cuerpo, de la emergencia de lo anímico, hasta el punto de que Kant llega a emplearla como sustituto del término «alma»:

En su vigoroso lenguaje estoico dice Crisipo: ‘*En vez de sal, la naturaleza ha añadido al cerdo un alma para que no se pudra*’. Este [alma] es el nivel inferior de la naturaleza del hombre antes de toda cultura, es decir, el mero instinto animal. Es como si el filósofo hubiera echado una mirada adivinatoria al sistema fisiológico de nuestra época: sólo que hoy, en lugar de la palabra alma [Seele], se ha preferido usar la de fuerza vital [Lebenskraft], algo a lo que se tiene derecho, porque se puede hacer patente el efecto de una fuerza que produce, pero no el efecto de una sustancia particular apropiada a tal efecto (VNAEF, AA 08: 413).

Para Kant, tanto los cuerpos orgánicos, como los inorgánicos, e incluso el alma misma son concebidos más que como sustancias, como plexos de fuerza (ÜGTP, AA 08: 157-184) (KU, AA 05: 422-425). No hay para él ruptura entre evolución físico-cósmica, biológica y antropológica<sup>5</sup>. Desde la emergencia de formaciones materiales como sistemas solares, planetas, etc., que se comportan como totalidades integradas; pasando por la de los seres vivos, entendidos como cuerpos organizados y autoorganizados; hasta la de la propia autonomía cognitiva (Moya 2019, p. 49) y moral del hombre (NTH, AA 01: 364) (Conill

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<sup>5</sup> Habría que señalar, en cualquier caso, las distancias que separan a Kant respecto a Herder en este punto. Herder, a partir de la concepción evolucionista de la naturaleza que Kant había planteado en *Historia natural y teoría del cielo* (1755), se opuso también al preformismo y adoptó, en sus *Ideas para una Filosofía de la Historia de la Humanidad*, una nueva concepción de la epigenesis, distinta a las dos presentadas arriba, y que puede caracterizarse como animista, vitalista o espontaneísta. Herder asumió la idea de epigénensis, esto es, de la capacidad de la naturaleza de ganar estructura con el paso del tiempo y la adaptación al entorno y circunstancias. Pero pretendió argumentar a favor de la naturaleza espiritual del alma humana. Utilizando la idea neoplatónica de naturalezas plásticas, concibió un cierto «reino invisible de la creación» que todo lo organiza hacia el modelo de perfección organizativa que constituye el hombre. Así consideró que todos los seres de la Tierra, minerales, plantas, y animales, se habían ido aproximando, en su evolución, al modelo de perfección organizativa del ser humano. Este planteamiento de Herder suponía concebir la *Bildungstrieb* como un principio vital que se modificaba a sí mismo (espontaneísmo) para adecuarse a la diversidad de las circunstancias exteriores en su evolución hacia el modelo del hombre. Esta idea fue inaceptable para Kant, pues suponía un proceso organizativo azaroso, espontaneísta, producido por el capricho de la naturaleza. Para él resultaba erróneo olvidar la idea de gérmenes originarios en cuanto limitaciones de la potencia autoformativa de todo lo vivo, que conferirían la unidad de cada especie.

2016, p. 11), nos encontraríamos ante una constante evolutiva: un aumento de la complejidad y, al mismo tiempo, una mayor integración o (auto)organización de las partes. La evolución (historia) de la naturaleza está así marcada por un proceso de continuidad y divergencia en las transiciones entre *physis*, *bios* y *anthropos*.

### 5. La naturaleza de la razón: complejidad, conflicto y locura

Como puede leerse en la Reflexión 4104, Kant defendió, frente al preformismo leibniziano, una «*epigenesis psychologica*» o «*systema generationis naturalis*» del alma humana<sup>6</sup> (HN, AA 17: 416). Kant habría tomado como modelo para esa psicogénesis individual las ideas de Caspar F. Wolff, planteando una formación ontogénica del alma por capas germinales (*Blätter*) en un proceso en el que, como defendería posteriormente el naturalista Ernst Haeckel (1866), la ontogenia recapitula la filogenia, es decir, en el que se procede de lo general a lo particular, recorriendo el individuo en su ontogénesis las distintas fases evolutivas presupuestas en el orden natural al que pertenece su especie. En su *Theoria Generationis* defendió Wolff que la embriogénesis consistía en un proceso de diferenciación (*Differenzierung*, *Neubildung*) de cuatro estructuras fundamentales del embrión (la nerviosa, la muscular, la cardiovascular y la intestinal) a partir de una masa germinal indiferenciada (*Keimscheibe*) (Schad 2003). Kant, anticipándose a Haeckel (1899, 125), habría defendido la idea de una escala graduada del alma (*Stufenleiter der Seele*) al considerar que las fuerzas orgánicas habrían obrado en el plano psíquico como las fuerzas físicas lo habrían hecho sobre el terreno: por estratos (Moya 2008, p. 289).

En analogía con la estratificación de todo lo material formulada por Kant en el *Opus postumum* a través de su idea de una «*Stufenleiter im Elementarsystem der bewegenden Kräfte der Materie*» o escala graduada del conjunto de seres de la naturaleza (OP, AA 22: 374) Kant habría planteado una básica y paradójica triple disposición natural en el hombre en su *anthropologische Charakteristik*: a la animalidad, en cuanto ser viviente; a la humanidad, en cuanto ser viviente y racional; y a la personalidad, en cuanto que capaz para hacerse libremente a sí mismo (Anth, AA 07: 321-325) (RGV, AA 06: 26-28). El ser humano aparece así para Kant como un animal paradójico, como un animal portador de la paradoja en sus disposiciones naturales —«*das Widersinnliche der Naturanlagen*» (KU, AA 05: 430).

La clave de esa *anthropologische Charakteristik* es que expone unas disposiciones naturales que constituyen lo que un hombre tiende a ser porque traducen las tendencias originarias de la especie, es decir, todo lo que «queda hereditariamente recogido en la fuerza procreadora [...], originariamente presente en la especie para su autoconservación» (KU, AA 05: 420). La epigénesis psicológica desarrolla estas disposiciones en función de

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<sup>6</sup> Más que de una epigénesis del alma, debería hablarse de una epigénesis psicológica que posteriormente se complementa con una epigénesis intelectual de las categorías que Kant defendió en el §27 de la segunda edición de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, un párrafo que constituye la clave de bóveda de la deducción trascendental de las categorías. Habla allí de una epigénesis de la razón pura, un concepto que resulta clave para reconciliar el plano de la investigación trascendental con el plano empírico y naturalizar el sujeto trascendental (Cf. Moya 2008, 17-18 y 44).

las circunstancias del medio humano, que, como señala Kant, consisten en la concurrencia de la socialización y el aprendizaje de una lengua. Y análogamente a la embriogénesis planteada por Wolff, donde el desarrollo comienza con lo externo para avanzar hacia lo interno y más propio y donde el individuo recorre en su ontogénesis las fases evolutivas básicas presupuestas en el orden natural al que pertenece su especie, la psicogénesis planteada por Kant procedería desarrollando las facultades del alma en ese mismo orden: primero, las sensibles; más tarde, las intelectivas; y finalmente, las racionales.

Kant reconoce así al hombre como una criatura animal a la que el planeta entregó la materia con la que fue hecho (KpV, AA 05: 162-163) y a través de la que fue provisto de una fuerza vital constitutiva de su ser y responsable, en última instancia, de su misma organización compleja, autoorganizada y capaz de organizar la experiencia (HN, AA 23: 484-485). El carácter paradójico del hombre se produce porque a su animalidad la naturaleza le añade la conciencia de sí mismo (VNAEF, AA 08: 414) y, además, añade con su razón un espíritu (*Geist*), otro *Lebensprinzip* de la fuerza vital, superpuesto al alma, al animo (*Seele, Gemüt*), a fin de llevar «una vida no sólo adecuada al mecanismo de la naturaleza y a sus leyes técnico-prácticas, sino también a la espontaneidad de la libertad y a sus leyes práctico-morales» (VNAEF, AA 08: 417)

Hay en el hombre un principio activo, no suscitable por ninguna representación sensible, ínsito en el hombre, mas no como alma que presupone un cuerpo, sino como espíritu [*Geist*] [...]

El hombre no es un animal que tenga fines internos o también sentidos, etc., por ejemplo, órganos, entendimiento, sino una persona que tiene derechos (y con relación al cual toda otra persona tiene derechos). A él no sólo lo vivifica un alma [*Seele*] (*animans*, por tanto) sino que mora en él un espíritu: *spiritus intus alit. Mens* (OP, AA 22: 55-56).

En su opúsculo *Probable inicio de la historia humana* señala Kant que «la Naturaleza ha depositado en nosotros disposiciones tendentes a dos fines diversos, cuales son el de la humanidad en tanto que especie animal y el de ella misma en cuanto especie moral» (MAM, AA 08: 117). Dos fines que no sólo serían diversos, sino opuestos y contradictorios entre sí. Y este carácter paradójico del hombre, esa contradicción de intereses entre «las leyes depositadas en su naturaleza con miras al tosco estado animal» bajo la forma del instinto y «el afán de la humanidad por obtener [...] su destino moral» bajo la forma de la cultura conducen inevitablemente al conflicto (*Widerstreit*) (MAM, AA 08: 116).

Según Kant la retracción del instinto y el tránsito a la cultura no se ha hecho sin pérdidas para el hombre, pues como apunta en su *Antropología*, junto al germen de la razón la naturaleza ha puesto en él el germen de la discordia (*Keim der Zwietracht*) a fin de que mediante la razón extraiga de ésta última aquella concordia (*Eintracht*) o, al menos, la constante aproximación a ella en lo que constituye «el perfeccionamiento del hombre por medio del progreso de la cultura, aunque sea con más de un sacrificio de las alegrías de sus vida» (Anth, AA 07: 322). Desde el día en que el hombre, señala Kant allí (Anth, AA 07:

128-130), después de pensarse como yo, tiende por egoísmo a no contrastar sus juicios apelando al entendimiento de los demás, a no apelar más que a su gusto para apreciar lo bello, y a no guiarse por otros fines que los propios, el conflicto se convierte en una constante de la vida humana en sociedad. Pero también en una constante en la vida psíquica individual, dando lugar a la locura. Vida social y vida psíquica se presentan indisolublemente unidas en la locura.

En cualquier caso, Kant sitúa el origen de la locura, junto al carácter complejo, paradójico y conflictivo de la psique humana, en su propia condición natural. Inaugura así una hipótesis que ha perdurado en la comunidad científica durante más de dos siglos y que plantea la idea de una humanidad afligida por una fractura neurofisiológica innata, como puede rastrearse desde las investigaciones localizacionistas de neuroanatomistas como Franz Joseph Gall o Paul Broca; pasando por la teoría evolucionista jacksoniana de un sistema nervioso jerarquizado funcionalmente o la tónica freudiana de la mente caracterizada por la división y el conflicto en ella entre un ello inconsciente indomable y un yo consciente y racional; hasta las divisiones cerebrales planteadas por Paul MacLean entre el cerebro visceral y el córtex, análogamente a la división freudiana entre el ello y el yo (MacLean 1949), y que posteriormente completaría con su modelo triúnico del cerebro, según el cual éste se dividiría en tres partes («reptilian», «old mammalian» y «new mammalian»), correspondientes a estadios evolutivos diferentes, con funciones distintas y propias, y que muchas veces serían incapaces de integración funcional (MacLean 1973). Como ha señalado recientemente Edgar Morin, complejidad, conflicto y locura serían rasgos naturales del hombre (Morin 2005):

El cerebro es hipercomplejo, igualmente, en el sentido en que es «triúnico», según la expresión de MacLean. Porta en sí tres cerebros en uno: el cerebro reptiliano (celo, agresión), el cerebro mamífero (afectividad), el neocórtex humano (inteligencia lógica y conceptual), sin que haya predominancia del uno sobre otro. Al contrario, hay antagonismo entre esas tres instancias, y a veces, a menudo, es la pulsión quien gobierna la razón. Pero también, en y por ese desequilibrio, surge la imaginación.

## 6. Razón y locura: el concepto de *sinrazón positiva*.

La preocupación de Kant por la locura comenzó pronto. El 10 de febrero de 1764 el filósofo alemán publicó en el número 3 del *Periódico político e ilustrado de Königsberg* (AA 02: 489) una nota que recogía la aparición en Königsberg de un hombre de mediana edad que vagaba por el campo, descalzo y cubriendo sus partes con hojas de parra, junto a un niño de 8 años y a un pequeño rebaño de ovejas y cabras. El hombre, un polaco llamado Jan Pawlikowicz, era conocido como el «profeta de las cabras» por recurrir a citas bíblicas, pertinentes o no, ante cualquier cuestión que se le planteara. Era un hombre perturbado a causa de una enfermedad sufrida 7 años antes. Sobre el pequeño se suscitó una gran expectación sobre si se trataba de un niño criado en estado natural o salvaje. Ambas figuras, la del loco y la del niño salvaje, parecen haber influido en la concepción kantiana de la locura que desarrollara en 1764 en su *Ensayo sobre las enfermedades de la cabeza*

(VKK, AA 02: 259-271), publicado aquel mismo mes de febrero en dicha publicación periódica. Kant contrapone allí el papel desempeñado por la naturaleza y la sociedad en el hombre. La sencillez y sobriedad de la primera promueve y forma en el hombre sólo nociones comunes y una tosca honestidad; por el contrario, la coacción artificiosa y la opulencia de la organización civil, si bien da lugar a hombres ingeniosos y razonadores, en ocasiones también a locos.

El ser humano en estado de naturaleza puede estar sometido a pocas insensateces y difícilmente a alguna locura [*Narrheit*]. Sus necesidades le mantienen en todo momento próximo a la experiencia y le dan a su sano entendimiento un quehacer tan ligero que ni siquiera se da cuenta de que necesita entendimiento para sus actividades [...] En la constitución civil [de la sociedad] se encuentran propiamente los fermentos de toda esta corrupción. (VKK, AA 02: 269)

Kant vincula así la locura con el estado social. Sólo una razón compleja, capaz de entrar en conflicto consigo misma puede desvariar y esa complejidad sólo alcanza a la vida social. La explicación de ese vínculo entre vida mental compleja y sociedad hay que buscarla en la idea de epigénesis del alma o razón<sup>7</sup>, pues ésta es el resultado de la interacción de los gérmenes y disposiciones naturales del hombre con el medio, que está destinado a ser social y lingüístico y a fomentar su desarrollo. En este sentido es acertada la tesis sostenida por Constantini según la cual a juicio de Kant la sociedad no produce la locura, sino que se limita a crear las condiciones para su manifestación (Constantini, 2018, pp. 234-235).

Kant defendió siempre la idea de un desarrollo progresivo de las distintas facultades de la razón. En la *Crítica de la razón* pura afirma que la experiencia demuestra, contra el dualismo mente-cuerpo, «que tanto el aumento como la perturbación de nuestras facultades psíquicas no son más que modificaciones orgánicas» (KrV, A 779 / B 807). En la *Antropología*, después de señalar que en la medida en que descansan en representaciones de agravio o beneficio las señales de llanto y risa que aparece al cuarto mes de vida del bebé son un anticipo de la razón, plantea Kant un desarrollo de las facultades de representaciones (*Entwicklung der Vorstellungsvermögens*), desde la simple aprehensión sensorial del niño, que demuestra al seguir con los ojos los objetos brillantes que se le ponen delante, hasta el conocimiento perceptivo de los objetos sentidos, que implica la unidad conceptual de lo diverso dado al sentido (Anrh, AA 07: 127-128). En la *Historia general de la naturaleza* Kant había ido aún más lejos al incluir en este desarrollo la capacidad moral, aunque en un lenguaje aún no formado críticamente —no distingue funcionalmente la facultad del entendimiento de la de la razón—:

En la medida en que se forma su cuerpo, las facultades de su naturaleza intelectual reciben también los grados convenientes de perfectibilidad... Se desarrollan [entwickeln] lo suficientemente temprano aquellas facultades por las que puede satisfacer las necesidades impuestas por su dependencia de las cosas externas. Algunos hombres no llegan más allá de este grado de desarrollo. La capacidad de unir conceptos abstractos, de dominar la tendencia de las pasiones por la libre aplicación

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<sup>7</sup> Véase nota 5.

del entendimiento, se presenta tarde y en algunos nunca en toda su vida (NTH, AA 01: 355-356).

La idea de un desarrollo progresivo de las facultades psíquicas junto con las de la estratificación de lo mental y su carácter emergentista nos llevan a pensar, con Eugenio Moya (2004, p. 136), que la morfogénesis de la razón individual planteada por Kant se aproximaría a esa modularización gradual o epigenética de la mente que Anette Karmiloff-Smith habría planteado a partir de ciertas correcciones al modularismo innatista fodoriano (Karmiloff-Smith 1994, pp. 21-22). Los módulos o facultades mentales consistirían en unidades de procesamiento encapsulado de información de dominios específicos, esto es, de conjuntos de representaciones que constituyen un área específica de conocimiento/interacción con el mundo.

La idea de la locura como expresión del conflicto de la razón consigo misma puede ser rastreada hasta el núcleo de la misma *Crítica de la razón pura*. Para hacerlo hay que detenerse en los *Sueños de un visionario explicados por los ensueños de la Metafísica*, que Kant publicó en 1766, dos años después del *Ensayo*.

En los *Sueños de un visionario* Kant critica las ideas del teósofo sueco Emmanuel Swedenborg, un vidente de la época que alcanzó gran celebridad en la Europa de aquel momento afirmando poseer conocimientos privilegiados sobre el mundo de los espíritus y los muertos, con los que afirmaba estar en contacto. Kant se enfrentó aquí al tipo de discurso que presenta como verdades de hecho ideas sin ningún apoyo en la realidad. Su interés se centró en la distinción entre aquello que es transmisible y verificable entre los distintos sujetos y aquello que sólo son fantasías sin posibilidad de confrontación con la experiencia, planteándose así la idea de *límites* del conocimiento —de la razón—, una idea tan fundamental que posteriormente devendrá la tarea central de la primera *Crítica*.

Kant concluyó del caso Swedenborg que aquellos presuntos conocimientos que éste afirmaba poseer a través de visiones no eran distintos de las representaciones manejadas por un alucinado, es decir, un loco:

No censuro al lector en absoluto si en vez de considerar a los visionarios como medio ciudadanos de otro mundo, los despacha brevemente y bien como candidatos al hospital, librándose mediante ello de toda investigación posterior (TG, AA 02: 348).

Pero lo más interesante de la obra, como prefigura ya en el su propio título, es que Kant compara a estos visionarios con los metafísicos en la medida en que ambos poseen “conocimientos” que no pueden ser compartidos por otros hombres:

En cierto parentesco con los *soñadores* de la *razón* [los metafísicos] están los *soñadores* de la *sensación*, entre los que normalmente se cuenta a aquéllos que a veces tienen trato con espíritus, y ello por los mismos motivos que el resto, es decir, porque ven algo que ningún otro hombre sano ve y tienen su propio contacto con seres que no se manifiestan a nadie por muy buenos sentidos que tenga (TG, AA 02: 342).

Kant parece considerar que, en cierto sentido, el metafísico está afectado por alguna de las enfermedades de la cabeza y que sus representaciones son como desvaríos, locuras, excesos de la razón institucionalizados en una rama del saber. Las pretensiones de la metafísica son del mismo orden que las del esoterista sueco: conocer aquello para lo cual no hay pruebas en la experiencia. Mostrar cómo se producen estos excesos y ponerles límites será la tarea de la primera *Crítica*.

En la *Crítica* Kant señala lo que considera el escándalo de la filosofía: que a pesar de haberse fundado como disciplina en los tiempos de Aristóteles (S. IV a.C.) no ha habido desde entonces ningún progreso en sus conocimientos y reina el disenso entre los miembros de esta comunidad científica. La polémica y el conflicto afectan a cuestiones como la inmortalidad del alma, la infinitud del mundo y la existencia de Dios. Ahora bien, el litigio, apunta el filósofo alemán, no procede de ciertos hombres, dotados de razón, dedicados a la metafísica, sino «de la misma naturaleza de esa razón» (KrV, A 744 / B 772). La metafísica, reconoce Kant, es una disposición natural de la mente humana, «seguiría existiendo aunque éstas [las ciencias] desaparecieran totalmente en el abismo de una barbarie que lo aniquilara todo» (KrV, B XIV). Por eso, la historia de los conflictos especulativos de la metafísica es, de algún modo, la historia de la propia razón (KrV, A 852-856 / B 880-884). Sus sofismas «son sofismas de la razón misma, no de los hombres. Ni el más sabio [...] puede librarse de ellos» (KrV, A 339 / B 397). El sabio puede quizás evitar el error mediante la crítica, pero no puede deshacerse de las ilusiones (trascendentales). Éstas, bajo la forma de paralogismos o antinomias, son manifestaciones de un conflicto inherente a la mente humana. «El germen de los conflictos —dice Kant— se halla en la naturaleza de la razón misma» (KrV, A 778 / B 806). Por todo ello, cabe afirmar, con Monique David-Ménard, que el conflicto y la locura se sitúan en el corazón de la *Crítica de la razón pura* (David-Ménard 1990).

Pero reparemos en que sólo en una mente (*Gemüt*) compleja, estratigráfica y dinámica se puede producir el desajuste entre distintas facultades que da lugar a las ilusiones trascendentales: el uso trascendente de los principios de la facultad de la razón (*Vernunft*) (en lo nouménico), en lugar de su uso inmanente (en lo fenoménico), donde opera el entendimiento (*Verstand*). Por eso la tópica o cartografía de la mente (KrV, A 268 / B 324) llevada a cabo por Kant en la *Crítica* —que nos descubre una mente constituida por una pluralidad de facultades estructuralmente diferenciadas, con naturaleza y funciones específicas y autónomas, aunque interconectadas funcionalmente entre sí— resulta clave no sólo para la propia investigación trascendental, sino también para entender la locura.

Por todo ello, parece acertada la hipótesis de una concepción modularista de la mente defendida por Kant en la *Crítica de la razón pura* que ha sido planteada por Eugenio Moya (Moya 2003, pp. 57-58). Siguiendo el modelo de J. A. Fodor (1983), considera Moya que la concepción kantiana de la razón habría asumido: 1. una arquitectura de la mente integrada por módulos cognitivos sensibles e intelectivos autónomos (facultades); 2. los cuales realizarían operaciones cognitivas irreductibles —intuición, juicio, inferencia—; y 3. estarían encapsulados: realizarían operaciones cognitivas autónomas e independientes; y

4. cuya continuidad operacional haría posible el la experiencia objetiva y el conocimiento. Y no sólo el conocimiento, porque dicha continuidad operacional haría posible, al mismo tiempo, la autoconsciencia o unidad sintética de la apercepción, y con ella, la salud mental (Moya 2008, p. 311). La razón estaría así constituida por un conjunto de facultades heterogéneas y autónomas cuya coordinación funcional daría lugar a un sistema que la primera *Crítica* muestra como modelo del sujeto normal; pero cuyo desajuste mostrado en su *Antropología* conduciría a una desviación de ese sistema, y, en los casos más graves, a la constitución de otro sistema mental anómalo al que Kant denomina sinrazón positiva<sup>8</sup> (Anth, AA 07: 216).

Kant hace una división entre las debilidades y las enfermedades del alma. Las primeras afectan a la parte estabilizadora de la facultad de conocer: el entendimiento. Las segundas se subdividen en dos grupos: la hipocondría y la manía. La hipocondría es una enfermedad más leve en la que el sujeto es consciente de que el curso de sus pensamientos no va bien y no puede dirigirlos ni controlarlos, pero todavía se da en él una experiencia objetiva que puede ser compartida con otros. En el caso de la manía esto no ocurre, pues «es un curso arbitrario de los pensamientos, que tiene su regla propia (subjetiva), pero que es contrario al concordante con las leyes de la experiencia (objetivo)» (Anth, AA 07: 202). Las manías pueden ser diversas: amencia (*Unsinnigkeit*) y demencia (*Wahnsinn*), que recargan la imaginación; insania (*Wahnwitz*), que afecta a la heurística del juicio; y vesania (*Überwitz*), que lo hace respecto a la facultad de la razón.

La vesania aparece como la enfermedad más grave de todas, en la que el enfermo se remonta mediante su razón perturbada, por encima de la escala entera de la experiencia y busca ávido principios que le hacen creer que concibe lo inconcebible. Ella no sólo supone la desviación de la regla del uso “normal” (intersubjetivo) de la razón, sino la constitución de otra regla (subjetiva) que no es adecuada para el entendimiento común y que da lugar a otra experiencia de las cosas que no puede ser compartida con otros:

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<sup>8</sup> Foucault dedicó su *Thèse complémentaire pour le doctorat* a la traducción al francés e introducción de la *Antropología* kantiana (Foucault 2008). En ella estudió las relaciones existentes entre el nivel de la *Crítica* y el de la *Antropología*, concluyendo que *la Antropología repite la Crítica*, esto es, que Kant presupone en el análisis empírico-psicológico realizado en la primera las estructuras del sujeto trascendental de la segunda. El sujeto, que en la *Crítica* es ajeno al paso del tiempo, es contemplado individualmente y al margen de todo lenguaje, aparece en la *Antropología* sometido al tiempo —en la duración—, ya integrado en el interior de una sociedad e inmerso en una lengua concreta. Puede considerarse que el sujeto de la *Crítica* es un modelo epistémico —y de salud mental— ideal que le sirve a Kant en la *Antropología* para analizar la realidad empírica de los hombres concretos existentes. En este sentido, y para el caso del análisis de la locura, la consideración de transubjetividad (universalidad y necesidad exigidos trascendentalmente) o intersubjetividad (universalidad y necesidad exigidas empíricamente) que aparezcan en el texto dependerá del plano desde el que se realiza el análisis. Por otra parte, esa consideración de las relaciones del sujeto entre *Crítica* y *Antropología* nos hacen disentir de la tesis mantenida por Frierson (2009a) (2009b), según la cual los desordenes mentales investigados por Kant en su *Antropología* tienen implicaciones epistemológicas y morales en el nivel de la *Crítica*, pues ellos obligarían a reconocer el trabajo de la *Crítica de la razón pura* como una epistemología social y plantearían problemas para la filosofía moral kantiana al socavar la libertad humana y la racionalidad.



En esta última especie de perturbación mental [Vesania] no hay meramente desorden y desviación de la regla para el uso de la razón, sino también una *positiva sinrazón*, esto es, *otra regla*, una posición enteramente diversa a que el alma se desplace, por decirlo así, y desde la cual ve de otro modo todos los objetos, y saliendo del *sensorius communis*, que se requiere para la unidad de la *vida* (animal), se encuentra desplazado a un lugar alejado de él [...] Es, empero, admirable que las fuerzas del alma destrozada se coordinen, sin embargo, en un sistema, y la naturaleza tienda incluso en la sinrazón a introducir un principio que las una, a fin de que la facultad de pensar no permanezca ociosa, si bien no para llegar objetivamente al verdadero conocimiento de las cosas, al menos para atender de un modo meramente subjetivo a la vida animal (Anth, AA 07: 216).

El punto de vista psicológico-transcendental desde el que Kant aborda la enfermedad mental grave a través del concepto de sinrazón positiva nos muestra el núcleo dicha enfermedad como un desequilibrio entre las facultades intelectivas y sensibles que da lugar a la constitución de una experiencia subjetiva idiosincrática no compartible del mundo o, lo que es lo mismo, un trastorno categorial. Este planteamiento resulta de gran actualidad científica, pues, como reconoce el médico y psiquiatra español Agustín Béjar Trancón, está en el núcleo de muchas de las principales cuestiones que atañen a la teoría y la práctica psiquiátrica contemporáneas (Béjar 2001, p. 51). Así Edward M. Hundert<sup>9</sup> (1990) y Manfred Spitzer<sup>10</sup> (1988) (1990) han explorado la comprensión de la psicosis recurriendo a la filosofía trascendental y a las reflexiones antropológicas kantianas al considerar la esquizofrenia como un trastorno categorial en el sentido de ser una grave perturbación en la estructuración de la experiencia. En ella no se seguiría el sistema de categorización que Kant presentó como modelo en la Crítica. Ambos investigadores consideran que con este planteamiento se obtiene un marco más adecuado para comprender y relacionar una variedad de fenómenos característicos de la esquizofrenia que, en principio, no están conectados, como los síntomas conocidos en la psicopatología clásica europea como «trastornos del yo» o de «los límites del yo».

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## La “psiche estesa” tra Kant e Freud\*

### *“Psyche is extended”: from Kant to Freud*

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#### **Abstract**

This paper is inspired by one of Freud’s last notes, which is famous for its astonishing conclusion: “Psyche is extended; knows nothing about it,” which describes the perception of space as a product of the extension of the psychic apparatus, and compares it with Kant’s a priori categories. The Author reconstructs the historical background of this idea as part of a long discussion between Freud and his pupil Marie Bonaparte in the second half of 1938, and shows how the relationship between body and psychic functions in Freud’s thought was influenced by his intellectual debt to Kant. Through an outline of the influence of Kantian philosophy on the emerging Naturphilosophie in fin de siècle Vienna, the Author aims to show the profound influence of Kantian philosophy on the development of Freud’s thought. By committing to a modern and non-dualistic conception of the relationship between body and mind, Freud conceives an indissoluble bond between the mind and, not only the brain, but the whole body and its spatial extension. The Author concludes by identifying a close link between the aphorism of 1938 and Kantian pre-Critique thought, and, more generally, highlighting the influence of the Königsberg philosopher on the relationship between mind and body and on the perception of time and space in Freudian thought.

#### **Key words**

Mind-body relationship; space; time; Freud; Kant.

Je suis corps et je pense, je n’en sais pas davantage.  
Voltaire, *Lettres philosophiques*

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Che la materia pensi, è un fatto. Un fatto, perché noi pensiamo; e noi non sappiamo, non conosciamo di essere, non possiamo conoscere, concepire, altro che materia. Un fatto perché noi veggiamo che le modificazioni del pensiero dipendono totalmente dalle sensazioni, dallo stato del nostro fisico; che l’animo nostro corrisponde in tutto alle varietà ed alle variazioni del nostro corpo.

Giacomo Leopardi, *Zibaldone*, 18 settembre 1827.

### *Introduzione*

Negli ultimi decenni intorno al problema della relazione corpo-mente si è rinnovato il dibattito che vede schierate, su fronti contrapposti, due impostazioni epistemologiche solo apparentemente antitetiche. La prima, che potremmo definire con un vecchio termine *riduzionista*, sempre più fortificata dai nuovi strumenti di *neuroimaging*, descrive la mente come pura risultante di fenomeni cerebrali e proclama la non esistenza di processi mentali propriamente detti, essendo essi nient’altro che il prodotto, o l’epifenomeno, di processi neurologici o cerebrali che progressivamente potranno essere spiegati dalle nuove scoperte delle neuroscienze. L’altra è un’impostazione rigidamente *mentalista* che suppone che i processi psicologici siano autonomi e indipendenti da quelli fisiologici e, se interazione esiste, è soprattutto perché i primi incidono sui secondi. Parte della psicologia clinica, alcuni approcci della psicoanalisi e il vasto campo della psicosomatica vanno in questa direzione. Se queste due impostazioni, sembrano contrapporsi su un piano quasi ideologico, esse hanno tuttavia un punto in comune: entrambe, escludono il corpo nel suo insieme. Per i riduzionisti il termine corpo è assimilato al termine cervello, tanto da preferire una questione *mente-cervello* a una *mente-corpo*. Per i mentalisti invece, il corpo finisce con essere quasi un sottoprodotto della mente, l’oggetto danneggiato da stress, nevrosi o da posizioni psichiche autolesioniste.

Voglio qui riproporre, facendo una serie di passi indietro nella storia della psicoanalisi e della filosofia, la specificità irrinunciabile della antinomia di fondo costituita dalla relazione corpo-mente, intendendo per “corpo” quell’insieme complesso di funzioni non solo neurobiologiche, ma anche fisiologiche, biologiche, chimiche, ormonali, ecc., che contribuiscono alle esperienze soggettive di provare sensazioni, emozioni, sentimenti e persino di pensare pensieri e che non possono essere ridotte alle specifiche attivazioni cerebrali osservabili con la MRI o con la PET. A sostegno di questa impostazione, basterebbe considerare la complessa relazione che esiste tra sistema ormonale e sistema nervoso, le recenti scoperte sulle connessioni tra sistema nervoso centrale e sistema immunitario, il rapporto tra epilessia e depressione, lo straordinario fenomeno dell’*effetto placebo*, ecc. La relazione tra cervello e mente non sembra, in ogni caso, che possa essere definita in termini di causa-effetto: questo legame eventualmente deve ancora essere dimostrato. Fechner (1860) parlava di *parallelismo psicofisico*, Freud (1891) aveva definito lo psichico un *concomitante dipendente* del corrispettivo fisiologico. Non si può cioè assimilare il sistema psichico a quello nervoso, né si possono separare come se fossero

indipendenti uno dall'altro; dovremmo piuttosto pensare alla mente come funzione ed espressione del corpo *nella sua completezza*, supporre cioè che ci sia, in tempi e in proporzioni differenti, 'mente' nel cervello e nel midollo allungato, nel sistema ormonale e in quello immunitario, nell'apparato digerente e in quello respiratorio, nel piede come nella punta del naso. Questa ipotesi è stata avanzata dal neurobiologo Antonio Damasio secondo il quale perché vi sia attività mentale sono necessari sia il cervello, sia il resto del corpo: «le nostre azioni migliori e i pensieri più elaborati, le nostre gioie e i nostri dolori più grandi, tutti impiegano il corpo come riferimento». Quest'ultimo, non è solo una cornice di riferimento, un sostegno necessario, ma fornisce «la materia di base per le stesse rappresentazioni cerebrali» (Damasio 1994, p. 24). L'attività mentale per Damasio è il risultato dell'associazione corpo-cervello e della sua interazione con l'ambiente ed è costituita da una serie illimitata di rappresentazioni: queste rappresentazioni trovano la loro radice nel corpo.

In che modo si inserisce la psicoanalisi e in particolare il pensiero di Freud su questo tema? A dispetto di una lettura del pensiero psicoanalitico estremamente "psicologizzante" che tende – forse un po' meno negli ultimi decenni (Ferrari 2004, Lombardi 2017) – ad attribuire allo psichico un'autonomia assoluta dal corpo, il pensiero di Freud si muove invece prevalentemente su quel crinale che separa e unisce corpo e mente dando vita a concetti come quello di *pulsione* e di *inconscio* intesi proprio come rappresentanti psichici della sfera somatica. Il tema del ruolo del corpo nelle teorie psicoanalitiche è molto ampio e rinvio ad altri scritti per una trattazione più approfondita (Favaretti Camposampiero et al. 1998; Cavagna e Fornaro 2001; Carignani 2006); qui voglio solo toccare un punto sollevato da Freud verso la fine della sua vita e che riguarda proprio la specifica accezione di una "psiche estesa nel corpo". Per fare questo dobbiamo ricostruire brevemente il contesto storico.

#### *Freud a Londra: la storia di un appunto*

Siamo all'inizio del 1938 a Vienna, Freud, ormai vecchio e malato, si illude ancora che l'Austria resisterà al tentativo di annessione della Germania hitleriana. Così non sarà e l'11 marzo i tedeschi entrano a Vienna. Nella stessa settimana, allarmato dalle notizie, Ernest Jones parte da Londra per raggiungere Freud e cercare, per l'ennesima volta, di convincerlo a lasciare Vienna e accogliere l'invito di trasferirsi in Inghilterra. Dopo varie resistenze Freud accetta di emigrare. Jones si impegnerà molto per farlo uscire dall'Austria, riuscendo a coinvolgere in questa tardiva impresa persino il presidente americano Roosevelt. Per consentirgli il passaggio in territorio francese e per aiutarlo a salvare parte del suo denaro viene coinvolta la principessa Marie Bonaparte, allieva e amica di Freud. Il 4 giugno Freud lascerà definitivamente Vienna con moglie e figlia, passerà la giornata del 5 nella casa di Marie Bonaparte a Parigi per partire la notte e arrivare il 6 giugno alla Victoria Station di Londra. Si stabilisce al numero 39 di Elsworthy Road dove lavora alla scrittura del *Compendio di psicoanalisi*, una sorta di introduzione alla psicoanalisi per un pubblico già esperto, saggio mai concluso e pubblicato postumo nel 1940. Secondo Jones, Freud aveva cominciato a lavorarci già nel mese di maggio, a



Vienna, ma il manoscritto porta in calce la data del 22 luglio, il che vorrebbe dire che avrebbe cominciato a scriverlo quando era già a Londra. Esattamente un mese dopo, il 22 agosto, Freud scrive una breve nota su un foglio di carta che contiene, sulle due facciate, anche altri appunti presi in giorni differenti, nel corso di quell'estate. Il foglio viene ritrovato dopo la sua morte avvenuta il 23 settembre 1939 e pubblicato (parzialmente<sup>1</sup>) postumo nel 1941 con il titolo di *Risultati, idee, problemi*. Ecco il testo, datato 22 agosto 1938:

Lo spazio può essere la proiezione dell'estensione dell'apparato psichico. Nessun'altra derivazione è verosimile. Invece [di una] delle condizioni a priori kantiane nel nostro apparato psichico. La psiche è estesa, di ciò non sa nulla<sup>2</sup>. (Freud 1938, p. 566)

Il carattere insieme criptico e assertivo di queste righe colpisce subito il lettore. È un appunto preso per fermare un pensiero, una riflessione veloce annotata su un foglio, non certo pensata per una pubblicazione. Un pensiero buttato lì con la libertà di chi non deve renderne conto a nessuno, libertà necessaria per potere scrivere una frase apodittica come: *la psiche è estesa, di ciò non sa nulla*. In che modo possiamo spiegare questo appunto che il filosofo Nancy (1992, p. 21) ha definito come «l'espressione più affascinante e più importante dell'intera opera di Freud»? Un appunto che ha ricevuto letture contrapposte: da espressione dell'apparato metaforico freudiano (Petrella 1980) a «esposizione non-metaforica» (Scalzone 2004); un'affermazione così oscura e sconcertante che fa della psiche un'espressione della materia, una *res extensa*, annientando in un solo colpo, come è stato da più parti evidenziato, l'antica distinzione cartesiana, riducendo le due *res* (la *cogitans* e la *extensa*) a pura descrizione della stessa realtà (Scalzone 2006, p.64). In quale contesto prende luce questo appunto e quali sono le fonti possibili di questa riflessione lasciataci da Freud su un foglio di carta isolato? Per rispondere a queste domande è necessario ricostruire la cornice storica in cui si inserisce questa nota che è stata spesso citata<sup>3</sup>, ma poco analizzata, di cui si è sottolineato soprattutto il carattere oscuro ed enigmatico, trattandola come una sorta di aporia in forma ellittica, un ossimoro inavvicinabile e difficilmente coniugabile con il pensiero di Freud. Già trenta anni fa Simenauer a proposito di questa nota scriveva:

Questo pensiero in forma di aforisma ha affascinato gli psicoanalisti per quasi 45 anni e non è stato, a mia conoscenza, mai confrontato con nessun argomento della letteratura, come se fossero rimasti tutti turbati dalla enorme difficoltà di doversi confrontare con una assoluta antitesi di tutto pensiero filosofico, specialistico e popolare. La fondamentale

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<sup>1</sup> Due degli appunti presi da Freud vennero omissi dalla pubblicazione. Sulle note di Freud vedi Grubrich-Simitis (1993).

<sup>2</sup> *Räumlichkeit mag die Projektion der Ausdehnung des psychischen Apparats sein. Keine andere Ableitung wahrscheinlich. Anstatt Kants a priori Bedingungen unseres psychischen Apparats. Psyche ist ausgedehnt, weiß nichts davon.*

<sup>3</sup> Vedi anche Matte Blanco (1975, p. 11); Askay e Farquhar (2006, p. 376). Chessick lo riporta solo per ricordare che «non è giusto commentare questa citazione perché è soltanto una breve nota e non è stata mai sviluppata da Freud. Sebbene non sostenuta da argomentazioni serve per mostrare quanto fino alla fine l'approccio kantiano fosse presente nei pensieri di Freud» (Chessick 1980, p. 582).

distinzione platonica tra mente e corpo, le indagini di Cartesio sulla materia e sulla sua spazialità contrapposte al pensiero, i Teoremi di Spinoza, così come le “*verité de fait*” di Leibniz costituivano l’eredità comune, vincolante in ogni direzione, delle fondamenta del pensiero filosofico occidentale. (Simenauer 1983, p. 360)

Lo stupore di Simenauer è facilmente condivisibile, la forza dirompente di un’affermazione del genere da parte di Freud lascia a bocca aperta e sembra - anche se solo in apparenza - porlo a grande distanza dai filosofi menzionati. Ciò che colpisce invece è il mancato confronto con l’unico filosofo citato: Immanuel Kant. D’altra parte, più recentemente, anche Green cita l’appunto di Freud ma lo confronta al *De anima* di Aristotele (2002, p. 280) e quando, poche righe dopo, affronta i rapporti di Freud con Kant esordisce in questo modo: «*A priori* non vi è opera filosofica più lontana dalla psicoanalisi di quella di Kant [...] Inoltre, oggi è nel kantismo che gli avversari della psicoanalisi trovano i loro argomenti per difendere un formalismo che ha assunto i colori dell’attuale cognitivismo» (Green 2002, p. 282-283), anche se poi trova, come molti altri analisti<sup>4</sup>, in *Antropologia Pragmatica* un possibile punto di incontro fra il filosofo illuminista e Freud. È curioso dovere segnalare ancora oggi una certa difficoltà ad accostare Freud a Kant<sup>5</sup>, nonostante i riferimenti espliciti del primo al secondo, nonostante (come vedremo meglio oltre) l’influenza di Kant sulla formazione di Freud, nonostante l’accostamento proposto già da molto tempo da Bion tra la *Critica della ragion pura* e il Freud dei *Precisazioni sui due principi dell’accadere psichico*. Questa difficoltà ha ostacolato l’affiorare di domande semplici, più semplici di quelle di Simenauer: perché questo improvviso interesse di Freud per le categorie kantiane? Da dove proviene un’idea così azzardata che fa dello spazio una realtà prodotta dalla spazialità della mente, cioè dalla sua materialità, dalla sua estensione? E questa idea deve essere vista in antitesi o complementare al pensiero di Kant?

Nella traduzione italiana – e nella interpretazione corrente della nota – non si tiene conto di un’ambiguità del testo tedesco che viene sciolta univocamente in una direzione. Il testo tedesco dice: «Anstatt Kants *a priori* Bedingungen unseres psychischen Apparats» e viene tradotto in italiano con: «Invece [di una] delle condizioni *a priori* kantiane nel nostro apparato psichico». La mancanza di punteggiatura nell’originale rende possibile questa interpretazione che però, così tradotta, rimane oscura. Chiunque d’altronde abbia una minima conoscenza del pensiero di Kant sa che egli non si è mai interessato “delle

<sup>4</sup> Vedi Pontalis (1999, p. 5), Funari (2007, pp. 28-33), Fulgencio (2007). È curioso notare, come segnala D. L. Smith (1999, p. 12), che Freud pur possedendo una copia dell’*Antropologia* kantiana non sembra averla mai letta. In effetti l’unica citazione che Freud fa dell’*Antropologia* è ne *L’interpretazione dei sogni* ed è di seconda mano poiché è tratta dalla lettura del libro di Radestock (1879), come correttamente segnala nel testo, anche se Freud cita erroneamente la pagina 84 invece di 164.

<sup>5</sup> La teoria che Freud fosse fondamentalmente anti-kantiano è stata sostenuta da più parti. Rieff per esempio scrive: «Nonostante una casuale ammissione che il suo lavoro abbia continuato e completato l’epistemologia kantiana, Freud era radicalmente anti-kantiano: non ha nessuna teoria delle *forme* della mente» (Rieff 1959, p. 51). Wolman sottolinea come Freud «si opponeva alla filosofia idealista tedesca di Kant» (Wolman 1968, p. 95). Anche Kaufmann lo disegna come “poetico”, “antiaccademico”, «goethiano e profondamente anti-kantiano» (Kaufmann 1980, p. 79).

condizioni *a priori* dell’apparato psichico” e, come dimostrerò più avanti, Freud aveva una conoscenza sufficientemente approfondita del pensiero di Kant per giustificare un’affermazione così grossolana. *Invece* in tedesco è *anstatt* che suona come *al posto di, in luogo*: una sostituzione, che qui però ha il sapore di un’aggiunta. Freud sembra voler affermare che se dal punto di vista trascendentale (cioè, in senso kantiano, non la conoscenza degli oggetti, ma il modo in cui funziona la conoscenza) lo spazio è un’intuizione *a priori*, cioè precede e presuppone ogni possibilità di esperienza, dal punto di vista empirico e scientifico è la specifica natura della psiche, cioè il suo essere estesa nel corpo, a fornire la condizione per la percezione dello spazio. La frase allora andrebbe letta così, con la semplice introduzione di una virgola: «Anstatt Kants *a priori*, Bedingungen unseres psychischen Apparats» e cioè: «Al posto degli *a priori* kantiani, le condizioni del nostro apparato psichico»<sup>6</sup>. Possiamo sostituire, o meglio ancora spiegare, gli *a priori* kantiani *attraverso il funzionamento del nostro apparato psichico*.

Se è possibile quindi condividere il giudizio di Laplanche e Pontalis che vedono nell’aforisma, e in particolare nel carattere esteso dell’apparato psichico, un «dato fondamentale» del pensiero di Freud, non si può altrettanto aderire alla loro ipotesi che esso costituisca un tentativo «di rovesciamento della prospettiva kantiana» (1967, pp. 605-606); così come mi appare discutibile l’analoga ipotesi di Michael Molnar il quale interpreta la nota di Freud come «una risposta» alla filosofia di Kant, come se egli sottintendesse che spazio e tempo non fossero condizioni *a priori* della conoscenza, ma veri e propri «atti di percezione», concludendo che «in questo modo all’esperienza viene concesso il primato sulle astrazioni metafisiche» (Molnar 1992, p. XXIII). In altra sede, Molnar arriva ad affermare – sulla linea di Laplanche e Pontalis – che Freud potesse avere l’idea di «annettere la filosofia kantiana [alla psicoanalisi], capovolgendola» (Molnar 2003, cit. in Noel-Smith 2016, p. 152).

Al contrario io credo che il tentativo di Freud non fosse affatto quello di sovvertire la filosofia kantiana, bensì quello di fornire un supporto empirico alla sua epistemologia, se è vero, come scriveva Bona-Meyer a proposito delle condizioni *a priori* della conoscenza, che Kant ci ha solo insegnato che esse non sono frutto dell’esperienza e che non sono idee innate: «Ma allora, che cosa sono altrimenti e attraverso cosa le otteniamo? A questo Kant non ha mai risposto» (Bona-Meyer 1870, p. 49). Freud, invece, da scienziato dell’Ottocento, cerca proprio le basi empiriche della conoscenza trascendentale. Già negli anni Venti, proponeva che il concetto di tempo, un altro *a priori* della filosofia trascendentale, potesse essere il risultato di una oscura percezione del funzionamento discontinuo dell’apparato Percezione-Coscienza, una sorta di autopercezione priva di

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<sup>6</sup> A un rapido - ed inevitabilmente sommario - controllo sulle traduzioni di questa frase nelle principali lingue, essa risulta tradotta sempre nello stesso modo, in inglese, francese, spagnolo, portoghese e italiano. Sono riuscito a trovare solo una traduzione spagnola di López Ballesteros («En lugar del *a priori* kantiano, las condiciones de nuestro aparato psíquico») e una in Lussemburgo in lingua francese di T. Simonelli, («Au lieu de l’*a priori* de Kant, les conditions de notre appareil psychique»), che traducono la frase in maniera simile a quella che propongo.

consapevolezza (Freud 1920, p. 214 e 1924, p. 67-68). Questa idea è antica nel pensiero di Freud: sin dagli inizi egli aveva ipotizzato che la percezione di spazio e tempo fossero il risultato di una proiezione all'esterno della percezione del funzionamento dell'apparato psichico. In una lettera a Fliess del 12 dicembre 1897, scriveva: «La confusa percezione interna del proprio apparato psichico stimola le illusioni del pensiero, le quali naturalmente vengono proiettate verso l'esterno e, in modo del tutto caratteristico, nel futuro e in un aldilà» (Freud 1985, p. 323).

In breve, in vari passaggi della sua opera, dall'inizio alla fine, noi troviamo in Freud il tentativo di fornire le ragioni delle condizioni trascendentali della conoscenza: in che modo riusciamo ad avere una forma *a priori* di spazio e di tempo? Freud risponde: attraverso la proiezione delle specifiche caratteristiche del funzionamento del nostro apparato psichico, che è, per come lo si può conoscere attraverso l'indagine psicoanalitica, *esteso e discontinuo*.

Ed è proprio su questo dialogo con Kant che si sofferma Derrida sottolineandone inizialmente la contrapposizione:

E tuttavia nel leitmotiv di *Psiche*, nell'aforisma ereditato da un moribondo che, giacendo sul letto di morte, dichiara che *Psyche ist ausgedehnt*, è verso Kant che Freud si era rivolto. È contro Kant che si era rivoltato. In quattro righe, formulò un'ipotesi, richiamò una possibilità soltanto verisimile. Ma per quanto densa ed ellittica sia la logica di tale verosimiglianza, essa non tende a mettere l'anima al di fuori, a espellerla in uno spazio o in un'estensione che ci sarebbe data inizialmente e irriducibilmente, familiare, là fuori, esterna. Al contrario, la spazialità dello spazio, la sua *esteriorità*, non sarebbe altro che una proiezione, al di fuori, d'una estensione *interna e propriamente psichica*. Il fuori, insomma, non sarebbe altro che una proiezione! Per quanto enigmatica resti la cosa, la derivazione freudiana (puramente *psicologica*, dunque) sarebbe irreversibilmente orientata in questo senso e in questa direzione, dell'estensione interna verso l'estensione esterna, verso la spazialità dello spazio, la sola esteriorità degna di questo nome. (Derrida 2000, p. 63)

Derrida coglie bene la portata di questa nota, in particolare l'aporia contenuta nell'idea di una psiche estesa, fonte di qualunque rappresentazione spaziale e quindi creatrice di uno spazio nel quale essa stessa agisce e, procedendo in questa direzione, non può quindi non cogliere la sostanziale vicinanza tra la nota di Freud e il pensiero kantiano:

Ma si tratta veramente di una opposizione? E se, nonché opporsi a Kant, Freud volesse soltanto interpretare e raffinare il modello kantiano sostituendogli, ma all'interno della stessa logica, una sorta di formalizzazione migliorata? [...] Secondo quest'ultima lettura (quella d'una sostituzione più adeguata o più conseguente, ma nella *stessa* prospettiva), uno psicologismo trascendentale, più precisamente una psicoanalisi trascendentale, o meglio ancora un'estetica trascendentale psicoanalitica renderebbe conto della spazialità partendo da un apparato psichico che dovrebbe essere ben esteso per comportare, tra le

due forme pure dell'intuizione sensibile, una forma *a priori* del senso esterno. (Derrida 2000, p. 65)

La lettura di Derrida mi sembra utile proprio per spostare l'accento dall'idea di una psicoanalisi anti-kantiana tutta persa nel misticismo dell'inconscio (visto quindi contrapposto a una ragione "pura"), verso una metapsicologia che procede in direzione di un'estetica trascendentale *arricchita* dalla lettura psicoanalitica. D'altronde l'idea di una psicoanalisi trascendentale aveva un precedente illustre, quello di Tausk, che a una 'riunione del mercoledì' a casa Freud, il 24 novembre 1909, propose di sostituire il termine metapsicologia con quello di *psicologia trascendentale* (Nunberg and Federn 1967, p. 327).

Moroncini (2006) ha dedicato un intero articolo all'aforisma di Freud partendo proprio dai testi di Nancy e Derrida, sottolineando soprattutto come, attraverso questa nota postuma, Freud si opponga a una lettura psicologizzante della psiche (2006, p. 579). Egli vede una forzatura nella proposta di Nancy e di Derrida di pensare alla psiche in termini di pura corporeità e collega invece il concetto di estensione alla topica freudiana, cioè alla descrizione di una suddivisione spaziale della psiche. Moroncini ha il merito di collegare la nota di Freud al *Compendio di Psicoanalisi* scritto nello stesso periodo (e quindi di inserirla in un contesto), e in particolare ad alcuni passaggi in cui Freud si riferisce alla spazialità della psiche. Restano però in sospeso le domande relative a questa improvvisa apparizione di Kant e il collegamento di quest'ultimo con l'idea di una *psiche estesa*. Perché in quei giorni di esilio e di tristezza Freud pensa a Kant?

Vi è una fonte coeva, trascurata dagli studi. Il giorno precedente, il 21 agosto, Freud scrive una lettera a Marie Bonaparte nella quale le annuncia di avere appena finito di leggere il suo «lavoro sul "tempo"». Si tratta di una versione manoscritta del suo *paper*, «Time in Life, Dream and Death», presentato dalla Bonaparte al XV Congresso Internazionale di Psicoanalisi di Parigi i primi giorni di agosto del 1938, lavoro che sarà pubblicato nel 1939 con il titolo «L'inconscient et le temps» sulla *Revue française de psychanalyse* (Bonaparte, 1939). Ricordando alla sua amica che hanno già avuto modo di discutere di alcune questioni dell'articolo e dopo essersi congratulato con lei per la qualità del suo lavoro, si permette di offrirle un «suggerimento»:

Esiste una zona i cui confini appartengono sia al mondo esterno che all'Io: le nostre superfici percettive. Può darsi dunque che l'idea del tempo sia connessa all'attività del sistema p.c. [Percezione-Coscienza]. Kant verrebbe allora ad avere ragione, se solo sostituiamo al suo antiquato «a priori» la nostra più moderna indagine dell'apparato psichico. Lo stesso avverrebbe per i concetti di spazio, causalità, ecc. (Jones 1953, vol. III, p. 542)

Questo passo è fondamentale<sup>7</sup> perché comprova quanto Freud pensasse a Kant in quei giorni, ritornando sulla possibilità di ampliare il concetto di *a priori* con il funzionamento del sistema Percezione-Coscienza, arricchendo la filosofia trascendentale alla luce delle conoscenze della psicoanalisi. Invita la sua allieva a riprendere i concetti kantiani di spazio e tempo, e considerarli non più come categorie *a priori* dell'intelletto, ma come prodotti dell'attività psichica, elementi costitutivi dell'apparato psichico e in sostanza modificare l'*a priori* kantiano trasformandolo in una precisa e indagabile funzione dell'apparato psichico. La percezione di tempo, spazio e causalità pur dipendendo dalle specifiche modalità di funzionamento dell'apparato psichico resterebbe però in fondo un *a priori* rispetto a ogni successiva conoscenza.

Bene, ora sappiamo che la lettura dell'articolo sul tempo della Bonaparte è stata la sollecitazione che ha portato Freud a scrivere quel breve appunto. Dobbiamo però ancora capire in che modo l'articolo della sua allieva abbia potuto sollevare un tale interesse.

Poche righe prima, nella lettera del 21 agosto, Freud scrive: «Abbiamo già discusso se siamo d'accordo o meno sulle conclusioni finali». Le “conclusioni finali” della Bonaparte, apparse successivamente in due paragrafi intitolati *Tentativo di risolvere l'enigma del tempo* e *Considerazioni conclusive: sintesi e critiche*, sono una succinta indagine filosofica sul concetto di tempo che parte proprio da Kant e che vede la Bonaparte criticare il filosofo tedesco sulla sua concezione dello spazio e del tempo come categorie *a priori* che prescindono dall'esperienza e che sono alla base della nostra conoscenza, conoscenza di fenomeni e non delle ‘cose-in-sé’. Scrive la Bonaparte:

È vero che i nostri sensi ci permettono di farci solo un quadro molto impreciso dell'universo ed è senza dubbio corretto affermare che essi possono fissare solo inadeguati campioni di realtà sotto forma di ‘apparenze’. Ma, dopotutto, ogni cosa che percepiamo con l'aiuto dei nostri sensi deve essere derivata, in qualche modo, dalla realtà esterna nella quale essi si sono gradualmente sviluppati nel corso dell'evoluzione della specie umana. (Bonaparte 1939, p. 459)

I concetti di tempo e spazio sono per la Bonaparte acquisiti attraverso l'esperienza e appresi dalla realtà esterna. Per Kant spazio e tempo sono forma dell'intuizione, condizioni *a priori* per ogni esperienza. Freud sembra essere più vicino a Kant che alla sua allieva poiché attribuisce la percezione del tempo (e dello spazio) alle specifiche modalità di funzionamento dell'apparato Percezione-Coscienza, attribuendo, in qualche modo, alle precipue caratteristiche dell'intelletto la facoltà di conoscerli. Freud ha quindi in mente il

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<sup>7</sup> La lettera è stata segnalata sia da Fell, in un articolo dal suggestivo titolo *Was Freud a follower of Kant?* (1976, p. 116) che, l'anno dopo, da D.B. Klein, in un paragrafo dal titolo simile *Was Freud influenced by Kant?* (1977, p. 104) come un esplicito riferimento di Freud a Kant, ma senza metterla in connessione con la nota del giorno dopo. La contiguità tra la lettera e la nota di Freud era stata riconosciuta da DL Smith (1999, p. 193), che definisce la nota «apparentemente ispirata dalla corrispondenza con la Bonaparte». Più recentemente Askay e Farquhar commentano questa lettera sottolineando come «spazio e tempo sono concepiti da Freud come proiezioni del funzionamento del nostro apparato mentale» e poi in nota riportano per intero l'aforisma del giorno dopo senza segnalarne la contiguità temporale e ammettendo di non sapere come interpretarlo (Askay e Farquhar 2006, pp. 49 e 376).

manoscritto della Bonaparte quando scrive quell'appunto il giorno successivo, appunto che contiene però elementi di una riflessione ulteriore: *la percezione dello spazio come prodotto della proiezione dell'estensione dell'apparato psichico*. Non si dice che la notte porta consiglio<sup>8</sup>?

«Abbiamo già discusso se siamo d'accordo o meno...» deve essere un modo gentile per ricordare il suo disaccordo. D'altronde la Bonaparte ha parole fortemente sarcastiche e critiche nei confronti di Kant e non è da escludere che questo tono possa avere irritato Freud. Essa scrive tra l'altro:

[Kant] piantò la sua tenda, come molti altri hanno fatto prima di lui, davanti al Mostro del tempo e, rovesciando i ruoli di Edipo e della Sfinge, ha cercato di trovare una risposta a questo problema filosofico: “Qual è la tua vera natura, tu che sembri divorare ogni cosa, tu senza il quale non potrei percepire il mondo?” E poco dopo troviamo Kant vantarsi di essere stato lui a strappare la maschera del Tempo e ad avere scoperto che dietro di esso non c'è altro che fumo. “Forme della nostra percezione”, esclama, “il tempo come lo spazio! Oltre il soggetto non c'è nient'altro. Al punto che essi non sono in nulla determinati dall'esperienza, ma esistono in noi *a priori*”. (Bonaparte 1939, pp. 456-57)

Per un uomo formato nella cultura tedesca dell'Ottocento, non deve essere stato facile accettare una posizione così dura e irridente nei confronti del grande filosofo dell'Illuminismo, un filosofo verso il quale - come vedremo - Freud era decisamente debitore. Proprio in quel paragrafo la Bonaparte aveva criticato la posizione di Kant di non potere conoscere il tempo attraverso i sensi, attribuendola alla sua incapacità a uscire dalla tradizione filosofica che separa anima e corpo:

[Kant] non è stato realmente in grado di rinunciare al credo dualistico di un'anima indipendente dal corpo e in un Dio creativo. [...] Questo Dio, che crea anime a suo piacimento e ha depositato in esse *a priori*, prima di ogni esperienza, quelle forme della nostra percezione o intuizione che noi chiamiamo spazio e tempo. (Bonaparte 1939, pp. 467-68)

Freud invece contesta anche questa affermazione collegando gli *a priori* kantiani con la possibilità di concepire una mente estesa nel corpo. Che su questi argomenti ci fosse un sostanziale disaccordo tra Freud e la Bonaparte risulta chiaro sia dalla lettera di Freud

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<sup>8</sup> Che sia passata una notte non è certo. Se seguiamo le informazioni presenti nel libro di Kelly Noel-Smith, *Freud on Time and Timelessness*, scopriamo la seguente informazione: la lettera di Freud, citata parzialmente da Jones, è stata da quest'ultimo erroneamente datata al 21 agosto, mentre la data effettiva sarebbe il 22 agosto, quindi in realtà lo stesso giorno della nota. Tale notizia proviene da Leonard Bruno, ex responsabile della Sezione dei Manoscritti alla Biblioteca del Congresso a Washington, dove si trova l'originale della lettera (Noel-Smith 2016, p. 73). Questa informazione, se confermata, rafforzerebbe la connessione tra la nota e la lettera. Il legame tra l'aforisma di Freud e il dialogo con Marie Bonaparte viene molto bene individuato da Noel-Smith, che non rileva però la stretta contiguità temporale fra i due.

sia, come vedremo fra poco, da quanto riportato dalla Bonaparte in coda al suo stesso articolo.

Freud scrive di avere già avuto occasione di discutere con Marie Bonaparte l'articolo sul tempo, forse a Londra in occasione delle visite di lei tra il 23 e il 26 giugno, forse prima, in occasione del suo passaggio a Parigi, anche se le fatiche di una giornata con il cuore lacerato dall'angoscia di avere lasciato la sua città in mano ai nazisti non sembrerebbero essere state la migliore condizione d'animo per discussioni scientifiche. Forse è nel corso di uno dei suoi nove viaggi a Londra che la Bonaparte gli lascia il testo dell'articolo, che Freud poi si farà copiare. Più probabilmente glielo riporta la figlia Anna il 5 agosto di ritorno dal Congresso di Parigi, organizzato dalla stessa Bonaparte dove la principessa aveva appena letto il testo del suo articolo. L'8 settembre Freud subisce un ulteriore intervento chirurgico al naso per un papilloma, (Schur 1972, p. 509). La Bonaparte tornerà a trovare Freud a Londra il 29 ottobre e resterà fino al 2 novembre, questa volta al numero 20 di Maresfield Gardens, dove Freud si era trasferito il 27 settembre (Jones 1953 e Molnar 1992). Ma anche in questa occasione (la prima dopo il 21 agosto) non ci sarà modo di parlare del lavoro sul tempo, probabilmente anche a causa del lento procedere della convalescenza.

Il 12 novembre Freud scrive alla sua amica: «I suoi commenti su “tempo e spazio” si sono dimostrati migliori dei miei – sebbene per quello che riguarda il tempo non l'avevo pienamente informata delle mie idee. Né lei, né nessun altro. Una certa avversione per la mia soggettiva tendenza a concedere troppa libertà all'immaginazione mi ha sempre frenato. Se ancora vuole sapere cosa ne penso gliene parlerò la prossima volta che viene». (Freud 1960 p. 455). Il tono è lo stesso di quello della lettera del 21 agosto: grandi elogi, ma una ferma resistenza ad accogliere le riflessioni filosofiche dell'allieva e un invito ad ascoltare le sue obiezioni.

Se dobbiamo tenere fede ai suoi propositi possiamo immaginare che questo dialogo ebbe luogo tra il 4 e l'8 dicembre in occasione della quarta visita della Principessa a Freud (vedi le “Kürzeste Chronik” del 1938 in Molnar 1992, p. 252), dialogo che la Bonaparte decise fortunatamente di riportare in coda al suo lavoro e che qui citiamo *in extenso*:

In una conversazione che io ebbi con lui dopo che aveva letto il mio lavoro, Freud confermò che *le sue opinioni erano potenzialmente in sintonia con quelle di Kant* (corsivo mio). Il senso che noi abbiamo del tempo, osservò, nasce dalla percezione interna della nostra vita che passa. Quando la coscienza si sveglia in noi, noi percepiamo questo flusso interno, dopodiché lo proiettiamo nel mondo esterno. La percezione dello spazio - proseguì Freud - non può essere separata da quella del tempo. Come possiamo acquisirla? Innanzi tutto noi dobbiamo domandarci se c'è qualcosa al mondo che noi possiamo concepire, indipendentemente dallo spazio, in maniera non spaziale. Una tal cosa esiste realmente, è la mente o la psiche. Ma questa scoperta deve arricchire la nostra riflessione. Se la mente appare così sprovvista della qualità dello spazio può essere a causa di una massiccia proiezione all'esterno delle sue caratteristiche spaziali originarie. La psicoanalisi ci ha insegnato in effetti che la psiche è composta da istanze separate che noi siamo obbligati a rappresentare come esistenti nello spazio. Si potrebbe dire che



questo è dovuto alla introiezione dello spazio esterno. Ma perché non dovrebbe essere vero il contrario? Quando la nostra coscienza comincia a stabilirsi essa percepirebbe come localizzate nello spazio queste istanze interne, istanze la cui ricostruzione dobbiamo integralmente alla psicologia del profondo. Non vi è dubbio che esse siano anche provviste di un substrato anatomico la cui natura, ciò nonostante, resta ancora da determinare. Noi dovremmo dunque proiettare al di fuori questo atto interno di conoscenza, in modo che lo spazio inerente al mondo esterno avrebbe la sua origine in una proiezione del nostro spazio interno, spazio che noi provvederemo poi a negare<sup>9</sup>.

Le percezioni che noi riceviamo dai nostri sensi fisici, proseguì Freud, sono esse stesse ‘proiezioni’ di diversa misura, secondo il senso particolare che esse implicano. Quelle associate al tatto e al gusto sono una questione totalmente interna. L’odorato proietta già le sue percezioni nello spazio circostante. L’udito lo suddivide in maniera equivalente tra mondo interno ed esterno. Quanto alla vista le sue percezioni sono completamente ‘proiettate’. Impressioni e immagini inscritte nelle aree visive del nostro cervello e che sono localizzate piuttosto lontane, posteriormente, ci sembrano di fatto esistere nel mondo esterno. A tal punto, devo aggiungere, che per migliaia di anni, gli uomini credettero che fossero i loro occhi a proiettare delle specie di raggi sugli oggetti. Non sarebbe lo stesso - concluse Freud - per le nostre percezioni dello spazio e del tempo? E questa traduzione nel linguaggio psicoanalitico dei vecchi argomenti *a priori* di Kant, non sarebbe in fondo un modo per dargli ragione? (Bonaparte 1939, pp. 466-67)

Abbiamo qui, grazie alla sollecitudine e all’onestà di Marie Bonaparte che non nasconde le obiezioni del maestro al suo lavoro, una testimonianza dettagliata del pensiero di Freud, una sorta di commento ragionato al breve appunto del 22 agosto a tre mesi e mezzo di distanza (se la mia datazione è corretta). L’accento dell’affermazione iniziale cambia però sensibilmente. *La psiche è estesa, di ciò non sa nulla* si chiarisce meglio: la psiche è innanzi tutto quel “qualcosa al mondo” che può essere concepito al di fuori dello spazio, cioè quel *cogito* che non necessita di alcuna obiettiva realtà materiale per esistere. Ma questa, propone Freud, potrebbe essere solo un’illusione. L’estensione dell’apparato psichico sarebbe proiettata all’esterno e da questa proiezione deriverebbe poi la negazione della spazialità della psiche stessa. La psiche come una sorta di funzione pensante del corpo che proiettata al di fuori del corpo perde le caratteristiche della corporeità e della materialità (spazio, tempo, causa-effetto) per favorire la conoscenza della realtà. Gli organi di senso (terreno di frontiera tra l’Io e il mondo esterno) svolgerebbero questa funzione di proiezione. Sembra ovvio allora che la psiche non ne possa sapere nulla, proprio perché ha

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<sup>9</sup> Questo passaggio ci permette di risolvere un dubbio sollevato sia da Christopher Watkin (2014), che da Naomi Segal (2016, p. 273) – la traduttrice inglese di un libro di Anzieu – i quali, in riferimento all’aforisma di Freud, fanno notare che *weiß* nel testo tedesco è ambiguo perché può essere sia prima che terza persona singolare e la frase potrebbe benissimo essere tradotta “La psiche è estesa; *io non ne so nulla*”, come fosse una dichiarazione di ignoranza di Freud e non una ignoranza della psiche stessa. Questo passaggio (come altri, in altri luoghi) parrebbe fugare ogni dubbio: la negazione di uno spazio psichico interno causa il limite della nostra conoscenza dell’estensione della psiche, confermando in tal modo la validità della traduzione di Strachey e di quelle successive.

perso qualsiasi percezione della sua stessa estensione<sup>10</sup>. Ebbene, pensare la psiche estesa, ignorante della sua stessa estensione, ma capace di percepire l'estensione dello spazio esterno, non potrebbe essere considerata la condizione necessaria perché si possa avere un'intuizione *a priori* dello spazio<sup>11</sup>? La conclusione del pensiero di Freud, più chiaramente di quella proposta nei brani precedenti, è in sostanziale accordo con le categorie kantiane e in disaccordo con la Bonaparte che dichiara esplicitamente il suo dissenso da Freud (e da Kant) sostenendo di non potere accettare l'ipotesi che «le nostre percezioni di spazio e tempo siano essenzialmente e originariamente un affare interno», affermando, con Goethe, che «tutto ciò che è dentro di noi esiste al di fuori» (Bonaparte 1939, p. 467). A questo punto la Bonaparte riporta, in una nota a piè di pagina, un'altra comunicazione personale di Freud<sup>12</sup> fatta dopo avere letto il suo articolo: «Freud mi comunicò un'altra idea: l'attenzione che poniamo sugli oggetti sarebbe determinata da investimenti rapidi ma successivi, una sorta di quanta emanati dall'Io. La nostra percezione interna la trasformerebbe in seguito in una continuità, e sarebbe questa, proiettata all'esterno, il nostro prototipo del tempo». È per questa ragione, continua Freud, che nel corso del sonno non c'è percezione del passare del tempo. «Il risultato di tutto questo sarebbe l'equazione: attenzione = percezione = tempo» (Bonaparte 1939, p. 467). Potremmo dire, parafrasando l'appunto del 1938: «La psiche è discontinua, di ciò non sa nulla». Questa idea di un apparato psichico che proietta il proprio funzionamento

<sup>10</sup> Hartocollis risolve invece questa *ignoranza* della psiche assimilandola all'inconscio – «per “psiche” Freud intende il regno dell'inconscio, quella parte dell'apparato psichico che “di ciò non sa nulla”» (Hartocollis 2006, p. 134) – il quale ignora le categorie kantiane di spazio e tempo. C'è però un precedente nei testi di Freud che andrebbe accostato a questa “ignoranza della psiche” e che contraddice l'ipotesi di Hartocollis. Nel *Progetto* del 1895 Freud scriveva, già allora, che «ogni teoria psicologica, oltre alle esigenze che deve soddisfare dal punto di vista della scienza naturale, ha da rispondere a un altro grande requisito. Deve spiegarci ciò che conosciamo, in maniera oltremodo enigmatica, attraverso la nostra “coscienza”; e poiché questa coscienza non sa nulla di ciò che noi abbiamo sin qui supposto, cioè quantità e neuroni, deve anche spiegarci questo non sapere» (Freud 1895, pp. 213). È quindi la coscienza stessa - non la psiche inconscia - a ignorare la sua estensione, il suo essere corpo, il suo essere «quantità e neuroni». Nancy problematizza questa ignoranza fino a renderla la corporeità stessa di Psiche: «Questa non-conoscenza è il vero corpo di Psiche, o piuttosto, è il corpo che Psiche stessa è. Questa non-conoscenza non è il negativo della conoscenza o la negazione della conoscenza; è semplicemente l'assenza della conoscenza, l'assenza della vera relazione di conoscenza, qualsiasi sia il suo contenuto. Usando un certo vocabolario uno potrebbe dire: la conoscenza vuole un oggetto, ma con i corpi c'è solo soggetto; con i corpi ci sono solo soggetti. Ma si potrebbe dire che in assenza di un oggetto non c'è né soggetto né terreno trascendentale, e ciò che rimane è precisamente il corpo, corpi. Il “corpo” è fatto per non avere nessun oggetto». (Nancy 1993, p. 199).

<sup>11</sup> Apparentemente Derrida non conosce questo dialogo, ma sembra averne intuito il contenuto dall'aforisma di Freud. Egli scrive: «E quando Kant, questa volta nella *Critica della Ragion pura* e non nell'*Antropologia*, dichiara che “la rappresentazione dello spazio (*die Vorstellung des Raumes*) non si può prendere a prestito, mediante l'esperienza, dai rapporti dell'apparenza esterna, [al contrario] questa esperienza esterna è essa stessa possibile solo mediante la suddetta rappresentazione. Lo spazio è una necessaria rappresentazione *a priori* che sta alla base di tutte le rappresentazioni esterne” [Kant 1787, KrV, AA 03, p. 52; trad. it. 1976, p. 79], non annuncia di fatto certi argomenti di Freud? Quest'ultimo, a sua volta, non è più docile di quel che sembra alla logica d'una ‘esposizione’ (*Erörterung*) “metafisica” poi “trascendentale” del concetto di spazio? Freud non conferma che “l'intuizione pura [qui dello spazio] deve trovarsi in noi *a priori*, cioè prima di qualsiasi percezione di un oggetto” e che di conseguenza “deve essere un'intuizione pura, non empirica”? [Kant 1787, KrV, AA 03, p. 54; trad. it. 1976, p. 81]» (Derrida 2000, p. 65).

<sup>12</sup> Annette Laget suppone che questo sia il testo di una lettera di Freud a Marie Bonaparte, ma a quanto mi risulta dovrebbe invece fare sempre parte del dialogo avuto con lei verso la fine del 1938 (Laget 1995, p. 45).

all'esterno per poi riconoscerlo come appartenente alla realtà era già stata espressa da Freud nel saggio *La negazione*, dove scriveva: «Ora non si tratta più di stabilire se qualcosa che è stato percepito (una cosa) debba essere accolto nell'Io oppure no, ma invece se una certa cosa, presente nell'Io come rappresentazione, possa essere ritrovata anche nella percezione (realtà). È di nuovo, come si vede, una questione attinente al *fuori* e al *dentro*» (Freud 1925, p. 199).

### *Aspetti metapsicologici*

Dicevamo che, forse nel mese di maggio, forse il 22 luglio del 1938, Freud inizia a scrivere *Compendio di Psicoanalisi*. Ritroviamo il tema che stiamo trattando, sotto una diversa luce, proprio all'inizio di questo saggio:

Di ciò che chiamiamo la nostra psiche (o vita psichica) [*Seelenleben*, letteralmente: vita dell'anima] ci sono note due cose: innanzi tutto l'organo fisico e il suo scenario, il cervello (o sistema nervoso) e, in secondo luogo, i nostri atti di coscienza che sono dati immediatamente e che nessuna descrizione potrebbe farci comprendere più da vicino. Tutto ciò che sta in mezzo a queste due cose ci è sconosciuto e non è data una relazione diretta fra i due estremi del nostro sapere. Ma se pure una tale relazione esistesse, al massimo potrebbe fornire un'esatta localizzazione dei processi della coscienza, comunque non potrebbe aiutarci a comprenderli meglio. Le nostre due ipotesi si riallacciano a questi punti terminali o iniziali del nostro sapere. La prima riguarda la localizzazione. Noi supponiamo che la vita psichica sia la funzione di un apparato al quale ascriviamo *estensione spaziale...*». (corsivo mio) (Freud 1938, p. 572)

Qui Freud parte da un tema che gli è caro e che ha accompagnato il suo lavoro per tutta la vita: le possibili relazioni tra corpo e mente, tra funzioni cerebrali e apparato psichico, tra neurologia e psicologia, ecc. Sin da *Studi sull'afasia* e dal *Progetto di una psicologia* (quella "Psicologia per neurologi"<sup>13</sup> anch'essa salvata meritoriamente dalla principessa Bonaparte) questo tema riemerge continuamente dalle pieghe della ricerca psicoanalitica. Tema irrisolto, forse irrisolvibile, che angoscerà Freud per lunghi periodi della sua vita (Jones 1953, vol. I pp. 311-312), tema dal quale non riesce ad allontanarsi, soprattutto ora, malato e giunto alla fine dei suoi giorni. Freud aveva combattuto la cosiddetta teoria del localizzazionismo, o per lo meno del localizzazionismo stretto<sup>14</sup>, che cercava corrispondenze tra un'anatomia neurologica e una fisiologia psicologica sia nel saggio *Studi sull'afasia* che nel *Progetto*, ma aveva sempre concepito la psiche come soggetta a una suddivisione spaziale, una topica: essa occupa spazio e questo spazio è diviso in regioni. Anche qui ritorna l'idea che la psiche, la vita dell'anima, abbia una sua estensione, occupi spazio, si faccia corpo, e occupi quel territorio intermedio situato a mezza via tra il cervello e la coscienza. Freud pensa, come si sa, all'inconscio, estesa e profonda provincia dell'apparato psichico e prima espressione psichica del corpo, corpo

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<sup>13</sup> Lettera a Fliess del 27 Aprile 1895 (Freud 1985, p. 153).

<sup>14</sup> A proposito del localizzazionismo 'stretto' o 'ben temperato' in Freud cfr. Napolitano (2010).

che si fa mente, il *missing link* a cui fa riferimento nella famosa lettera a Groddeck del 5 giugno 1917<sup>15</sup>.

I riferimenti espliciti a Kant nell'opera di Freud - a eccezione dei passi che abbiamo citato - sono abbastanza generici: che si tratti di fare riferimento all'imperativo categorico, ai sogni, o alle forme dell'intuizione *a priori* di spazio e tempo, Freud non si addentra mai nella filosofia di Kant, non lo cita in dettaglio, non ne indaga né la psicologia, né la metafisica. A una prima lettura Freud sembra sempre riferirsi al Kant della *Critica della ragion pura*, al filosofo dell'intelletto, allo studioso della psicologia razionale più che a quello della psicologia empirica. Ma in quest'ultima nota l'interesse di Freud per uno *spazio che nasce dal corpo* e per una *psiche estesa* deve tenere conto di un altro debito nei confronti di Kant, o un debito nei confronti di un altro Kant da quello della *Critica*<sup>16</sup>. Voglio ipotizzare che sia da cercare proprio in Kant la fonte implicita di quella criptica nota che ci ha lasciato nella cupa estate del 1938.

#### *Influenza di Kant sulla formazione di Freud*

Freud si era formato in un clima culturale in cui la conoscenza filosofica di Kant e l'applicazione della teoria kantiana alla scienza erano elementi scontati (soprattutto in Austria in cui stava nascendo una prima forma di *Naturphilosophie*), e costituiva il patrimonio culturale di ogni scienziato così come di ogni intellettuale di lingua tedesca<sup>17</sup>. È difficile quindi rintracciare nel pensiero di Freud il debito nei confronti della filosofia kantiana che in realtà impregna molti aspetti della teoria psicoanalitica. Questo spiega il fatto che nelle opere di Freud non si trovino molti riferimenti a Kant (e, ciò nonostante, questi rimane il filosofo più citato dallo psicoanalista viennese). Un tentativo interessante di individuare il debito di Freud nei confronti del filosofo di Königsberg è stato fatto da A. Brook che paragona e collega la seconda topica freudiana con il pensiero kantiano trovando corrispondenze tra il concetto di conoscenza in Kant e l'Io freudiano, tra quello di

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<sup>15</sup> Vale la pena citare il passo di Freud nella lettera a Groddeck perché rende l'idea di quanto egli rifiutasse le estremizzazioni del pensiero, in questo caso un'eccessiva riduzione dell'autonomia dello psichico: «Mi sembra non meno temerario dare un'anima a tutta la natura che ridurre tutto all'inanimato. Lasciamole dunque la sua grandiosa molteplicità, che si estende dal mondo inanimato al mondo organico animato, dalla vita fisica a quella psichica. Certamente l'Ubw [l'Inconscio] è il giusto tramite tra il fisico e lo psichico, forse il tanto a lungo cercato *missing link*» (Groddeck 1976, p. 18).

<sup>16</sup> Non è dello stesso avviso Spillers che indagando il concetto di spazio nell'opera letteraria di Faulkner parte proprio dall'aforisma di Freud e confrontandolo con la *Critica della ragion pura* ne segnala il rovesciamento di prospettiva. Spillers parte proprio dalla proposta di Laplanche e Pontalis che vede Freud in contrasto con Kant e per sottolinearne le differenze sceglie proprio il confronto con il maggior testo kantiano (Spillers 2004, pp. 539-45).

<sup>17</sup> Come scrisse nel 1862 lo storico della filosofia Kuno Fisher: «Non c'è alcun esimio pensatore del tempo di Kant la cui dottrina non abbia fatto i conti con quella kantiana; nessuna che, attraverso uno sviluppo o una contrapposizione, non fosse derivata da questa; nessun pensatore che non abbia voluto addurre una prova del fatto che la dottrina kantiana, correttamente intesa e autonomamente giudicata, portava direttamente alla propria» (cit. in Bona-Meyer 1870, p. 41). Crediamo che in parte questo pensiero possa essere adattato anche per la Vienna *fin de siècle*. Il grido di battaglia lanciato da Liebmann nel 1865 «Zurück zu Kant!» (Torniamo a Kant!) costituisce idealmente la nascita del neo-kantismo che impregnerà la cultura scientifica tedesca della seconda metà del XIX secolo (Liebmann 1865).

ragione morale e il Super-io e tra il senso interno e l'Es (Brook 1988). Ma a parte poche eccezioni, sono scarsi i lavori che cercano di individuare il debito di Freud verso Kant<sup>18</sup>.

A sostegno di questa ipotesi va ricordato che Freud era stato, già in adolescenza, un attento studioso della filosofia di Kant. In una lettera dell'11 aprile 1875 all'amico Silberstein, il diciannovenne Freud dimostra una raffinata conoscenza della metapsicologia del «glorioso Kant» (Freud e Silberstein 1989 p. 95) che definisce, riprendendo Douay, «il più avveduto di tutti i filosofi» (p. 93). Anche McGrath commentando la lettera afferma che Freud aveva una «grande e articolata padronanza del sistema kantiano» (Mc Grath 1986, p. 348). Come scrivono Askay e Farquhar «l'illuminismo tedesco esercitò la sua influenza su Freud prevalentemente attraverso la filosofia di Kant in modi significativi e non riconosciuti. Freud si muoveva chiaramente a suo agio nella filosofia di Kant» (Askay e Farquhar 2006, p. 47). Sappiamo che il 24 aprile 1882, da poco laureato, acquistò un'edizione di scritti del periodo precritico, *Kleinere Schriften zur Naturphilosophie* e una copia della *Critica della ragion pura*, copia che annotò in modo accurato e che ha mantenuto un posto speciale, insieme al *Saggio sull'intelletto umano* di Locke, nella sua biblioteca - ora in gran parte a Londra (Zaretsky 2004, p. 402, n. 24). Due mesi dopo l'acquisto di questi volumi Freud lascerà l'Istituto di Fisiologia di Brücke per dedicarsi al lavoro clinico. Ma a parte questi puntuali riferimenti dobbiamo tenere conto che l'influenza del pensiero di Kant sulla cultura tedesca *fin de siècle* era molto estesa e la conoscenza della teoria kantiana era data generalmente per acquisita. Bisogna inoltre tenere conto che vari tra i maestri di Freud potevano essere considerati a buon diritto kantiani: Brentano, Brücke, Herbart, Helmholtz, Meynert, Fechner, Mach e Lipps – solo per citarne alcuni. Un esempio fra tutti: Hermann von Helmholtz, il grande fisico e fisiologo tedesco capostipite di una scuola di ricerca a cui apparteneva anche Brücke, aveva sottolineato, nel suo libro *The facts in perception*, il profondo «accordo tra la recente fisiologia dei sensi e le dottrine di Kant» e aveva anche affermato che nella ricerca scientifica «ci poggiamo sul terreno del sistema kantiano» (Helmholtz 1878, p. 711). Heidegger nei suoi *Seminari di Zollikon* sottolinea proprio questa commistione in Freud tra scienza empirica e sistema kantiano: «La metapsicologia di Freud è la trasposizione della filosofia neokantiana all'uomo. Egli ha, da un lato, le scienze della natura, e, dall'altro, la teoria kantiana dell'oggettualità» (Heidegger 1991, p. 287). Questa visione di Heidegger sembra ben ricalcare – con altri toni - l'ammirazione manifestata dalla Bonaparte nei

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<sup>18</sup> Fra questi vale la pena di citare oltre al citato saggio di Brook (1988), anche un altro di Brook (2003) e quelli di Scarpellini (1962), Fell (1976), Fulgencio (2001), Loparic (2003). P.-L. Assoun (1976) dedica un capitolo del suo libro all'attenzione di Freud a Kant e un paragrafo a Freud lettore di Kant. Cita due volte l'aforisma del 1938, senza però analizzarlo. Unica eccezione mi sembrano gli studi recenti di Tauber (2009, 2010, 2013), primo serio tentativo di valutazione del debito della psicoanalisi nei confronti del pensiero kantiano. Egli dedica, tra l'altro, un intero paragrafo di un suo libro alla comprensione di Kant *Freud's understanding of Kant* (Tauber 2010, pp. 117-25). Merita di essere ricordato che il capostipite degli studi dei rapporti di Freud con Kant fu Adorno che presentò nel 1924, Freud dunque ancora vivo, la sua *Habilitationschrift*, dal titolo *Il concetto dell'inconscio nella teoria trascendentale della mente*. Come segno premonitore della scarsa fortuna che incontrerà questo filone di studi va segnalato che la tesi di Adorno fu rifiutata ed egli ottenne la qualifica solo sette anni più tardi con una tesi sull'estetica in Kierkegaard (Adorno 1926).

confronti del suo maestro quando lo aveva definito «un misto di Pasteur e di Kant» (Jones 1953, v. 2, p. 496).

Questo intreccio fra teoria trascendentale e scienze della natura è stato recentemente riconosciuto con precisione da Tauber che si spinge a parlare di una “struttura kantiana della psicoanalisi”. Egli scrive: «Il fondamentale impegno filosofico di Sigmund Freud era suddiviso tra le sue aspirazioni a creare una scienza positivista della mente (che originava dalle sue indagini neuroscientifiche e una strategia interpretativa costruita sul tema kantiano della relazione trascendentale tra mente e natura» (Tauber 2009, p. 2). Egli sottolinea l'importanza dell'influsso filosofico di Kant e del kantismo proprio nella descrizione dicotomica di una mente assoggettata alle leggi biologiche e deterministiche della natura (l'inconscio) e di una mente razionale capace di conoscere e interpretare l'inconscio e libera di scegliere responsabilmente.

D'altronde è Freud stesso a inserire la psicoanalisi nel solco della tradizione kantiana quando nel saggio *L'inconscio* afferma che:

L'ipotesi psicoanalitica di un'attività psichica inconscia ci appare, [...] come la prosecuzione della rettifica operata da Kant a proposito delle nostre vedute sulla percezione esterna. Come Kant ci ha messo in guardia contro il duplice errore di trascurare il condizionamento soggettivo della nostra percezione e di identificare quest'ultima con il suo oggetto inconoscibile, così la psicoanalisi ci avverte che non è lecito porre la percezione della coscienza al posto del processo psichico inconscio che ne è l'oggetto. Allo stesso modo della realtà fisica, anche la realtà psichica non è necessariamente tale quale ci appare. (Freud 1915, p. 54)

Questo tema era antico per Freud, la sua ipotesi dell'esistenza di un sistema inconscio, non avvicinabile – se non per vie indirette – dalla coscienza era, sin dall'inizio, permeata proprio da una filosofia della scienza di stampo kantiano. La presenza di Kant nel pensiero di Freud è esplicita quando nella *Traumdeutung* fornisce un'illuminante definizione dell'inconscio:

L'inconscio è lo psichico reale nel vero senso della parola, *altrettanto sconosciuto nella sua natura più intima quanto lo è la realtà del mondo esterno, e a noi presentato dai dati della coscienza in modo altrettanto incompleto, quanto il mondo esterno dalle indicazioni dei nostri organi di senso.* (Freud 1899, p. 557)

Questa chiave di lettura per cui l'inconscio costituirebbe la cosa-in-sé, il noumeno dell'apparato psichico meriterebbe essere indagata, ma non è questa la sede<sup>19</sup>. Quello che qui ci interessa è quanto Freud fosse profondamente permeato dal sistema kantiano e non poteva quindi verosimilmente ignorare che il concetto di spazio e il suo rapporto con la conoscenza sensibile non fosse così univoco nel pensiero del filosofo tedesco poiché esso

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<sup>19</sup> Possiamo solo ricordare l'ingenua domanda posta da Freud al filosofo e psicologo svizzero Häberlin nel maggio 1913 se l'inconscio e la cosa-in-sè kantiana non fossero in fondo la stessa cosa (Freud-Binswanger 1992, p. 237).

assumeva, a seconda del momento, carattere di realtà oggettiva, di intuizione pura priva di realtà oggettiva, o di forma dell'intuizione sensibile. Qui c'è da fare un breve inciso. In tutta evidenza Freud ha un'idea del pensiero di Kant non certo pura e incontaminata, ma sicuramente segnata dalla tradizione idealista che tiene conto contemporaneamente del razionalismo e dell'empirismo, dell'illuminismo e del romanticismo presenti nel pensiero del filosofo di Königsberg. La Bonaparte invece sembra leggere Kant attraverso Schopenhauer e Nietzsche e finisce quindi con il contrapporlo a Goethe<sup>20</sup>.

### *Kant precritico e la filosofia del corpo*

Naturalmente la complessità del pensiero kantiano va ricostruita lungo l'intero percorso che conduce alla formulazione della *Critica della ragion pura*; bisogna quindi risalire al cosiddetto Kant precritico<sup>21</sup>, ed in particolare a quel periodo della produzione kantiana che va dal 1766 al 1770, che anticipa alcuni temi presenti sin dalla prima edizione della *Critica* del 1781 e che precede il lungo silenzio – durato più di un decennio - in cui Kant studia per preparare la stesura del suo testo più famoso. Si tratta di tre saggi - che Freud aveva con ogni probabilità letto - che a detta dello stesso Kant costituiranno le basi del testo del 1781: *Sogni di un visionario chiariti con i sogni della metafisica* del 1766, *Del primo fondamento della distinzione delle regioni nello spazio* del 1768 e *La forma e i principi del mondo sensibile e intelligibile* del 1770, la famosa *Dissertatio* che consentì a Kant il passaggio universitario a ordinario di Logica e Metafisica. A questi saggi dovremmo aggiungere un ciclo di lezioni universitarie condotte probabilmente nella seconda metà degli anni '70, noto come *Metaphysic LI* e tradotto in italiano con il titolo di *Lezioni di psicologia*. In questa fase della speculazione kantiana, il filosofo sembra ancora alla ricerca di quelle invarianti umane che sono alla base delle categorie dell'intelletto che costituiscono la *conditio sine qua non* della conoscenza, categorie formali che saranno studiate e definite con maggior precisione a partire dalla *Critica della ragion pura*.

La strada che conduce Kant a elaborare la sua concezione di spazio e di tempo come condizioni «a priori» perché qualunque intuizione sia possibile e quindi vi sia conoscenza, è una strada ricca di considerazioni riguardo al rapporto fra la percezione dello spazio e il dialogo o, per dirla con Kant, il *commercium*, tra anima e corpo<sup>22</sup>. Lungo questa strada troviamo molti elementi che, non sappiamo per quale via, costituiscono in maniera evidente, la fonte remota della nota di Freud e delle sue considerazioni a margine.

Sin dall'inizio della sua produzione filosofica, dal suo primo scritto del 1747, *Pensieri sulla vera valutazione delle forze vive*, Kant, ancora studente, si pone il duplice interrogativo di come possa la materia, tramite l'influsso fisico, essere in grado di

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<sup>20</sup> Trovo condivisibili le critiche di Moroncini ad Assoun che legge invece Freud in chiave schopenhaueriana (vedi Moroncini 2006, pp. 577-578 e Assoun 1976, pp. 218-250). Vi è una tradizione psicoanalitica che ama contrapporre Kant a Goethe, tra cui come abbiamo visto Kaufmann. Come segnalato da Tauber (Tauber 2009, p. 22, fn. 7) il debito di Goethe nei confronti di Kant è riconosciuto da Goethe stesso.

<sup>21</sup> Come scrive lo studioso kantiano, Otte «la cosiddetta opera precritica di Kant costituisce la più ricca e fortemente polemica filosofia del corpo nell'Illuminismo» (cit. in Bochicchio 2006).

<sup>22</sup> Non è mia intenzione inoltrarmi in questo campo di studi oltre quello che è necessario ai fini di questo lavoro. Per approfondimenti sul rapporto tra anima e corpo in Kant vorrei segnalare alcuni testi recenti: Meld Shell (1996), Carpenter (1998), Bochicchio (2006), Svare (2006), Fabbrizi (2008), Nuzzo (2008).

creare rappresentazioni nell'anima in modo efficace e in che modo l'anima, dal canto suo, sia in grado di porre in movimento la materia (1747, GSK, AA 01 p. 21; trad. it. 2000, p. 58). Nel 1764 scrive due saggi, entrambi dedicati al tema della malattia mentale, le *Osservazioni sul sentimento del bello e del sublime* (GSE AA 02) e il *Saggio sulle malattie della testa*. Questo secondo saggio, noto a Freud e citato nelle *Traumdeutung* (Freud 1899, p. 93), si conclude con una riflessione sull'origine corporea delle malattie mentali in cui afferma che il corpo segnala disfunzionalità ben prima che si possa avvertire uno squilibrio nell'animo: «si dovrebbe dire, piuttosto che l'uomo è diventato arrogante perché già in un certo grado era squilibrato, anziché affermare che egli è andato soggetto a tale disturbo perché arrogante» (Kant 1764, VKK, AA 02, p. 272; trad. it. 1989, p. 75).

Sin dagli inizi della sua riflessione filosofica, Kant riflette sull'intreccio tra anima e corpo attribuendo alla prima un ruolo subordinato e al secondo per lo meno una precedenza temporale. Ma sarà nel 1766 che Kant affronta il tema con maggiore determinazione, pubblicando un breve scritto, i *Sogni di un visionario chiariti con sogni della metafisica*, redatto a causa delle «viva sollecitazione di amici conosciuti e sconosciuti» (Kant 1766, TG, AA 02, p. 318; trad. it. 2000, p. 350) che gli chiedevano di esprimersi su *Arcana Coelestia*, l'opera in più volumi dello svedese Emanuel Swedenborg (un precursore degli studi sullo spiritismo che tanto affascinò il giovane Jung) che pretendeva di essere in grado di comunicare con gli spiriti e con le anime dei morti (Swedenborg 1749-56). In realtà l'occasione è un pretesto per affrontare il problema anima-corpo e dare voce al proprio materialismo. In questo saggio egli propone dei passaggi che difficilmente possono essere sfuggiti a Freud. Ne scegliamo uno, abbastanza lungo, che costituisce a nostro avviso una coincidenza troppo smaccata per non essere considerata una fonte primaria della nota di Freud. Kant sta contestando, attraverso un dialogo immaginario, l'esistenza degli spiriti, e scrive:

Qual è il luogo di questa anima umana nel mondo corporeo? Io risponderai: Quel corpo, i cui cangiamenti sono cangiamenti *miei*, questo corpo è il *mio* corpo, e il luogo di esso è nello stesso tempo il *mio* luogo. Se si continuasse oltre a domandare: «dov'è in questo corpo il luogo tuo (dell'anima)?», temerei in tal domanda una qualche insidia. (Kant 1766, TG, AA 02, p. 324; trad. it. 2000, 356)

Come si evince Kant si sta ponendo una questione molto simile a quella che si sarebbe posto Freud circa 170 anni dopo. Come si può (se si può) localizzare l'anima dentro il corpo, se esiste un luogo dell'anima pensabile al di fuori della collocazione spaziale del corpo, se esiste un luogo circoscritto dove possiamo confinare il nostro Io o se invece la nostra anima è estesa nel corpo. Proseguiamo la lettura.

Poiché si nota facilmente che in essa è già presupposto qualcosa che non è conosciuto mediante l'esperienza, ma si fonda forse su argomenti immaginari: cioè che il mio io pensante sia in un luogo, che sia distinto dai luoghi delle altre parti di quel corpo che appartiene al mio Io. Laddove nessuno è immediatamente cosciente di un particolare luogo nel suo corpo, ma di quello che egli occupa come uomo riguardo al mondo



circostante. Io mi atterrei dunque all'esperienza comune e provvisoriamente direi: *Io sono là dove io sento* [*Wo ich empfinde, da bin ich*]. Io sono proprio così immediatamente nella punta delle dita come nella testa. Io sono quello stesso che soffre nel calcagno, e a cui il cuore batte di affetto. Se mi tormenta un callo, io non sento l'impressione dolorosa di un nervo cerebrale, ma alla fine delle dita del mio piede. Nessuna esperienza mi insegna a ritenere lontane da me alcune parti della mia sensazione, a sbarrare in un posticino microscopicamente piccolo del mio cervello il mio indivisibile io, perché poi ponga di lì in movimento con la leva della mia macchina corporea, o sia anche colpito per la stessa via. Perciò io desidererei una prova rigorosa per trovare assurdo ciò che dicevano i maestri: *La mia anima è tutta in tutto il corpo e tutta in ognuna delle sue parti*» [Totam animam in toto corpore omnibusque partibus corporis organici praesentem esse]. (Kant 1766, TG, AA 02 p. 324-325; trad. it. 2000, p. 356-357)

Ci sembra molto interessante questa posizione antilocalizzazionista *ante litteram* assunta da Kant. L'anima non può essere localizzata in un punto del corpo, essa è dappertutto e in ogni sua parte. Le modificazioni introdotte dalle sensazioni fanno sì che io sia in quel punto in cui avviene la modificazione, il cambiamento, per poi spostarmi in altro luogo, in altro punto corporeo, per essere sempre in quel *da*, dove io sento: letteralmente *dove io sento, là io sono*. L'anima quindi erra per il corpo nell'impossibilità di trovare un luogo, uno spazio determinato, anzi, in questo modo si introduce «una sorta di distruzione della localizzazione dell'io, dell'anima, del soggetto. [...] ma anche, più radicalmente, distruzione della possibilità stessa di una simile localizzazione» (Leoni 2002, p. 69). L'impossibilità di differenziare la dimensione corporea dall'esperienza dell'anima sembra essere in questi anni un profondo convincimento di Kant il quale, ancora nelle sue *Lezioni di psicologia* definiva il *commercium* dell'anima con il corpo come una «dipendenza reciproca», una «comunanza»:

*La comunanza è quella unione in cui l'anima costituisce un'unità col corpo; in cui i mutamenti del corpo sono al tempo stesso quelli dell'anima e i mutamenti dell'anima al tempo stesso quelli del corpo.* (Kant metà anni 1770, V-Met/Heinze, AA 28, p. 259; trad. it. 1986, p. 91)

È proprio questa comunanza che rende impossibile identificare un luogo in cui possa risiedere l'anima, la cui estensione non è minore di quella del corpo. Nelle *Lezioni di psicologia*, Kant definisce molto difficile osservare questo *commercium*, poiché l'anima è un oggetto del nostro senso interno, mentre il corpo è un oggetto del nostro senso esterno; come questi due possano entrare in comunicazione non ci è dato di sapere<sup>23</sup>. Questo rende impossibile localizzare l'anima nel corpo:

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<sup>23</sup> Qui lo psicoanalista si distingue dal filosofo. Mentre Freud indaga l'area di confine tra corpo e mente e cerca di descriverne il funzionamento e le leggi interne, attraverso concetti come quello di pulsione, di Es e di inconscio, Kant invece definisce l'«indagine sul modo in cui gli organi del corpo stanno in collegamento con i pensieri» come «sottile, e [...] sempre vana» (Kant lettera a Marcus Herz della fine del 1773, Br, AA 10, p.145; trad. it. 1990, p. 78). Kant vuole descrivere i limiti della conoscenza, fino a definire la metafisica come «scienza dei limiti della ragione umana» i cui dubbi «non eliminano la certezza utile, ma quella inutile»

Ora, dal momento che l'anima sta nel commercium col corpo, noi domandiamo dove l'anima abbia la sua propria *sede* nel corpo. Il luogo dell'anima nel mondo viene determinato dal luogo del corpo; *la mia anima è là dove è il mio corpo*. Ma dove ha l'anima la sua sede nel corpo? Il luogo del corpo nel mondo è determinato solo dal senso *esterno*; ora, poiché l'anima è oggetto del senso *interno*, ma dal senso interno non può essere determinato alcun luogo, *allora neppure si può determinare il luogo dell'anima nel corpo*. (Kant metà anni 1770, V-Met/Heinze, AA 28, p. 280-281, trad. it. 1986, p. 119)

È possibile che Freud non avesse nessuna memoria di queste *Lezioni di psicologia* di Kant – pubblicate per la prima volta nel 1821 – quando affermava che la psiche è estesa? che essa occupa lo spazio, che essa è spaziale e che questo le consente di percepire lo spazio fuori da sé? Quando Freud scrive che l'unica cosa non spaziale che possiamo concepire è la psiche, non sta rievocando il pensiero di Kant quando scrive che poiché l'anima non è oggetto dell'intuizione esterna «*essa neppure è nello spazio*, ma solo agisce nello spazio»? (Kant metà anni 1770, V-Met/Heinze, AA 28, p. 280-281; trad. it. 1986, p. 121)

Torniamo un attimo indietro ai *Dreams* e proseguiamo la lettura che abbiamo lasciato in sospeso. Si ponga attenzione a questo passaggio:

Il senso comune scorge spesso la verità prima che conosca le ragioni, con cui può provare a chiarirla. Mi si dica pure che in tal modo io penso *l'anima estesa* [*Seele ausgedehnt*] e sparsa per tutto il corpo, [...] l'obiezione non mi sconcerta affatto. (corsivo mio) (Kant 1766, TG, AA 02 p. 325; trad. it. 2000, p. 357)

I termini usati da Kant sono gli stessi usati poi da Freud<sup>24</sup>: l'anima (o la psiche, ma ricordiamo come anche Freud si riferisse spesso alla *Seelenleben* per parlare della vita psichica) è estesa, *ausgedehnt*, occupa spazio. La coincidenza è significativa, soprattutto in un momento in cui Freud sembra pensare agli aspetti spaziali dell'apparato psichico avendo in mente le categorie kantiane. Il termine tedesco *ausgedehnt*, d'altronde, non può essere considerato casuale, poiché verrà usato da Kant in molte altre occasioni proprio per caratterizzare, nel solco della tradizione cartesiana, la specificità dei corpi. Nei *Prolegomeni ad ogni futura metafisica*, per descrivere il principio di contraddizione su cui si basano tutti i giudizi analitici a priori, userà il seguente esempio: «Ogni corpo è esteso (*ausgedehnt*), e: Nessun corpo è inesteso (*unausgedehnt*)» (Kant 1783, Prol, AA 04

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(Kant 1764c., AA 20, p. 181; trad. it. 2001, p. 245). E qui la certezza inutile potrebbe essere proprio l'ambizione di conoscere il luogo di incontro tra anima e corpo.

<sup>24</sup> Nuzzo, attraverso Derrida, sembra riconoscere la connessione fra l'aforisma di Freud e il testo kantiano dei *Sogni*, ma curiosamente accosta l'aforisma di Freud al pensiero di Swedenborg piuttosto che a quello di Kant, pur non fornendo spiegazioni della sua idea (Nuzzo 2008, p. 316).

p. 267; trad. it. p. 29)<sup>25</sup>. Successivamente nei *Principi metafisici della scienza della natura*, differenzierà proprio le possibilità di conoscere il corpo esteso (*ausgedehnt*) attraverso il senso esterno e l'anima pensante attraverso il senso interno. A maggior ragione questa affermazione di Kant nel saggio del 1766 acquisisce particolare rilievo, proprio per il carattere apparentemente paradossale di un convincimento che Kant si ostina, in quella occasione a difendere:

La mia anima, nel modo in cui è presente nello spazio, non differirebbe dagli elementi della materia, e giacché la facoltà intellettuale è una proprietà interna, che io non potrei percepire in questi elementi, quand'anche vi si trovasse in tutti, così non potrebbe essere addotta alcuna buona ragione per dimostrare che la mia anima non è una delle sostanze che costituiscono la materia, e che i particolari fenomeni suoi non provengono unicamente dal luogo che essa occupa in una macchina artificiale qual è il corpo animale, luogo in cui il congiungersi dei nervi cade propizio per l'interna facoltà di pensare e volere. Ed allora non si riconoscerebbe più, con sicurezza, una caratteristica propria dell'anima, che la distinguesse dalla grezza materia prima delle nature corporee. (Kant 1766, TG, AA 02 p. 326; trad. it. 2000, p. 358)

È molto forte qui l'affermazione di Kant e la sua vicinanza con alcune affermazioni di Freud sulla corporeità dell'Io – e quanto era fuori strada la Bonaparte quando lo tacciava di fedeltà al dualismo cartesiano<sup>26</sup>! Noi sappiamo che il Kant della *Critica* ridurrà l'importanza attribuita all'esperienza sensoriale (cioè all'esperienza dei dati sensibili) per valorizzare gli aspetti formali delle possibilità dell'intelletto, cioè i presupposti per la conoscenza<sup>27</sup>. Va anche detto che un secolo di neokantismo ha finito con estremizzare questa posizione che in Kant era molto più sfumata, persino nella *Critica*. Per Kant è l'incontro tra *sensibilità* e *intelletto* a produrre conoscenza; la mancanza di questo incontro produce effetti sterili: «I pensieri senza contenuto sono vuoti, le intuizioni senza concetti

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<sup>25</sup> L'idea che l'anima potesse essere estesa nel corpo aveva già precedenti nell'Illuminismo francese. La Mettrie aveva dedicato un intero paragrafo della sua *Histoire naturelle de l'âme* a questo tema con argomenti molto vicini a quelli sollevati da Kant. Il paragrafo intitolato *De l'étendue de l'âme* si conclude così: «In effetti, dov'è la vostra anima quando l'odorato le trasmette gli odori che le piacciono o le dispiacciono se non in quelle pieghe da cui i nervi olfattivi traggono la loro origine? E dov'è l'anima quando percepisce con piacere un bel cielo o una bella prospettiva se non nelle pieghe ottiche? Analogamente, per sentire, bisogna che essa si trovi là dove nasce il nervo auditivo, ecc. Tutto prova dunque che quel campanello al quale abbiamo paragonato l'anima per darne un'idea sensibile si trova in parecchi luoghi del cervello, giacché esso è realmente colpito da parecchie parti. Non voglio dire con questo che esistano parecchie anime; indubbiamente ne basta una sola che abbia l'estensione di quella sede midollare che l'esperienza ci ha obbligato a concederle. Essa basta, voglio dire, per agire, sentire e pensare tanto quanto le è permesso dagli organi» (La Mettrie 1745, p. 88).

<sup>26</sup> La distanza dal pensiero cartesiano era stata ben compresa invece dall'abate Albertino Bellenghi che, a nome della sacra Congregazione dell'Indice scrisse un testo di censura che comportò il ritiro della traduzione italiana della *Critica della ragion pura* l'11 giugno 1827. In questo testo Kant viene censurato anche a causa della sua opinione che l'anima per conoscere abbia bisogno dei sensi (Tolomio 1999).

<sup>27</sup> Va comunque ricordato che, come risulta da due lettere del 7 giugno 1771 e del 21 febbraio 1772 a Marcus Herz, inizialmente Kant avrebbe voluto intitolare il suo libro più famoso *I limiti della sensibilità e della ragione*, poiché lo scopo principale con cui aveva cominciato la stesura della *Critica* era proprio quello di descrivere tali limiti (Kant Br, AA 10, pp. 123 e 130; trad. it. 1990, pp. 62 e 64).

sono cieche», scrive Kant all'inizio della Logica Trascendentale nella *Critica della ragion pura* (Kant 1787, KrV, AA 03, p. 75; trad. it. 1976, p. 109). Ma negli anni che precedono e che preparano la redazione della *Critica*, vi è maggiore peso lasciato all'esperienza sensibile rispetto al tentativo di trovare un «principio interno della mente» (Kant 1770, MSI, AA 02 p. 393; trad. it. 2000, p. 428). Così lo spazio, dapprima considerato come il prodotto dell'esperienza del corpo diviene progressivamente una condizione astratta da sensazioni esterne, non creato da esse, ma da esse supposto: «La possibilità di percezioni esterne come tali *suppone* il concetto di spazio, non lo *crea*». (Kant 1770, MSI, AA 02 p. 402; trad. it. 2000, p. 440)

Il cambiamento sembra avvenire nel 1769 quando Kant ricevette “la grande luce” che lo porterà alle formulazioni della *Dissertatio* che costituiranno la base di partenza della *Critica*. Ma la strada che lo porta alla “grande luce”, che lo condurrà a considerare lo spazio come una forma dell'intuizione, *a priori*, è piena della predeterminazione del corpo.

L'argomento che Kant vuole introdurre è quello degli *opposti incongruenti*. Questa geniale intuizione, che per Kant costituisce in prima battuta la prova schiacciante dell'esistenza di uno spazio assoluto indipendente dall'esistenza degli oggetti materiali e caso mai condizione per la loro conoscenza, necessita di una premessa che Kant propone al lettore nel suo articolo del 1768, *Del primo fondamento della distinzione delle regioni nello spazio*<sup>28</sup>:

Nello spazio corporeo, a causa delle sue tre dimensioni, si possono pensare tre piani che si tagliano tutti tra loro ad angolo retto. Ora siccome tutto ciò che è fuori di noi è da noi conosciuto coi sensi soltanto in quanto è in relazione con noi stessi, non è da meravigliarsi se noi prendiamo il primo fondamento per generare il concetto delle regioni nello spazio, dal rapporto di questi piani di intersecazione con il nostro corpo. (Kant 1768, GUGR, AA 02, p. 378-379; trad. it. 2000, p. 412-413)

Kant prosegue poi definendo questi tre piani: uno orizzontale che distingue fra *sopra* e *sotto*, e due verticali: il primo distingue fra lato *destro* e *sinistro* e il secondo fra lato *anteriore* e *posteriore*. La nostra percezione dello spazio è subordinata alla anatomia e all'orientamento del nostro corpo e financo le più remote regioni dello spazio cosmico sono determinate in rapporto ai lati del nostro corpo. (Kant 1768, GUGR, AA 02, p. 379; trad. it. 2000, p. 413). Questa premessa doveva servire a introdurre gli *opposti incongruenti* (*incongruentes Gegenstück*) per dimostrare l'idea newtoniana dell'esistenza dello spazio assoluto. Di cosa si tratta? Per determinare con precisione una figura corporea non è sufficiente, secondo Kant, determinare il rapporto e la posizione reciproca delle parti come accade a due figure geometriche piane, le quali, se sono uguali fra di loro, si possono sovrapporre una all'altra. Diversa è la situazione quando si passa alla «estensione

<sup>28</sup> Questo saggio è contenuto nei *Kleinere Schriften zur Naturphilosophie* acquistati da Freud nel 1882 e conservati nella sua biblioteca.

corporea» (*körperlichen Ausdehnung*). Queste superfici possono essere uguali in tutto e per tutto, ma così differenti «che i limiti dell'una non possano coincidere con quelli dell'altra» (Kant 1768, GUGR, AA 02, p. 381 trad. it. 2000, p. 415). È proprio dal corpo umano che Kant trae l'esempio che servirà a dimostrare l'esistenza dello spazio indipendentemente dagli oggetti che lo occupano:

Il più comune e lampante esempio noi l'abbiamo nei membri del corpo umano, che sono ordinati simmetricamente rispetto al piano verticale di esso. La mano destra è simile ed uguale alla sinistra, ed una compiuta descrizione di una sola di esse per quanto riguarda e la proporzione e la posizione reciproca delle parti e la grandezza del tutto, deve anche valere in tutte le sue parti per l'altra. Un corpo che è completamente uguale e simile ad un altro, sebbene non possa essere chiuso negli stessi limiti, io lo chiamo il suo *opposto incongruente*. (Kant 1768, GUGR, AA 02, p. 381-382 trad. it. 2000, p. 415-416)

In sostanza se sovrapponiamo sullo stesso piano le due mani di un uomo esse, diversamente dalle figure geometriche, non potranno sovrapporsi l'una all'altra. Da qui ne discende l'esistenza di uno spazio indipendente dai corpi, cioè uno spazio assoluto originario non oggetto di sensazione, ma condizione di tutte le possibili sensazioni. Ma questo spazio indipendente dai corpi è in fin dei conti uno spazio intuibile grazie alla corporeità del soggetto conoscente, corporeità che definisce modi e forme dell'intuizione dello spazio. Come afferma Martinello affrontando il saggio kantiano del 1768: «se il corpo è in grado di differenziare e organizzare lo spazio sulla base di proprie caratteristiche», è «lecito pensare che la stessa spazialità che contraddistingue la nostra percezione del mondo esterno dipenda per la sua generazione dal fatto che noi esistiamo come *soggetti conoscenti incarnati in un corpo* (corsivo mio)» (Martinello 2011, p. 167).

Lo spazio quindi, lo spazio assoluto che precede ogni esperienza e che nella *Critica* verrà definito concetto *a priori*, diventa la condizione per quel *sentire* a cui Kant faceva riferimento come ipotetico, indeterminato ed esteso luogo, quel 'da', dove momentaneamente si può situare l'io. È la premessa per quella distinzione tra facoltà *sensitiva* e facoltà *intellettiva* che Kant proporrà nel '70 con la *Dissertatio*, dove l'esempio degli incongruenti servirà per dimostrare invece come lo spazio sia intuizione pura priva di realtà oggettiva. Lo stesso esempio verrà utilizzato invece nei *Prolegomeni* e nei *Principi metafisici della scienza della natura* (1786), per descrivere lo spazio come forma dell'intuizione sensibile (Scaravelli 1968). Ma se l'esempio viene usato con finalità differenti, costante rimane negli anni, come fa notare Nuzzo, il legame tra gli opposti incongruenti e l'asimmetria corporea, «la connessione tra incongruenza e incorporazione» (2008, p. 26).

#### *Freud e Kant*

E qui possiamo tornare a confrontare Freud a Kant. Per Freud le percezioni possono essere pensate come proiezioni all'esterno di un atto interno di conoscenza. Va ricordata la distinzione in Kant di una materialità del corpo che può essere conosciuta attraverso il senso esterno e quella dell'anima attraverso il senso interno per accorgersi di quanto Freud stia qui utilizzando un linguaggio kantiano e la sua ipotesi che diverse percezioni possano

essere il prodotto di un'operazione che va dall'interno verso l'esterno sembra trovare alcuni punti di incontro proprio con il concetto di *sensibilità* che appare per la prima volta ne *La forma e i principi del mondo sensibile e intelligibile*. La sensibilità per Kant è la capacità del soggetto di essere *modificato* dalla presenza dell'oggetto e ogni sensazione altro non è che una specifica modificazione. Questa idea permarrà immutata anche nei lavori successivi e nella *Critica alla ragion pura* ribadirà il concetto scrivendo che «l'unica maniera in cui gli oggetti ci vengono dati, consiste nella modificazione della nostra sensibilità» (Kant 1787, KrV, AA 03, p. 135; trad. it. 1976, p. 219), che sommato al fatto che «noi non conosciamo null'altro se non il nostro modo di percepire gli oggetti», (Kant 1787, KrV, AA 03, p. 65; trad. it. 1976, p. 97) pone la facoltà sensitiva in termini estremamente soggettivi, una facoltà che dice più del soggetto che dell'oggetto, o che dice dell'oggetto attraverso il soggetto. La vicinanza del pensiero di Freud a questo approccio ci sembra enorme. La conoscenza è data dalla facoltà del soggetto di entrare in rapporto osmotico con l'oggetto e di lasciarsene modificare. È chiaro che sia per Kant sia per Freud (diversamente che per Locke) la sensazione in se stessa non costituisce conoscenza. Perché vi sia conoscenza c'è bisogno di attenzione, valutazione, giudizio. Le facoltà dell'intelletto (per il filosofo), o l'inconscio che si fa cosciente (per lo psicoanalista), sono le condizioni di una vera e propria conoscenza. Come sottolinea Kant la proposizione «sensu non fallunt» è falsa non perché i sensi non giudichino giusto, ma perché i sensi non giudicano affatto, non è compito loro, anzi, possono ingannare, nel senso che possono spingere verso un giudizio erroneo, come l'apparente moto del sole intorno alla terra. E Freud, dal canto suo, in una pagina del *Compendio* dove parla ancora della sua ipotesi di un «apparato psichico spazialmente esteso», afferma che per quanto potremo raffinare strumenti artificiali per accrescere la potenza dei nostri sensi, «la realtà stessa non speriamo neppure di poterla attingere [...], il reale rimarrà per sempre "inconoscibile"» (Freud 1938, p. 196): un ulteriore omaggio al pensiero di Kant.

### Conclusioni

L'eredità di Kant per la filosofia e l'epistemologia scientifica e quella di Freud per la psicologia e la psicoanalisi sono impegnative per chi intende raccoglierle. L'Ottocento per Kant e il Novecento per Freud sono stati secoli di grandissima fortuna e il successo, si sa, deforma. Kant è diventato il filosofo dell'intelletto e del razionalismo, Freud il medico che ha liberato la psiche dalle pastoie dell'organicismo. Oggi è difficile ricollocarli in una dimensione più equilibrata, quella originale dei loro testi, dove non esisteva sensibilità senza ragione, anima senza materia, inconscio senza pulsioni, psicologico senza biologico, mente senza corpo. ««Io sono là dove io sento» scrive Kant, l'Io «è prima di ogni altra cosa un Io-corpo» (Freud 1923, p. 490) gli fa eco Freud un secolo e mezzo dopo: l'eredità di Kant è in qualche modo passata anche nelle mani di Freud che gli è forse più debitore di quanto non si sia creduto fino a oggi e di quanto forse non abbia mai pensato egli stesso: la psicologia trascendentale di Kant si trasforma in psicoanalisi trascendentale.

Sono partito da una frase apparentemente criptica e oscura di Freud di cui ho cercato di mettere in luce nodi e connessioni che emergevano da un'analisi di quel brano e del suo contesto. L'estensione della psiche: un apparente paradosso che ha il merito di intersecare indissolubilmente corpo e mente senza cadere né nelle ristrettezze del riduzionismo, né nella mistica del dualismo. L'incessante tensione generata da queste due polarità è alla base del nostro modo di essere, di pensare. Ancora una volta, un'ultima volta, Kant ci viene in aiuto con una sua lezione di antropologia dove, con la libertà che gli è consentita nel contesto di una lezione universitaria, spiega ai suoi studenti: «La nostra anima non pensa mai da sola, bensì *nel laboratorio del corpo* [Laboratorio des Körpers], c'è sempre un'armonia tra i due. Così come l'anima pensa, essa muove il corpo» (corsivo mio) (Kant V-Anth/Collins AA 25, p. 145). L'augurio è che non si dimentichi che anche il metodo psicoanalitico freudiano, dagli *Studi sull'Isteria* al *Compendio di Psicoanalisi* fino all'ultimo (speriamo ora meno criptico) aforisma dell'estate del 1938, si proponeva proprio come un *laboratorio del corpo*.

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## **Madness in the Organic Order of Space. Kant and the Imagination**

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### **Abstract**

In this paper, I first examine the classification of mental derangements contained in Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, in order to highlight the role played by imagination in their pathogenesis. Later, on the basis of this examination, I reflect on the origins of critical philosophy, which can be seen as an attempt to construct a control device for the imagination structured as a systematic, organic space.

### **Key words**

Critical Philosophy; Imagination; Kant; Mental Disorders; Mental Illness; Space; System.

«*Courage, gentlemen, land is in sight!*»

I. Kant, *Träume eines Geistersehers*

### **1. The Role of Imagination in Mental Derangements**

In the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, 34 years after the *Essay on the Maladies of the Head*, Kant presents a second classification of psychopathologies, considered, in general, as «defects of the cognitive faculty» (*Fehler des*

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*Erkenntnißvermögens*) (Anth 202; 2006: 96)<sup>1</sup>. If compared to that of the *Essay*, the classification of the *Anthropology*, which goes from § 45 to § 53, undergoes substantial changes in the number of the featured entries, in the respective arrangement, and in certain symptomatological descriptions<sup>2</sup>. It is not, however, our aim to engage in a comparison that depicts, case by the case, the differences between the two nosologies. We will rather try to highlight how imagination plays a dominant role within those pathological conditions which Kant gathers under the name of «mental derangements» (*Gemüthsstörungen*)<sup>3</sup>.

Since its pragmatic point of view removes the *Anthropology* from the knowledge of the natural causes of human phenomena, it would be useless to search through its pages for a proven aetiology of psychopathologies. In the rare instances where Kant suggests a cause, he ostensibly does so to subordinate its non-apodictic knowledge to pragmatic purposes. Thus, when he describes mental derangements as «an arbitrary course in the patient's thoughts which has its own (subjective) rule, but which runs contrary to the (objective) rule that is in agreement with laws of experience» (Anth 202; 2006: 96), he does so to provide the general sign of identification—*sensus privatus* taking over *sensus communis*<sup>4</sup>—which, once detected in a person, allows their reclusion in the *Narrenhospital*: «[...] a place where human beings, despite the maturity and strength of their ages, must still, with regard to the smallest matters of life, be kept orderly through someone else's reason» (Anth 202; 2006: 97). Likewise, when he claims that madness is generally a hereditary disease which «develops together with the germ of reproduction» (Anth 216; 2006: 111), once again he does so in view of the praxis to which such knowledge is subordinated, that is avoiding to «marry into families where even a single such individual [i.e. the lunatic] has been met with» (ivi). The statements on the causes of madness, just like the *Anthropology* as a whole, are simple observations, appearing in scattered annotations and comments on circumstantial πράγματα<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, although Kant's description of individual mental derangements leaves us in the dark insofar as the remote causes of their onset are concerned, it allows us, at least, to retrace a portion of their pathogenesis and to recognize in a certain behaviour of the imagination the way the disease emerges within the psyche.

<sup>1</sup> When not otherwise indicated, translations are mine.

<sup>2</sup> On the classification of psychopathologies in the *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* cf. Costantini 2018.

<sup>3</sup> «Mental derangements», together with «hypocondria», belong to the group of «mental illnesses» (*Gemüthskrankheiten*), which Kant distinguishes from «mental deficiencies» (*Gemüthsschwächen*) (Anth 202; 2006: 96).

<sup>4</sup> «The only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of *common sense* (*sensus communis*) and its replacement with *logical private sense* (*sensus privatus*); for example, a human being in broad daylight sees a light burning on his table which, however, another person standing nearby does not see, or hears a voice that no one else hears. For it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the *understanding of others*, instead of *isolating* ourselves with our own understanding and judging *publicly* with our private representations, so to speak» (Anth 219; 2006: 113).

<sup>5</sup> Avoiding marrying a person who had cases of madness in their family, or interning anyone who proves to have lost common sense, can be considered, from a Kantian point of view, «pragmatic imperatives» aimed at happiness and general welfare (GMS 415-417; 2002a: 32-33).

When Kant, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, deals with error, that is illusion, he declares a principle which could be applied also to madness: «No force of nature can of itself depart from its own laws» (KrV B 350, A 294; 1998: 384). With this he meant that at the origin of error there is an «influence» of sensibility, or imagination, on the understanding, «through which it happens that the subjective grounds of judgment join with the objective ones, and make the latter deviate [*abweichen*] from their destination» (KrV B 350-351, A 294-295; 1998: 385). A «deviation» (*Abweichung*) can be equally found in mental derangements (Anth 216; 2006: 110), yet it is provoked by more than imagination exercising an influence. In such cases, indeed, imagination assimilates the force with which it blends and exerts it with exceptional intensity. In the madness typical of derangements, it is the same error that is repeated each time, the error of exceeding in the use of such and such cognitive faculty, of augmenting its range by placing it under the deforming lens of imagination.

We will thus analyse the four types of *Gemüthsstörung* described in § 52 of the *Anthropology*, nonsenseness (*Unsinnigkeit*), deception (*Wahnsinn*), fabulation (*Wahnwitz*), and extravagance (*Aberwitz*), in order to highlight the role of imagination in their pathogenesis and, at the same time, to identify, where needed, the faculty that has been deviated, since Kant makes that explicit only in the cases of fabulation and extravagance: judgement and reason, respectively.

We will proceed in order, beginning from nonsenseness. Kant describes it as «the inability to bring one's representations into even the coherence necessary for the possibility of experience», adding that «in lunatic asylum it is women who, owing to their talkativeness, are most subject to this disease: that is, their lively power of imagination inserts so much into what they are relating that no one grasps what they actually wanted to say» (Anth 215; 2006: 109). Kant does not specify here which faculty is the one affected by the disorder, but the reference to the «coherence necessary for the possibility of experience» has led some interpreters (*cf.* Meo 1982: 78-83; Butts 1986: 301; Brandt 1999: 311, 313; Frierson 2009: 274-275, 288) to claim it is the understanding, and that the distinctive feature of nonsenseness is the inability to provide sensible representations with the synthetic unity necessary to make an experience in general possible. The subject affected by nonsenseness would dwell in a world that is rhapsodic, fragmented, devoid of the «qualitative unity» of the concept that is like «the unity of the theme in a play, a speech, or a fable» (KrV B 114; 1998: 217). There are, however, two reasons to doubt this interpretation. The first is a textual evidence: although Kant, in § 52, does not mention where nonsenseness strikes, in § 45 he claims that such disorder concerns «sense representations» (*Sinnenvorstellung*) (Anth 202; 2006: 96). The second reason consists in the emphasis given, in the symptomatology, to the vivacity of imagination, which renders the failed connection of the manifold of intuition as a secondary symptom, ascribable not so much to a *deficit* in intellectual ability, but rather to a *surplus* in imaginative ability. The concept, in itself, wouldn't have any gaps, if only imagination, due to an excess of representative material, were not that resistant to its grasp, and didn't behave in a way that strongly resembles that of aesthetic ideas when they are animated by an excess of spirit.

The *Critique of the Power of Judgement*, indeed, tells us more on nonsenseness than the *Anthropology*, insofar as it recognizes in it the danger looming over the artistic production of genius. The imagination of a genius whose judgement, i.e. taste, does not shape his own spirit, that is to say an imagination that does not adapt, even formally, to the understanding, is an imagination whose «richness [...] produces, in its lawless freedom, nothing but nonsense [*Unsinn*]» (KU 319; 2000: 197). We could thus conclude from this passage that nonsenseness should not be considered a pathology of the understanding, since it implies, on the contrary, that imagination escapes from it in order, apparently, to merge entirely with sensibility, generating such a «richness» of content that the understanding skips from unity to unity in the attempt to synthesize it. It is significant, in that sense, that Kant would call this first type of disorder «tumultuous» (Anth 215; 2006: 109), a further indication that it is not characterized by a failed convergence of representations, but by their positive divergence; not by the absence of a theme, but by the constant passage from one theme to another.

Thus, the faculty affected by nonsenseness is sensibility, and not the understanding, which, for its part, is at risk of being the victim of another kind of disorder: deception. In truth, even in regard to the latter, § 52 does not state explicitly which specific faculty is affected and, by claiming it is the understanding, we would be disrespectful towards the text which, in § 45, includes deception, together with nonsenseness, among the *Sinnenvorstellung* disorders. We do believe, however, that it would not be possible to depict the nosology of mental disorders following the same systematic approach that Kant almost unwillingly adopts<sup>6</sup>, if not by admitting a point-by-point correspondence between the order of his entries and the hierarchical order of the cognitive faculties established by transcendental philosophy. Since the last two nosological entries, fabulation and extravagance, concern respectively judgment and reason, it is appropriate to believe that they are preceded by a disorder of the understanding. Thus, the three higher cognitive faculties would be arranged in their proper order, preceded, to complete the picture, by the lower cognitive faculty, sensibility. In any event, in order to support such theory we will present evidences retrieved from the text itself.

Psychiatrists and historians of psychiatry identify what Kant calls *Wahnsinn* (deception) with what we refer to today as paranoid personality disorder (*cf.* Kisker 1957: 23; Leibbrand, Wettley 1961: 366; Rauer 2007: 138). The identification is legitimate, since Kant claims that those who suffer from deception «believe that they are surrounded by enemies everywhere, who consider all glances, words, and otherwise indifferent actions of others as aimed against them personally and as traps set for them» (Anth 215; 2006: 109). However, the lines immediately preceding this description are the most interesting for us:

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<sup>6</sup> «It is difficult to bring a systematic division into what is essential and incurable disorder. It is also of little use to occupy oneself with it, because all methods of cure in this respect must turn out to be fruitless, since the powers of the subject do not cooperate (as is the case with bodily diseases), and yet the goal can only be attained his own use of understanding. Although anthropology here can only be indirectly pragmatic, namely only command omissions, nevertheless it still requires at least an attempt at a general outline of this most profound degradation of humanity, which still is attributable to nature» (Anth 214; 2006: 108-109).



«[...] everything that the insane person relates is to be sure in conformity with the formal laws of thought that make an experience possible; but, owing to the falsely inventive power of imagination, self-made representations are regarded as perceptions» (ivi). If we were to interpret this passage literally, deception should be regarded as a disorder of imagination<sup>7</sup>, or even of sensibility<sup>8</sup>. It would thus be a hallucinatory phenomenon: representations produced in complete autonomy from imagination would substitute those coming from the outer sense, whereas the understanding, for its part, would comprehend the hallucinated objects as if they were sensible, in accordance to the formal laws of thought. Nevertheless, Kant describes self-deceivers as those who «consider [*betrachten*] all glances, words, and otherwise indifferent actions of others as aimed against them personally and as traps set for them» (ivi), that is as individuals who *have* representations of reality, but interpret them incorrectly, transforming them into something they are not. The effects of deception do not appear, then, immediately in the falsity of intuitive data, but in the transformation that the data undergoes right *after* it was interpreted. *Wahnsinn* is not hallucination but misrepresentation. Moreover, conformity to the formal laws of thought, that is to logic, is not necessarily a sign of a healthy understanding. We have seen how, in the case of nonsenseness, madness materializes in a hyperfunction, rather than in a dysfunction, of the sensible faculty (a restless synopsis) and, in principle, we could suppose the same happens in all the other kinds of disorder. There are no objections to Jalley-Crampe's claim that «Kant has never confused the irrational with the ineffectual» (1979: 10). Imagination intensifies the faculty with which it merges; it becomes, so to speak, its accelerator. For Kant the madness that is most dangerous, and thus most worthy of attention, is the one that bears the sign of enormity, exaggeration, overkill<sup>9</sup>. In the case of deception, such signs are easily recognizable in the propensity to understand the particular manifoldness of experience—«glances, words, and otherwise indifferent actions»—under the sole universal of conspiracy. Self-deceivers, Kant writes, «in their unhappy delusion are often so acute [*scharfsinnig*] in interpreting that which others do naturally as aimed against them that, if only the data were true, we would have to pay due honour to their understanding» (Anth 215; 2006: 109, translation modified). In this passage as well, apparently Kant seems to claim that the understanding performs its function as per norm but its results are invalidated by the falsity of the starting data. However, according to the *Critique of Pure Reason*, truth and falsity of a sensible representation are not the result of an error of the senses, but of an error of the understanding (*cf.* KrV B 349-351, A 293-295; 1998: 384-385)<sup>10</sup>. It is thus possible to interpret deception as an excess of «acumen» (*Scharfsinnigkeit*), a quality that belongs to the subject of knowledge in which

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<sup>7</sup> This is how Frierson (2009: 276) and Sánchez Madrid (2018: 154) consider it.—What we are trying to demonstrate in this first part of our work is that imagination should always be regarded if not as the remote cause, at least as the proximate cause of mental derangement, which implies that it always suffers, *in primis*, from a pathology, but also that, as a faculty, it never does so in a specific way. It never happens that the imagination *alone* becomes ill and that the rest of the system of the faculties remains intact.

<sup>8</sup> As suggested by Butts (1986: 301) and by Makkreel 2014: 388.

<sup>9</sup> Makkreel states that mental illness involves «overstimulation», but adds that «its ultimate effect is to leave the mind even more passive than before» (2014: 388).

<sup>10</sup> *Cf.* also Anth 146; 2006: 37.

Kant recognizes, after all, a noxious potential: the «subtleties» that don't expand knowledge should be considered as a «useless employment of understanding» (Anth 201; 2006: 95). In this perspective, what appear as «self-made representations» would consist of the effects that a sick understanding elicits on sensibility, the exact opposite of what happens in the case of nonsenseness, where it is a sick sensibility that elicits effects on the understanding (constantly pushing it beyond itself in search of a correct unity of synthesis of the manifold of intuition)<sup>11</sup>. On the whole, it is true that deception refers to *Sinnenvorstellung*, yet it does so indirectly. Meo rightly observes how the subject of deception does not reach false conclusions from data, but shapes them on the basis of a «general definition of “conspiracy” which pre-exists perception» (1982: 84-85). Even before it is received by sensibility, the sensible in general is destined to be misinterpreted by the light of imagination under which the understanding lucubrates.

Kant defines fabulation, the third of the disorders discussed in the *Anthropology*, as a disorder of judgment (*cf.* Anth 202; 2006: 96). By judgment, intended as the faculty that has a priori principles, we mean reflective judgment, employed in the research of the universal (*genus* and *species*) to organize the manifoldness of the particulars of the experience. The Kantian *Logic* teaches that to search for the universal means to conceive it, to elaborate it, and in order to do so it is necessary to compare different sensible representations to discern similarities and dissimilarities and abstract identity from the many differences (*cf.* Log 93-95; 1992a: 591-593). Now, the elaboration of the universal, in general, does indeed depend on judgment, but this latter can perform its task only insofar as it possesses the natural talent of «wit» (*Witz*). The *Anthropology* emphasizes this in § 44 and later again in § 54 where the power to «pair» or «assimilate» «heterogeneous representations» is attributed to the «*ingenium comparans*» (Anth 220; 2006: 115). Thus, fabulation (*Wahnwitz*) alters judgment since it is a faculty that possesses «wit» (*Witz*). In fabulation,

the mind is held in suspense by means of analogies that are confused with concepts of similar things, and thus the power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding [*scil.* judgment], conjures up the connection of disparate things as universal, under which the representations of the universal are contained. Mental patients of this kind are for the most part very cheerful; they write insipid poetry and take pleasure in the richness of what, in their opinion, is such an extensive alliance of concepts all agreeing with each other (Anth 215; 2006: 109-110).

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<sup>11</sup> Our interpretation differs slightly, but significantly, from Brandt's. Brandt, in his *Kommentar zu Kants Anthropologie*, recognizes in deception a disorder of the understanding, but he locates it, specifically, in the failed discernment of the irreality of the objects constituted by it, rather than in the way those objects have been constituted: «Der Verstand versagt [...] im Fall des Wahnsinns bei der Frage des Realität des nunmehr einheitlichen Objekts» (Brandt 1999: 313). After all, such an interpretation still calls upon the falsity of intuitive data, from which the understanding would draw exact conclusions under a formal-logical profile: «Im Wahnsinn (von 1798) werden Phantasieobjekte als Gegebenheiten der Erfahrung genommen; diese falsche Prämisse dient dann als Grundlage formal richtiger Schlüsse» (*ibid.*: 315).

Here even more clearly than in other cases, it can be noted how imagination takes possession of a psychic function that does not belong to it and uses it improperly, with an atypical exuberance: imagination is confused with judgment and substitutes the painstaking task of comparing representations with the endless game of analogies, resulting in a pseudo-concept, very close to contrivance and poetry, that replaces the true, intellectual, concept. Imagination is, once again, at the origin of a «richness» of content that the Kantian taste for sobriety barely tolerates. In § 44 of the *Anthropology*, such an imaginative wit, harbinger of intellectual «riches», is judged to be of extremely poor quality and accuracy, and is associated with «game» and «luxury» (Anth 201; 2006: 96).

Finally, let us turn to the last kind of mental disorder, extravagance, the deranged reason. Kant notes the following symptoms:

The mental patient flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that can be completely exempted from its touchstone, imagining that he conceives the inconceivable. – The invention of the squaring of the circle, of perpetual motion, the unveiling of the supersensible forces of nature, and the comprehension of the mystery of the Trinity are in his power. He is the calmest of all hospital patients and, because of his self-enclosed speculation, the furthest removed from raving; for, with complete self-sufficiency, he shuts his eyes to all the difficulties of inquiry (Anth 215-216; 2006: 110).

It is hard to deny that the symptoms of extravagance can be found in the dogmatic philosopher, whose speculations on the nature of the soul, the beginning of the world, and the existence of God are well above the domain of sensible experience (cf. Brandt 1999: 317). The term «Aberwitz» does not appear in any of the three *Critiques*, and its occurrences in the Kantian *corpus* are, indeed, so rare that the *Kant-Lexikon* does not include it among its entries. Nonetheless, extravagance can be considered the most strictly theoretical element of *Schwärmerei*, of religious fanaticism, which is, even more than superstition, the great threat of Kantian Enlightenment (cf. Allouche-Pourcel 2010). Actually, besides the most specific meaning of religious fanaticism, the concept of *Schwärmerei* in Kant's critical thought has a technical meaning: «*Schwärmerei*, in the most general meaning is an overstepping of the bounds [*Grenzen*] of human reason undertaken according to principles» (KpV 85; 2002a: 110), and the faculty that is most inclined to go beyond the limits of reason is undoubtedly reason itself, driven by a «dogmatisch schwärmende Wißbegierde» (KrV A 10) whose oneiric, imaginative substrate Kant had already noticed in the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*. The *Reflexion 1505* included in the *Collegentwürfe* shows how extravagance is part of the concept of *Schwärmerei*, that is how dogmatic metaphysics, with its intuitive knowledge of the supersensible, constitutes the theoretical premise of practical fanaticism: «In der Phantasterey ist Wahnsinn, im Aberglauben Wahnwitz, in der Schwärmerey Aberwitz. [...] Schwärmer scheuen

Definition und Experiment wie als Feuer. Metaphysik macht Schwärmer, weil sie ihren eignen Qvell und Grenzen nicht zeigen kan» (HN 810)<sup>12</sup>.

## 2. The Non-Place of Imagination

Each of the four types of mental derangement implies the demolition of a specific boundary, since the contact with imagination presses one or the other cognitive faculty to an abnormal functional activity. Jalley-Crampe has observed how, for Kant, it is not «the sleep of reason that produces monsters; but, on the contrary, a hyperactivity that reason unfolds when it dreams whilst being awake or, which is the same thing, when it's devoted to metaphysics» (1979: 12). Nevertheless, if we look more closely and consider the monomaniacal aspect of deception and, in particular, of extravagance, that is the impoverishment of psychic contents that characterizes these two disorders, we should be talking of amplification rather than «hyperactivity» or hyperfunctioning. The psychic conduct of those affected by a disorder could be compared not so much to that of one who does many things, or more things than necessary, but rather to that of one who goes over the top. Although in the *Anthropology* Kant suggests on several occasions that a «richness» of representations is a particular attribute of imagination (cf. Anth 180, 181, 201; 2006: 73, 75, 96), the disorders produced by it, once madness takes place, seem to interest the intensity of the form instead of the abundance of contents. Mental derangements have a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature. Even the symptoms of nonsense and fabulation could be reinterpreted from this perspective. In the first case, we would have a greater space-time capacity of the *comprehensio aesthetica*; in the second, the extension of a same analogical relation (whatever that may be) to the totality of the representations of the universe. After all, the classification of psychopathologies in the 1764 *Essay* was undertaken by observing the qualities that madness manifests once it has reached a certain degree of intensity (cf. VKK 260; 2007: 66). But, eventually, the critical Kant has preferred the «Grenze», the limit of space, to the «Limitation», the limit of reality, and to him madness, especially that of reason, takes on the appearance of the overcoming of a line drawn before one's eye, since it is perceived within a precise geometry of the psychic space. Such geometry has all the appearance of being designed for the purpose of limiting imagination on multiple sides, thereby preventing it from any form of excess—creating, *de facto*, the conditions for an excess, in general, to occur<sup>13</sup>. In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant wrote that «the frontiers [*Grenzen*] between folly and understanding are so poorly marked that one can scarcely proceed for long in the one region without occasionally making a little sally into the other» (TG 356; 1992b: 343), and the aim of the first *Critique* was precisely that of sharpening the gaze on our cognitive faculty to better define these «so poorly marked» limits and block the areas of the understanding, sensibility, judgment, and reason to prevent imagination from enveloping them in its nebulous and exciting

<sup>12</sup> For an account of *Schwärmerei* that reverses the order of the terms, and treats *practical* fanaticism as «the most potent source of *theoretical* fanaticism», cf. Zuckert 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Conditions that are completely unrelated to the *Essay*, in which the theory of degrees ensures that the so-called 'normality' is nothing but a less intense form of madness.

atmosphere. Isn't what De Quincey recounts curious, that in Königsberg, before 1770, Kant used to hold private conferences for soldiers on the «art of fortification» (1873: 104)?

The phenomenon of mental derangement has elicited in Kant the necessity to render every faculty of the human mind a space with clear outlines, so that each kind of representation has a specific place of belonging, with the tacit assumption that imagination does not possess, in turn, a particular kind of representations, but rather is the phantasmal place of their blending<sup>14</sup>. In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, Kant believed that in order to prevent the illusions of madness it was necessary to «place the concepts in the true position [*wahre Stelle*] which they occupy relatively to the cognitive faculty of human nature» (TG 349; 1992b: 336). And what in that work might have seemed like a passing assertion later became, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the principle of a real «doctrine», the «transcendental topic», which, representing the faculties as «places» (*Örter*) (KrV B 325-325, A 268-269; 1998: 371), requires to examine representations in relation to «their seat [*Sitz*] in the mind» (KrV B 319; 1998: 368), since «it is this place [*Stelle*] in which they belong that concerns how they ought to belong to each other» (KrV B 318; 1998: 367). Such «topic», as it is known, is intended to distinguish, in particular, sensibility from the understanding, since at the origin of every speculative extravagance of reason there is a confusion between appearance and noumenon, caused, precisely, by the failed demarcation of the places dedicated to one or the other kind of representation. It seems that critical philosophy has delivered to the subject the topographical chart of his mind. But what is left of imagination in this drawing?

To *make* of each faculty a place has also meant to *give* each faculty a place: a necessity that emerges from the concept of system that inspires the transcendental doctrine of elements. A system differs from an aggregate because it is based on an idea of reason which, as a purpose, or an idea of the whole, determines a priori «the domain of the manifold as well as the position [*Stelle*] of the parts with respect to each other» (KrV B 860, A 832; 1998: 691). If the unity of the aggregate is a relative unity, made up of a

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<sup>14</sup> Kant displays his complex organization of human representations as follows: «The genus is **representation** in general (*representatio*). Under it stands the representation with consciousness (*perceptio*). A **perception** that refers to the subject as a modification of its state is a **sensation** (*sensatio*); an objective perception is a **cognition** (*cognitio*). The latter is either an **intuition** or a **concept** (*intuitus vel conception*). The former is immediately related to the object and is singular; the latter is mediate, by means of a mark, which can be common to several things. A concept is either an **empirical** or a **pure concept**, and the pure concept, insofar as it has its origin solely in the understanding (not in a pure image of sensibility), is called *notio*. A concept made up of notions, which goes beyond the possibility of experience, is an **idea** or a concept of reason» (KrV B 376-377, A 320; 1998: 398). However, Kant's words preceding the abovementioned passage are even more significant: «We are not so lacking in terms properly suited to each species of representations that we have need for one to encroach on the property of another [*in das Eigenthum einer anderen einzugreifen*]» (ivi). Using a juridical lexicon, Kant claims that each representation has a «property», a «landed estate» (*Eigenthum*). Lastly, it should be noted that, with the exception of the reference to «a pure image of sensibility», which, in any case, can only be either the pure form of space or the pure form of time (cf. KrV B 182, A 142), no reference is ever made to the image, intended as a particular kind of representation.

perpetually extendable series of parts that are added extrinsically to one another, the unity of system is, instead, an absolute unity, that allows «no contingent addition or undetermined magnitude of perfection» (ivi), and that can only grow from within, «like an animal body, whose growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb stronger and fitter for its end without any alteration of proportion» (KrV B 861, A 833; 1998: 691). The order of the system is organic, or, in the Kantian language, «architectonic», since it arranges a space in which everything that appears is localized, meaning it is located exactly where it should be. To systematize does not mean to worry about where such and such a thing should go, but to know what should be in such and such a place. This organic type of order affects the faculties collectively as a macrosystem and each one of them taken individually as a subsystem. For instance, in the opening lines of the *Transcendental Analytic*, Kant writes that it is possible to expose the concept of the pure understanding «only by means of an idea of the whole of the a priori cognition of the understanding, and through the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their connection in a system» (KrV B 89, A 64-65; 1998: 201); later on, in § 10 of the *Analytic of Concepts*, Kant claims that «the headings already exist; it is merely necessary to fill them out, and a systematic topic, such as the present one, will make it easy not to miss the place [*Stelle*] where every concept properly belongs and at the same time will make it easy to notice any that is still empty» (KrV B 109, A 83; 1998: 214); lastly, in Chapter III of the *Analytic of Principles*, Kant writes: «We have now not only travelled through the land of pure understanding, and carefully inspected each part of it, but we have also surveyed it, and determined the place [*Stelle*] for each thing in it» (KrV B 294, A 235; 1998: 338-339). And what applies to the understanding also applies to the other faculties, including reason, in its paradoxical way of being part of a system designed by itself.

Now, within this topographical organization of the mind, articulated on a large as well as a small scale, it seems that everything has been given a place so that imagination has none. Heidegger, in the *Kant-Buch*, rightly states that «the transcendental imagination is homeless» (1962: 142), since not only the *Critique of Pure Reason* deprives it of a part intended for its dissertation, but, in B Deduction, it also deprives it of the role of third fundamental faculty of knowledge next to the understanding and sensibility. Yet does all of this really depend, as Heidegger claims, on Kant's recoiling from the transcendental imagination as though in front of the «abyss» of an ontological knowledge of man that he feared to face (Heidegger 1962: 166-176)? Or doesn't it rather depend on a strategy aimed at keeping imagination in check and framing it in a hole, an absence delimited by the four faculties from which it was excluded? An exclusion, of course, instrumental to its control, since Kant's Enlightenment reply to the «unbridled» and «ruleless» «inventions» of imagination (Anth 181; 2006: 74), the harbinger of madness, surely does not correspond to a rejection but, rather, to an assimilation into a system that organizes the absence of imagination on a structural level to make better use of its strength on a functional level, in the synthesis of possible and intelligible; a system, that is, designed to transform imagination into *productive* imagination, reducing its «richness» to the simplicity of the

geometric, adimensional point from which each time it will have to restart in order to (re)construct its contents. The banning of the *Schwärmerei* from the sphere of moral actions depends on a theoretically disciplined imagination<sup>15</sup>.

We reserve the detailed exposition of the capture of imagination in the system of the faculties for another work. We hope, at least, to have depicted the topographical structure that made it possible<sup>16</sup>.

### 3. Madness in the Organic Order of Space

The existence of such a structure, after all, could explain why Kant adopts as a synonym for «mental derangement» the term «Verrückung», which means literally «displacement». Madness in the organic order of space appears as a displacement<sup>17</sup>. The term «Verrückung» is part of Kant's medical lexicon already in 1764, when he writes the *Essay*, but his stance within nosology changes: the «Verrückung» has no more the role of species, as a disorder of sensibility (cf. VKK 270; 2007: 76), but of genus. It guides the arrangement of the entries that compose the nosology itself. Nonsenseness, deception, fabulation, and extravagance are different forms of the «Verrückung überhaupt» (Anth 214). In each of them there is a displacement of a faculty from the place assigned to it by the system, a shift, a dislocation that relocates it in the non-place of imagination. There are as many types of disorder as there are types of displacement. But only three of them have a negative connotation, as causes of «disorder» and «deviation», since when reason is delirious its displacement has a positive connotation: it does not concern something that was organized within a certain order anymore, but the order itself in which things are organized. For nonsenseness, deception, and fabulation the displacement is relative, while for extravagance it is absolute: the whole mind is displaced, and with it all the faculties that belong to it:

[...] in this last kind of mental derangement there is not merely disorder and deviation from the rule of the use of reason, but also *positive unreason* [*positive Unvernunft*], that is,

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<sup>15</sup> «*Schwärmerei* leads the exalted person to extremes [*Äußersten*], *Muhammad* to the prince's throne and *John of Leyden* to the scaffold» (VKK 267; 2007: 73). But the fate of the exalted person depends on nothing but a total abandonment of the imagination to itself. Kant writes in the *Anthropology*: «[...] the power of imagination is naturally inclined to heighten the extremes [*Äußersten*]» (Anth 173; 2006: 66). This inclination, of which Kant senses all the danger, is what the critical system of the faculties has the task of correcting, by channeling the imaginative flow in the sole direction of a figuration produced under the rules of the understanding. In this regard, we quote an illuminating passage from the *Prolegomena*: «The imagination can perhaps be excused if it fantasizes [*schwärmt*] every now and then, that is, if it does not cautiously hold itself inside the limits [*Schranken*] of experience; for it will at least be enlivened and strengthened through than to remedy its languor. That the understanding, however, which is supposed to *think*, should, instead of that, *fantasize* [*schwärmen*] – for this it can never be forgiven; for all assistance in setting bounds [*Grenzen*], where needed, to the *Schwärmerei* of the imagination depends on it alone» (Prol 317; 2004: 68-69, mod. trans.). Imagination is allowed to surpass the *Schranken* of experience as long as it remains confined within the *Grenzen* imposed by critical philosophy, that is, as long as it remains subsumed under the understanding. Beyond the *Grenzen* are the «extremes», the fanaticism of the *Schwärmer*.

<sup>16</sup> In this article we have deliberately avoided addressing the issue of the role of imagination in the Kantian theory of knowledge, since our aim was to create the framework within which this issue should be addressed.

<sup>17</sup> Cf. the draft in Latin of the 1786 *Rektoratsrede* (HN 939-953), where the expression «mens in sede sua mota» recurs several times.

*another* rule, a totally different standpoint into which the soul is transferred [*versetzt*], so to speak, and from which it sees all objects differently. And from the *Sensorio communi* that is required for the unity of *life* (of the animal), it finds itself transferred to a faraway place (hence the word *Verrückung*) – just as a mountainous landscape sketched from a bird’s-eyes view prompts a completely different judgment about region than when it is viewed from level ground (Anth 216; 2006: 110).

In truth, this passage seems to be the legacy of a physiological hypothesis presented by Kant in his winter semester lectures on anthropology in 1781-1782:

The German word *Verrückung* indicates that the soul is moved [*gerückt*] from its appropriate place. The entire system of nerves is connected in the brain, where one may think there is what doctors have only supposed, i.e. the *sensorium commune*, or *corpus callosum*, the callous cerebral matter in the striated part of the brain, where the soul should be. This is the part of the brain from which all nervous centres begin. The *Verrückung* (we do not call here *Verrückung* a *delirium*, i.e. when a man raves during a disease, but when it is a usual madness) is perhaps a malady of the *sensorio communi* (V-Anth/Mensch 1011-1012).

Although the *Anthropology*, in the *Vorrede*, openly distances itself from physiology, which wouldn’t allow but to «speculate» (*vernünfteln*) about «cranial nerves and fibers» (Anth 119; 2006: 3), it is undeniable that in the aforementioned passage Kant gives credit to the theory of the *corpus callosum*, since «in this way we explain, as best we can, the so-called *Verrückung*» (Anth 216; 2006: 110). Yet, it is also undeniable that Kant couldn’t fully believe in this theory, which has as its object not the mind (*Gemüth*) but the soul (*Seele*), unless one wishes to believe that he intended to retract the *Critique*’s chapter on the paralogisms of pure reason<sup>18</sup>. Moreover, already in the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, when dealing with the thorny issue of the seat of the soul in the body, he would take shelter behind a non-localist position as oppose to the localist one of Knutzen and Crusius<sup>19</sup>. Thus,

<sup>18</sup> Perhaps it is also worth mentioning Kant’s letter to Soemmering of 10 August 1795: «[...] the concept of a seat of the soul requires *local presence*, which would ascribe to the thing that is only an object of the inner sense, and insofar only determinable according to temporal conditions, a spatial relation, thereby generating a contradiction» (Br 32; 2007: 223).

<sup>19</sup> In *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* Kant writes: «If one pursued the question further and asked: Where then is *your* place (that of the soul) in this body? Then I should suspect there was a catch in the question. [...] The question presupposes, namely, that my thinking ‘I’ is in a place which is distinct from the places of the other parts of that body which belongs to my self. But no one is immediately conscious of a particular place in his body; one is only immediately conscious of the space which one occupies relatively to the world around. [...] For that reason, I would insist on its strict refutation before I could be persuaded to dismiss as absurd what used to be said in the schools: *My soul is wholly in my whole body, and wholly in each of its parts*» (TG 324-325; 1992b: 312-313). On the issue of the local presence of the soul in XVIII century German philosophy cf. Heßbrüggen-Walter 2014.



in a certain way, the physiological explanation belongs to that kind of provisional, non-apodictic knowledge subordinated to pragmatic purposes<sup>20</sup>.

Nevertheless, if we wanted to bring the discourse on a more strictly transcendental level, we could say that Kant has translated the *sensorium commune* of metaphysical physiologists in the more purely transcendental concept of *sensus communis* (cf. Manganaro 1983: 185-186), where instead of the nervous fibres of the body, it is the cognitive faculties of the mind that are collected in a system and topographically arranged so as to establish a mutual harmony and agreement. Thus, the fourth type of *Verrückung*, absolute displacement, can surely mean the failure of a topographical arrangement of the faculties<sup>21</sup>. Once all of them are decentralized, they all centralize in a non-place defined by excitement and eccentricity<sup>22</sup>. The thinker (the deranged) lifts off the ground to look at things «from a bird's-eyes view». This «totally different standpoint» on things brings together the dogmatic philosophies of all times that were not able to territorialize the mind while casting their weak gaze on it. Kant's critical philosophy, soaked in what Hohenegger calls the «terminology of spatiality»<sup>23</sup> was born to solve an issue that was fundamentally logistical: to arrange a space that would function as a structure for the world of representation, ordering it to remove it from the dim light of imagination which confounds all. Such space could take shape only under the powerful gaze of an eye that limits and localizes, tracing dividing lines and putting each thing in its own place. But how much is there of imagination in this gaze, how much of derangement?

#### 4. Postscript. Remarks on Critical Philosophy

From the descriptive, empirical character of Kantian nosology—which is shared, incidentally, by every nosology—it does not follow that it is located «on the edge of transcendental philosophy» (Manganaro 1983: 178). Critical knowledge is implicit in the *Anthropology*, it constitutes its secret texture, and the paragraphs concerning the classification of the faculties are the most evident proof of such implication. And yet the *Anthropology* is not just a simple collection of critical acquisitions:

[It] maintains the division of the “faculties”—*Vermögen*—as in the *Critique*. However, its privileged domain is not that where the faculties and powers show off their positive

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<sup>20</sup> Knowing how to give a plausible account of madness can have its pragmatic function in certain contexts. Therefore the physiological-metaphysical concept of the seat of the soul has no value in itself, but only for the practical purpose towards which it is directed.

<sup>21</sup> As Fantasia (2020: 30-41) recently pointed out, with the loss of common sense there is the loss of the possibility of claiming a universal agreement with one's own judgments. For our part, we want to highlight that Kant, in § 40 of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, identifies common sense with taste, that is, with a «proportion» of the «cognitive faculties» (UK 293; 2000: 173). Since this proportion depends on the systematic disposition of the faculties, a damage to this disposition should be detected in the general symptom of the loss of common sense.

<sup>22</sup> The *Schwärmer* «is also often called (in milder terms) *over-excited* [*exaltirt*] or even eccentric [*excentrischer Kopf*]» (Anth 202; 2006: 97).

<sup>23</sup> Hohenegger acknowledges that the organic representation of space is essential for Kant on a meta-theoretical level, since it is «a constructive tool of his philosophy» (Hohenegger 2014: 520; cf. also 2012: 420-428), but does not investigate the reasons behind the choice of this tool.

attributes but where they show their failings—or at least where they face danger, where they risk being obliterated. [...] In anthropological investigation [...] the pursuit of each faculty takes the path of all possible deviation (Foucault 2006: 68-69).

The *Anthropology* is the «negative of the *Critique*» (*ibid.*: 66), hence the negative of a negative, which is the set of limitations that critical philosophy has given to the *Gemüth*. This means that through the empirical description of the misuses and pathological deviations of the cognitive faculty, confined by Kant within the range of what is purely subjective in the subject, the *Anthropology* allows us to grasp the original experience that Kant must have had of the *Gemüth*, away from categories such as those of subjective and objective. The *Gemüth* is the object the Kantian architectonic genius modelled with the territorializing tool of critical philosophy. The fact that mental illness can disrupt the system of the faculties is a sign of its contingency and factitious character, and gives us a clue as to why it was fabricated. The anthropological investigations of the 1760s have disclosed to Kant how the human mind is essentially something insane, fantasizing, even when it reasons, especially when it reasons. The *Inquiry*'s claim that «it is perhaps during sleep that the soul exercises its greatest facility in rational thought» (UD 290; 1992b: 263) will always be noteworthy. An awakening is surely not enough for a reason that also daydreams and that only in sleep has a way to fully rejoin its own essence. But is this what the critical thought really was, an awakening? Didn't reason, to distinguish itself from dream, have to dream *more*, to dream *better*, employing all that «creative poetic capacity» (*schöpferische Dichtungsfähigkeit*) with which, as Kant claims, «the soul of every human being [...] completes some imperfect resemblance in the representation of present things through one or another chimerical trait» (VKK 265; 2007: 70)?

The *Critique of Pure Reason* could not have been a «preventive measure [*Präservativ*] against a malady [*Krankheit*] of reason, which has its germ in our nature» (HN 79-80), without the resources provided to it by a systematic, organic space. Kant was not the first, and will not be the last—just think of Freud—, to take advantage of a spatial representation in order to give a philosophical account of the mind. Indeed, it is well known that Hume's idea of a mental geography played a central role in the development of Kant's critical thought:

It is remarkable concerning the operations of the mind, that, though most intimately present to us, yet, whenever they become the object of reflection, they seem involved in obscurity; nor can the eye readily find those lines and boundaries, which discriminate and distinguish them. The objects are too fine to remain long in the same aspects or situation; and must be apprehended in an instant, by a superior penetration, derived from nature, and improved by habit and reflection. It becomes, therefore, no inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different operations of the mind, to separate them from each other, to class them under their proper heads, and to correct all that seeming disorder, in which they lie involved, when made the object of reflection and enquiry. [...] And if we can go no farther than this mental geography, or delineation of the distinct parts and powers of the mind, it is at least a satisfaction to go so far... (Hume 2000: 10).

One wonders, however, if this «superior penetration», fallible, uncertain, has not been replaced, in Kant, by invention; if a fantasy has not drawn its «chimerical traits» where the eye barely sees; if the ever-changing contours of a geography have not given way to an immutable geometry, established once and for all. Hasn't Kant gone even further than Hume causing a force to turn against itself, pushing imagination to imagine the system within which it could no longer freely imagine<sup>24</sup>?

### Abbreviations for Kant's Works

Anth	<i>Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. VII, G. Reimer, Berlin 1973.
Br	<i>Briefwechsel</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. II, Bde. X-XIII, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.
GSM	<i>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. IV, De Gruyter, Berlin 1963.
HN	<i>Handschriftlicher Nachlass</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. III, Bde. XIV-XXIII, De Gruyter, Berlin 1925-1938.
KpV	<i>Kritik der praktischen Vernunft</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. V, De Gruyter, Berlin 1963.
KrV	<i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft (2. Auf. 1787)</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. III, De Gruyter, Berlin 1962; <i>Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1. Auf. 1781)</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. IV, De Gruyter, Berlin 1963.
KU	<i>Kritik der Urteilskraft</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. V, De Gruyter, Berlin 1963.
Prol	<i>Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. IV, De Gruyter, Berlin 1963.
TG	<i>Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik</i> in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.
UD	<i>Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.
VKK	<i>Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes</i> , in <i>Gesammelte Schriften</i> , Ab. I, Bd. II, De Gruyter, Berlin 1969.
V-Anth/Mensch	<i>Vorlesungen Wintersemester 1781/1782 Menschenkunde</i> , Petersburg,

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<sup>24</sup> To those who wanted to object that in aesthetic judgments there is, as Kant states, a «free play» of imagination, I reply that the latter, in its so-called freedom, must in any case conform to the rules of the understanding.

in *Gesammelte Schriften*, Ab. IV, Bd. XXV, De Gruyter, Berlin 1997.

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## La melancolía de la razón pura (baby blues *ex ante facto*)

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### Abstract

El texto es una reflexión dividida en 28 secciones que, a través de diversas resonancias y evocaciones entrelazadas que parten del texto “Duelo y Melancolía” de Sigmund Freud, propone concebir la razón pura como la sede de una melancolía auto-infligida, de un “yo pienso” estructuralmente “pobre y vacío”, haciendo por el camino escala en las ramificaciones y el potencial (por ejemplo, anticapitalista) de la melancolía frente al duelo.

### Key words

Duelo; melancolía; razón pura; idealismo trascendental; Freud; Kant.

*A Monique, quien sabe bien de esto*

1. *Duelo y melancolía* (1917) es una pequeña obra maestra de introspección—análoga en eso a las *Meditaciones metafísicas* cartesianas. A pesar de su aparente método comparativo y su aparente validez restringida a unos pocos casos clínicos, es introspectiva de cabo a rabo; el vacío en el yo (ese pseudo-sentimiento) o, diríamos, el hueco en el plexo inferior no es otra cosa que un conjunto de sentimientos reflexivos en constante conflicto, de ahí la ambigüedad melancólica. La escaramuza permanente *dentro* como principio de autoconstitución.

Se dice, pues, que *Trauer*, entendido como *duelo*, “refiere tanto al afecto penoso como a su manifestación exterior”. Curioso, ello supone una dialéctica peculiar entre lo interior y lo exterior: abre en un caso el espacio para la condolencia, el fingimiento, para el rito y otras instituciones que marcan socialmente las transiciones biológicas de las personas. Pero, acaso, será necesario recordar que hay tipos de muerte, y que a cada uno debiera corresponder un tipo de duelo: si el muerto ha sufrido, si ha gozado y se ha ido “en paz”, si ha sido asesinado, torturado, accidentado por las máquinas o devorado por otros animales. A cada tipo de muerte, un tipo de duelo. Las categorías forenses no dan la pauta, pues si bien toda muerte es natural, no toda muerte es violenta. En el duelo, podría decirse,

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lo que se hace y se dice no tiene que coincidir con lo que se siente. La melancolía no tiene, en cambio, pausa: lo que se siente —el vacío dentro— o no se siente es lo que se hace y lo que se dice. El vacío es, y tiene peso, mucho peso ontológico.

2. Pura *daementia praecox*, inducción artificial del bienestar pequeño burgués. Tras sufrir los tiempos modernos en el proletarísimo arrabal, el diván es el mérito-merecimiento supremo. Una meretriz es jefa, reina. No hay como ser funcional, pro-duc-ti-vo. ¿Ya completó usted su correspondiente informe/ declaración?

3. Si el duelo es un afecto normal (Freud *dixit*), la melancolía podría ser un defecto normalizado. El duelo permanente es la conclusión prohibida de una deducción competente. Ciertamente, el duelo ininterrumpido, como las deducciones incompetentes, produce casi sin excepción compulsiones a repetir y repetir y repetir... El efecto del vacío buscado y cultivado —puesto que el duelo debe anteceder, a costa de la culpa, la herencia. Y cuando lo testado no permite el duelo, la melancolía es la única deducción competente de la culpa. Acaso es la melancolía la única re-creación *ex nihilo*, ya que por la nada nada pasa. Aquí no ha pasado nada. ¡Vete (*Va toi*) con tus interrogaciones a otra parte!

4. El buzo cartesiano y la expectativa de castigo (un buen título para un ensayo ágrafo). La creación (de qué) como redención. Se requiere precizarla. Ya.

5. O la melancolía es un duelo (nace del duelo, se nutre del duelo anticipado, imaginado, ficcionado y es, por tanto, duelo maximizado), o bien se opone al duelo, lo contradice: traspasa los mojones de lo que tiene remedio, de lo que todavía no se decide a pasar del todo y se queda en esa manera de dar vueltas y vueltas de un gato tierno que huye mientras saca las garras. La pérdida y la función de X (o doble negación). Episodio fóbico: allá va lo que se daba, que no (nunca) lo soportó, y no obstante, lo buscó siempre: me vuelvo mi acosador y el tirano de sí, la ingrata compañía. Pero, en fase maniaca, la melancolía no es ya un duelo —el gozo supremo de la pérdida, la única libertad sin adjetivos, la cura pagada— ni tampoco se opone al duelo: simplemente no importa quién pene y quién goza, siempre que se *pene* y se *goce*. Siempre que (alguien, algo) *pene/goce*. Bien, por fin, lo real pasa a chingar a su madre (y a su padre) autorizadamente.

6. **Pasado** un cierto tiempo se le superará (*es wird mal aufgehoben werden*). Al duelo no hay que perturbarlo, no se le *debe* perturbar, a la melancolía no se le *puede* perturbar. Por ello, el melancólico vive sólo en el espacio, no en el tiempo. La melancolía se vive sólo espacialmente: el tiempo, como se dice en el lugar común, ha quedado suspendido. Curioso que, en esto, la melancolía comparta rasgo con el arrobo amoroso, con los raptos creativos, pero también con las variadas formas de sociopatía vigentes.

7. ¿La pérdida de una abstracción? La patria proletaria, la justicia humana y la divina, la libertad de los antiguos y la de los modernos —el objeto de conocimiento y lo sujetado. Ya. Si se mira el estado de las cosas humanas, habría que declarar el estado de duelo permanente. La melancolía reina y la jaula generacional pasa la cuenta. El napalm y los drones no son ninguna abstracción *pour hippies de luxe...* y, sin embargo, el nominalismo nomina poco. (Messidor)

8. La melancolía descansa en un sistema de desasosiego. En el extremo derecho, una delirante expectativa de castigo (*Straff*)... el castigo es el duelo mismo, la escaramuza de

poderes, deberes y haceres que se han perdido sin remedio, como los peces/mónadas que nadie discierne bajo la mezcolanza de las aguas. Resultado: la pérdida de interés por el mundo externo es la fase melancólica; en la otra esquina (yacen, penan), la demostración de la existencia de Dios, de la existencia del mundo externo, las pruebas antiescépticas, la construcción lógica del mundo sobre la base de enunciados observacionales, el principio de plenitud según el cual la perfección consiste en la realización del mayor número de posibilidades (fase maniaca).

9. El /La orden de la realidad no es, de suyo, dolorosa/o--¡sólo su ejecución! Y, ¿quién (qué moderno) puede ejecutarla sin placebos? El placebo kantiano es la razón pura y el supremo experimento mental que ésta supone para entender el conocimiento empírico; también la acción hecha por deber (no sólo conforme al deber); también, al lado de una extraña capacidad de juzgar, la contemplación de lo bello y lo sublime desprovista de deseo; también la historia racional y el optimismo teleológico; así como la ilusión de las libertades políticas meramente burguesas. (Termidor)

10. La teoría kantiana de la idealidad del espacio y del tiempo (que no del espacio-tiempo) en la Estética trascendental es un testimonio melancólico superior. Es, como bien se sabe, la pieza clave del idealismo trascendental, aquel que aún se pregona como si hubiese sido una revolución científica. [Ojo: esa teoría es mejor entenderla como una teoría acerca del espacio y del tiempo en relación con la experiencia posible de las criaturas humanas, no como una teoría sobre el espacio y el tiempo físicos. Lo que es más, no es siquiera una teoría sistemática propiamente, sino algo así como el punto cero o el *Big Bang* (Caimi) de la empresa denominada crítica de la razón pura.] Tomemos sólo al espacio. Kant tiene afirmaciones diversas: que es una intuición, no un concepto; que no obtenemos la representación única y singular del espacio por la experiencia; que es una *forma* de la intuición. Todo ello, y más, de algún complicado modo, debe ser combustible para la *Humildad* epistémica, i.e., la conclusión de que el espacio no es una propiedad de las cosas consideradas en sí mismas, sino una condición subjetiva de la experiencia de objetos externos –los fenómenos. ¿Cómo no atisbar aquí, en la célebre y celebrada tesis de la humildad–expresada, eso sí, en ese magno ejercicio de *Arroganz* que es la *Crítica*-- el abismo melancólico de la razón pura?

11. A vuelapluma, la humildad kantiana proviene de una secuencia de pensamiento como la que sigue: para los humanos, es imposible conocer un objeto sin que éste les afecte sensiblemente (premisa epistémica). Las propiedades extrínsecas de las cosas –esto es, las que ellas poseen en virtud de sus relaciones (e.g., espaciales, temporales, causales)—no son reductibles a sus propiedades intrínsecas –aquellas que las cosas poseen en virtud de lo que ellas mismas son (premisa metafísica). De ahí sigue (conclusión epistémica) que no podemos conocer las propiedades intrínsecas de las cosas, es decir, se sigue nuestra ignorancia de las cosas en sí mismas.

12. El espacio es, o bien una sustancia, un contenedor de espacios relativos (aunque sí que funciona como marco de referencia), o una abstracción de la percepción de las relaciones espaciales determinadas entre los objetos (así como un árbol genealógico es una



abstracción a partir de relaciones de parentesco determinadas), o una condición subjetiva de la experiencia de objetos externos. Si el espacio fuese una sustancia o una relación entre sustancias, nuestra representación del espacio provendría de la experiencia de objetos y de las relaciones en el espacio. No obstante, nuestra representación de espacio es una intuición a priori, por lo que las primeras dos opciones quedan descartadas. Así, tenemos permitido concluir, *al mismo tiempo y en un mismo paso*, que el espacio es una condición subjetiva de la experiencia de objetos externos (la subjetividad del espacio), y que el espacio no es una propiedad de las cosas consideradas en sí mismas (la idealidad del espacio).

13. La idealidad del espacio como orden de la coexistencia, preconizada desde Leibniz y barrocammente retomada por Kant, es un modo, perverso, de soportar el orden de la realidad. Es crucial que tal orden incluya un sujeto o, al menos, un detector de relaciones espaciales.

14. Ejecutar pieza a pieza la orden/ el orden de la realidad. El espacio como el orden de coexistencia de las sustancias materiales o de los fenómenos bien fundados, se vislumbra, en Kant, como condición de la experiencia de lo externo determinado. De *orden a condición*, uno podría decir que hay una cierta liberación en la medida en que, metafísicamente hablando, para el Leibniz que presumiblemente estaba leyendo Kant, las propiedades extrínsecas sí que se reducen a las intrínsecas. ¿Qué es esto? Se trata del *efecto pixel*, como podría llamarsele: Tómese la imagen de una cara formada por puntos expandidos. Por un lado, es posible notar la configuración local de las relaciones de cercanía y lejanía entre los puntos que constituyen la imagen, y, por otro, desde una perspectiva espacial distinta, la imagen misma. Un cambio en la disposición y arreglo mutuo de los puntos resulta en un cambio en el rostro. Pues bien, la idea de que las propiedades extrínsecas de una sustancia pueden reducirse o, en última instancia, no son otra cosa que las correspondientes propiedades intrínsecas –las propiedades de las mónadas—es la idea de que las propiedades representadas en la imagen (imaginemos las arrugas de un rostro) dependen y, en última instancia, *no son sino* el arreglo peculiar de los puntos sobre un superficie.

15. Arrugas/marcas del rostro: de arruga en arruga puede acaso trazarse la trayectoria de los duelos. De un duelo a otro, como de una a otra arruga. Las arrugas del melancólico, sin embargo, no transitan, no expresan nada, porque dentro no hay nada que pudiera aspirar a expresarse. En la melancolía, las arrugas sólo son, no expresan.

16. La idealidad del espacio es un testimonio del empobrecimiento del mundo propio de la afección melancólica. El mundo de los fenómenos, el mundo de los objetos que es posible ubicar en el espacio (y en el tiempo) y a los que cabe aspirar conocer, es un mundo incoloro... o al menos indiferente al color. Matiz: solamente le importa el color –una propiedad de las llamadas *secundarias*—en la medida en que puede categorizarse como una *magnitud intensiva*. Y eso es, a decir verdad, bastante poco para lo que es el color, ¿o no?

17. Uno siempre puede saber *a quién* perdió, pero nunca *lo que* perdió. Nunca, nada, nadie (Saer). Y, si el mundo tiene juntas fundamentales, en la idea de que uno puede saber que debe haber algo que cumpla una función –para que, e.g., la realidad física sea en algún

sentido legaliforme—sin saber exactamente el *quid* de ese algo (cuál es su naturaleza, qué es determinadamente), hay, también, más melancolía que teoría. Dicho de otro modo, el realismo modal, el cual no solo es compatible sino que lleva a la humildad epistémica, es, como el idealismo trascendental, un testimonio supremo de melancolía.

18. La constelación anímica de la revuelta...si Abraham es el primer melancólico, el buddhismo es obligación: no hay unidad originaria, sólo agregados de agregados de partes que en sí mismas son, a su vez, agregados de agregados. La sensación de perder algo que nunca se tuvo. Hendrix, *Little Wing*. Nada parecido al Calvario del espíritu absoluto, el remedio definitivo de la contingencia y la vulnerabilidad. ... Sus quejas son (en uno de los milésimos ciclos) reclamos (a sí mismo). Pero no, el fóbico acompañante del sacrificado no alcanza redención, no hay salida, nadie irá a llorarle, ninguna dolorosa mujer acudirá a lamerle las heridas al cadáver y, por lo tanto, dado que el llanto debe reinar, llora por sí mismo —el último recurso de la autorepresentación melancólica. La representación melancólica, sin embargo, no puede ser nunca un auto de fe —el rito es privado, representa y priva. La razón es que siempre hay razones, aunque no siempre sean aceptadas de la misma manera. Y como sus quejas (*Klagen*) son reclamos (*Anklagen*), no puede haber paz, solo guerra todo el tiempo —*war all the time*. La razón pura se halla acosada por preguntas que ella misma no puede, nunca, resolver.

18.1 Los manuscritos de Leningrado, donde el sentido interno se intuye a sí mismo: me afecto a mí mismo al llevar las representaciones de los sentidos externos a la conciencia empírica de mi estado. El sentido interno marca subjetivamente el orden de la sucesión *ad infinitum*, por lo que no puede soportar la pura permanencia o el orden de la simultaneidad indefinida.

Aunque la *Crítica* es la costosa terapia, no hay resultado redentor; de ahí la humildad epistémica, la consciencia de la propia ignorancia. Lo mejor de la cura son las flores de sangre: si esperábamos algo sustancial y sustantivo con qué operar las sustituciones indefinidas, descubrimos que somos sólo amasijos de relaciones en relación con amasijos de relaciones. El mundo natural y la subjetividad, hasta donde es posible para los humanos saberlo, tienen una estructura relacional, no categorial. No hay, por tanto, hasta donde alcanzamos a saber, propiedades intrínsecas de las cosas, sólo propiedades extrínsecas: su tiempo, su espacio, su comunidad de causas, su interacción. En el fractalismo hay cosas con relaciones, pero las cosas siempre son, a su vez, relaciones —acaso de otro estrato, con otras leyes. Por eso, cualquier sustitución en una parte supone una revisión en muchas de las otras —y no hay porqué asumir solo causalidad o efectividad meramente próximas.

19. El remplazo y lo remplazable. El melancólico no puede pagar una ruptura, sólo vivir es, ya, estar pagándolo todo —como elección conciente, racional, como decisión unánime de todos los yos convocados y desbocados. Sí, queridos, aspirad a ser soportados cuando la tolerancia es sólo tener que soportar, así sea en tanto los críos crecen, tanta miseria patriarcal. Pero, queridas, *una* puede saber a quién ha perdido, pero no puede (nunca) saber *qué* ha perdido. ¿No es maravilloso? Después de todo hay redención: al menos del tipo

narcisista: ¿no? Lxs que me perdieron, aunque no coincidan extensionalmente con lxs que se perdieron de mí, no saben lo que perdieron –no saben de lo que se perdieron.

20. ¿Habrán melancolías colectivas, o es solo una, solitaria y privada la jaula de la melancolía? La castora: “el hombre permanece solo [...lo cual para muchos es] una experiencia más atractiva que una relación auténtica con un ser humano.” Es cierto, pero, en algún lugar, alguien, acaso, se preguntará, pensando en casos individuales, ¿qué es más atractivo? Experiencias auténticas pueden tenerse, al menos en principio, con seres humanos, con plantas o con animales de granja. La atracción de la soledad, una melancolía cultivada: compárese la búsqueda de autenticidad con la búsqueda de la autonomía. ¿Estará en la primera, más que en la segunda, el punto de quiebre de la opresión de la especie en los cuerpos femeninos? Este patriarcado es también, acaso, una jaula colectiva de la melancolía.

21. La inhibición de toda productividad como característica de la melancolía. La melancolía que se encontró con un publitrelacionista que decía ser poeta que se encontró con un perro que no quería ladrar, con una madre que no quería ya saber nada de nada (*Baby blues*). El potencial anticapitalista de lo melancólico: después de todo, si, como el imperativo categórico en su tiempo, la melancolía fuera el rasero de las intenciones humanas postindustriales, nadie produciría ya nada. Pero, acaso la máxima melancólica puede universalizarse... y entonces la prehistoria que somos cobra su precio real.

22. Las alcantarillas son necesarias para mantener la salubridad de los palacios. Abbas Kiarostami. De *10*: la diferencia entre las casadas y las callejeras es la diferencia entre el mayoreo y el menudeo. La metafísica aplastante del patriarcado reina. El acto sexual se torna en un servicio. De ahí que la “legalización de la prostitución” sea análoga a la legalización de una sustancia psicoactiva. Es, cuando la historia se cuenta completa, la constatación de la libertad de sufrir bajo el turbocapitalismo. De la calle a la alcoba matrimonial, la consigna es generar valor agregado en la cadena productiva.

23. La opresión oprime. Y la guitarrita ya como último remedio. Como si hubiera remedio de tanto agravio, tanta mierda derramada sin control, sin hastío, sin bastar, tanto irse siempre para abajo como remedio que no es remedio. ¿De qué podría ser remedio la guitarrita, --la música, el arte? Cuantimás se encarama el mono, más enseña la cola, el orificio de desalojar y la mierda que no alcanza a lamer con la larga lengua.

*As high as the monkey can climb*

*the more it shows its tail.*

*Misery is the river of the world.*

*(The devil built the chapel).*

*There is nothing kind about man.*

“Las querellas (*Anklagen*), en fin, se ajustan a otra persona a quien el enfermo ama, ha amado, o amaría.” En el duelo, el mundo se ha hecho pobre y vacío; en la melancolía, eso le ocurre al yo mismo. El enfermo nos describe a su yo como indigno, estéril y moralmente despreciable; se hace reproches, se denigra y espera repulsión y castigo. Se humilla ante todos los demás y conmisera a cada uno de sus familiares por tener lazos con una persona tan indigna. No juzga que le ha sobrevenido una alteración, sino que extiende

su autocrítica al pasado; asevera que nunca fue mejor. El cuadro de este delirio de insignificancia -predominantemente moral- se completa con el insomnio, la repulsa del alimento y un desfallecimiento, en extremo asombroso psicológicamente, de la pulsión que compele a todos los seres vivos a aferrarse a la vida. En uno de sus ciclos, el melancólico es contraejemplo del conato espinoziano; es un organismo, un ser vivo, sin finalidad y sin fuerza interna, y un organismo sin conato no es solo un tragicómico ser para la muerte sino un ser indeterminable: un zombie emocional.

24. El iceberg se derrite con las guerras del agua. [*There ain't no use to sit and wonder why, babe ...it don't matter anyhow.*] Así que en la melancolía el yo se ha hecho pobre y vacío, a diferencia del duelo, donde lo empobrecido y hueco es el mundo. Ahora bien, si el yo pienso --aquél que tiene que poder acompañar todas mis representaciones pues de lo contrario no serían nada para mí-- es pobre y vacío, pobres serán todas sus representaciones. No en balde tiene una identidad meramente lógica, no sustancial, no es una cosa. La cura del melancólico kantiano es ¡uno, dos, tres egos cartesianos! Sustancia, más sustancia (sea como algo que existe por sí mismo, como sujeto que no puede ser objeto, como la portadora madre de todas las propiedades, como lo que permanece a lo largo de los cambios, como lo único que es verdaderamente capaz de actuar), pensamiento, menos pensamiento; yo, tres veces yo; y cuerpo, cuál, dónde, cómo: sólo que los cuerpos no se tocan (no hay cuerpos, sólo, acaso, mi cuerpo), y el pensamiento, de tan lleno, no alcanza a pensar nada fijo más allá de tres minutos cortos (lo que transcurre en la pantallita dactilar), y el yo no está en el cuerpo como un capitán en su barco. ¿O sí? ¿Qué capitán, en cuál de todos los barcos? Es preferible el buzo que se hunde bajo la presión superficial pero flota por la presión del fondo. El buzo kantiano.

25. La línea de flotación del buzo kantiano está trazada por el espacio y por el tiempo (no confundir con el espacio-tiempo) como condiciones subjetivas de la experiencia posible; no lo está, como cabría quizás esperar, por los sentidos externo e interno. Puede barruntarse que la teoría del sentido interno está diseñada para acomodar la representación del transcurso del tiempo en la sensibilidad, entendida ésta como capacidad para recibir o ser afectado por objetos particulares. Sentimos el orden de lo sucesivo en el tiempo a través de un sentido, especial, que es el sentido interno. No hay necesidad de hacer esto con la representación no conceptual de la simultaneidad espacial. Decir que el espacio es la forma del sentido externo es decir que lo simultáneo tiene un orden y que ese orden es parte constitutiva de experiencia humana. Para decir lo correspondiente del tiempo, hay que decir, además, que tenemos una capacidad de representación no conceptual del tiempo que es el sentido interno. No obstante, la teoría de los sentidos externo e interno supone la diversidad espacial y temporal. Y esa diversidad, depende de las intuiciones puras de espacio y de tiempo. A esto debe agregarse que espacio y tiempo son, por sí mismos, intuiciones, no solamente órdenes previos a la experiencia, aunque presentes en toda experiencia de objetos. Como intuiciones, son representaciones singulares y únicas: sólo hay un espacio, y sólo hay un tiempo, y la diversidad de espacios y de tiempos se deriva,

según Kant, de la unidad original de tales intuiciones. Estamos ante dos unidades originarias, no conceptuales, enraizadas en la sensibilidad humana.

26. La redención y el reemplazo. Nada como un clavo para sacar otro clavo. Pero, ¿cuál es el otro? La estructura de las revoluciones científicas: nunca se abandona una teoría, por mala que sea, si no se tiene ya, al menos en ciernes, una alternativa... o dos, o tres. El paso a la acción no es, de cualquier forma, garantía de resultados –o más bien, el paso a la acción tiene casi siempre resultados inesperados. Nadie sabe nunca para quién trabaja. En el duelo la redención es el orden de la realidad: primero, saber de la pérdida, la desfavorida huida de la existencia física del muerto –lo que sólo existe como células en el proceso irremediable de descomposición. Y, entonces, la sustitución sobreviene con algún otro saco de células, éstas todavía vivas de algún modo, los cuales sacos de células más temprano que tarde encuentran su disolución en cámaras de incineración después de leucemias y testamentos. Y la rueda de las sustituciones sigue, simplemente porque sigue, sin ninguna razón en particular o, si se quiere, por todas las profundísimas razones que no equivalen en verdad a gran cosa –cuando se las piensa bien.

27. En la melancolía, en cambio, la redención no tiene solución químico-física –a no ser la máquina biológica de reproducción social... con los costos consabidos para la creatividad presunta o inventada, para la autonomía del individuo y de la individuo, para la serenidad de los lazos disfuncionales de parentesco. La melancolía, para ser melancolía, debe no tener redención –o la redención no puede ser sino inventada –no hay, en estricto sentido, ningún cuerpo pestilente que permita la clausura epistémica del deseo libidinal, ningún orden de la realidad que se imponga a las autoinfatuaciones del melancólico. La razón es que el vacío es autoinfligido –autocultivado, autopermisido, autocombatido. En este plexo, la melancolía deviene en el contrario de la autarquía. El principio rector es el hueco dentro –la nada que nada y que, así como amanece, así también anochece. Esto explica, también, que en la melancolía el reemplazo sea imposible –¿cómo se puede reemplazar un ideal (algo a fin de cuentas hueco) sino con otro ideal (algo igualmente hueco)? Pero, ¿para qué necesitamos agentes permanentes y persistentes? La actividad de cocinar, ¿requiere que el fuego sea un agente persistente, o solamente una serie continua de llamas?

28. Espuma de días, tensión superficial.

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## **Kant on melancholy: philosophy as a relief to the disgust for life**

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### **Abstract**

Melancholy occupies a privileged place in the Kantian taxonomy of temperaments since the pre-critical phase, but it is in the Nineties that it reveals its philosophical fecundity. Melancholy becomes, in fact, an interesting notion not so much because of its relationship with Kantian biography, nor because of its presence in the description of psychopathies, but because it lies, unique in this, on the borderline between pathology and sanity. Melancholy thus provides an opportunity to show the topicality of Kantian reflection on mental illness since it underlines the continuity, and not the rupture, between the healthy mental state and that affected by illness, in line with today's most widespread tendencies to consider mental illness as a privileged observatory of the subject.

### **Key words**

melancholy, mental disease, pain, temperament, disgust

Kant writes in the *Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view* (§ 50): melancholy (*Tiefsinnigkeit, melancholia*) “is itself not yet a mental derangement, but it can very well lead to it”, it “can also be a mere delusion of misery which the *gloomy* self-tormentor (inclined to worry) creates”. It is so easy to take as melancholic “only a profoundly thoughtful (*tiefdenkenden*) person” (Anth, AA 7: 213; tr. p. 107)<sup>1</sup>.

Melancholy has a privileged place in Kantian taxonomy of temperaments since the pre-critical period, starting from the relationship between the melancholic state of mind and

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<sup>1</sup> There may also be here an interplay of words on Kant's part between the terms *Tiefsinnigkeit* (Melancholy) and *tiefdenkenden* (thoughtful).

the feeling of the sublime in the *Observations*. Also in the *Essay on the maladies of the head*, melancholy stays as one of the main temperaments Kant describes. It is however in the writings on anthropology that melancholy reveals its philosophical fertility. By comparing Kant's *Lectures on Anthropology* and the *Anthropology from a pragmatical point of view*, melancholy shows up as a complex notion, not only relevant in Kant's biography (think for example to Vahinger's essay, *Kant als melancholiker* [H. Vahinger 1898]), or for its presence in the description of psychopathies, but because it is placed on the border between pathology and healthy mental state.

The thesis I will support states that melancholy signs the boundary between disease and temperament, showing more the continuity than the break between sane and insane mental state. I will also support that, collecting the many passages in the anthropological writings dedicated to melancholy, we can observe a twofold and opposite direction. Melancholy can be meant as *Tiefsinnigkeit*, as a deep insight typical of the scientific thought and of philosophizing, or it can degenerate in mental disease when, on the contrary, melancholy is born from boredom and it brings to nausea or disgust (*Überdruß*) towards life. I will compare this mood with duties towards oneself and I will point at philosophizing and at cultivating one's own spiritual progress as a possible therapy against melancholy. The aim will be to show that cultural autopreservation is part of duties towards oneself just as physical autopreservation. Philosophy carries so out the task of "soul dietetic" by avoiding to the subject a degeneration of melancholy in mental illness, through a search of the unity of life. The two directions melancholy can follow, towards the sane or towards the insane state of mind, can so be summarize as such: when melancholy is a kind of uneasiness combined with curiosity, it becomes an element of the process of knowledge and it comes near to the embarrassment we feel in front of the world when we are amazed of it; on the contrary, when melancholy is not involved in a movement of the state of mind, it describes the mood of the subject stuck in a state of boredom that leads to self-loathing, madness and suicide.

Melancholy gives so the occasion to show the actuality of Kant's thought on mental illness, in line with the nowadays most common trends to consider mental illness as a privileged observatory for the subject (see E. Brady-A. Haapala 2003; J. Radden 2002). As Kandel has recently written: "every activity we engage in, every feeling and thought that gives us our sense of individuality, emanates from our brain. When you taste a peach, make a difficult decision, feel melancholy, or experience a rush of joyous emotion when looking at a painting, you are relying entirely on the brain's biological machinery. Your brain makes you who you are" (E.R. Kandel 2018, p. 23). I will follow so a clear methodological framing within a "dialectical" perspective on mental illness, that is within a point of view considering psychopathy nor as a loss of reason nor as an annihilation of humanity but as opposition to the sane mental state and as its definition in negative.



### 1. Melancholy in 18th century

The possibility to state a thesis supporting that melancholy lays in between madness and healthy state of the mind is allowed by the same methodology followed by Kant. In dealing with mental diseases, Kant applies a method consolidated between the Fifties and the Sixties of the 18<sup>th</sup> Century, a method developed and promoted by the class of experimental philosophy at the Berlin Academy of Sciences (L. Lattanzi 2013). In the 1759 *Lois de Beausobre* reports three *Memoires* dedicated to madness and published only seven years later (L. de Beausobre 1766 and 1767). Beausobre's *Memoires* are relevant to my research not only because they are a source for Kant and reveal an interest in madness within the context of Wolff's psychology, but especially because they support a thesis of continuity between the healthy and the sick mental state starting from a reflection on melancholy. Referring to Leibniz's metaphysics and to Johann Georg Sulzer's reprise in his research on pleasure (1751 and 52), Beausobre deals with madness from the study of the functioning of the imagination, as Kant did in his writings on anthropology. This is associated with a comparison with modern French philosophy, with postcartesian thought, but above all with the contemporary *Encyclopedie*, in which, under the voice *Delire*, D'Aumont writes that the three main forms of illness of the spirit are delirium, "mania" and precisely "melancholy" (D'Aumont 1966, p. 44).

Beyond this, according to the perspective that has been spreading in Germany since the end of the Fifties, the madman is therefore the one who is unable to see clearly the connection between ideas: that is to say, without going beyond classical rationalism. Within this context, scholars examine madness because they want to identify not only what distinguishes it, but also what opposes it to reason, yet at the same time it becomes clear that no one can say he is at safe and that mental illness can appear from a simple error of the imagination. Placing the cause of madness in the imagination means in fact recognizing that the madman has no false perceptions, but rather his imagination alters his perceiving. The state of the madman is therefore irreducible to a state of disease: the madman is never just a sick person. A clear example of the ambiguous character of the functioning of the imagination is the poetic activity, which allows to show how the imaginative action moves on the border between madness and artistic creation. For Beausobre, poets do not confuse reality with the ghosts of their imagination, yet they are often so caught up in their images that they seem to feel their presence. When poets almost come to feel the presence of the ghosts of their imagination, they are not far from the fools.

It is therefore a question of reflecting on the possibility of extending the imagination: a reflection that is widely shared by the philosophers who developed Wolff's psychology, especially within the aesthetic thought and within the theories of the sublime; according to Beausobre, we actually have to consider also the risks of this extension of imagination in terms of psychopathy. Within this reflection, melancholy constitutes the privileged case study, and the medical examples proposed to investigate the relationship between imagination and mental illness almost always lead to the treatment of melancholy. The examples suggest that madness is not an extraordinary pathological condition, but a state of

the soul to which everyone is exposed, at least in certain forms, or for some time (Lattanzi 2013).

As Beausobre expressly states, if in the soul of every man, at every moment, the representations of the past are mixed with those of the present, and the imagination continually alters the sensations, the only difference between the mad and the reasonable people is the degree of liveliness of the imagination. The point of passage, the moment when the soul begins to push towards madness is imperceptibly marked by the 'degree of assent' given to the representations of the imagination (L. de Beausobre 1767, p. 405; see Ch. Wolff 1747, p. 130).

Beausobre illustrates the nature of madness by describing the classical symptoms of "mélancolias", which he considers the "first degree" of madness. This disorder arises when the imagination is left free to concentrate on one idea, usually a sad one, that hides all other representations, including distinct ideas, hindering the exercise of reason. In this condition it is possible – though not necessary, as Beausobre points out elsewhere – that the ghosts of the imagination are confused with the sensations to the point of replacing them, pushing the soul to madness (L. de Beausobre 1768, p. 431).

As it is caused by a specific activity of the imagination, madness is, however, different from melancholy, which Beausobre elsewhere defines as the "first degree" of madness: even melancholy is a moral disorder determined by psychological causes, but the origin is the concentration of the soul on a few unpleasant ideas, without the imagination necessarily altering the feelings.

## 2. *Melancholy as temperament*

Kant seems to have exactly these reflections in mind when in his *Anthropology*, in the section dedicated to the character, he defines the melancholic temperament. Kant recognizes the ambiguity of melancholy, between illness and healthy depth of thought, and immediately he makes a distinction between those who have an emotional tonality prone to melancholy and the actual melancholy (see Sturm 2009). Only the latter indicates a state, a stasis in a certain position of the soul. The melancholic temperament instead indicates a tendency, a movement in those who pay great attention to the things that happen to them, in those who direct their attention primarily to the difficulties. Whoever tends to melancholy is profound in thought, avoids making promises, moved by moral causes, is embarrassed by contrariety and suffers from an inability to experience joy. He suffers then from the inability to reach full pleasure (Anth, AA 7: 288; tr. p. 188).

As Robert Louden notices, there is a remainder of the second section of the *Observations* relates Kant's distinction between beautiful and sublime moral characters to the traditional division of characters into phlegmatic, melancholic, sanguine, and choleric (R. Louden 2006, p. 206); the most interesting point here is his characterization of the melancholic, not as someone who deprives himself of the joys of life, but as someone who "subordinates his sentiments to principles," and who therefore makes his desires "the less subject to

inconstancy and alteration the more general is this principle to which they are subordinated [...]. All particular grounds of inclinations are subjected to many exceptions and alterations in so far as they are not derived from such a higher ground” (GSE, AA 2: 220; tr. p. 27). Here Kant clearly anticipates his mature model of morality: it does not require the elimination of natural feelings and desires, but their governance in accordance with universal principles of reason.

Also through this reference it is clear that melancholy is a tone of the soul, a trend, which may or may not be predominant.

It is Kant’s own definition of temperament that places the melancholic tendency among the movements of the soul: “considered *psychologically*, that is, when one means temperament of soul (faculties of feeling and desire), those terms borrowed from the constitution of the blood will be introduced only in accordance with the analogy that the play of feelings and desires has with corporeal causes of movement (the most prominent of which is the blood). [... Each temperament] can be connected with the excitability (*intensio*) or slackening (*remissio*) of the vital power, only four simple temperaments can be laid down (as in the four syllogistic figures, by means of the *medius terminus*): the *sanguine*, the *melancholy*, the *choleric*, and the *phlegmatic*” (Anth, AA 7: 286-7; tr. p. 186; see Larrimore 2001).

It is therefore clear that melancholic temperament is characterized by a dynamism that defines it, by a tendency, compatible, if not favourable, with aesthetic feeling and moral attitude. It is a trait of the character moved by vital forces and driven to research and depth of thought that cannot find a definitive conclusion in satisfaction: it is the state of those who are moved by authentic curiosity and “what is called a crotchety person (who is not mentally ill; for by this we usually mean a melancholic perversion of inner sense), is mostly a human arrogance that borders on dementia” (Anth, AA 7: 203; tr. p. 97). This is clear also in the *Lectures on Anthropology (Anthropologie Friedländer)*: «One calls the pondering of the power of judgment whims. A “cricket” is a “grasshopper”. Who catches such “grasshoppers” is a “cricket-catcher.” Thus, whoever pursues empty thoughts which have no use, is a ponderer and a melancholy individual (*Grillenfangen*)» (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 520; tr. p. 87).

### 3. Melancholy as disease

Different is the case of melancholy, i.e. the individual affected by psychopathy. In the precritical essay *On Maladies of the head*, “The *melancholic* is a gloomy person who is demented with respect to his sad or offensive conjectures” (VKK, AA 2: 268; tr. p. 214). In *Anthropology*, therefore, there is a gradual and continuous shift from the “crotchety person”, on this side of the healthy state of mind, to the more moderate deviation. The mildest of all deviations is the “hobbyhorse”: it is a slight obsession that consists in keeping busy with an idea or objects of the imagination with which the intellect plays for fun. Older people, for example, play games of this kind, which are good for health, keep their vital forces active and make them laugh like in a new, carefree childhood (Anth, AA 7: 204; tr. p. 98). The risk of melancholy leading to a form of illness is clearly expressed in

*Anthropologie Mrongovius*: «Melancholy must stem from this displeasure with life, which in turn must be derived from the deep penetration of the sensations on the mind. [...] The mind becomes disturbed in the sensation of life through this assiduity, and melancholy thus arises. (The melancholic has in general a habitual attachment to all representations.) Even enjoyment upsets the melancholic more than it pleases him; for once he becomes merry, he is totally giddy because everything makes an impression on him so deeply. The cause of his sadness is that everything appears to him to be so important, for he fears losing the agreeable, and then he views the agreeable as a great ill» (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1372; tr. p. 468).

The real entry into mental illness, on the line of melancholy, occurs instead when there is no movement. “Absentmindedness” occurs when the reproductive power of imagination shows mental deficiencies in a representation on which one has paid great attention and from which one is not able to get away: “that is, one is not able to set the course of the power of imagination free again. If this malady becomes habitual and directed to one and the same object, it can turn into dementia” (Anth, AA 7: 206-7; tr. p. 101).

For this reason, distract oneself, that is moving from a fixed idea or a static thought, is healthy for the reproductive power of imagination: it is even “a necessary and in part artificial precautionary procedure for our mental health” (Anth, AA 7: 207; tr. p. 101). So as “*Recollecting oneself (collectio animi)*” makes the subject ready for every new occupation and so “promotes mental health by restoring the balance between one’s powers of soul” (Anth, AA 7: 207; tr. p. 101). In Kant’s account, in line with the customs of eighteenth century society, the healthiest way of keep the powers of soul in movement is “social conversation filled with varied subjects, similar to a game” (Anth, AA 7: 207; tr. p. 101). Kant then elaborates a kind of dietetics for the mind, which preserves from mental illness and from deviations of the imagination: it consists first of all in the art of distract oneself in order to collect one’s mental abilities: “thus to distract oneself without being distracted is an art that is not common” (Anth, AA 7: 208; tr. p. 102). This is precisely the capacity of the health melancholic spirit to abandon itself to deep thoughts and let itself be guided by the movements of its own curiosity.

On the contrary, the insane melancholic is stuck in a state of boredom. Boredom appears as a mental disease properly as incapacity to connect ideas: “the conversation must not jump from one topic to another, contrary to the natural relationship of ideas, for then the company breaks up in a state of mental distraction, since everything is mixed together and the unity of the conversation is entirely missing. Thus the mind finds itself confused and in need of a new distraction in order to be rid of that one” (Anth, AA 7: 207; tr. p. 101). This is the typical shift from the melancholic temperament, who needs distractions and finds them in conversations, and the insane melancholic state of mind, who is confused and bored. “Boredom is [so] perceived as a void of sensation by the human being who is used to an alternation of sensations in himself, and who is striving to fill up his instinct for life with something or other” (Anth, AA 7: 233; tr. p. 128). In *Anthropologie Mrongovius* the connection between melancholy, boredom, mental illness and disgust for life is explicit:

«boredom is the disgust that one has for a condition in which one finds oneself. – It is the great ill and the cause of much evil» (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1336; tr. p. 440). Of course, each of us can feel bored, and this precisely confirms the idea that madness is not something that firmly distinguishes the sane from the insane: coherently with the time he was living, Kant recognizes that nobody will be at safe from mental disease.

#### 4. The priority of pain and a philosophical dietetics

Discussing the relationship between pleasure and sorrow, in the section immediately following the one dedicated to mental illness, Kant still shows that he adheres to the ideas of Sulzer, but also of Locke and Pietro Verri, giving priority to pain. “What directly (through sense) urges me to leave my state (to go out of it) is disagreeable to me – it causes me pain; [but if] Enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life [...] Therefore pain must always precede every enjoyment; pain is always first. For what else but a quick death from joy would follow from a continuous promotion of the vital force, which cannot be raised above a certain degree anyway?” (Anth, AA 7: 231, tr. p. 126)<sup>2</sup>.

In this alternation of pleasure and pain governed by the negative element, Kant again sees the need for soul movement. Boredom is considered an even worse evil than pain and can sometimes push one to harm oneself, to seek suffering or even to self-destruction in order to get out of the immobile state of boredom. In Kant’s mental dietetics, boredom is perceived as “a void of sensation”, as a lack of vital forces, whereas the human being is used to an alternation of sensations in himself, of pleasure and pain: the human being “is striving to fill up his instinct for life with something or other” (Anth, AA 7: 233; tr. p. 128). In the *Lectures on anthropology*, ‘melancholy’ is used so as a synonym for ‘boredom’, which is interpreted by Pietro Verri in his theory of the ‘unnameable pain’ (P. Verri 1781).

Melancholy as mental disease is identified also with a sort of disgust for life. In the paragraph dedicated to boredom and amusement, the healthy mental state consists both in living life and in enjoying oneself; in Kant’s words, this means “to feel oneself continuously driven to leave the present state (which must therefore be a pain that recurs just as often as the present)” (Anth, AA 7: 233, tr. p. 128). In this perspective it is easy to understand how boredom constitutes a form of oppression perceived even as an attempt on life for those who take care of their lives and their time, i.e. for the “cultivated human beings”. Boredom is not just the static state of mind that cannot go further with life. Boredom is also defined as that empty distraction, as the “pressure or impulse” to leave every point of time, it is the inability to stay in the moment you are living, which generates

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<sup>2</sup> See also *Anthologie Mronovius*: «The Italian Count Verri 168 <(Meiners translated his writing on the nature of enjoyment)> says, among other things, that the beautiful arts and sciences are means against the nameless pains of boredom. If we always had enjoyment, that would not benefit us at all, for we would not be conscious of our life. With pain we actually feel our existence. Boredom is incessant, nameless pain. Sensitive persons often have it» (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1316; tr. p. 425).

a continuous sliding into the next moment, with inconclusiveness and dissatisfaction, in an endless process. Boredom can so “grow until a man makes the resolution to end his life; for the luxurious person has tried every form of enjoyment, and no enjoyment is new to him any longer” (Anth, AA 7: 233, tr. p. 129). It becomes so clear that boredom is not just a mere vice, but it is a serious illness of the mind, typical of Modernity and I would say also of our contemporaneity. And, for Kant, nobody is at safe. The bored melancholic perceives the void of sensations that “arouses a horror (*horror vacui*)”. Boredom is so perceived as a “slow death” which can be more difficult to bear than even a pain that directly threatens our lives.

This is why in *Anthropologie Friedländer* melancholy and loathing are juxtaposed: «The melancholic and loathsome situation is such a one in which the individual does not like himself. Loathing is in itself disagreeable; accordingly the rebuke of vice from the standpoint of loathing is to be eliminated. There are vices whose disapproval at all times produces loathing, and these are vices against nature; hence they are also unspeakable. Among all the sensations, loathing has no substitute, because it inhibits the source of life. Sadness does not inhibit the source of life, but is a hindrance over which one must predominate. Thus bitter dishes are more likely to be edible than loathsome ones. All other frames of mind, for example, anger, are agitations, thus also animations, but loathing is a suppression of agitation, and therefore no animation» (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 564; tr. p. 121).

Pain can therefore be a promotion of life if it gives rise to movement from a state of immobility. And here comes the positive and sane function of the melancholic tendency, as the tendency of never feeling a full joy: “But what about contentment (*acquiescentia*) during life? – For the human being it is unattainable [...] As an incentive to activity, nature has put pain in the human being that he cannot escape from, in order always to progress toward what is better” (Anth, AA 7: 234-5; tr. p. 130). To be completely satisfied with one's life, without any incentive for further improvement, would therefore be a state of immobility and would inevitably lead to unhealthy boredom. Such a state is no more compatible with the intellectual life of the human being and it could even lead to a slow death unless a stimulus leads to a new movement, even if painful.

Paradoxically, it comes out then that the melancholic state of the insane mind, the insane boredom, can be opposed exactly by the melancholic tendency to deal with deep thoughts. For Kant, the remedy to boredom and to the mental illness is so a philosophical diet that allows the mind to alternate pain and enjoyment, that is through cultivating culture and fine arts. As Kant writes in one note, “our reading public of refined taste is always sustained by the appetite and even the ravenous hunger for reading ephemeral writings (a way of doing nothing), not for the sake of self-cultivation, but rather for enjoyment. So the readers' heads always remain empty and there is no fear of over-saturation” (Anth, AA 7: 234, tr. p. 129).

Here comes then one way of enjoying ourselves that “is also a way of cultivating ourselves”; this self-cultivation consists in increasing the capacity for having more

enjoyment from the intellectual life, and this applies to “the sciences and the fine arts”. There is so “a principal maxim” for Kant’s philosophical dietetics: that in order to avoid mental illness, we have always to “climb still further”; on the contrary, “being satiated produces that disgusting state that makes life itself a burden for the spoiled human being” (Anth, AA 7: 237; tr. p. 133).

In conclusion, in Kant’s treatment of melancholy, cultivating culture and fine arts becomes a duty towards oneself, a duty that according to his philosophical dietetics allows the melancholic tendency to deep thoughts and prevents against the melancholic state of boredom.

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## **Kant on mental illness, emotions and moral responsibility**

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**Abstract** The paper discusses some thematic issues that emerge from the Kantian study of diseases of cognition and volition, taking into consideration his anthropological works and some problems emerging from his main critical works. Starting from the explanation of the taxonomy of the main mental illnesses (and their causes), some epistemological themes will be illustrated, linked to the fallible relationship between transcendental truths and the empirical dimension of knowledge and to the Kantian concept of error. Subsequently, the study of affects and passions, conceived as illnesses of volition, will show the difficulties linked to a total involvement of reason in moral action, concerning the shortcomings of human action with respect to the principle of responsibility. Finally, the paper will focus on the role of legal *imputability* in relation to moral responsibility and to mental diseases.

**Key words** Kant; knowledge; moral; mental illness; legal imputability; pathology

### 1. Kant, philosophy and medicine.

It is a relevant fact that Kant puts his study of mental illnesses only in his pragmatic anthropology, rather than in his Critical works and, consequently, does not focus on the theoretical implications of mental pathologies for his transcendental system. In fact, in his main critical works, Kant never refers to mental alterations, either in relation to knowledge or in relation to practical reason. However, it was noted that Kantian scheme of mental illnesses can be added to his transcendental work to allow important features of his critical

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method to emerge regarding both cognition and volition, because the diseases of the faculty of cognition and of the faculty of feeling and desire potentially raise different questions in many points of his philosophical project. The interpretation of a “corrective dimension”<sup>1</sup> of mental illnesses, if it has the merit of rehabilitating them within the critical interest, loses the deeper meaning of mental pathology in Kantian philosophy. In fact, it is difficult to identify Kantian psychopathology with his “gnoseo-pathology”, i.e. to conceive his theory of mental pathologies based totally on his theory of knowledge<sup>2</sup>. Mental illnesses, in fact, have a much more important role in Kantian moral theory, as well as having an interesting development on questions relating to the conception of the *person* and *imputability*. In this sense, I will try to consider mental illness not only as a defect to be rectified but as a relevant element for Kantian philosophy, from a theoretical and practical point of view. The Kantian analysis of illness explains the errors, restrictions, and obstacles in the formulation of judgments and, on the other hand, the emergence of passions and affections interferes with the practical decision. It can be said that, if mental illness has been investigated from a theoretical and practical point of view in various studies, much less importance has been given to its legal and moral interpretation.

In this paper, I will first introduce the relation between medicine and philosophy in Kant’s work. I will focus first on the epistemological and then on the moral aspects of mental illness. To conclude, I will give an interpretation of the relation between imputability and mental illness starting from the concept of personality. I will try to show that mental illnesses have above all a relevant importance in Kantian moral philosophy.

Kant orders mental pathologies starting with the study of the whole psychological faculty and its functioning – and problems - (cognition, feeling, or desire). Kant – it is important to note - was not a physician and his theory of mental ailments is not a real clinical theory. The Kantian point of view is anthropological<sup>3</sup> but it provides advice on the prevention and, partially, the cure of mental disorders. Kant also criticizes the physiological approach to the study of mental illnesses inaugurated in Platner’s anthropology, in 1772, in the work *Anthropologie für Aerzte und Weltweise*. According to Kant, in fact, this theoretical model was not able to provide practical results relevant to the study of the problem of the disease but was limited to a reductionistic and physical investigation. However, Platner, professor and philosopher at Lipsia university, was a follower of Leibniz and rationalist philosophy, and his anthropology<sup>4</sup> was important for some later philosophers and thinkers, such as Herder, Schiller and Moritz. His anthropology, interpreted from a modern point of view, considered human being in its unity and totality, through a psychosomatic vision and a

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<sup>1</sup> On this point, Frierson, P. (2009), *Kant on Mental Disorder*, Journal of History of Psychiatry, 20 (03), pp. 1 – 23.

<sup>2</sup> To find out more see also, Meo, O. (1982), *La malattia mentale in Kant*, Tilgher, Genova.

<sup>3</sup>For example, Kant indicates that the reading of novels can become a cause of *dementia* by making distraction habitual, so avoiding novels is a way to help ward off dementia. He also proposes art and culture as ways of refining feeling and thereby treating affects.

<sup>4</sup>See also Zammito, J. (2002), *Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology*, University of Chicago Press, p. 250.

physiological and rationalist methodological approach. Platner also placed psychosomatic medicine at the center of his reflection and his concept of the unconscious [*Unbewußtseyn*], coined in German for the first time, is relevant for subsequent theoretical developments. The issue of mental illnesses is connected to the theme of the relationship between body and mind in Kantian philosophy, a link that has only recently been observed with attention. The theme of the body and disease is not only connected to literary attention or to an acquired philosophical tradition but also to a transcendental interest. In fact, although the body is a traditional theme of the European Enlightenment, Kant links it to his philosophy, both in the pre-critical phase, in relation to Leibniz and the theories of predetermined harmony, and in the critical phase, to delimit what is body and what is matter from what is not. In the following discussion I will also try to develop the theme of the body in relation to disease and, above all, the role of philosophy as a cure for the soul, beyond the function of medicine conceived as a cure for the body.

The Kantian interest in mental illness arises in the context of the birth of psychiatry, which is a discipline placed between medicine and philosophy<sup>5</sup> that collaborates with theology and jurisprudence. Starting from the intertwining of these disciplines, Kant believes that the judgment on mental illness is philosophical and it concerns the social responsibility of the sick subject. In the relation between medicine and philosophy, Kant believes that the cause and cure of physical diseases belong to medicine and to medical care. Illnesses of the mind, on the other hand, are subjected to philosophical, anthropological and psychological judgment. The Kantian approach to the disease of soul is *formalistic*, i.e. based on his theory of knowledge and on a descriptive and non-physiological nosology. In this sense, the Kantian model is very close to German tradition and diseases are not explained through their causal relations, but only through their clinical recognition. The Kantian reflection on mental illness is also an interesting contribution of traditional debate on the “organ of the soul” and of the theory of pathologies of the mind in Germany at the end of the eighteenth century. The work of psychiatry, also called the “experimental science of the soul”, went beyond “pragmatic physiology”, which was connected instead to a simply classificatory work of empirical description. The interest in the new psychiatric knowledge increased the study of the relation between bodily functions and faculties of the mind. In addition, great attention was given to the development of neurological and anatomo-cerebral investigation. In this respect, most of the studies focused on the difficult relationship between physical sensations, perceptions and consciousness flow and the disease of the soul was interpreted as originating in activity of the central nervous system. In 1808, J. C. Riel coined the term “psychiatry” (in German “*psychiatrie*”) and introduced a distinction between the ganglionic and cerebral systems. From this point of view, mental illness is explained by the distorted activity of a single spiritual force and the soul is interpreted as an activity and not as a unitary substance. From this, the investigation of the disease of the mind becomes difficult since it is not possible to directly investigate the work of the brain,

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<sup>5</sup> To study the dialogue between medicine and philosophy, see also Von Engelhardt, D. (2003), *Il dialogo fra medicina e filosofia in Kant nel contesto storico*, in *Kant e il conflitto delle facoltà. Ermeneutica, progresso storico, medicina*, ed. by C. Bertani e M. A. Pranteda, il Mulino, pp. 253 – 265.

which is considered the seat of the soul. Acting on mental illness does not foresee acting directly on the brain but on the whole life of the soul. Reil refers to the Kantian work *The Conflict of the Faculties*<sup>6</sup> (1798) and, in this sense, his treatment of pathologies also has a moral value. There is, in fact, an “interest of reason” which considers the representations of psychic life not simply in a theoretical sense but, above all, in a practical meaning. Psychiatric treatment is also necessary for a moral purpose, conceived as the realization of man’s unity in his spiritual conscience.

The relation between Kant and medicine is also explained through his letters and correspondence. Kant had many relations with famous physicians and, among all the scientists of that period, he certainly had important intellectual exchanges with S. Th. Sömmering<sup>7</sup> and D. C. Hufeland. In the letters of August 10 and September 17, 1795, Kant replies to Sömmering's work on the *Organ of the soul (Über das Organ der Seele)*<sup>8</sup>. The Kantian answer, both scientific and philosophical, was added by Sömmering to his book, published the following year. According to Kant it is not possible to speak of the physical seat of the soul but only of its organ, because the soul does not have a specific material and space-time determination. Interpreted as a mere virtual and dynamic presence, the soul cannot be interpreted as the ventricle of the brain (*sensorium commune*) in which the nerves intertwine. It is possible, in fact, to define the place only of something material and not of a fluid contained in the brain cavity. Kant admits that there is a separation between body and soul that philosophy and medicine must accept. The concept of the position of the soul for Kant is therefore contradictory because it requires a local presence and a spatial quality of a thing that is an object of inner sense. To indicate the brain as the physical seat of the soul means to give a *judgment of subreption*, that is to confuse the traces of the impressions exerted on the brain with thoughts, through laws of association.

Another important reference is Hufeland, who, with his essay *Die Kunst das menschliche Leben zu verlängern*<sup>9</sup> (1797) allows Kant to reflect on a dietetic of Galenic tradition. Following a modern configuration of a “psychosomatic” Kant responds to Hufeland through the idea that the preservation of the body is also a moral self-preservation<sup>10</sup>, based on the Stoic principle of the “*substine et abstine*”. The prevention of diseases of the body is achieved through the strength of the spirit and soul; philosophy, which is also understood as a medical art, explains the power of the soul [*Gemüt*, also *animus*] over sick bodily sensations and that ability to discriminate pathological sensations from healthy ones. The relation between moral disposition and *dietetic* is interpreted by Kant as an anthropological-pragmatic connection between acting and suffering, between the ability to

<sup>6</sup> Kant, I. (1996), *The Conflict of Faculties*, ed. by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge.

<sup>7</sup> See also Marino L. (1994), *Soemmering, Kant and the Organ of Soul*, in *Romanticism in Science. Science in Europe, 1790 – 1840*, ed. by S. Poggi, M. Bossi, Dordrecht, Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp.127 - 142.

<sup>8</sup> Sömmering, S.T. (1796), *Über das Organ der Seele*, Nicolovius, Königsberg.

<sup>9</sup> Hufeland, C. W. H. (1995), *Die Kunst, das menschliche Leben zu verlängern*, Frankfurt a. M. – Leipzig.

<sup>10</sup> On the concept of the conservation of life as an moral ideal, see Marianetti, M. (1999), *Vivere, invecchiare ed essere vecchi. Kant e Christoph Wilhelm Hufeland*, Istituti Editoriali e Poligrafici Internazionali, Pisa – Roma.

control negative impulses and the conservation of one's physical health. In this sense, the answer to Hufeland is presented above all in the third part of the *Conflict of Faculties* and in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view* (1798), through the concept of *Gemüt*, understood as the capacity of the soul to become autonomous, in its representation, from its connection with affection. In fact, Kant defines the *Gemüt* by referring explicitly to the Stoic and Latin tradition of Cicero and Lucretius and to that faculty capable of contrasting old age and illness. These references help to understand the articulated relation between medicine and philosophy in Kantian thought, within an interest between gnoseology, anthropology and morality. The cure of mental illness is for Kant a moral goal, but also a specific characteristic of humanity. But how is pathology of mind (conceived as brain lesions or severe mental insufficiencies), understood as a deviation of reason or absence of reason, justified? And, above all, how can the behavior of the mentally ill be reconciled with the categorical imperative?

## 2. The *Essay on Maladies of Mind*: mental illness, equilibrium of the faculties and society.

The taxonomy of mental illness is shown by Kant in two works, in the *Essay on Maladies of the Head*<sup>11</sup> (1764) and in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*<sup>12</sup> (1798). Between the work of 1764 and *Anthropology*, Kant develops the themes of madness during his academic lessons, without following an analytical method. However, in 1764 Kant also wrote the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*<sup>13</sup>, which has the same object and the same phenomenological and descriptive method of the *Essay*: the method of observational analysis of temperaments and their degenerations is similar to the description of the alterations of mental illnesses. Another analogy between the two works is that the diagnosis of the disease is based on the observation of human behavior and, moreover, mental deviation is connected to the moral constitution of the subject. In the *Observations* a psychology of temperaments is presented and the only degenerate "alteration" is related to the melancholy attitude. In the *Observations* there is no psychopathological theory and the symptoms of mental illness, that is, hallucinations, are manifested only in the melancholy. Pathological traits are explained as a degeneration of the "normal" characteristics of the personality. Furthermore, as in the essay of 1764, Kant notes the influence of the disease on intersubjective relationships and the reactions of the social environment.

In the 1764 *Essay*, Kant realizes a classification of "diseases of the head" ("*krankheiten des kopfes*" is used in literal translation, but to use modern language we can say "diseases of the mind", or "psychiatric diseases"). Kant's attention is focused on two points: on the one hand, the social and ethical theme of Rousseau and the English moralists, and on the

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<sup>11</sup> Kant, I. (2007), *Essay on Maladies of the Head*, ed. by G. Zöllner, R. Loudon, tr. H. Wilson, Cambridge.

<sup>12</sup> Kant, I. (2006), *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*, ed. by R. Loudon, Cambridge.

<sup>13</sup> Kant, I. (2012), *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, ed. by P. Frierson, P. Guyer, Cambridge.

other, the gnoseological theme of criticism of German rationalist metaphysics. According to Locke's distinction between mental weakness and madness, taken from Leibniz and from German philosophy, the study of the deviant traits of a sick personality is used by Kant to fix the possibilities and limits of reason in its normal use. Generally speaking, Kant divides the deficiencies (weakness) of the mind [*Gemütsschwächen*] from the diseases of the mind [*Gemütskrankheiten*]. In both cases, Kant believes that the pathology disrupts the operational functions of the faculties. This is an important aspect, especially for the critique of traditional metaphysics and for the construction of a system of principles and concepts based on precise transcendental structures. Mild disorders are intellectual deficits or illnesses such as foolishness and nonsense. These hit the *Witz*, the *Verstand*, the *Urteilkraft*, and the *Vernunft*. Serious disorders, on the other hand, which concern perceptual and cognitive alterations, affect the lower cognitive faculty, the *Urteilkraft* and the *Vernunft*, understood as higher cognitive faculties. More specifically, the nosology of *Essay* is divided into two central figures: either illness emerges because the imagination loses all contact with sensibility and considers its ghosts and images as real, or because the information of the senses is distorted by erroneous forms of judgment. In both cases, that is, in hallucinations and ravings, a correct elaboration of reality connected with sensibility is not given and the imagination, connecting sensible data, doesn't work. In the case of illness, in fact, instead of figurative syntheses of the imagination, we have ghosts or illusions which are separate projections from the data of reality. In these cases reality is completely lost and the speech of the mentally ill person is expressed in the vacuum of the separation between the psychic sphere and reality. According to Kant, on the other hand, a good balance of the mind occurs when the data offered by sensibility are processed so that the result corresponds to things as they really happened. In the case of mental illness, however, there is no connection between reality and the mind, so an ill person is in a non-real dimension. Among the most serious perceptual and cognitive disorders, Kant therefore includes alterations and fantasies (chimeras) and the various disorders of judgment [*Wahnsinn*], of reason [*Wahnwitz*] and of judgments of experience [*Aberwitz*]. The faculty of understanding [*Verstand*] assumes the general role of a higher faculty distinct from judgment and reason. Judgment, which has the function of comparing a predicate with a concept, can make a logical error if it falsely associates empirical notes with a concept. In this way, the defect of the insane is in the construction of a defective logical connection, given by an erroneous syllogistic deduction.

The point of view of the *Essay* is close to the *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer* (1766)<sup>14</sup>, where Kant, in his criticism of dogmatic metaphysics, adopted the empirical tradition. The ideal of a right reason and a right knowledge is based on empiricist gnoseology, according to which thinking real objects means referring to data that derive from our sensations. In particular, regarding the methodology, the procedure found in those years is based on an analytical knowledge that is able to eliminate the sources of error and illusion through the impartial analysis of phenomena, examined in detail and divided into their ultimate

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<sup>14</sup> Kant, I. (2003), *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer*, tr. by Gregory R. Johnson, Swedenborg Foundation Publishers.

elements. From Newton, Kant takes up the substitution of the principle of synthetic explanation of essences towards an observational method of phenomena in their empirical connections: the analysis of confused concepts of experience takes place through the isolation, subdivision and comparison of the notes of the given concept. Analysis, in this conception, is a philosophical method that is based on the experience, allowing the decomposition of its infinite aspects, and trying to find the principles that can organize the manifold observed. The analytical method, however, also finds insoluble concepts (from ethics, aesthetics, religion, feeling) to be such that they cannot be fully explained through observation, because of the fallibility and limitation of human capacities. Regarding mental illnesses, the visionary and the mentally ill have common characteristics and are described in a similar way through the same neurophysiological theory based on the principles of optics and on the Cartesian doctrine of material ideas. For both, there is a displacement of the object produced by the imagination, which from a simple chimerical figure is projected as an external and “real” physical object. In this case, the alteration connected to the judgments of experience is an overcoming (the German prefix “*aber*” means “passing forward”) of the limits of experience, in the same way as the metaphysician or the visionary who does not remain within the limits imposed by reason. Kant, therefore, associates the *Essay’s* creative faculty of invention [*schöpferische Dichtungsfähigkeit*] with the *Dreams’* imagination [*Einbildungskraft*], both are distinct from the higher cognitive faculties and in close relation with the sensibility. Finding the operative site affected by mental illness, Kant also establishes the limit beyond which the use of the cognitive faculties is illegitimate.

Kant considers mental illness deriving from bodily defects, according to the medicine of Boerhaave and Hoffmann, but mental illness is also considered a disease of the soul. The soul, in this context, is the center of man’s passions. Passions come true within the social environment and, in particular, it is in society that pathological forms of the mind can arise. The *Essay on the Maladies of the Head* is important because Kant proposes a new cultural model, instead of the deterministic model, which refers to medicine as a therapeutic science. According to the cultural model - a paradigm that Kant will abandon in the critical phase - Kant gives a description and an etiology of mental illness starting from the relationship that the human being has with his social environment. In society, Kant observes, there is attention to appearance and to all those artificial rules that concern public behavior in social life. In this context, as Kant observes, natural passions can be transformed in an unnatural way of life and, for this purpose, society can become the origin of the expression of mental illness. The problem of the *Observations* is that even if moral judgment is given by an immediate feeling, in particular of the sublime, from a Kantian point of view a moral philosophy that based its rules exclusively on that feeling is exposed to a lack of universality and necessity. So, Kant integrates the moral conceptions of the English moralists, based on the study of man in his peculiar nature, with Rousseau’s ethics, in order to link a moral of sentiment with a rational morality. Kant searches, through the study of Rousseau’s philosophy, for a new method for the study of man, conceived as an absolute and ideal concept and assuming it as a basis for psychological descriptive ethics,

through the phenomenal observation of behavior. The outlined human ideal is given by two points of view, i.e. a state of natural and instinctive perfection and a state of spiritual perfection, within which the history of humanity is conceived in its efforts and errors. The morality is based on a philosophy of history, and not only in an anthropological and individual sense. In this sense the social, juridical and psychological elements that ground the moral rules are very important for Kant, in a first step the principle of prudence, according to an anthropological-pragmatic attention, and then an ethical-normative dimension. Social dimension is a sphere of interest that is evaluated by Kant from a calm observation of the illusory play of appearance to a decisive criticism of costumes. In this context, in which the human is conceived by its specific nature and in its ways of social living, Rousseau's work is crucial, because it is able to offer, beyond the Newtonian method of analysis, a new methodology, which can orient and guide the investigation in the experience and existence. Kant shows the passage from the degeneration of human nature to the unnatural state of civilization<sup>15</sup>. The critique of society, that is explained by the criticism of excess of human desire, is grounded on an immoderate enjoyment and a cult of the superfluous and the opulence of customs. While Kant shows the degeneration of social life, he believes that in this negative dimension of civilization there are the tools to overcome decay. The Kantian observation, in fact, aims to unmask all the levels of human behavior in society and, at the same time, tries to show the origin of civilization, beyond its illusory artifice. The real decay of civilization is characterized, according to Kant, by the stereotypical formality of good taste, by the anesthetization of society that reduces virtue to a mere semblance, compromising social life. The Kantian critique of the barbarization of customs is also extended to politics, culture and religion. In this perspective, Kant is close to Rousseau and to his concept of cultural and educational revolution. Kant derives from Rousseau the research for an original foundation of the concept of humanity, starting from a critique of current customs and reaching an original state of nature, where the conditions and the feelings of beauty and dignity are found. Kant analyzes the pathological aspects of civilization, but he finds a revolution of customs, because he does not believe that man can go back to a naive and primitive stage. The discourse is articulated through the identification of a shared and universal dimension of human nature, which is not comparable to transcendental subjectivity. Kant shares with Rousseau the following conception: the ability of man in the state of nature is based on a search for a feeling of freedom and independence from the bonds of society, in an immediate feeling of justice and religiosity. On the other hand, there are many differences between the two authors. First of all, in Kant's view, the state of nature is not characterized by an absolute goodness of man, even if primitive man tends to be morally good and does not need to cure his instincts because they are naturally oriented towards good. However, unlike Rousseau, the Kantian savage does not have a universal feeling of pity and sympathy. According to Kant, in fact, it is necessary to start not from a natural *a priori*, in order to be able to define the

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<sup>15</sup> An interesting point of view on the theme is given by Foucault, M. (1965), *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason*, New York, Vintage.



historical forms in which civilized man is determined, but to proceed analytically and genealogically, it is important to stay on the level of the civilized and modern man, identifying the possibility of social reform, through the observation of the pathological problems that characterize him. In fact, the Kantian analysis of the virtues of civilized man is divided into positive and degenerate characters, that is, on the one hand, into temperaments cultivated and supported by morality and, on the other hand, morals corrupted by society. From this point of view, the same human character can degenerate or be "cured" through a progressive social revolution which also affects the imposition of a precise moral habit.

According to Kant, the exasperation of artificial life and of behavior conceived as the set of rules and code of actions, becomes a negative human model in contrast with natural spontaneity, which can cause mental disturbs, because the man of society can risk madness<sup>16</sup>. This Kantian conception is a reworking of Rousseau's thought, according to the idea of typical anti-Enlightenment radicalism shown in the pre-critical period works. From this perspective, the cause of madness is social living and, therefore, Kant is interested in a dietetics of the mind. After the essay of 1764, Rousseau's naturalism becomes a central concept of Kantian morality. In fact, in 1763 Kant was a Newtonian scientist, a scholar of logic who was careful to separate the structures of deductive thought from causal inferences. From the moral point of view he distinguished a duty conditioned by an absolute obligation, and yet the ethical and aesthetic sphere was dominated by English and Scottish sentimentalists. In this atmosphere Kant reads the *Emil or On Education* of Rousseau and the *Nouvelle Eloise*. In the *Observations*, Rousseau's philosophy is central in Kantian reflections. In this perspective, madness is not conceived as a degrading return of man to bestiality, but as a general effect connected with social conditions of life. According to Kant, in nature, the three faculties of sensibility, imagination and understanding are balanced and work in perfect accord with the natural environment. The relationship between man and the environment is perfectly adequate and passions are balanced in natural man in a total vision of energetic harmony (in this sense, the English tradition of society joins the German vitalistic culture of life). In these natural conditions, the mentally ill person is naturally ill, that is, he has the misfortune of not having sufficient physiological endowment. It is instead social life that breaks this balance, because it produces strategies, fictions, artifices and attitudes. The artificial construction of man in society has a potential imbalance, and diseases derive from the social condition of life. Just like in Rousseau's thought, it is the confusion of natural passions that creates the conditions of illness, and the human condition in society explains the possible alteration of the relation between imagination and understanding.

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<sup>16</sup>For an interpretation of society as an artificial machine and its liberation in an aesthetic and philosophical sense, see also Schiller, *On the Aesthetic Education of Man in a Series of Letters*. Here, Schiller elaborates a theory of harmonious activity in which a balance or equipoise is maintained. In particular, starting from Kant and Rousseau, Schiller believes in elevating human potential through the arts for the development of free citizens of the Republic, using the model of the French Revolution.

3. The critical-epistemological relapses of mental illness: a reflection on *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view* (1798).

The work of 1764 proposes a nomenclature of mental illnesses [*eine Onomastik der Gebrechen des Kopfes*], from paralysis, to foolishness, to madness, ranging from the simplest grades of disease to the most serious mental illnesses. The *Essay* still appears immature as regards a precise arrangement and classification of the faculties from a transcendental point of view and, however, here Kant fixes mental illnesses in some figures that will remain substantially the same even in the classification offered in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*. Regarding *Anthropology*, Kant distinguishes two specific disorders starting from the cognitive faculties, *weaknesses* and *illnesses*. The first derive from a deficiency of cognitive power or from a decreased function of that power. The latter maintain a partially positive relation with the cognitive faculty but, although there is correspondence, the operations of causal laws are different from the activity of a subject in normal conditions. In particular, Kant conceives the taxonomy of mental illnesses starting with cognitive powers in their legitimate and transcendental use, to be able to study any anomalies, deficiencies and defections. This is possible because Kant considers mental deficiencies and mental illnesses as *defects* of the cognitive faculty. Furthermore, Kant believes that the illnesses affect the higher faculties and not the senses. In this sense, diseases are deviations of the higher cognitive faculty [*Verstand*]. The defect of sensibility is not in the organ that receives the manifold but in the faculty of the rules, i.e. it concerns the faculty of understanding and the reason.

It is interesting to see how anthropology's treatment of mental illnesses is a theoretical "return" to the gnosological themes addressed in the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1787)<sup>17</sup>. Through the study of mental illnesses, Kant proposes the scheme of the transcendental faculties from another point of view and thinks about the possible errors of "pure reason". First of all, the higher faculty of cognition has many specific aspects. The faculty of understanding, through *a priori* principles and concepts, brings to one's representations the transcendental unity experience: in this way, Kant builds a conception of the world conceived as an objective synthesis of phenomena. Secondly, reason is a theoretical ability to produce ideas, starting from the predicative activity of the faculty of understanding and based on a specific logical faculty of syllogisms. Finally, the power of judgment, based on the concept of aesthetic and teleological reflection, has two kinds of deficiencies that derive either from an absence of capacity (stupidity) or from a reduced function of this power. The ailments listed by Kant follow from the alterations in the functioning of these faculties. Insanity (*Wahnwitz, insania*) is a "deranged power of judgment": in this case, the ordinary function of judgment and its power to make analogies is confused with the activity of understanding, and with its power to relate the particular under concepts *a priori*, in a confusion of faculties and of operations. In particular, insanity is a disturbance

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<sup>17</sup> Kant, I. (1998), *Critique of Pure Reason*, ed. by P. Guyer, A. W. Wood, Cambridge.

of the content of thought in which the syllogistic structure is intact but the error consists in false application of the rules. Judgment can, in fact, create false analogies or fallacious syllogisms. The insane person mistakes a logical presumption for a rational deduction, concludes the total identity of the subjects from a partial identity of the predicates, and treats different species as belonging to the same species. Amentia (*Unsinnigkeit, amentia*) is a defect of imaginative association and regards the perversion of the understanding as the inability to bring one's representations into the necessary coherence for the possibility of experience; craziness (*Aberwitz; vesania*) is a "sickness of a deranged reason. - The mental patient flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that can be completely exempted from in touchstone, imagining that he conceives the inconceivable.. The squaring of the circle... and the comprehension of the mystery of Trinity are in his power."<sup>18</sup> In this kind of disease of unbalanced reason, the mentally ill person goes beyond the whole experience and aims at incomprehensible principles. Deficiencies and derangement also belong to the lower faculty of cognition, which includes the outer senses, the inner sense (which is an activity of introspection of one's own mental states)<sup>19</sup> and the imagination. While the outer senses are not essential for the beginning of illness, according to Kant the inner sense plays a fundamental role. In fact, the inner sense does not have in itself the origin of illness or some kind of deficiency but is subjected to illusions and "can easily lead to enthusiasm and madness"<sup>20</sup> because there may be "a confusion in the mind of supposed higher inspirations and powers flowing into us". From the imagination derive also the deficiencies of the reproductive activity of imagination that Kant calls absent-mindedness, an involuntary distraction of the representations. Dementia (*Wahnsinn*) is a mental ailment of imagination through which "owing to the falsely inventive power of imagination, self-made representations are regarded as perceptions"<sup>21</sup>. Kant also finds other mental deficiencies, linked to the faculties. The deficiency of imagination is distraction; a lack of wit is obtuseness; a lack of judgment is defined as stupidity and, in the end, one with a weakness of understanding is called a simpleton<sup>22</sup>. To sum up, in the *Unsinnigkeit*, the madman remains in the experience; in *Wahnsinn* and *Wahnwitz* the insane person acts within the territory of experience but provides a wrong interpretation of it; in the *Aberwitz* he crosses the experiential boundary. It is important to observe how Kant qualifies diseases and their severity starting from their level of overcoming the limits of knowable experience. The mentally ill person, in *Anthropology*, is one who makes logical errors, falls into prejudices, or does not adapt concepts to experience.

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<sup>18</sup> *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of view*, p. 110

<sup>19</sup>For the problem of a "empirical psychology" in Kantian philosophy see Frierson, P. (2014), *Kant's Empirical Psychology*, Cambridge.

<sup>20</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 20.

<sup>21</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 109.

<sup>22</sup>For a good reconstruction of the defects of the faculty and the problem of the connection between disease and epistemology, see also Frierson, P. *Kant on Mental Disorder* (2009).

In Kant's mind, as we said, mental ailments originate from various circumstances. First of all, a mental illness can derive from a "physical illness that requires medical attention"<sup>23</sup> or, it can sometimes be based on a specific human predisposition, such as a hereditary cause or genetic and familiar physiology. Mental deficiencies can also derive from a combination of environmental and hereditary aspects but, in general, Kant is not worried about the defects of the higher cognitive powers, because the critique of pure reason, with its investigation into the limits and validity of correct reasoning, is also an instrument which is capable of distinguishing healthy reasoning from "sick" reasoning. Once the diagnosis of mind defects is clear, Kant reflects above all on ways to cultivate cognitive powers, through an anthropological and pragmatic point of view. In fact, Kant theorizes a natural therapeutic modality, to prevent or definitively eliminate the disturbs. The pragmatic point of view, in fact, is based on the idea that an individual can live with various mental disorders and, in this sense, the role of the soul physicist is not exclusively that of curing the sicknesses of the mind but also that of helping the individual to live with it. In fact, some mental pathologies are incurable because they have a biological basis, but they are simply observable and classifiable, that is, it is possible to live with them and, at the same time, compose a reasoned taxonomy. However, as we have seen, Kant suggests a non-biological cause of diseases of the mind, in the "most profound degradation of humanity" where "the only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of *common sense* and its replacement with *logical private sense*"<sup>24</sup>. In some figures of mental illness, in fact, there is a kind of nihilistic delirium<sup>25</sup>, in which the unity of consciousness is broken. The incorrect application of the categories by the mentally ill person excludes him from the unity of "I think" and from the legislation of nature. In mental illness, according to Kant, there is a *private sense* of logic in relation to objects. The theoretical-transcendental principles of the mentally ill, in this sense, cannot say anything about the unity of experience. Furthermore, the mentally ill person has a formal inability to unify the experience because he makes mistakes in applying this capacity. The limits of the mentally ill are related to the application of concepts and are connected to the use of rules and language. In the case of a hereditary disease, according to Kant, the patient cannot control his impulses or correct his logical inability and illness does not derive from a "bad" or "wrong" use of reason. Kant distinguishes several pathologies: on the one hand, there are serious diseases that require psychiatric assistance; on the other, Kant admits that pragmatic anthropology can help the patient to correct his "mistakes". In the latter case, in fact, Kant speaks of a "diminution" and not of a "cancellation" of humanity. The mentally ill patient is still "human" but will have an epistemic and moral humanity of a "particular" kind.

<sup>23</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 108.

<sup>24</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 113.

<sup>25</sup> The term *nihilism* is famous in Nietzsche's philosophy but in this context it is useful to understand the particular form of "gnoseological solipsism" of the mentally ill in Kantian philosophy.

Kantian treatment of mental illnesses has also important gnoseological and epistemological implications because is able to show the limitations, dangers and difficulties that transcendental philosophy hides. As noted by P. Frierson (2009), mental illnesses bring significant problems to the assumptions of criticism and raise questions that lead to a renewed analysis of the principles of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kantian philosophy, as it is explained in the first Critique, does not study the possible errors deriving from an incorrect application of transcendental principles (which is a topic studied above all in logical writings and lectures), but it focuses on the construction of experience through the ordering of the manifold offered by space and time and by the unification of the understanding which confers universality and necessity. The *Critique of Pure Reason* does not investigate the mistakes given by the application of its principles but it studies how its rules process phenomena in a valid and correct way, through the discovery of a transcendental logic. Critique is, first of all, an investigation into limits and possibilities, not about objects but about a priori concepts of objects in general. Critique opposes the failure of dogmatism which has generated skepticism and the illusion of metaphysical knowledge, which are followed as a reaction to dogmatism. With the critique of pure reason, then, Kant offers a *cure* to skepticism, since it aims to discover if pure a priori knowledge is possible and what its extension is. From the critical investigation it appears that reason is the faculty from which the fundamental concepts and the a priori principles arise and from which all other a priori knowledge can be deduced. The critique is a *propaedeutics* to the system of pure reason, that is, a science that judges pure reason and the sources of this knowledge, by determining its limits. The critique investigates whether this a priori knowledge can be applied in an unlimited way to supersensitive objects or only to sensitive objects. For this reason, the *critique* is not the *doctrine* of pure reason but the critique of it, that is, its object of study is not knowledge, but the field from which knowledge arises. The aim of the critique of pure reason extends to all the claims of the cognitive faculty in order to see its validity. The task of critique of pure reason is negative and its function is restrictive. In this sense, the critique is a “cure” of transcendental knowledge.

As we have seen, the study of mental illnesses is necessary to consider a general problem of knowledge, since it reveals negative aspects of reasoning in its operations. In a discussion on the possibility of *a priori* knowledge, the role of contingent elements relating to human nature is highly relevant, within the constitution of a unitary and objective cognitive experience. In this regard, the logical dimension, which is expressed in an adequate application of the a priori principles of understanding, could also be determined by some psychological elements and, thus not necessarily guarantee objective knowledge. For example, these psychological limitations could be derived from genetic, hereditary defects, from mental malformations. These “physiological” defects could certainly have an impact on the logical level of knowledge processing. The conditions of a transcendental

philosophy is connected to the fact that the truths at the basis of exact science<sup>26</sup> (mathematics and logic), from a Kantian point of view, are based on the subjective principle of our way of feeling (through space and time) and unifying (through the categories) a complete experience of the world<sup>27</sup>. Starting from this conception, the logical, mathematical and geometric truths must be true in every world built, according to our transcendental principles. Kant does not study this distinction between *truth of facts* and *truth of reason*, but the transcendental deduction of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* is in opposition to a particular *psychologism* of his conception of the faculties. The deduction of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* has a more realistic structure, since Kant rejects the psychological and subjective organization of the faculties taken up by J.N. Tetens (Tetens speaks about three faculties and three syntheses of a subjective deduction), according to which there is a generating function of the objective world. The anti-psychologistic and anti-subjectivist perspective of the second transcendental deduction can be understood starting from the subtraction of time from the synthesis of the manifold and its consequent generalization. This passage between the first and second transcendental deduction marks a turning point in Kant's conception of transcendental knowledge. The imagination acquires a subordinate function to the categories in the process of knowledge and, with the abolition of time from the synthesis of the manifold, a generalization of the function of categories takes place, not only connected to the organization of the sensible but now considered within a transcendental logic. In this sense, Kant divides, on the gnoseological level, the laws of empirical and psychological association, still present in the subjective deduction, from the transcendental function of categories.

To summarize, the possibility of the relation between a valid and true knowledge, which is also objective and based on logical and formal laws, and the presence of these transcendental principles in a finite subject which is subjected to psychological and physical limitations, is a complex point of Kantian philosophy. In this way, Kantian transcendental philosophy is based on a discovery of theoretical and moral principles that are able to guarantee truth and validity to knowledge of the world and of action. Euclidean

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<sup>26</sup> This issue obviously concerns the epistemological status of empirical psychology which, for Kant, is not an exact science like mathematics and physics. Empirical psychology deals with an empirical, changeable and non-deducible object starting from a formal rule. Kantian empirical psychology has a small place in its critical system and is partially replaced by anthropology, which is not a formally rigorous science (*einer förmlichen Wissenschaft*).

<sup>27</sup> This is also problematic in B. Russell's philosophical work. Beyond the distinctions between analytic and synthetic, logic is autonomous and, as he says in the "Introduction to mathematical philosophy", it is a question of giving a new meaning to the principle according to which truths are analytic (a new meaning because the principle of non-contradiction). On the other hand, he assumes, in a Leibnizian way (like Gödel), that we have an intuitive knowledge both of the truths of mathematics and of factual truths (for example, cogito or apperception fall into the latter species). In later texts, between 1913 and 1914, he tries to sketch a theory of non-dualistic knowledge, whereby the truths of mathematics and logic are precisely "hard data" and that their criterion is finally a sort of psychological "evidence". In fact, Leibniz also argues that the type of evidence of the truths of reason cannot be compared with those of fact, and says that for the latter we need a logic of verisimilitude.

space as an order of coexistence, and time conceived as an order of succession, are based on pure principles of universal and necessary sensibility, which are valid for everybody. In the same way, the intellectual categories with which we build phenomena and objects of experience are the same in everyone and are conceived as the principles of reunification of the manifold of a shared experience from an intersubjective point of view. The problem will then concern the validity of such truths, based always and in any case on human nature and, for this reason, the problem is based on the difficulty of defining them as necessary or as endowed with logical evidence. In this sense, transcendental rules govern healthy reason and the normal operations of the higher cognitive faculty. Nevertheless the human being can err through various restrictions and subjective obstacles, not proceeding within his own normative standards, because it is possible to make mistakes by formulating judgments inappropriately. In this sense, a healthy intellect can make mistakes; the sick intellect does not simply make mistakes, but radicalizes them into a coherent and “new” model of reality. Kant believes that the healthy faculty of understanding is the same faculty capable of elaborating coherent judgments in a good relationship between sensibility and understanding, in which there are no irregular interferences. This is a sign of Kantian principle of *harmony* of the faculty that Kant maintains in the first and, above all, the *Critique of Judgment* (1790)<sup>28</sup> and in which the correct operations of the cognitive faculties is supported through the discovery of a new a priori principle. The healthy reason presents an objective unity of the relation between the imagination and the understanding. This means that the imagination operates a first organization of the empirical manifold by figurative syntheses, which are subjected to the synthesis of categories. According to Kant there is also a subjective unity of the relationship between imagination and intellect, that is, the *free play* of faculties that occurs in aesthetic judgment<sup>29</sup>. Furthermore, in the latter case the faculties are connected to each other according to a principle of finality and harmony and they determine specific aesthetic and non-cognitive judgments. In both cases, the functioning of the faculties does not close the individual into selfishness deprived of a solitary knowledge, since the correctness of the judgments is based on the sanity of the

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<sup>28</sup> The discourse on the private dimension of illness can also be explained through the aesthetic perspective of the *Critique of Judgment*, in which Kant separates the public judgment on the beautiful from the private judgment on the pleasant. Judgments about the agreeable are private because they cannot be communicated, as they show something that pleases the senses and subjective sensations; judgments about what is beautiful show a very particular claim to subjective universality. In the first case, i.e. in the judgments on the agreeable, that which pleases remains on a private level of knowledge, and the content is not communicable, in the same way in which mental illnesses link the subject to a form of erroneous and prejudicial reasoning, devoid of any foundation in reality. In the judgment of the agreeable, however, there will be a judgment of perception, that is, a judgment based on private sensations, which is not communicable to others, but which they can still understand starting from the same system of sensible perception. As for the judgments that the patient bases on what he believes to be true and real, we speak instead of a completely altered state of the use of the faculties, in which logical prejudice is understood at its highest degree. Some diseases, in fact, seem to oppose the structure of “I think” as they not only introduce a private sense of logic but also they split one personality into many different personalities.

<sup>29</sup> See also, Kenneth F. Rogerson (2008), *The Problem of Free Harmony in Kant’s Aesthetics*, State University of New York Press.

intellect, guaranteed by the order and unity of the representations in transcendental apperception.

If in his critical works Kant focuses on the harmony between the faculties in their functioning, in his lessons<sup>30</sup> he uses the term *prejudice* [*Vorurtheil*] to indicate the way in which reason can make mistakes, interfering in the regular connections of judgments<sup>31</sup>. In the conception of the limits and validity of human knowledge, in fact, it is necessary to consider that there may be other forms of reasoning which are capable of overcoming the boundaries of human knowledge as understood from an objective point of view and, in this sense, Kant reflects on the possibility that human beings have different cognitive structures. The treatment of pathologies does not establish their absolute negativity, since Kant discusses the conditions, the causes and the possible prevention of the illnesses, without considering what, on the other hand, would be healthy situations. In cases of craziness or insanity Kant then manages to find an unnecessary level of contingency for human nature, which proceeds beyond the coherence of transcendental truths “In this... kind of mental derangement there is not merely disorder and deviation from the rule of the use of reason but also positive unreason; that is, another rule, a totally different standpoint into which the soul is transferred, so to speak, and from which it sees all objects differently.”<sup>32</sup> A mentally ill person is described as one who lives in a different world, and in which “the powers of the unhinged mind still arrange themselves in a system” and “even arrange cognitions according to “a principle of unity”<sup>33</sup>. He who is mentally disturbed, according to Kant, lives with “a totally different standpoint” and even if the “objects must conform to our cognition” Kant declares that the afflicted person lives “in his own world”<sup>34</sup>. If Frierson’s reading of logical variations assumes a fundamental aspect of the relation between the transcendental dimension and empirical psychology in Kant’s theory of knowledge, his interpretation does not clarify the question of prejudices and provisional judgments in Kantian logic. In some logic lectures, Kant clarifies the difference between *provisional judgments* and *prejudices*. Prejudice is the “foundation” we have for judging something in advance [*vorher*], which however does not derive from the laws of the understanding. It is a sort of “deviation” of the judging from the application of the transcendental principles. Prejudices are described as preliminary judgments that are misunderstood in their function. Provisional judgments derive from objective foundations, prejudices from subjective foundations; the former derive from reason, the latter from the sensibility that distorts them. In this sense, provisional judgments seem to be exact precognitions (which may come from experience), while prejudices are false judgments, formulated without a sufficient foundation, that is, without a *ratio determinans*. Kant insists on the formal falsity of prejudices which remains fundamental even when these are

<sup>30</sup> I. Kant, *Vorlesung über Philosophischen Enzyklopädie* (1775), Ak XXIX<sub>1</sub>, 25.

<sup>31</sup> The discourse could also be inserted into the more general problem of *obscure representations* [*Anthropology*, § 5] between sensibility and the faculty of understanding.

<sup>32</sup> I. Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 111.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>34</sup> *Anthropology*, p. 114.



correct with respect to the content (i.e. "true"). A prejudice remains a prejudice even when what it claims is true. If prejudices can be true with respect to the content, they remain false as to the foundations (i.e. the way they were obtained and produced) and are therefore dangerous. The consideration of the formal point of view concerns the degree of the affirmed correctness of a judgment. Thus any persuasion is false with respect to the form (*formaliter*) since here an uncertain knowledge seems to be certain. The formal consideration of truth consists in comparing the certainty required by a knowledge with the foundations that exist to affirm that knowledge. If there is a contradiction between the two aspects, then the knowledge is formally false, even if it may be true regarding the content. The provisional judgment precedes the complete or decisive judgment, and makes use of preliminary indications obtained from an in-depth evaluation of an object. When this presumption is confused with a definitive judgment, one falls into error. The act of formulating a judgment in advance, based not on the laws of the understanding but on interference of the sensibility with the intellect, is the logical prejudice. This, like mental illness, generates erroneous beliefs and dangerous forms and constitutes a crime even when good can be derived from it. Kant believes there are prejudices that derive from habit and others that derive from authority. Prejudices, therefore, from a logical point of view can have a content of truth but formally be erroneous.

The errors that Kant lists from the various pathologies are not, however, connected only to logical prejudices but to problems of general application of principles and concepts in the formation of judgments. Kant also refers to an incorrect comparison of predicates with objects, to syllogistic defects, to errors given by illusory projections, to the exchange of a logical presumption for a rational deduction. For this reason, considering the error of the mental patient only as a variation or a logical prejudice is limiting. In fact, this conception of logical errors, arising from habit or authority, has an ancient tradition and, on this aspect, Kant retrieves the theory of error from Galen's medical school. In his treatise on the cure of the passions, in fact, Galen does not deal with the healing of diseases (and therefore with therapy) but with the cure of errors and passions. Mistakes arise from a false opinion and concern a rational level; passions arise from an irrational faculty. Similarly, as noted, pathology in Kant arises from an imbalance of faculties and an error of reasoning. The cure of the disease is a therapy of the error and the elimination of the elements that favor its development. But Kantian mental illness is not simply produced by a logical variation. This interpretation seems to conceive Kant's work in a too modern way. The idea that error is inherent in language and is given by deceptions in conceptual and expressive relations is, above all, a conception of contemporary logic (in Frege's philosophy, for example). The error in Kant, in addition to having a logical and linguistic function, is also an element that concerns the more general limit of the use of transcendental principles. However, a Kantian theory of error is useful for understanding one of the ways in which mental illness is expressed, which has, above all, consequences on the moral and anthropological level. The cure of the disease, understood as the correction of the error, is only a limited part of the Kantian theory of mental pathologies. In

Kant's theory, in fact, there is a moral conception of the cure of illness, in which the rectification of a logical irregularity is only the starting point of a deeper intervention.

To conclude, Kant believes that health is grounded on the order of thoughts and representations, an order shared by all men. It is on this basis that Kant can indicate the simple deficiencies and diseases of the soul with respect to the faculty of cognition. Kant also believes that the exercise of some small, controlled, and deliberated madness, especially reduced to the private sphere of entertainment, such as hobbies, can be positive since it keeps "vital forces always awake". The diseases of the soul can be cured if the soul collaborates to the order of the thoughts; when the disorder is complete and the subject completely ignores the objective laws of representations, there is no possible cure. There is a full and complete interaction between the physical, animal, nature of man and his moral rationality. Given this interaction, the senses and the understanding must necessarily collaborate, since the disease can only be "felt" but the causes must be investigated by the reason. Since health is the balance in the antagonism of the vital forces of the animal body, and excitability (*incitabilitas*) in the nervous system and irritability (*irritabilitas*) in the muscular system are the driving forces, from which life is derived, then it is reasonable to suppose that medicine is similar for men and for animals. The difference is that for man the "preservation of himself in his animal nature" is not just an instinct but a *duty*.

This conception of medical treatment, in which the moral intention is closely connected to the therapeutic one, considers the Kantian theory of pathology as a "philosophical" theory. This philosophical theory is a "medicine of the soul". According to Kant, therefore, while the disorder based on a physical level must be treated by a doctor, the philosopher can play a role, intervening in the parallel treatment of the soul. Because all the ailments of the soul reveal an absence of order, philosophy is a form of treatment of diseases. The order that all men can share, outside the solitary dreams of a spirit-seer, is in fact the set of principles of transcendental philosophy (that is, it is the order of universal and necessary laws that found and regulate knowledge). Therefore, philosophy does not only offer the support for establishing an objective order. Philosophy can also prescribe maxims for a good use of the mind and against some disturbances of the mind – with positive consequences for the body. It is up to the philosopher to ensure that the soul does not become a cause of illness and suffering for the body, and above all to evaluate the origin of some illnesses in the disturbance of the soul, and to intervene on them as a guide, so that they are eliminated.

#### 4. Defect of volition and of the principle of desire.

Besides the defects of cognition, related to the faculty of understanding, Kant establishes a classification of the defects of *volition*, starting from the faculty of desire and its operations. Indeed, just as logical prejudices and disorders of the cognitive faculty compromise the right production of objective knowledge, so too the higher faculty of desire (and the faculty of feeling) may not function properly. Desire (*appetitus*) is "the self-

determination of a subject's power through the representation of something in the future as an effect of this representation. Habitual sensible desire is called inclination"<sup>35</sup>. The inclination, if it cannot be governed by the reason of the subject, is defined as passion. The feeling of pleasure or displeasure which does not make use of subjective reflection is emotion (*affection*). While the correct functioning of the cognitive faculty is achieved by the correct application of logical-transcendental principles through the organization of the manifold through space and time and its unification in the phenomenon through categories, the operation of the faculty of desire is articulated in a different way. The faculty of desire, in fact, is divided into two levels, the higher faculty of desire and the lower faculty of desire, and in both cases the action is defined through the imposition of maxims. The higher faculty of desire bases moral action on a pure law of reason. The lower faculty of desire produces maxims which are material principles, that is, based on an object of desire. Reason, conceived as a "whole" faculty, has a theoretical use and a practical use. In this latter sense, pure reason is able to determine the will by a principle, the moral law. This practical reason is active every time there is an action based on a principle or on a calculation. Every time we act, in a proper sense and not by instinct (and, for this reason, Kant believes that the problem of the instinct must be studied in the context of a *possible* empirical psychology and not in a transcendental philosophy), we base our action on a maxim or principle that is not necessarily rational. Acting through a principle does not mean that the motivation for the action comes from pure reason and from the moral law. In fact, it is also possible to determine the actions to obtain a certain object of desire and the principle of the actions, in this case, is the simple motivation for an object of desire. In this sense, the *Critique of Practical Reason*<sup>36</sup> (1788) does not study deviations or errors of the faculty of desire. The *analytics* of practical reason analyzes the practical principles of the will, of the objects and the motives, with the aim of defining these elements according to the requirements of pure practical reason. Even the study of the matter of desire, that is, of all the objects that give pleasure and displeasure, is not a treatment about a "deviation" of the desire faculty, according to Kant. The study of the material principles of the will has its own specific dignity and completes the Kantian treatment of the faculty of desire. In *Anthropology*, according to Kant, the man who is subject to emotions and passions has an "illness of the mind, because both affect and passion shut out the sovereignty of reason. Both are also equally vehement in degree; but as concerns their quality they are essentially different from each other"<sup>37</sup>.

In this general perspective, the human capacity to produce an action starting from principles of self-governance is subjected to different forms of deviations, both from what is properly defined "evil" and from two forms of defects of the volition, affects and passions. These defects of volition compromise self-governance above all, questioning the human principle of moral responsibility. In *Metaphysics of Morals* (1797) and in *Anthropology of a Pragmatic point of View*, Kant defines affects [*Affekten*] as a "lack of

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<sup>35</sup> I. Kant, *Anthropology*, p. 149.

<sup>36</sup> I. Kant (2002), *Critique of Practical Reason*, ed., tr. by W. S. Pluhar, intr. by S. Engstrom, Cambridge.

<sup>37</sup> *Anthropology*, p. 149.

virtue” and passions [*Leidenschaften*] as “properly evil”, starting with his distinction between the lower faculty of desire and the higher faculty of desire. In the general scheme concerning the description of human motivation, the faculty of lower desire is motivated by the matter of desire and feeling, desire and action follow from sensations not be mediated by any principle of reflection on them. The higher faculty of desire, on the other hand, has as a principle of reason as its reason for acting. According to Kant, affects are “alterations” of the faculty of feeling and passions are “disturbs” related to the faculty of desire. Affects and passions are defined as “illness[es] of the mind”: “agitations of soul are twofold, affects and passions... Affect is a feeling through which we come out of composure [of soul]. Passion is rather a desire that brings us out of composure”<sup>38</sup>. Affects and passions are similar with regard to the loss of self-control and, more specifically, they exclude the total government of reason in practical action. While differing in faculties (or feelings or desires), affects and passions are not ordinary emotions or feelings, such as, for example, inclinations. Even with regard to very strong inclinations or feelings, Kant never refers to these elements negatively, as sensations apt to corrupt moral action<sup>39</sup>. In Kant’s view, affects are “not the intensity of a certain feeling that constitutes the affected state, but the lack of reflection”<sup>40</sup>. Affects, according to Kant, are “thoughtless” and suspend the mind’s composure, making reflection impossible. In this contest, reflection is considered as “the representation by means of reason as to whether he should give himself up to [the feeling] or refuse it.”<sup>41</sup> Affects arrive suddenly and flow away fastly, and Kant compares them to the physiological states of the body, both referring to those that increase vital forces and to those that relax the same forces. Kant speaks about affects starting from the faculty of feeling and, for this reason, the discussion on these defects of volition does not seem to concern their motivational efficacy. But the question is more difficult than it seems. Kant links affections with physiological and biological components that can compromise physical health above all. However, in many places, Kant insists on linking the presence of an altered affect to the motivation to act, because affects are bad and undermine agency. Since most feelings are practical and fundamental to the cultivation of

<sup>38</sup>I. Kant (2012), *Lectures on Anthropology*, ed. by A. Wood, R. Loudon, Cambridge, p. 142.

<sup>39</sup>For this questions, see also the concept of *akrasia*. The Aristotelian notion of *akrasia* has been re-enacted by Anglophone philosophy, to indicate an inconsistent practice with respect to recognized and proclaimed values (Chapell, 1995; MacIntyre, 1988). To focus on it we consider four different levels concerning ethical discourse and actual action. They are: objective norms (prescriptive level); the values or principles of the subject (axiological level); beliefs (preferential level); intentions (teleological or intentional level). With regard to the relationships between them, we note that: the objective norms and intentions of the subject are not identified; the relationship between the objective norms and the values or principles of the subject is mediated by beliefs. Regarding beliefs, *akrasia* presupposes that in addition to distinguishing between the objective level of the obligation and the subjective level of beliefs, we must also distinguish what the subject considers positive for himself, from what he considers positive in and of himself. The distinction between axiological beliefs and preferential beliefs is important to explain the *akrasia* and the bases of a theory of will and action. This in order to constitute a bridge between the action plan, closely linked to the intentional and the epistemic one of the subject's preferential beliefs and, in a mediated and variable form, also that of his axiological beliefs.

<sup>40</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 152.

<sup>41</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 149.

the practical sphere, Kant focuses attention on the alterations of feelings and desires that can compromise action, through the analogy with “temperaments of feeling”. The study of temperaments allows Kant to grasp the connection between disordered feelings and disordered actions. Temperaments are normally motivational and an individual’s character is capable of determining action, through the faculty of feeling. If there is an affection, a disorder, caused by a stronger feeling, there is a “suspension of composure”. In this case, affects do not allow reflection and suspend the practical decision of a subject, conditioning the higher faculty to desire. Affects are so overwhelming in the mind that they overcome reflection and become principles of immediate causation of action, disregarding the primacy of the faculty of cognition and of desire. In this conception it is the body that becomes central and Kant associates this kind of action, which favors only the lower faculty of feeling, to pure animal instinctive action. In the *Observations* and in the *Remarks*, Kant theorizes a positive circularity between aesthetic and moral factors within the single principle of the *Gefühl*. Temperaments and human inclinations, then, if adequately cultivated, provide the starting point for the formation of a precise ethical habit. If, in fact, the ambit of temperaments and the virtues connected to them can prepare one for the formation of an ethical attitude, without there being the voluntary adequacy to a norm of reason, the altered affects do not allow the healthy control of behavior towards oneself and others. During the pre-Critical period, Kant had not yet organized the higher faculties as the only proper locus of moral motivation, so a rational affect could be explained as a legitimately moral source of moral motivation.

Like affects, passions are defined as illnesses of mind that “shut out the sovereignty of reason”<sup>42</sup>. Passion is an “inclination that prevents reason from comparing it with the sum of all inclinations in respect to certain choice”.<sup>43</sup> Moreover, passions, unlike affects, imply that “the calm with which one gives oneself up to [a passion] permits reflection and allows the mind to form principles”<sup>44</sup>. In this sense, passions involve reflection and they are conceived as “inclinations”. In moral philosophy Kant uses the term “inclination” to define a ground of the lower faculty of desire, where the sensations are strictly connected to the ambit of volition. Inclinations, in Kantian philosophy, are not connected to instincts and are not only related to the lower faculty of feeling or desire. Kant also uses the term inclination to explain the reference of practical principles that indirectly determine the higher faculty of desire and pursue ends imposed by inclinations. In this sense, inclination is a principle that determines a sensible end, in contrast with the purity of moral law and its principle. Kant also thinks that passions are disordered inclinations that do not evolve towards higher faculties. Nevertheless, identifying passions with inclinations could imply that passions, as well as affections, exceed the superior faculty of desire and could become motivating for action without relying on the activity of deliberation and reflection. In *Anthropology* Kant writes “One can list being passionately in love [among the passions] (as long the other party persists in refusal), but one cannot list any physical love as passion,

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<sup>42</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 149.

<sup>43</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 165.

<sup>44</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 166.

because it does not contain a constant principle with respect to its object. Passion always presupposes a maxim on the part of the subject, to act according to an end prescribed to him by his inclination. Passion is therefore always connected with his reason, and one can no more attribute passion to mere animals than to pure rational beings.”<sup>45</sup> Therefore it seems clear that passions allow reflection because they are particular inclinations, understood as direct principles to inclinational ends. Again, in a handwritten note: “Passion[s]... presuppose a sensible but nevertheless also a counteracting rational faculty of desire (they are therefore not applicable to mere animals), except that inclination in [animals] takes away pure practical reason, in [passionate persons] dominat[es practical reason], taking possession of maxims either in respect to one’s ends or the use of means toward them.” Passions, then, do not exclude the role of imposing a maxim as a motivational principle of action. However, in the case of passions, with respect to the giving of the principle of pure moral law, the object will be offered by inclination and by the matter of desire. For example, cold passions too (manias for honor, dominance and possessions, for example) are not only connected with an affection, but also with a maxim, determined by another kind of end, which is not strictly moral. In the case of the passion for vengeance, Kant says that it is motivated by a principle which is able to formulate maxims, a decision of action but connected to desire. The passionate person is completely overwhelmed by the principles imposed by his passion and his feeling and does not consider the moral implications of his actions. Passionate action always requires a particular intervention of the higher faculty of desire, even if the principle governing action is passionate and reflection precludes both morality and happiness. In fact, the truly passionate individual in love, does not consider happiness or morality to be fundamental for his action, but only seeks out maxims that can satisfy his own passion. He will have his own passion as the end of this act, without any regard for any other kind of purpose.

The Kantian treatment of passions and affections holds that the human being can act against his own interests and higher ethical principles. Affections are disordered feelings that overcome the highest faculty of feeling; passions are deep and persistent alterations of the higher faculty but establish a different purpose from the moral one. According to Kant, various forms of defects of will exist because human action is partially connected to causes that can be explained from an empirical point of view. The importance of human action is given by the fact that it is always an expression of transcendental freedom and only because one possesses an intelligible level of freedom is it also possible to explain the choice for actions or choices ascribable to an empirical level. In the critical treatment Kant subordinates to the practical law all the maxims and resolutions deriving from *heteronomous* principles, giving a consistent priority to moral principles. The connection between the defects of the will and mental illnesses is thus explained. Cognitive pathologies that emerge from logical mistakes lead to a cognitive solipsism. In the same way, there is something similar in the diseases that emerge from the defects of volition. Affections and passions are extreme forms of moral selfishness that Kant defines in

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<sup>45</sup>*Anthropology*, p. 165.

*Anthropology* as the tendency to seek ends not for duty but for happiness. The egoism to which they lead is connected to the exclusive personal purpose of the passionate inclination, excluding any reference to others or one's own moral autonomy. But the mentally ill and the wicked (or the criminal) are profoundly different, because the former is not responsible for his actions, while the latter is capable of thinking a subjective maxim.

In the previous section, we observed how the mentally ill is unable to build a systematic unity of nature. Similarly, the Kantian conception of the deviations and errors of the rules of reason has an ethical implication. In this way, mental illness produces a form of alienation, i.e. an inability to control impulses. When the cause of the disease is hereditary, the responsibility for immoral behavior does not fall on a man conceived as a free agent, but on his physiological structure. In these severe cases of mental illness, an anthropological-pragmatic perspective of the cure is not useful. The person compromised by a serious illness is not responsible for his "bad" use of reason. In these cases, the patient is unable to correct his condition. But, what "kind" of humanity does the mentally ill have? The *decrease* in the level of humanity of the mentally ill is very difficult to understand. Kant believes that the mentally ill is not a subject of free action but is only able to live and create his personal world. A subject incapable of free action cannot be considered *totally* a person by Kant: the mentally ill person is, in fact, guided by others, and he is not autonomous. In this sense, then, the concept of "minority", overcome by the *Enlightenment*, explains the state of the mentally ill, i.e. who is unable to formulate ends and to use his reason without the guidance from another.

##### 5. Mental illness and imputability: a possible interpretation.

The study of the diseases of cognition and volition explains the deficiencies and the distortions of human action as unusual errors and problematic mistakes of the will, because not all free subjects are able to adapt their action according to rational principles and the moral law. It is important for Kant to analyze the non-moral motivations, because the laws of empirical psychology, which can be considered as a discipline that treats the principle of action not connected to the moral law, study motivation based on desire, and not only on the spontaneity of law of freedom. If the *Critique of Practical Reason*, in the part relating to the material determination of the principles of will, studies the problem of desire and the material objects of pleasure, a discipline such as empirical psychology is not developed by Kant as a systematic part of his transcendental philosophy. In this sense, the study of the passions, of the affections of the soul, as well as of the desirable aspects of action, fall into anthropological works, although, as we shall see, they have a tangent interest with some themes concerning the legal sphere.

The affections and passions of the soul are not exclusively perturbations of the soul, but they are important elements through which it is possible to understand that action is also

subjected to a material determination of the will<sup>46</sup>, to objects of desire, by a form of natural causality. Kant, in fact, says: “affect does a momentary damage to freedom and dominion over oneself. Passion abandons them and finds its pleasure and satisfaction in a slavish mind. But because reason still does not ease off with his summons to inner freedom, the unhappy man groans in his chains, which he nevertheless cannot break away from because they have already grown together with his limbs, so to speak”<sup>47</sup>. This quote is important for the connection between human passion, reason and freedom. In the passion of the soul, man is constantly called to his internal freedom, through practical reason. The passionate man, therefore, consciously chains himself, “deciding” on passion as the principle of his action and not for the moral law. The passionate man is aware of making a choice which is capable of subverting the rational order of action.

In this regard, a problem of considerable importance is the relation between mental illness and the imputability [*Zurechenbarkeit*] in a moral perspective. In particular, as we will see, Kant focuses on the relation between imputability and diseases of the mind, from a cognitive point of view and from the point of view of the faculty of desire. In particular, the problem is to understand the role of the subject’s health and his or her responsibility in action and to establish the degree of guilt and the punishment that can be given. According to Kant, the concept of legal imputation is based on the possession of the complete functioning of the higher cognitive faculties. In ethical writings, Kant links these higher faculties to action, through the principle of freedom “we can attribute something to someone but not impute it to him; the actions, for example, of a madman or a drunkard can be attributed even if not imputed to them. In the indictment the action must spring from freedom.”<sup>48</sup> Therefore, when an action is due to diseases of the cognitive faculty, one can be exempted from legal responsibility. Kant reduces the role of mental disturbs, especially cognitive, in the dimension of juridical imputability but highlights, in his *Metaphysics of Morals*<sup>49</sup> (1797), important implications of the difference between affects and passions for moral responsibility. Kant believes, in fact, that although affects and passions both hinder morality and both interfere with the normal processes of rational choice. In this sense, according to Kant, affects simply indicate a “lack of virtue”, while passions are “really evil”. The affects, which exclude the reflection in the faculty of feeling and interfere with choice, represent only a weakness. Weakness of mind<sup>50</sup>, as a loss of will in the principle of action, is not negative in itself and concerns the inability to put a principle of reflection on motivation. For example, a person may kill someone out of anger, but the power of choice, in this case, is not involved. A person may not be able to provide assistance to someone in need, but only because he is not capable of formulating relevant wishes or desires. Acting or not acting because of affects is morally similar to acting or not acting when one is

<sup>46</sup> See also, Borges, M. (2004) “What Can Kant Teach Us about Emotion?”, *Journal of Philosophy* 101: 140 – 58.

<sup>47</sup> *Anthropology*, p. 166.

<sup>48</sup> Kant, I. (1997) *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. by P. Heath – J.B. Scheenwind, Cambridge, 1997, p. 80.

<sup>49</sup> Kant, I. (1996), *The Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. by M. Gregor, R. J. Sullivan, Cambridge, 1996.

<sup>50</sup> See also, Bratman, M. (1979) “Practical reasoning and Weakness of the Will”, *Nous* 13; 153- 71.



asleep, or like suffering from sleepwalking. In this case, one is morally unconscious and is not morally corrupt, as the maxim of action is not a passionate principle but simply an action followed by a loss of voluntary forces. For this reason, the affects do not make the subject less virtuous, but he does not progress in virtue, because the weakness of the will is neither doing evil nor progressing towards good. Unlike affects, passions work through the power of choice of ends, choosing to pursue the object of an inclination without reflections on other possible objects of choice. Therefore passions are not simply weak states of mind, like the affections, but they are also evil. Passions do not preclude the choice, but intentionally pervert it and this is the principle of a radical evil. One with passion deliberately rejects all interests, including moral law, in favor of seeking an inclination. Therefore all passions are completely incompatible with having good will.

The relation between legal imputability and mental illness is not studied by Kant in an interrelated way. In *Anthropology*, therefore, Kant does not treat with the problem of legal imputation directly<sup>51</sup>, but focuses on some problems concerning the relation between affections, passions and moral responsibility. In particular, responsibility and freedom appear strongly undermined starting from the passions of the soul - the real diseases of the will - that Kant believes to be “cancers” of the soul: “passion is cancerous sores for pure practical reason”<sup>52</sup>. Kant is clear in the definition of passion. Since the passion is expressed in reflection, and is not a rushed movement like the affection (which is temporary), it tends to take root and to be tied to “reasoning”. For this reason, Kant sees passion as capable of becoming the object of a maxim of the faculty of desire, in the same way as moral law. Passion offers a principle to action, a motivation that is structurally linked to the basis of action. Affection is a shattering excitement which disappears as soon as it is over. Passions, says Kant, are not, like affects, “unfortunate states of mind” but are “evil as well”<sup>53</sup>. Kant connects passion to reason, studying the difference between man and animal. The impetuous inclination of the animal, expressed in the animal instinct (the inclination for sexual union) and in the research for means of subsistence, is not passion, because the animal is not reasonable. For this reason, as Kant says “animals [...] have no reason, which alone establishes the concept of freedom and with which the passion comes into collision”<sup>54</sup>. The difference between man and animal, and the fact that animals have instincts and not passions, clearly links passion to man and to freedom. In this sense, only the reasonable man can be subject to the disease of the will and to the passion, which is an element of opposition and natural necessity, as opposed to the freedom of the moral law.

Now, returning to the concept of imputability, Kant links the problem in the *Metaphysics of morals* to the concept of person. Kant defines the person as: “a subject whose actions can be imputed to him. Moral personality is therefore nothing other than the freedom of a rational being under moral laws (whereas psychological personality is merely the capacity

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<sup>51</sup> The Kantian perspective presented in §48 of *Anthropology*, where the problem of the *protection* of the mentally ill is discussed, seems to consider the patient without personality.

<sup>52</sup> *Anthropology*, p. 166.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibidem*

<sup>54</sup> *Anthropology*, p. 169.

for being conscious of one's identity in different conditions of one's existence). From this it follows that a person is subject to no other laws than those he gives to himself."<sup>55</sup> The concept of person has relevance both in the domain of law and in that of ethics, through the relation with the notions of "obligation", "imputation", "duty", "freedom" and "law". The originality of Kant's reflection on the concept of "person" derives from its link with the Wolffian heritage: in Wolff, therefore, the moral or spiritual man, distinct from the merely carnal man, is the subject of rights and obligations; as such, in the wake of Grotius and Locke, man is a person, because he carries out imputable actions and, as a person, he is free because imputability entails reference to a dimension further than that of natural causality. In Kant, we can find an analogous intertwining between the concepts of person, freedom and imputability: however, each of these concepts, and therefore also the whole, must be placed in the new argumentative horizon opened by the categorical imperative, which involves the a priori foundation of obligation. In Kant, in fact, the imputability of actions refers to the criterion of the interior duty to man: thus it emerges that the juridical capacity of the Kantian person, which is not reducible simply to a *habilitas*, as in Wolff, and the very fact of "being a person" is no longer defined in Kant from the point of view of a generally understood will, but on the basis of a "pure possible will". Imputation is, then: "(*imputatio*) in the moral sense is a judgment by which someone is regarded as the author (*causa libera*) of an action, which is then called a *deed (factum)* and stands under law."<sup>56</sup> In this conception, the human person appears to be endowed with moral conscience (*Gewissen*) and awareness (*Bewusstsein*), unlike things ("is that to which nothing can be imputed"), animals or, as we have seen, the insane or mentally ill. In order to be imputed, in fact, the action must be free and it is precisely for this reason that in the case of a drunk or a maniac the actions can be ascribed to the two subjects but it is not possible to impute them to these people. In Kant, therefore, there is the conception that freedom of action and the moral law proceed together in imputation. When the action is not free, for whatever reason, according to Kant it cannot be imputed, but only ascribed to the subject who performs it.

To conclude the discourse on imputability, we now refer to the theme of the fragility of human nature, expressed by Kant in the expected "degrees" of imputation. In the *Lectures on Ethics*, Kant argues that the degrees of imputation depend on the degrees of freedom. The subjective conditions of freedom are the capacity to act, that is, the knowledge of the motive and object of the action. In the absence of these conditions, the charge does not take place. Kant offers the example of the child and the drunkard. Kant also believes that the greater are the impediments (including psychological and related to freedom and will), the less free the action. He who kills out of jealousy and he who steals out of hunger have different appetites: an appetite of nature and an appetite of greed. Kant precisely distinguishes between the two, condemning the latter. Another reason for the reduction of imputability is the weakness [*Schwäche*] and the frailty [*Gebrechlichkeit*] of human nature.

<sup>55</sup> *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 50.

<sup>56</sup> *The Metaphysics of Morals*, p. 53.

The sentence becomes less applicable when there is a weakness of human nature: in that case the person who is fragile does not have the moral goodness to perform an action which is adequate to the law. In Kant the fragility and the weakness of human nature are important concepts, like radical evil. In fact, in man there can be both the absence of positive good and the presence of positive evil, as a natural tendency to evil. According to Kant, *fragilitas* and human *infirmitas* can be evaluated only in others and in their actions, and the pragmatic judge and legislator has the duty to consider these two concepts when judging subjects who are also men. In this sense, Kantian legal theory is not only connected to the concept of personality and imputation but also to other dimensions of human subjectivity, which is conceived in a structured way. The Kantian concept of imputability explains the action of a free subject, the behavior of a fragile or weak man, the crime of a delinquent. In the case of mental illness, where it is not possible to consider a concept of imputability, the challenge for the Kantian interpretation is the study of another conception of subjectivity, in addition to that of personality.

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## **Kant contemporáneo / Kant subterráneo**

### *Contemporary Kant / Subterranean Kant*

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#### **Abstract**

With this brief text I introduce the homonymous dossier. The idea of the dossier was to compile texts on matters that are not usually studied in the literature, written from original and polemical perspectives. These papers focus on subjects like the extraterrestrial perspective on humans (Laura Herrero Oliva), the a priori character of political conflict (Paola Romero), drinking alcohol with friends (Maria Borges) and political philosophy of the mind (Robert Hannah).

#### **Key words (TNR 11)**

Aliens; Life on other planets; Conflict; Alcohol; Friends; Anarchy

Este dossier nació de la idea de armar una colección de ensayos sobre aspectos subestudiados de la filosofía kantiana (esos aspectos que son objetos menores y marginales en la reflexión filosófica y que, llevados al centro de la preocupación, nos descubren nuevas luces), sobre la contemporaneidad (o no) de la filosofía política de Kant frente a los problemas de nuestros presentes y sobre interpretaciones alternativas a las visiones hegemónicas de su teoría.

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Entre que tuvimos la idea de emprender este dossier y su puesta en marcha, apareció la pandemia que alteró la vida de muchas y muchos colegas y agravó las dificultades con las que muchas colegas conviven al tratar de conciliar, por ejemplo, la práctica de la maternidad y otras tareas de cuidado con las exigencias innecesarias de una vida académica que responde cada vez más a lógicas mercantiles, meritócratas e insensibles a las diferencias a veces abismales entre las condiciones materiales en las que trabajamos quienes hacemos filosofía en diferentes partes del mundo. Por las dificultades que la vida en pandemia, hemos atrasado la publicación del dossier para que se pudieran terminar los trabajos. También hemos perdido varios trabajos muy valiosos de colegas a quienes la pandemia las ha afectado especialmente (y a ellas va dedicado este trabajo conjunto). El dossier “Kant subterráneo / Kant contemporáneo” quedó, entonces, con solamente cuatro de los alrededor de ocho trabajos que habíamos planeado inicialmente que tuviera. Pero el hecho de que sean “solo” cuatro trabajos no le quita ningún valor al dossier, pues los artículos que reúno aquí cumplen con creces la idea inicial que animó el proyecto. En lo que sigue resaltaré los aportes de cada uno de ellos.

En “Kant y los otros seres racionales. El punto de vista de los habitantes de los astros” Laura Herrero Oliva rastrea en el corpus kantiano la presencia de habitantes de otros planetas. Herrero Oliva reconstruye el hilo que conecta diferentes obras escritas a lo largo de toda la vida intelectual de Kant (*Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*, *Sueños de un visionario*, *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres y Antropología en sentido pragmático*) para resaltar la importancia subterránea de la mirada racional y sensible pero no humana sobre la humanidad. ¿Cómo nos miran desde otros planetas, para cuyos habitantes la Tierra es una maravilla del cielo estrellado? Herrero Oliva sostiene que la mirada extraterrestre no solo amplía el concepto de racionalidad asociado a seres finitos y sensibles sino que además nos sirve como espejo de la reflexión sobre nuestra propia condición humana. Las miradas de quienes habitan otros planetas, existan o no, lleguemos o no a encontrarnos algún día, iluminan lo que sucede aquí en la Tierra: “pensar lo otro”, sostiene Herrero Oliva, “es condición para entendernos a nosotras mismas”. Esta respuesta es, junto con otras que encontrarán en su texto, parte de la propuesta de lectura que la autora nos propone a partir de las preguntas bellas y originales que ella les plantea a las fuentes. Sobre un pasaje célebre de *Fundamentación*, “Es ist überall nichts in der Welt, ja überhaupt auch außer derselben zu denken möglich, was ohne Einschränkung für gut könnte gehalten werden, als allein ein **guter Wille**” (GMS, AA 04:393), ella nos hace notar que “la primera parte de la afirmación que nos lleva a un fuera del mundo que desde este momento no hemos de olvidar en la lectura de esta obra”. A partir de esto, se pregunta “¿Qué hay fuera de este mundo y por qué es tan interesante para la metafísica de las costumbres?”. Ya la sola formulación de este interrogante es un gran aporte para renovar los modos en los que se sigue leyendo uno de los textos más visitados y peor comprendidos de Kant. La lectura del artículo revela, además, pistas interesantes para dar con buenas respuestas.

El novedoso trabajo “How Carl Schmitt (and others) got Kant wrong” de Paola Romero resalta un elemento que aunque está en la columna vertebral del corpus político de Kant es ignorado por completo en la mayor parte de las lecturas que de él se hacen tanto en la literatura especializada como en las teorías políticas y debates contemporáneos que reclaman una filiación en Kant: el *conflicto*. Contra Carl Schmitt y contra las lecturas que los defensores de la paz democrática y de la guerra justa hacen de Kant, esto es, contra las interpretaciones despolitizantes de Kant, Romero sostiene que el conflicto tiene un rol sistemático en Kant (en el conocimiento, en la moral y en la política) y que además está inscripto normativa y necesariamente en las inevitables relaciones prácticas entre agentes con voluntad y arbitrio. El conflicto, explica la autora, se suscita en Kant independientemente de condiciones empíricas como la escasez de recursos o nuestros deseos particulares; es, en rigor, a priori y por lo tanto inerradicable. En efecto, otro aporte interesante de Romero es que ella interpreta el conflicto como un rasgo cuasidefinitorio de la interacción entre voluntades humanas y esta es la razón por la que en Kant ni la política, ni la moral ni el derecho pueden ni deben intentar eliminarlo: negar o ignorar el conflicto nos conduce a hacer teorías políticas y jurídicas que nada tienen que ver con nuestras realidades y a la imposición violenta de concepciones de la paz ajenas a lo humano.<sup>1</sup>

Robert Hannah escribió para el dossier un texto titulado “The New Conflict of the Faculties: Kant, Radical Enlightenment, The Hyper-State, and How to Philosophize During a Pandemic”. Hannah nos presenta una lectura anarquista, socialista y cosmopolita de la ilustración radical en Kant. El autor retoma las críticas radicales a la subordinación de la academia a los fines despóticos de los gobiernos que Kant detalla en *El conflicto de las facultades* y repone la fuerza contrahegemónica allí implicada. Hannah considera que existe un “nuevo conflicto de las facultades” y su ensayo se encarga de aplicar la concepción radical de la ilustración kantiana, vía un análisis muy interesante desde la perspectiva de la filosofía política de la mente, al escenario contemporáneo de neoliberalismo, hiper-estatalidad y pandemia, haciendo foco en el modo en el que los medios colaboran con la reproducción de esta realidad distópica que vivimos.

En “Kant on Eating and Drinking”, Maria Borges nos muestra que los comentarios de Kant sobre los aspectos sociales y morales de la comida y el consumo de alcohol se asociaban consistentemente con su vida cotidiana. Kant asocia la virtud del vino con los beneficios de la sociabilidad amistosa. Comer con personas amigas en conversación amena y amable nos ayuda con nuestra digestión. La autora también relaciona las visiones de Kant sobre la ingesta de alimentos, bebidas alcohólicas y hasta del opio con las visiones médicas de su época. Borges resalta la validez de la reprobación kantiana de las dietas estrictas que nos privan de nutrientes y de la aprobación entusiasta de compartir la mesa con nuestros seres queridos.

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<sup>1</sup> Recomiendo la lectura de su tesis de doctorado (Romero, P. (2019), *Kant and political willing. PhD thesis*, The London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Londres) donde Romero desarrolla con detalle los argumentos que sostienen su tesis sobre el conflicto y las consecuencias para la comprensión de la filosofía política kantiana.

Por último, me queda agradecer a Nuria Sánchez Madrid, quien fue protagonista en el armado de este dossier.

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**Kant y los otros seres racionales.  
El punto de vista de los habitantes de los astros**

*Kant and other rational beings.  
The perspective of the inhabitants of the planets.<sup>1</sup>*

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**Resumen**

En este artículo recorro algunas de las páginas de la obra kantiana que introducen la problemática de los otros seres racionales, me centro para ello en *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*, la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* y la *Antropología en sentido pragmático*. Mi propuesta es que la hipótesis de la existencia de otras formas de racionalidad, que en algunos textos Kant sitúa en otros planetas, nos proporciona una perspectiva necesaria para poder dar alguna respuesta a la cuestión ¿qué es el ser humano? Si bien Kant aborda en textos muy relevantes la forma de tener por verdad la existencia de tales seres, lo realmente importante es el ser capaces de asumir esa perspectiva para reflexionar en torno a nuestra racionalidad.

**Palabras clave**

Kant; seres racionales; analogía; libertad; perspectiva

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<sup>1</sup> Traduzco ‘astros’ por ‘planets’ siguiendo la edición inglesa de *la Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*.

**Abstract**

I reflect in this paper about some of the pages that Kant devotes to the problem of other rational beings. I focus on following works, *Universal Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*. My thesis is that the hypothesis of the existence of other forms of rationality that Kant locates on other planets offers us the necessary perspective to answer the question ‘what is the human being?’

**Key words**

Kant; rational beings; analogy; freedom; standpoint

Él que, con un mismo ojo, como Dios de todo  
 Ve perecer a un héroe y caer a un gorrión,  
 Destruirse los átomos o los sistemas,  
 Ve estallar una burbuja y hundirse un mundo entero.  
 Pope, *Ensayo sobre el hombre*<sup>2</sup>

En 1755 Kant concluye su *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*<sup>3</sup> con una tercera parte que lleva por título ‘Contiene un ensayo de comparación entre los habitantes de diversos planetas, basado en las analogías de la naturaleza’, y un apéndice ‘Sobre los habitantes de los astros’. Lejos de ser un tema de interés del Kant treintañero, la alusión a otros seres racionales es constante en su obra. En la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* de 1798 leemos en el último párrafo las palabras siguientes:

Bien podría ser que en algún otro planeta existieran seres racionales que no pudiesen pensar de otro modo que en voz alta, esto es, así despiertos como en sueños, encontrándose en compañía o solos, no pudiesen tener pensamientos que al mismo tiempo no expresaran ¿Qué conducta recíproca daría esto por resultado, distinta de la de nuestra especie humana? (Anth, AA 07:332)

Entre ambos textos Kant publica la mayor parte de sus obras y todo parece indicar que no ha perdido la curiosidad que sentía por la pregunta de la habitabilidad de otros planetas,

<sup>2</sup> Cita que aparece en *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo* (NTH, AA 01:318), se corresponde con la Epístola I, § III, del *Ensayo sobre el hombre* de Alexander Pope. Este poema citado de Pope es la traducción de Lunqdt que parece seguir el texto inglés y no el alemán de Brocke que reproduce Kant, donde ‘God’, ha sido traducido por ‘Schöpfer’, ‘Creador’.

<sup>3</sup> Existen dos traducciones al castellano, ambas publicadas en Buenos Aires, la primera de 1946, traducción de Pedro Merton en la editorial Lautaro, y una segunda de Jorge Lunqdt del año 1969, en la editorial Juárez. He comparado las traducciones de los extractos citados con el original a través de la edición electrónica de las Obras Completas de Kant de la Universidad de Duisburg-Essen, (<https://korpora.zim.uni-duisburg-essen.de/Kant/>) y variado algún término de la traducción donde he creído pertinente para ajustar el texto al original. En líneas generales considero la traducción de Lunqdt más precisa, aunque sigue en gran medida el trabajo previo de Merton de 1946. Uno de los cambios que he introducido es en el título de la obra que en Lunqdt es *Historia General de la Naturaleza y Teoría del Cielo*, y he cambiado por *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*.

pero sobre todo el interés acerca de las condiciones que pensamos vinculadas a esos seres. Teniendo en cuenta la presencia de este tema en diversos momentos de su obra, una presencia que desde luego puede pasar, y no sin razón, muy desapercibida, no puedo sino leer la referencia al cielo estrellado de la *Crítica de la razón práctica* (KpV, AA 05:161), como una admiración no sólo hacia los astros, sino a la posibilidad de ampliar el concepto de racionalidad. Veremos en las líneas que siguen si esta interpretación personal puede sostenerse teniendo en cuenta las fuentes kantianas directas.

En las páginas que siguen pretendo mostrar la diferencia y, sobre todo, la semejanza que podemos encontrar entre las formulaciones respecto de la vida de los habitantes de los astros del texto precrítico de 1755, y las referencias a ellos en las páginas críticas, especialmente en la *Antropología en sentido pragmático* (*Antropología*), pero también en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* para analizar los lugares en que en esta obra aparecen mencionados otros posibles seres racionales.

Los pasajes de la obra de Kant en que aparecen alusiones a otros seres racionales reflejan dos intereses diversos; en primer lugar, tratan del tipo de conocimiento que podemos tener acerca de ellos. Este es el interés que se refleja, por ejemplo, en el famoso pasaje de la *Crítica de la razón pura*:

El criterio corriente para distinguir si lo afirmado por alguien es mera persuasión o constituye al menos una convicción subjetiva, es decir, una creencia firme, es la *apuesta* [...]. Si fuera posible decirlo mediante alguna experiencia, apostaría cuanto tengo a que al menos alguno de los planteas que vemos está habitado. Por ello afirmo que no es una mera opinión, sino una firme creencia (por cuya corrección arriesgaría muchas ventajas de mi vida) el que otros mundos estén habitados (KrV, A 825/ B 853).

En segundo lugar, encontramos en esos pasajes una propuesta acerca de cómo serían esos otros seres racionales, ya que la forma de su racionalidad, aunque no sea más que una hipótesis de trabajo, nos dejaría entender mejor la nuestra propia. En este segundo caso nos encontramos con formulaciones condicionales como la que podemos leer en la cita que he transcrito de la *Antropología* unas líneas más arriba (Anth, AA 07:332). Es por este segundo interés por el que me he decantado en las páginas que siguen.

Para llevar a cabo esta reflexión dedico una parte de la exposición al estudio de la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* (*Fundamentación*), donde en ningún momento se habla de habitantes de otros planetas, aunque sí en múltiples ocasiones de otros seres racionales. Pretendo mostrar cómo la consideración de otras formas de racionalidad apunta en la dirección de la pregunta fundamental de la obra kantiana, ¿qué es el ser humano? Teniendo esto en cuenta mi trabajo ha consistido en tratar de responder a la pregunta ¿qué nos puede enseñar de la razón humana esta vida racional supuesta en otros lugares? Pensar otros seres racionales tendría implicaciones antropológicas, haciéndonos ver que pensar lo otro es condición para entendernos a nosotras mismas.

## 1. Lecturas de la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*.

La *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* sigue siendo uno de los textos de acceso a la filosofía kantiana. Sus páginas son extensa y muy frecuentemente citadas y, tal vez por ese exceso, también en ocasiones ridiculizadas cuando sus citas aparecen sin su contexto pertinente. Por lo que a las presuntas pretensiones del libro se refiere, se ha repetido en múltiples ocasiones que propondría una especie de moral para ángeles, y, acusándola de fundar un juego formal vacío<sup>4</sup>, las propias críticas la vacían aún más con interpretaciones que ven ángeles en cualquier otro ser racional, por ejemplo, cuando Kant afirma:

A esto se añade, que, si no se quiere negar al concepto de moralidad absolutamente toda verdad y referencia a un objeto posible, no se puede poner en duda que su ley es de tan extendida significación que tiene que valer no meramente para los seres humanos, sino para todos los seres racionales en general, no meramente bajo condiciones contingentes y con excepciones, sino de modo absolutamente necesario (GMS, AA 04:408).

En este primer epígrafe pretendo explorar quiénes son estos otros seres racionales que aparecen en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* y por qué su aparición es tan relevante en esta obra.

### 1.1. El ‘Prefacio’ de la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*.

Comprendo la *Fundamentación* como un relato que va perfilando una tensión que se crea entre las leyes de la naturaleza y las leyes de la libertad al ser referidas a un ser racional que también es sensible<sup>5</sup>. Las leyes de la naturaleza tienen dos funciones en el ser humano, por un lado, obligarle a seguir las mismas leyes mecánicas que al resto de seres materiales, por otro lado, convertirle en un ser con impulsos, deseos e inclinaciones. De esta forma, la naturaleza atañe a su cuerpo a través de las leyes de la naturaleza, acerca de lo cual se ocuparía la física, pero tiene una vía de acceso también para determinar su voluntad. En la *Fundamentación*, y en general en el sistema crítico kantiano, lo que nos interesa es el segundo de los aspectos cuando hablamos de la naturaleza que influye en el ser humano. Si

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<sup>4</sup> Agradezco muy profundamente la propuesta que por parte de una de las personas que han revisado mi artículo me han realizado para señalar algunas de estas críticas al formalismo kantiano. Creo que en este momento podría yo estar repitiendo las palabras de un trabajo que me acompañó en la redacción de mi tesis doctoral: Ramón Rodríguez García, *La fundamentación formal de la ética*. Allí podemos leer: “La representación que habitualmente se tiene de la obra moral de Kant, no sólo por parte de manuales escolares, sino de filósofos de reconocida autoridad como Hegel, Mill, Dewey, Scheller, Hartmann, etc., - por supuesto, cada uno a su manera- es que se trata de un “vacío formalismo”, de una “ética sin contenido”, es decir, de una moral que no propone a la conciencia fines prácticos concretos, sino la abstracta norma del deber, una pura disposición de espíritu”. (Rodríguez García 1982, p. 165). Para profundizar en la crítica de Hegel a Kant propongo la lectura del artículo “A Critica de Hegel ao Formalismo Kantiano em Defesa da Eiticidade” de Caroline F. Fernandes, y para conocer la lectura que Hartmann realiza de Kant, el trabajo del profesor Pedro Chacón Fuertes “Sistema y problema. Anotaciones a la «interpretación» de Nicolai Hartmann sobre Kant” (ver referencias bibliográficas completas al final).

el abismo que ha de cerrar la filosofía crítica kantiana se refiere más bien a la diferencia entre los usos de la razón aplicada a la naturaleza material y a las leyes necesarias para una voluntad (usos teórico y práctico de la razón); en el ser humano el abismo se sitúa más bien en el modo en que ambos tipos de leyes, de la naturaleza y de la libertad, se refieren a su voluntad, fundando, las primeras, impulsos e inclinaciones, las segundas, imperativos. El ser humano se reconoce en esa tensión buscando un equilibrio que requiere siempre un principio para la acción. En la *Fundamentación* aparece esa tensión enmarcada explícitamente entre dos esquemas, pero implícitamente en todo el texto; el primero de los esquemas abre en el ‘Prefacio’ la investigación que Kant nos propone, explicitando cuáles son y cómo se relacionan los saberes racionales; el segundo esquema en la ‘Tercera Sección’ (GMS, AA 04:451) explicita la vinculación de la *Fundamentación* con la *Crítica de la razón pura*, y lo hace utilizando una nomenclatura que dará problemas para la exégesis kantiana, pues Kant nos habla de un mundo de los sentidos y un mundo del entendimiento, ofreciendo así cierto rango ontológico a la condición epistémica de la objetividad del conocimiento. En estas líneas de la *Fundamentación* se está deteniendo Kant en la defensa de la existencia de las cosas en sí que tenemos que admitir detrás de los objetos de los sentidos, de ahí esa apariencia ontológica en la nomenclatura de los dos mundos, a los que creo que debemos entender como dos puntos de vista diversos siguiendo la solución a la tercera antinomia de la *Crítica de la razón pura*<sup>6</sup>. Entre esos dos mundos se encontrará el ser humano, es decir, él podrá ser observado desde ambas perspectivas, como también otros seres racionales en comparación con los cuales podremos entender los requisitos de la acción humana. Analicemos el primero de los esquemas a que he hecho referencia.

Tratemos de entender por qué abre Kant la *Fundamentación* con el esquema de la división del conocimiento racional, o, al menos, para qué nos sirve en nuestro propósito de entender a la voluntad humana en el más amplio ámbito de la racionalidad. Como nos dice Kant en las primeras líneas de la obra (GMS, AA 04:387), lo relevante en un esquema es entender el principio de la división que, en el caso de los conocimientos racionales, no habría ofrecido la antigua filosofía griega a pesar de compartir la misma clasificación.

La distinción básica a la que apunta el esquema se da entre los conocimientos formales, de la lógica, que se ocupan de formas y reglas sin distinción de objetos; y los materiales, dirigidos a algún tipo de objeto y sus leyes. Los conocimientos racionales materiales son de dos tipos, pues conocemos las leyes de la naturaleza y las leyes de la libertad, de la doctrina de la naturaleza y la doctrina de las costumbres respectivamente. Ambas contienen a su vez una parte empírica y una parte pura. No hemos de olvidar que la parte empírica se halla dentro del concepto general de conocimiento racional del que se parte; en un sentido más restrictivo Kant utiliza el término conocimiento racional para referirse

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<sup>6</sup> La referencia a la tercera antinomia de la *Crítica de la razón pura* me fue sugerida en una de las revisiones que recibí antes de la publicación de este artículo. Agradezco a la persona que llevó a cabo esta revisión tan pertinente sugerencia. Un análisis más pormenorizado de esta antinomia desbordaría los objetivos de este artículo.

exclusivamente a la filosofía pura de cada una de las doctrinas (metafísica de la naturaleza y metafísica de las costumbres). Si nos dice que ambas doctrinas tienen una parte empírica es porque en esas partes el conocimiento se basa en fundamentos de la experiencia, pero, por supuesto, no sólo; en el caso de la doctrina de las costumbres su parte empírica se refiere a una voluntad humana afectada por la experiencia y puede recibir igualmente el nombre de antropología práctica; en el caso de la doctrina de la naturaleza su parte empírica se refiere a la naturaleza como objeto de la experiencia. Ambas tienen también una parte pura, la metafísica de las costumbres y la metafísica de la naturaleza. La primera, por oposición a la parte empírica, ha de tratar de todo ser racional, pues entre sus funciones Kant establece: “saber cuánto puede rendir la razón pura [...] y de qué fuentes extrae ella misma esta su enseñanza *a priori*” (GMS, AA 04:388-389). Así, si la antropología práctica se refiere a la voluntad humana, la metafísica de las costumbres nos habla de todo aquello que se halla en la voluntad de un ser racional. Más adelante veremos que, aunque la antropología se refiera al ser humano, para hacerlo, necesita observarlo desde un punto de vista externo, es decir, desde el punto de vista que puede alcanzar otro ser racional.

La aparición de los otros seres racionales para el tratamiento de la metafísica de las costumbres no respondería según mi tesis a un interés esotérico,<sup>7</sup> sino a un compromiso con el juego copernicano de la razón, que, extendiendo su paradigma a toda propuesta kantiana, se aplica en este caso a la investigación de la voluntad, en el sentido de que si ya no hay fronteras para la aplicación de las leyes de la naturaleza al resto de planetas y a otros posibles sistemas solares, como veremos en el escrito de 1755, esto se habría de reflejar igualmente en el estudio de las leyes de la libertad. Es decir, si Kant nos puede hablar de la formación de los planetas y de su organización en diversos sistemas en base a la analogía con las leyes de la naturaleza experimentada, también se podrá ampliar el espectro de las leyes de la libertad a todos los seres racionales de los que no tenemos experiencia. No sólo se puede, sino que si queremos entender qué es el ser humano apelando a su racionalidad tendremos que investigar, sobre todo, qué es lo que tiene de común con otros seres racionales que puedan ser pensados.

En el ‘Prefacio’ de la *Fundamentación* encontramos otro de esos textos citados con profusión y de los que propongo una lectura que implique un interés antropológico. La investigación de la *Fundamentación* propone entender la racionalidad humana en relación con los rasgos comunes de cualquier otra racionalidad:

Todo el mundo tiene que confesar que una ley, si es que ha de valer moralmente, esto es, como fundamento de una obligación, tiene que llevar consigo necesidad absoluta; que el mandato: no debes mentir, no es que valga meramente para hombres, sin que otros seres racionales tuviesen que atenerse a él [...]; que, por lo tanto, el fundamento de la

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<sup>7</sup> El interés presente en el siglo XVIII acerca de la vida en otros planetas ha sido estudiado por Losch (2016, p. 266). En este artículo se citan las obras de Fontenelle, Huygens o Derham como representantes de la creencia en los habitantes de otros planetas. Al inicio del artículo de Clark (2001) por el contrario se dice que Kant era casi el único en albergar esta creencia (Clark 2001, p. 263).

obligación tiene que ser buscado aquí no en la naturaleza del hombre, o en las circunstancias en el mundo en que está puesto, sino *a priori* exclusivamente en conceptos de la razón pura (GMS, AA 04:389).

Si no vale meramente para hombres, ¿para quién más vale? Para todo ser racional, y en la tensión entre la antropología y la metafísica de las costumbres, Kant irá situando diversas formas de pensar a esos posibles seres, que no tienen por qué ser meramente figuras angelicales.

La metafísica de las costumbres que, repito, es la parte pura de la doctrina que trata de la razón en tanto que universal (presente en todo el universo), no es una mera cuestión erudita que nos lleve más tarde a la lectura de una antropología, sino que tiene también una intención en la aplicación de los principios: “porque las costumbres mismas permanecen sometidas a todo tipo de corrupción mientras falta ese hilo conductor y norma suprema de su correcto enjuiciamiento” (GMS, AA 04:390). El conocimiento de nuestra razón pura, pero sabiendo que es tan nuestra como de otros seres racionales, colaborará a la hora de garantizar que el principio de la moralidad no se pervierta (GMS, AA 04:410). Imaginar lo que puede dar de sí esa racionalidad universal puede ser relevante para una mera cuestión antropológica.

## 1.2. ¿Qué otros seres racionales aparecen en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*?

La pregunta señalada en el título de este epígrafe podemos pertinentemente planteárnosla al comenzar la lectura de la ‘Primera Sección’ de la *Fundamentación*. Un *locus* de nuevo, profusamente citado:

En ningún lugar del mundo, pero tampoco siquiera fuera del mismo, es posible pensar nada que pudiese ser tenido sin restricción por bueno, a no ser únicamente una *buena voluntad* (GMS, AA 04:393).

Las citas y el estudio de este fragmento suelen centrarse en esa aparición de la buena voluntad y en la determinación de su contenido, no es este mi interés en este caso, sino pensar la primera parte de la afirmación que nos lleva a un fuera del mundo que desde este momento no hemos de olvidar en la lectura de esta obra. ¿Qué hay fuera de este mundo y por qué es tan interesante para la metafísica de las costumbres?

En la *Fundamentación* no sólo nos hallamos ante la formulación del imperativo categórico, sino ante un problema más relevante como es analizar las partes de ese imperativo en tanto que juicio sintético *a priori*, es decir, determinar cuáles son el sujeto y el predicado que se unen en él y además cuál es el nexo que lo hace posible. Por lo que se refiere a cuál sea ese nexo este es uno de los momentos claves para comprender su presencia en el imperativo:

Tales proposiciones sintéticas sólo son posibles porque ambos conocimientos están enlazados entre sí por la conexión con un tercero en el que podemos encontrarlos cada uno por su parte. El concepto positivo de la libertad proporciona ese tercero [...]. Pero

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aquí no se puede indicar todavía en seguida qué sea ese tercero al que la libertad nos remite (GMS, AA 04:447).

La libertad es la clave, por lo tanto, para la comprensión del imperativo categórico en tanto que juicio sintético *a priori*, una libertad que tiene que presuponerse “como propiedad de la voluntad de todos los seres racionales”, pues “no basta que adscribamos libertad a nuestra voluntad, por la razón que sea, si no tenemos una razón suficiente para atribuirla también a todos los seres racionales” (GMS, AA 04:447). La explicación de por qué podemos realizar esta adscripción de la libertad a todo ser racional aparece de forma clara y concisa en las líneas siguientes, no sin dejar de ser problemática por sus implicaciones; Kant nos dirá que aquel ser que se piensa obrando según la idea de libertad es por ello libre, la consciencia de la causalidad propia ya nos hace libres en sentido práctico (GMS, AA 04:448); Kant presenta este sentido de la libertad como una autoactividad pura (GMS, AA 04:452) en tanto que nos pensamos, “por libertad, como causas eficientes *a priori*” (GMS, AA 04:450) y en vinculación a una causa por libertad “que en la idea sirve de fundamento a todas las acciones de seres racionales” (GMS, AA 04:453). A pesar de esta espontaneidad de la razón, no debemos perder de vista que la libertad permanece siempre como idea “cuya realidad objetiva en sí misma es dudosa” (GMS, AA 04:455), y como presupuesto para entender el propio imperativo categórico, pero como una idea que nunca podremos conocer.

La pregunta que formulaba como título de este epígrafe la repito ahora ligeramente modificada, ¿quiénes son esos otros seres racionales en los que además tenemos que presuponer también la libertad? ¿quiénes son los otros seres racionales para los que es válida de forma absolutamente necesaria la misma ley de la moralidad que no podemos conocer ni en la experiencia ni por experiencia?

En primer lugar, nos encontramos con la posibilidad de pensar una voluntad absolutamente buena, que la podemos igualar a la voluntad divina o santa (GMS, AA 04:414). Nos la ha presentado Kant en las mismas líneas que abren la ‘Tercera Sección’:

Una voluntad absolutamente buena es aquella cuya máxima pueden contenerse siempre en sí misma a sí misma considerada como ley universal (GMS, AA 04:447).

En una voluntad absolutamente buena los influjos sensibles encuentran sus canales cerrados para llegar a su determinación, el deber entendido como constrictión no se da sino en forma de un querer, “un querer que vale para todo ser racional bajo la condición de que la razón fuese en él práctica sin obstáculos” (GMS, AA 04:449). Para tal voluntad las acciones son tanto objetiva como subjetivamente necesarias, no hay distinción posible entre la máxima y el principio de la voluntad (GMS, AA 04:412) y para ella el principio de la moralidad no se expresa como deber, es decir como imperativo.

En segundo lugar, habríamos de pensar otros seres racionales que “como nosotros, son afectados además por sensibilidad como resortes de otro tipo, y en los que no siempre



ocurre lo que la razón haría por sí sola” (GMS, AA 04:449), es propiamente en estos seres en los que hablamos de un deber. Estos seres tienen conciencia de su doble vinculación a la razón y a la sensibilidad y es por esa doble conciencia por la que el principio de la moralidad se presenta no como un querer sino como una constricción (GMS, AA 04:413), como un imperativo. Es en este momento donde el deber deja de ser expresado como *Pflicht* y se pone el énfasis en el *sollen*<sup>8</sup> (GMS, AA 04:413). El uso del término constricción, nos hace pensar que existe también un deseo que permanece latente, con una fuerza cohibida por el poder de la obligación de la razón, un deseo de buscar la felicidad propia de los sentidos. Dentro de estos seres racionales además afectados por la sensibilidad podemos encontrar diversas declinaciones de la relación entre los principios sensibles y los racionales de la acción: el espectador imparcial racional (GMS, AA 04:393), el malvado con sangre fría (GMS, AA 04:394), el tipo más ordinario de hombre (GMS, AA 04:396), el peor malvado (GMS, AA 04:454), el comerciante prudente (GMS, AA 04:397), el desdichado de alma fuerte (GMS, AA 04:398), el filántropo con congoja (GMS, AA 04:398), el observador dotado de sangre fría (GMS, AA 04:407), el ser más penetrante y al a vez más poderoso, pero sin embargo finito (GMS, AA 04:418), el que siente fastidio por la vida y se pregunta si puede quitársela (GMS, AA 04:422), otro que tiene la necesidad de tomar dinero sabiendo que no lo puede devolver (GMS, AA 04:422), el que no desarrolla un talento posible (GMS, AA 04:423), al que no le importan los esfuerzos de los demás por conseguir sus objetivos (GMS, AA 04:423). De nuevo, un análisis de todos ellos nos irá haciendo cada vez más precisa, aunque nunca del todo definida, la figura del ser humano que tanto le interesa a Kant.

Lo que tienen de común en tanto que seres racionales tanto la voluntad absolutamente buena, como todos los seres en que encontramos un rasgo de racionalidad es que podrán ser pensados como fines en sí mismos y a la vez como legisladores en un posible reino de los fines según el “enlace sistemático de distintos seres racionales por leyes comunes” (GMS, AA 04:433).

No podemos pasar por alto que en sus reflexiones acerca del derecho Kant introduce también la mención al pueblo de ángeles y al pueblo de demonios, de hecho, aparecen ya mencionados en la obra precrítica *Sueños de un visionario*, aunque exponiendo otra problemática. No me ocuparé del tema de los ángeles y demonios en estas páginas, pero creo conveniente indicar el lugar en que situar esos pueblos. Acerca del pueblo de ángeles podemos decir que representa “a possible world of perfectly virtuous Kantian agents who always do their duty from duty, reliably compelling themselves to act as morality demands” (Baxley 2017, p. 326). Es decir, los ángeles son seres con una voluntad absolutamente buena y esta es precisamente la razón por la que no me detengo en ellos en

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<sup>8</sup> Utilizo en este caso los términos alemanes porque en ellos se aprecia una diferencia entre el deber (*Pflicht*) entendido como cuidado por el otro o respeto, y el deber (*sollen*), que aun teniendo el mismo contenido por lo que a la acción se refiere, pone el énfasis en la constricción de la voluntad. Es muy significativa esta diferencia cuando Kant usa la tan importante expresión ‘*aus Pflicht*’, para indicar el obrar por deber, pero un deber que no es tanto constricción como respeto.

estas páginas que proponen reflexionar principalmente en torno a otros seres que siendo racionales son también sensibles. Por lo que se refiere a los demonios nos podrían plantear una relación más problemática con estos seres racionales y sensibles, pues son demonios humanos, seres “con inclinaciones, motivos y pasiones diversas, y, sobre todo [...] radicalmente libres” (Lazos 2009, p. 120). En aras de la simplificación voy a considerar a estos demonios como “criaturas infinitamente astutas, que jamás siguen otra ley que la de sus fines particulares” (Lazos 2009, p. 126), es decir, seres en los que encontraríamos una sensibilidad dominante que no deja ningún espacio a la racionalidad y que así se escapan también de la presentación que hace Kant de los otros seres racionales que pueden tender a buscar el equilibrio entre la sensibilidad y la racionalidad. De esta forma la moral de Kant sería más una moral para una diversidad de seres racionales y sensibles que una moral para ángeles.

El supuesto de un ser absolutamente bueno nos ayuda con su concepto para entender por qué el imperativo categórico es un juicio sintético *a priori*, es la diferencia entre el querer según el principio de la moralidad y el deber actuar siguiendo este principio lo que explica la unión de los términos en un juicio sintético. El principio de la moralidad sería un juicio analítico para la voluntad absolutamente buena, es la tensión puesta en marcha por la sensibilidad en su unión con la razón la que exige ampliar, es decir hacer sintético, el conocimiento de la voluntad, pero esto, además, de forma universal, es decir *a priori*:

Y así son posibles los imperativos categóricos, porque la idea de la libertad hace de mí un miembro de un mundo inteligible, por lo cual, si yo fuera únicamente eso, todas mis acciones serían siempre conformes a la autonomía de la voluntad, pero, como a la vez me intuyo como miembro del mundo de los sentidos, deben ser conformes a ella; este deber categórico representa una proposición sintética *a priori*, porque sobre mi voluntad afectada por apetitos sensibles se añade aún la idea de precisamente esta misma voluntad, pero perteneciente al mundo del entendimiento, pura, por sí misma práctica (GMS, AA 04:454).

Es la sensibilidad, en tanto que introduce los principios de las inclinaciones y los deseos, lo que hace necesaria la constrictión. El punto de vista del ser cuya voluntad es absolutamente buena es solo una perspectiva, como leemos hacia el final de la *Fundamentación*:

El concepto de un mundo del entendimiento es, así pues, sólo un punto de vista [...] para pensarse a sí misma como práctica (GMS, AA 04:458).

Reforzando esta última cita mi tesis inicial, que las múltiples menciones a seres racionales variados son una forma de mirar hacia el ser humano, preocupación fundamental de la filosofía kantiana.

### 1.3. Los otros seres racionales para entender la dignidad de ser feliz.

Poder pensar simultáneamente los seres racionales con una voluntad absolutamente buena y los seres racionales que a la vez son afectados por la sensibilidad nos lleva a pensar de otra forma la felicidad, que juega un papel muy relevante en la metafísica de las costumbres. Esa relevancia no la adquiere por lo que al contenido de la felicidad se refiere, sino por la forma en que ha de afectar a la voluntad del ser sensible, es decir por la dignidad de ser feliz, lo que traducido “en conformidad con el gusto del público” (GMS, AA 04:388) podríamos enunciar como el merecer o no ser feliz para un ser que se sabe responsable de sus acciones. Poder asumir la perspectiva del ser racional absolutamente bueno es lo que otorga al ser con una voluntad afectada además patológicamente su dignidad para ser feliz. Observarse desde cierto punto de vista, lo que para Kant además será obrar desde esa perspectiva, otorga la dignidad de ser feliz; no porque el ser absolutamente bueno lo sea, nada más lejos de su posibilidad, pues la felicidad es la suma de las inclinaciones que no se encuentran en el ser absolutamente bueno, sino porque entonces, esa poderosa inclinación a la felicidad que tiene todo ser humano (racional pero sobre todo, en este caso sensible) concuerda no sólo con la sensibilidad sino con la razón. Es por ello por lo que Kant nos dice que “asegurar la propia felicidad es un deber” (GMS, AA 04:399, 3), y han de concordar porque tanto la buena voluntad como la felicidad son consideradas como bienes, si bien es cierto que la primera es la fundamentación de la segunda, “el bien sumo y la condición para todo el restante” (GMS, AA 04:396). La posibilidad de asumir esa perspectiva es un rasgo de una buena voluntad “y así la buena voluntad parece constituir la indispensable condición de la dignidad de ser feliz” (GMS, AA 04:393).

Cuando el ser racional y sensible se sitúa en la perspectiva del ser absolutamente bueno concuerda con él en el *principio del querer* (GMS, AA 04:400), un querer que no es afectado por nada más en el caso del ser cuya voluntad es afectada inmediatamente por la razón, pero que se encuentra en una disyuntiva en el ser sensible; el querer del auténtico yo, el responsable de sus acciones, se siente refrenado por el yo sensible y pulsional, por obstáculos subjetivos (GMS, AA 04:397), en el sentido de individuales, que lejos de ocultar el deber “lo hacen resaltar por contraste y aparecer tanto más claramente” (GMS, AA 04:397). Ese principio de la voluntad es la máxima que confiere valor moral a las acciones, por lo que ese valor no es atributo de una mera ley universal, sino de una voluntad que es consciente de ella en su obrar. El valor moral de la acción no descansa así en la ley que la determina sino en la conciencia de la misma, esa conciencia de la ley en el obrar propio que transforma el principio objetivo en máxima es lo que en la *Fundamentación* aparece formulado como obrar *por deber*. El hecho de que tenga sentido diferenciar la ley de la libertad de la ley de la naturaleza, la diferencia específica entre ellas, es que la primera se refiere a una voluntad que es consciente de esa ley en su obrar; es decir, esa ley de la libertad sólo se da, si tiene una voluntad a la que referirse, y en esa relación entre la representación de la ley y la voluntad surge el respeto pues “todo respeto

por una persona es propiamente sólo respeto por la ley de la que esa persona nos da ejemplo” (GMS, AA 04:401, nota).

El recurso al ser absolutamente bueno nos deja comprender que es sencillo tratar de obrar según una buena voluntad, pues no es necesario conocer el curso del mundo, “simplemente” tenemos que excluir los resortes sensibles (GMS, AA 04:404) y preguntarnos si nuestra máxima puede convertirse en ley universal (GMS, AA 04:403). El recurso a los otros seres racionales nos acerca no a una moral para ángeles, sino a la facilidad en el cumplimiento del principio de la moralidad.

## **2. A la búsqueda de los otros seres racionales en la *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*.**

La *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres* trata de cómo determinarían su acción seres racionales y a la vez sensibles. Si nos planteamos dónde podemos encontrar a esos seres hemos de dirigirnos a la *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*. Pero lo más interesante es que en esta obra además de responder a la pregunta por el dónde, se introducirán además relevantes reflexiones en torno a la felicidad del ser humano. No perdamos de vista que no estamos hablando en este caso de las figuras angelicales de voluntad santa (ni por oposición de las demoníacas), sino de seres que a la vez de racionales pueden ser sensibles y que también han de conquistar la dignidad de ser felices.

Lo que pretendo mostrar con el estudio de esta obra es que la hipótesis de los habitantes de los astros nos permite asumir un punto de vista externo a nuestra razón para poder observarla y compararse con ella<sup>9</sup>. La reflexión en torno a otras formas de racionalidad nos va mostrando qué es el ser humano, una pregunta que por lo tanto se hallaría ya en el Kant precrítico.<sup>10</sup>

### **2.1. Presentación de la obra**

En 1755 Kant escribe *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*, son años anteriores a su década del silencio y al despertar del sueño dogmático de la razón, a pesar de ello, en las páginas de esta obra, ya plenamente copernicana en su ámbito, la astronomía, encontramos una similar admiración ante el cielo estrellado colofón de la obra crítica kantiana. Esta admiración es acompañada en múltiples lugares por versos del

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<sup>9</sup> Esta misma propuesta de perspectiva para observar al ser humano la podemos encontrar en *Sueños de un visionario*: « Cuando se habla del cielo como morada de los difuntos, la representación popular lo coloca sobre sí, arriba en la inmensidad del espacio cósmico. Pero no se tiene se cuenta que nuestra tierra, vista desde allí, aparece también como una de las estrellas del cielo, y que los habitantes de otros mundos podrían con el mismo derechos señalarlos y decir : he ahí la morada de las alegrías eternas, la morada celeste presta a recibirnos un día. Y ello porque una extraña fantasí hace que el vuelo de la esperanza sea siempre asociado a la idea de ascensión, olvidando que mientras ás alto se suba, mayor será la caída » (TG, AA 02 :332).

<sup>10</sup> Un interesante estudio de la importancia que le dio Kant al punto de vista del observador lo encontramos en Peter Szendy (2013, capítulo 2). En este capítulo vemos una interesante referencia al respecto sobre el breve escrito *¿Qué significa orientarse en el pensamiento?* (Szendy 2013, p. 63).

*Ensayo sobre el Hombre* de Pope, que otorgan a la lectura un ritmo que aproxima esta cosmología a una física cualitativa.<sup>11</sup> Las palabras de Kant en varios pasajes recuerdan y parecen anunciar las famosas líneas de la *Crítica de la razón práctica* (KpV, AA 05:161), quiero destacar de entre todos los pasajes relevantes para apreciar esa resonancia a la obra posterior el siguiente:<sup>12</sup>

Por su inconmensurable magnitud y por la infinita variedad y belleza que deja traslucir por todas partes, el edificio universal provoca un mudo asombro. Si la concepción de toda esta grandeza cautiva la imaginación<sup>13</sup>, es otra la clase de encantamiento a que se entrega el entendimiento<sup>14</sup> al considerar cómo tanta magnificencia, tanto esplendor transcurre por una sola regla general con un orden eterno y justo. La estructura planetaria en que el sol desde el centro de todos los círculos hace girar por su poderosa atracción los globos habitados de su sistema en círculos eternos, fue formada en su totalidad, como hemos visto, de los originariamente dispersos elementos iniciales de toda materia universal. (NTH, AA 01:306)<sup>15</sup>

En este texto, además del asombro causado por la magnitud de lo observado, se menciona el encantamiento por la unidad del edificio universal. Este encantamiento es un reflejo, no tanto de lo que daría de sí el copernicanismo patente en estas líneas, sino de la inserción de la propuesta de Newton en la organización planetaria, que tuvo una influencia explícita más relevante que Copérnico en la composición de esta obra. A través de una explicación mecanicista Kant nos acerca a la exposición tanto “de las articulaciones de la creación” (NTH, AA 01:221), como de su origen, es decir, nos ofrece tanto una cosmogonía como una cosmología derivadas de las leyes de la mecánica newtoniana. Unas leyes que producen encantamiento por su simplicidad, pues por dos fuerzas, la de repulsión y la de atracción (NTH, AA 01:234) Kant es capaz de explicar el funcionamiento del edificio universal:

La configuración de los círculos, la coincidencia de la dirección, la excentricidad, todo puede reducirse a las causas mecánicas más simples y se puede esperar con confianza descubrirlas, puesto que es posible derivarlas de los axiomas más fáciles y visibles (NTH, AA 01:230).

En el ‘Prefacio’ se anuncian tres hilos conductores de la investigación que se van entrelazando según avanza el libro y que podemos resumir en a) mostrar la sistematicidad

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<sup>11</sup> En torno a la presencia de una física cualitativa o cuantitativa en Kant ver el artículo de Losch (2016) y Moreno Corral (2004), en este último podemos leer: “Aquí es importante hacer notar que la cosmología kantiana en verdad es cualitativa, pues no dio ninguna fórmula ni enunció la ley que permitiera determinar esa fuerza proyectiva que, en términos de sus planteamientos, evidentemente tenía que ser de carácter repulsivo” (Moreno Corral 2004, p. 8).

<sup>12</sup> Son múltiples los pasajes que podríamos señalar que nos recuerdan a la admiración ante el cielo estrellado de la *Crítica de la razón práctica*. De entre ellos me gustaría proponer al lector el pasaje NTH, AA 01:256

<sup>13</sup> ‘Einbildungskraft’ en el original, ‘fantasía’ en la traducción de Lunqdt

<sup>14</sup> ‘Verstand’ en el original ‘razón’ en la traducción de Lunqdt.

<sup>15</sup> Además de poder establecer una relación de este pasaje de *Historia universal de la naturaleza* con la *Crítica de la razón práctica*, podemos encontrar un hilo que le une igualmente a la contemplación de lo sublime como aparece en la *Crítica del Juicio*.

y por lo tanto unidad y homogeneidad de los sistemas universales, b) mostrar la formación de éstos a través de unas mismas leyes mecánicas y, todo ello, inevitablemente penetrado de c) la cuestión religiosa tratada de forma detallada en el ‘Prefacio’ y el capítulo VIII de la parte segunda de la obra.

Mi interés se dirige a la última parte del libro ‘Contiene un ensayo de comparación entre los habitantes de diversos planteas, basado en las analogías de la naturaleza’ y al apéndice ‘Sobre los habitantes de los astros’, interés que queda por tanto un tanto retirado de estos tres hilos conductores, si bien si se ha de relacionar con uno será con el primero, pues lo que sean los otros seres racionales depende de que los consideremos miembros de un mismo sistema, es decir, sujetos a las mismas leyes que los seres racionales terrestres. La diferencia entre esta última parte del libro con las dos primeras partes es su forma de tener por verdadero lo que en ellas se expone, pues, aunque Kant no duda de que haya planetas habitados,<sup>16</sup> lo que se pueda decir de los habitantes de esos planetas está sujeto a la probabilidad (NTH, AA 01: 236), pero a la vez contribuirá a ampliar nuestro conocimiento (NTH, AA 01: 351). Esta última afirmación justo al comienzo de la ‘Tercera Parte’ es prueba de que Kant está convencido de que lo que podamos decir de otras racionalidades será parte de lo que podamos llegar a conocer de la nuestra propia.

## 2.2. ¿Quiénes son los otros seres racionales en la *Historia universal de la naturaleza y Teoría del cielo*?

El amplio ‘Prefacio’ de la *Historia universal de la naturaleza* lo dedica Kant a una cuestión de una gran importancia como es el lugar que se otorga a la divinidad en el orden de la naturaleza, tema que ocupa también buena parte del capítulo octavo de la ‘Segunda parte’. Así como he propuesto una lectura de la *Fundamentación* tensionada entre la sensibilidad y la racionalidad, podemos llevar a cabo ahora también una lectura de esta *Historia universal de la naturaleza* con un interés por establecer el lugar que ocupa la divinidad en la propuesta kantiana, un lugar que ha de asegurar a ésta su función, y a la naturaleza su independencia, lo que crea también una tensión. Kant es consciente del peligro en clave de lectura atea que entraña su propuesta y se adelanta a las acusaciones dejando clara “la coincidencia que encuentro entre mi sistema y la religión” (NTH, AA 01:222), y si bien sabe que su teoría es muy parecida a la de “Lucrecio o sus predecesores, Epicuro, Leucipo y Demócrito” (NTH, AA 01:226), recalca que la diferencia con ellas estriba en su negación del azar como “accidental encuentro” que ayudaba a deducir la razón de la irracionalidad (NTH, AA 01:227) y apuesta por la necesidad de una materia

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<sup>16</sup> En la misma línea se expresa casi diez años más tarde en sus *Observaciones sobre el sentimiento de lo bello y lo sublime*, cuando hablando del gusto en las mujeres afirma: “De la misma forma, no necesitan saber más del universo para que les conmueva la vista del cielo en una hermosa noche, cuando han comprendido en cierta medida que en él hay más mundos y, de la misma forma, aún más bellas criaturas” (2: 231). Esta cita se incluye en el artículo de Losch (2016) citado.

creada y proyectada según designios preestablecidos (NTH, AA 01:227). La materia, por lo tanto, ha sido creada ligada a ciertas leyes universales y necesarias, la presencia de Dios se muestra en esa necesidad adherida a los cuerpos que le permite la no interferencia divina en la naturaleza. Esa independencia de la naturaleza que junto con la simplicidad de sus leyes es capaz de trazar su historia universal es lo que explicita Kant con el famoso lema: “Dadme sólo materia y os construiré con ella un mundo” (NTH, AA 01:229).<sup>17</sup> Precisamente el no intervencionismo de Dios en su creación es una marca de la perfección de la misma y de la omnipotencia de su creador:

¿Qué concepto merecerá una deidad a la cual las leyes generales de la naturaleza sólo obedecen gracias a una especie de obligación forzada, mientras que por sí mismas se oponen a sus más sabios designios? (NTH, AA 01:333)

No quiero pasar por alto que, mientras que esa materia atada a sus leyes mecánicas no podría dar cuenta del origen de la vida, pues “el origen de toda la actual constitución del Universo podrá ser comprendido con mayor facilidad que el nacimiento de una sola hierba, o el de una oruga” (NTH, AA 01:230), las mismas leyes mecánicas, sí podrán dar cierta cuenta del modo de relación de la materia con la racionalidad y de la clase de seres racionales que podremos encontrar en cada punto del universo. La perfección de la racionalidad depende de la materia que la limita y determina el ejercicio de su libertad (NTH, AA 01:330) de tal forma que:

Los seres racionales, cuyo lugar de formación y permanencia se halla más cerca del centro de la creación, están hundidos en una materia espesa e inmóvil que mantiene encerradas sus fuerzas en una inercia insuperable [...]. Con la distancia del centro común crecerá en escala permanente la perfección de este mundo espiritual. (NTH, AA 01:330)

Antes de responder a quiénes son los otros seres racionales presentes en esta *Historia universal de la naturaleza*, creo pertinente plantearnos ¿cómo podemos de llegar a ellos? Ya he comentado que en esta obra menciona Kant más a Newton que a Copérnico, pero no porque fuera menos importante sino porque parece que el giro copernicano ya ha dado sus frutos y los asume como una perspectiva muy personal. Así, en vez de tener a un espectador que mira al cielo, tenemos ya en 1755 un ojo externo que mira a nuestro sistema:

Si este mundo de estrellas fijas en tan inmensa distancia es observado por el ojo de alguien que se halla fuera de él, entonces aquel mundo aparecería bajo un pequeño ángulo como un espacio reducido, iluminado por una luz débil. (NTH, AA 01:253)

La mirada a las estrellas y a la concepción de otros mundos se realiza desde el punto de vista de un ser que cambia su punto de vista. Esta perspectiva le lleva a admirar, no sólo la inmensidad del cielo sino la minúscula magnitud del planeta Tierra:

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<sup>17</sup> Losch (2016, p. 263) explica como Kant se apropia de este lema con el que Voltaire pretendía ridiculizar la propuesta cartesiana.

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Si la magnitud de un mundo planetario dentro del cual la tierra es tan imperceptible como un grano de arena, asombra al entendimiento, cuanta mayor sorpresa ha de provocar la observación de la infinita cantidad de mundos y sistemas que forman la esencia de la Vía Láctea (NTH, AA 01:256).

Pero el pasaje que deja más claro esa admisión de nuestro conocimiento como el de un determinado punto de vista se encuentra en el ‘Apéndice’ donde Kant reproduce la fábula<sup>18</sup> que compara a los seres humanos con piojos que de repente se dan cuenta de que existen otras cabezas y ven esfumarse la razón de su arrogancia (NTH, AA 01:353). Estas líneas nos recuerdan sin duda al comienzo de *Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral*.<sup>19</sup> La puesta en valor de la perspectiva para el conocimiento también se aplica a la concepción del tiempo, llegando a afirmar Kant que la necesidad del mismo depende de la magnitud de lo realizado y la velocidad de la ejecución (NTH, AA 01:361).

La consideración de que nuestro punto de vista es sólo uno de los posibles, junto con el método de la analogía posible por la consideración sistemática de los cuerpos celestes, permiten a Kant explicar las formas de vida racional en otros planetas, una vez que ha explicado la creación y ordenamiento de toda materia posible (aunque no olvidemos que no puede explicar el origen de la vida). En realidad, tanto la forma de ordenarse y dirigirse la materia como la forma de vida racional posible van de la mano en la propuesta de la perfectibilidad que Kant adscribe a la naturaleza creada:

La creación no es la obra de un momento [...]. Pasarán millones y verdaderas montañas de millones de siglos durante los cuales se formarán y llegarán a la perfección nuevos mundos y sistemas universales. (NTH, AA 01:314). Espacios infinitos están en lucha con el caos, para presentar en lo futuro verdaderos conjuntos de mundos y sistemas universales con todo su correspondiente orden y hermosura (NTH, AA 01:315).

Pero, a pesar de esta perfectibilidad, el progreso no es exactamente lineal pues los mundos se destruyen y vuelven a restaurarse desde el caos; tal vez tendríamos más bien que pensar que la destrucción de los mundos posibles no es signo de imperfección sino, al contrario, un estar sujetos a las mismas leyes necesarias de la materia y sus fuerzas, y no muestra más que un ciclo constante de nacimiento y ocaso. El ser humano (y el resto de posibles seres racionales) dejan de ser imprescindibles a pesar de mostrar cierta forma de perfección en su progreso. Así tenemos ya una primera característica de esos seres racionales posibles en diversos astros, y es que se van acercando al “fin de la más alta perfección, es decir, a la divinidad, pero sin poder alcanzarlo jamás” (NTH, AA 01:331).

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<sup>18</sup> Según consta en la edición inglesa de la obra se desconoce la procedencia de esta fábula.

<sup>19</sup> En el artículo de Clark (2001) se encuentran más referencias a esta obra de Nietzsche en relación con estas líneas de Kant. Las líneas de *Sobre verdad y mentira en sentido extramoral* que recuerdan a este texto por su imagen de los insectos que se creen el centro del universo son las siguientes: “Pero si pudiéramos entendernos con un mosquito, llegaríamos a saber, que también él navega por el aire con ese mismo *pathos* y se siente el centro volante de este mundo”.



Las páginas finales de la obra son las que de una forma más clara nos muestran a un Kant precrítico por la fuerza con la que la racionalidad depende de la experiencia sensible:

El ser humano ha sido creado para recibir las impresiones y emociones que el mundo debe provocar en él, mediante aquel cuerpo que es la parte visible de su ser y cuya materia no sólo sirve al espíritu invisible que lo habita para imprimirle las primeras concepciones de las cosas exteriores, sino también es indispensable en la acción interna de repetirlas, de unir las entre sí, en una palabra, de pensar. (NTH, AA 01:355)

Esta es la estructura de nuestra naturaleza que nos obliga a depender de un cuerpo, pero Kant reconoce la superioridad de la parte espiritual que se ve así limitada. ¿Cómo es esta relación del cuerpo con el espíritu en los otros planetas habitados? Según Kant todo depende de la distancia al Sol, de tal forma que los cuerpos van siendo más livianos y la hondura espiritual más perfecta según va aumentando la distancia al astro. El ser humano ocupa una posición intermedia (NTH, AA 01:359) y, rebajando en este punto el nivel de verosimilitud, puede que el resto de seres racionales no puedan hacerse responsables de sus actos y por lo tanto no se les pueda adscribir el pecado<sup>20</sup>. Una segunda característica por lo tanto de estos seres es la diferencia que en ellos se halla la capacidad de asumir sus propios actos, sólo en la Tierra y tal vez en Marte encontramos seres responsables al habitar en “un punto intermedio entre la debilidad y la aptitud de resistencia” (NTH, AA 01:366). Por ello podríamos decir que, si bien estamos ante una concepción heliocéntrica según el copernicanismo, es decir, desde el punto de vista geográfico, no se ha abandonado aún el antropocentrismo que considera al ser humano como el más perfecto de los seres morales. Losch introduce el concepto de principio de la mediocridad (atendiendo a la definición de mediocre como propio del punto medio) como una característica geográfica de la visión kantiana del universo, pero este principio no se encontraría en la relación moral del ser humano con el resto de seres racionales donde encontramos, en 1755, cierto antropocentrismo (Losch 2016, p. 265).

Es en la ‘Conclusión’ de la obra donde Kant nos muestra su intención al reflexionar sobre estos temas. Podemos pensar en todo lo que ha habido, hay y habrá en el universo, pero ante el espectáculo del cielo estrellado reconoce el ser humano que tiene un camino abierto para la felicidad y una altura “superiores a los privilegios que la más ventajosa creación de la naturaleza puede conquistar en todos los cuerpos siderales” (NTH, AA 01:368). En el Kant precrítico el ser humano es el ser racional que además puede ser feliz y esto le otorga un privilegio sobre el resto de seres racionales.

### **3. Reflexiones finales en torno a la *Antropología en sentido pragmático*.**

El hecho de que en la *Antropología* Kant nos vuelva a decir: “Bien podría ser que en algún otro planeta existieran seres racionales” (Anth, AA 07:332), al igual que habíamos encontrado en 1755, me lleva a pensar que cuando Kant admiraba el cielo estrellado y la

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<sup>20</sup> Este supuesto no está libre de consecuencias teológicas pues el pecado parece depender únicamente de la constitución sensible de ese ser racional.

ley moral en él (KpV, AA 05:161), también tenía en su horizonte la presencia de la ley de la moralidad en otras racionalidades posibles. De esta forma, dando la vuelta a las palabras de Kant, la ley moral la conocía en primer lugar necesariamente en él, pero la reconocía a la vez en el mismo cielo estrellado, por eso podían estar conectadas en la conciencia de su existencia (KpV, AA 05:162).

Kant cierra la *Antropología* tratando el carácter de la especie, y para ello plantea la dificultad que supone no poder comparar, de hecho, al ser humano con otros seres racionales (Anth, AA 07: 321). La presencia de esos otros seres racionales en esta obra concluye el desarrollo de esa parte empírica de la doctrina de las costumbres que encontramos en el ‘Prefacio’ de la *Fundamentación*, y me parece suficiente para admitir que, con independencia de la forma de tener por verdad su existencia, es decir, con independencia de que existan o no, podemos conocer al ser humano en perspectiva con un propósito eminentemente práctico. La pregunta ‘¿qué es el ser humano?’ recibe una resolución negativa en estas páginas de la *Antropología*:

Parece, pues, que el problema de indicar el carácter del género humano es absolutamente insoluble, porque tendría que resolverse comparando dos especies de seres racionales por medio de la experiencia: comparación que esta no nos ofrece (Anth, AA 07:321).

Así, si en la primera *Crítica* la metafísica se descubre como ciencia imposible desde el punto de vista del uso teórico de la razón y sólo posible desde el uso práctico, la pregunta por el ser humano podría tener, por analogía, una resolución desde el uso práctico de la razón. Esta resolución práctica parece tener dos partes, por un lado, dado que no puede ser comparado con otra especie, el ser humano ha de volverse a sí mismo y así “tiene un carácter que él mismo se crea, al ser capaz de perfeccionarse de acuerdo con los fines que él mismo se señala [...], puede hacer de sí un animal racional” (Anth, AA 07:322). Por otro lado, la comparación con una hipotética especie racional que pueda ser pensada puede servir como punto de referencia para entender el progreso de la especie en la historia desde el punto de vista de la moral.<sup>21</sup> El esfuerzo por pensar otros seres racionales es el esfuerzo de pensar lo que puede dar de sí la razón de un ser que a la vez es sensible.

De hecho, este esfuerzo de pensar un ser que la experiencia no nos muestra tiene ventajas sobre la propia experiencia posible de esos seres, ventajas que podemos reconocer a partir del ‘Prólogo’ de la *Antropología*. Al pensar en esos otros hipotéticos seres racionales, es decir, pensar cuanto da de sí la racionalidad vinculada a la sensibilidad, no nos las tenemos que ver con el disimulo de la persona que se sabe observada ni con los hábitos que actúan como segunda naturaleza, y que, por lo tanto, son difíciles de separar del carácter propio de la especie (Anth, AA 07:121).

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<sup>21</sup> Para comparar la perspectiva de este desarrollo con el del progreso que podemos encontrar en el Kant crítico ver el artículo de Kleingeld (2008).

Este ‘Prólogo’ de la *Antropología* concluye además poniendo en valor la invención de personajes como en la literatura, que además de la experiencia pueden mostrarnos la naturaleza humana, la explicación en boca de Kant nos anima a no abandonar las perspectivas de los otros personajes racionales posibles, pues:

Han de estar tomados en sus *rasgos fundamentales* de la observación del obrar y omitir reales de los hombres; porque si bien tienen que ser exagerados en cuanto al grado, en cuanto a la cualidad deben ser concordantes con la naturaleza humana (Anth, AA 07:121).

Es la posibilidad de comparar al ser humano con cierta forma de racionalidad de la que no tenemos experiencia lo que nos posibilita para pensar en la predisposición pragmática de civilizarse por medio de una cultura (Anth, AA 07:323) que no deja ver su término (Anth, AA 07:324). Pero no olvidemos que lo importante es el ejercicio de la comparación, y por extraño que resulte, lo menos significativo es la existencia de los términos comparados. Kant nos decía en la *Fundamentación* que no podremos nunca tener la certeza de que una acción humana haya sido absolutamente determinada por el principio de la moralidad y, por lo tanto, puede que nunca se haya dado una acción semejante, sin embargo, esto no resta en absoluto nada al valor del principio de la determinación de la voluntad; aplicando esta misma lógica podemos decir que nunca podremos conocer de forma absolutamente cierta la existencia de otros seres racionales, pero lo relevante son los principios de la comparación de la racionalidad que con esos seres podemos trazar. La perspectiva de la racionalidad en otros seres permite a Kant formular que mientras que en los demás animales sabemos cuáles son sus fines propios, su destino, en el ser humano tenemos que pensar en “las innumerables generaciones que pueden elevarse hasta la consecución de su destino” (Anth, AA 07:324). De la misma forma, la predisposición moral necesita que su carácter sensible pueda ser superado en su continua propensión a apetecer lo ilícito (Anth, AA 07:324) por su carácter inteligible para poder ser considerado *bueno*. Este parangón con otras posibles racionalidades posibilita pensar al ser humano con la independencia de la experiencia que de él tenemos: la experiencia del conflicto continuo, de la fragmentación de las ciencias (Anth, AA 07:326), de la felicidad irresuelta (Anth, AA 07:326), de una constitución civil en la que es “más poderosa la *animalidad* que la pura *humanidad*” (Anth, AA 07:327). Las otras racionalidades nos permiten pensar la educación del género humano como conjunto y no como colección (Anth, AA 07:328). Pensar en la racionalidad de otros posibles seres, es decir, pensar la racionalidad en perspectiva, abre la puerta a que la razón pura, pensada desde su impureza, nos hable del progreso de la historia.

El punto de vista el espectador exterior que observa al ser humano nos muestra el disimulo como una de las características más pertinentes para nuestra descripción:

Es inherente ya, pues, a la composición originaria de una criatura humana y a su concepto de especie el indagar los pensamientos ajenos, pero el contener los suyos (Anth, AA 07:332).

Sabemos que esto no es una respuesta desde el punto de vista teórica a la pregunta por el ser humano, es más bien una respuesta pragmática que nos indica la pertinencia de un principio de precaución en el trato con tales seres.

#### 4. Conclusiones

La presencia de los otros seres racionales en la obra kantiana es una perspectiva constante. Pensar en otras formas de racionalidad en cuyas voluntades se da también una influencia sensible nos ha servido para tratar las siguientes cuestiones:

- Pensar una voluntad absolutamente buena en comparación con las posibles voluntades afectadas por la sensibilidad es la forma en que Kant nos explica por qué el imperativo categórico es un juicio sintético *a priori* y nos muestra los términos del mismo.
- La posibilidad de pensar en otros seres racionales y sensibles que pueden habitar en otros planetas y que no sean ni ángeles (con una voluntad absolutamente buena o santa) ni demonios (donde la racionalidad se encuentra prácticamente negada, aunque no del todo), nos permite pensar la dignidad de ser feliz o simplemente la felicidad en el caso de los escritos precríticos.
- Pensar la racionalidad existente en perspectiva a través de otra posible nos permite pensar un progreso necesario, una perfectibilidad de la racionalidad, así como entender las condiciones del obrar de esta.

El amplio texto de David L. Clark (2001), explica de forma exquisita el sentido de esta comparación entre seres racionales que he tratado de describir:

Necessary yet extraneous, missing yet accounted for, the aliens evoke other human or quasi-human alterities that are not elsewhere, on a distant world, but here, on Earth—and that threaten to make of here and elsewhere (Clark 2001, p. 204).

No hay un encuentro posible *con* los otros seres racionales,<sup>22</sup> pero sí encuentra Kant *en* ellos el mejor referente para entender la racionalidad humana, en tanto que pueda pensarse como relativa a otras racionalidades.

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<sup>22</sup> Sobre la imposibilidad de este encuentro: “Admitir habitantes racionales en otros planetas es una cosa de la opinión, pues si pudiéramos acercarnos a ellos, lo cual es en sí posible, decidiríamos, por experiencia, si hay o no tales habitantes, pero nunca llegaremos a suficiente distancia, y así queda esto opinable” (KU, AA 05:467) Pasaje citado en Losch (2016).

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## Why Carl Schmitt (and others) got Kant wrong

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### Abstract

This essay traces the influence of Carl Schmitt on an *interpretative tendency* found in a number of contemporary readings of Kant's political philosophy. This influence can be traced back to two basic commitments: the idea that Kant's philosophy (i) seeks to defend a pacifist and humanitarian ideal of history and progress, and (ii) that political conflict must, for this reason, be somehow pacified or eradicated. I argue that these '*anti-conflict*' readings of Kant go astray in ignoring the systemic role conflict plays in Kant's understanding of agency and freedom on the one hand, and in overlooking that this conflict is not empirical but normative, and thereby, unavoidable. In light of this '*agential conflict*', Schmitt's critique to Kant begins to lose all its force.

### Key words

Kant, Schmitt, conflict, humanity, pacifism, agency.

This essay is born out of a perplexity, namely that of recognising how a number of contemporary interpretations of Kant lend themselves to be a clear target to Carl Schmitt's critique of liberalism. This is worrisome for two reasons: if we take Schmitt's critique seriously, specifically his accusation against liberalism's appeal to the idea of 'humanity'<sup>1</sup>

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as a means wage war and to depoliticise political life, this argument seems to be too often rooted back to Kant. Second and relatedly, if it turns out that Kant is indeed a case in view of Schmitt's critique, by holding a humanitarian/universalist philosophy stripped from a concern for conflict and politics, was Schmitt then right to target his philosophy as naïve and depoliticised?

In what follows I show that Kant does not need to be defended from Schmitt's critique, because he holds a distinctive theory of conflict as developed in his account of agency and external freedom. This bears significant implications if one is inclined to read Kant's political philosophy as aiming at a 'conflict-free' world. I have identified this interpretative tendency in contemporary appropriations of Kant coming from the field of political science and international relations, and in more strictly Kantian interpretations of his thought. What these approaches share is a common pacifist approach to Kant, dismissing the role conflict plays as an unavoidable and inherent fact of our constitution as free agents. My aim in this essay is to explain why Schmitt and 'anti-conflict' readings of Kant have got Kant wrong *on the specific issue of conflict*. I do this by showing how the philosophical presuppositions underlying his theory of agency under a juridical state, and the normative role conflict plays in our external and mutually-affecting political and social relations, frees us from (i) defending Kant against Schmitt's 'anti-conflict' objection, and from (ii) accepting a de-politicised and sanitised version of Kant's political philosophy. The combination of these two interpretative claims brings a third, salutary benefit: (iii) recognising that conflict, albeit not of an empirical-kind, is ever-present and a necessary condition of the possibility of a shared juridical existence. This claim invites us to rethink the status of Kant's teleological arguments about peace, and the possibility of establishing such a condition in a world where conflict cannot be ever fully eradicated.

My purpose is, therefore, to offer an argument that gives conflict its due systematic place within Kant's theory of the agency in politics. So, in 'getting Kant straight' on the issue of conflict, we also get straight why the naïve idealism sometimes attributed to him<sup>2</sup>, and the objection of his endorsement of an abstract humanitarian morality with covert political aims, are ill-founded. If conflict is, as I argue, a basic fact of our constitution as free agents with a *will*, who stand in unavoidable practical relations with other agents, then 'the end of politics' is nowhere in sight. What follows from this reading is a distinct approach to Kantian politics that is not vulnerable to Schmitt's caricature of a 'conflict-free' and moralizing liberalism, and a reading that precludes reducing Kant's thought to the calculations of the empirical benefits of liberal democracy, peace, and of a cosmopolitan world-order. Three basic ideas furnish my argument: (i) politics should be understood as a

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<sup>1</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 54ff.

<sup>2</sup> Kant, alongside Rousseau and Saint-Pierre, was referred to as "naive" by some of his critics, for defending the possibility of moral progress and a perpetual peace, despite our anthropological limitations. In 1796, the French mathematician Sylvestre Chauvelot writes to Kant: "The Abbé of Saint-Pierre and you, Sir, have travelled through the country of chimeras, in thinking, based on purely good will, or by not having sufficiently looked into the depths of the human heart, that peace could reign universally on earth, only after all nations have appropriately disarmed". Reference in Aramayo 1996, p. 106.

system enabling us to influence and affect one another through the free exercise of agency; (ii) a juridical condition is therefore tasked with the job of establishing the rightful limits of such interaction, instead of remedying the conflicts that arise from material scarcity or from our passions and interests; finally, (iii) this condition of freedom of agency under law takes conflict as *constitutive*, and legislates accordingly.

The dialectic of the argument is as follows: In Section I, I offer a summary reconstruction of Schmitt's critique, by focusing on two aspects –neutrality and the hypocrisy of liberal humanism. In Section II, I appeal to a series of contentious issues –liberal democratic peace, humanitarian intervention, and a cosmopolitan world-state– to show how appropriating Kant's thought on these specific issues commits him to a kind of pacified liberalism geared towards the elimination of conflict of the type Schmitt objected to. In Section III, I present my positive account of the role of conflict in Kant, in order to defend the centrality of this idea in the context of his theory of agency and freedom. Finally, I contrast my reading in Section IV with a number of 'anti-conflict' interpretations of Kant to see how this interpretative tendency gets rehabilitated in the literature. I conclude that little sense can be made of a conflict-free world in Kant, at least once we accept the relational nature of our interactions as human beings.

### **I. Schmitt's critique to liberal pacifism**

Recall our initial perplexity: if we take Schmitt's critique to liberalism seriously, we begin to see how, underlying a commitment to a liberal democratic peace, grounded in the universal value of a shared humanity, lies a corresponding commitment to the eradication of conflict in human relations. What interests me of this critique, and the reason why I appeal to it in the context of a discussion about Kant, is the fact that a number of arguments in favour of (i) a democratic liberal peace, (ii) a justification for humanitarian intervention, and (iii) a defence of a cosmopolitan order, appeal back to Kant as a philosophical ground for their approaches. More importantly as I will argue in what follows, these interpretations seem to make the further commitment identified by Schmitt to the ideal of a world free of conflict. It is on this specific issue of the connection between an alleged Kantian liberal peace on the one hand, and an ideal of a world order free from conflict and antagonism on the other hand, where I think lies the need to revisit Kant in light of Schmitt's critique. His critique is vast and multi-layered, but for the purposes of my argument I want to focus on three specific aspects, namely, liberalism's commitment to neutrality, its appeal to an abstract concept of 'humanity' to justify war, and the Kantian-type universalism underlying a quest for total pacification. Looking at these aspects more closely will allow us to see how, knowingly or not, some of Schmitt's critical diagnosis of liberalism, and in particular of its *political deficits*, can be targeted against contemporary interpretations of Kant on the issue of peace, war, and of a cosmopolitan world-order.



According to Schmitt, a liberal democratic peace requires if not the elimination of conflict altogether, at least its progressive pacification. What this kind of liberal approach to peace ignores is the realization that “the ever-present possibility of conflict must always be kept in mind”,<sup>3</sup> if we are to keep the central distinction animating all political life: the distinction between friend and enemy. The political deficits of liberalism lie therefore in its tendency to seek neutrality in the place of antagonism: “if the different states, religions, classes, and other human groupings on earth should be so unified that a conflict among them is impossible” Schmitt predicts, “then the distinction of friend and enemy would also cease.”<sup>4</sup> To be sure, one can resist the connection Schmitt tries to draw between a set of liberal values such as unity, neutrality, and consensus, and the *inevitability* leading to a world where “the possibility of conflict is eliminated, [of] a completely pacified planet”.<sup>5</sup> One would be right to resist it partly because the analysis depends on a contentious commitment to the idea of politics as an inherently conflictual sphere, anchored in the friend and enemy distinction. This *sui generis* definition of politics as the relationship between friend and enemy is part of the explanation of why Schmitt links the anti-political nature of liberalism –in its dismissal of antagonism–, with a commitment to pacifism. As I will show in the following sections, a similar link between pacifism and an anti-conflict stance is rooted back to Kant’s philosophy, thereby overlooking the centrality of conflict in his political philosophy.

But before presenting my own positive account, it is worth dwelling deeper into Schmitt’s diagnosis of liberalism’s faults, to see how it gets rehabilitated in a number of Kantian interpretations. For Schmitt, the friend and enemy distinction started to crumble in the light of the rapid technological advances of the twentieth century (however this pretence of “un-political purity” was already in the making in the eighteenth-century)<sup>6</sup>. Technology’s “promise of neutrality” was meant to bring about the progressive erosion of antagonism to give place to a world where “everything should go smoothly and free from unnecessary frictions”.<sup>7</sup> Lying behind this illusion of “fluidity”, distinctive of a consumerist capitalism, lay for Schmitt a subterranean longing for pacification and neutralization of political life altogether.<sup>8</sup> As I mentioned, his polemic against liberalism’s anti-political stance and its relation to a capitalist way of life was also grounded in a deeper critique to the rationalism of the eighteenth-century, in its universalist and humanitarian variants. He traces a connection between the desire of a universal kind of morality shared among all humans on

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<sup>3</sup> Schmitt, 2007, p. 32.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 53.

<sup>5</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 35.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* 2007, n. 2, p. 21.

<sup>7</sup> Schmitt 1916, pp. 63. The ideal of a kind of ‘smooth neutrality’ in matters of domestic and international politics is contested by Mouffe when analyzing the decay of traditional party systems in the West, and the rise of populist alternatives. Taking her lead from Schmitt, she explains how the idea of “impartiality” as a version of political neutrality “is precisely where the problem lies. There are no impartial solutions in politics, and it is this illusion that we now live in societies where political antagonisms have been eradicated that makes it impossible for political passions to be channeled through traditional democratic parties.” (Mouffe, 2005, p. 55)

<sup>8</sup> Cf. Schmitt 1916, pp. 63-68.

the one hand, and the elimination of conflict and differences to form a unitary, global community on the other. This “eighteenth-century humanitarian concept of morality”, and note the tacit reference to Kant here, is “universal, i.e. all embracing, a social ideal, a system of relations between individuals” that materializes itself “only when the real possibility of war is precluded and every friend and enemy grouping becomes impossible”.<sup>9</sup>

We can begin to see how a version of Kant as a representative of this way of thinking comes to the fore. Put more systematically, this Kantian universalism is problematic for Schmitt in two ways: one, it *abstracts* from the specific circumstances of the individuals that constitute the political body, thereby disembodimenting the existential reality of the friend and enemy distinction, and the importance of the “concrete situation”<sup>10</sup>. By legislating positive law from the ideal of an abstract universalism, laws are not *for someone* but become a mere vehicle of a form of humanity with no concrete agency. Second, this Kantian universalism is problematic in that the notion of ‘humanity’ with which it operates is not only abstract but *disinterested*: it precludes the possibility of identifying ‘someone’ or ‘something’ against which we can define our interests and be committed to risk our lives in defending them. According to Schmitt, we can only know *who we are* by knowing *who is the other*, and this dynamic is of course inherently conflictual. When we cease to identify another as our enemy –as this humanitarian philosophy allegedly does–, ‘humanity’ becomes “an ideological instrument particularly useful for an imperialistic expansion and, in its ethical-humanitarian form, it becomes also a vehicle for economic imperialism”.<sup>11</sup> From this it would follow that a Kantian liberal peace, directed at negating the enemy of its existential role in shaping political dynamics, is a kind of peace that actually intensify and perpetuates conflict rather than eliminate it, by camouflaging economic interests under the guise of moral values.

At the bottom of this critique lies Schmitt accusation of liberalism’s *hypocritical* stance towards its own aims: it presents itself as wanting to end all wars, but only to covert its interest in perpetuating its power and domination –particularly abroad. As we will see, this point will become particularly relevant to our discussion on humanitarian interventions, and the ‘Kantian-type’ justifications in the name of a shared, valued humanity. This appeal to war as a means to end all wars is commonly voiced in political discourse. For example in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Obama captured the idea in a nutshell: “America will always be a voice for those aspirations that are universal...I believe that force can be

<sup>9</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 55.

<sup>10</sup> Schmitt 1992, p. 41.

<sup>11</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 54. According to Seyla Benhabib, Schmitt’s critique to a humanitarian liberalism marks him as someone different than simply a theorist of agonistic or contentious politics. He is more properly understood as a “theorist of the rights of states to conduct war for their own preservation and also [as a] theorist who rejects concepts such as human rights and crimes against humanity as being moralizing glosses on superpower politics.” Benhabib, 2012, p. 690.

justified on humanitarian grounds”.<sup>12</sup> This is the logic Schmitt is trying to disclose, and one he thinks is deeply rooted in the humanitarian/universalist philosophy of Kant’s century. So, a war *in the name of humanity* to guarantee a liberal peace free of all potential enemies, misses two important facts for Schmitt: that in order to wage a war you need a *concrete* enemy, and that the pacification of all forms of conflict would not mean the end of all war, but the end of politics altogether:

Humanity as such cannot wage war because it has no enemy, at least not on this planet...When a state fights its political enemy in the name of humanity, it is not a war for the sake of humanity, but a war wherein a particular state seeks to usurp a universal concept against its military opponent. At the expense of its opponent, it tries to identify itself with humanity in the same way as one can misuse peace, justice, progress, and civilization in order to claim these as one’s own and to deny the same to the enemy.<sup>13</sup>

What follows from the ideological tool of a ‘war in the name of humanity’ is the establishment of a homogeneous liberal world order, closely linked to the cosmopolitan ideal prominently defended in Kant’s time. What is implied by a cosmopolitan world order is the ultimate erasing of the friend and enemy distinction, and the subsequent elimination of the role of conflict from politics since, “for many people the idea of a global organization means nothing else than the utopian idea of total depoliticalization”.<sup>14</sup> However, it is not my purpose to evaluate the coherency of Schmitt’s polemic treatment of liberalism’s ‘true’ but ‘covered’ intentions, but rather to show that the way he portrays the value of liberal peace, of a humanitarian war and cosmopolitanism, seems to find home in contemporary interpretations of Kant.

## II. ‘The end of all wars’<sup>15</sup>: a contemporary appeal to Kant

One appealing feature of Kant’s political philosophy can be found in the available philosophical and particularly moral arguments for those interested in grounding theories relating to democratic peace, humanitarian intervention, and cosmopolitanism. I focus on

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<sup>12</sup> Obama 2009 ‘Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize’, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize> (Visited on 20/07/2020).

<sup>13</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 54

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 2007, p. 55.

<sup>15</sup> The English author H.G. Wells famously referred to the Great War as “the war that will end wars”. War was a “moral conflict”, a conflict that must put an end to all conflict once and for all: “We have now to either to destroy or to be destroyed...We have to go on until we are absolutely done for.” The phrase has been sometimes incorrectly attributed to President Wilson, in the latter’s attempt to convince Americans and the world at large, that the war would make the world safe for democracy and free from new conflicts. Cf. Wells 1914, p. 8; Knock 2019.

these issues partly due to a surprise in recognizing how common it is to find explicit appropriations of Kant's thought on these matters in political science and international relations studies.<sup>16</sup> What they seem to find in Kant is a useful philosophical source to justify the role a liberal democratic peace plays in fostering peaceful relations between states, and in contributing to promote "conflict inhibition" and "growing war-weariness" among peoples and states.<sup>17</sup> What strikes me about these approaches is precisely the connection they make between liberal democracy, and the potentially measurable benefits of its potential to reduce conflict-driven relations at the international sphere. This connection between democracy, peace, and "conflict inhibition" is sometimes explained as the result of fruitful forms of free commercial exchanges among nations, thus delivering a framework for peace-driven international relations.<sup>18</sup> This idea of peace understood in terms of the progressive pacification of conflict through robust commercial exchange, can also be found in a more radical version according to which, a cosmopolitan world-order would ultimately demand the end of the principle of state sovereignty, to give place to a form of intra-people relations free from conflict and antagonisms.<sup>19</sup>

There is, to be sure, a legitimate place in Kant's thought to find an argument in favor of a condition peace, and to establish as a matter of "direct duty" a "league of a special kind" that does not seek to end only one war, but "to end all war forever."<sup>20</sup> However I want to problematize two things in the face of this Kantian duty to peace: on the one hand, I want to show how some contemporary interpretations of Kant draw a connection between the value of a liberal democratic peace, and of the peaceful potential of humanitarian interventions, with the claim that these conditions entail a commitment to the progressive eradication and pacification of conflict. This leads me to my second point of contention, namely, that such a link between liberal democracy, peace, and humanitarian intervention and *conflict* is not a claim we can attribute to Kant. As I will defend in the next section, conflict is ever-present in the fact that we are free agents who stand in practical relations to other free agents. This equality of agency I argue, precludes the elimination of conflict at least in the way that some interpretations seem to attribute it to Kant. What I want to question, therefore, is the claim that the progressive pacification of conflict (at least as an ideal), is entailed by the conciliatory benefits of liberal democracy *as an interpretation of*

<sup>16</sup> For an explicit appeal to Kant from qualitative political science and international relations studies can be found in Cederman 2001; Oneal J and Russett B 1999; and Doyle, 1983a, 1983b.

<sup>17</sup> Reference to Mueller (1989) in Cederman 2001, p. 24.

<sup>18</sup> I agree with Luigi Caranti that the interest of rooting the principles of democracy theory back to Kant is more clearly a strategy within the discipline of political science, rather than an interpretation widely endorsed within political theory and strictly Kantian studies. Accordingly, the bulk of democratic theory offers a "narrow" interpretation of Kant's cosmopolitanism, particularly in their appropriation of the arguments of *Perpetual Peace*. Caranti 2018.

<sup>19</sup> I do not think anyone holds this extreme version. However, it is relevant for our discussion to the extent that it captures some of the caricaturesque elements that Schmitt wrongly attributes to any position in matters of international politics that judges itself to be following Kant or a Kantian-like cosmopolitanism, Thomas Pogge might be the clearest defender of a cosmopolitanism order based on Kantian arguments. Cf. Pogge 1992.

<sup>20</sup> ZeF AA 08:356

*Kant*. This I hope will become clearer as we advance in the argument.

However, it is common to see the attribution of these interrelated claims in some degree to Kant. As Howard Williams notes, “the end of the Cold War brought with it an enthusiasm for democratic ideals and their supposedly pacifying effects, which openly and directly connected itself with Kant’s political thinking – particularly his tract on *Perpetual Peace*.” Attention focused on the “republican mode of government” and in “the federation of free states that Kant hoped would develop from the growth of republican states”, resulting if necessary from required humanitarian interventions.<sup>21</sup> In political science, efforts have been made to quantify this ideal connection between democratic processes and peace, by calculating the progressive presence of conflict at the domestic and international level. Most camps of the democratic peace hypothesis agree that “Immanuel Kant laid the intellectual foundation of the hypothesis in the late eighteenth century. Whether aiming at corroboration or refutation, most contemporary scholars appear to believe that they are operationalizing and testing some version of the Kantian thesis.”<sup>22</sup> Michael W. Doyle for example has tried to rework Kant’s thesis from an empirical perspective, approaching peace as a “long run ‘inevitable’”, predicting it as a global condition “by the year 2113”.<sup>23</sup> These attempts to meet scientific standards are laudable, but should not blind us to the fact that such an appropriation of Kant’s moral and political vocabulary when defending a theory of democratic peace, should not commit him to a further claim about an inevitable – and somehow empirically testable – elimination of conflict. It seems to me that these approaches become targets of Schmitt’s objections to a naive and unpoliticized liberalism.

To be sure, a different question arises as to whether the benefits of a democratic peace among free nations might require a humanitarian intervention to expand these ideals around the globe. As we noted in the previous section, for Schmitt this is precisely the kind of hypocrisy underlying all forms of liberalism, in their attempt to cover national and imperialistic interests under the guise of an expansionist war in the name of Kantian-like values. On the thesis for a humanitarian intervention as a means to peace, Kant is sometimes read as endorsing an argument in favour of such an intervention, as a means to achieve morally just political ends.<sup>24</sup> A different issue is exactly how these interpretations address Kant’s critical attitude against interventionist war in the international arena.<sup>25</sup> However, my purpose is to show how these set of claims about democracy and peace, lead also to an appeal to Kant to further ground the humanitarian character of such interventionist enterprises.

This renewed celebration of the republican ideal and its peace-inducing benefits has been sometimes appropriated in the context of a discussion on just war. For contemporary

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<sup>21</sup> Williams 2012, p. 2.

<sup>22</sup> Cederman 2001, p. 15.

<sup>23</sup> Doyle in Cavallar 2001, p. 247.

<sup>24</sup> Scruton 2004, ‘Kant and the Iraq War’ [https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article\\_1749jsp/](https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/article_1749jsp/) (Visited in 20/07/2020); Tesón 2005.

<sup>25</sup> Cf. Zef AA 08: 346-7, specifically Preliminary Article 5 im *Perpetual Peace*.

interpreters like Fernando Tesón, Kant is an ideal source for offering theoretical justifications in the international sphere with a humanitarian outlook. For Tesón “the Kantian thesis includes a theory of just war; it is the war waged in defence of human rights”.<sup>26</sup> Human rights become a central Kantian feature for the justification of war, to the extent that it is *in their name* that such a war becomes justified. Tesón’s “hyper-interventionism”<sup>27</sup> rests therefore in the duty of democratic governments to “defend and promote human rights and global democracy”, on the basis of the “universal” character of such rights (think back to Obama’s Nobel Prize speech here).<sup>28</sup> It is tempting to read this form of justified interventionism in the name of the abstract ideal of ‘human rights’, as echoing the ‘humanitarian wars’ that Schmitt was so keen in disclosing. Unfortunately, Tesón’s direct appeal to Kant seems to revitalise Schmitt’s critique, rather than respond to it.

Let me highlight a couple of things at this point: First, it is not the aim of this article to adjudicate on Kant’s position as a representative of the theory of humanitarian intervention, particularly in the context of his prohibition against interventionists wars in *Perpetual Peace*. However, I have appealed to a specific version of this theory, namely the justification of humanitarian intervention on the basis of human rights because such a ‘humanitarian’ approach to war, and its alleged connection to Kant’s philosophy, puts pressure on whether Schmitt’s accusation to a humanitarian liberalism is, after all, so off the mark. The task is even more pressing when we are able to find in interpretations such as Tesón’s and that of other democratic peace theories, a direct attribution to Kant of a theory of humanitarian war based on ethical premises that would minimise the presence of conflict. Second, we can assume that the task of defending human rights across the globe comes with the need of establishing, protecting, and preserving a democratic kind of peace, that will in turn enable people to exercise such rights. Would this kind of peace allow for a friend and foe distinction of politics? I doubt it. So, if the enterprise of a humanitarian intervention as a means to peace and human rights is broadly *Kantian* in outlook, the resulting system of politics will be one stripped from the pressure of conflict, henceforth the link I have been trying to explore between peace, war-like intervention, and conflict resolution.

I think this “world without politics”<sup>29</sup> is not Kant’s own. Once we assume the *normative role* conflict plays in Kant’s theory of political agency, we are in a better position to see how his theory of peace, and the appropriations Kantians make of it, must be revisited and further qualified. A step towards this qualification can be made by recalling an important distinction in Kant between the empirical and the ideal levels operative in his theory, and the arguments pertaining to the realms of law and morality respectively. One way of

<sup>26</sup> Tesón 2005, p. 57.

<sup>27</sup> Williams 2012, p. 119.

<sup>28</sup> Tesón 2005, p. 56.

<sup>29</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 35.

explaining the status of Kant's pacifist ideals is done by attributing to him a kind of normative optimism, grounded in a version of natural law. This seems to be Richard Tuck's approach who reads Kant as a representative of liberalism's natural law tradition. For Tuck "Kant was notably more optimistic than Rousseau about the propensity of republics to live in peace with one another",<sup>30</sup> an optimism which, from the perspective of political realism, would amount to a kind of "juridical pacifism".<sup>31</sup> I disagree in reading the status of Kant's claims on peace and the pacification of conflict as a vestige of natural law. On this point I share Macarena Marey's approach according to which what this 'realist' objection against an alleged Kantian optimism ignores is the fundamental difference in Kant's philosophical registers between the empirical and the normative. More specifically, what is missed is the complex relationship in Kant between:

The notion of a republic, of the right of non-intervention, the cosmopolitan character of a federation of states, and [his] rejection to use empirical theses about the actual workings of the world, and the existing constitutions within it, with the aim of justifying normative ideals.<sup>32</sup>

What this qualification helps to resist is a too common tendency to sit Kant in two opposite ends, none of which fully capture the distinctiveness of his thought: either to sit him with a "blank realism (or positivism)", or with a "rationalist natural law, to which Tuck associates, in a rather paradoxical way, the whole liberal humanist tradition". In other words, if Kant cannot be defended as a representative of a political realism *tout court*, it seems that the only available alternative is to attribute to him a "series of robust natural laws", capable of justifying the humanitarian interventionism and the cosmopolitan pursuits carried by his philosophy.<sup>33</sup> What we see here is that in both of these 'versions' of Kant, the Schmittean objection still holds: if his realism is based on mere empirical optimism, those who appeal to Kant to justify their own agendas could be objected of covering 'true' political aims in the guise of a naive optimism. On the other hand, if Kantian ideals are ultimately grounded in robust natural laws of a universalist scope, we revert back to Schmitt's critique regarding the lack of concrete political referents to ground a theory of politics that takes conflict seriously.

A final issue remains on the tendency to appeal to Kant to ground the possibility of a world-order guaranteeing the absence of intra-state conflict. A cosmopolitan world-order seems to be implied by a duty to peace, thereby testifying to Schmitt's concern about the universalising character of eighteenth-century morality. Habermas was particularly alert to this when discussing Schmitt's critique to Kant: "The politics of a world organization," he writes, "that takes its inspiration from Kant's idea of perpetual peace and is directed to the

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<sup>30</sup> Tuck 2011, p. 219.

<sup>31</sup> Marey 2012, p. 174.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 172.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 2012, p. 202; 173.

creation of a cosmopolitan order, harkens to the same logic, according to Schmitt: its pan-interventionism would inevitably lead to pan-criminalization, and hence the perversion of the goal it is supposed to serve”.<sup>34</sup> This logic of a pan-interventionism justified via Kant’s ideal of perpetual peace that Schmitt tries to disclose is at fault according to Habermas, in that it ignores the crucial distinction operative in Kant between law and morality. More importantly, the establishment of a true cosmopolitan order would not have to hide behind abstract values –as a supposed argument for the ‘legality’ of war’ in the name of its ‘morality’–, but it would rather be subjected to strict legal procedures and positive law. What Habermas attributes to Kant and Schmitt ignores, is the independence that should be drawn between (public) law and (individual) morality, allowing for a “cosmopolitan transformation of the state of nature among states into a legal order”.<sup>35</sup>

However, to think that Kant, or Kantian forms of cosmopolitanism, are committed to endorsing a world order where conflict would be somehow eradicated, would mean to overlook a fundamental distinction Kant himself makes. He distinguishes between a ‘world republic’ or *Volkerstaat*, and the idea of a ‘federation of states’ or *Volkerbund*.<sup>36</sup> Kant further distinguishes between these two conditions in terms of what is required by practical reason ‘*in thesi*’, and what is possible only in a provisional manner in practice, namely a federation of states. So:

[...] (if all is not to be lost) in place of the positive idea of a *world republic* only the *negative* surrogate of a *league* that averts war, endures, and always expands can hold back the stream of hostile inclination that shies away from right, though with constant danger of its breaking out.<sup>37</sup>

In the light of this clarification between the ideal of a world republic, and a feasible yet perfectible federation of states, Schmitt’s accusation against a liberal world republic free from conflict as inherited from Kant starts to look less challenging. To be sure, the universalism of a *Volkerstaat*, as we saw in the passage from *Perpetual Peace* will remain in Kant within the limits of a regulative ideal of reason, and must be kept separate from the “negative surrogate” of a league of nations, always prone to conflict and “constant danger”. But how are we to understand the *nature* of conflict in Kant’s politics such that we can legitimately say that it has a necessary role to play in his theory? This is important because, as I have indicated, some contemporary interpretations of Kant become problematic to the extent that they assume that the pursuit of Kantian ideals, as appropriated by their specific debates, involves the progressive elimination of human conflict both at a domestic and international level. To put it slightly differently: if a

<sup>34</sup> Habermas 2001, p.188.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 201.

<sup>36</sup> On the differences between a ‘league on nations’ and a ‘world federation’ in Kant see Kleingeld 2004.

<sup>37</sup> ZeF AA 8: 357. Whether this league is coercive or the result of a free association within the context of *Perpetual Peace*, see Höffe 2006 and Lutz-Bachmann 1997.



humanitarian peace of the Kantian type is at all possible, so the argument goes, then conflict must slowly leave the political arena. The problem is that such a thesis *as an interpretation of Kant* leaves us with a deeply depoliticised version of his philosophy. In contrast, I defend the thesis that conflict is indeed central for Kant, in the sense that it is necessarily entailed by the practical relations that individuals establish between one another as agents with a will to choice and action. Despite Schmitt and others, conflict does have a role to play, and a fundamental one.

### III. The role of conflict in Kant

Whether Kant conceived of a cosmopolitan world order beyond the state, or held firmly to a precarious but nevertheless pacific league of free sovereign states, is an ongoing debate.<sup>38</sup> The question that I want to engage here is more specific: *if* there is an argument for giving conflict, albeit of a normative and not empirical kind, a central place in Kant's political thought, *should* this change the way we interpret his commitment to the ideal of perpetual peace, moral progress, and of a pacific order among states? My contention is that it does, and it does this in the following way: once we accept that conflict between free agents of choice is *normative* for Kant, i.e. necessary given our condition as equal beings with a will to choice and action [*Willkür*], questions about whether conflict should be pacified, harnessed, or ultimately eradicated, need to be revisited. They need to be revisited in light of the inherent conflict that arises from the idea of equality among agents, who in their legitimate exercise of external freedom, affect the normative landscape of everybody else. This conflict as I said is not empirical, nor it has to do with the conflicts arising from scarcity of resources in our shared use of the earth, or from our passions or our interests. In this sense, it is a conflict that *remains as an ever-present fact about our constitution as agents*. I think that this 'agential conflict', as I want to call it, is indeed compatible with Kant's commitment to a teleology of peace, and with Kantians who endorse and rehabilitate his pacifist project, to the extent that such a conflict does not preclude the *empirical* pacification of hostile attacks, violent threats, and material wrongs in this world.

My assumption, therefore, is that *pace Schmitt*, conflict plays a central role in Kant, but not as it is commonly understood. In his political writings, Kant himself flags different descriptions of conflict, some of which tempt us to reduce conflict to a contingent and empirical kind. In a somewhat Hobbesian spirit, he describes conflict as a "resistance" between our strong inclinations to live together within the precincts of law, and the drive to "constantly [threaten] to break up this society". This resistance comes with the difficulty of overcoming our "propensity to indolence", and our tendency to desire to "gain worth in the opinion of others".<sup>39</sup> The centrality of conflict is further explored through his analysis of

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<sup>38</sup> For a comprehensive discussion of the debate see Corradetti 2020, Part III & IV.

<sup>39</sup> IaG AA 8:20–21; RGV 6:27; ZeF AA 8:366; RGV AA 6:93, emphases in the original.

the state of nature. This state is portrayed primarily as a situation where “everyone follows his own judgment”, driven by “the unsocial characteristic of wanting to direct everything in accordance with his own ideas”. As “Hobbes maintains”, Kant goes on to explain, in the face of violence “we have no option save to abandon [the state of nature] and submit ourselves to the constraint of law, which limits freedom solely in order that it may be consistent with the freedom of others and with the common good of all”.<sup>40</sup> In Part III of *Religion*, this “perilous state” is explained not by “what comes (to a person’s) way from his own raw nature, so far as he exists in isolation, but rather from the human beings to whom he stands in relation or association”. This leads Kant to conclude that in a state where law is absent, men “must remain forever armed for battle”.<sup>41</sup>

I presented these remarks with the intention of highlighting how conflict is a key ingredient of human experience for Kant. Noteworthy, however, is the fact that in these descriptions Kant oscillates between limiting conflict to actual or potential *hostilities* among individuals due to their desires and needs, and a much more *agential* understanding of it due to the fact that human beings “stand in relation or association”. Despite the Hobbesian enmity that surfaces in some of these descriptions, Kant overall does not appeal to an instrumental and empirical explanation of the root of such conflicts –be this something about the contingency of the condition we find ourselves in, or the structure of our selfish desires and fears. Rather, he proposes an analysis of the *relational nature* of a conflict that is rooted in the non-empirical and a priori fact that we are beings endowed with a will to choice [*Willkür*], with the power to affect everybody else’s equal capacity to freedom. Two further claims render my argument more explicit: first, that Kant’s relational approach to agency as involving the coexistence of conflicting claims to freedom, does not mean that such a conflict has to do with the presence of *more or less choices* available to the agent. As he puts it “Rightful (hence external) freedom cannot be defined, as it usually is, by the warrant to do whatever one wants provided one does no wrong to anyone.”<sup>42</sup>

In this sense, the conflict I am trying to articulate has nothing to do with my exercise of will involving a limitation to your available *choices*, nor a restriction to the scope of your action so long as I do not wrong you. When I speak of there being a conflict between my claim to external freedom and your claim to the same thing, this should be read as a formal requirement of what it means to be an agent, namely, a requirement that entails the duty to live a shared juridical existence, where our freedom-claims are rightly respected.<sup>43</sup> Second and relatedly, Kant’s agential conflict is formal to the extent that it identifies an unavoidable tension that arises from conceiving freedom as an equal right to each to choose and to act. It is in this equality of choice and action as a *formal constraint on our exercise of will* [*Willkür*], that Kant’s account of conflict arises.

<sup>40</sup> KrV A752/B780.

<sup>41</sup> RL AA 6:312; IaG AA 8:20; RGV AA 6:93.

<sup>42</sup> ZeF AA 8: 350, footnote.

<sup>43</sup> I appreciate an anonymous referee of this journal for helping me clarify this point.

Key to Kant's argument is his insistence that the way the exercise of our external freedom unavoidably affects the equal right of everybody else to do the same, has nothing to do with human beings' tendencies to be violent, selfish, or ambitious in the use of their freedom. To be sure, he does not deny that "envy, addiction to power, avarice, and the malignant inclinations associated with these assail [our] nature", but this is not what makes a juridical condition necessary:

However well-disposed and law-abiding human beings might be, it still lies a priori in the rational idea of such a condition (one that is not rightful) that before a public lawful condition is established individual human beings, peoples and states can never be secure against violence from one another... So, unless it wants to renounce any concepts of right, the first thing it has to resolve upon is the principle that it must leave the state of nature, in which each follows its own judgment, unite itself with all others... that is, it ought above all else to enter a civil condition.<sup>44</sup>

Note that "violence" here should not be equated with a Schmittian hostility, not even with an existential kind of violence arising from a concrete enemy. For Kant this conflict among agents when their freedom is not strictly under the coercive power of a law that is public, need not be actual for it to require the establishment of a public authority, since "it is not necessary to wait for actual hostility", and that no one "need[s] to wait until he has learned by bitter experience" that we are "authorised to use coercion against someone who already, by his nature, threatens him". We are then authorised to coerce others to leave this state where our freedom is "wild" and "arbitrary", and hence where the inherent conflict of equal agency is exacerbated.<sup>45</sup> More to the point, Kant describes the state of our will in the state of nature as a "state of externally lawless freedom".<sup>46</sup> What this conception of non-freedom gives expression to is that, unless we abandon this condition and constitute an external public will, our will as our capacity to choice and action will continue to stand in conflict with everybody else's.

From this perspective, the agential conflict I have tried to articulate requires a kind of ordering, if our equal capacity to freedom is to be exercised *with right*, i.e. legitimately. This for Kant demands abandoning the state of nature, and entering into a civil condition to put our wills, and hence, our freedom, under a universal law. It follows that the ordering of this constitutive, normative conflict I am here defending turns out to be at the basis of Kant's particular solution to the problem of political authority in terms of universal law: "[S]o act externally that the free use of your choice can coexist with the freedom of everyone in accordance with a universal law".<sup>47</sup> It follows that Kant's theory of conflict is

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<sup>44</sup> RL AA 6:312.

<sup>45</sup> RL AA 6: 307-8.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> RL AA 6:231.

conceptually tied to his account of political authority in terms of a *Public Will*.<sup>48</sup> This form of rightful coercion is not meant to merely *remedy* the inconveniences of an empirical conflict, but to attempt to render practical relations between agents rightful, without ever being able to fully eradicate the tension lying at the heart of a commitment to equality of agency.

Does this mean that this agential conflict I have tried to articulate, once it is rightfully ordered under the laws emanating from a public will –embodied in the empirical institutions and effective exercises of positive laws- is somehow, eradicated? This question is important in light of my criticisms to the ‘anti-conflict’ readings of Kant explored in Section II, and it is particularly relevant in the context of Schmitt. If we read Kant’s political/juridical solution to the conflict of equal agency as a *definite* solution, that is, as a solution where public law would make the limits of freedom strict and clear in a way that no friction would ever arise from our free exercise of choice, then we seem to fall back into a picture of Kantian politics closer to a depoliticized liberalism where conflict is, after all, eliminated. I do not think this is Kant’s approach to politics, and my reason for this is derived from his commitment to free agency. When I stated that this conflict is *constitutive of what it means to be an agent endowed with a will*, what I mean by this is that such agents, even under the strict authority of an external and coercive law, will always have their claim to external freedom in tension with that of others.

Two claims follow from my argument at this point: firstly, that such a constitutive conflict among free agents can be ‘resolved’ in a *qualified sense*, namely, through the establishment of a juridical condition, embodied in an omnilateral and public will [*öffentliche Wille*],<sup>49</sup> endowed with the coercive power to draw the limits of rightful interaction. Secondly, the establishment of this omnilateral and public authority becomes then the *locus* that enables the exercise of such rightful interaction. In more familiar Kantian terms, a public will becomes the condition of possibility of a political life in common where conflict is, indeed, present, but ordered under the limits of universal law. From this point of view, Schmitt’s critique to all “ethical-humanitarian”<sup>50</sup> theories as unconcerned with conflict starts to crumble.

Considering that Kant dismisses all arguments that explain conflict by appeal to empirical aspects of our world or of our nature, and if we are to defend, as I do, that his political philosophy is attentive to conflict as a fact of life, this ‘fact’ has to be understood in a very particular way. I suggested that this conflict should be called *normative*, and it is normative in in two senses: on the one hand, it is a normative conflict to the extent that it arises independently of empirical conditions –scarcity of resources, the particular constitution of

<sup>48</sup> The establishment of political authority requires for Kant “a will that is omnilateral, that is united not contingently but a priori and therefore necessarily, and because of this is the only will that is lawgiving.” RL AA 6:263.

<sup>49</sup> Cf. RL AA 06: 256.

<sup>50</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 54.

our desires, the contingency of our needs—. It arises, instead, due to the fact that we stand in unavoidable relations to one another in respect to our equal freedom to choose and to act. Nothing about our empirical circumstances, or about human nature explains or triggers this conflict. It is, in contrast, constitutive of our being agents endowed with a will. On the other hand, this conflict is *normative* in the sense that it is not about the relationship of our will to things outside ourselves, and the conflict this unilateral claim over objects might arise in the face of other's equal claims to it; rather, the normativity of this conflict arises from the relationship of our will to the will of *another*, namely from the relational aspect underlying human agency in general. What Kant's political solution to this problem tries to achieve is not the eradication of conflict to give place to a conflict-free world, but rather the juridical condition becomes the condition of possibility of being able to stand in practical relations with others, by *drawing rightful limits to our otherwise conflictive exercise of freedom of choice and action*. Such a lawful ordering by means of public legislation does not aim at making political life a frictionless exchange as Schmitt's critique would have it, but rather it aims at the legislation of lawful interactions. Therefore, a juridical condition is then tasked –through its institutions and its officials–, to guarantee “the most precise determination and protection of the limits of [each person's] freedom so that it can coexist with the freedom of others”.<sup>51</sup>

I should note that the reading I am offering here is necessarily limited to the specific aim of this paper, that is to show that conflict plays a systematic role in Kant's political philosophy that makes it neither vulnerable nor accommodating of Schmitt-like critiques of a ‘conflict-free’ liberalism. As discussed in the previous section, however, some appropriations of Kant as a paradigmatic defender of a long-lasting peace, and as a source of robust values such as human rights, have contributed to think of Kant's philosophy as an ‘anti-conflict’ philosophy, resembling in some respects the ‘anti-conflict’ liberalism that Schmitt alerted us against. Therefore, arriving at a better understanding of both the role and nature of conflict as it operates in Kant, allows us to re-address some issues in his political philosophy, and the various ways in which it has been appropriated. I suggest that from this perspective, political life in common is *conflictive* since it involves the exercise of entering into “external and indeed practical relation[s] of one person to another”, in ways that our actions and deeds bear a significant “influence on each other”.<sup>52</sup> It is precisely this fact of agency that I think is crucial for Kant, and for the way he thinks of conflict as an ever-present reality. To put it differently: it is the fact that freedom involves influencing and affecting others in ways that are constitutive and inevitable of what it means to be an agent, that such an influence will always be relational, and hence, conflictive. I suggest we think of this as a kind of *dynamising conflict* that can hardly be reduced to a picture of Kant's politics as a blunt and moralising pacifism. This commitment to agency as a deeply relational and mutually affecting business precludes such a reading.

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<sup>51</sup> IaG AA 8:23.

<sup>52</sup> RL AA 6: 230.

However, conflict in Kant has not always been systematized in this way. My initial perplexity in this essay had, in fact, two sources. We are now familiar with the worry that, at least from the perspective of contemporary appropriations of Kant in the field of political science and international relations, these appropriations required us to take Schmitt's critique of Kant seriously. Yet there is a second source of discomfort, namely contemporary philosophical interpretations of Kant himself. What these interpretations have in common is their approach to Kant's political philosophy in general, and his teleology of history specifically, as tasked with the role of progressively sublimating, harnessing, or eventually eradicating conflict from human interaction. Are we to take these interpretative tendencies as targets of Schmitt's objections to a 'conflict-free' world? To some extent we should, and I suggest it is worth understanding why.

#### IV. 'Anti conflict' readings of Kant: pacification and eradication

So far, I warned against reading conflict in Kant's political philosophy as an empirical fact having to do with violent enmity between individuals, or with the contingent constitution of human nature. I argued in contrast that for Kant conflict is to be understood normatively, as a tension in the way our agency affects the freedom of others. If Schmitt's accusation to Kant is that his theory of peace and his universalist morality cannot deliver us with a robust view of politics as 'the' sphere of human conflict, then that can be partly explained by Schmitt's limited identification of conflict with sheer violence. To be sure, for Schmitt conflict can manifest in many ways, as fear of violent death, or as a deeper, existential threat posed by an enemy who intends to "negate his opponents way of life".<sup>53</sup> However, it is wrongly entailed by Schmitt's critique to all theories committed to a universalist and humanitarian morality, based on formal and legalistic principles in the way Kant does, that they ought to reject the presence of *all forms of conflict*, regardless of whether its manifestation happens at a normative or at an empirical (and literally) physical level. Schmitt goes wrong, therefore, in equating a commitment to universalism with a commitment to total pacifism, since for him universality "would necessarily have to mean total depoliticalization".<sup>54</sup>

However, an interpretative issue seems to persist, namely what I identify as properly 'anti-conflict' readings of Kant. I find these interpretations particularly problematic because they explicitly read his political philosophy, and in particular his teleology of history, as aiming towards the pacification and progressive eradication of conflict. This is worrisome for the systematic reasons I defended in Section III, and for the way these strictly Kantian interpretations might further influence other appropriations of Kant, as discussed in Section II. Getting Kant straight on the issue of conflict becomes, once again, a pressing task.

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<sup>53</sup> Schmitt 2007, p. 27.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 55.

We are able to find traces of this broadly ‘anti-conflict’ reading of Kant in the interpretations of Hans Saner, Patrick Riley and Allen Wood. Saner for example maintains that Kant’s thought “proves time and again to be the turn from diversity to unity”. As a “peacemaker” both in metaphysics and in politics, Kantian politics can be synthesised in the question “[H]ow is it possible, despite the antagonistic forces of the passions that always work in politics, to unify the state-building will” and achieve “long lasting peace?”.<sup>55</sup> This search for unity and harmony arising from conflict and antagonism, is shared by Patrick Riley, for whom the process of going from a state of “empirical politics” to the “sublimely metaphysical” idea of a perfect republic requires “the sublimation of conflict”.<sup>56</sup>

This quest for a conflict-free condition is also present in Allen Wood’s reading of Kant. Wood’s interpretation is particularly relevant to the development of our present discussion: first, there is a point of contact between his interpretation and my own in our shared interest in the *systematic* role conflict plays in Kant’s thought. Second, I believe Wood is correct in placing Kant’s interest in conflict against a broader concern by highlighting the “historical urgency” that underpins all of Kant’s ethical concerns.<sup>57</sup> This relation between conflict and history is, in my view, a beneficial one, as it increases our sensitivity to the political implications of Kant’s thought. I suspect, however, that Wood’s appeal to history relies on teleological underpinnings to a greater extent than the interpretation I have tried to advance here, and it is possibly the reason why his defense of a progressive eradication of conflict has to be done in Kant through the lenses of a teleological plan of reason.

Taking moral philosophy as his starting point, Wood defines Kant’s ethics as a “radical moral philosophy aimed at abolishing conflict”.<sup>58</sup> This radical project develops alongside a teleology of history. For Kant, history develops in epochs, starting with the “epoch of nature” and finishing with the “epoch of freedom” in which men, and not nature, establish their own “autonomous ends”. According to reason’s “conscious and collective plan”, the natural antagonism between human beings “will gradually be overcome, vanquished by reason’s free concord”.<sup>59</sup> But, how does politics fit into this picture? For Wood, there is a tension between politics and moral progress since politics belongs to the “epoch of nature”, and morality is found only in the “epoch of freedom”. These two conflicting realms are nevertheless bridged by history. The philosophy of history acts as a kind of pacifier for the tension Wood thinks exists between these two realms. So the solution is ultimately achieved by a teleological approach to morality, of which politics is just a stage. As Wood concludes, “whereas right is to *control* social conflict in the interest of nature’s ultimate purpose, morality is to *abolish* it in order to actualise the final human ends”.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Saner 1973, pp. 4, 41.

<sup>56</sup> Riley 1983, p. 123.

<sup>57</sup> Wood 1999, p. 245.

<sup>58</sup> Cf. Wood 1999, p. 244ff.

<sup>59</sup> Wood 1991, p. 343.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 344.

Two things are worth clarification: first, for Wood, a true pacified condition is ultimately our task as *moral beings* with a collective destiny, and a different issue is how this ideal abolition of all frictions is predicated on the *social control of conflict* through the effective and coercive power of institutions and public law. Second, the fact that Wood understands conflict empirically, and as pertaining human nature, explains why it is malleable and open to be first controlled by law, and then abolished by teleological means. This progression will be slow and achieved only in stages, but the ‘anti-conflict’ goal is nevertheless clear. As Wood himself concludes, Kant’s political philosophy (at least from a teleological point of view) is aimed at the “historical task of controlling [conflict] externally by achieving peace with justice, through cosmopolitan republicanism”.<sup>61</sup> A very different picture of Kantian politics emerges from this set of assumptions if we make the abolition of conflict as an explicit teleological end.

What these ‘anti-conflict’ interpretations of Kant reveal is that at least some aspects of Schmitt’s critique are able to find a space in versions of Kant’s philosophy. I am not however claiming that Saner, Riley or Wood would commit Kant to the kind of liberal pacifism Schmitt portrays. My appeal to Wood was done with the interest of showing that there is an *interpretative tendency* to dismiss conflict as a systematic element in Kant’s theory of political and social agency. In contrast, what we commonly find is a commitment to the eradication of conflict as a basic aim of Kant’s philosophy, thereby ignoring one of the most original and distinctive aspects of his approach to politics. These “practical relations” that Kant was interested in exploring, showed how the fact that we are beings with a will which ineludibly affect the exercise of another’s freedom, makes it impossible in my view to hold to a completely pacified, conflict-free world.

## V. Between peace and conflict: concluding remarks

To conclude: I can make little sense of a conflict-free world in Kant – at least once we accept the relational nature of his approach to freedom and agency. An understanding of Kant’s philosophy as aimed at “abolishing conflict altogether”<sup>62</sup> fails to recognise (i) what it means to be an agent endowed with a will to choice and action, and therefore (ii) what it means to be an agent in a world where others have equal claims to the exercise of such a capacity to freedom. What would political life be reduced to if the ideal of a world free of all conflicts were, indeed, attainable? What I have tried to show is that this, at least, would not be Kant’s world. However, taking on board this insight into the inherently conflictual nature of free agency does raise interesting and novel questions worth exploring, for example: ‘how should we understand the ideal of perpetual peace if conflict between agents is ever-present?’; ‘is moral progress compatible with the fact that we are beings

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<sup>61</sup>Wood 1991, p. 345.

<sup>62</sup>*Ibid.*, pp. 344-5.



with an equal faculty for choice and action?'; 'if conflict is necessary at the level of agency, is it so at the level of states?'. I did not offer definite answers to these questions. Instead I suggested how an account of agential conflict in Kant requires a deeper and more global analysis of the relationship between his teleology and his politics, and between his theory of law and his theory of individual morality. I think that the pacifist projects underlying some contemporary appropriations of Kant from the camp of political science and international relations, as well as the more teleologically oriented approaches to his political philosophy, are both compatible with the positive account of agential conflict I defended here. What we must not lose sight of is the fact that such a normative conflict as a structural feature of agency, will be ever-present. If this is right, then Schmitt's critique to Kant looks like a blunt distortion, or at least conceptually weak.

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<i>KrV</i>	Critique of Pure Reason
<i>RL</i>	Doctrine of Right
<i>IaG</i>	Idea of Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim
<i>ZeF</i>	Perpetual Peace
<i>Prol</i>	Prolegomena to all Future Metaphysics
<i>RGV</i>	Religion within the limits of pure reason

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## **The New Conflict of the Faculties: Kant, Radical Enlightenment, The Hyper-State, and How to Philosophize During a Pandemic**

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### **Abstract**

In this essay, I apply the Kantian (or at the very least, Kant-inspired) interpretation of enlightenment as *radical enlightenment* to the enterprise of *philosophy* within the context of our contemporary world-situation, and try to answer this very hard question: “As radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by *the double-whammy* consisting of what I call *The Hyper-State*, together with *the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic*, what should we dare to think and do?” The very hard problem posed by this very hard question is what I’ll call *The New Conflict of the Faculties*. By way of a direct answer to this very hard question and by way of an effective solution to this very hard problem, I provide seven recommendations.

### **Key words**

Kant, Radical enlightenment, Hyper-State, Digital media, Civil disobedience, Voltaire, 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic

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Our age is the genuine age of **criticism**, to which everything must submit. **Religion** through its holiness, and **legislation** through its **majesty** [and, in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, **the military-industrial-university-digital complex** through its ideological hegemony and coercive authoritarianism—RH] commonly seek to exempt themselves from it. But in this way they excite a just suspicion against themselves, and cannot lay claim to that unfeigned respect that reason grants only to that which has been able to withstand its free and public examination. (*CPR Axi n.*)<sup>1</sup>

## I. Introduction

In this essay, I want to apply the Kantian (or at the very least, Kant-inspired) interpretation of enlightenment as *radical enlightenment* to the enterprise of *philosophy* within the context of our contemporary world-situation, and try to answer this very hard question:

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<sup>1</sup> Throughout this essay, for convenience, I refer to Kant's works infratextually in parentheses. The references include both an abbreviation of the English title and the corresponding volume and page numbers in the standard "Akademie" edition of Kant's works: *Kants gesammelte Schriften*, edited by the Königlich Preussischen (now Deutschen) Akademie der Wissenschaften (Berlin: G. Reimer [now de Gruyter], 1902-). I generally follow the standard English translations, but have occasionally modified them where appropriate. For references to the first *Critique*, I follow the common practice of giving page numbers from the A (1781) and B (1787) German editions only. A list of relevant abbreviations and English translations can be found at the end of the main text of the essay.

As radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by *the double-whammy* consisting of what I call *The Hyper-State*,<sup>2</sup> together with *the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic*, what should we dare to think and do?

The very hard problem posed by this very hard question is what I'll call *The New Conflict of the Faculties*.

## II. What Enlightenment Is

To coin a question, *what is enlightenment?* In his equally famous and notorious, but in any case historically and philosophically seminal, same-named essay, Kant says this:

*Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his own self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This immaturity is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have the courage to use your own understanding! is thus the motto of Enlightenment. (WiE 8: 35)*

Following Kant's lead and elaborating a little, I will say that the concept of ENLIGHTENMENT, *as such*, says that (i) because we are, by virtue of a unified set of innately-specified cognitive, practical, and affective/emotional capacities, *autonomous rational human animal agents possessing dignity*, that is, *persons*, but (ii) because, tragically, against the backdrop of various more or less brute, goading material conditions of physical nature, human history, and social-institutional or political culture, we have also freely—even if unreflectively and self-deceivingly—put ourselves into a longstanding condition of cognitive, practical, and affective/emotional passivity, robotic subservience, mind control, and mental slavery, and thus into a longstanding state of *self-incurred moral and intellectual immaturity*, (iii) therefore, in order finally to advance beyond this tragic immature condition and to satisfy the categorically normative demands of our rational human nature as persons, *we ought to dare to use our own understanding and think for ourselves*, or as the classical slogan has it, *Sapere aude!*

But unfortunately, and fatefully, whether intentionally or not, Kant's seminal essay is *highly ambiguously written*, in such a way as to permit two sharply different readings of the concept of enlightenment, depending on whether one interprets it, as most casual readers, scholars, and Kantian or non-Kantian philosophers do, in the light of (i) Kant's neo-Hobbesian liberal Statist political philosophy in *The Doctrine of Right*, or instead, as a few contrarian “Left Kantians” (Hanna 2017a) do, in the light of (ii) Kant's

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<sup>2</sup> I'm borrowing this useful neologism from Otto Paans, who himself adapted it from the work of Marc Augé and Timothy Morton.

uncompromising non-egoistic, non-consequentialist, autonomy-driven, dignitarian ethics in the *Groundwork* and *Critique of Practical Reason*, his post-Statist, spiritually-inspired moral cosmopolitanism in *Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*, and his defense of the absolute autonomy of philosophy in “The Conflict of the Faculties.” According to the first interpretation, which I call *Enlightenment Lite* (**EL**), you ought to “argue as much you like about whatever you like, but obey!” Correspondingly, **EL** is committed to an essentially *instrumental, empiricist* conception of cognitive and practical rationality, an essentially *deterministic* or at least *compatibilist* metaphysics of free will and autonomy, an essentially *egoistic utilitarian* conception of ethics, an essentially *individualist* conception of social life, and an essentially *intellectualist* or *dualist* conception of the nature of the human mind. But on the contrary, according to the second interpretation, which I call *Radical Enlightenment* (**RE**),<sup>3</sup> or *heavy-duty enlightenment*, you ought to dare to think and act for yourself, and in so thinking and so doing, thereby *exit the State* in order to create and sustain a cosmopolitan moral community that Kant calls the “ethical community”: hence **RE** is a Kantian version of *philosophical and political cosmopolitan anarcho-socialism* (Hanna 2017b). Correspondingly, **RE** is committed to an essentially *non-instrumental, apriorist* conception of cognitive and practical rationality (Hanna 2015), a *natural libertarian, source-incompatibilist* metaphysics of free will and autonomy (Hanna 2018b), an essentially *dignitarian, respect-based* conception of ethics (Hanna 2018c), an essentially *enactive and embedded* conception of social life (Maiese and Hanna 2019), and an essentially *embodied* conception of the human mind (Hanna and Maiese 2009).

Now the ideological allure of the first or **EL** interpretation is so powerful that you may find it hard to believe that there even *is* a second or **RE** interpretation. If so, then I hereby invite you, as a self-consciously critical Critical philosopher, to put the all-too-familiar **EL** interpretation in abeyance for a very brief moment, and recognize that the **RE** interpretation practically *leaps out* of these three juxtaposed texts:

When nature has unwrapped, from under this hard shell, the seed for which she cares most tenderly, namely the propensity and calling to *think* freely, the latter gradually works back upon the mentality of the people (which thereby gradually becomes capable of *freedom* in acting) and eventually even upon the principles of *government*, which finds it profitable to itself to treat the human being, *who is now more than a machine*, in keeping with his dignity. (WiE 8: 41-42)

A *juridico-civil* (political) *state* is the relation of human beings to each other inasmuch as they stand jointly under *public juridical laws* (which are all coercive laws). An *ethico-civil* state is one in which they are united under laws without being coerced, i.e., under *laws of virtue* alone.... In an already existing political community all the political citizens are, as

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<sup>3</sup> In his excellent but also highly controversial *Radical Enlightenment: Philosophy and the Making of Modernity 1650-1750*, and its two sequel volumes, Jonathan Israel (2001) traces the origins of the very idea of a radical enlightenment project back to Spinoza, pantheism, and metaphysical monism. I certainly agree with Israel that Spinozism is at least one important source of the radical enlightenment tradition. Kant’s own contribution to the controversy about Spinozism is presented in “What Does it Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” (OT).



such, still in the *ethical state of nature*, and have the right to remain in it; for it would be a contradiction (in *adjecto*) for the political community to compel its citizens to enter into an ethical community, since the latter entails freedom from coercion in its very concept. Every political community may indeed wish to have available a dominion over minds as well, according to the laws of virtue; for where its means of coercion do not reach, since a human judge cannot penetrate into the depths of other human beings, there the dispositions to virtue would bring about the required result. But woe to the legislator who would want to bring about through coercion a polity directed to ethical ends! For he would thereby not only achieve the very opposite of ethical ends, but also undermine his political ends and render them insecure. – The citizen of the political community therefore remains, so far as the latter’s lawgiving authority is concerned, totally free: he may wish to enter with his fellow citizens into an ethical union over and above the political one, or rather remain in a natural state of this sort.... THE HUMAN BEING OUGHT TO LEAVE THE ETHICAL STATE OF NATURE IN ORDER TO BECOME A MEMBER OF AN ETHICAL COMMUNITY. (*Rel* 6: 95-102)

When it is a question of the *truth* of a certain teaching to be expounded in public, the teacher cannot appeal to a supreme command nor the pupil pretend that he believed it by order. This can happen only when it is a question of action, and even then the pupil must recognize by a *free* judgment that such a command was really issued and that he is obligated or at least entitled to obey it; otherwise, his acceptance of it would be an empty pretense and a lie. Now the power to judge autonomously—that is, freely according to principles of thought in general—is called reason. So the philosophical faculty, because it must answer for the truth of its teachings it is to adopt or even allow, must be conceived as free and subject only to laws given by reason, not by the government. (*CF* 7: 27)

In any case, a striking contemporary example of **EL** is Steven Pinker's *Enlightenment Now* (2018) and, for better or worse, I have recently developed and defended **RE** in *Kant, Agnosticism, and Anarchism* (Hanna 2018d).

Very much in the spirit of **RE**, in “The Conflict of the Faculties,” Kant is fully critically aware of the real possibility of mind-control and mental slavery (aka “ideological hegemony”) *within* the university, especially via the faculty of theology; and he correspondingly asserts the absolute autonomy of the faculty of philosophy from the theology faculty, from other university faculties, and from the government. But, as radical as that is, perhaps suprisingly, Kant neglects to consider the equally real possibility of ideological hegemony *within faculties of philosophy themselves* (Hanna 2018e); nor—perhaps *unsurprisingly*—does he foresee the real possibility of almost unlimited mind-control and mental slavery via *contemporary digital media*, not only within States but also across States, worldwide.

Now when we combine (i) the coercive authoritarianism of all States, especially including all contemporary neoliberal nation-States, with (ii) global corporate capitalism, (iii) complicit, conformist, neoliberal universities and their faculties (Maiese and Hanna 2019: ch.4), and with (iv) globalized digital media, then we have what I will call “The

Hyper-State,” that is, *the military-industrial-university-digital complex* that nationally, internationally, and globally guides and shapes States and their governments, often more or less covertly and without our being self-consciously critically aware of it.<sup>4</sup>

In the rest of this essay, as I mentioned in the Introduction, I want to apply the Kantian interpretation of enlightenment as **RE** to the enterprise of philosophy within the context of our contemporary world-situation, and try to answer this very hard question: “As radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by the double-whammy consisting of The Hyper-State, together with the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, what should we dare to think and do?” And as I also mentioned in the Introduction, the very hard problem posed by this very hard question is what I’m calling “The New Conflict of the Faculties.”

### III. The Argument From Socialism: Log Off, Subvert, and Dismantle

As a necessary preliminary to our fully facing up to The New Conflict of the Faculties, I’m going to start with a recent critical analysis of *social media* by Benjamin Y. Fong in the American democratic socialist journal, *Jacobin*. Fong writes:

For the Left, ... social media presents an imminent threat: it attracts people who are natural fodder for socialist politics and then absorbs them in the unthinking narcissism of pseudo-political statement pronouncement, where they enter the negative feedback loop that distances them from the reality of everyday human engagement. Twitter is thus not just a *medium of expression* for the “psychic pathologies” of what Mark Fisher described so well as the “Vampire Castle.”<sup>5</sup> *It is the Vampire Castle*, doing capitalism’s work by further atomizing and distancing people from the kinds of conversations required for real political

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<sup>4</sup> The well-known phrase “military-industrial complex,” originally derives from US president Dwight D. Eisenhower’s “Farewell Address” in 1961:

[The] conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual—is felt in every city, every statehouse, every office of the federal government. We recognize the imperative need for this development. Yet we must not fail to comprehend its grave implications. Our toil, resources and livelihood are all involved; so is the very structure of our society. In the councils of government, we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military-industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists, and will persist. We must never let the weight of this combination endanger our liberties or democratic processes. We should take nothing for granted. Only an alert and knowledgeable citizenry can compel the proper meshing of the huge industrial and military machinery of defense with our peaceful methods and goals so that security and liberty may prosper together. (underlining added)

See, e.g., (Wikipedia 2019). And for the closely-related notion of *the deep state*, see, e.g., (Herman and Chomsky 1988; and Lofgren 2014). Unfortunately, the neologism I was originally using for the Hyper-State, “the deeper state,” has been irremediably corrupted by the opportunistic, systematic misuse of the term “the deep state” by American right-libertarians and neo-fascists, during The Age of Trump.

<sup>5</sup> See (Fisher 2013).

engagement. The sooner we realize this about social media, the sooner we can get to the work of dismantling it. (Fong 2018)

Here, in turn, is a four-step rational reconstruction of Fong's argument:

1. Socialism—whether democratic socialism or social anarchism (aka *anarcho-socialism*, *libertarian socialism*, etc.)—is fundamentally concerned with respect for universal human dignity; with human freedom of thought, expression, choice, and action; with individual and collective creativity and flourishing; and with the universal satisfaction of true human needs.
2. Internet-based social media may appear to be highly promising and legitimate vehicles for the realization of socialist aims.
3. But in fact, social media are an essential part of the “military-industrial-university-digital complex” that not only produces widespread *mind-control and mental slavery*, but has also enabled a worldwide *mental health crisis* of social media addiction (Griffiths 2018; Nguyen 2018; Schulson 2015).
4. Therefore, anyone who recognizes the value of the fundamental concerns of socialism should (i) engage in a serious critical analysis of social media, (ii) “log the fuck off” on a regular basis, in order to resist their largely malign influence, and also (iii) wholeheartedly individually and collectively commit to subverting and dismantling the entire system of social media.

I think that this argument is sound. Moreover, I also think that its conclusion should be generalized so as to apply to *all digital media controlled by other parts of The Hyper-State*, not just social media, therefore all digital media, including all parts of the internet, that are controlled by (i) the governments of contemporary nation-States, especially including their coercive authoritarian enforcement-specialists, the military and the police, and/or (ii) global corporate capitalists, and/or (iii) universities and professional academic organizations. The rationale for this generalization is that premises 1, 2, and 3 of the above argument apply just as correctly and directly to *all* digital media controlled by The Hyper-State, as they do to social media in particular. Therefore, the generalized conclusion of the rationally reconstructed version of Fong's argument should be a starting point for all of us, including *all philosophers*, which in turn includes *all radically enlightened Kantian philosophers*.

Now we can advance to the philosophical main event of this essay, namely fully facing up The New Conflict of the Faculties: *specifically* as radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by The Hyper-State, what should we dare to think and do?

#### **IV. One Thing That Radically Enlightened Kantian Philosophers Should Dare to Think and Do: Political Philosophy of Mind**

In section III, I argued that anyone who recognizes the value of the fundamental concerns of socialism should (i) engage in a serious critical analysis of all digital media substantially controlled by The Hyper-State, (ii) “log the fuck off” on a regular basis from the digital media substantially controlled by The Hyper-State, in order to resist their largely malign influence, and also (iii) wholeheartedly individually and collectively commit to subverting and dismantling the entire system of digital media substantially controlled by The Hyper-State. But these are things that *anyone*, not just radically enlightened Kantian philosophers, should dare to think and do, insofar as they are confronted by The Hyper-State. So we need to isolate some thing or things that radically enlightened Kantian philosophers are especially well-positioned to be able to dare to think and do, by virtue of their training and by virtue of their wholehearted commitment to *real philosophy*, aka *rational anthropology*, as a full-time, lifetime calling (Hanna 2018a).

Here is *one* thing, namely what, following the contemporary German philosopher Jan Slaby, I call *political philosophy of mind*. Political philosophy of mind, as I am understanding it, has two parts: (i) *the mind-body politic*, which is an extension of the theory of what Michelle Maiese and I call *the essential embodiment theory* of the mind-body relation (Hanna and Maiese 2009), to the critical analysis and radical emancipatory politics of *social institutions*, and (ii) *the political philosophy of cognition*, which is an extension of the theory of human cognition to the critical analysis and radical emancipatory politics of *ideologically-driven cognitive illusions*. Here is an example of the mind-body politic:

[The mind-body politic] fuses contemporary philosophy of mind and emancipatory political theory. On the philosophy of mind side, we draw from our own previous work on the essential embodiment theory and enactivism, together with work by Jan Slaby, John Dewey, Bourdieu, and J.J. Gibson. On the emancipatory political theory side, we draw from Kant, Schiller, Kierkegaard, early Marx, Kropotkin, Foucault, and Frankfurt School Critical Theory. We begin with the claim that human minds are necessarily and completely embodied, and inherently enactive, social, and environmentally embedded, and proceed from there to argue that social institutions partially determine and shape our essentially embodied minds, and thereby fundamentally affect our lives. Our focus is on social institutions in contemporary neoliberal societies, specifically higher education and mental health practice. We hold that although these social institutions shape our essentially embodied minds in a destructive, deforming, and enslaving way, yet it’s possible to create social institutions that are constructive, enabling, and emancipatory. According to our proposed enactive-transformative principle, enacting salient changes in the structure and complex dynamics of a social institution produces corresponding salient changes in the structure and complex dynamics of the essentially embodied minds of the people belonging to that institution. (Maiese and Hanna 2019: ch.1)

And here is an example of the political philosophy of cognition:

I am deeply and fundamentally interested in explaining how memory and sense perception can be ideologically manipulated for political purposes, and also how the philosophy of cognition can be deployed to indicate and justify practical, effective cognitive strategies for resisting this manipulation and for ideological self-deprogramming and cognitive self-liberation when the manipulation has already occurred. My proposal is that the overall value of those cognitive theories will be made retrogressively manifest through their ability to provide fruitful and robust consequences for political theories and real-world political frameworks that emphasize *individual and collective free agency* and *radical enlightenment*. (Hanna 2018f)

### **V. Another Thing That Radically Enlightened Kantian Philosophers Should Dare to Think and Do: Philosophical Civil Disobedience**

What else should radically enlightened Kantian philosophers dare to think and do? In recent work, I've argued (i) that a metaphilosophical "second copernican revolution" will occur when and insofar as radically enlightened philosophers *exit the professional academy* in order to emancipate themselves from the mind control and mental slavery of contemporary professional academic philosophy, which is itself fully embedded within and fully reflective of the mind control and mental slavery that pervades contemporary neoliberal universities and other social institutions of higher education (Hanna 2018e), and (ii) that the specific kind of philosophy that radically enlightened philosophers should be doing is *borderless philosophy*, or *anarcho-philosophy* (Hanna 2018g). Borderless philosophy, or anarcho-philosophy, is a sub-species of real philosophy, aka rational anthropology (Hanna 2018a), according to which (i) real philosophy is expressly *anti-professional-academic* or at least *extra-professional-academic*, (ii) real philosophy is expressly *cosmopolitan* or global, and (iii) there are *no in-principle restrictions as to the format or content of real philosophical works*.

But there's another aspect of borderless or anarcho-philosophy that is also closely connected with Martin Luther King Jr's doctrine of *civil disobedience* (King 2018), as per the following eight-step argument.

1. By *violence*, I mean *the use of actually or potentially destructive force*, and by *nonviolence* I mean *the refusal to use actually or potentially destructive force*.
2. Violence with respect to people is rarely if ever rationally or morally justified; indeed, except in last-resort cases of self-defense against violent attack or in order to protect the innocent from violent attack, universal nonviolence with respect to people is rationally justified and morally obligatory.

3. Nevertheless, sometimes it is not only permissible, but even rationally justified and morally obligatory, to be nonviolent with respect to *people* yet also violent with respect to *private property*, if the relevant private property represents a basic and widespread source of violations of respect for universal human dignity—e.g., if it's private property owned by big-capitalist conglomerates or corporations, that expresses and implements an inherently oppressive social system, such as the symbiotic combination of *racism, big capitalism, and the coercive authoritarianism of the State* (e.g., of the police and the legal justice system of mass incarceration)—and the purpose of the violence with respect to private property of this kind is solely to change this inherently oppressive social system into something fundamentally better, in that it sufficiently respects universal human dignity.

4. Martin Luther King Jr (henceforth MLK), argues that massive nonviolent (with respect to people) civil disobedience is required in order to effect fundamental social change for the better in inherently oppressive social systems, and also that this nonviolent civil disobedience can include “direct action” such as the disruption of the daily operations of the inherently oppressive symbiotic social system of racism, big capitalism, and the coercive authoritarianism of the State, perhaps even including violence with respect to private property owned by big-capitalist conglomerates or corporations (King 2018).

5. Although MLK does not explicitly draw this distinction, there is nevertheless a basic difference between (i) *coercion*, which is either (ia) imposing or threatening to impose violence on people or (ib) imposing or threatening to impose salient although nonviolent harms on people, in order to compel those people to do various things, or heed various commands or demands, in order to bring about egoistic or publicly beneficial ends of the coercer, and (ii) *noncoercion*, which is the refusal to engage in coercion.

6. Since coercion treats other people as mere means or mere things, and not as persons with dignity, it violates sufficient respect for human dignity; hence all coercion is rationally unjustified and immoral, *even if* it is beneficial for many people.

7. So only *nonviolent (with respect to people), noncoercive civil disobedience* is rationally justified and morally acceptable for the purposes of effecting fundamental social change for the better in inherently oppressive social systems, and *only nonviolent (with respect to people), noncoercive civil disobedient “direct action” or “disruption”* is fully consistent with MLK's overall moral and political philosophy.

8. Therefore, although MLK was a *serious* radical—indeed, he was an *anarcho-socialist*, since political anarchism is just a generalization of civil disobedience which says that we're *always* permitted or obligated to disobey the coercive

authoritarian commands of the State *whenever* those commands are rationally unjustified and immoral, hence the State as such, as inherently coercive and authoritarian, has no genuine rational and moral legitimacy—he was not a *dangerous* radical, except insofar as he peacefully but also rebelliously challenged the oppression of racists, big capitalists, and coercive authoritarian Statists.

Civil disobedience in MLK’s sense, then, is the refusal to heed, or the direct violation of, rationally unjustified and immoral commands or laws of the State, for the sake of sufficiently respecting universal human dignity. And anarcho-socialism is just a generalization of civil disobedience. Or to express this doctrine of anarcho-socialist civil disobedience in the refined MLK sense *pictorially*, via a famous image created by the British artist Banksy:



In turn, I think that there are at least five modes of civil disobedience: (i) *direct action or disruption*, for example, strikes, marches, sit-ins, occupations, etc., (ii) what I call *emancipatory* free speech or freedom of expression, that is, free speech or expression whose essential purpose is *to resist oppression for the sake of sufficiently respecting universal human dignity*, (iii) *counter-cultural escape into independent or unincorporated creative, meaningful activity*, for example, artistic activity of all kinds, crafts of all kinds, scholarship of all kinds, especially philosophy, and, more generally, J.S. Mill’s “experiments in living,” (iv) what the political anthropologist James C. Scott calls *weapons of the weak* (Scott 1985), for example, foot-dragging, covert noncompliance, theft, sabotage, defacement of property, etc., and finally (v) what I call *philosophical civil disobedience*.

As regards (v), we'll remember that according to the refined version of MLK's conception of civil disobedience that I sketched above, all civil disobedience must also be (i) nonviolent (with respect to people), and (ii) noncoercive. So what kind or kinds of civil disobedience in the refined MLK sense are *especially* appropriate for radically enlightened Kantian borderless or anarcho-philosophers? Looking back to the origins of western philosophy, Socrates and Diogenes, for example, were both *emancipatory free-speakers* and *counter-cultural escapees*: Socrates was a subversive philosophical market-place conversationalist; and Diogenes was an outrageous, Lenny-Bruce-style, philosophical sociopolitical critic, and a self-styled hobo or vagrant. In these regards, Socrates and Diogenes were both *civil disobedients* in the refined MLK sense, and correspondingly they were regarded by their contemporary governments and/or power-elites as *dangerous thinkers*. As we all know, Socrates was arrested by the government of Athens, imprisoned, tried, and executed; and Diogenes was banished from Sinope for defacing the currency, and later kidnapped by pirates and sold into slavery. But neither Socrates nor Diogenes, unlike *Voltaire*, lived in the time of natural disasters like the Lisbon earthquake of 1755, which killed 30,000 people—



Voltaire in turn, directly responding to the Lisbon earthquake disaster in the light of the rationalist optimism of 18<sup>th</sup> century Leibnizian-Wolffian professional academic philosophy, carried out an act of radically enlightened philosophical civil disobedience by creating and publishing his brilliantly satirical 1759/1761 anti-professional-academic philosophy novel, *Candide* (Voltaire 1981). Kant, of course, knew about the Lisbon earthquake disaster, and had also closely read *Candide*. So in the “Practical Conclusion” to his own Voltaire-inspired satirical essay of 1766, “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elicucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics,” he wrote:



It seems more consonant with human nature and moral purity to base the expectation of a future world on the sentiments of a nobly constituted soul than, conversely, to base its noble conduct on the hope of another world. Such is also the character of *moral faith* (*moralische Glaube*).... [S]ince our fate in that future world will probably very much depend on how we comported ourselves at our posts in this world, I will conclude with the advice which *Voltaire* gave to his honest *Candide* after so many futile scholastic disputes: *Let us attend to our happiness, and go into the garden and work.* (DSS 2: 373)<sup>6</sup>

Correspondingly, in the next section, I'll apply what I think is the core radically enlightened philosophically disobedient thought in *Candide*—namely, “*il faut cultiver notre jardin*,” i.e., “we must cultivate our garden,” to our very hard leading question, namely, “As radically enlightened Kantian philosophers confronted by the double-whammy consisting of The Hyper-State, together with the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, what should we dare to think and do?,” and also to the very hard problem posed by this very hard question, namely, The New Conflict of the Faculties.

## VI. II Faut Cultiver Notre Jardin Mondial, Or, How to Philosophize During a Pandemic

The history of [*Candide*'s] world-famous phrase, which serves as the book's conclusion – *il faut cultiver notre jardin* – is ... peculiar. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, it didn't come into written use in English until the early 1930s – in America through Oliver Wendell Holmes and in Britain thanks to Lytton Strachey. But a long, unrecorded history of its oral use and misuse can be deduced from Strachey's announced desire to cure the “degenerate descendants of *Candide*” who have taken the phrase in the sense of “Have an eye to the main chance.” That a philosophical recommendation to horticultural quietism should be twisted into a justification for selfish greed would not necessarily have surprised *Voltaire*. (Barnes 2011)

In *Voltaire*'s *Candide*, the scathing critique of abstract, world-alienated, self-alienating, sanctimonious theoretical philosophy in general, and of professional academic philosophy in particular—specifically exemplified by 18<sup>th</sup> century Leibnizian/Wolffian rationalism and theodicy, or theo-idiocy, satirically represented by that iconic moralistic idiot of professional academic philosophy, Dr Pangloss—equally evocatively and provocatively concludes with the phrase “*il faut cultiver notre jardin*,” i.e., “we must cultivate our garden.” What does *Voltaire*'s world-famous phrase mean? As per the quotation at the beginning of this section, the novelist Julian Barnes aptly noted that a popular, vulgar misuse and twisting of it means “have an eye to the main chance,” that is, a “justification for selfish greed,” and then proposed that, contrariwise, its real meaning is “a philosophical recommendation to horticultural quietism.” *That* reading of its real meaning seems wrong

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<sup>6</sup> See also Kuehn (2001: 174).

to me, however, an anachronistic interpretation over-influenced by the later Wittgenstein's idea that real philosophy should only get clear on the confusions of classical philosophy as represented by mainstream professional academic philosophy, discharge all its bad pictures, engage in liberating self-therapy, and then just "leave the world alone."

Contrariwise to Barnes's Wittgensteinian contrariwise, I think that when Voltaire wrote "il faut cultiver notre jardin," fully in accordance with his radically enlightened realistically optimistic dignitarian humanism (Hanna 2020), he was really saying:

*In a world without an all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), or all-good (omnibenvolent)—aka 3-O—God, it's up to all of us to nurture everyone and everything.*

Correspondingly, Voltaire was *also* telling us to *revolutionize philosophy*, and transform it from abstract, world-alienated, self-alienating, sanctimonious theorizing into *a concrete, world-encountering, self-realizing, emancipatory, rational humanistic enterprise*: in a nutshell, *the real philosopher as a rational rebel for humanity*. Hence what Voltaire is really saying, in the context of *18<sup>th</sup> century radical enlightenment*, is essentially closer to what the early, humanistic Marx is saying in his 1844 *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts* and his 1845 *Theses on Feuerbach*—

The resolution of *theoretical* considerations is possible only through *practical* means, only through the practical energy of humanity. Their resolution is by no means, therefore, the task only of understanding, but is a *real* task of life, a task which philosophy was unable to accomplish precisely because it saw there a *purely* theoretical problem. (Marx 1964: 72)

The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world in different ways; the point is to *change* it. (Marx 1964: 69)

and to what Thoreau is saying in his 1854 *Walden*—

There are nowadays professors of philosophy, but not philosophers.... To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school, but so to love wisdom as to live according to its dictates, life of simplicity, independence, magnanimity, and trust. It is to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically. (Thoreau 1960: 9)

—than it is to what Wittgenstein is (or at least seems to be<sup>7</sup>) saying in the *Philosophical Investigations*.

That being so, how do (i) the meaning of "il faut cultiver notre jardin," (ii) Voltaire's radically enlightened critique of professional academic philosophy as abstract,

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<sup>7</sup> Although the quietist reading of the later Wittgenstein's views is the most common one—hence it's not surprising that Barnes subscribes to it—it's also at least possible to give a "Left Wittgensteinian" reading of the later Wittgenstein that emphasizes moral and political activism, and not quietism. See, e.g., (Williams 2007). In fact, even my own essay, (Hanna 2010), could be interpreted as a step in this direction. In any case, I'm grateful to Fabian Freyenhagen for making this good general point in e-mail correspondence.

world-alienated, self-alienating, sanctimonious theorizing, and (iii) his corresponding radically enlightened 18th century recommendation about real philosophy, jointly apply to *contemporary philosophy*? **First**, I think it's entirely clear that the popular, vulgar misuse and twisting of "il faut cultiver notre jardin" as "have an eye to the main chance" applies directly to the *professionalization and neoliberalization* of academic philosophy in late 20<sup>th</sup> and early 21<sup>st</sup> century liberal democratic, or not-so-liberal and and not-so-democratic States, whether in Europe, North America, or anywhere else in the world. **Second**, I think it's also entirely clear that Voltaire's radically enlightened critique of professional academic philosophy as abstract, world-alienated, self-alienating, sanctimonious theorizing applies directly to *the Ivory Bunker of professional academic philosophy in the USA in The Age of Trump* (Z aka Hanna 2016). **Third**, I think it's even self-evidently clear that Voltaire's radically enlightened recommendation about real philosophy directly applies to the three basic proposals made by members of the *Against Professional Philosophy* circle, including: (i) Robert Frodeman's and Adam Briggles's conception of [field philosophy](#) (Frodeman and Briggles 2016), (ii) Susan Haack's conceptions of *reintegration in philosophy* and [serious philosophy](#) (Haack 2016a, 2016b), and most radical of all, (iii) *borderless philosophy*, or *anarcho-philosophy*, as I've described it above. Therefore, 21<sup>st</sup> century philosophers, let's eradicate the infamy! (*écrasez l'infâme!*) that is the panglossian professionalization and neoliberalization of academic philosophy worldwide, together with the ivory-bunker-ization of professional academic philosophy in the USA in The Age of Trump, and cultivate our garden.

But that's not all. The 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic is obviously a *natural evil*, and to that extent a very bad thing for anyone and everyone who is adversely affected by it. Yet at the same time, I strongly believe that the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic is a *borderless or cosmopolitan* natural evil that demands an *unpanicked, radically enlightened, dignitarian, existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarcho-socialist* moral and political response, and not a *panicked, insular, nationalist, Statist, and merely instrumentalist (whether egoistic or utilitarian)* moral and political response. Moreover, the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic *also* vividly highlights large-scale moral and political issues such as (i) the oppressive, unfair healthcare system in the USA, (ii) massive income-disparity between the richest and the other 99%, not only in the USA but also in the rest of the world, (iii) Brexit-induced anti-EU nationalist insularity in the UK, (iv) the anti-dignitarian threats of so-called "populism" i.e., *neo-fascism*, worldwide, and other dire situations in the contemporary world, especially including (v) global poverty, (vi) the global refugee crisis, and (viii) global climate change. And finally, since the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic is being globally presented to us by The Hyper-State, we need to be able to distinguish critically and sharply between (i) what *what we really should be thinking and doing about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic*, and (ii) what *The Hyper-State, via the digital media controlled by it, is telling us to think and do about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic*.

Now what do I mean by the terminological mouthful, “radically enlightened, dignitarian, existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarcho-socialism”? Before I can explain *that*, I’ll need to define some *other* terms: *Statism*, *coercion*, and *authoritarianism*. As Kant (*MM* 6: 203-372) and Max Weber have famously pointed out (Weber 1994: 310), States possess a territorial monopoly on the (putatively) legitimate control of the means and use of coercion; and as philosophical and political anarchists have also somewhat less famously (or even downright infamously) pointed out, States are also inherently authoritarian. By *coercion* (also briefly defined, in passing, in section V above) I mean:

either (i) using violence (e.g., injuring, torturing, or killing) or the threat of violence, in order to manipulate people against their will according to certain predefined purposes of the coercer (*primary coercion*),

or (ii) inflicting appreciable, salient harm (e.g., imprisonment, termination of employment, or large monetary penalties) or deploying the threat of appreciable, salient harm, even if these are not in themselves violent, in order to manipulate people against their will according to certain predefined purposes of the coercer (*secondary coercion*).

So all coercion is a form of *manipulation*, and proceeds by following a variety of strategies that share the same core characteristic: treating people as mere means or mere things. Correspondingly by *authoritarianism*, I mean the doctrine that telling people to obey commands and do things is legitimated merely by virtue of the fact that some people (the purported authorities) have *told* them to obey those commands or do those things—“it’s right just because we say it’s right!”—and are *also* in a position to enforce this by means of coercion, not on any rationally justified or objectively morally defensible grounds. So authoritarianism and coercion per se are different things, because although all authoritarianism requires coercion, nevertheless the converse is not the case: coercion can occur without authoritarianism—e.g., if you’re threatened or attacked by some random thug on the street. Now all States are *coercive* insofar as they claim the right to compel the people living within their boundaries to heed and obey the commands and laws of the government, in order to realize the instrumental ends of the State, *whether or not* those commands and laws are rationally justified or morally right on independently ethical grounds. In turn, all States are also *authoritarian* insofar as they claim that the commands and laws issued by its government are right *just because* the government says that they’re right and possesses the power to coerce, *not* because those commands or laws are rationally justified and morally right on independent ethical grounds.

With those definitions in place as conceptual backdrop, I’m now in a good position to break down the complex phrase, “radically enlightened, dignitarian, existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarcho-socialism,” term-by-term.

1. *Radically enlightened*. See section II above.

2. *Dignitarian*. Dignitarianism, and especially the broadly Kantian version of it, says (i) that everyone, everywhere, has absolute, non-numerable, non-instrumental, innate moral value, aka *dignity*, simply by virtue of their being real persons (i.e., conscious, caring, cognizing, self-conscious rational animals with a further capacity for free will) (Hanna 2018b), and that dignity is—or at the very least, can be regarded as—a fundamental, irreducible, and therefore *primitively given* feature of persons that cannot either be erased by any bad actions or bad habits of character, or sanctified by any good actions or good habits of character, and (ii) that everyone, everywhere ought to treat themselves and everyone else with sufficient respect for their dignity.

3. *Existential*. By *existential*,<sup>8</sup> I mean the primitive motivational, or “internalist,” normative ground of the philosophical, moral, and political doctrine I defend, which is the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed life *not essentially based* on egoistic, hedonistic, or other merely instrumental (e.g., utilitarian) interests, aka *the desire for self-transcendence*, while at the same time fully assuming the natural presence—aka the *facticity*—of all such instrumental interests in our “human, all too human” lives. In a word, the existential ideal of a rational human wholehearted autonomous life is the ideal of *authenticity*.

4. *Kantian*. By *Kantian*, in this context, I mean the primitive objective, or “externalist,” normative ground of the philosophical, moral, and political doctrine I defend, which is the recognition that the fundamental, innate need we have for a wholehearted, freely-willed, non-egoistic, non-hedonistic, non-consequentialist life, which we call *the desire for self-transcendence*, can be sufficiently rationally justified only in so far as it is also a life of *principled authenticity*, by which I mean *principled wholehearted autonomy*, or having a *good will* in Kant’s sense, guided by respect for the dignity of all real persons,<sup>9</sup> under the Categorical Imperative.

5. *Cosmopolitan*. Notoriously, there is no comprehensive, analytic definition of the term *cosmopolitanism* as it is used in either ordinary or specialized (say, legal, political, or scholarly) language, covering all actual and possible cases. It is variously taken to refer to globe-trotting sophistication; to nihilistic, rootless, world-wandering libertinism; to the general idea of “world citizenship”; to a single world-state with coercive power; to a tight federation of all nation-states, again with coercive power; or to a loose, semi-coercive international federation of nation-states and related global institutions concerned with peace-keeping, criminal justice, human rights, social justice, international money flow and

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<sup>8</sup> See also, e.g., (Crowell 2012). For an extended response to the classical “formalism,” “rigorism,” and “universalism” worries about Kant’s ethics, see (Hanna 2018c: ch. 2).

<sup>9</sup> By “real person,” I mean *an essentially embodied person*, or a rational minded animal, as opposed to either disembodied persons (for example, souls) or collective persons (e.g., business corporations). On essential embodiment, see, e.g., (Hanna and Maiese 2009). And for a general theory of real personhood, see (Hanna 2018b: chs. 6-7).

investment, or world-trade, like the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the (plan for a) World Court of Human Rights, the World Bank, or the World Trade Organization (Kleingeld and Brown 2013). Nevertheless, the term “cosmopolitanism” has an original, core meaning. As Kwame Anthony Appiah correctly and insightfully points out:

Cosmopolitanism dates at least to the Cynics of the fourth century BC [and especially to Diogenes of Synope], who first coined the expression cosmopolitan, “citizen of the cosmos.” The formulation was meant to be paradoxical, and reflected the general Cynic skepticism toward custom and tradition. A citizen—a *politēs*—belonged to a particular polis, a city to which he or she owed loyalty. The cosmos referred to the world, not in the sense of the earth, in the sense of the universe. Talk of cosmopolitanism originally signalled, then, a rejection of the conventional view that every civilized person belonged to a community among communities. (Appiah 2006: xiv)

In short, the original, core meaning of *cosmopolitanism* expresses a serious critique of existing political communities and states; a thoroughgoing rejection of fervid, divisive, exclusionary, loyalist commitments to convention, custom, identity, or tradition; and a robustly universalist outlook in morality and politics, encompassing not only the Earth but also other inhabited worlds if any, and also traveling between worlds (as per, for example, *The Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy*), and, finally, the entire natural universe. By *cosmopolitan*, then, I mean the original, core meaning of that term. And, borrowing from Kant, I call the cosmopolitan universal ethical community, *The Real Realm of Ends*.

6. *Anarcho-socialism*. Finally, by *anarcho-socialism* (Hanna 2018d; Kropotkin 1910; Bookchin 1986; Bookchin 1995), I mean *philosophical and political social anarchism*, defined as follows. The thesis of *philosophical social anarchism* says that there is *no* adequate rational or moral justification for political authority, the State, or any other State-like social institution. Correspondingly, the thesis of *political social anarchism* says that we should *reject* and *exit* the State and other State-like institutions, in order to create, belong to, and sustain a real-world, *universal ethical community*, *The Real Realm of Ends*, in a world in which there are no States or other State-like institutions.

Now, finally, we’re in a position to dare to think for ourselves about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, by critically considering *a real-world thought-experiment*. Let’s consider two scenarios.

## SCENARIO 1.

In the **first** scenario, there’s a panicked, nationalist, bordered, coercive authoritarian, liberal democratic, or not-so-liberal and not-so-democratic, Statist response to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, employing all the medical and epidemiological knowledge and healthcare logistics expertise that any given State has as its command, in order to create a comprehensive plan to deal with the pandemic *only insofar as it*

*specifically affects that particular State*, a plan which is also such that, under a city-wide, state-wide, or national “state of emergency,” *individual city governments, individual provincial or state governments, and/or the central government, are granted temporary special powers, including the power to impose martial law, in order to implement it*, with individual mayors, individual state governors or leaders, and at the central level, so-called “populist” but in fact neo-fascist national leaders like Brazil’s Jair Bolsonaro, the UK’s Boris Johnson, Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, Russia’s Vladimir Putin, and the USA’s Donald Trump, etc., or even neoliberal centrists like Joe Biden, etc., acting as, in effect, *temporary military dictators* for the duration of the pandemic as it specifically affects their own countries.

## **SCENARIO 2.**

By a diametric contrast to the first scenario, in the **second** scenario, there’s an unpanicked, borderless or cosmopolitan existential Kantian dignitarian anarcho-socialist response to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, not in any way restricted to national boundaries, *employing exactly the same amount of medical and epidemiological knowledge and healthcare logistics expertise in order to create a comprehensive plan to deal with it*, and then a worldwide implementation of the plan—say, by means of a worldwide, massively expanded *Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières* operation, so let’s call it *Super-Duper Doctors Without Borders*—but no authoritarian coercion whatsoever anywhere, rather only strong recommendations and strongly-worded requests for *voluntary compliance* with the plan, and *equally as much attention* paid to dealing with the effects of the COVID-19 virus on refugees, poor people, people put out of work due to the crisis, etc., etc., anywhere in the world, as is paid to well-off people in highly industrialized nations, and also *sufficient attention* paid to dealing with *the ecological side-effects, both local and global* (Koren 2020) of implementing the comprehensive plan.

And let’s also assume that in the second scenario, no force whatsoever is ever used, *except for* minimally effective defensive and protective responses to direct attacks on individuals or groups of innocent people, especially including direct attacks on the people working for *Super-Duper Doctors Without Borders* and/or on their medical installations and equipment (Hanna and Paans 2019). Granting all that, then my question is:

From a philosophical, moral, and political point of view, which scenario constitutes an all-around better and more effective response to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic: **SCENARIO 1** or **SCENARIO 2**?

I think that it’s self-evidently and even gobsmackingly *obvious* that **SCENARIO 2** constitutes the all-round better and more effective response. In other words, we should be using **SCENARIO 2** as what Kant would call a rational practical *Idea*, that is, as a fundamental commitment of *moral faith (moralische Glaube)*, for guiding our critical thought and autonomous action about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, and therefore,

correspondingly, we should *not* allow ourselves to be bamboozled into thinking and acting according to the panicked, nationalist, coercive authoritarian, liberal democratic, or not-so-liberal and not-so-democratic, Statist response that's represented by **SCENARIO 1** and delivered to us 24-7 via the digital media controlled by The Hyper-State. So in turn, *that's* what I mean by the Kant-inspired neo-Voltairean phrase, "il faut cultiver notre jardin mondial," in the context of the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic:

*Not only must we not panic, and not only must we not complicitly, obediently, and passively allow ourselves to be told what to think and do about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic by the digital media controlled by The Hyper-State, but also we must cultivate our global garden.*

## **VII. Conclusion**

Now taking up the three radically enlightened Kantian proposals for thinking about and dealing with digital media that I made in section III, together with the proposal about political philosophy of mind that I made in section IV, and also updating the Socratic, Diogenesian, and especially Voltairean models of specifically philosophical civil disobedience in the refined MLK sense that I described in section V, together with the neo-Voltairean radically enlightened existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarcho-socialist version of Candide's famous last line, now updated to *il faut cultiver notre jardin mondial*, as applied to the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic, that I described in section VI, I'm hereby proposing that radically enlightened Kantian borderless or anarcho-philosophers should (i) wholeheartedly individually and collectively engage in a serious critical analysis of all digital media controlled by The Hyper-State, (ii) "log the fuck off" on a regular basis from digital media controlled by The Hyper-State, in order to resist their largely malign influence, (iii) wholeheartedly individually and collectively commit to subverting and dismantling the entire system of digital media controlled by The Hyper-State, (iv) wholeheartedly individually and collectively pursue political philosophy of mind, including *the mind-body politic* and *the political philosophy of cognition*, (v) like Socrates, Diogenes, and Voltaire, wholeheartedly individually and collectively engage in *emancipatory* free speech or freedom of expression, (vi) like Socrates, Diogenes, and Voltaire, wholeheartedly individually and collectively perform *counter-cultural escapes* into independent or unincorporated, *anti-* or at least *extra-*professional-academic real philosophy, and finally, (vii) as Kant-inspired neo-Voltaireans, *dare to think and act about the 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic in radically enlightened existential Kantian cosmopolitan anarcho-socialist ways*. And then, since the world in which we live, move,



and have our being, is self-evidently *a thoroughly nonideal natural and social world*, we should simply *rationally hope for the best*, or at least *for the substantially better*.<sup>10</sup>

### Kant-Text Abbreviations and English Translations

- CF* *Conflict of the Faculties*. Trans. M. Gregor. Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1979.
- CPR* *Critique of Pure Reason*. Trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1997.
- DSS* “Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics.” Trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote. In *Immanuel Kant: Theoretical Philosophy: 1755-1770*. Pp. 301-359.
- MM* *Metaphysics of Morals*. Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996, pp. 365-604.
- OT* “What Does It Mean to Orient Oneself in Thinking?” Trans. A. Wood. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 7-18.
- PP* “Toward Perpetual Peace.” Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, pp. 317-351.
- Rel* *Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason*. Trans. A. Wood and G. Di Giovanni. In *Immanuel Kant: Religion and Rational Theology*. Pp. 57-215.
- WiE* “An Answer to the Question: ‘What is Enlightenment?’” Trans. M. Gregor. In *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*. Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996. Pp. 17-22.

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<sup>10</sup> An earlier version of this essay was presented as a plenary address at the 12th *Kant-Readings* International Conference, “Kant and the Ethics of Enlightenment: Historical Roots and Contemporary Relevance,” sponsored by the Immanuel Kant Baltic Federal University’s Institute for the Humanities, Academia Kantiana, which took place in Kaliningrad, Russia, on 22-24 April 2019. I’m very grateful to the institutional sponsors of the conference and especially to its organizers: Nina Dmitrieva, Vadim Chaly, and Mikhail Zgirnyak. And I’m equally grateful to my father, Alan Hanna, for suggesting in March 2020 that I write something philosophical about the COVID-19 pandemic, which inspired me to update and extend the original essay. And I’m also very grateful to Otto Paans for suggesting in February 2021 that I use “Hyper-State” as a replacement term for “the deeper state,” which I’d used in earlier versions of this essay.

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## **Kant on Eating and Drinking**

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### **Abstract**

In this paper I analyze Kant's ideas about eating and drinking. First, I show that gluttony and drunkenness are considered ways to oppose to the duty to oneself as an animal being. Second, I claim that for Kant there is a healthy way of having meals, which consists in eating together with friends. Then I indicate that Kant accepts that one can drink at dinner parties but has to avoid drinks that lead to drunkenness and unsocial behavior. In this sense, he draws a classification of the various kinds of alcoholic drinks, according to their potential harm. Afterwards, I illustrate how Kant's own intimate life was a daily practice of his thoughts on dietetic conceptions and on what is better for digestion and health. To conclude, I mention the idea of a philosopher's medicine of the body and why a strict diet should be avoided.

### **Key words**

eat, drink, Kant, medicine, digestion

### **What is the importance of Kant's view on eating and drinking?**

Why should we care about this discussion on Kant vis-à-vis food or drink? Does it have any relation with his practical philosophy? Or does it have only biographical relevance? Does Kant's view still have any relevance for us today? Is it based on sound medicine? Should his dietetical advice be followed nowadays?

In this paper I show that Kant's remarks about the excessive use of food and drink have an importance concerning his doctrine of virtue. Gluttony and drunkenness are considered vices because they are against the duties to oneself as animal being related to the preservation of one's body.

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Kant's vision about eating and drinking also has an importance regarding the value of socialization in meals, that may lead to the improvement of social interaction and virtue. Also, his view about which foods and drinks we are to have is related to medical views. Although some are obsolete, the advice for moderation is still a valuable principle to keep one's health.

### **Gluttony, drunkenness, and the duties to oneself**

In the §5 of the *Doctrine of Virtue*, Kant claims that the human being has a duty to oneself as an animal being, that consists in preserving oneself in one's animal nature. There are many different ways of acting against this duty. One is to commit suicide; another one is mutilating oneself. Mutilation can be material or formal. Material mutilation is to deprive oneself of an organic part, such as the castration of singers or selling a tooth to be transplanted in another's mouth. However, there are some circumstances under which one can cut a part of one's body and it would not be considered mutilation. Kant claims that to "have a dead or diseased organ amputated when it endangers one's life, or to have something cut off that is a part but not an organ of the body, for example, one's hair, cannot be counted as a crime against one's own person" (TL, AA 6: 423). To cut off a part of the body that is not an organ, such as hair or nails, does not count as mutilation. Also, it is not mutilation to amputate an organ that can prevent the death of the sick person.

There is another form of mutilation, a formal one, that consists in depriving oneself "of one's capacity for the natural (and so indirectly for the moral) use of one's powers" (TL, AA 6: 421). Kant classifies excessive drinking and eating as forms of formal mutilation:

Brutish excess in the use of food and drink is misuse of the means of nourishment that restricts or exhausts our capacity to use them intelligently. Drunkenness and gluttony are the vices that come under this heading. A human being who is drunk is like a mere animal, not to be treated as a human being. When stuffed with food he is in a condition in which he is incapacitated, for a time, for actions that would require him to use his powers with skill and deliberation. It is obvious that putting oneself in such a state violates a duty to oneself (TL, AA 6: 427).

Although Kant does not specify how much of food and drink count as gluttony and drunkenness, both are considered morally wrong. Excess in eating is below human dignity, since it is a passive condition that approaches the enjoyment of cattle, without any arousal of the imagination:

Gluttony is even lower than that animal enjoyment of the senses, since it only lulls the senses into a passive condition and, unlike drunkenness, does not even arouse imagination to an active play of representation; so it approaches even more closely the enjoyment of cattle (TL, AA 6: 427)

Drunkness is considered morally wrong. Even if the act of getting drunk is a free act, it is against the consistency of freedom, because it prevents the use of the capacity to make further choices. Guyer explains the Kantian meaning of this consistence:

One thing it seems to mean is that I must make free choices on particular occasions in a way that preserves and promotes my ability to make and carry out further free choices on other occasions. To use some Kant's characteristic examples, particular decisions to commit suicide or get drunk considered by themselves would certainly be free choices - instances of setting myself "any end whatsoever" - but they would not be consistent with preserving and promoting my capacity to make and carry out further free choices (GUYER 2006, p. 187).

Even if committing suicide and getting drunk seem to be acts of extreme freedom, they lead to the opposite: the restriction of the use of one's capacity to act freely.

### **The importance of a meal in a good company**

In *Anthropology*, Kant claims that "the good living that still seems to harmonize best with true humanity is a good meal in good company" (Anth, AA 7: 278). At a dinner party, people enjoy not only food and drinks, but mutual company. Although there is this general idea that Kant was a lonely man, and even a misanthrope, his comments on the importance of banquets shows the opposite:

Eating alone (*solipsismus convictorii*) is unhealthy for a scholar who philosophizes; it is not restauration but exhaustion (especially if it becomes solitary *feasting*); fatiguing work rather than a stimulating play of thoughts. The *savouring* human being who weakens himself in thought during his solitary meal gradually loses his sprightliness which, on the other hand, he would have gained if a table companion with alternative ideas had offered stimulation through new material which he himself had not been able to track down (Anth, AA 7: 280).

Solitary meals debilitate men because they lack the stimulation of a lively discussion at the table. In accepting this important feature of a social meal, Kant asks if one can be justified in accepting the invitation for a banquet, since it is also an invitation to the use of wine, a drink that "enlivens the company conversation and in so doing makes them speak more freely" (TL, AA 6:428).

Although a banquet is a formal invitation to excess in both food and drink, there is still something in it that aims at a moral end, beyond mere physical well-being: it brings a number of people together for a long time to converse with one another. And yet the very number of guests (if, as Chesterfield says, it exceeds the number of the muses) allows for



only a little conversation (with those sitting next to one); and so the arrangement is at variance with that end, while the banquet remains a temptation to something immoral, namely intemperance, which is a violation of one's duty to oneself- not to mention the physical harm of overindulgence, which could perhaps be cured by a doctor (TL, AA 6: 428).

A banquet may be an invitation to intemperance, but at the same time it is an occasion for people to get along and have social intercourse, which is a good way to develop social virtues. There remains a casuistic question, if one should or not accept these invitations: "How far does one's moral authorization to accept these invitations extend?" (TL, AA 6: 428). Should we accept or not the invitation for the dinner parties and consequently the temptation to excess in food and alcoholic beverages? It is not clear if Kant would recommend temperance in eating during the banquets, but he would certainly advise to drink but not to get drunk, because as one reads in *Anthropology*: "Drunkenness is the unnatural condition of inability to order one's sense representation according to the laws of experience, provided that the condition is the effect of an excessive consumption of drink" (Anth, AA 7:166).

### **The classification of drinks**

Is Kant criticizing the excess of drinking or the consumption of any alcoholic beverage? In *Anthropology*, he makes a distinction among the many beverages: "All silent intoxication has something shameful in it; that is, intoxication that does not enliven sociability and the reciprocal communication of thoughts – of which opium and brandy are examples" (Anth, AA 7:170).

Here it seems that consumption of spirits and drinks that derive from narcotics such as opium deserves the strongest reprobation. In *Doctrine of Virtue*, when referring to the vice of drunkenness, he claims that this debasement, "below even the nature of an animal, is usually brought about by fermented drinks, but they can also result from narcotics, such as opium and other vegetable products" (TL, AA 6: 427). These drinks are not welcome, because while they are seductive and make men dream that they are happy for a moment, they are also followed by a bodily and mental weakness, and in the case of narcotics, by addiction.

While he is undoubtedly critical of the use of narcotics and fermented drinks, the consumption of wine is the object of a certain doubt, since it is consumed at dinner parties that have the end of bringing about moral sociability: "The use of opium and spirits for enjoyment is closer to be a base act than the use of wine, since they make the user silent, reticent and withdrawn by the dreamy euphoria they induce. They are therefore permitted only as medicines" (TL, AA 6: 428).

The acceptance of alcoholic beverages is based on their potential for bringing about social interaction. If we were to approve some sort of intoxication, be it for the purpose of sociability:

Wine, which merely stimulates, and beer, which is more nourishing and satisfying like a food, serve as social intoxication; but with the difference that drinking-bouts with beer make guests dreamier and more withdrawn, whereas at a wine party the guests are cheerful, boisterous, talkative, and witty (Anth, AA 7:170).

Between wine and beer, Kant prefers the use of wine, not only because it fosters social interaction, but also because it could strengthen virtue. At least in two texts, Kant cites Horace's praise to Cato, *virtus eius incaluit mero*, "his virtue was strengthened by wine". (TL, AA 6: 428, Anth, AA 7: 171) Apparently, he admits that could be the case.

In her article "The ultimate Kantian experience: Kant on dinner parties", Alix Cohen introduces a classification of drinks and drugs according to their relation to sociability and virtue. Wine is the first in the rank, because it induces merriness and is also good to virtue. Beer is in the second rank, because, while it is an intoxication that helps social interaction, it induces impoliteness; it is good for conversation, but bad for virtuous sociability. The worst are opium, brandy and spirits, because they "induce silence, reticence, stultifying and dreamy euphoria. Thus, they contravene sociability and conversation" (COHEN 2008, p. 318).

According to Wasianski, Kant was even more critical to beer, which he considered a "slow, but mortal drink": "he was a declared enemy of this drink, and, when a man died in the force of ages, he used to say: 'undoubtedly, he was a beer drinker'" (WASIANSKI 1985, p. 121).

### **The intimate Kant**

Kant not only defended the importance of a good meal in a good company, he also lived according to this conception, always avoiding having his meal alone. According to Jachmann,<sup>1</sup> until the age of 73, Kant had lunch at a hotel, where many important people of the Königsberg society used to join him. He was also invited to private lunches by members of the Prussian government, as well as bankers and art dealers: M von Schroetter, minister of the State; Comte Henckel von Donnersmark, the General Von Brunneck, the Duke of Holsteinbeck, the Comte of Kayserling, the bank director Ruffman; the art dealer Motherby. (JACHMANN 1985, p. 44).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Reinhold Bernhard Jachmann was director of the provincial school of Conradino auf Jenkau, near Königsberg. He was a student of Kant and his secretary from 1784 to 1794. Kant asked him four years before his death to write his biography.

<sup>2</sup> In 1980, at the French *Bibliothèque Nationale*, Jean Mistler, member of the French Academy, has found three books, printed in Königsberg, written by three members of the Lutheran church, who were also students of Kant: Borowski, Jachmann et Wasiansky. They were all about Kant's life. Jean Mistler translated and published them in 1985, under the title of *Kant intime* (Paris: Grasset et Fasquelle, 1985).

After the age of 73, Kant finally moved to a house of his own and usually invited a certain number of hosts to lunch, which was the only meal Kant used to have on a daily basis. The lunch followed the rules concerning the number of guests Kant made explicit in *Anthropology*: more than the number of graces and less of the number of muses. He also tried to have interesting but light conversation during the meal, and according to his former student Wasianski they never talked about his *Critiques*. The subjects of conversation varied from physiology, medicine, the life and habits of the people, chemistry, natural history and also politics. These gatherings followed the idea of a cultivation that Kant considered important for the spirit of Enlightenment. Also, he invited many different members of what we could call the Enlightenment society: professors, students, doctors, State employees, cultivated salesmen (WASIANSKI 1985, p.65).

The lunch's menu was composed by a three-course meal, cheese, butter, and dessert. The meal was accompanied by wine, usually a Medoc, but sometimes he also had white wine, because the red one was too astringent for him (JACHMANN, 1985, p. 47). The first course was usually a fish plate and Kant's favorite was cod. He was so fond of a good meal to the point that his friend Hippel once told him that he should write a "Critique of cooking" (BOROWSKI 1985, p. 17). For him, one of the virtues of women was to prepare a good dinner to the point that he once said that "a man, even if he is a painter or a poet, would not be happy if his wife offer him a poem or a painting instead of a dinner" (JACHMANN, 1985, p.48). This was considered a sexist view, even by women of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

### **Digestion, food, and health**

It is easy to understand that alcohol drinks could lead to a lack of control of one's own mind and then create the conditions for the weakness of the will, but how could gluttony be a moral problem? Although it can certainly lead to diseases and to the need to ask for a doctor's help, it is unclear how this could have a moral importance.

Although gluttony is considered a vice related to a duty to oneself as an animal being, not overeating seems also to be related to Kant's concerns about health, besides moral concerns.

He was very interested in medicine and was aware of some medical theories of his time, according to which to be healthy is a consequence of the equilibrium of the vital forces. Besides reading the news about discoveries in medicine, Kant has his own thoughts about the correct way to attain this equilibrium. The fact that he used to have only one meal a day is probably an important part of his own dietetic program. Another recommendation of this discipline was not to sleep after a huge meal, in order to avoid some digestion problems. The advice not to discuss hard subjects during the meal, besides the rules of etiquette, also responded to a health concern: to aid digestion. This purpose can be seen in the proposed three stages of a meal: narration, arguing, digestion. In the first one, people should talk about light subjects, such as the news of the days. In the second part, the party becomes livelier and people dispute over many subjects.

Lively discussion has also a physiological purpose, as it helps to stir up the appetite for food and drink: “a dispute arises that which stirs up the appetite for food and drink and also makes the appetite wholesome in proportion to the liveliness of this dispute and the participation on it” (Anth, AA 7: 280). After eating, mild and witty conversation should take place because arguing would take the energy that should be used for digestion:

And so, the meal ends with laughter, which, if it is loud and good-natured, has actually been determined by nature to help the stomach in the digestive process through the movement of the diaphragm and intestines, thus promoting physical well-being (Anth, AA 7: 281).

While talking about the affects that promote health mechanically Kant gives more details of the physiological process involved in laughing (Anth, AA 7: 262): the exhaling of air in laughter “strengthens the feeling of vital force through the wholesome exercise of the diaphragm” and is “a shaking of muscles involved in digestion”, in this way promoting health “far better than the physician’s wisdom would do”. Also, for elderly people, laughing is a healthful exercise. In comparing young people’s preference for drama and old people’s preference for comedy and burlesque, Kant explains why they do not appreciate the distressing and terrifying impressions of a drama:

On the other hand, with old people these impressions are not so easily blotted out, and they cannot bring back the cheerful mood in themselves so easily. By his antic a nimble-witted harlequin produces a beneficial shaking of their diaphragm and intestines, by which their appetite for the ensuing social supper is whetted and thrives as a result of the lively conversation (Anth, AA 7: 263).

Besides laughing, there are other affects by which nature promotes health mechanically. Crying and anger are among these affects that can help digestion:

Anger is also a fairly reliable aid to digestion, if one can scold freely (without fear of resistance), and many a housewife has no other emotional exercise than the scolding of her children and servants. Now if the children and servants only submit to it, an agreeable tiredness of the vital force spreads itself uniformly through her body; however, this remedy is not without its dangers, since she fears resistance by these members of the household (Anth, AA 7:261).

Kant was very concerned with digestion, not only theoretically, but also in his daily life. According to Jachmann, “he thought it was important to attain an old age, and he had a list of the older people in Königsberg and he was happy to advance in that list” (JACHMANN 1985, p. 48). In one of their last meetings, Kant told his secretary that he was very proud of what he had done to his body and “that he placed great value on what he considered a feat: having managed to maintain his health and vigor” (JACHMANN 1985, p. 51). He was extremely interested in staying healthy and having a good digestion was an important part

of that. Besides moderation in eating, he also regularly took some pills of aloes, a spoon of cinchona tincture, and a small glass of Rhum in the morning, although these last two ended up having bad outcomes. The cinchona tincture made his pulse irregular and the Rhum gave him heartburn.

Kant had a strict routine. He woke up every day at 5 am, had breakfast until 7 am, that consisted only of two cups of tea. After that, he gave courses at the University or at home. Afterwards, he worked until 12:45 in his office. He received his guests at 1 pm for lunch, and this gathering could go on until 4 or 5 pm. After lunch, he used to take a one-hour walk along the same street every day and to come home to read or prepare his courses until 10 pm, when he went to sleep. This discipline and his dietetic concerns seemed to have led Kant to attain the surprising age of 80, in a time when the expectancy of life was around 37 years old, and to remain active until nearly his last year.

In his daily routine we can find an answer to the proper use of alcoholic beverages. It is not against virtue to drink wine with moderation and use it to enliven a conversation during a meal. The criticism seems to be directed to other beverages, such as beer, besides the use of alcohol for the purpose of a lonely drunkenness.

### **The philosopher's medicine of the body**

In the speech Kant gave in the completion of his term as a Rector of the University of Königsberg, he claims that the philosopher can have a function in treating the body through reason. While “the doctor's business is to help the ailing mind by caring for the body; the philosopher's is to assist the afflicted body by a mental regimen” (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 939). One of the topics of this speech is how the powers of the mind could help to promote health, in particular a good digestion. Kant claims that “everyone knows how we can promote digestion by the emotions stirred in friendly but lively conversation, or by turning away from our meditations during dinner” (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 940).

He advises that people should free their minds from any concerns and that conversation should be an enthusiastic one:

It is healthful for the body when, at dinner, the mind is not only free from care but disposed to merriment and turned away from concentrating on any one subject. What best serves the body is conversation, amiable discussion, especially mirth breaking into hearty laughter. Here the mind exerts most strongly its force in moving the body (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 940).

In this speech, he calls attention to the aspects underscored in *Anthropology*, as well as in *Doctrine of Virtue*: a meal should encompass a light discussion and end up with a good laugh. This is not only good for the spirit, but it helps to promote health. And again, he mentions that to help the function of the body, it is not advisable to eat alone in a quiet mood, but to have a lively conversation with friends:

It is not only when the mind is free from care and serene that it aids the vital functions of the body, but also when it is stirred up, at dinner, by the sport and jests of conversation—when, to enliven the gathering, the guests enter into a contest, and the enthusiasm and exertion of the conversationalists rises to the limits of an affect (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 949)

The interaction of people at dinner or lunch increases the vital forces of the body by the excitement of the mind. Among the doctors of his time, Kant expressed his partiality for the system of John Brown, the Scottish doctor, whose methods, according to Mary Gregor, “are said to have killed more people than the French Revolution and the Napoleonic wars combined (including its founder, who died of an overdose of his favorite remedies, opium and whisky)” (GREGOR 1992, p.191). According to John Brown, life is a forced state, resulting from the presence of exciting powers. If the exciting powers are withdrawn, the human being dies. Following this principle, diseases are classified between sthenic and asthenic diseases, the first ones resulting from the excess of excitement, the second, due to deficient excitement.

Having Brown’s system in mind, Kant will not advice strict temperance while eating. Even though Kant criticizes gluttony, he was not for a strict diet that keeps one always hungry: “It is true, he says, that the sort of intemperance that indulges the body alone is most to be avoided, and Horace in particular says: the body burdened with yesterday vices... But wisdom does not require us to cheat ourselves, in step motherly fashion, and waste away by frugality” (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 950).

Whilst people should void gluttony, Kant stresses the importance of having a proper meal, although this could cause some stomach discomforts. Even if people have digestion problems, Kant advise them to eat for the purpose of not weakening the forces of the body: “so it is particularly relevant that someone can become, as it were, intemperate on fasting, because of certain discomforts that generally go along with a full stomach” (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 942). Kant also had some discomforts related to digestion, according to his biographers. However, his opinion is that one has to tolerate these digestive problems, without lessening the right amount of food: “my opinion”, he says, “is that one should eat to satiety at least once a day, and put up with the resulting discomfort until the body’s strength has increased” (Rektoratsrede, AA 15:942).

Eating less than one needs is worse for the body than overeating. The body’s balance cannot be attained by an abstemiousness that makes one always hungry and sub-nourished:

So the imminent philosopher Mendelssohn was forced to observe strict temperance because of the many bodily infirmities from which he suffered. But, as we have heard, in trying to keep his mind in good shape for his studies, he went beyond temperance to such abstemiousness that he kept himself always hungry, so as to avoid the slight and usually transitory discomforts of the stomach that follow a proper meal (Rektoratsrede, AA 15: 950).

Mendelssohn died in 1786. The question of what caused his death was debated in the newspapers of Berlin and Hamburg. According to Mary Gregor, some blamed Jacobi for that, because he has criticized Lessing for being an atheist, mocker and hypocrite, and made some unprincipled use of Lessing comments on Spinoza. Mendelssohn felt obliged to refute the attack on his friend: “Mendelssohn produced his reply quickly, so as to erase the impression Jacobi had made, and the strain so weakened him that he died of a cold he caught while delivering his reply to the publisher” (Gregor 1992, p.205).

Kant was aware of this debate, but he did not impute his death to any philosophical discussion, no matter how unkind:

Eulogizers of that great man Mendelssohn put the blame for his death on one or another of the learned man who got him involved in a dispute with them. In my judgement, however, no one should be accused of such an atrocious crime. What was at fault was, rather, the very way of life of that much-lamented man (Rektorsrede, AA 15: 942)

Kant finally attributed the death of Moses Mendelssohn to a mistake in his diet, because he followed a diet based on strict temperance and abstemiousness: “By this, however, he so weakened the forces of his body, that the sort of every-day injury, that would hardly affect someone properly nourished, shattered and killed that much-lamented man, exhausted by excessive temperance” (Rektorsrede, AA 15: 951).

It is important to consider that, against excesses, Kant defends moderation, and in the case of food he rejects fasting, considering that satiety is preferable at least at one meal a day, as was his habit.

Kant’s remarks inform us about his philosophy more generally in interesting ways and help us rethinking the moral value of consumption today. He points to a wise use of food and drink, that correctly nourishes the body, without the excess of consumption, and prevent us to follow a diet that will not give enough nutrients for the body.

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## *Phenomenalism and Kant*

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### **Abstract**

Readings of Kant's *Critique* as endorsing phenomenalism have occupied the spotlight in recent times: ontological phenomenalism, semantic phenomenalism, analytical phenomenalism, epistemological phenomenalism, and so on. Yet, they raise the same old coherence problem with the *Critique*: are they compatible with Kant's Refutation of Idealism? Are they able to reconcile the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition with the Refutation of the second, since Kant repeatedly claimed that he never changed his mind in-between the two editions of his *Critique*? This paper addresses the key question: was Kant a phenomenalist and, if he was, in which precise sense? I propose a metaphysical but not ontologically reductionist reading of Kant as a phenomenalist. I argue for the following claims. To be sure, for Kant appearance is mere representation. Yet, appearance is representation only insofar as we take "appearance" in the *empirical sense*, namely the way that the mind-independent existing noumenon appears in space and, crucially, when we take "representation" in the transcendental sense, namely the mind-dependent way that we can cognize the same mind-independent existing noumenon. How shall I argue in defense of my alternative reading? First, I argue that my reading is pretty much compatible with Kant's Refutation (in contrast to the rivals). Second, I argue that my reading reconciles the causal with the intentional readings of the Refutation. Third, I argue that my reading makes the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition and the Refutation of Idealism of the second completely compatible.

### **Key-words**

Ontological Phenomenalism; Analytical Phenomenalism; Semantic Phenomenalism; Epistemological Phenomenalism; Empirical Sense; Transcendental Sense; Metaphysical Phenomenalism without Reductionism.

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## Introduction

It is common currency in scholarship that Kant was rejecting Berkeley's ontological phenomenalism when he wrote his *Refutation of Idealism*: if the existence of something outside *mere representations in me* is required for the determination of the consciousness of my existence in time, *esse cannot be percipi*, things outside exist mind-independently, and, therefore, they cannot be reduced to mere representations. The only open question is whether Kant changed his mind in-between the first edition (Fourth Paralogism) and the second edition (*Refutation*). Those scholars who claim that Kant changed his mind usually also claim that in the first edition Kant was defending a sophisticated form of old Berkeleian ontological phenomenalism. To be sure, claim those readers, Kant was not endorsing Berkeley's naïve claim that *esse est percipi*, that is, the existence of outside things is nothing but the existence of mere representations in us. Still, he was endorsing what Van Cleve (2002) has recently called "analytical phenomenalism," namely the thesis that the notion of object is reducible to a rule-governed synthesis of mental representation in accordance to concepts.

Yet, entirely new readings of Kant's phenomenalism have recently emerged. By identifying appearances and representations, Kant never had ontological phenomenalism in mind (either naïve or analytical). Regarding this, at least two complementary proposals are worth mentioning. The first is what Jankowiak (2014) has called "semantic phenomenalism." Appearance is mere representation only in the sense that we can only refer to "mental representations" or in the sense that we can only refer to mind-dependent things. The second is what we may call here "epistemological phenomenalism." Appearances are mere representations only in the sense that we have cognitive access only to mind-dependent things, or mental representation. Indeed, the rejection of ontological phenomenalism is pretty much in line with Kant's blunt reaction to the Feder-Garve Göttingen review in the second edition of the *Critique* in his *Prolegomena* and in his *Correspondence*. However, the old exegetical problem remains untouched: if ontological phenomenalism is in fact incompatible with Kant's *Refutation*, the new readings also seem to be; after all, if we only refer to/know representations, how can Kant support his claims in his *Refutation* that this "persistent" thing, presupposed by the empirical consciousness of my own existence in time, cannot be an "intuition in me?"<sup>1</sup> Something has gone amiss.

This paper addresses the question: was Kant a phenomenalist and, if he was, in which precise sense? Following the new trend in Kant's scholarship I resolutely reject the ontological or analytical readings of Kant's phenomenalism: reality is not a mind-made rule-governed rejection of mental representation in accordance to empirical concepts and categories.<sup>2</sup> Yet, in opposition to the new trend I propose a metaphysical reading of Kant's phenomenalism as follows. To be sure, appearance is nothing but a mere representation. Still, I hold that appearance is representation but *only insofar as we take "appearance" in the empirical sense*, namely the way that the underlying noumenon appears to us as persistent in space. Even more crucially, mental representations are nothing but appearances *but only insofar as we take "representation" in the*

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<sup>1</sup>See Allais 2004, p. 662.

<sup>2</sup>The traditional idea that reality is mind-made by a synthesis rule-governed by categories is a tenet of the intellectualist reading of the *Critique*. Against this view see Pereira (2013; 2017)

*transcendental sense*, namely as the mind-dependent way that we can cognize the same mind-independent existing noumenon as appearance; or so I shall argue.

I argue in defense of my alternative metaphysical reading of Kant's phenomenalism abductively, namely as the inference to the best explanation. First, I argue that my reading is pretty much compatible with Kant's Refutation (in contrast to the two rivals). Second, I argue that my reading reconciles the causal with the intentional readings of the Refutation of Idealism. Finally, I argue that my reading makes the Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation compatible.

After this brief introduction, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In the next two sections I present and discard two main readings of Kant's phenomenalism (on similar grounds). Then, I briefly present my own view. In the subsequent two sections I argue in detail for my view.

### Semantic Phenomenalism

As a general claim, Kant's alleged phenomenalism is the thesis that appearances are nothing but "mere representations." Now, even recognizing that Kant's alleged phenomenalism is controversial in Kant's scholarship, the textual evidence casts no doubt about this claim.<sup>3</sup> The only remaining question is how we should understand such identification. The Feder-Garve Göttingen review seems to suggest that Kant's phenomenalism is nothing but the transcendental restatement of Berkeley's view:

1) Ontological Phenomenalism: *esse est percipi*.

Claim 1) expresses the most extreme form of subjectivism and solipsism: real is what appears to us as real. However, Van Clave (2002) is (conditionally) right: if Kant embraces ontological phenomenalism, this takes a sophisticated form:

2) Analytical Phenomenalism. External reality is mind-made in the relevant sense that the concept of object is nothing but a rule-governed synthesis of mental representations in accordance with concepts.

Interestingly, the mainstream scholarship is willing to accept (2), but is unprepared to accept (1); after all, that is what Kant seems to say in his famous passages at A104-105 and at B242-243 when he talks about the object.<sup>4</sup> Yet, on closer inspection, the only relevant ontological difference between (2) and (1) is the additional claim that *reality is mind-made*. As reality is the *esse*, what (2) adds to (1) is that reality (the object) emerges only when the mind's intellectual activities manage to unify representations in accordance to conceptual rules. *Before* such activity, there is only a chaotic manifold of sensation devoid of reference. Is that really what Kant had in mind?

I do not believe so. Be that as it may. Ontological phenomenalism is not my concern here. I limit myself to observing that ontological phenomenalism clashes completely

<sup>3</sup>The claim is repeated *ad nauseum* in both editions of his *Critique* and in several Reflections published right after the publication of the second edition of the *Critique*. Here are just a few passages in which he clearly refers to phenomenalism as a general claim: A490/B518; A104; B164; A492/B521; Refl. AA, 17: 688, R4723; Refl. AA, 18: 379, R5902; Refl. AA, 18: 612, R6312; Refl. AA, 18: 673, R6342; Refl. AA, 18: 673, R6342; Refl. AA, 18: 687.

<sup>4</sup>We will come back to this point.

with the results of the Refutation. How can Kant claim at the same time that he has proven the existence of persistent things that are not “intuitions in me,” if those things are unities of “mere representations” in accordance to rules? Indeed, defenders of Kant’s ontological phenomenalism are willing to recognize the contradiction. That is why they famously claim that Kant changed his mind in-between the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition and the Refutation of the second.<sup>5</sup>This blatant contradiction and Kant’s blunt reactions to the Feder-Garve Gottingen review have invited new readings of Kant’s phenomenalism. What did Kant have in mind when he claimed repeatedly that appearance is mere representation, if he was not endorsing, albeit in a sophisticated way, Berkeley’s infamous tenet that *esse est percipi*?

Recently, two suggestions have come under the spotlight in the recent debate over Kant’s phenomenalism, namely the semantic and epistemological readings. The first suggestion is to construe Kant’s identification between appearance as a claim about semantic reference and ontological commitment. In a recent paper, Jankowiak (2017) suggests the following reading of Kant’s phenomenalism:

- 3) Semantic Phenomenalism. The only things to which the subject can make *content-laden reference* in experience are the subject’s own representations. (2017, p. 209, emphasis added)

By identifying appearances with representations Kant is claiming that we can only refer to mind-dependent entities (the own subject’s mental representations). According to Jankowiak, semantic phenomenalism does not entail ontological phenomenalism (couched either in sentence 1) or in sentence 2)). What paves the way from 3) to ontological phenomenalism is the following additional claim:

- 4) Presence Phenomenalism. The only things that are immediately present to consciousness are sensations.

According to him, though, presence phenomenalism is not a Kantian doctrine (see 2017, p. 209). Yet, if we assume semantic phenomenalism--again the assumption that we can only make content-laden reference to our own representations--it is hard to see how we avoid presence phenomenalism, that is, the “Cartesian theater” or the “veil of ideas,” ensuring that we do refer directly to mind-independent things. Be that as it may. Without assuming presence phenomenalism, Jankowiak sustains that semantic phenomenalism only entails what he calls:

- 5) Epistemological Phenomenalism. *Knowledge* of physical things is exhaustively *knowledge* of their ways of appearing, i.e. of the ways they do and would appear to us under various conditions. (2017, p. 167, emphasis added)

Forster (2008), Chiba (2012), Oberst (2018), and Stang (2018) presented quite similar proposals as readings of Kant’s phenomenalism. The idea is quite clear. By identifying appearance with representations Kant is not endorsing any Berkeley-like ontological reduction of external reality to representations. Rather, what he is claiming is we can only cognize (whatever it is) mind-dependently. To be sure, Kant’s phenomenalism

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<sup>5</sup>Regarding this, see Guyer 1987.

contains this epistemological claim. The only question is whether that is all that Kant has in mind when he identifies appearances with representations. I do not believe that this is the case and in the remainder of this paper I shall argue that Kant's phenomenalism has a clear unequivocal metaphysical commitment.

Now, regardless of whether epistemic phenomenalism entails "semantic phenomenalism" or not, Jankowiak's suggestion raises a red flag. It is false that the subject can only refer to his own representations in Kant's theoretical philosophy. There are a number of passages in which Kant clearly states that mental states *do refer to things in themselves* rather than to anything mental.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, Jankowiak may like it or not, but what he calls "the content-laden reference to mind-independent things in themselves" is exactly what Kant aims to prove in his Refutation: the acknowledgement of the mind-independent existence of noumena is the ultimate condition for the consciousness of my own experience in time.<sup>7</sup>

But Jankowiak's proposal raises another red flag. The idea that we can only make content-laden reference to our own mental representations ends up *reifying the notion of mental representation*, as if it were the very object of cognition. That opens up the doors to the old ontological phenomenalism: the object of our human cognition turns out to be a logical construction built out of those mental representations, namely a *necessary unit of those mental representations* in accordance to conceptual rules.

### Epistemological Phenomenalism

Oberst (2018) offers a much more interesting way of reaching an epistemological reading of Kant's phenomenalism. Phenomenological phenomenalism is a Cartesian claim (viewed from Kant's own perspective, of course) according to which only cognitive access to states of one's own mind can be taken as *certain*, while cognitive access to outer objects is *uncertain*. Kant retains from Cartesianism what he finds valuable for his critical project, namely the transcendental divide between appearances and things in themselves and the claim that we can only have certain cognitive access to appearances, but certainly not to things as they exist in themselves. Cartesian epistemology is supposed to be the combination of two claims. Oberst summarizes

<sup>6</sup>See B XXXIX, 121n, AA, 18: 230, R5554, AA, 18:416 Refl 5984, and so on.

<sup>7</sup>See again B XXXIX, 121n, AA, 18: 230, R5554, AA, 18:416 Refl 5984, etc. Perhaps the clearest statement by Kant on this is the following: "Now since in inner sense everything is successive, hence nothing can be taken backwards, the ground of the possibility of the latter must *lie in the relation of representations to something outside us*, and indeed to something that is not itself in turn mere inner representation, i.e., form of appearance, *hence which is something in itself*." (AA, 18: 612, R6312, emphasis added)

Moreover, epistemological phenomenalism does not even imply any sort of semantic phenomenalism either. Even if I have only cognitive access to my own mental representations, to what appears to me inside my mind, it does not follow that we can only make content-laden reference to those mental representations. Let's put Kant aside for a moment. An epistemological phenomenalist who claims that we have only epistemic access to our own mental representations (to our own mind) is much like an envatted brain that has only epistemic access to proximal stimulations. Given this, let us consider again Putnam's famous mental experiment and consider an envatted brain, that is, one with epistemic access only to the proximal stimulation that the unscrupulous scientist produces in it. The question is: assuming the envatted brain has only cognitive access to proximal stimulation, whenever it experiences or thinks, does it refer only to those proximal stimulations? The answer is certainly not in light of the best causal and externalist theories of reference available in contemporary semantics. Regardless of what it knows, it always refers to the distal cause of its proximal stimulation. The lesson that we learn from semantic externalism is that cognitive access does not determine semantic reference!

Kant's alleged Cartesian heritage in two claims: (a) "cognition of empirically inner objects can be certain, (b) cognition of outer objects is necessarily uncertain." (2018, p.179)

Yet, Oberst's great insight into his epistemological reading of Kant's phenomenalism is to be found in Kant's own remark about the ambiguity of the phrase "outer thing" in his Fourth Paralogism of the first edition of the *Critique*. As Oberst reminds us, in his Fourth Paralogism, Kant's phenomenalism is his way of addressing the idealist skeptic of Cartesian provenance, namely by disambiguating the notion of an "outer object." This can mean that something is either empirically or transcendently outside us. In his own words: "Empirically outer objects are outer appearances in space; transcendently outer objects are things in themselves." (2018, p. 175)

The way that Kant addresses the challenge is not supposed to be a mystery. Let me recap. The idealist skeptic claims that we cannot cognize things outside us, but only things inside us because such cognition is not immediate, but rather relies on the problematic causal inference: the existence of outside things is the probable cause of the mental representations we have of them. Therefore, there is no way of justifying this causal inference, which remains "problematic." Oberst reconstructs the putative skeptic idealist's causal argument as follows:

I-Cognition of objects that can be only causally inferred is never certain.

II-Cognition of outer objects is cognition of objects that can be only causally inferred.

III-Thus, cognition of outer objects is never certain. (2018, p. 181)

However, in arguing so, the skeptic mistakes the empirical sense of the phrase "things outside us" with the transcendental one (*sophisma figurae dictionis*); or so Kant argues. In the empirical sense, outside us are things that we encounter in space without the need to transcend the bounds of the mental realm. We have immediate cognitive access to them as mere mental representations in us. In contrast, in the transcendental sense, outside us are things in themselves, that is, noumena in the negative sense. To be sure, Kant concedes to the idealist skeptic that we cannot cognize the underlying nature of things outside us in the transcendental sense. Yet, because we do not need to transcend the bounds of the mental realm, the way is open for the cognition of outside things in the empirical sense, namely bodies in space. Yet, Oberst claims that Kant also possesses a version of the causal argument:

Cognition of objects that can be only causally inferred is never certain.

Cognition of transcendently outer objects is cognition of objects that can be only causally inferred.

Thus, cognition of transcendently outer objects is never certain. (Oberst 2018, p. 181)<sup>8</sup>

According to Oberst, Kant's epistemological phenomenalism is a cluster of three key claims:

(A) Cognition of empirically inner objects can be certain.

(B) Cognition of empirically outer objects can be certain.

(C) *Determinate* cognition of transcendently outer objects is necessarily uncertain, *whereas indeterminate* cognition can be certain. (Oberst, 2018, p. 181)

<sup>8</sup>Here Oberst is following what Chignell calls the "causal refutation." See Chignell 2010, p. 506. Just like Chignell, I have serious concerns about the "causal refutation."

However, it is hard to follow Oberst here and believe that Kant could have his own version of the causal argument, unless we assume he changed his mind completely in the second edition with the Refutation.<sup>9</sup> First, Kant never claimed that we can *cognize* things in themselves either as *certain* or as *uncertain*. The most that Kant explicitly admits in his Refutation is the following claim:

The consciousness of the existence of things in themselves is a condition for the consciousness of the time-order of my own mental states and, hence, a condition for the consciousness of my own existence in time.

Second, even when we assume the so-called “causal reading” of Kant’s Refutation (“causal refutation”), nowhere does Kant claim that cognition of transcendently outer objects is cognition of objects that can be only causally inferred. On the contrary, Kant claims crystal clear that awareness of the temporal determination of my own mental states is at the same time awareness of things outside me, things in themselves outside intuitions/representations in me.

Finally, if cognition of noumena is *uncertain* insofar as it can only be inferred from the cognition of mental states, then the only things to which the subject directly refers to in experience are his own representations. Yet, in this way, we are again reifying representations as a realm apart from noumena and end up embracing the two-objects view of Kant’s transcendental idealism. The question is: how can Kant avoid the skeptic idealist regarding the outside world? If we assume that the cognition of noumena is uncertain or problematic, the only alternative is to reduce the outside world to representations (ontological phenomenalism). Again, the object of our human cognition turns out to be a logical construction built out of those mental representations, namely a *necessary unit of those mental representations* in accordance to conceptual rules.

### Non-reductionist Metaphysical Phenomenalism

I believe that Oberst is on the right path, but barking up the wrong tree. The ambiguity between two different ways of understanding “things outside me” is indeed the key to opening the doors to Kant’s phenomenalism. Nonetheless, the ambiguity not only concerns “outer thing,” but it naturally extends itself to the very notion of “representation.” “Representation” can also be taken in two different senses. First, in the empirical sense, “representation” means a mental state in time (as in Kant’s Refutation). Yet, second, in the transcendental sense, “representation” means that we can only cognize something in a mind-dependent way (that is the main meaning in the A-Deduction and in the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition). Given this, let me start by rephrasing both Kant’s phenomenalism and ontological phenomenalism:

(6) Kant’s Phenomenalism: appearance *in the empirical sense* (what appears in space) is mere representation *in the transcendental sense* (what we can mind-dependently cognize).

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<sup>9</sup>Yet, I cannot enter into this debate here for a question of space. All I retain from the “causal refutation” is the idea that the noumenon affects the mind (in the empirical sense). This affection results in appearances in the empirical sense. See Chignell’s criticism in 2010.

To start with (6) does not entail (7):

(7) Ontological Phenomenalism: the object of appearance *in the empirical sense* is logical constructions built out of representations *in the empirical sense*, namely a synthetic unity of mental representations in accordance to conceptual rules.

If “representation” in the transcendental sense means what we can cognize mind-dependently, we are not allowed to infer from the fact that we cannot cognize mind-independently (anything beyond our representations) *in the transcendental sense* that the object of our cognition is logical constructions built out of representations *in the empirical sense* (namely a synthetic unity of mental representations in accordance to conceptual rules). The inference of (7) from (6) is a further case of *sophisma figurae dictionis*: the word “representation” in (6) is taken *in the transcendental sense*, while in (7) it is taken *in the empirical sense* (a mental state in time). I believe that it is all we need to distinguish Kantian phenomenalism (stated in 6) from the Berkeleian varieties (stated in 7). The lurking question is: is (6) pure epistemological phenomenalism without any metaphysical commitments as Oberst suggests?

I do not believe that this is the case. For one thing, appearance (*Erscheinung*) is always *appearance of something that appears*. Likewise, “representation” (*Vorstellung*) is always the presentation of something else before the mind. Thus, what appears in the empirical sense in space is always the appearance of something existent in itself, the noumenon. By the same token, representation in the transcendental sense is representation of something essentially unknown, the noumenon again. Regarding this, there are two ways of reading (6) in the literature. We either assume the so-called two-objects view or the two-aspects view. According to the first possibility:

(6’) Kant’s Phenomenalism: appearance *in the empirical sense* is mere representation *in the transcendental sense* and both are distinct from the noumenon.

According to the second reading that I am proposing here:

(6’’) Kant’s Metaphysical/Epistemic Phenomenalism. Appearance *in the empirical sense* is mere representation *in the transcendental sense* because (i) in the empirical sense appearance is the way that the noumenon appears to us in space and (ii) in the transcendental sense representation is the mind-dependent way that we know the noumenon.<sup>10</sup>

In both claims Kantian phenomenalism is not a purely epistemological view. It is a doctrine that is metaphysically loaded. In both cases we are committed to the existence of unknown noumena. The only difference is that in (6’’) appearance, representation, and noumenon are ontologically identical and irreducible to each other; while in (6’) noumenon is different from both appearance and representation. Now, what paves the way from 1) to 2) [ontological reductionism] is just the one-object view couched in (6’). In other words, it is by assuming that appearance and representation, on one hand, and noumenon, on the other, are numerically different things that we invite the thought that if we cannot know the noumenon, we can at least know its “surrogate,” namely a logical

<sup>10</sup>About Kant’s Idealism, see Pereira (2018a ; 2019a ; 2019b).



construction built out of mere representations, i.e. a synthetic unity of representations in accordance to rules. In contrast, if we stick to (6''), there is no threat of reductionism: appearance *in the empirical sense* is representation *in the transcendental sense* because both are the same thing *an sich* that appears in space and is only cognized mind-dependently.

But why does Kant use both expressions: “appearance” and “representation?” Well, the answer is quite clear. Kant uses “appearance” whenever he wants to stress the *metaphysical grounding*: appearance is the way that the noumenon appears in space. In contrast, he uses the expression “representation” whenever he wants to stress that we can only cognize that noumenon mind-dependently. Kant’s phenomenalism thus has complementary metaphysical and epistemic sides.

### Metaphysical Phenomenalism and the Fourth Paralogism

Again, since the Cartesian skeptic idealist is a transcendental realist in the first place (A369), the skeptic is challenging us to prove that we have *cognition* of things outside us, in the transcendental sense, of things in themselves, rather than in the empirical sense, of mere representations in the outer sense. And all parties in the debate agree that such cognition is impossible for Kant: it is beyond the bounds of the senses. The question is how Kant’s controversial statements of A370 must be understood:

The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito, ergo sum. For because he allows this matter and even its inner possibility to be valid only for appearance - which, separated from our sensibility, is nothing - matter for him is only a species of representations (intuition), which are called external. (A370)

On closer inspection, by saying that matter is just a representation in us, Kant is not endorsing ontological phenomenalism. Again, “representation” here must be understood in the transcendental rather than in the empirical sense, that is, as the mind-dependent way that we cognize the mind-independent existing noumenon. By claiming that matter is just a mere representation in us, Kant is only trying to persuade the skeptic idealist that “matter” (A370) is nothing but the mind-dependent way that we cognize the mind-independent thing in itself.

Therefore, my reading of Kant’s phenomenalism is the one that best fits the argument of the Fourth Paralogism of the first edition. But what can we say about the key controversial passages of A104-105 and B242-243?

What does one mean, then, **if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition (Erkenntnis)**? It is easy to see this object must be thought of only as something in general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that we could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it.

We find, however, that our thought of the relation of all cognition (Erkenntnis) to its object carries something of necessity with it, since namely the latter is regarded as that which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily rather than being determined a priori, since insofar as they are **to relate to an object our cognitions** must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it, i.e., have that unity that constitutes the concept of an object. (A104-105, emphasis added)

If we investigate what new characteristic is given to our representations by **the relation to an object**, and what is the dignity that they thereby receive, we find that it does nothing beyond making the combination of representations necessary in a certain way, and subjecting them to a rule... (B242-243, original emphasis)

Is Kant thereby stating that *the object* is nothing but a rule-governed synthesis of mental representations in accordance to concepts? That is only the case if we assume that “representation” is taken here in the *empirical sense* of the mental states of a person. However, if “representation” is taken here in the transcendental sense (and appearance in the empirical sense), what we have is something quite different. What Kant is stating is that the fact-awareness (*cognition/Erkenntnis*) of what appears in space simultaneously or successively as necessarily connected relies on categories as the ultimate principles of the lawlike connection of appearances.<sup>11</sup> Kant’s claim is not that *reality is mind-made*, but rather that the *cognition* of the mind-independent existing reality *an sich* is mind-dependent on categories of human understanding.<sup>12</sup>

### Metaphysical Phenomenalism and the Refutation

Some scholars are willing to agree that Kant is closer to ontological phenomenalism in the Fourth Paralogism of the A-edition, but insist that this is completely different in the B-edition. The underlying assumption is that Kant changed his mind probably after the attack of the Göttingen Feder-Garve Review.

Regardless of whether Kant changed his mind or not, one thing is for sure: ontological phenomenalism is incompatible with the Refutation of Idealism. Now, is the metaphysical reading of Kant’s phenomenalism (6’) compatible with the Refutation of Idealism? That is what I will argue for now (i). I shall also argue in addition (ii) that (6’’) is the only reading of Kant’s phenomenalism that makes the causal and the intentional readings of Kant’s Refutation compatible and (iii) that (6’’) is the reading of Kant’s phenomenalism that best makes the Refutation in the second edition compatible with the Fourth Paralogism. Let me briefly recap the steps in the Refutation:

- i. I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. (B275)
- ii. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. (B275)
- iii. But this persisting element cannot be an intuition in me. For all the determining grounds of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as such they themselves need something persisting distinct from them, in relation to which their change, and thus my existence in the time in which they change, can be determined. (Bxxxix)
- iv. Thus, the perception of this persistent thing is only possible through a **thing** outside me and not through the mere **representation** of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence

<sup>11</sup>Kant’s examples leave no doubt that he is concerned with representation in the transcendental sense = appearances in the empirical sense:

“If the cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being were now changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red...” (A100)

<sup>12</sup>This mind-dependent cognition of the mind-independently existing reality in accordance to the categories of the understanding is what Kant calls “nature:”

“Thus we ourselves bring into the appearances that order and regularity in them that we call **nature**, and moreover we would not be able to find it there if we, or the nature of our mind, had not originally put it there. For this unity of nature should be a necessary, i.e., certain unity of the connection of appearances. (A125, original emphasis)

in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (B275–B276, original emphases)

v. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore, it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me. (B276)<sup>13</sup>

Let me start with claim (i). For the defense of the compatibility between (6'') and the argument of the Refutation, besides the first note, steps (iii)-(v) are also crucial. In (iii), Kant makes the famous addendum in the preface: “this persisting element cannot be *an intuition in me*” (Bxxxix, emphasis added). In (iv), he reiterates the same by stating that: “the perception of this persistent thing is only possible through a thing outside me and not through *the mere representation* of a thing outside me” (B275–B276, emphasis added). As I have already remarked, the very same idea reappears in several Reflections right after the publication of the second edition of the *Critique*.<sup>14</sup>

The question now is: why is the addendum in the preface Bxxxix needed? The answer is quite clear from the very text itself: to avoid an infinite regress. Now, this step only makes sense if “representation” is understood in the empirical sense as a mental state in time (rather than in the transcendental sense). Again, that is what my metaphysical reading of Kant’s phenomenalism in (6'') stresses: one should never confuse the empirical with the transcendental sense of “representation.” Let us suppose that this persistent thing in space were a mere “intuition in me” (representation in the empirical sense). Yet, as a mere representation in me, it would also be in time and, hence, would also require a “determining ground” and hence indefinitely, representation after representation. The only way of stopping the infinite regress is to assume that the cognition of my own representations in the empirical sense in time presupposes the existence of noumena (that empirically appear as persistent in space). Thus, the consciousness/cognition of my own existence in time forces me to acknowledge the mind-independent existence of a thing in itself.

It is worth noting that in the Refutation, Kant is not stating that some putative mind-independent *cognition* of outside things (in the transcendental sense) is a condition for the determination of consciousness of my existence in time. In contrast, he talks merely about “the *consciousness of the existence* of actual things” (B276) as a condition for the consciousness of my own existence in time. We cognize only “representations” in the transcendental sense, but as the way the noumena appear to us as persistent things in space. Thus, metaphysical non-reductionist phenomenalism is quite compatible with the

<sup>13</sup>About Kant’s Refutation, see Pereira (2018b ; 2019b ; 2020).

<sup>14</sup>We remain in the world of the senses [crossed out: however], and would be led by nothing except the principles of the [crossed out: law] understanding that we use in experience, but we make our possible progression into an object in itself, by regarding the possibility of experience as something real in the objects of experience. (Refl 5642, AA, 18:280–1)

We must determine something in space in order to determine our own existence in time. That thing outside of us is also represented prior to this determination as noumenon. (Refl 5984, AA, 18:416)

Now since in inner sense everything is successive, hence nothing can be taken backwards, the ground of the possibility of the latter must lie in the relation of representations to something outside us, and indeed to something that is not itself in turn mere inner representation, i.e., form of appearance, hence which is something in itself. The possibility of this cannot be explained. Further, the representation of that which persists must pertain to that which contains the ground of time-determination, but not with regard to succession, for in that there is no persistence; consequently that which is persistent must lie only in that which is simultaneous, or in the intelligible, which contains the ground of appearances. (Refl 6312, AA, 18:612)

Refutation. Even if I can only cognize mind-dependently (representation in the transcendental sense), I must still acknowledge that what I cognize mind-dependently exists mind-independently.

Let me focus now on the defense of my claim (ii). According to the causal reading of Kant's Refutation of Idealism, in order for us to make justified judgments about the mere temporal order of our inner states, those states must be caused by the successive states of objects in space outside us.<sup>15</sup> As I have argued against Oberst, that reading *prima facie* seems to contradict claims in the criticism of Cartesian idealism; after all, in the Refutation Kant claims that we experience outer things directly rather than indirectly, namely as the result of some problematic causal inference from our putative immediate experience of our inner experience.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the overwhelming evidence (quoted above) clearly indicates that the acknowledgment of the mind-independent existence of the noumenon is what is required for the temporal determination of our representations in time.

Has the so-called "causal refutation" got everything wrong? I do not think so. If we have in mind that representations can be taken both in the empirical and in the transcendental sense as (6'') suggests, we can hold on to the claim that the mind-independent existent noumena is the "cause" or the ultimate ground of the temporal determination of our representations in the empirical sense (as mental states), and we can also hold on to the claim that we can only cognize them mind-dependently as a representation in the transcendental sense, namely as persistent in space.

Let me focus finally on my last claim (iii). Besides being compatible with both the Fourth Paralogism and the Refutation of Idealism, my metaphysical non-reductionist phenomenalism (6'') is the reading that best harmonizes the most reasonable reading of the Fourth Paralogism with the widely shared reading of the Refutation (without assuming that Kant changed his mind in-between the two editions).

In the Fourth Paralogism, Kant tries to persuade the Cartesian external-world skeptic that we do possess direct epistemic access to material things, because material things are nothing but representations in the relevant transcendental sense. In contrast, in his Refutation he attempts to prove that representations in the relevant empirical sense presuppose noumena insofar as they are time-determined.

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<sup>15</sup>Guyer 1987 and Dicker 2008 have prominently championed the "causal refutation." The details of the debate are beyond the scope of this paper. However, I am less interested in the causal relation between appearances in space and mental states in time, but rather in the causal relation between noumena and representations in the empirical sense.

<sup>16</sup>Chignell criticizes the causal refutation on the grounds that it is a posteriori. See Chignell 2010, p. 506.

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**La apercepción cosmológica y los confines del yo**  
*Cosmological Apperception and the Boundaries of the Self*

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**Resumen**

La Reflexión de Leningrado, desde su publicación en 1986, ha llamado la atención principalmente por la introducción de la apercepción cosmológica, cuya función en el sistema kantiano no es del todo clara. Usualmente, la interpretación del concepto ha sido condicionada por la lectura de la Reflexión como una modificación de la Refutación del Idealismo, de lo que es buen ejemplo el trabajo de Claudia Jáuregui (2001). En este ensayo, argumento que esta lectura no puede dar cuenta de todas las innovaciones a las que Kant parece estar apuntando en este texto y que, por el contrario, relacionarlo con ciertos avances en el *Opus Postumum* con respecto a la auto-afección lleva no sólo a una comprensión más rica de la apercepción cosmológica, sino también a un argumento innovador frente al idealismo.

**Palabras clave**

Reflexión de Leningrado, Opus Postumum, Apercepción cosmológica, Auto-afección

**Abstract**

The Leningrad Reflection, since its publication in 1986, has attracted attention mostly due to the introduction of cosmological apperception, the role of which in the Kantian system is not entirely clear. Usually, interpretation of the concept has been conditioned by reading the Reflection as a modification of the Refutation of Idealism, of which the work of Claudia Jáuregui (2001) is a good example. In this essay, I argue that this reading cannot account for all the innovations that Kant seems to be pointing at in this text and that, on the contrary, relating it to certain advances in the *Opus Postumum* regarding self-affection leads not to only to a richer understanding of cosmological apperception, but also to an innovative argument against idealism.

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**Key words**

Leningrad Reflection, Opus Postumum, Cosmological Apperception, Self-affection

1. *Introducción*<sup>1</sup>

La Reflexión de Leningrado (RL) (propriadamente Loses Blatt Leningrad I) ha llamado la atención desde su publicación en 1986 en parte por ofrecer lo que parece ser una modificación del argumento de la Refutación del Idealismo (RI), pero principalmente por una particular innovación terminológica, la de incluir la apercepción cosmológica:

Uno debe diferenciar la apercepción pura (trascendental) de la *apperceptio percipientis* empírica, de la *aperceptiva percepti*. La primera dice simplemente yo soy. La segunda, yo era, soy y seré, esto es, soy una cosa del tiempo pasado, el presente y el futuro, en donde esta conciencia, yo soy, es común a todas las cosas como determinación de mi existencia como magnitud. Esta última es la cosmológica, la primera es puramente psicológica. La *apercepción* cosmológica, que considera mi existencia como magnitud en el tiempo, me pone en relación con otras cosas, que ya son, fueron y serán [...] (RL R22-26)<sup>2</sup>

El misterio que parece contener el término ha invitado a las más diversas interpretaciones,<sup>3</sup> pero ninguna, que yo sepa, ha intentado relacionarlo con los trabajos tardíos de Kant en el *Opus postumum*, donde vuelve a examinar muchos de los mismos problemas. En consecuencia, en este artículo, partiré de la interpretación que hace Claudia Jáuregui de RL, a mi manera de ver la más cuidadosa, y señalaré las limitaciones que tiene por depender en exceso de los trabajos previos de Kant, específicamente de la RI (sección 2). Después, dada la frecuencia con que el tema de la auto-afección aparece tanto en RL como en las obras posteriores, daré un breve mirada al problema del sentido interno como auto-afección en la Deducción Trascendental, que es, hasta donde sé, el tratamiento más

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<sup>1</sup> La idea inicial para este ensayo se gestó durante el seminario *Mujeres intérpretes de Kant* que dictó Catalina González Quintero el segundo semestre del 2019 en la Universidad de los Andes, en Bogotá, Colombia. Además de este impulso inicial, tengo una profunda deuda de gratitud con Catalina por sus repetidas lecturas del manuscrito e innumerables recomendaciones. Estoy en deuda también con los revisores anónimos de *Con-textos Kantianos*, en especial por sus sugerencias sobre las traducciones de pasajes del *Opus Postumum* (cuyos defectos, por supuesto, siguen siendo responsabilidad mía).

<sup>2</sup> Las traducciones al español de la Reflexión de Leningrado y del *Opus Postumum* son mías (ayudado, para la primera obra, por la traducción al francés y, para la segunda, por la traducción al inglés citadas en la bibliografía). Las traducciones al español de la primera Crítica son las de Mario Caimi. Para las referencias a RL, cito primero si es el Recto (R) o Verso (V) de la página y luego los números de línea.

<sup>3</sup> Oroño (2015 ; 2017) y Couto-Soares (2004), pese a que el texto parece indicar todo lo contrario, atribuyen a la apercepción cosmológica un carácter *a priori*; Seel (2013), cercano a lo que yo espero indicar, argumenta que representa un avance en la teoría kantiana en tanto principio de unificación entre el mundo sensible y el intelectual, mientras que Green (2010) ve el nombre, en relación con la actitud de Kant ante la prueba cosmológica, como una declaración del carácter aporético de la apercepción y Carl (2006) lo ve como un argumento en torno al posible uso de indexicales.



cuidadoso que del tema hizo Kant, esperando encontrar allí más información sobre la síntesis pura del tiempo y su relación con la autoconciencia (sección 3), a lo que seguirá un examen de pasajes claves del *Opus postumum* (sección 4). Para terminar, ofreceré un esquema de lo que podría ser una nueva interpretación de la Reflexión de Leningrado: mi lectura, expresada escuetamente, es un intento por darle pleno sentido a la expresión *apercepción cosmológica* a la luz de las modificaciones que, a la largo de la obra de Kant, fue sufriendo la concepción de la auto-afección; estos cambio parecen llevarlo a una postular una nueva variante de la conciencia a priori que de sí mismo tiene el sujeto como ente en el mundo (*Weltwesen*), lo que lo obliga a precisar todavía más la naturaleza del yo empírico como aquel que se percibe simultáneamente con otras entidades en el mundo (sección 5).

## 2. *La Reflexión de Leningrado y la Refutación del Idealismo, primer intento (según Claudia Jáuregui)*

Poco después de introducir la apercepción cosmológica, Kant ofrece lo que, a ojos de Jáuregui, es el argumento central de RL:

La simultaneidad no es una determinación de la realidad con respecto al *percipientis*, sino al *percepti*, pues la simultaneidad sólo es representada en lo que puede ser percibido hacia atrás igual que hacia adelante, lo que no puede ser la existencia [*Daseyn*] del *percipientis*, que sólo puede ocurrir sucesivamente, esto es, hacia adelante. (RL R 27-30)

Tomando esto como punto de partida, es natural asumir, como lo hace Jáuregui, que RL vendría a ser una nueva versión del argumento de RI, pero apelando a la noción de simultaneidad en vez de a la de permanencia (Jáuregui 2008: 292-293). La pregunta sería, entonces, qué tanta diferencia habría entre ambas versiones del argumento; según veremos, para Jáuregui, es más bien poca.

Jáuregui propone que tomemos la afirmación de que “De manera inmediata no soy un objeto para mí mismo, sino sólo aquél que percibe un objeto” (RL R 32) como equivalente a la “conclusión escéptica” de RI; esto es, debemos entender esta afirmación como proveniente la creencia kantiana (que discutiremos en un par de párrafos) de que el flujo de la conciencia que aparece en el sentido interno no permite la aplicación de la categoría de la sustancia, sin la cual no es posible sintetizar algo que pueda ser objeto de la experiencia. Ahora, nos dice Jáuregui, si las categorías del entendimiento no pueden aplicarse al múltiple dado en el sentido interno, tampoco puede realizarse la síntesis de la apercepción, en tanto ésta depende del reconocimiento de la unidad del acto sintético que es la aplicación de las categorías. No tendríamos, en otras palabras, conciencia o experiencia alguna si dependiésemos de manera exclusiva del sentido interno; para que la

conciencia surja, entonces, hace falta que nos sean dadas intuiciones en el sentido externo, en el espacio, a las que sí resulte posible aplicar las categorías. Una vez haya objetos sintetizados en el sentido estricto, podríamos, supone Jáuregui, experimentar de alguna manera el contraste entre lo objetivo y lo meramente subjetivo, contraste que vendría marcado por la posibilidad de una aplicación plena de la categoría de sustancia, que permite la percepción de simultaneidad, en contraste con el carácter por completo sucesivo de la experiencia dada en el sentido interno (Jáuregui 2008: 296-298).

La misma Jáuregui acepta que su interpretación transforma el argumento central de RL en una reelaboración de RI que poco agrega a la ya ofrecida en la segunda edición de la Crítica. Sin embargo, afirma que sí hay algo novedoso en RL y que esta novedad viene indicada por el bautizo de la apercepción empírica como cosmológica, en tanto el nombre indica que “the empirical consciousness of our existence in time is not only given in *correlation* with the consciousness of the external world, but it involves also the consciousness that *we are part of it*” (Jáuregui 2008: 298), interpretación que defiende apelando a RL V 4-6: “Soy consciente de mí mismo en tanto ente del mundo [*Weltwesens*] inmediata y originalmente, y justamente sólo por ello es mi propia existencia [*Daseyn*] determinable, sólo como fenómeno, como una magnitud en el tiempo”. Si bien estoy de acuerdo con que este énfasis en mi existencia dentro del mundo resulta una innovación con respecto a la Crítica, creo que por eso mismo estamos obligados a preguntarnos si no debe haber también una innovación en el argumento. Quiero decir, si el argumento de RL es idéntico al de RI, ¿por qué llegaría Kant a una conclusión distinta? Si la lectura de Jáuregui es correcta y la experiencia que tiene el sujeto de sí mismo no es la de un objeto en sentido estricto, sino la de una especie de pseudo-objeto<sup>4</sup> que se manifiesta con unos parámetros de constitución distintos, ¿qué justificación tendría Kant para llevar todavía más lejos su conclusión y creer que había demostrado que el sujeto no es un observador externo del mundo sino una entidad esencialmente mundana? Espero poder ofrecer algunas pistas para responder estas preguntas en la conclusión de este ensayo, pero, antes, debemos aclarar qué razones tiene Jáuregui para leer RI como obligándonos a asumir una conclusión escéptica sobre la experiencia en el sentido interno.

Buena parte de la lectura que hace Jáuregui de RI depende de su intento por resolver un aparente contradicción entre ésta y la Primera Analogía de la Experiencia, contradicción que bien puede resumirse así: en la Primera Analogía, Kant parte de la imposibilidad de determinar la diferencia entre el orden temporal subjetivo y el objetivo dependiendo sólo del orden de la experiencia y concluye que, si esta diferenciación se da, ha de ser porque la síntesis objetiva depende de la categoría de sustancia, que determina a un objeto como perdurando en el tiempo y, en esa medida, indica que el orden de la percepción pudo haber sido distinto (A182-183/B225-226). Ahora, agreguemos a esto que Kant acepta la muy clásica doctrina de que el cambio sólo puede percibirse como una

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<sup>4</sup> Tomo esta expresión de Jáuregui (2001), en que, partiendo de RI, concluye la imposibilidad de aplicar las categorías a la experiencia interna.

alteración de aquello que permanece y concluiremos que, para que haya experiencia de un cambio, tiene que haberse sintetizado algo como sustancia (A184/B227) o, por ponerlo en términos de la tesis en la edición A de la Analogía, el cambio sólo puede percibirse como una alteración de la sustancia. Pasemos ahora a RI: el argumento de Kant, en líneas generales, establece que, si el sujeto tiene experiencia de sí mismo, ha de haber algo sustancial que permita dicha experiencia (hasta aquí, sigue a la perfección lo establecido en la Analogía), pero, como nada hay de sustancial en la experiencia que de sí tiene el sujeto en el sentido interno, dicha sustancialidad ha de provenir del sentido externo y, por lo tanto, debe existir algo por fuera del sujeto para que el sujeto tenga una experiencia de sí mismo (B275-276). El problema, según lo señala Jáuregui, está en que la tesis de la Analogía en A establece que todo cambio ha de ser una alteración de la sustancia, pero, en este caso, nada hay de sustancial en el sujeto de lo que los cambios en el sentido interno puedan ser alteraciones, o, de lo contrario, el sujeto podría percibirse a sí mismo sin tener que apelar al sentido externo (Jáuregui 2018: 51).

El problema se soluciona, nos dice Jáuregui, si prestamos la debida atención a la modificación en la Analogía B, en la que Kant afirma que la sustancia es aquello “in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearance can be determined” (B225); en otras palabras, el alcance de la tesis de Kant se ha extendido a afirmar que los cambios pueden darse no sólo como alteraciones de las sustancias como tales, sino también en relación con ellas, sin que esto implique de manera necesaria que pertenezcan como accidentes a la sustancia (Jáuregui 2018: 51-52). Esto, sin embargo, no implica que Kant haya rechazado la conclusión de la Analogía A; muy por el contrario, la dejó presente en la segunda edición. Jáuregui soluciona el problema argumentando que la extensión de la tesis es posible porque Kant distingue dos maneras de percibirse el cambio, una tal que los cambios sean percibidos como objetivos, en cuyo caso tendrían que ser accidentes de una sustancia (esto es, corresponder con la tesis formulada en A), y otra en que los cambios se den sólo *en relación con* una sustancia, en cuyo caso podrían corresponder a una serie temporal subjetiva (y caerían entonces bajo la extensión propuesta en B) (Jáuregui 2018: 53-54). Es de aquí que se sigue la conclusión escéptica que nos interesaba rastrear: si hemos de evitar que la conclusión de la Analogía A nos lleve a postular (a la luz de RI) una sustancialidad contradictoria tras los cambios en la experiencia que de sí tiene el sujeto en el sentido interno, tenemos que aceptar que esta experiencia es la de un pseudo-objeto en tanto no está sintetizado por las categorías del entendimiento: “La ‘experiencia’ interna no es pues un genuino autoconocimiento, porque no responde a las condiciones que requiere la constitución de un orden propiamente objetivo” (Jáuregui 2018: 54-55).

¿Es ésta la única manera posible de darle sentido a RL? Según espero demostrar, hay otra que no sólo no nos lleva a una conclusión escéptica, sino que nos permitirá entender la noción de apercepción cosmológica como un verdadero avance en la filosofía kantiana. Sin embargo, para llegar a ella, tendremos que hacer un breve excursus a través de la naturaleza del sentido interno.

3. *El sentido interno como auto-afección del entendimiento*<sup>5</sup>

En una nota al párrafo 24 de la Deducción B, Kant se queja de no entender “cómo se puede encontrar tanta dificultad en que el sentido interno sea afectado por nosotros mismos” y pasa a explicarlo con los actos de atención: “Todo acto de *atención* puede darnos un ejemplo de ello. El entendimiento determina siempre, en él, al sentido interno de acuerdo con el enlace que él piensa, de modo que llegue a producirse una intuición interna que corresponda al múltiple de la síntesis del entendimiento” (B156-157n; énfasis en el original). Para darle plena fuerza a esta tesis, hace falta agregar un par de detalles. Empecemos por señalar que, para Kant, al sentido interno no parece serle dado un múltiple que pueda ser sintetizado por sí mismo con independencia del espacio: “Por consiguiente, no es que el entendimiento *encuentre* ya en éste [el sentido interno] un enlace tal de lo múltiple, sino que lo *produce*, al *afectarlo*” (B155; énfasis en el original); al sentido externo, en cambio, sí le es dado dicho múltiple, a través de la intuición, que, además, puede sintetizarse *a priori* para proveernos de conocimiento (en la geometría, por ejemplo):

Esta *síntesis* de lo múltiple de la intuición sensible, que es posible y necesaria *a priori*, puede llamarse *figurativa (synthesis speciosa)* [...]. (B151; énfasis en el original; cf. B160n)<sup>6</sup>

Sin entrar a debatir la diferencia precisa entre la *synthesis speciosa* y la *intellectualis* (problema que exigiría otro artículo), vale la pena recalcar que la primera establece, con toda claridad, que lo múltiple de la intuición sensible efectivamente puede sintetizarse *a priori*. Esta posibilidad es la que permite la construcción de conceptos espaciales que fundamenta el conocimiento geométrico; lo interesante aquí es que, a ojos de Kant, el objeto singular se construye *a priori* a partir de lo dado al sujeto en la intuición pura, y por ello permite conclusiones universales (B741-742). Esto es, el entendimiento sintetiza el múltiple espacial *a priori* dado al sentido externo, mientras que, en el caso del sentido interno, esto no parece posible.

La razón para esta diferencia no es del todo clara, pero encontramos una indicación, muy relacionada con lo ya mencionado en la discusión de RI, en B68:

La conciencia de sí mismo (apercepción) es la representación simple del Yo; y si sólo por ella fuera dado, *espontáneamente*, todo lo múltiple en el sujeto, entonces la intuición interna sería intelectual. En el ser humano, esta conciencia requiere

<sup>5</sup> El problema tratado en esta sección es tan amplio como oscuro; aquí me limitaré a señalar algunas tesis centrales, sin entrar en discusiones de detalles. Para más información, recomiendo la lectura de Dyck (2006) (a quien debo cuanto haya de claridad en mi exposición) y Schmitz (2015).

<sup>6</sup> Para la posibilidad de una síntesis *a priori* de la intuición pura, véase también A78-79/B104: “Lo primero que debe sernos dado *a priori* para el conocimiento de todos los objetos, es lo *múltiple* de la intuición pura; la *síntesis* de esto múltiple por la imaginación es lo segundo[.]” (énfasis en el original).

percepción interna de lo múltiple que es previamente dado en el sujeto; y la manera como esto [múltiple] es dado en la mente sin espontaneidad, debe llamarse, en virtud de esta diferencia, sensibilidad. (énfasis en el original)

Juntando las secciones recién mencionadas, creo que podemos construir el siguiente argumento explícito sobre lo múltiple en el sentido interno: sabemos, dado el argumento de la Deducción, que, si tenemos conocimientos universales y necesarios como la geometría y la aritmética, es porque poseemos intuiciones *a priori* del espacio y el tiempo (cf. B15-16). En el caso de la geometría, esto es posible porque el sentido externo aporta un múltiple dado *a priori* (en el espacio) al que es posible aplicar las categorías. Sin embargo, si intentásemos aplicar esto al caso del sentido interno, resultaríamos en posesión de un objeto dado *a priori* en el tiempo y sintetizado por las categorías y, dado el presupuesto inicial de RI, ya sabemos que ésta es una posibilidad que Kant niega.<sup>7</sup> La pregunta es, entonces, de dónde puede provenir el múltiple *a priori* en el tiempo (que sirve, por ejemplo, de fundamento para la aritmética) si no ha de ser dado por el puro sentido interno; la única respuesta plausible, que explicaremos apelando a la Deducción B, es que el sentido interno opere sólo sobre lo múltiple dado en el espacio (esto es, en el sentido externo):

Lo que determina al sentido interno es el entendimiento y la facultad originaria de éste, de la enlazar lo múltiple de la intuición, es decir, de someterlo a una apercepción (en la cual descansa la posibilidad misma de él). Ahora bien, como el entendimiento, en nosotros los humanos, no es, él mismo, una facultad de intuiciones, y a éstas, aunque estuvieran dadas en la sensibilidad no puede él acogerlas *en sí* para poder enlazar aquello que entonces vendría a ser lo múltiple de la intuición propia *de él*, resulta que la síntesis de él, cuando se lo considera a él únicamente por sí mismo, no es nada más que la unidad de la que él es consciente, como tal [acción], aun sin la sensibilidad, [acción] por la que él tiene el poder de determinar internamente la sensibilidad con respecto a lo múltiple que a él puede serle dado de acuerdo con la forma de la intuición de ella. El entendimiento, entonces, bajo la denominación de *síntesis trascendental de la imaginación*, ejerce sobre el sujeto *pasivo* cuya *facultad* es él [mismo], aquella acción de la cual decimos, correctamente, que por ella es afectado el sentido interno. (B153-154; énfasis en el original).

Simplificando un poco, el punto de Kant parece ser que la intuición *a priori* dada al sentido interno es el resultado de reconocer la unidad del acto sintético por medio del cual el entendimiento realiza la síntesis figurativa de lo múltiple. Dado que dicho reconocimiento es la apercepción pura (B132), se sigue que la intuición pura dada al sentido interno es producto de la apercepción en tanto reconoce como producida por su espontaneidad la unidad de la intuición espacial. Si tenemos esto en cuenta, el ejemplo de la línea resulta especialmente claro:

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<sup>7</sup> Tal vez sea posible interpretar B68 no como dependiendo del mismo presupuesto que RI, sino como ofreciendo un argumento a su favor, pero esto exigiría un ensayo aparte.

[N]i tampoco [podemos representarnos] el tiempo, sin prestar atención, en el *trazado* de una línea recta (destinada a ser la representación figurativa externa del tiempo), meramente a la acción de síntesis de lo múltiple, por la cual determinamos sucesivamente el *sentido interno*, y [sin prestar atención] por ese medio a la sucesión de esta determinación en él. El movimiento, como acción del sujeto (no como determinación de un objeto), y en consecuencia, la síntesis de lo múltiple en el espacio, cuando hacemos abstracción de éste y sólo atendemos a la acción por la cual determinamos el sentido interno de acuerdo con la forma de él, es incluso lo que produce, ante todo, el concepto de la sucesión. (B154-155; énfasis en el original)

Cuando dibujo una línea, me percató de la multiplicidad de actos por medio de los cuales sintetizo cada nuevo trazo para continuar percibiendo la línea como una en vez de como diversas entidades de distinta longitud creándose *ab nihilo* a cada momento; pero, por supuesto, para que esta unificación de diversos múltiples espacio-temporales resulte posible, deben ellos mismos ser sintetizados como actos relacionados con la unidad del “yo pienso”. La acción del yo que es esta segunda síntesis llevaría a que el sujeto se afectara a sí mismo justamente en tanto realiza un acto de síntesis cuya unidad depende de la suya; de ahí que la intuición dada al sentido interno sea el resultado de la auto-afección.

En cierta medida, lo anterior, en caso de ser una interpretación correcta, ya contiene el germen de RI; sin embargo, hay un elemento que resulta problemático: a lo largo de la Deducción, Kant insiste en que hay dos clases de apercepción, la pura, que corresponde con el mero reconocimiento del “yo pienso” que puede acompañar todas mis representaciones, y la empírica, en que yo me soy dado como una mera apariencia (B132), pero, en los pasajes antes citados, Kant parece abrir la posibilidad a que el sujeto se afecte a sí mismo (esto es, produzca un múltiple para el sentido interno) partiendo sólo de la forma de la intuición, lo que implicaría otra especie de apercepción, que no corresponde con el mero reconocimiento de las representaciones como mías del yo trascendental, pero que tampoco es empírica en sentido estricto, en tanto correspondería a un sujeto que se afecta a sí mismo en la síntesis trascendental de la imaginación. Apelando a lo que hemos venido diciendo en esta sección, podríamos describir la auto-afección como la intuición pura que el sujeto tiene de sí en tanto intuye su propia actividad sintética operando *a priori* sobre el espacio. En tanto todo aquello que intuye es puro, no correspondería al sujeto empírico, pero tampoco correspondería con el yo trascendental en tanto éste es condición de posibilidad para cualquier síntesis, mientras que esta nueva apercepción sólo es posible cuando intuyo la actividad sintética del sujeto. Sospecho que el haberse percatado de esta posibilidad fue lo que llevó a Kant a reelaborar el argumento de RI en RL, pero, antes de entrar en RL como tal, debemos pasar por el *Opus postumum* para encontrar evidencia de que Kant sí fue consciente de este posible nivel intermedio de la apercepción.

#### 4. El sentido interno y el yo cosmológico en el *Opus postumum*

Toda una sección del *Opus postumum*, intitulada por los editores *Selbstsetzunglehre*, está dedicada a reconsiderar, una y otra vez, el acto de conciencia en que el yo se pone a sí mismo (*selbst setzen*). Si bien de fragmento en fragmento hay variaciones, creo que es posible extraer una doctrina general, que, en alguna medida, aparece resumida en XXII:413:

El primer acto de conocimiento es el verbo [*verbum*]: Yo soy, la conciencia de sí mismo, pues yo [en tanto] sujeto soy un objeto para mí: -Aquí ciertamente hay una relación que antecede a toda determinación del sujeto: a saber, la de la intuición con el concepto, en la que el yo se duplica; esto es, en tanto yo me ponga a mí mismo [*mich selbst setze*], [el sujeto] es tomado de dos maneras: por un lado, en tanto cosa en sí (*ens per se*) y, por el otro, como objeto de la intuición, específicamente u objetivamente en tanto apariencia o como constituyéndome a mí mismo *a priori* como una cosa, esto es, como una cosa en sí misma.

La conciencia de sí mismo (*apperceptio*) es un acto por medio del que el sujeto en general hace de sí mismo un objeto. No es todavía una *percepción* (*apprehensio simplex*), esto es, una representación sensible, para la cual se requiere que el sujeto sea afectado por un objeto cualquiera, lo que haría de ésta una intuición empírica, sino [que es] una intuición pura, que, bajo las denominaciones del espacio y el tiempo, contienen [*sic*] meramente lo formal de la composición (*coordinatio et subordinatio*) de lo múltiple de la intuición [...].<sup>8</sup>

A primera vista, el comienzo de esta sección no parece añadir nada nuevo a lo que ya sabemos desde la primera Crítica: debe diferenciarse el puro acto intelectual de la apercepción trascendental de la apercepción empírica, en que me soy dado como objeto. El segundo párrafo, sin embargo, introduce una nueva distinción en la apercepción del sujeto como objeto. Ésta sería el resultado de una síntesis de la pura intuición, que podríamos, siguiendo nuevamente lo expuesto en la sección 3, explicar como la auto-afección del sujeto que sintetiza la intuición formal del espacio, lo que no llevaría a la síntesis de un objeto como tal (esto es, no habría percepción de sí mismo), pero sí a una conciencia formal del sujeto como afectable (sensible, si se quiere) en el espacio y tiempo. Más

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<sup>8</sup> Der erste Act des Erkenntnisses ist das Verbum: Ich bin das Selbstbewustseyn da Ich Subject mir selbst Object bin: — Hierin liegt nun schon ein Verhältnis was vor aller Bestimmung des Subjects vorhergeht nämlich das der Anschauung zu dem des Begriffes wo das Ich doppelt d.i. in zwiefacher Bedeutung genommen wird indem ich mich selbst setze d.i. einerseits als Ding an sich (*ens per se*) zweytens als Gegenstand der Anschauung und zwar entweder objectiv als Erscheinung oder als mich selbst *a priori* zu einem Dinge constituirend d.i. als Sache an sich selbst.

Das Bewustseyn seiner selbst (*apperceptio*) ist ein Act wodurch das Subject sich überhaupt zum Objecte macht. Es ist noch keine Wahrnehmung (*apprehensio simplex*) d.i. keine Sinnenvorstellung zu welcher erfordert wird daß das Subject durch irgendeinen Gegenstand afficirt werde und die Anschauung empirisch wird sondern reine Anschauung die unter den Benennungen von Zeit und Raum blos das Formale der Zusammensetzung (*coordinatio, et subordinatio*) des Manigfaltigen der Anschauung enthalten [...].

evidencia de esto puede encontrarse en XXII:418,<sup>9</sup> donde Kant retoma la síntesis *a priori* de la pura espacio-temporalidad, XXII:421,<sup>10</sup> donde considera la posibilidad de sintetizar objetos de la intuición *a priori* como mera forma, XXII:77-78,<sup>11</sup> donde retoma la conciencia intuitiva pero trascendental de sí mismo en el marco de la intuición formal *a priori* del espacio y el tiempo e introduce también una terminología que facilitará nuestra exposición: lo *cogitabile* como la mera unidad conceptual y lo *dabile* como la síntesis de la intuición a la luz de un concepto, que bien puede ser, como en el caso del espacio, el tiempo, y el nivel intermedio de la apercepción, trascendental. A esto bien podríamos agregar, para mantener la unidad terminológica, lo *datum*, en tanto síntesis conceptual realizada sobre la experiencia, como objeto dado *a posteriori*. En XXII:79, Kant retoma los términos *cogitabile* y *dabile* y los aplica al caso específico de la apercepción, asegurándose de aclarar que me conozco como intuición pura *a priori*:

Para mí mismo, soy un objeto del pensamiento (*cogitabile*) y de la intuición (*dabile*), en primer lugar como de una representación *pura* (no empírica); este conocimiento se llama conocimiento *a priori* y contiene en sí un principio de la conexión de la multiplicidad de estas representaciones en tanto lo *formal* de esta unidad, independientemente de toda percepción en tanto lo material de las representaciones. (énfasis en el original)<sup>12</sup>

La misma apercepción pura del sujeto como intuición aparece en XXII:81-81 y XXII:83-84.

A todas éstas, sin embargo, no hemos especificado mayor cosa en qué consistiría esa intuición formal que de sí mismo tendría el sujeto. La Selbstsetzungslehre, hasta donde veo, no va más lejos que afirmar la evidente conclusión de que no puede haber un conocimiento

<sup>9</sup> Zuerst daß wir ein Manigfaltiges der Anschauung unserer selbst setzen Zweytens in sofern wir etwas ausser uns setzen wovon wir afficirt werden d.i. als Erscheinung im Raume und der Zeit drittens daß der Verstand das Manigfaltige der Anschauung nach einem Princip synthetisch setzt [...] und zur durchgängigen Bestimmung fortschreitet Das *determinabile* ist das Ding an sich ist das durch den Verstand gegebene u. Synthetisch *a priori* der Form nach gesetzte (*dabile*) das Manigfaltige der Anschauung das *abignabile*.

<sup>10</sup> Sich einen Gegenstand der Anschauung zu setzen nicht der Sinnenanschauung empirisch sondern dem Formalen nach *a priori* Raum u. Zeit.

<sup>11</sup> Das erste was der Vorstellungskraft gegeben ist, ist Raum und Zeit und das Daseyn der Dinge im Raume und der Zeit als des Inbegriffs (*complexus*) eines auf zwey Seiten unendlich verbreiteten Manigfaltigen der Anschauung. Die Gegenstände dieser Vorstellung sind nicht existirende Dinge (*non sunt entia*) aber eben so wenig auch Undinge (*non entia*) denn sie sind nicht Gegenstände der Wahrnehmung objectiv ausser dem Vorstellenden sondern unsere Vorstellung selbst sondern nur subjectiv in der Vorstellung desselben gegeben ihre unbeschränkte Größe ist nicht Allgemeinheit (*vniversalitas conceptus*) sondern die Allheit (*ommitudo complexus Vniversitas*) nicht ein blos denkbare Ganzes nach Begriffen (*cogitabile*) sondern als Gegenstand gegeben (*dabile*) [...]

Das Bewustseyen seiner selbst (*apperceptio*) in so fern es afficirt wird ist die Vorstellung des Gegenstandes in der Erscheinung in so ferne es aber das Subject ist was sich selbst afficirt so ist es auch zugleich als das Object an sich = X anzusehen.

<sup>12</sup> [I]ch bin mir selbst ein Gegenstand des Denkens (*cogitabile*) und der Anschauung (*dabile*) zuerst als reiner (nicht empirischer) Vorstellung welches Erkenntnis ein Erkenntnis *a priori* heißt und ein Princip der Berknüpfung des Mannigfaltigen dieser Vorstellungen als das F o r m e l e dieser Einheit unabhängig von aller Wahrnehmung als das Materiale der Vorstellungen in sich enthält [...]



determinado en la auto-conciencia, en tanto esto exigiría un *datum* que sintetizar, sino que, en tanto mero *dabile*, es la forma en general en que un sujeto se concibe como objeto (cf. XXII:87). Sin embargo, hay algunas pistas, que por fin nos acercarán al misterio de la apercepción cosmológica y, con ello, a la interpretación de RL, en la sección que los editores han dado en llamar “¿Qué es la filosofía trascendental?”.

En esta sección, nos encontramos con fragmentos a los que Kant mismo ha dotado de títulos y es sorprendente la frecuencia con que los títulos apuntan a una nueva concepción de la filosofía trascendental como partiendo de tres principios básicos: Dios, el mundo, y el sujeto (cf. XXI:24, 32, 34, 59). Dado que no será esencial para lo que aquí nos concierne, dejemos de lado qué exactamente entiende Kant por Dios.<sup>13</sup> El mundo, por su parte, es un principio de la razón, pero relacionado con la sensibilidad: es la unidad de la suma de todo aquello que puede ser dado como apariencia en el espacio y el tiempo; esto es, el mundo es el principio que garantiza la unidad de la totalidad de nuestras experiencias (cf. XXI:21, 24, 30).

Pasemos, entonces, a lo que más nos interesa: el sujeto:

Entre todas las características que a un ente pensable corresponden, la primera es ser consciente de sí mismo como persona, en concordancia con lo que el sujeto [...] se constituye a sí mismo *a priori* como objeto, pero no como en la apariencia, [...], sino como ser que es fundador [*Begründer*] y creador de su propio ser según la cualidad de ser personalidad, según el *yo soy*. En tanto humano, para mí mismo, soy un objeto sensorial en el espacio y tiempo y, simultáneamente, un objeto del entendimiento. (XXI:14)<sup>14</sup>

Tal vez no se aleje mucho de la filosofía trascendental como se manifiesta en las Críticas afirmar que el sujeto, en tanto sabe de sí mismo en la pura apercepción, se reconoce como cosa en sí, por fuera del alcance de la categoría de la causalidad y, en consecuencia, libre, aunque esta libertad no sea más que un concepto negativo. La diferencia relevante, según creo, está en que, en el *Opus postumum*, Kant afirma que un componente esencial de este autoconocimiento incluye sabernos *a priori* objetos libres, entidades que son un *dabile* espacio-temporal a la vez que una cosa en sí:

Dios, el mundo, y lo que a ambos piensa en relación real el uno con el otro: el sujeto como ser-en-el-mundo [*Weltwesen*] racional.

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<sup>13</sup> Sospecho que, como índice XXI:14, Dios es por encima de todo un principio garante de la universalidad del deber ético, pero eso es tema para otra discusión.

<sup>14</sup> Unter allen Eigenschaften die einem denkenden Wesen zukommen ist die erste die seiner selbst als einer Person bewusst zu seyn nach welcher das Subject [...] sich selbst *a priori* zum Objecte constituirt nicht als in der Erscheinung [...] sondern als Wesen das seiner Selbst Begründer und Urheber ist nach der Qualität der Personlichkeit Das ich bin. — Ich als Mensch bin mir Sinnenobject im Raum u. der Zeit und zugleich Verstandesobject[.]

El *medius terminus* (cópula) en el juicio es aquí el sujeto que juzga (el ser-en-el-mundo [*Weltwesen*] pensante, el ser humano en el mundo). *Sujeto, predicado, cópula.* (XXI:27)<sup>15</sup>

Esta cita, según creo, puede aclararnos el punto de Kant: únicamente porque hay un sujeto que responde a ambos conjuntos de leyes, un sujeto que puede interactuar tanto con lo sensible como con lo racional, es que resultan posibles los juicios de conocimiento. En otras palabras, la posibilidad del juicio (y, en consecuencia, del conocimiento) depende de la existencia de un sujeto, de un ente que se puede conocer en tanto ente pensante que puede ser afectado por lo sensible o, lo que viene a ser lo mismo, en tanto ente que *a priori* se sabe en un mundo (*Weltwesen*) por él unificado (como en la síntesis figurativa que da unidad a lo múltiple de la intuición). Creo que, en este punto, si llamamos apercepción en tanto *Weltwesen* al saberse *a priori* en necesaria relación con un mundo (como *dabile*), podemos llamar a la conciencia empírica del sujeto, como ya dentro de un mundo empírico de cuya unidad nomológica se sabe el garante, “apercepción cosmológica” sin que suene extravagante.

##### 5. *La Reflexión de Leningrado y la Refutación del Idealismo, segundo intento*

Pasemos ahora a confirmar si esta conciencia *a priori* de sí mismo que surge de la auto-afección producida por la síntesis figurativa del espacio corresponde a lo que Kant tenía en mente cuando escribió RL; creo que el siguiente par de líneas parecen indicar que sí:

Sólo en tanto yo *aprehenda* objetos en el tiempo, y específicamente objetos del espacio, determino mi existencia [*Daseyn*] en el tiempo – es necesario que yo pueda ser consciente de mí mismo *a priori* como en *relación* con otras cosas aún antes de la percepción de las mismas, y en consecuencia que mi intuición en tanto que externa pertenezca a la misma conciencia antes que aquella de mi impresión de la misma, pues el espacio es la conciencia de esta relación real. (RL R33-V1).

El comienzo de esta intrincada y elíptica (tanto en términos gramaticales como argumentativos) oración parece indicar, primero, que la auto-conciencia depende, de manera inmediata, de la síntesis en el tiempo, pero que ésta, a su vez, es siempre de objetos espaciales, lo que concuerda con nuestra exploración del sentido interno en tanto auto-afección. Y, por supuesto, la necesidad *a priori* de la posibilidad de la relación con otros

<sup>15</sup> Gott, die Welt, und was beyde in realem Verhältnis gegen einander denkt, das Subject als vernünftiges Weltwesen.

Der *medius terminus* (*copula*) im Urtheile ist hier das Urtheilende Subject (das denkende Weltwesen, der Mensch, in der Welt.) *Subiect, Praedicat, Copula.*

objetos espaciales parece apuntar justamente a la conciencia que el sujeto tiene de sí mismo en tanto persona, que implica el ser un objeto espacial sensible, susceptible de interactuar con otros objetos espaciales. Si a esto añadimos que, un par de líneas más adelante, Kant usa la expresión *Weltwesen*, frecuente en los pasajes del *Opus postumum* arriba citados, para referirse no a la conciencia empírica que de sí tiene el sujeto, sino a aquello que permite la determinación de la existencia particular del sujeto (RL R4-6), creo que no resulta atrevido pensar que ya tenía en mente la división tripartita de la apercepción en apercepción pura o trascendental, apercepción en tanto *Weltwesen* (apercepción del *dabile*) y apercepción empírica o cosmológica. A esta última, según mencionamos más arriba, se le caracteriza no sólo por ser la mera forma del sujeto en el espacio-tiempo (la persona), sino por el conocimiento objetivo de sí mismo como continuo en un pasado, presente y futuro. Pero esto todavía nos deja con una pregunta: como bien nos lo señala Jáuregui, buen parte de RL está dedicada a comentar la problemática relación entre la percepción de la simultaneidad y el sentido interno. Pero, entonces ¿qué tiene que ver la simultaneidad con todo lo que hemos venido comentando?

La interpretación de Jáuregui, según vimos antes, deja a la simultaneidad jugando un papel secundario, dependiente de la categoría de la sustancialidad (y, en consecuencia, de la percepción de permanencia), sin explicar qué razón tendría Kant para no apelar a la versión más corta del argumento (i.e., sólo a la permanencia, como en RI). Creo que, si tenemos presente la apercepción como *Weltwesen*, la necesidad de cambiar el argumento es clara: Kant parece haberse dado cuenta de que el sujeto, aunque sea sólo formalmente, sí puede intuirse a priori en el espacio y tiempo, en tanto intuye una síntesis pura que, por supuesto, ocurriría sólo por medio de la aplicación de las categorías; en alguna medida, por lo tanto, el sujeto tendría algo como una permanencia, lo que volvería problemática la premisa inicial de RI. ¿Cómo solucionarlo entonces? Parte de la respuesta, sospecho, está en el énfasis que hace Kant en que yo me soy dado, tanto empíricamente como *a priori*, como posible relación con objetos y que de esto depende mi determinabilidad. Pensémoslo así: ¿qué puede dárseme en la intuición formal del tiempo? Tanto en la primera Crítica (e.g., B225) como en el *Opus postumum* (e.g., XXI:77-78), Kant niega que el tiempo como tal sea perceptible y, tanto en el *Opus postumum (ibidem)* como en RL, niega que lo que hemos venido llamando la apercepción como *Weltwesen* incluya determinación alguna. Añadamos a esto que, en la primera Analogía de la Experiencia, Kant concluye que el cambio afecta sólo a las apariencias en el tiempo (A183/B226) y podríamos concluir que, aun poniéndose a sí mismo (*selbst setzen*) *a priori* como objeto en el espacio y el tiempo, nada hay aquí de determinado que pueda cambiar y que, en esa medida, permita la percepción de un efectivo fluir del tiempo (el tiempo como tal, recordémoslo, no cambia para Kant, sino que el cambio transcurre en él (A183/B226), de dónde se sigue, paradójico cuan pueda sonar, que no hay flujo en la intuición formal del tiempo). La única manera en que el sujeto podría concebirse, por lo tanto, como un particular con un pasado, presente y futuro determinados, sería si le es dado un cambio empírico en la experiencia con el cual relacionarse para determinar en relación con él, por su *simultaneidad* con los diferentes

momentos del cambio, tiempos distintos. En otras palabras, la percepción de la simultaneidad es necesaria para que pueda percibirse el fluir del tiempo, el cambio, pero (y ésta sería la gran diferencia con el argumento de RI) esto no implica que no haya una especie de autoconocimiento independiente de la percepción empírica de la simultaneidad: ésta sería la apercepción cosmológica.

Ahora, esto puede llegar a sonar a idealismo, pero, según creo, esta sería un interpretación errada. En primer lugar, según dijimos en la sección anterior, la apercepción cosmológica, el saberse un *Weltwesen*, es saberse un ente que está en un mundo de cosas que pueden afectarlo; en otras palabras, la posibilidad del idealismo no puede siquiera surgir, en tanto no hay autoconocimiento que no exija también la noción de mundo. En segundo lugar, esta autoconciencia es meramente formal: yo sería consciente de mí mismo como un ente con la forma de un cuerpo (esto es, con la posibilidad de interactuar sensorialmente con otras cosas), pero no habría ningún conocimiento determinado del sí mismo y, en esa medida, tampoco habría conocimiento en sentido estricto de una entidad existente (de ahí que, con frecuencia, Kant lo describa como un ponerse en vez de un saberse o conocerse). Creo que a esto se refiere Kant cuando incluye, en RL, un punto muy similar al que explicamos en la discusión del sentido interno como auto-afección:

El que nos podamos afectar a nosotros mismos [...] sólo es posible porque aprehendemos las representaciones de cosas que nos afectan, esto es, de cosas externas, pues por este medio nos afectamos a nosotros mismos y el *tiempo es justamente la forma de la aprehensión de representaciones que se relacionan con algo fuera de nosotros*. (RL V10-13; énfasis en el original)

Con esto, ya he terminado de enunciar las tesis principales de mi interpretación de la Reflexión de Leningrado. Si estoy en lo correcto, creo que ofrece cuatro ventajas sobre la de Jáuregui:

- 1) Da razones teóricas para la inclusión del apelativo *cosmológica* a la apercepción empírica a la vez que señala por qué Kant se vio obligado a introducir un término nuevo en su sistema: la apercepción a la que aquí se refiere no es ni el mero conocimiento lógico de la apercepción trascendental ni incluye las determinaciones del autoconocimiento del yo empírico, sino que es saberse la forma de un cuerpo que hace parte de un mundo.
- 2) Explica por qué Kant sintió la necesidad de apelar a la simultaneidad en vez de a la permanencia: habiéndose percatado de que la apercepción cosmológica hace que sea inconcebible la noción del sujeto sin incluir un mundo en que se encuentre, el verdadero problema sería, según creo, evitar que esa misma apercepción nos dé acceso a la demostración *a priori* de la existencia de una entidad (el sujeto mismo). Sin embargo, según dijimos, para saberse existencia en el tiempo, hace falta que el sujeto se determine (se dé contenido, no sólo se sepa como forma) como ubicado en diferentes momentos temporales, pero esto sólo sería posible si hay entidades con las que pueda correlacionarse

en cada momento: esto es, saberse simultáneo en momentos distintos con entidades distintas. Dicho de otra manera, la apercepción cosmológica incluye una conciencia formal de sí, pero, para determinarse como entidad temporal, tendría que ser capaz de ubicarse en tiempos distintos, lo que exige que cada tiempo se diferencie. Dado que la mera forma del tiempo no ofrece un criterio de diferenciación, hace falta que los distintos momentos tengan contenidos que el sujeto perciba como simultáneos con sí mismo.

3) Evita la problemática necesidad de asumir que el sentido interno por sí solo produce pseudo-objetos. No habría, después de todo, algo como un objeto del mero sentido interno (en tanto sólo existe como auto-afección dependiente de la síntesis figurativa del espacio) y, en cambio, sí podemos apelar a una síntesis especio-temporal del sujeto que haga pleno uso de las categorías y a la que, por lo tanto, pueda referirse el cambio en concordancia con las conclusiones de la primera Analogía de la Experiencia.

4) Por último, nos permite leer RL como un esfuerzo de Kant por ofrecer un tratamiento novedoso de algunos de los problemas con los que había lidiado en la primera Crítica, en vez de limitarlo a seguir escribiendo, una y otra vez, los mismos argumentos.

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## **A comment on Dietmar Heidemann's account on Kant's Non-Conceptual Aesthetics: Against an active understanding**

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### **Abstract**

This paper aims to contribute to an ongoing and controversial debate about non-conceptuality in Kantian aesthetics. It is a replica on a paper of Dietmar Heidemann in *Con-Textos Kantianos* N.º 12, to which I do consent, but I'd like to give some additional comments on a specific issue: I show in this paper that the problem about whether or not the understanding contributes to aesthetic judgment can be elucidated by means of a revaluation of the imagination's capacity of formal representation and the subsuming activity of the power of reflective judgment. I argue that the understanding is considered by the power of reflective judgment merely in his lawfulness in order to find a universal under which the imagination's particular, the formal representation of the beautiful shape, can be subsumed.

### **Key words**

Aesthetic experience, power of reflective judgment, faculty of imagination, Kantian non-conceptualism, judgment of taste

In this paper I would like to comment on Dietmar Heidemann's *Response to my critics: In defense of Kant's aesthetic non-conceptualism*, which has been published in *CON-*

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More concretely, I want to put pressure on one of Dietmar Heidemann's statements concerning the controversial topic of the influence of the understanding on the free play of the faculties in judgments of taste. Defending his interpretation of the non-conceptuality of aesthetic representation, which I consider thoroughly well-structured and argued, he points out that making sense of the contribution of the understanding in the free play "remains problematic for conceptualists and non-conceptualists alike." (Heidemann 2020, p. 180). As Kant makes explicit in the very first pages of the *Analytic of the Beautiful*, aesthetic pleasure is universal even though no concept is implied (KU, AA 05: 211–9) – but the understanding is nevertheless mentioned in relation to the imagination in the free play. How is this to be understood?

Without wanting to claim a complete understanding of all the *Third Critique's* obscure passages, I think that I can advocate for a satisfactory solution concerning the above-mentioned issue. I argue that by emphasising the function of the faculty of imagination and the power of judgment in order to make sense of the formal structure of this free play, one can avoid including an active understanding in aesthetic contemplation. Heidemann advocates for the latter: "For the free play of imagination and understanding is not chaotic but, in some way, formally structured (cf. KU, §§ 10–14) which can only be explained through the understanding being active." (Heidemann 2020, p. 179). My argument follows three steps: First, I show that the imagination is the faculty that combines the shapes of the intuited and is responsible for structuring the representation. Second, that the aim of the power of reflective judgment is to look for and find a universal under which the particular representation can be subsumed. In a third and final step, that the power of judgment, in the activity of subsumption, establishes a connection to the understanding's lawfulness, as the formal universal under which the formal representation can be – merely formally and in reflection – subsumed. Thus, no activity of the understanding is needed in *causing* aesthetic pleasure, merely the synchronisation in reflection of its formal aspects.

Before proceeding to my proposal for a solution, a brief outline of the context and theme of the problem is in order. For the non-conceptualist account, it is crucial to demonstrate that pure aesthetic judgement, "xy is beautiful", is grounded on the famous aesthetic feeling; a feeling that, unlike mere sensation, comes along with an a priori transcendental structure and a peculiar subjective universal validity. Thus, the subject of experience "must believe himself to have grounds for expecting a similar pleasure of everyone" (KU, AA 05: 211). The important distinction lies in the fact that, in contrast to judgments of cognition, this universal validity is not an objective one, as it is not grounded on determinate concepts, but merely subjective: it rests on the subject's feeling and state of mind (KU, AA 05: 217). Nevertheless, it entails a claim for universal validity because what triggers the feeling is a very special relation among the subject's cognitive faculties, i.e., the imagination and the understanding, of which every subject is in possession. In



judgments of cognition, these faculties are in accordance with each other: the intuition and the corresponding concept are combined to generate objective cognition. In judgments of taste however, neither a determinable intuition of the perceived object nor a determining concept is central or at issue at all for establishing that correspondence (cf. KU, AA 05: 203 and 217).

Kant stresses more than once that no concept can be involved in the judgment of the beautiful, i.e., that no conceptual content of the representation can be the determinable ground for it.<sup>1</sup> But still, the representation is formally structured, which allows for the pleasing correspondence between imagination and understanding. Heidemann claims that this “can only be explained through the understanding being active” (Heidemann 2020, p. 179) and that this activity of the understanding is the synthesis “of what is given in intuition and since synthesis is possible only according to rules, i.e., categories, categories must be somehow operative in aesthetic cognition, too, although, as Kant says, ‘without a concept of the object’ (KU, AA 05: 217).” (Heidemann 2020, p. 179).

I think that involving the understanding as an actively contributing faculty is problematic with respect to Kant’s account of aesthetic experience. We should not forget the well-known claim about the “free and indeterminately purposive entertainment of the mental powers with what we call beautiful, where the understanding is in the service of the imagination and not vice versa.” (KU, AA 05: 212). I claim that two important points must be considered here in order to elucidate the free play as a mental state which does not contain an active contribution of the understanding: a) the role of the imagination while forming the representation of the beautiful shape (*Gestalt*) and b) the estimating and subsuming procedure of the faculty of reflective judgment.

### a) On the aesthetic function of imagination

A very trivial but no less necessary reflection is fundamental: It is the imagination that provides the representation of the beautiful shape. It does so in a different way than for representing an object meant to be determined, i.e., objectively. Representing aesthetically is, as we know, based on a merely formal representation of the shape of anything intuited (KU, AA 05: 240–1), since the aesthetic pleasure of a beautiful representation comes along without interest in any determinable or actual property of an object. Therefore, the faculty responsible for representing, the imagination, needs to be able to refrain or abstract from whatever material quality of the perception there is, in order to represent merely formally:<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> As Heidemann shows further this does not suffice for proving the non-conceptuality of the aesthetic representation, but that “in order for mental content to be cognitively relevant it must be representational, phenomenal and intentional” (Heidemann 2020, p. 176). As Heidemann proves in his article, these criteria are met.

<sup>2</sup> Paul Guyer, too, supports the view that imagination is capable of abstraction. In response to the question of the conditions of mere formal representing, he mentions: “A decision on these questions is impossible without a decision on the scope of our power of abstraction, and thus of the freedom of imagination to create the conditions in which its harmony might occur.” (Guyer 1997, p. 223).

Only the spatio-temporal composition and no relation to anything objective guarantees a pure judgment, and in this case a judgment of taste.<sup>3</sup> This way of representing entails further that the power of judgment cannot find a determining concept under which the representation can be subsumed; which, as we know, is the case for aesthetic and reflective judgment (cf. KU, AA 05: 179–181 and 231).

How does the imagination represent merely formally, without the guidance of the understanding?<sup>4</sup> First, it is of course highly difficult to offer a concrete reading of the imagination’s function in Kant’s work. But we find evidence that the faculty can be seen as a fundamental faculty, a basic power, that is not reducible to any other faculty like sensibility or understanding. Heidemann in *Kants Vermögenstheorie* (cf. Heidemann 2017, p. 61–2) argues for such a reading as well. In the A-Deduction of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant lists the imagination as a source of cognition next to sense and apperception (KrV, A 115), each of which are “elements or foundations a priori that make this empirical use itself possible” (KrV, A 115). He continues:

We therefore have a pure imagination, as a fundamental faculty of the human soul, that grounds all cognition *a priori*. By its means we bring into combination the manifold of intuition on the one side and the condition of the necessary unity of apperception on the other. Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination, since otherwise the former would to be sure yield appearances but no objects of an empirical cognition, hence there would be no experience. (KrV, A 124)

The claim that the imagination is a “necessary ingredient of perception” (KrV, A 121, note) reads the same way, because it isn’t sensibility that can give the manifold of

<sup>3</sup> „A pure judgment must be based on a pure aspect of objects, and on the theory of the first *Critique* that means it can be determined neither by the sensory qualities of objects themselves nor by the concepts which apply to them, but only by their spatial and temporal forms, their figure and play.“ (Guyer 1997, p. 203).

<sup>4</sup> Jackson Hoerth advocates as well for a reading of the imagination as an independent and form-bringing capacity (Hoerth 2020). In his article, he implies by means of contextual and systemic considerations that this ability of giving form to what has been intuited is the central function of that faculty. Nevertheless, he does not make explicit how the execution of this activity could be understood. Furthermore, he argues that the imagination itself engages in agreement with the understanding because it recognises harmony while comparing intuitions and concepts (Hoerth 2020, pp. 326–7 and 333). Hoerth even claims that imagination adopts its own principle of purposiveness (Hoerth 2020, p. 334). I think that these considerations go a bit too far and do not uphold the importance of the power of judgment in reflection. I agree that it is *thanks to* the activity of imagination that the representation receives its form and I agree that this is groundlaying for the purposive agreement between the cognitive faculties. But I defend that it is the power of reflective judgment which is responsible for establishing that relation and that purposiveness is its proper principle for comparing what shall be subsumed, for bringing about the agreement, and for judging the relation. The roles for both faculties become sometimes blurred in the Third *Critique* (see Schleich 2020, pp. 117–136 for elucidations and differentiations). Still, I consent that the imagination’s form-giving capacity makes purposiveness applicable.

experience in an intuitable form, the essential function here fore is synthesis, which is, as Kant states, “in general [...] the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind though indispensable function of the soul, without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious.” (KrV, A 78/B 103). These passages allow us to understand the imagination as an a priori, irreducible fundamental faculty, which mediates between sensibility and understanding and is not dependent on either of them. The *Metaphysik Pölitz* and *On the Use of Teleological Principles in Philosophy* both offer passages as well that strongly support this reading (cf. V-Met-L1/Pölitz, AA 18: 262 and ÜGTP, AA 08: 180f., note). In the chapter on schematism, which Kant did not alter while revising the first edition, the faculty of imagination is even able to produce a “third thing” (KrV, A 138/B 177) a schema, thanks to which the accordance between sensibility and understanding is made possible (KrV, A 140/B 179). The independence of imagination does not entail that it is in its function not *oriented* towards understanding’s lawfulness. It synthesises in a spatio-temporal structure towards a potential unification of the manifold: It adds partial representations one after the other to result in a completed and for the subject intuitable shape of what has been perceived. The representation of this shape is only possible thanks to its temporally-sequenced structure.

Of course, the revised deduction of the First *Critique* makes the interpretative situation difficult. There, we face the imagination as a faculty working for the understanding, as its synthesis is merely an effect of the understanding’s spontaneity on sensible intuition (KrV, B 152). The following consideration may facilitate the case though: If it is kept in mind that Kant was in the B-Deduction primarily concerned to defend his account on how cognition is possible, i.e., how the categories, as expressions of spontaneous thought, apperception, are able to be applied to sensual perception, the interpretative context is shifted. What we read in the revised Deduction is how objective cognition can be possible, i.e., objective unity in the manifold, but not the possibility of representations as such, including those representations that are not able to be determined by means of concepts.

Still, what we need now to make sense of is the function of the imagination: representing by means of synthesis. I argue, and here I follow the non-conceptualist approach, that the mere combination of partial representations (*Teilvorstellungen*) of the manifold in intuition brings about a representation, which is *as it is* a representation without being sufficient for cognition (KrV, B 103f.). The imagination grounds the intuitability of objects, as it represents what has been perceived in an intuition in a way that it meets the requirements of formal intuition, i.e., space and time (KrV, A 78). This ability to do so describes the central function of the imagination: synthesis. To keep things brief: We need to differentiate between the *synthesis speciosa*, as Kant calls the synthesis of the imagination representing in space and time, and the *synthesis intellectualis*, which, in the B-deduction, is the synthesis of the understanding operating without any meddling of the

imagination.<sup>5</sup> The latter counts as “unity of the action” (KrV, B 153) which enables cognition: thinking an objective unity in the manifold by means of the categories. And the synthesis of the imagination that shall provide an intuition suitable for cognition has to be oriented on that objectifying ground (cf. Birrer 2017, p. 191). It is this synthesis that is at stake in the context of objective cognition: “Yet to bring this synthesis [the synthesis of the imagination] *to concepts* is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense” (KrV, A 78/B 103).

Nonetheless, it is possible to advocate for a reading of the imagination’s synthesising function that is not guided by the intellectual synthesis: Birrer talks in this sense about an ‘autonomous and non-intellectual synthesising capacity’ (Birrer 2017, pp. 191–2 and cf. KrV, A 124), Olk calls it the ‘prereflective synthesis’ (Olk 2016, 100f.), which may or may not be in accordance with the categories and which is definitely not executed by means of categorial determination. Hanna describes that function of the imagination as “*sub-rational* or *lower-level* spontaneous” (Hanna 2005, p. 249) but also as „essentially spontaneous, goal oriented, and vital – in a word creative“ with „its own specialized representational faculty and cognitive function“ (Hanna 2001, pp. 39–40).

What interests me here the most is that in the act of combining the imagination connects parts in the representation in a temporally successive way: It combines one part after the other and thereby represents something that is intuitable by us, as we need the spatio-temporal form to intuit at all. Its function is therefore fundamental for anything that can be represented as an intuition (cf. KrV, A 124 and 99f.) – and by this function it lays the ground for, if this were the case, the condition of determination, as determination of an intuition requires the possibility for applying formal time-conditions, categories, on what has been sensibly intuited (cf. KrV, A 139–40/B 179). If now the materialistic elements of what has been perceived are not considered in this connecting activity, all that remains is combining mere shapes in a successive manner: creating a form.

The formal structure of the representation is thus guaranteed by the synthesis of the imagination and grounds the required “lawlikeness”<sup>6</sup> of the aesthetic kind of representation mentioned by Kant in the Third *Critique* (KU, AA 05: 287). Aesthetic representation is no occasion for irregularity; it allows for a universally communicable, pure judgment of taste if and only if the way of representing meets certain conditions, namely a free and purposive play between imagination and understanding (KU, AA 05: 218). Now, what happens in the case of aesthetic representation is that the process of combination interrupts and switches contexts. The synthesising of the forms in a temporal sequence is what is needed per se to bring about anything representable. But then, the

<sup>5</sup> I here follow the interpretation of Birrer 2017.

<sup>6</sup> The Cambridge Edition uses “lawlike” as translation for *gesetzmäßig* and “lawfulness” for *Gesetzmäßigkeit*. I would like to stick to the term lawlikeness in this sentence in order to highlight the ‘likeness’ (the analogical formal structure) of the representation in relation to the lawfulness of the understanding.

imagination abstains from rendering the perceived content of the object determinable, it schematises without a concept, as Kant describes (KU, AA 05: 287): in its reflective freedom, it continues to bundle merely the shapes and creates thus another kind of representation. As we know from the Third *Critique*, imagination can ‘transform experience’ in some special cases:

The imagination (as a productive cognitive faculty) is, namely, very powerful in creating, as it were, another nature, out of the material which the real one gives it. We entertain ourselves with it when experience seems too mundane [...]; in this we feel our freedom from the law of association (which applies to the empirical use of that faculty), in accordance with which material can certainly be lent to us by nature, but the latter can be transformed by us into something entirely different, namely into that which steps beyond nature. (KU, AA 05: 314)

The imagination here is not productive (*schöpferisch*) because it relies on what has been perceived – but it is able to bundle it in a different way: it thus creates, by means of this free and extraordinary combination of representational parts, a new representation: a representation that exceeds what could objectively be determined (see also Anth, AA 07: 224) which does not rely on any guidance by or orientation towards understanding.

The preceding aspects had to be considered in order to make sense of the imagination being able to represent aesthetically, independently of any determining or objectifying endeavours. The imagination can thusly be considered “in its freedom” (KU, AA 05: 287), whereas, of course, it needs to be held in mind that this kind of freedom is merely reflective and not to be confused with freedom in the practical sense.<sup>7</sup> It has been shown that the imagination’s synthesising function allows for the representation’s formal structure. This is, and I will emphasise this in the following, the necessary condition for the fulfilment of reflective judgment’s aim for indeterminate subsumption, for the concept of purposeless purposiveness and, of course, for the pleasure in the beautiful and the judgment of taste. This reading will make explicit why no understanding needs to be *actively* present or contributing to aesthetic representation or judgment. It is nevertheless certain that understanding needs to come somehow ‘into play’ in subsumption, as aesthetic feeling rests on the a priori condition of imagination and understanding being in free accordance, just ‘as if’ it is the case for cognition in general (cf. KU, AA 05: 190). This is what guarantees each: the purposiveness in aesthetics and the universal communicability, same as the claim for universal validity.

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<sup>7</sup> For an extensive analysis of the imagination in the aesthetic context and further considerations concerning reflective freedom see Schleich 2020, esp. chapter 3.5, pp. 158–173. As this is not of central concern here, I will keep it brief: in the case of the aesthetic imagination, its freedom is in reflection only – it has no concrete influence on any possible practical determination or determinability, as a throughout spontaneous and free faculty like reason can have, but only on her own usage (*Vermögensgebrauch*) in representing.

### **b) Reflective Power of Judgment and Formality**

Aesthetic pleasure only arises when the power of *reflective* judgment is successful in finding a particular for subsumption, i.e., when judgment manages to establish an accordance between the particular and the universal – in reflection. As Kant makes explicit from the beginning on, the latter as a concrete concept is missing in aesthetic representation. Therefore, reflective power of judgment must strive for finding a universal under which the particular could be subsumed and thus, to bring imagination and understanding into accordance. The particular that imagination represents in beautiful contemplation is but a shape and nothing concretely determinable. Now Kant states that in case of the beautiful, it is the

subsumption not of intuitions under *concepts*, but of the *faculty* of intuitions or presentations (i.e., of the imagination) under the *faculty* of concepts (i.e., the understanding), insofar as the former *in its freedom* is in harmony with the latter *in its lawfulness*. (KU, AA 05: 287)

The condition of that subsumption is, as the power of judgment's a priori principle of purposiveness tells, that an accordance must be found in order to make something cognitively tangible, purposive, and meaningful for the subject. Subsumption requires "the condition that the understanding *in general* advance from intuition to concept" (KU, AA 05: 287, my emphasis). Kant's statement that "freedom of the imagination consists precisely in the fact that it schematizes without a concept" (KU, AA 05: 287), points out that it is by means of this merely formal schematisation that the representation receives its formal structure. The formal structure of the representation, i.e., the imagination representing merely formally, allows it to meet the conditions that are set for cognition *in general*: the mere possibility of temporal determination. The representation must be given in a temporal structure (successively bundled) to be intuitable. Even though, as is the case in aesthetics, no determination will concretely follow, it is this kind of representation (*Vorstellungsart*) that reflective judgment holds to be what fits the universal (cf. KU, AA 05: 271). And vice versa, even though there is no determining universal available under which the peculiar representation could be subsumed, reflective judgment relates the formal representation with the formal part of the understanding: its lawfulness.

To make my primary claim explicit – that active understanding does not contribute to aesthetic experience (including contemplation and judgment) – I'd like to point explicitly to the function of reflective judgment and free play. In its aim to subsume the particular under the general, judgment needs to establish a relation that respects the principle of purposiveness. This principle is transcendental and subjectively formal: it is assumed by the power of judgment for its own use, and is given by the reflective power of judgment *itself* as its own law (cf. KU, AA 05: 183 and 180). As the necessary regulative principle for subsumption, it says

that what is contingent for human insight in the particular (empirical) laws of nature nevertheless contains a lawful unity, not fathomable by us but still thinkable, in the combination of its manifold into one experience possible in itself. (KU, AA 05: 183–4)

As the faculty itself is giving the principle for itself heautonomously (KU, AA 05: 185–6), neither understanding nor reason can be read as actively commanding it. The indeterminacy and subjectivity of aesthetics remain thoroughly preserved.

To fulfil its aim, the power of judgment therefore needs to find ‘an agreement of nature with our faculty of cognition’, and presupposes this agreement *a priori*, “in behalf of its [the power of judgment’s] reflection on nature in accordance with empirical laws” (KU, AA 05: 185, my emphasis). This is its endeavour to find purposiveness, i.e., to search for a universal enabling the accordance with nature (the particular that needs to be subsumed).<sup>8</sup>

It is thus by means of the power of judgment that the understanding comes into play: In order to reach an agreement between the particular and the universal, it establishes a purposive relation between the imagination (in its freedom as merely formally representing) and the understanding’s lawfulness: “For that apprehension of forms in the imagination can never take place without the reflecting power of judgment, even if unintentionally, at least comparing them to its faculty for relating intuitions to concepts.” (KU, AA 05: 190).

A passage in the *Anthropology* highlights that the formal aspect is central for aesthetic judgment: It relates the *formally* representing imagination (in its freedom) to the *form* of understanding, i.e., its lawfulness (thus not with concrete laws for determination):

The judging of an object through taste is a judgment about the harmony or discord of freedom, in the play of the power of imagination and the lawfulness of understanding, and therefore it is a matter only of judging the form aesthetically (the compatibility of the sense representations), not the generation of products, in which the form is perceived. (Anth, AA 07: 241)

It is important to emphasize that this relation is merely formal, not for the sake of determining the object of experience. What makes the agreement between the faculties possible is grounded on the way the imagination is representing: it combines the *shape* (no

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<sup>8</sup> The domain of *reflective* judgment explains the possibility of fathoming for fitting universals, for establishing ‘as if’ agreements that rest on merely subjective and formal purposiveness: Reflection describes a process of investigation, of retrospection and evaluation. In contrast to the determining process, it is here shifted away from the concrete concern for knowledge, for given concepts or objective determination. This means a kind of independence, which allows representing in reflexive freedom: In reflection, one can proceed formally, without being bound by a purpose or legislation (see KrV, A 260/B 316). The Third *Critique*’s power of judgement, as already mentioned above, looks for the universal, under which the particular can be subsumed.

material properties of the perception) in a temporal sequence, i.e., successively (connecting in time remains formal). This is what lays the ground for a possible accordance with the lawfulness of the understanding, which is the transcendental formal time-condition through the application of the pure concepts, the categories (KrV, A 138–9/B 177–8). This accordance is the *subjective* transcendental condition for judgments in general, only that in taste it is reflective and aesthetic (related to the subject’s state of mind and feeling) and in cognition, it is objective. The reflective judgment is grounded on this formal relation between the cognitive capacities. As it is not determined nor following actual determining rules, it is considered free: a free play between imagination and understanding.

In this reply I have tried to show that it is the power of judgment which initiates the relation to the understanding, i.e., that it does not involve the understanding actively taking part, but that judgment merely reflects upon the understanding’s formal aspect as the possible universal under which the forms of the imagination could be subsumed. As such, it establishes an ‘as if’ relation: a purposive accordance between the formally representing imagination and the lawfulness of the understanding in its lawfulness that triggers aesthetic pleasure. It does not matter if it is but a formal and subjective purposive accordance; we find – unexpectedly – a way to relate nature and intelligibility in representation, to subsume the forms of the manifold under the formal aspects of unification, and this is what causes pleasure. Additionally, these considerations favour of a reevaluation of the function of the imagination: through its ability for aesthetic representation (i.e., synthesising mere forms, abstracting from determinable content and acting independently of external determination), it lays the ground for the subsequent moments: a) it gives a special kind of particular that can only be related in reflection to a merely formal universal, and b) as it represents in its freedom, there cannot be any determination that meddles in this activity. This would contaminate the indeterminacy of pure aesthetic judgment since no free play, no unexpected accordance between the faculties of cognition could take place and thus, no aesthetic pleasure would arise. For the aim of the present argument, it was thus central to prove

- 1) that the synthesising of the imagination happens to shift in the case of aesthetic representation,
- 2) that it is the power of reflective judgment which searches for a universal in order to subsume the particular and that it finds this universal in the formal aspect of the understanding,
- 3) that in creating a relation among imagination and understanding, it reaches its aim of a purposive estimation of the representation. This shows that no active contribution of the understanding is needed to judge aesthetically.

As the aim of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* was to make explicit the possibility and the conditions of “the transition from the domain of the concept of nature to



that of the concept of freedom” (KU, AA 05: 196), I hope that the considerations about reflective judgment and the formally representing imagination in this paper can contribute to understanding the possibility of such a transition by means of a relation established in reflection. Additionally, I think that the reading of the understanding as only passively made present by reflective judgment in aesthetic cognition is a favourable argument for the non-conceptualist account of Kant’s aesthetics.

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**Acerca de las diferencias y las relaciones entre las concepciones  
kantianas de la psicología empírica y la antropología  
pragmática**

*On the differences and relationships between Kant's conceptions  
of empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology*

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**Resumen**

El objetivo de este trabajo es mostrar las diferencias y relaciones entre las concepciones kantianas de dos disciplinas. La primera es la psicología empírica contenida en la *Metafísica* de Baumgarten, que Kant empleaba para dar sus lecciones de antropología. Consideraremos principalmente la interpretación kantiana de esta psicología. La segunda es la antropología pragmática. Con respecto a esta última disciplina, tendremos en cuenta las lecciones de antropología de Kant y la publicada *Antropología en sentido pragmático*. Mostraremos que, aunque las concepciones kantianas de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática son esencialmente diferentes, hay relaciones entre las mismas. Nuestra conclusión es que la psicología empírica permanece como un cierto enfoque metodológico dentro de la antropología pragmática. Tal enfoque consiste en la consideración de los fenómenos internos, y es uno, entre otros, de los recursos metodológicos empleados por la antropología pragmática.

**Palabras clave**

Kant; Baumgarten; Psicología empírica; Antropología pragmática

**Abstract**

The aim of this paper is to show the differences and relationships between Kant's conceptions of two disciplines. The first is the empirical psychology contained in Baumgarten's *Metaphysics*,

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which was employed by Kant to give his lectures on anthropology. We will consider mainly Kant's interpretation of this psychology. The second is pragmatic anthropology. With regard to the last discipline, we will take into account Kant's lectures on anthropology and the published *Anthropology in pragmatic sense*. We will show that, although Kant's conceptions of empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology are essentially different, there are relationships between them. Our conclusion is that empirical psychology remains as a certain methodological approach within pragmatic anthropology. Such approach consists in the consideration of inner appearances and is one, among others, of the methodological resources employed by pragmatic anthropology.

### **Key words**

Kant; Baumgarten; Empirical psychology; Pragmatic Anthropology

Immanuel Kant comenzó a impartir lecciones sobre metafísica en la Universidad Albertina de Königsberg en el semestre de invierno de 1755-1756. El manual que empleaba en el marco de estas lecciones es la *Metaphysica* de Alexander Baumgarten.<sup>1</sup> Más adelante, en el semestre de invierno de 1772-1773, Kant empezó a dictar lecciones sobre Antropología. El libro de texto utilizado era la sección de la *Metaphysica* de Baumgarten denominada "Psicología empírica" (§§504-739). Como fruto de esta labor docente, Kant publicó en 1798 su *Antropología en sentido pragmático* (Anth).

Esta breve presentación de hechos nos conduce al interrogante fundamental de este artículo: ¿cuál es la relación entre la psicología empírica incluida por Baumgarten en su metafísica y la antropología pragmática del filósofo de Königsberg? ¿Son en el fondo dos maneras de mencionar la misma disciplina? ¿O coinciden en algunos aspectos fundamentales? Aquí intentaremos mostrar, por un lado, que Kant transforma pragmáticamente, desde el inicio de sus lecciones, tesis contenidas en la psicología de Baumgarten y, por el otro, que la interpretación de la psicología empírica propia de Kant es diferente de su concepción de la antropología pragmática, si bien ambas disciplinas están íntimamente vinculadas.

Debe notarse que un examen de la evolución de la concepción de la antropología pragmática en las lecciones impartidas por Kant a lo largo de los años excede el alcance de un artículo. Sin embargo, nos serviremos de pasajes de lecciones de antropología del período crítico y del precrítico. Además, por motivos de espacio, no haremos referencia a la historia de las interpretaciones acerca de la temática que nos ocupa.<sup>2</sup> Emplearemos únicamente una parte de la muy abundante bibliografía secundaria que puede encontrarse hoy en día. En esta bibliografía ocupa un lugar destacado el extenso, documentado y riguroso estudio de Thomas Sturm (2009).

A fin de sustentar nuestras tesis, expondremos en el primer apartado la concepción pragmática de la antropología que nos ocupa y la distinguiremos de la interpretación kantiana de la psicología empírica. En el apartado siguiente, distinguiremos entre los objetivos, las fuentes de conocimiento y el contenido de las concepciones kantianas de ambas disciplinas. En el tercer apartado, presentaremos cuatro ejemplos de transformación pragmática, por parte de Kant, de afirmaciones contenidas en la psicología empírica de

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<sup>1</sup> La primera edición de la *Metaphysica* data de 1739; la segunda, de 1743; y la tercera, de 1750. A medida que tenían lugar sus cursos, Kant comenzó a emplear la cuarta edición publicada en 1757. Hemos traducido pasajes de este texto teniendo en cuenta la siguiente traducción: Baumgarten 2013.

<sup>2</sup> Puede encontrarse una buena síntesis de la historia de las interpretaciones acerca de la génesis de la antropología pragmática, así como del papel de la psicología empírica en dicha génesis, en Wilson 2018, pp. 11-16. Cf. *infra*, n. 21.

Baumgarten. En el apartado cuarto, señalaremos que, para Kant, la psicología empírica puede entenderse como la parte de la antropología pragmática que se ocupa de los fenómenos internos. Por último, en el apartado quinto detallaremos la tesis sustentada en el apartado anterior. Con este fin, explicaremos el carácter no científico de la psicología empírica y el carácter científico de la antropología pragmática. La conclusión global de este artículo es que, para Kant, la psicología empírica permanece dentro de la antropología pragmática como un enfoque metodológico consistente en la introspección, enfoque que debe ser ampliado y corregido por los restantes recursos metodológicos de la mencionada ciencia.

## I.

En este apartado presentaremos en primer lugar las características fundamentales de la antropología de Kant, tal como ellas aparecen en los textos kantianos relevantes del período crítico.<sup>3</sup> Llevaremos a cabo esta exposición basándonos en los diferentes sentidos que Robert Louden encuentra en la concepción kantiana de lo pragmático. Coincidimos plenamente con este comentarista, aunque intentaremos presentar sus tesis con más detalle. Las mencionadas características de la antropología pragmática, que se expondrán aquí y en el apartado siguiente, no se encuentran en la interpretación kantiana de la psicología empírica. Además, al final de este apartado mostraremos que las características en cuestión están presentes, aunque no completamente desarrolladas, en una muy temprana lección de antropología, esto es, V-Anth/Collins (1772-1773).

En primer lugar, la antropología es pragmática en el sentido de que se diferencia de las antropologías fisiológicas como la de Ernst Platner (véase su *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise*, Leipzig, 1772). Marcus Herz publicó el año siguiente una reseña de ese libro en la revista *Allgemeine Deutsche Bibliothek*. En una carta a Herz de fines de 1773, Kant afirma refiriéndose a enfoques fisiológicos como los de Platner: “la investigación sutil y en mi opinión eternamente inútil acerca de la manera como los órganos del cuerpo están relacionados con los pensamientos queda enteramente suprimida” (Br, AA 10: 145). Anteriormente había dicho: “mi plan es enteramente diferente” (*Ibid.*). Muchos años más adelante, en la publicada Anth (1798), Kant vuelve a contraponer su concepción de la antropología con la concepción fisiológica de esta disciplina. “El conocimiento fisiológico del ser humano se dirige a la indagación de lo que la *naturaleza* hace del ser humano; el pragmático, a lo que *él*, como ente que actúa libremente, hace, o puede y debe hacer, de sí mismo.” (AA 07: 119).

Podemos concluir que, mientras que la antropología fisiológica se centra en el ser humano como ser natural, la antropología pragmática toma al ser humano como agente libre. Esto último no implica que la antropología kantiana pueda acceder al ámbito incognoscible de lo nouménico, donde se encuentra el origen de la libertad humana, sino que estudia los efectos de esta libertad en el ámbito fenoménico (Louden 2008, p. 517). Efectivamente, la razón fundamental por la cual Kant rechaza los enfoques fisiológicos es que son irrelevantes para conocer al ser humano como un agente libre, que es el objeto de

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<sup>3</sup> Tales textos son las lecciones siguientes: V-Anth/Mensch (1781-1782), V-Anth/Mron (1784-1785), V-Anth/Busolt (1788-1789) y V.A.Dohna (1791-1792). Además, emplearemos la publicada Anth (1798). Notemos que en la traducción de pasajes de las lecciones tuvimos en cuenta las traducciones siguientes: Kant 2012 y 2015. Por último, señalemos que no consideraremos las lecciones de lógica ni las de metafísica por motivos de espacio.

la antropología pragmática.<sup>4</sup> Por otro lado, si bien en los pasajes citados Kant no hace mención de la psicología empírica, consideramos que para el filósofo de Königsberg esta disciplina también toma al ser humano como ser natural. Efectivamente, en V-Anth/Busolt (1788-1789) se asevera que la antropología pragmática “no debe ser una antropología teórica, que meramente plantea cuestiones y contiene en sí solamente investigaciones psicológicas; más bien, queremos dar una instrucción acerca de cómo mediante una observación se conoce la constitución del ser humano, a fin de poder utilizarla aquí para nuestro fin” (AA 25: 1436). Tanto la antropología fisiológica como la psicología empírica adoptan un enfoque teórico que no es el más adecuado para examinar la libertad del ser humano en el ámbito fenoménico.

En segundo lugar, en V-Anth/Mensch (1781-1782), Kant vuelve a oponerse a Platner. En este caso, nuestro filósofo afirma: “Platner ha escrito una antropología escolástica” (AA 25: 856). Para Kant, existen dos tipos de estudios, el escolástico y el mundano. Un estudio es escolástico cuando “está de acuerdo con la escuela y las justificaciones de la profesión” y se dirige a los doctos (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25: 853. Cf V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1209). De este tipo de estudio no se puede obtener instrucción para la vida común. En cambio, el estudio mundano o estudio del mundo se extiende más allá de los límites de la escuela y sus integrantes y pretende suministrar conocimientos de utilidad general y aplicables en el marco del trato con los otros seres humanos. Así, esta clase de estudio se dirige a todos los seres humanos y pretende poseer entonces un carácter popular. Por otro lado, en V-Anth/Busolt, Kant explica: “[l]o que más nos ocupa en el mundo, lo que más pone en movimiento nuestras inclinaciones, nuestros apetitos y nuestra voluntad, es el ser humano. Por tanto, conocimiento del mundo es precisamente tanto como conocimiento del ser humano” (AA 25: 1435). Tal conocimiento pragmático del ser humano considera a éste como un ciudadano del mundo.<sup>5</sup> Notemos, además, que Kant considera posible y deseable llevar a cabo una aplicación popular del saber escolástico, a fin de no caer en la pedantería. Cabe destacar, por último, que, para Kant, también la psicología empírica es un saber escolástico o especulativo.<sup>6</sup>

En tercer lugar, la antropología pragmática tiene, entre sus características principales, un tipo muy específico de utilidad. En pocas palabras, el conocimiento del ser humano que suministra esta antropología puede emplearse para utilizar a los otros seres humanos con vistas a los propios fines. De esta manera, según la V-Anth/Mensch, el conocimiento de la antropología pragmática concierne “al modo como un ser humano puede tener influencia sobre el otro y guiarlo de acuerdo con su intención” (AA 25: 855). Tal conocimiento, según V-Anth/Busolt, “nos muestra cómo podemos usar para nuestro fin a los seres humanos” (AA 25: 1436). Por ejemplo, quien conoce el temperamento de un ser humano tiene más probabilidad de utilizarlo exitosamente para sus fines (acerca de los diferentes temperamentos, véase Anth, AA 07: 286-291). Louden subraya el hecho de que el mencionado conocimiento antropológico puede ser empleado no sólo en intención

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<sup>4</sup> Esta última tesis fue presentada y defendida extensamente por Thomas Sturm. Sturm distingue entre dos críticas kantianas a la antropología fisiológica: en primer lugar, los conocimientos de la época acerca de la base fisiológica a partir de la cual se pretenden explicar los fenómenos psíquicos serían insuficientes; en segundo lugar, la tesis que hemos mencionado, a saber, que tales conocimientos serían irrelevantes para las explicaciones efectuadas de acuerdo con un enfoque pragmático. Sturm concluye acertadamente que la crítica principal es la segunda (Sturm 2009, pp. 261-304)

<sup>5</sup> Véase Louden 2006, p. 353 y Anth, AA, 07: 120.

<sup>6</sup> V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25: 855-856; V-Ant/Mron, AA, 25: 1214 y V.A.Dohna, p. 72.

moral, como seguramente pretendía Kant,<sup>7</sup> sino también en intención no moral (2008, p. 517).

En cuarto lugar, la antropología que nos ocupa tiene por objetivo volvernos más prudentes. En V-Anth/Mensch se dice: “[l]a prudencia descansa entonces meramente en el conocimiento del ser humano, en virtud del cual somos capaces de conducir a los otros según nuestra intención”. (AA 25: 855).<sup>8</sup> Ciertamente, como señala Louden, parece haber un solapamiento entre la prudencia así definida y la propiedad pragmática de guiar a los demás de acuerdo con nuestros propósitos (2008, p. 517). Sin embargo, explica el comentarista, lo prudencial también está vinculado con la búsqueda de la felicidad. Ya en la temprana V-Anth/Parow (1772-1773) se afirma: “[l]a capacidad de elegir los mejores medios para la felicidad es la prudencia. La felicidad consiste en la satisfacción de todas las inclinaciones, y para poder así elegirla, uno tiene que ser libre. Es contrario a la prudencia todo lo que hace ciego”<sup>9</sup> (AA 25: 413).<sup>10</sup>

Aunque este artículo no se ocupa del problema de la génesis de la concepción madura de la antropología pragmática kantiana, destaquemos que estas características fundamentales que acabamos de explicar pueden encontrarse en una lección de antropología del semestre de invierno de 1772-1773, a saber, V-Anth/Collins. Citamos y comentamos brevemente, a continuación, los pasajes pertinentes de la lección mencionada.

1. “No examinaremos al ser humano solamente según sus propiedades ocultas, que sólo sirven para la especulación, sino especialmente según sus propiedades prácticas. / El tránsito del movimiento corporal al espiritual no se deja explicar ulteriormente; en consecuencia se equivocan mucho Bonnet y diversos otros si creen poder inferir con seguridad del cerebro al alma.” (AA 25: 9).<sup>11</sup> La oposición entre las propiedades ocultas del ser humano y sus propiedades prácticas puede entenderse en términos de la oposición entre los objetos de estudio de la antropología fisiológica y la antropología que a mediados de la década de 1770 Kant llamará pragmática.

2. “El conocimiento de aplicar convenientemente las ciencias es el conocimiento del mundo. Este conocimiento del mundo consiste en el conocimiento del ser humano, cómo podemos llegar a ser complacientes con ellos [MAA: los seres humanos], etc. El conocimiento del mundo impide entonces que la erudición se convierta en

<sup>7</sup> “La predisposición pragmática es la posibilidad de desarrollar prudencia, a la que Kant en numerosos lugares define como la habilidad para usar a los otros como medios para los fines propios [MAA: se remite a nota 101: Anth, AA, 07: 201, 271 y 312]. Por supuesto, él no quiere decir ‘usa a los otros sin su consentimiento’. Kant distingue claramente entre la persona astuta [*Arglist*] y la persona prudente [*Klugheit*] [MAA: se remite a nota 102: AA, Anth 07: 198]. La persona astuta usa a los otros sin su consentimiento o consentimiento expreso, mientras que la persona prudente sabe cómo ganar para sus esfuerzos la cooperación de los otros.” (Wilson 2006, p. 80). Véase *infra*.

<sup>8</sup> Véanse afirmaciones similares en Anth, 07: 201 y 271.

<sup>9</sup> Véase V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1210 y GMS, AA 04: 416n. Acerca de los conceptos de prudencia y felicidad, y de la independencia de la prudencia con respecto a la moralidad, véase Kain 2003.

<sup>10</sup> Acerca de la satisfacción con la propia vida, cf. Anth, AA 07: 234-235. Nos hemos basado en las clasificaciones presentadas en Louden 2006, pp. 352-354 y 2008, pp. 517-518. La clasificación de Louden 2000, pp. 69-70 es diferente. Cabe destacar que, en su artículo de 2006 (p. 352), Louden menciona un trabajo de Allen W. Wood (2003, pp. 40-42). Tal trabajo contiene una clasificación similar a la presentada por Louden en 2006 y 2008. El extenso estudio de Sturm sobre el concepto de lo pragmático, si bien no contradice en lo esencial los puntos generales aquí expuestos, presenta tantos matices que no puede ser examinado en el marco de un artículo (Sturm 2009, pp. 470-518, *inter alia*).

<sup>11</sup> Los editores del texto alemán de V-Anth/Collins y los de la traducción parcial inglesa del mismo dan a entender que, en el pasaje citado, Kant también se está refiriendo a Platner. Véase AA 25: 9 y Kant 2012, 526n5.

pedantería”. (AA 25: 9). Vemos aquí esbozada claramente la oposición entre conocimiento escolástico y conocimiento mundano.

3. Reproducamos una oración del pasaje citado anteriormente: “cómo podemos llegar a ser complacientes con ellos [MAA: los seres humanos]”. Consideramos que esta oración puede entenderse en el sentido de que la antropología pragmática nos enseña a complacer a los demás seres humanos a fin de que cooperen para alcanzar nuestros fines. En este caso, la característica fundamental de la prudencia estaría ya presente en V-Anth/Collins.<sup>12</sup> Con respecto a la relación entre prudencia y felicidad, citamos más arriba un pasaje de V-Anth/Parow (AA 25: 413), conjunto de anotaciones que, al igual que V-Anth/Collins, provendría del curso de 1772-1773. Reproducimos ahora unas líneas similares de la esta última lección: “[c]omo la prudencia es una capacidad de satisfacer nuestra felicidad como suma de todas las inclinaciones; así la contradice todo lo que nos hace ciegos, y consecuentemente también la emoción.” (AA 25: 211).

Podemos concluir que, para Kant, mientras que la psicología empírica es una disciplina teórica y escolástica, la antropología pragmática está orientada principalmente hacia la adquisición de la prudencia. Esta antropología se dirige al ser humano como agente libre situado en un mundo en el marco del cual tienen lugar las interacciones con los demás. La mencionada prudencia consiste en una habilidad para alcanzar la felicidad y para cooperar con los demás agentes libres a fin de que sirvan a nuestros fines.

## II.

Hemos visto que Kant establece dos oposiciones fundamentales entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática: carácter teórico – carácter pragmático y saber escolástico – saber mundano. En este apartado proseguiremos nuestra tarea de diferenciación entre las dos disciplinas mencionadas. En primer lugar, presentaremos una examinación más detallada del concepto de prudencia. Tal examinación nos permitirá establecer una tercera oposición entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática. En segundo lugar, mostraremos que hay una diferencia entre las fuentes de conocimiento de las disciplinas mencionadas. Por último, señalaremos también una diferencia entre los objetos de estudio de las disciplinas que nos ocupan.

Kant distingue entre tres tipos de doctrinas. “La primera clase nos hace diestros, la segunda prudentes, la tercera sabios” (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25: 855). Diestros nos vuelve el conjunto de los estudios dictadas en la escuela. Así, lo diestro está vinculado con lo teórico de la escuela. En cambio, lo prudente está vinculado con la instrucción para hacer uso de las destrezas propias. Según Kant, un relojero que fabrica un reloj perfecto es diestro; y, si también conoce el arte de venderlo, es prudente. Sólo podemos apoderarnos de las cosas cuando podemos emplear a los seres humanos como medios, porque “las manos del ser humano producen todo a partir de la naturaleza bruta” (*Ibid.*). En este contexto afirma Kant:

[e]l conocimiento del ser humano tiene dos clases: el conocimiento especulativo del ser humano nos hace diestros y es tratado en la psicología y la fisiología, pero el práctico nos hace prudentes; es un conocimiento del modo como un ser humano puede tener influencia sobre el otro y guiarlo de acuerdo con su intención. Todo conocimiento práctico, en la medida en que sirve para satisfacer todas nuestras intenciones, se llama pragmático. Toda doctrina de la sabiduría es moral, y toda la

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<sup>12</sup> Acerca de este punto, véase Wilson 2018, pp. 19-20. En tales pasajes, Wilson se opone acertadamente a Brandt. Véanse Brandt 1994, pp. 14-24 y Brandt y Stark 1997, pp. VII-XXIV.

de la prudencia es pragmática. Una doctrina es pragmática, en la medida en que nos hace prudentes e idóneos para los asuntos públicos, donde no tenemos necesidad meramente de la teoría, sino también de la práctica (V-Anth/Mensch, AA 25: 855-856).<sup>13</sup>

Este pasaje ilustra con bastante precisión la distinción entre las tres doctrinas consideradas.<sup>14</sup> Lo que nos interesa destacar es que, para Kant, la psicología empírica, a diferencia de la antropología pragmática, no nos vuelve prudentes, sino diestros. Por tanto, podemos establecer una tercera oposición entre tales doctrinas: saber de destrezas – saber prudencial.

Por otro lado, para Kant,<sup>15</sup> en consonancia con Baumgarten,<sup>16</sup> la fuente de conocimiento de la psicología empírica viene dada por lo que el filósofo de Königsberg denomina “sentido interno”.<sup>17</sup> Mediante tal sentido, cuya forma es el tiempo, intuimos los estados de nuestra propia mente.<sup>18</sup> Por tanto, puede afirmarse que el método de la psicología que nos ocupa es la introspección. En cambio, en la antropología pragmática las fuentes de conocimiento son tanto el sentido interno como el externo. Este último sentido, cuya forma es el espacio, nos proporciona intuiciones de los fenómenos diferentes de nosotros mismos. En Anth, Kant afirma que uno debe obtener conocimiento del ser humano en el trato cotidiano con los demás individuos en sociedad. Sólo tras formar de esa manera un plan del conocimiento antropológico, tiene sentido, para ampliar ese conocimiento, viajar o leer relatos de viajeros (Anth, AA 07: 120). Kant agrega que la antropología posee además ciertos instrumentos auxiliares, a saber, “la historia mundial, las biografías, e incluso las obras de teatro y las novelas”. En el contexto también se consideran la introspección y sus dificultades, pero en la antropología pragmática son fuentes de conocimiento, como vimos, tanto el sentido interno como el externo (Anth, AA 07: 121).<sup>19</sup>

Otra diferencia digna de notarse entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática consiste en que sus campos de estudio tienen alcances diferentes. Hay solapamiento entre estos campos de estudio sólo si se tiene en cuenta la primera parte de la antropología mencionada, a saber, lo que en Anth es denominado “Didáctica antropológica”. Aquí Kant divide la exposición en cierta conformidad con los temas expuestos por Baumgarten. En cambio, la segunda parte de Anth, esto es, la “Característica

<sup>13</sup> Véanse también V-Anth/Mron, AA 25: 1211 y V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1435-1436.

<sup>14</sup> En V-Anth/Busolt se asevera: “[u]no también puede expresar estas 3 clases de doctrinas de otra manera y más brevemente. 1. Mediante la ciencia de la escuela, en la cual somos cultivados. 2. Mediante la doctrina de la prudencia, en la cual somos civilizados. 3. Mediante la doctrina de la sabiduría, en la cual aprendemos a valorarnos a nosotros mismos, o donde somos moralizados”. (AA, 25: 1436). Cf. Anth, AA 07: 322ss.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. KrV, A347/B405-406 y MAN, AA 04: 471.

<sup>16</sup> Véase su *Metaphysica*, §503, AA 17: 130.

<sup>17</sup> Acerca del concepto de sentido interno desde la tradición alemana del siglo XVII hasta Kant, véase Camposampiero Favaretti 2018.

<sup>18</sup> En sus tempranas lecciones de antropología, Kant todavía considera que mediante una intuición de uno mismo pueden inferirse la simplicidad, la substancialidad, la personalidad y la libertad del alma o del Yo. (Véase V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 10-12 y V-Anth/Parow, AA 25: 244-246). En KrV, la posibilidad de una intuición no sensible del Yo, que parece estar presupuesta en las tesis mencionadas, es descartada en el capítulo “De los Paralogismos de la razón pura” (A341/B399ss.).

<sup>19</sup> Véase la crítica de Patrick Frierson 2014, p.37n.43, para quien la fuente primaria de tal conocimiento es el sentido interno, a Thomas Sturm 2009, pp. 259-260, para quien esa fuente primaria es el sentido externo. Aquí estamos de acuerdo con Frierson en este punto (véase el apartado cuarto de este artículo, esp. n. 26). Kraus 2018 caracteriza brevemente las interpretaciones de Sturm y Frierson acerca de las dos disciplinas bajo examen y presenta una interpretación diferente. Véase también Kraus 2011.



antropológica”, pone el énfasis en el concepto kantiano de “carácter”.<sup>20</sup> El concepto en cuestión torna posible una explicación del accionar de los seres humanos y permite pasar de la psicología individual a la consideración de las diferencias existentes entre los distintos grupos humanos. Tales grupos son conformados teniendo en cuenta, por ejemplo, las diferencias entre los caracteres de los sexos y las nacionalidades.<sup>21</sup>

En conclusión, para Kant, la antropología pragmática, a diferencia de la psicología empírica, no nos hace diestros, sino prudentes. Asimismo, mientras que la fuente de conocimiento de esta psicología es el sentido interno, la de la antropología mencionada incluye al sentido interno y al externo. Por último, hay coincidencia entre los campos de estudio de estas disciplinas sólo si tenemos en cuenta la primera parte de Anth.

### III.

Hasta ahora hemos intentado presentar detalladamente las diferencias que, según Kant, se encuentran entre sus concepciones de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática. Ahora bien, ¿qué efectos, aparte de la ordenación de los temas de la “Didáctica antropológica” mencionada en el apartado anterior, tiene el texto de Baumgarten en las lecciones de antropología de Kant? En el presente apartado intentaremos mostrar que en muchos casos Kant transforma en un sentido pragmático contenidos teóricos presentados por Baumgarten. Daremos ejemplos tomados de distintos textos de antropología. Comenzaremos con una de las lecciones de antropología más tempranas, a fin de mostrar que Kant lleva a cabo la transformación mencionada desde los inicios de su reflexión sobre esta disciplina.

Consideremos el concepto de abstracción. Según Baumgarten, “si, al comparar, abstraigo aquello que no es comparado, lo que queda es percibido distintamente” (§631, AA 15: 35). Al tratar este tema en V-Anth/Parow (1772-1773), Kant afirma: “[h]ay una atención y abstracción voluntarias, pero también una involuntaria, esta es un estado miserable; en cambio, es muy ventajoso cuando la atención y abstracción están a nuestro arbitrio, pues así ninguna ofensa puede hacernos infelices, abstraemos y mediante ello hacemos invisible la imagen que nos tortura” (AA 25: 264). De esta manera, Kant

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<sup>20</sup> La psicología empírica de Baumgarten consta de 22 apartados. Los apartados 2-21 se ocupan de las diferentes facultades del alma y su clasificación. El apartado 1 se ocupa de la “Existencia Animae” (§§504-518, AA 15: 5-8) y el 22 del “Commercium Animae et Corporis” (§§733-739, AA 17: 139-140). (Véase Sturm 2009, pp. 370-371). Sturm señala que el estudio de las propiedades esenciales del alma, por parte de Kant, culmina en 1777-1778 (Sturm 2009, pp. 371-372). Por otro lado, la temática de la “interacción entre cuerpo y alma aparece sólo pasajeramente en las lecciones” (Sturm 2009, p. 372). En 1777-1778 el costado metafísico del problema es dejado de lado, y “[a] más tardar a partir de 1788-89 Kant no dedica ningún capítulo propio, en las lecciones, a las discusiones sobre correlaciones empíricas, que son relevantes por ejemplo para cuestiones de salud corporal o espiritual.” (Sturm, *Ibid.*). Podemos concluir que la psicología empírica de Baumgarten fue empleada por el Kant maduro principalmente en lo que hace a la doctrina de las facultades (la “Didáctica antropológica” de Anth). Sin embargo, debe notarse que ambas doctrinas de las facultades no son idénticas. Mientras Wolff y Baumgarten dividían entre dos facultades fundamentales (cognoscitiva y apetitiva), Kant agrega el sentimiento de placer y displacer. Debe notarse que Baumgarten formula una tripartición semejante en su *Ethica philosophica* (1751). (Sturm 2009, pp. 372-373). Acerca de las facultades fundamentales, véase el quinto apartado de este trabajo. Por último, no hay correlato en la psicología empírica de Baumgarten para la segunda parte de Anth, es decir, la “Característica antropológica”.

<sup>21</sup> En este párrafo nos servimos de indicaciones de Frierson 2014, p. 48. Acerca del problema de las posibles fuentes empleadas por Kant para elaborar la segunda parte de su antropología, véase Brandt 1994; Brandt y Stark 1997, pp. VII-XXIV; Loudon 2000, p. 71; Stark 2003 y 2014; Wilson 2018 y Lorini 2018.

transforma una tesis de la psicología empírica baumgartiana en una indicación pragmática.<sup>22</sup>

Más adelante, en V-Anth/Fried (1775-1776), Kant parece apropiarse pragmáticamente de otra tesis de Baumgarten. De acuerdo con este último autor, “una sensación clara más fuerte que sucede a otra diferente más débil es clarificada por esa misma novedad.” (§549, AA 15: 16). Kant, en cambio, explica: “[l]a novedad fortalece la sensación, así fortalece la mañana del día la sensación del ser humano, porque ella es nueva, por lo tanto la mañana es muy alabada. La alternancia también forma parte de ello, cuando entre las representaciones viejas<sup>23</sup> vienen otras en medio de las mismas, así las viejas vuelven a ser nuevas. Por lo tanto, se tiene que mantener nuevo un divertimento mediante la poca frecuencia con que se lo disfruta, así será siempre agradable.” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 501-502). Aunque no estimamos que el pasaje citado sea enteramente claro, parece evidente que en el mismo Kant extrae una consecuencia pragmática a partir de una tesis baumgartiana. La consecuencia pragmática es la indicación de conceder poca frecuencia a los divertimentos, mientras que la tesis baumgartiana es, en última instancia, que la novedad de una sensación con respecto a las restantes fortalece a la primera.

Durante el período crítico (V-Anth/Mron, 1784-1785), encontramos, entre otras, la temática de la memoria. Según Baumgarten, “[e]l compendio de reglas para el perfeccionamiento de la memoria es el Arte Mnemotécnico” (§587, AA 15: 25). Kant no se limita a afirmar que hay reglas para el perfeccionamiento de la memoria, sino que discute distintos tipos de memorización y da algunas indicaciones. Por ejemplo, para Kant, las novelas, entre otros efectos, fomentan una tendencia al olvido: “[c]ausan más daño que utilidad [...] porque estimulan los nervios [...] y entonces además tienen la desventaja de que uno de ninguna manera las lee con el propósito de retenerlas, sino meramente para divertirse. De esa manera, se presta también poca atención y por eso no se retiene nada de ellas. Por lo tanto, ocurre que después, cuando uno lee otros libros, dirige también tan poca atención a ellos y olvida todo.” (V-Anth/Mron, AA 25:1275). Kant recomienda, entonces, no leer novelas a fin de potenciar la memoria.

Por último, daremos un ejemplo tomando en consideración la versión publicada de la antropología pragmática. De acuerdo con Baumgarten, poseemos una capacidad de previsión o visión anticipada. “Soy consciente de mi futuro estado, y a partir de ahí del futuro estado del mundo (§369). La representación del futuro estado del mundo, y a partir de ahí de mi propio futuro estado es la previsión. Preveo, y a partir de allí tengo la facultad de prever.” (§595, AA 15: 27). Cuando Kant trata este tema en Anth, incluye la siguiente consideración pragmática: “[e]l vivir al día (sin previsión ni cuidado) no honra mucho al entendimiento de los seres humanos [...]. Pero siempre que con ello no se produzca ninguna falta contra la moralidad, se puede tener por más feliz a aquel que es aguerrido para [enfrentarse con] cualquier acontecimiento, que al que con perspectivas siempre sombrías se arruina el gusto por la vida.” (AA 07: 186). Parecería que Kant quiere señalar que es más prudente intentar adoptar una actitud de fortaleza con referencia a los acontecimientos futuros que una actitud sombría respecto de los mismos.

En síntesis, los cuatro casos expuestos en este apartado muestran que Kant transforma pragmáticamente al menos algunas tesis pertenecientes a la psicología empírica de Baumgarten. Por ende, la conclusión del apartado presente es que existe una diferencia

<sup>22</sup> Este párrafo debe mucho a las explicaciones de Wilson 2018, p. 24

<sup>23</sup> Leemos, junto con la traductora de V-Anth/Fried en la edición de Cambridge de las obras de Kant, a saber, G. Felicitas Munzel, “viejas” (*alten*; Kant 2012, p. 72) en lugar de “todas” (*allen*; AA 25: 501).

fundamental no sólo entre la concepción global kantiana de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática del filósofo de Königsberg, sino que también existe una diferencia entre, por un lado, esta psicología tal como está expuesta en el texto de Baumgarten y, por el otro, la antropología que nos ocupa, incluso en sus lecciones más tempranas. De este modo, se presta más sustento a las conclusiones de los primeros dos apartados de este artículo.

#### IV.

Tras haber estudiado las diferencias entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática, intentaremos mostrar en este apartado cuáles son, para Kant, las vinculaciones entre las mismas. Concluiremos que la psicología empírica es la parte de la antropología pragmática que está orientada hacia el examen de los fenómenos dados en el sentido interno. Tal vez uno de los pasajes más importantes para el estudio de las relaciones entre ambas disciplinas sea uno perteneciente a la *Crítica de la razón pura* (KrV).

¿[D]ónde queda la *psicología empírica*, que siempre ha mantenido su puesto en la metafísica [...]? Respondo: ella va a parar allí donde debe ponerse la doctrina de la naturaleza –[la doctrina] propiamente tal (empírica)– a saber, del lado de la filosofía *aplicada*, para la cual la filosofía pura contiene los principios *a priori*, la cual, por consiguiente, debe, por cierto, ser enlazada con aquélla, pero no debe ser confundida con ella. Por consiguiente, la psicología empírica debe ser enteramente desterrada de la metafísica, y está enteramente excluida de ella ya por la idea de ésta. Sin embargo, se deberá seguir concediéndole, empero, según el uso académico, un lugarcito en ella (aunque sólo como digresión); y ello por móviles económicos, porque ella todavía no es tan rica que constituya ella sola un estudio, pero es sin embargo demasiado importante para que se la elimine del todo, o para que se la coloque en otro lugar en el que pudiera encontrar todavía menos afinidad que en la metafísica. Es, por tanto, meramente un extraño que ha sido acogido hasta ahora, al que se le concede asilo por algún tiempo, hasta que pueda ocupar su propia vivienda en una antropología completa ([que es] la pareja correspondiente a la doctrina empírica de la naturaleza). (848-849/B876-B777).

Una de las tesis más importantes de este pasaje es la relativa a la expulsión de la psicología empírica fuera del campo de la metafísica. La razón principal de esta expulsión es que la psicología que nos ocupa tiene un carácter empírico, mientras que la metafísica admite únicamente conocimientos *a priori*.<sup>24</sup> Sin embargo, Kant presenta, “según el uso académico”, dos razones por las cuales la psicología empírica debería permanecer durante cierto tiempo dentro de la metafísica. Es cierto que la psicología empírica “todavía no es tan rica que constituya ella sola un estudio”, pero es “demasiado importante” como para que (1) “se la elimine del todo” o (2) “se la coloque en otro lugar en el que pudiera encontrar todavía menos afinidad que en la metafísica.”

Ahora bien, ¿por qué se afirma que la psicología empírica es “demasiado importante”? Consideramos que es importante porque se ocupa del sentido interno, esto es, es un estudio de una dimensión del ser humano, y según Anth, “[t]odos los progresos en la cultura, por medio de los cuales el ser humano hace su aprendizaje, tienen el propósito de aplicar los conocimientos y habilidades así adquiridos al uso en el mundo; pero en éste, el objeto más importante al cual él puede aplicarlos, es el *ser humano* [mismo]; porque él es su fin último.” (AA 07: 119). Sin embargo, debe notarse que nuestra interpretación parece adjudicar derivadamente a la psicología empírica, en tanto examen del sentido interno

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<sup>24</sup> Esta tesis se encuentra presente ya en V-Anth/Collins, AA 25: 7-8.

humano, un carácter mundano. En efecto, al presentar el pasaje de Anth hemos asignado a esta psicología ciertas tesis del texto mencionado acerca de la aplicación del conocimiento al uso mundano y, consiguientemente, al ser humano. Podría objetarse, entonces, que nuestra exposición entra en conflicto con una de las oposiciones que hemos examinado en el primer apartado de este artículo, a saber, la que se presenta entre el saber escolástico (psicología empírica) y el saber mundano (antropología pragmática).

Puede responderse a la objeción indicada considerando la última parte del pasaje citado de KrV (A848-849/B876-B777). Allí se señala que en algún momento la psicología empírica ocupará “su propia vivienda en una antropología completa”. Por tanto, no es que la psicología empírica sea importante por constituir independientemente un saber mundano, sino que lo es porque está destinada a ser parte de una ciencia mundana, a saber, la antropología pragmática.

Dado que el único método de la psicología empírica es la introspección, y que la antropología pragmática tiene como fuentes el sentido interno y el externo, puede afirmarse que la psicología en cuestión permanece como un cierto enfoque metodológico dentro de la antropología pragmática. En otras palabras, la psicología empírica es la parte de la antropología pragmática que se ocupa de los fenómenos del sentido interno.

Ahora bien, ¿qué función cumple la introspección en el marco de la antropología pragmática? Al comienzo de los “Paralogismos de la razón pura” (KrV), Kant afirma:

todo lo que piensa está constituido de la manera como la sentencia de la conciencia de mí mismo lo declara con respecto a mí. La causa de ello reside en que debemos atribuirles necesariamente, *a priori*, a las cosas, todas las propiedades que constituyen las condiciones sólo bajo las cuales nosotros las pensamos. Ahora bien, de un ente pensante no puedo tener la más mínima representación por una experiencia externa, sino solamente por la conciencia de mí mismo. Por consiguiente, tales objetos no son nada más que la transferencia de esta conciencia mía a otras cosas, que sólo por ello son representadas como entes pensantes. (A346-347/B404-405).

En el pasaje citado no se encuentra ninguna alusión al conocimiento antropológico. Sin embargo, estimamos que es relevante para la comprensión del proceder de esta ciencia. La psicología empírica examina el sentido interno de un ser humano. Este examen da por resultado los esbozos de un conocimiento de, por ejemplo, la memoria (Anth, AA 07: 182-185). A fin de investigar esta cuestión en los demás seres humanos, uno tiene que efectuar una “transferencia de esta conciencia mía” a los demás, a fin de representarlos como seres pensantes semejantes a uno mismo. A partir de este punto, comienza la utilización de los otros recursos metodológicos de la antropología pragmática. Tales recursos presuponen el empleo del sentido externo. Mediante el trato con los demás en sociedad, los viajes o lecturas de libros de viajeros, etc.,<sup>25</sup> se refina, revisa, corrige y amplía el conocimiento mencionado. Por último, la integración del conocimiento en cuestión en la antropología que nos ocupa presupone que este puede aplicarse de un modo pragmático.<sup>26</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Véase el segundo apartado de este trabajo.

<sup>26</sup> Cf. *supra*, n. 19. Aunque en esa nota damos la razón a Frierson 2014 en su crítica a Sturm 2009, acerca de que la fuente primera del conocimiento antropológico es la introspección, no coincidimos con la tesis más importantes de este autor. En primer lugar, no seguimos a Frierson en su tesis según la cual “en muchos sentidos, el contraste entre psicología empírica y antropología pragmática es artificial.” (2014, p. 46). En segundo lugar, no coincidimos con Frierson en lo que hace a su afirmación según la cual la psicología empírica es una ciencia de la naturaleza, aunque en un sentido impropio del término, como la química (2014, pp. 18-27). Con respecto a este último punto, véase MAN, AA 04: 471. La psicología empírica no es una ciencia, sino solamente una parte de la ciencia que es la antropología pragmática (acerca de esta cientificidad,

El pasaje siguiente expresa muy bien la mencionada metodología antropológica: “[e]l conocimiento de la humanidad es al mismo tiempo mi conocimiento. Entonces, tiene que estar a la base un conocimiento natural, según el cual podemos juzgar lo que está a la base de cada ser humano; luego tenemos principios seguros, según los cuales podemos proceder. Por consiguiente tenemos que estudiarnos a nosotros mismos, y porque queremos aplicar eso a los otros, entonces tenemos que estudiar la humanidad” (V-Anth/Fried, AA 25: 471).<sup>27</sup>

A continuación del pasaje citado se dice que ese estudio debe ser pragmático. En el pasaje mismo se afirma claramente que tenemos que estudiarnos y seguidamente aplicar los resultados a los demás. Por este proceder, “el conocimiento de la humanidad es al mismo tiempo mi conocimiento”.<sup>28</sup>

Damos un ejemplo de aplicación de la metodología antropológica. Gracias, fundamentalmente, a la introspección, sabemos que la memoria, cuando menos, tiene “la facultad de *reproducir* voluntariamente la representación pasada” (Anth, AA 07: 182). Ahora bien, la aplicación de la metodología antropológica posibilita indicaciones pragmáticas como la siguiente:

[l]a memorización *ingeniosa* es un método de grabar en la memoria ciertas representaciones mediante la asociación con representaciones secundarias, que en sí (para el entendimiento) no tienen parentesco ninguno entre sí, p. ej. [la asociación de] los sonidos de una lengua con imágenes enteramente heterogéneas que tienen que corresponderles a ellos; con lo cual, para guardar algo en la memoria con mayor facilidad, se la sobrecarga a ésta todavía más con representaciones secundarias; [lo que es,] por consiguiente, *absurdo*, pues es un procedimiento desordenado de la imaginación en la formación de parejas de aquellas cosas que no pueden estar bajo uno y el mismo concepto; y a la vez es una contradicción entre el medio y el propósito, pues se procura aliviar el trabajo de la memoria, pero en verdad se lo hace más pesado al imponerle innecesariamente la asociación de representaciones muy dispares. El que las personas ingeniosas raramente tienen una memoria fiel (*ingeniosis non admodum fida est memoria*) es una observación que explica aquel fenómeno (Ant, AA 07: 183-184).<sup>29</sup>

Indudablemente, el texto citado contiene indicaciones útiles para los interesados en mejorar el funcionamiento de la memoria. Además, posiblemente se recomiende tácitamente no confiar en la memoria de las personas con un ingenio muy desarrollado.

En suma, para Kant, la psicología empírica es parte de la antropología pragmática en la medida en que constituye uno de los recursos metodológicos de la misma. Tal recurso está orientado hacia el estudio de los fenómenos internos. Los resultados de tal estudio

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véase el quinto apartado de este trabajo). Aunque esa psicología sea sistemática, la introspección no alcanza para obtener un conocimiento pragmático válido para todos los seres pensantes.

<sup>27</sup> Véase también Anth, AA 07: 143.

<sup>28</sup> Con respecto a la relación entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática, puede coincidir con esta afirmación de Gary Hatfield: “[l]o que era novedoso acerca de la antropología [MAA: de Kant] era su giro ‘pragmático’, esto es, el uso de material psicológico a fin de proveer orientación a los individuos para ayudarlos a evitar dificultades cognitivas, conseguir autosuperación, y entrar en comportamiento social efectivo” (1998, p. 426). Debería agregarse que esta afirmación es válida principalmente para la primera parte de Anth (“Didáctica antropológica”) y que el material psicológico que Kant utiliza requiere desde el principio reelaboración según la metodología antropológica.

<sup>29</sup> En nota al pie correspondiente al pasaje citado, Kant afirma: “[a]sí, la cartilla ilustrada, tal como la Biblia ilustrada, y hasta la *Doctrina de las Pandectas* representada en imágenes, es una caja óptica de un maestro pueril, para volver a sus alumnos aún más pueriles de lo que eran” (Anth, AA 07: 183-184n.). Notemos que dimos otro ejemplo de conocimiento pragmático referido a la memoria en el apartado anterior de este artículo.

deben ser rectificadas y ampliadas por medio del uso de los restantes recursos metodológicos de la antropología pragmática, recursos que implican el uso del sentido externo.

## V.

En el apartado anterior estudiamos las vinculaciones entre la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática. Hemos visto que, de cierta manera, para Kant, la psicología empírica es la parte de la antropología pragmática que se ocupa de los fenómenos internos. Ahora bien, Kant considera que la psicología empírica no es una ciencia, mientras que su antropología pragmática efectivamente lo es. Una interpretación integral de las relaciones entre estas dos disciplinas presupone una explicación de la diferencia mencionada. Dedicaremos este apartado al estudio de este problema. Concluiremos que la psicología empírica no es una ciencia porque, aunque es sistemática, no admite ni experimentación ni observación duradera y que, en cambio, la antropología pragmática es una ciencia porque es sistemática y admite observación duradera. Una parte importante de este apartado está dedicada al problema de la sistematicidad de la antropología pragmática. Señalaremos, en pocas palabras, siguiendo a Sturm (2009), que esta antropología es sistemática en virtud de su empleo de una doctrina de las facultades fundamentales humanas.

Según Kant, la psicología empírica no puede ser una ciencia propiamente dicha como la física matemática, dado que, a diferencia de esta última, no posee una fundamentación metafísica. Además, tampoco puede ser una ciencia en sentido impropio como la química. La química es una ciencia por ser sistemática y experimental. La psicología empírica, en cambio, aunque sea sistemática, no puede ser una ciencia experimental. Efectivamente, los fenómenos internos, a diferencia de los externos, no pueden observarse duraderamente porque son dados en un flujo constante en el que no hay nada permanente; además, no pueden manipularse a fin de realizar experimentos (MAN, AA 04: 471).<sup>30</sup>

La antropología pragmática tampoco posee una parte de conocimiento metafísico que pueda fundamentarla. Por tal motivo, esta antropología es una disciplina meramente empírica. Ahora bien, Kant estima que la misma es una ciencia (Anth, AA 07: 119). Consideramos que la antropología pragmática es una ciencia porque, en primer lugar, aunque no es experimental como la química, ella emplea efectivamente el sentido externo y puede, entonces, a diferencia de la psicología empírica, proceder mediante observación duradera (Anth, AA 07: 134). En segundo lugar, la antropología pragmática es una ciencia porque es sistemática (Anth, AA 07: 119).<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Véase *supra*, n. 26. Hay un debate en torno a si, para Kant, la psicología empírica es una ciencia. Se han publicado numerosos estudios para mostrar que esta psicología es científica o que no lo es. A fin de no presentar aquí este debate, lo que nos llevaría a efectuar extensas exposiciones, nos permitimos referir a un artículo nuestro, en el cual mostramos que la disciplina en cuestión, para Kant, no es una ciencia: Arias Albisu 2017.

<sup>31</sup> Acerca de las reglas investigadas por esta ciencia, véase *infra*, n. 38. Debe notarse que, aunque Kant considera que la antropología pragmática puede alcanzar el estatus de ciencia, hay dificultades para ello en la naturaleza humana misma. Según Anth: 1) cuando una persona se da cuenta de que uno intenta examinarla, o bien se incomoda y por tanto no puede mostrarse como verdaderamente es, o bien disimula, lo cual es expresión de que no quiere ser conocida como verdaderamente es. 2) También es dificultoso el estudio de uno mismo. Cuando una persona está en un estado tal como una emoción, no puede estudiarse a sí misma en virtud de la acción de los resortes impulsivos de tal estado; y cuando puede observarse a sí misma, los resortes mencionados ya están en reposo. 3) Los diferentes lugares y épocas en los que habitan los seres

Ahora bien, ¿por qué la antropología pragmática es sistemática? Citamos un pasaje de Anth:

[u]na antropología formulada sistemáticamente y sin embargo redactada de manera popular en sentido pragmático [...] tiene, para el público lector, la ventaja de que gracias a la exhaustividad de los títulos bajo los cuales puede ponerse esta o aquella propiedad observada en los seres humanos e incidente en lo práctico, se le dan a él, con ello, otras tantas ocasiones e incitaciones para que haga de cada una [de esas propiedades] un tema por sí, procurando colocarla en el casillero que le corresponda; con lo cual los trabajos, en ella, se reparten por sí mismos entre los aficionados a este estudio, y se unifican poco a poco en una totalidad, a través de la unidad del plan (AA 07: 121-122).

Las características de la antropología pragmática mencionadas en el párrafo citado son su sistematicidad y la exhaustividad de sus títulos o divisiones. Las distintas propiedades de los seres humanos que tienen incidencia en lo práctico (a saber, en este contexto, en lo pragmático) son colocadas sucesivamente bajo los diferentes títulos, con lo cual el sistema se acerca paulatinamente a una totalidad unificada. Esta explicación parece estar consonancia con el concepto de lo científico expuesto en la “Arquitectónica de la razón pura” de KrV: “la unidad sistemática es aquella que primeramente convierte al conocimiento común en ciencia, es decir, que de un mero agregado de ellos hace un sistema” (A832/B860). Pese a las apariencias en contra, este pasaje debe interpretarse en el sentido de que la sistematicidad es un criterio necesario, aunque no suficiente, de científicidad. Recordemos que la psicología empírica es sistemática pero carece de carácter científico (MAN, AA 04: 471). Más adelante del pasaje citado se afirma: “[b]ajo el gobierno de la razón, nuestros conocimientos [...] deben constituir un sistema [...]. Entiendo empero por sistema la unidad de los múltiples conocimientos bajo una idea. Ésta es el concepto racional de la forma de un todo, en la medida en que mediante ese concepto se determina *a priori* tanto la extensión de lo múltiple, como el lugar respectivo de las partes.” (*Ibid.*).

Si esta concepción pudiera aplicarse a la antropología pragmática, entonces existiría una idea de la razón acerca del conocimiento antropológico. Esta idea determinaría la forma de tal conocimiento, es decir, el sistema de los títulos en los cuales este se divide. Mientras más títulos contengan conocimiento de propiedades humanas, y mientras más conocimiento esté contenido en cada uno de los títulos, más se acerca el sistema a su completud. Debe notarse que una disciplina empírica puede aproximarse indefinidamente a su completud, pero nunca puede alcanzarla integralmente (KrV, A642-647/B670-675).

Ahora bien, podría objetarse que las ideas de la razón mencionadas no pueden definir disciplinas empíricas como la antropología pragmática.<sup>32</sup> En este caso, la naturaleza sistemática de esta ciencia debería encontrar otra fundamentación *a priori*. Thomas Sturm considera que esta fundamentación se encuentra en la doctrina de las tres facultades

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humanos producen ciertos hábitos. Tales hábitos son como una segunda naturaleza difícil de distinguir de la primera. (AA 07: 121). Es evidente que tales dificultades no pueden ser insuperables. Si así lo fueran, la antropología pragmática no podría ser tenida por una ciencia. Consideremos las tres dificultades mencionadas. En primer lugar, uno puede examinar a otra persona tratando de no revelar la propia intención. En segundo lugar, uno puede retener y recordar al menos alguna información relativa a un estado emocional que tuvo lugar recientemente. En tercer lugar, la comparación de distintos grupos humanos, actuales o pasados, puede ayudar a determinar qué pertenece a la naturaleza humana y qué es solamente accesorio. Pueden encontrarse intentos de solución de estas dificultades en Sturm 2009, pp. 516-517 y Frierson 2014, pp. 33-41.

<sup>32</sup> Esta objeción es formulada por Brandt 2003, p. 85.

fundamentales de la antropología (la facultad cognoscitiva, el sentimiento de placer y displacer y la facultad apetitiva), doctrina que, en Anth, es expuesta principalmente en la “Didáctica antropológica”. Tal doctrina prestaría fundamento al sistema de los títulos indicado anteriormente. A partir de este punto, nos serviremos del comentario de Sturm de 2009 para explicar la fundamentación mencionada. Coincidimos integralmente con la concepción de este comentarista. Intercalaremos observaciones propias, pero estas tendrán solamente el objetivo de presentar aclaraciones o ejemplificaciones.

Según Sturm, Kant distingue entre las facultades fundamentales teniendo en cuenta las diferentes relaciones entre sujetos y objetos de estados espirituales (EEKU, AA 20: 205s.). Intentaremos explicar, en consonancia con Sturm, esta cuestión. Las tres facultades fundamentales sustentan actos espirituales. Tales actos pueden estar o no estar referidos a objetos. Si no lo están, el acto espiritual es un sentimiento. Si están referidos a objetos, las relaciones pueden ser o bien cognitivas, o bien apetitivas. Si se acepta esta división fundada en “diferencias de relaciones entre sujetos y objetos de estados espirituales”, entonces la concepción kantiana sería completa, esto es, no podría haber más facultades fundamentales; y basal, es decir, las facultades fundamentales no podrían reducirse a otras facultades más fundamentales. (Sturm 2009, pp. 386-387). Debe notarse que, según Sturm, esta tripartición de las facultades está sustentada por el uso de la categoría de causalidad (Sturm 2009, pp. 388-389, 391). La exposición de Sturm no es muy clara en este punto. Por otro lado, Sturm indica que, en el ámbito de la antropología, a diferencia del de la filosofía trascendental, no es relevante la tesis según la cual el sujeto produce cognitivamente el objeto (2009, p. 375). Nosotros estimamos, entonces, que la tripartición de las facultades fundamentales puede entenderse de la siguiente manera: 1) facultad cognoscitiva: un objeto es causa de un estado espiritual en un sujeto; 2) sentimiento de placer y displacer: hay un estado espiritual de un sujeto sin ninguna referencia a un objeto; y 3) facultad apetitiva: un estado espiritual de un sujeto es causa de un objeto. Además, si bien la doctrina de las facultades fundamentales se sirve de la categoría de causalidad y procedería entonces de modo *a priori*, el hecho de que estas facultades existan es, según Sturm, puramente empírico (2009, p. 391).<sup>33</sup>

Ocupémonos ahora de la “Característica antropológica”. Como afirma Sturm, el concepto central de esta segunda parte de Anth es el de carácter. A fin de comprenderlo es preciso examinar la distinción que efectúa Kant entre dos tipos de carácter, a saber, la manera de sentir (*Sinnesart*) y la manera de pensar (*Denkungsart*).<sup>34</sup> En Anth, Kant señala:

[e]n sentido pragmático, la ciencia universal *natural* (no civil) de los signos (semiotica universalis) se sirve de la palabra *carácter* en doble acepción, y a veces dice: cierto ser humano tiene *este* o aquel carácter (físico), y otras veces [dice que] él tiene, en general, *un* carácter (un [carácter] moral), que sólo puede ser uno único, o ninguno. Lo primero es el signo diferencial del ser humano como ser sensible o ser natural; lo segundo, [es el signo diferencial] de él como ser racional dotado de libertad. (AA 07: 285).<sup>35</sup>

<sup>33</sup> Según Sturm, Kant no sólo se ocupa de la completud y la basalidad de su doctrina de las facultades fundamentales, sino también de la conectibilidad de tales facultades (véase Sturm, 2009, p. 394). Ofrecemos un ejemplo nuestro: obtenemos conocimiento de un objeto que incita un sentimiento de placer y posteriormente determinamos la facultad apetitiva para realizar una acción tendiente a obtener tal objeto.

<sup>34</sup> De acuerdo con Sturm, la fijación terminológica vinculada con la diferenciación entre la manera de sentir y la manera de pensar aparece en 1777-1778. Sturm 2009, p. 429.

<sup>35</sup> Véase V-Anth/Pillau, AA 25: 821-822.



En primer lugar, centrémonos en el concepto de “manera de sentir”. El mismo está referido al “signo diferencial del ser humano como ser sensible o natural” y, por tanto, mayormente, a lo que la naturaleza hace del ser humano. Puede afirmarse que esta clase de carácter permite distinguir entre “las disposiciones y capacidades” (Sturm, 2009, p. 412) de los diferentes seres humanos. Sin embargo, su utilidad no está limitada a esta función. “El carácter de un ser humano es la nota diferencial de un ser humano respecto a otro, o del ser humano respecto a otros seres. Este es el carácter de la persona, el del sexo, el de un pueblo y finalmente el carácter de la especie”. (V-Anth/Busolt, AA 25: 1530).<sup>36</sup> En lo que hace a los pueblos, Kant distingue, por ejemplo, entre la “nación francesa” y el “pueblo inglés” (Anth, AA 07: 313-314). Consideramos que el objetivo de estas caracterizaciones es posibilitar una interacción prudente con los diferentes seres humanos o grupos de ellos dotados de diversos caracteres en tanto modos de sentir.

Pasemos ahora al concepto de “manera de pensar”. A diferencia de la manera de sentir, la manera de pensar tiene que ver con lo que el ser humano puede hacer de sí mismo. Es una propiedad de la voluntad. Mediante esta propiedad el sujeto se compromete a aplicar principios prácticos que él mismo se ha impuesto de manera inalterable por la razón en su uso práctico (Anth, AA 07: 292). Recordemos que en el pasaje de Anth (AA 07: 285) citado anteriormente se dice que en el ser humano la manera de pensar lo determina como un “ser racional dotado de libertad.”<sup>37</sup> Como indica Sturm, este carácter como modo de pensar, a diferencia del modo de sentir, no es empleado en un sentido descriptivo y diferenciador. Por el contrario, tiene que ver con la posibilidad de un sujeto de desarrollarse a sí mismo como ser racional. Se trata de entendernos como agentes libres que dan lugar a acciones propias y que, como están en sociedad con otros agentes libres, están en continua interacción con ellos y sus acciones. (Sturm, 2009, p. 419). El modo de pensar, señala también Sturm, debe ser adquirido por el agente mismo.<sup>38</sup> (Sturm, 2009, p. 422).

La sistematicidad de la “Característica antropológica” está conformada, en lo esencial, por una aplicación de la “Didáctica antropológica”. Como afirma Sturm, la teoría del modo de sentir es sistemática por al menos dos razones. En primer lugar, porque para investigar los diferentes modos de sentir esta teoría se sirve de la doctrina sistemática de las facultades y la toma como marco teórico. Por ejemplo, cuando introduce el concepto de “temperamento”, Kant da a entender que al menos el sentimiento de placer y displacer y la facultad apetitiva son tenidos en cuenta para analizar sistemáticamente los temperamentos. (Anth, AA 07: 286). En conexión con lo anterior, la teoría del modo de sentir es también entonces sistemática porque tiende a una clasificación de las propiedades concretas de los agentes humanos y ayuda consiguientemente a aproximar el conocimiento del ser humano

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<sup>36</sup> En Anth se estudia también el carácter de la razas (AA 07: 320-321).

<sup>37</sup> Lorini señala con acierto que la manera de pensar “se refiere a la libertad del sujeto” y es “una modalidad de actualización de un principio que está enraizado en el sujeto, y expresa así a la voluntad mediante la cual la razón se aplica en la acción” (2018, p. 73). Para un examen de las tensiones y la génesis del concepto de carácter, véase Jacobs 2003.

<sup>38</sup> Sturm distingue agudamente entre las leyes naturales y las reglas discutidas en la antropología pragmática: “[l]as reglas mediante las que el antropólogo kantiano explica el obrar de los seres humanos con referencia a su modo de pensar no son simplemente regularidades o leyes bajo las cuales el obrar puede caer o no. Como actor, uno no está de manera indiferente frente a una regla sobre la que se ha reflexionado mediante consideraciones racionales propias y que se ha convertido en parte del propio modo de pensar. Se la considera más bien como norma que uno mismo ha examinado minuciosamente y aceptado, y esto significa no en último lugar: que uno excluye ciertas otras reglas para el propio obrar.” (Sturm 2009, p. 423).

a la totalidad del mismo definida por la antropología pragmática como ciencia (Sturm 2009, p. 410).<sup>39</sup>

Con respecto a la doctrina del modo de pensar, su sistematicidad también está vinculada con la teoría de las facultades. Kant emplea su concepción de las facultades fundamentales para estudiar al ser humano como agente libre (Sturm, 2009, p. 526). Nosotros estimamos que la facultad más relevante es en este caso la apetitiva, especialmente en su forma de razón práctica, si bien la primera está en interacción con las dos restantes. En este caso, las otras dos facultades fundamentales están subordinadas a la primera. Piénsese, por ejemplo, que la ley moral tiene como efecto subjetivo un sentimiento de respeto (GMS, AA 04: 400-401 y KpV, AA 05: 71-89);<sup>40</sup> y que la realización de una acción moral exige un conocimiento de al menos ciertos entes. Por último, notemos que una indicación pragmática presente en la “Característica antropológica” consiste en preferir el trato de personas con carácter, dado que ellas poseen principios racionales inalterables y se sabe entonces qué se puede esperar de las mismas. (Anth, AA 07: 285).

Ya expuestas las notas fundamentales de la psicología empírica y la antropología pragmática, podemos concluir este apartado intentando responder a la pregunta acerca de la integración de la primera disciplina en la segunda. La psicología empírica no es una ciencia porque considera el flujo constante de los fenómenos internos. Tales fenómenos no admiten ni experimentación ni observación rigurosa. Sin embargo, al estar incluida dentro de la antropología pragmática como enfoque metodológico que concierne a los fenómenos mencionados, la psicología empírica puede y debe ser complementada por los restantes recursos metodológicos de esta ciencia. Tales recursos metodológicos suponen la posibilidad de observación duradera mediante el sentido externo. De este modo, mediante la conjunción de la autoobservación y, por ejemplo, la interacción con los demás, obtenemos un conocimiento sistemático de nuestras facultades. Tal conocimiento es presentado en la “Didáctica antropológica” de Anth. En lo que respecta a la “Característica antropológica”, hemos visto que las doctrinas de la manera de sentir y la manera de pensar son sistemáticas, al menos en parte, porque aplican la sistemática doctrina de las facultades. No está de más recordar que todo este conocimiento es expuesto en intención pragmática. Por último, recordemos que la antropología pragmática es una ciencia por ser sistemática y por proceder mediante observación duradera.

## VI.

En este apartado presentaremos las conclusiones de este artículo. Nos hemos ocupado de mostrar que Kant toma ocasionalmente contenidos de la psicología empírica de Baumgarten y los redefine de una forma pragmática. Además, expusimos las características definitorias de la antropología pragmática y señalamos sus diferencias con respecto a la interpretación kantiana de la psicología empírica. También señalamos que, para Kant, la psicología empírica no es una ciencia y la antropología pragmática efectivamente lo es. Concluimos que la psicología empírica, en tanto enfoque metodológico consistente en la introspección, es una parte integrante de la antropología pragmática.

<sup>39</sup> Véase más arriba la cita del pasaje de Anth (AA 07: 121-122) y los párrafos que siguen a la misma.

<sup>40</sup> En Anth no se considera el sentimiento de respeto, pero sí se discute un similar “sentimiento moral” (AA 07: 324).

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**Reflexión y concepto en Hegel. Una aportación a las raíces  
kantianas de la *Ciencia de la Lógica***

***Reflection and notion according to Hegel. A contribution to the  
Kantian Roots of the Science of Logic***

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**Resumen**

La presente investigación trata de los conceptos de reflexión entre Kant y Hegel, y sobre cómo su tratamiento hegeliano conduce sus teorías del concepto y de la subjetividad. Partiendo de la diferencia entre inicio y principio de la filosofía propuesta por Hegel, trata de exponer su continuación y crítica del proyecto kantiano. Hegel delimitará, denunciará y expondrá las carencias teóricas kantianas y, simultáneamente, propondrá la superación de estas mediante el movimiento inmanente de los objetos, aprehensible mediante la reflexión inmanente, que termina por diluir la distinción kantiana entre razón y sujeto, y su escisión entre pensar y ser.

**Palabras clave:**

Hegel; Kant; Reflexión; Concepto; *Ciencia de la Lógica*

**Abstract:**

The present research glimpses the concepts of reflection between Kant and Hegel, and how its Hegelian treatment leads them to Concept and subjectivity. Starting from the difference between beginning and principle of philosophy proposed by Hegel, it is exposed his continuation and criticism of the Kantian project. Hegel will delimit, denounce and expose the Kantian theoretical deficiencies and, simultaneously, he will propose its overcoming through the immanent movement of objects, which is apprehensible through immanent reflection, which ends up diluting the Kantian split between reason and subjectivity and among thinking and being.

**Key words:**

Hegel; Kant; Reflection; Concept; *Science of Logic*

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## 1. Introducción

Hegel al inicio de la doctrina de la esencia en la *Ciencia de la lógica*<sup>1</sup> pone en relación las determinaciones reflexivas estudiadas en esa parte de la lógica, con la lógica del concepto. La lógica de la esencia

comprende las determinaciones de reflexión propiamente dichas [...]. La esencia no es aún el concepto mismo, sino que constituye primero la región de la reflexión como movimiento hacia el concepto (*CL* II: 210-211; *GW*: 11/32).

Las determinaciones de reflexión no son una pieza teórica hegeliana, sino que constituyen el núcleo de la “Anfibología” de la *Crítica de la razón pura* (*KrV*, A 260/B316 – A 292/B 349), añadida por Kant como apéndice al final de la analítica trascendental, donde critica el uso de estos conceptos por Leibniz.

Kant tiene que reconocer, al añadir como *Apéndice* de la Lógica trascendental o Doctrina del entendimiento un Tratado sobre los *conceptos de reflexión*: una esfera que se halla entre la *intuición* y el *entendimiento*, o sea entre el ser y el concepto (*CL* II: 134; *GW*: 12/19).

Estos conceptos de reflexión son para Kant los siguientes: identidad/diferencia, concordancia/discordancia, interior/exterior y, materia/forma. Se trata de conceptos sumamente importantes porque ellos fundan los cuatro tipos posibles de juicios:<sup>2</sup> por ejemplo, los juicios universales se basan en la identidad de muchas representaciones, los particulares en la diferencia de unas representaciones respecto de otras; cuando varias representaciones concuerdan entonces tenemos juicios afirmativos, etc. Como es bien sabido, la tabla de los tipos de juicios posibles es la base de la deducción trascendental en la primera edición de la *Crítica*.

La Anfibología, pese a ser un apéndice, es una pieza central en la *Crítica*. Actúa como puente entre la Analítica y la Dialéctica trascendentales. Respecto de la Analítica, Hegel se pronuncia muy favorablemente ya que por ella “la filosofía crítica convirtió ya a la metafísica en lógica” (*CL* I: 200; *GW*: 11/22). También valora que Kant situase en el ápice de la *Crítica*

la dialéctica —y este aspecto constituye uno de sus más grandes méritos—, al quitarle la apariencia de arbitrariedad que según la representación habitual tenía, y al exponerla como un hacer necesario de la razón (*CL* I: 204; *GW*: 11/26).

Pese a ello las exposiciones dialécticas de Kant “no [le] merecen gran alabanza» (*Ídem*). Advertida esta primera deficiencia se hace comprensible que el propio Hegel concibiese su

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<sup>1</sup> Citaré la *Ciencia de la lógica* (trad. Duque) como *CL* seguido del volumen y número de página tal y como recomienda la Sociedad Española de Estudios sobre Hegel. Añado su indicación en la *Gesammelte Werke* *GW* seguido de tomo y página. El volumen II apareció en 2015.

<sup>2</sup> Para un explicación y defensa de esta idea, véase: Vigo (2006).

lógica objetiva como “la crítica de verdad” (CL I: 211; GW: 11/32). La *Ciencia de la lógica* no es concebible sin Kant ni sin la crítica a Kant. Este es el objeto de estudio concreto de esta investigación.

Autores como Pipin (1989), Longuenesse (2007), McDowell (2009) o Beiser (2020) han concebido a Hegel como *el* continuador del proyecto kantiano.<sup>3</sup> Desde la perspectiva aquí defendida, estimo que Kant y Hegel siguen caminos divergentes, tras haber realizado un trecho juntos, pese a que Hegel tenga la impresión de no haber abandonado el camino andado con Kant, sino de estar prolongándolo.

Esta investigación comienza por el concepto de reflexión. Como veremos, para Hegel la reflexión es inicio, o comienzo, de la filosofía a la par que principio, en el sentido de fundamento. Pero, que la determinación del inicio sea reflexiva, y que al concepto se acceda reflexivamente, no puede llevar a confundir inicio y verdad. Esto según Hegel es “un malentendido capital” (CL II: 136; GW: 12/22) al que sucumbe Kant.

Hegel diferenciará dos grandes sentidos de la reflexión: la relativa o hacia otro —*Reflexion-in-Anderes*—, y la absoluta o hacia dentro —*Reflexion-in-sich*— (Enc, §121),<sup>4</sup> estudiadas respectivamente en la lógica de la esencia y la lógica del concepto. La primera es una reflexión que *sale* de sí —*exitus*— y se encuentra con lo otro. La segunda es una reflexión que *vuelve* a su interior —*reditus*— (Valls, 2018: 164).

La reflexión que sale de sí, extrínseca, fue muy estudiada por la filosofía moderna, en particular por Leibniz y Kant. Hegel estima que los diversos sentidos estudiados de la reflexión (lógica y trascendental) por Kant en la “Anfibología” son *subjetivos*. No en un sentido subjetivista, que introduciría el relativismo y el escepticismo, sino en un sentido muy profundo que involucra al sujeto trascendental en las operaciones reflexivas. Hegel intenta dotar de sentido objetivo a la reflexión, pues toda reflexión implica no solo un *reflejo* —un *salir*—, sino un *objeto* que *emite* ese brillo (*Schein*)<sup>5</sup> y al que la reflexión debe *volver* (Valls, 2018: 164).

La doctrina de la esencia estudia *el ser* como brillo o apariencia. Así el comienzo se justifica retrospectivamente, y el inicio no se confunde con el principio o con la verdad. Hegel no se cansó jamás de insistir, incluso en su mayor periodo de senectud, en que todo “avanzar es un retroceder hacia el fundamento, hacia lo originario y verdadero, del cual depende el principio con que se comenzó y por el que en realidad es producido”.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> En general, también prácticamente todas las publicaciones en *The Palgrave Hegel Handbook* que declaran, sin ningún miedo a esconderlo, intentar recopilar textos que muestran a Hegel como heredero y deudor de Kant. Véase: Bykova & Westphal, (2020).

<sup>4</sup> Citaré como *Enc*. Siempre se cita la tercera edición, por lo que se omite la C habitual, y a continuación el párrafo.

<sup>5</sup> Para las traducciones de las nociones de Hegel del alemán al español sigo las traducciones propuestas por Ramón Valls Plana.

<sup>6</sup> CL I, sigo aquí la edición de 1831, no traducida por Duque. La referencia en la *Sämtliche Werke* editada por Suhrkamp es 5/60.

## 2. La reflexión

### 2.1. Los sentidos subjetivo y objetivo de la reflexión

La reflexión en general es i) comienzo o inicio de la filosofía; y ii) principio, en el sentido de fundamento (*Enc*, §7). Se trata de dos sentidos muy distintos, y sin embargo conectados, de la reflexión. El primero subjetivo o cognoscitivo, el segundo objetivo u ontológico.

Que el saber y la ciencia tienen su *inicio* en la reflexión es una tesis *habitual*. Hegel recuerda en su “Lógica de la esencia” que

la reflexión viene tomada de manera habitual en un sentido subjetivo, como movimiento del Juicio que va más allá de una representación dada inmediata y busca para ésta determinaciones universales o las compara con ella (*CL I*: 452; *GW*: 11/254).

Lo propio del reflexionar es *producir* universalidades, conceptos (*Enc*, §20), desde lo dado inmediatamente. *Lo dado*, al reflexionar, es transformado en un *concepto*. Así, la actividad reflexiva surge de la advertencia de que lo dado inmediatamente no es lo último. No contentarse con lo dado es pues el origen de la ciencia y del filosofar. Este cambio, o transformación, es el resultado de la reflexión. Por ello, la reflexión es por una parte un volver —*Nach*— a pensar —*denken*—; y, por otra, un tipo peculiar de actividad de pensar: actividad negativa. La reflexión supone la negación de la inmediatez (*Ídem*).

En la *Crítica del Juicio*, Kant apela a la reflexión como constitutiva de todo juicio. Juzgar es pensar lo particular como subsumido bajo lo universal. Si lo universal está dado, por ejemplo, en la forma de una ley, entonces aplicamos lo universal a lo particular. Así hacemos ciencia y el tipo de juicio que tenemos son llamados por Kant *determinantes*. Pero si hemos de encontrar lo universal, entonces el juicio es propiamente *reflexionante*. Hegel caracteriza este tipo de reflexión como “el ir *más allá y fuera de sí* por parte de algo inmediato hasta hacerse universal” (*CL I*: 452; *GW*: 11/254). Un ir fuera de sí, fuera de lo dado inmediatamente, del singular o ente inmediato, buscando reflexivamente un concepto que dé razón de aquél como su ley, su principio o, su esencia.

Pues bien, Hegel, en confrontación directa con Kant, distingue de esta reflexión *externa* (o extrínseca) un sentido de la reflexión que él denomina *absoluta* o *inmanente*. Al encontrar reflexionando el universal, principio, regla o ley, encontramos la esencia de lo dado inmediatamente y en lo que tenía inicio nuestra reflexión. Esta ley, esta esencia, es precisamente la que *genera y determina*<sup>7</sup> realmente lo dado como lo que es verdaderamente. Es decir, la que justifica retroactivamente lo dado inicialmente. Salíamos reflexivamente

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<sup>7</sup> En la *Ciencia de la Lógica* Hegel estudia tres sentidos de la reflexión: ponente, externa, y determinante, pero también contrapone, la absoluta a la externa o extrínseca —*außerliches*—. Es decir, el movimiento absoluto de la reflexión frente a la mera reflexión externa que critica a Kant y a la metafísica anterior a este (Jaeschke, 1978).



de lo dado, y al encontrar aquello que lo principia verdaderamente, encontramos el mismo ser de lo dado. El ser del que se partía se *desvanece*, como aparente, cuando es confrontado con su esencia. He aquí la reflexión absoluta (CL I: 453; GW: 11/254). Así, en la reflexión lo finito se anonada en aquello que lo funda absolutamente.

Esta distinción entre inicio y fundamento era también capital para Kant. En efecto constituye la *primera tesis* de la *Crítica de la razón pura*: “aunque nuestro conocimiento empiece con la experiencia, no por eso procede todo él *de la experiencia*” (KrV B1). Hegel podía tener la impresión de que mantener esta *primera tesis* era no apartarse del camino inaugurado por Kant (Ferrarin, 2016: 183).

La metafísica dogmática había buscado establecer con determinaciones de reflexión las *leyes o principios del saber*:

las *determinaciones de reflexión* solían venir aprehendidas en otro tiempo en *forma de proposiciones*, enunciando así de ellas su *validez en todo respecto*. Estas proposiciones valían como *leyes universales del pensar*, situadas como fundamento de todo pensar, siendo en ellas mismas absolutas e indemostrables, aunque reconocidas y admitidas de inmediato y de manera indiscutida por cualquier pensar como verdaderas (CL I: 457; GW: 11/258).

Leyes de este tipo eran las de identidad (A=A),<sup>8</sup> las de no contradicción,<sup>9</sup> las de tercio excluso,<sup>10</sup> etc., que se predicaban de *todo*, o del *ser*, y regirían absolutamente sobre el pensar, y también sobre el ser (piénsese en el principio de individuación,<sup>11</sup> o el de razón suficiente<sup>12</sup>). En ellas aparecen una serie de conceptos: identidad, igualdad, diferencia, diversidad, oposición, fundamento, condición, que Hegel denomina, siguiendo a Kant, *determinaciones de la reflexión*, y que constituyen la parte central de la sección primera de la doctrina de la esencia. Como veremos, Hegel encontrará el “fundamento de todo pensar” no en estas determinaciones de reflexión, sino en su interpretación de la función kantiana de aperccepción trascendental. Pero antes hemos de estudiar los conceptos de reflexión.

## 2.2. Origen de la teoría hegeliana de la reflexión en la teoría kantiana de los conceptos de reflexión

Kant distingue en la primera *Crítica* entre reflexión lógica —*logische Reflexion*— y reflexión trascendental —*transzendente Reflexion, transzendente Überlegung* (KrV., A 260 ss., B 316 ss.). La reflexión lógica es una comparación que el entendimiento realiza entre varios conceptos con objeto de (i.) determinar si son el mismo o son diferentes, (ii.) si uno está implicado analíticamente en otro, o si por el contrario se le añade sintéticamente, y (iii.) si uno es determinable por el otro como la materia por la forma. La reflexión

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<sup>8</sup> Para la crítica de Hegel en este punto, véase: *Enc.* § 115N y § 117N.

<sup>9</sup> Para la crítica de Hegel en este punto, véase: *Enc.* § 119N.

<sup>10</sup> Para la crítica de Hegel en este punto, véase: *Enc.* § 119N.

<sup>11</sup> Para la exposición de Hegel sobre el principio de individuación: *Enc.* § 117N.

<sup>12</sup> Para la exposición de Hegel sobre la razón suficiente: *Enc.* § 121N y § 122N.

trascendental atiende a la facultad en que se originan los conceptos reflexivos. En la introducción a la *Crítica del Juicio*, Kant trata, como dijimos, del juicio reflexionante — *reflectierende*— que busca un universal para un particular dado. La reflexión, ya lógica, ya trascendental, se ejerce para alcanzar un concepto, que es el resultado de la comparación reflexiva. Según Hegel este concepto que se alcanza es externo a la idea dada de la que parte la reflexión (*Enc*, §214 N).

El término de este reflexionar del entendimiento no cae dentro de la idea analizada. El entendimiento alcanza este concepto por medio de reflexiones ulteriores, *distintas* a su vez de la que alcanzó a iluminar la primera idea. Para ello el entendimiento ha de comparar, contrastar, distinguir, o diferenciar una idea bien determinada respecto de otras.

Hegel continúa la estela kantiana sobre la reflexión lógica y el juicio reflexionante al tratar de la reflexión extrínseca, y también al poner esta en relación con la actividad del entendimiento —que *compara* y encuentra relaciones lógico-conceptuales como las de igualdad y/o diversidad de lo dado con un tercero—. Kant piensa también que el sujeto al reflexionar realiza movimientos entre los objetos que está comparando, y eso es probar, o deducir. De resultas, Hegel mantiene en cierto sentido una tensión con la manera de reflexionar de Kant en su *Ciencia de la lógica* —y más tarde recopilado nuevamente en su *Enciclopedia*. ¿En qué sentido la reflexión mantiene una tensión en el pensamiento de Hegel?

El uso kantiano de la reflexión es llamado por Hegel *extrínseco*, porque el sujeto encuentra desde *fuera* la igualdad o diversidad que pone. Reflexionar entonces es la actividad de igualar o desigualar una representación dada con otra externa a ella. Hegel aclara que el entendimiento (*Verstand*) opera separando y fijando las representaciones y fenómenos que logra: “El pensamiento en cuanto entendimiento se queda parado en la determinidad fija y en la distintividad de ella frente a otra” (*Enc*, §80). No advierte entonces que lo universal y lo particular no están separados, sino que lo universal *pone* o determina lo particular. Esto es lo que mantiene en tensión al pensamiento de Hegel frente al de Kant. Hegel termina criticando al juicio reflexionante kantiano que, al reflexionar sobre lo dado para encontrar un universal del cual lo dado sea caso, la esencia universal que encontramos es la que hace o determina a lo particular como particular (*Enc*, § 175). Es como si separásemos una totalidad, como la universidad, de las aulas, los despachos, el personal, las bibliotecas, etc.,<sup>13</sup> sin reparar en que estos elementos particulares son *puestos* por el todo, en este ejemplo la universidad. La separación entre lo universal y lo particular —las facultades, aulas, bibliotecas, despachos, laboratorios, etc.— es ilegítima, y así esta reflexión es ciega para advertir la totalidad que forman.

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<sup>13</sup> Este famoso ejemplo no es propio, sino que pertenece a Ryle en su obra *El concepto de lo mental*. Él lo utiliza para demostrar la existencia de eso que se denomina “mente” véase: Ryle (2005). Sin embargo, el mismo ejemplo puede ofrecer una relectura muy clarificadora para el caso que estamos exponiendo, y aunque se respete su autoría, se ofrece como ejemplo de lo que tratamos de exponer.

### 3. La reflexión inmanente en el plano cognoscitivo

La reflexión es inmanente porque permanece —*manere*— dentro de las partes, de lo que determinamos y observamos empíricamente, reuniéndolas *en —in—* un todo. Así las partes no son extrañas entre sí, sino *momentos* de un proceso en el que cada parte está en relación con las otras, y en esta relación se encuentran junto a sí, consigo mismas.

Habíamos dicho que lo propio del entendimiento es fijar, es decir, establecer en un *ser-así*. Cuando lo conocido se advierte como generando y determinado desde sí y por sí otras determinaciones como *momentos* de un proceso reflexivo, entonces se advierte que el momento *particular* se desliga de su ser-así, de su determinación *inmediata* —en la que permanece obstinada para la mentalidad analítica y la consideración del entendimiento— y se liga en cambio a lo otro. Está en lo otro cabe sí. En lo otro es más idéntico consigo, o se afirma más a sí mismo, es más sí mismo.

La reflexión inmanente es superación de la división entre lo idéntico y lo distinto subsumiendo a ambas nociones en una misma unidad conceptual. Hablando de cómo reflexiona el espíritu sobre sí mismo en el Derecho, pero de un modo que se puede extender a todo otro tipo de reflexión inmanente, Hegel afirma que

la reflexión inmanente [...] ha de ir más allá de su *particularidad*, como también de su *inmediatez* natural y ha de conferir a su contenido racionalidad y objetividad (*Enc.* § 474N).

La reflexión inmanente ha de superar las limitaciones del entendimiento, es la que hace aprehensible el concepto, o la verdad de lo objetivo, comprendiendo las relaciones que estos objetos guardan necesariamente. Al aprehender así la objetividad, entonces aprehende lo que esos objetos son en verdad, su mismidad real.

El concepto es lo común a la multitud de particularidades en que se realiza, y por ello su identidad no es abstracta, como la expresada en la tautología  $A=A$ . Más bien es una identidad que se alcanza a sí misma diferenciándose o particularizándose. El pensar especula cuando, al igual que el espejo, refleja o expresa *lo mismo* que en la realidad está sucediendo. Lo mismo es pensar y ser. Y por eso, la reflexión inmanente no es solo cognoscitiva, sino primariamente ontológica —como se verá en la siguiente sección— siendo reflexión *de lo*, y no solo *sobre lo*, procesual. De lo que no hay duda es de que Hegel propone es un dinamismo reflexivo ontológico y también cognoscitivo frente al estatismo reflexivo tradicional, tan propio de la reflexión extrínseca que aísla y fija mentalmente. Pero aislar es abstraer, es decir separar mentalmente el pensar del ser.

4. La reflexión inmanente en el plano ontológico: el concepto  
4.1. La naturaleza del concepto en confrontación con la crítica kantiana

Hegel elabora su “concepto del concepto” (CL II: 131; GW 12/16) en las primeras páginas del volumen II de la *Ciencia de la Lógica* que tratan “del concepto en general” (*Ibid.*: 125-142. GW: 12/11-27). Hegel pone ahí entre paréntesis nuestro concepto inmediato de concepto. Creemos saber qué es concepto, sin necesidad de reflexionar sobre ello. Pero si para alcanzar el concepto de cualquier objeto hemos de reflexionar, ¿por qué se nos habría de ahorrar la reflexión para saber la naturaleza de ese objeto al que llamamos “concepto”? (*Ibid.*: 125; GW: 12/11) Por ello no resulta extraño que la reflexión sobre “la naturaleza del concepto” (*Ídem*) cambie la comprensión inmediata y prerreflexiva del mismo.<sup>14</sup> Además, Hegel constata que en la historia de la filosofía se ha reflexionado poco acerca del concepto “presuponiendo que cualquiera entiende ya de suyo el asunto cuando se habla del concepto” (CL II: 131; GW: 12/16), y que no es infrecuente que los filósofos coloquen como lo supremo y absoluto, *lo inconcebible, lo indecible, etc.* (*Ídem*).

Según nuestro saber inmediato, prerreflexivo, parece que los conceptos son subjetivos. “Yo tengo conceptos y tengo al concepto, al igual que tengo un vestido, un color y otras propiedades exteriores” (*Ibid.*: 132; GW: 12/17). Pero las cosas no son tan sencillas. Situándonos entre los objetos que tenemos como dados, ¿es lo mismo tener sentimientos, que sensaciones, representaciones o conceptos? La respuesta negativa es obvia. Es algo que podemos encontrar en cualquier reflexión científica o filosófica sobre el conocimiento. Cuando las ciencias comienzan a reflexionar sobre el concepto, lo sitúan en estratos o niveles muy diferentes. Por ejemplo

En *psicología*, son el *sentimiento* y la *intuición*, y luego la *representación* en general los estadios precedentes al entendimiento. En la *fenomenología* del espíritu, en cuanto doctrina de la conciencia, se ascendió por medio de los estadios de la *conciencia sensible*, y luego de la *percepción*, hasta el entendimiento. Kant hace que precedan a éste solamente sentimiento e intuición (*Ibid.*: 134; GW: 12/19).

Y hay que añadir, que Hegel, en la *Ciencia de la Lógica*, hace preceder al concepto de las esferas del ser y la de la esencia. Así las cosas, lo primero que habría que decir sobre la naturaleza del concepto, es que es diferente, y superior, a las de otras formas de conocer. Más aún, para muchos filósofos es la suprema forma que adopta el conocimiento, su nivel más alto. Además, en el repaso que Hegel realiza a la tópica del concepto en la teoría del conocimiento kantiana, no se le escapa que, los conceptos de reflexión kantianos median

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<sup>14</sup> Para distinguir ambas, a partir de ahora la propuesta de Hegel en este ámbito distinguiré ortográficamente entre “concepto” (sentido usual) y “Concepto” (sentido hegeliano). En la introducción de su *Enciclopedia* afirma que “hay que distinguir entre lo que se llama concepto en sentido especulativo y lo que usualmente se denomina así” (Hegel, *Enc.* § 9N). Por eso es conveniente distinguirlos como el propio autor pone de sobre aviso.

entre la intuición y el entendimiento, entre lo inmediato —para Hegel el ser— y el concepto.

Esta apreciación kantiana tiene su correlato en la estructura de la *Ciencia de la Lógica*. La doctrina de la esencia trata, como hemos visto, de los conceptos de reflexión. Y justamente su culminación es la que abre paso al tratamiento hegeliano del concepto. Por otra parte, parece coherente admitir que de lo intuido inmediatamente en el espacio y el tiempo solo logramos su concepto por medio de la reflexión.

En cualquier caso, lo primero que podemos establecer como perteneciente a la naturaleza del concepto, es que éste es intelectual, mientras que los sentimientos, intuiciones y representaciones no lo son, sino que son respectivamente anímicos, sensibles e imaginativos<sup>15</sup>. Ahora bien, el intelecto es una facultad capaz de diversas operaciones, al menos para Kant las del entendimiento y las de la razón. Por eso hay conceptos puros (las categorías), empíricos (que dan lugar a conocimientos objetivos, y son síntesis a priori del entendimiento), y racionales (las ideas). Hegel denomina a las ideas precisamente así, “conceptos de razón —*Vernunftbegriffe*—” (CL II: 138; GW: 12/23).

Quizá sea el tratamiento kantiano del concepto un buen indicador de lo que habitualmente se suele entender por concepto. Hegel piensa que, para Kant, igual que para la mayoría del público, culto o no,

el concepto mismo viene tomado como algo *meramente subjetivo*, algo de lo cual no cabe *entresacar realidad* —entendiendo por tal la objetividad, ya que está enfrentada a la subjetividad— y, en general, el concepto y lo Lógico vienen explicados como algo solamente *formal*: aquello que, por hacer abstracción del contenido, no contendría verdad (*Ibid.*: 134; GW 12/19).

El concepto es tomado habitualmente como una mera forma del conocimiento. Su estudio correspondería a la lógica formal. Así lo consideraron Aristóteles, los estoicos, los escolásticos, y Leibniz antes de Kant. En cuanto mera forma es indiferente al contenido conocido. Para la mayor parte de pensadores, siguiendo en esto el nominalismo tardomedieval, la realidad del concepto no trasciende al cognoscente, tan solo tiene una funcionalidad epistemológica. Son lo tenido por un sujeto en su entendimiento, aunque se refiera, de un modo muy diverso, a la realidad que le hace frente objetivamente en el mundo. Realidad de la que sabemos intuitivamente. Aquí reaparece el nominalismo. Hegel se sitúa en las antípodas de esta postura,<sup>16</sup> denunciando que

Es de veras ilícito hacer valer esa estofa, dada por la intuición y la representación, como lo *real* frente al concepto. “No es más que un concepto”,

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<sup>15</sup> Esta idea es asentada por Hegel desde su *Protoenciclopedia*. Hegel dedica en esta obra al Concepto los §§ 54-57 como parte de la lógica subjetiva. Sin embargo, es en la primera sección de su tercera parte, “la ciencia del espíritu”, en la que Hegel se dedica a diferenciar el sentimiento, de las representaciones (Hegel, 2007: §§ 131-162).

<sup>16</sup> Leonardo Polo ha desarrollado la tesis de que el idealismo es una respuesta al nominalismo. Véase: Polo (2015 b).

suele decirse cuando no es sólo la idea, sino la existencia sensible, espacial y temporal, al alcance de la mano, lo tenido como algo ahí enfrente que sería más excelente que el concepto (CL II: 135; GW 12/21).

En consecuencia, la realidad estaría de un lado y el concepto de otro. Ambos enfrentados como el objeto al sujeto. Pero éste último no es capaz, como se lamenta Kant, de *intuición intelectual*. Es decir, el sujeto cognoscente humano sufre “la *incapacidad* del entendimiento, el no dar acogida a tal riqueza, y el tener que contentarse con la indigente abstracción” (*Ibid.*: 136; GW 12/21). Aquí radica el núcleo del agnosticismo kantiano. Kant separa *ser* y *pensar*, escinde la realidad del pensamiento,<sup>17</sup> al separar la forma del pensamiento de su contenido, lo puro de lo empírico. Nada tiene que decir un “concepto” sobre la realidad a que se refiere. El concepto es algo meramente formal, y para tener alcance real debe subordinarse a la materia empírica. Ésta es lo verdaderamente valioso, comparada con los conceptos, meras abstracciones vacías y formales (*Enc*, §51 N). Y esto alcanza una gravedad mayor cuando se trata de las ideas de la razón pura, los conceptos de la razón —*Vernunftbegriffe*— de que hablamos antes. Las ideas de la facultad racional

ya no tienen nada *constitutivo*, como lo tienen aún las categorías; son *meras ideas*: bien cabe que esté *permitido* hacer uso de ellas; pero con estas entidades inteligibles —en las que debiera salir a la luz de par en par toda *verdad*— no debe mentarse otra cosa —según se dice— que *hipótesis*; atribuirles una verdad en y para sí sería una completa arbitrariedad y loca temeridad; ya que ellas *no pueden venir a darse en experiencia alguna* (CL II: 138; GW: 12/23).

La separación del ser respecto del pensar aquí es radical. Las ideas, según Kant, solo *fingen*, es decir, dan existencia ideal a lo que no sabemos si la tiene, a fin de encontrar regularidades y unificaciones en la naturaleza (Allison, 2001: 38).

Si volvemos, no a nuestro parecer prerreflexivo sobre el concepto, sino al tratamiento científico y filosófico del concepto, se puede afirmar un punto en el que parece haber unanimidad. Y es que “la unidad constituye la esencia del *concepto*” (CL II: 132; GW 12/17). Desde el *dictum* aristotélico que sostiene que solo se conoce lo uno, hasta la tematización por parte de epistemólogos contemporáneos, como Carlos Moulinés, según la cual los conceptos “son las unidades más básicas de toda forma de conocimiento humano” (Moulines, 1997: 21), parece existir cierta concordia sobre este extremo.

Pues bien, el “concepto del concepto” arranca de este extremo:

Es una de las más profundas y justas intelecciones que se encuentran en la *Crítica de la razón* la de que la unidad, que constituye la *esencia* del *concepto*, sea reconocida como unidad *originariamente-sintética de la apercepción*, como unidad del *Yo pienso*, o sea, de la autoconciencia (CL II: 132; GW 12/17-18).

<sup>17</sup> Sobre la escisión entre pensar y ser tras el nominalismo y el empirismo subsiguiente, véase: García (2014).

Que esta unidad sea esencial al concepto implica que ha de diferenciar al concepto de los sentimientos, las intuiciones, o las representaciones. Un concepto ante todo es una unidad lograda por una facultad, el intelecto humano, y que es incapaz de ser lograda por otros niveles o facultades cognoscitivas. Siempre aprehendemos intelectualmente unidades, sean estas sintéticas o analíticas. Pero hablar de

*síntesis* conduce fácilmente de nuevo a la representación de una unidad *exterior* y de un *mero enlace* de cosas tales que, en y para sí, están separadas. Además, la filosofía kantiana se ha atendido solamente a [...] la permanente condicionalidad del concepto por lo múltiple de la intuición (*Ibid.*: 137; *GW* 12/22).

Según Kant, la síntesis conceptual kantiana es una reunión de un contenido fenoménico muy heterogéneo. Este contenido necesita del concepto para ser entendido, sin él es ciego. Pero el concepto, a su vez, necesita de lo heterogéneo y diferente de la intuición, para no ser una mera vacuidad intelectual. Lo múltiple, heterogéneo, determinado y diverso de la intuición es enlazado objetivamente por los conceptos puros del entendimiento en una unidad que es el *objeto*, o concepto empírico. Ese enlazar o sintetizar en una unidad lo múltiple y heterogéneo es el conjunto de acciones del pensar puro —*Handlungen des reinen Denkens* (*KrV*, A 57/ B 81)— que llevan a cabo los conceptos puros.

Pero Hegel observa aquí una vacilación en el planteamiento kantiano. Según este, los conceptos puros carecen de contenido, aunque realizan “la acción (*Handlung*) de reunir diferentes representaciones y de entender su variedad en un único conocimiento” (*Ibid.*, A 77/ B 103), esto es, de sintetizar a priori en conceptos empíricos lo múltiple dado por la intuición sensible. Esta síntesis —el objeto de experiencia u concepto empírico—, acoge cabe sí entonces la diferencia, las determinaciones, que es lo que Hegel denomina como lo singular. Solo entonces la distancia entre ser y pensar se anula. En el objeto de experiencia, el concepto y la cosa son idénticos. Y por eso, es posible el progreso, y la verdad, en las ciencias empíricas. Pero a Kant no le basta con recurrir a los conceptos puros como funciones de unidad objetiva. Sería imposible alcanzar la identidad entre concepto y cosa, entre pensar y ser, y con ello la verdad, si la autoconciencia vigilante no nos persuadiera de que estamos pensando nosotros, de que piensa un solo, mismo e idéntico sujeto. En otras palabras, la objetividad, y por ello la fiabilidad, del objeto de experiencia remite como condición de su propia constitución —es decir como condición trascendental— a la acción sintetizante del sujeto que se vehicula a través de las funciones de unidad que son las categorías o conceptos puros. Kant entiende que la acción originaria corresponde al sujeto, y que este es la última condición de posibilidad del objeto de experiencia, es decir, de las unidades intelectuales a las que llamamos conceptos.

Pues bien, Hegel concentra la atención precisamente en este punto de la *Crítica de la razón pura* kantiana. Esta tenía como

puntos de partida, sentimiento, intuición y representación—, apareciendo éstos como condiciones antecedentes de aquél, mientras que él [el sujeto

trascendental y sus funciones conceptuales puras de unidad] se ha dado a ver como *fundamento incondicionado de ellos* (CL II: 139; GW: 12/24).

Hegel y Kant realizan la misma operación fundamental: una retroflexión.<sup>18</sup> El avance consiste en un retroceder al fundamento. Y lo que se descubre como fundamento es precisamente el concepto y el sujeto. Se entiende bien que este volumen de la *Ciencia de la lógica* reciba como título “lógica subjetiva”.

#### 4.2. ¿Crítica de la razón o filosofía de la subjetividad?

Pero repárese en el último texto citado de la *Ciencia de la Lógica*. Es un texto capital. En él, Hegel distingue los puntos de partida o condiciones antecedentes — sentimiento, intuición y representación— de su “fundamento incondicionado”. Este fundamento incondicionado: el yo, la unidad de la autoconciencia juega ahora el papel que el racionalismo atribuía a las *leyes universales del pensar*, entendidas como fundamento de todo pensar, es decir, a los conceptos de reflexión, de que tratamos en los primeros epígrafes de esta investigación.

El inicio del saber y el fundamento del saber son distintos. Y esto es capital para Hegel. El fundamento del saber es identificado por Hegel como el Yo o Sujeto Trascendental. Como según Hegel todo avanzar es un retroceder al fundamento, puede identificar lo originario y verdadero de la razón con el sujeto. Kant sería entonces un filósofo de la subjetividad, la *Crítica de la razón pura* una teoría frustrada de la subjetividad, y la *Ciencia de la Lógica* el cumplimiento del proyecto kantiano.

Pero Kant se entiende a sí mismo como un filósofo que explora la razón en sus usos teórico y práctico. Su proyecto crítico atañe a la razón, no a la subjetividad. Para la razón, el sujeto trascendental cumple una *función*: unificar la diversidad de representaciones en una conciencia. Porque el sujeto es una función, no puede ser confundido con una sustancia, el alma de la psicología racional (Ferrarin, 2016: 185). Confundir funciones con sustancias es incurrir en paralogismo. Mucho menos el sujeto es para Kant “fundamento incondicionado”, sino la función de autoconciencia imprescindible para garantizar la objetividad del pensamiento.

Aquí se bifurcan los senderos kantiano y hegeliano, aunque Hegel no lo advierte, sino que piensa que Kant abandona su propio camino al no atender a cómo el sujeto *fundamenta* el conocimiento, a cómo el conocimiento *deriva*, no de la experiencia, sino del sujeto. Y por eso, Hegel piensa que Fichte sí siguió el camino verdaderamente kantiano, al deducir del yo las determinaciones del pensamiento (*Enc*, § 42N).

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<sup>18</sup> Para el tema de la retroflexión y las categorías como acciones del pensar puro en Kant véase: Llano (2002).



#### 4.3. La reflexión inmanente del concepto: diferencia fundamental entre Hegel y Kant

Este paso acometido por Fichte, pero no por Kant, es el que separa al idealismo subjetivo y al absoluto del idealismo trascendental. En las categorías, tal y como son pensadas por Kant “el concepto no se ha dado aún su *propia* realidad, engendrada a partir de él mismo” (CL II: 139, GW: 12/24). Esta realidad tendría que engendrarla él, desde sí mismo. Además, se hace patente que los conceptos puros no son impotentes, pues son capaces de sintetizar a priori. Para Hegel, el poder del Concepto no se refiere a la multiplicidad de la intuición, sino a lo que es capaz de engendrar dialécticamente por sí mismo. Y esta es la capacidad más sobresaliente del Concepto hegeliano, el Concepto es poder creador. La diferencia para con Kant, desde esta óptica, se hace enorme: las categorías, en cuanto meros conceptos puros vacíos, son conceptos abstractos, aún no desarrollados.

Si comendamos lo dicho hasta ahora, vemos que Hegel defiende dos tesis acerca de la naturaleza conceptual. La primera es que el Concepto es *libertad* porque él se pone, o se engendra sí mismo. Esta tesis ya ha sido anunciada al final del anterior epígrafe. La segunda tesis afirma que el Concepto es totalidad cuyas determinaciones son momentos de su desarrollo. Esta tesis también la hemos visto ya, como el desarrollo de la idea kantiana de que los conceptos puros realizan la síntesis de lo múltiple y heterogéneo dado en la intuición. Síntesis es unidad, y la unidad de una multiplicidad es su totalización (Werner, 2018).

Si unimos estas dos tesis, entonces tenemos que el Concepto es identidad consigo, que se determina, engendrándose desde sí y para sí (*Enc*, §160). Valls en su *Comentario*, apunta esto en dos planos o dimensiones del concepto: la ontológica y la cognoscitiva: el Concepto es libertad *ontológicamente* (en orden de su acción), y es totalidad *cognoscitivamente* (Valls, 2018: 232-233).

Estas dos tesis son dos posibilidades que abre la filosofía crítica kantiana. Pero, esta prosecución de Kant, ¿es posible? ¿No serán estas tesis meras afirmaciones dogmáticas que se instrumentan como comienzo de un sistema filosófico? Hegel, en la introducción a la *Lógica* subjetiva es consciente de que podría pensarse que su determinación de la naturaleza del concepto es acrítica y dogmática.

Estas proposiciones aquí recordadas no son aserciones dogmáticas; y no lo son, porque son resultados brotados del entero desarrollo de la *esencia* por sí misma (CL II: 139; GW: 12/24).

Es decir, la determinación hegeliana de la naturaleza del concepto implica el desarrollo y la comprensión de la primera parte de la *Ciencia de la Lógica*, las doctrinas del ser y de la esencia. La naturaleza conceptual brota de ellas, y no, de una comparación con otro la doctrina del concepto de otro autor, como por ejemplo Kant. Es decir, la doctrina del concepto surge como una reflexión inmanente al contenido que Hegel desarrolla en la *Ciencia de la Lógica*, y no de una reflexión extrínseca que compara con otras posiciones. Hemos desarrollado pues ya una reflexión extrínseca sobre el concepto. Ahora hemos de

enfrentarnos a la reflexión inmanente por la que el concepto surge y se desarrolla de las partes anteriores de la *Ciencia de la Lógica*.

Que el concepto brota inmanentemente de la esencia, Hegel lo afirma al comienzo el capítulo “del concepto en general” advirtiendo que “hay que ver por lo pronto al *concepto*, en suma, como lo *tercero* respecto al *ser* y a la *esencia*, a lo *inmediato* y a la *reflexión*” (*Ibid.*: 125; *GW*: 12/11). Y como las últimas categorías estudiadas en la doctrina de la esencia eran la sustancia, la causalidad y la acción recíproca, Hegel afirma que “el concepto tiene por consiguiente a la sustancia como presuposición inmediata suya: ella es *en sí* lo que él es como lo *manifiesto*” (*Ídem*).

Resultar de un proceso significa para Hegel dar razón de ese proceso, es decir ser su verdad. En la filosofía hegeliana siempre se verifica la afirmación de la *Ciencia de la lógica*, de que “avanzar es un retroceder hacia el fundamento, hacia lo originario y verdadero, del cual depende el principio con que se comenzó y por el que en realidad es producido”.<sup>19</sup> Así pues lo primero en el orden cronológico de la exposición y en el orden ontológico difieren. Lo primero ontológicamente es resultado de lo primero en el orden de la exposición. precisamente por ello, la determinación hegeliana de la naturaleza del concepto no es dogmática, sino resultado de un proceso racional.

La totalidad de la acción causal recíproca con que concluye la lógica de la esencia da razón de la filosofía de Spinoza. El plano objetivo es el plano de sustancias que se relacionan necesariamente entre sí. Pues bien, que el concepto es la verdad de la sustancia, que la desvela en su verdad, significa ante todo que muestra “la verdad de la necesidad” (*CL* II: 126; *GW*: 12/12). El concepto revela, lo que las anteriores categorías examinadas en la *Ciencia de la Lógica* son. Que la verdad sea resultado parece algo obvio. No nos encontramos inmediatamente con la verdad, sino con certezas. Averiguar la verdad de nuestras certezas es algo que hacemos como fruto por ejemplo de una experiencia, o de un razonamiento, en cualquier caso, de una reflexión.

La certeza del sistema spinozista es la de una sustancia de la que brotan sus atributos y modos espontánea y necesariamente. Y como todo lo finito no es sino expresión necesaria de esa sustancia —sus modos—, toda realidad finita, en realidad, es el fruto de una necesidad ciega, y la identidad entre los modos y la sustancia es también “una cosa ciega, es decir *interior*” (*Ibid.*: 130; *GW*: 12/15). Pues bien, la verdad de estas tesis spinozistas, es para Hegel que no son consistentes, y que el resultado de la dialéctica por la que estas prueban su insuficiencia es el concepto como libertad, y no como necesidad total.

No tiene entonces nada de extraño que sea en este contexto donde Hegel explica su celeberrima tesis sobre qué significa refutar un sistema filosófico:

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<sup>19</sup> *CL* I (2ª edición de 1831, no traducida por Duque: *SW*: 5/60), como ya se ha señalado utilizando esta misma cita con anterioridad.

Una refutación de verdad tiene que entrar en la fuerza del adversario y emplazarse en la órbita de su vigor; nada se adelanta con atacarlo fuera de él mismo, o con tener razón allí donde él no está. por consiguiente, la única refutación del spinozismo puede consistir solamente en que sea por de pronto reconocida su posición como esencial y necesaria: en segundo lugar, empero, en que esa posición sea elevada, *a partir de sí misma*, a otra superior. Es la relación-de-sustancialidad, considerada enteramente sólo en y para sí misma, la que de suyo viene a pasar a su contrario, al *concepto* (*Ibid.*: 129; *GW*: 12/15).

La sustancia o causa spinozista es una posición filosófica esencial pero parcial, hay una posición superior, más abarcadora y comprehensiva. Si se puede definir la verdad como la conformidad de una sustancia a su concepto, entonces habría que afirmar que la sustancia spinozista no es verdadera.

Las categorías estudiadas por Hegel en la lógica de la esencia son la unidad entre una forma de existencia y su condición. Esta unidad es reflexiva. La materia exige y se opone a la forma, lo fundado, exige y se opone al fundamento, la apariencia a la ley, lo externo a lo interno, y en definitiva el ser a la esencia. Pero aquí surge un problema, ¿cómo explicar estas relaciones entre formas de existencia y sus razones de ser? En cuanto opuestos, ninguno de los relatos da razón del otro. ¿Dónde se encuentra la base o sustrato —*Grundlage*— de estas categorías? Si no se responde a esto quedamos condenados a la perplejidad leibniziano y heideggeriana que se expresa en la sentencia “¿por qué el ser y no más bien la nada?”. No basta decir que es necesario que lo fundado tenga un fundamento, y que del fundamento se siga espontáneamente lo fundado. ¿Por qué actúa el fundamento de ese modo? ¿Hay alguna organización de su espontaneidad? ¿O esta es causación ciega, arbitraria, irracional? ¿Por qué la necesidad? La respuesta: la esencia, el fundamento, en realidad es un universal —un concepto— que se particulariza a sí mismo, que se autodetermina, lógica o racionalmente, que permite hacerse con la racionalidad natural, y da razón de la historia. Así, Hegel, convencido de que el Yo trascendental es el fundamento incondicionado del conocimiento pretende continuar el proyecto crítico.

En la misma distinción entre *natura naturans* y *natura naturata* residía la debilidad de Spinoza. En hacer del mundo sensible, de los modos, lo otro respecto de la esencia que los sostiene y que tiene que aparecer. El mundo sensible, la realidad efectiva, solo es verdadera si se identifica con su concepto. Y por ello, el concepto no es mero fundamento. Eso es la esencia. El concepto es precisamente la unidad de la multiplicidad de realidades efectivas, aquello que está organizándolas, y que por ello dispone del fundamento que las hace ser. Pero si el concepto no es mero fundamento, si es más que el fundamento, entonces es libertad. No es la carencia de fundamento o abismo, como es el *Abgrund* de Schelling. Lo opuesto al fundamento es lo fundado. Lo que es más que el fundamento no es, para Hegel, lo que carece de fundamento —*Abgrund*—, sino la libertad que organiza (Ferrarin, 2001: 189) racionalmente lo fundado disponiendo del fundamento.

Frente al *Abgrund* de Schelling, Hegel denomina al concepto *Grundlage*. Literalmente en alemán significa la ubicación, la situación o la tesitura —*Lage*— del fundamento —*Grund*—. También se podría traducir literalmente como los términos o el cariz —*Lage*— del fundamento —*Grund*—. Es habitual usar *Grundlage* para referirse a aquello sobre lo que se puede construir, sobre lo que apoyarse, sobre lo que comenzar algo. Por eso Félix Duque traduce este término por base, basamento. Se podría traducir también como el *asiento* o *sede* desde el que el fundamento se desarrolla racionalmente, porque *conoce la necesidad* con que este actúa, y por eso puede aprovecharla y queda libre de ella. Es decir, el concepto es la verdad de la necesidad, su manifestación, y por eso su actuación no es ficticia, sino que tiene base. Y por eso, el Concepto es poderoso, estando más allá del fundamento, siendo estrictamente su verdad. Como es un sujeto que se desarrolla a sí mismo, en lo múltiple y externo, disponiendo de la esencia, entonces es libre, autónomo, no queda sometido a ella, sino que la somete a sí.

Es bien conocido que Hegel afirma que el concepto se despliega —*Entwicklung* (*Enc*, §161)— como lo vivo, crece alcanzando sus determinaciones, en las que se concreta. Se trata de una universalidad autodiferenciante. Y por ello singularizándose en las particularizaciones que alcanza y en las que se despliega tal y como realiza un ser vivo.<sup>20</sup> Sin esta singularización gracias a las particularidades que va generando, su universalidad quedaría abstracta, vacía. Más bien el Concepto es lo universal concreto, que crece, como los seres vivos, por causa de su propia actuación.

##### 5. Conclusión: Los senderos que se bifurcan del pensamiento moderno

Esta investigación ha intentado contribuir al debate actual señalado en la introducción (Longuenesse, Pippin, McDowell, Beiser), sobre la interpretación hegeliana de Kant. Debate que se aleja cada vez más de la caracterización que Hegel hace de la *Crítica de la razón pura*, y de la autointerpretación que realiza de su puesto en la historia de la filosofía. Para ello he seguido los hitos fundamentales de la interpretación que Hegel hace de Kant. Hegel, y esto ha sido parte de su herencia, concibe su idealismo absoluto como un discernimiento, o crítica, de algunas tesis fundamentales kantianas: la naturaleza extrínseca tanto de la reflexión lógica como de la trascendental, la fijeza del yo trascendental y su oposición a los objetos, la necesidad de una garantía empírica que proporcione certidumbre al conocimiento, como se ha visto.

Hegel se concibe a sí mismo como un filósofo que está dando cumplimiento del proyecto de la Analítica trascendental, que a su juicio transformaba la metafísica en lógica. Para ello estima que debe reformar por completo la dialéctica trascendental y su tratamiento de los conceptos racionales. Y este punto es el que se ha investigado en realidad, pues para ello Hegel logra relacionar su concepto de reflexión con su concepto de Concepto.

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<sup>20</sup> Para una exposición sobre esto, véase el cuarto capítulo de la reciente obra: Ng (2020).

Probablemente esos juicios hegelianos, como se está dilucidando en el debate actual, puedan llegar a ser injustos para con Kant, cercenando gran parte de las virtualidades de la filosofía crítica. Sobre por qué Hegel llegó a concebir a Kant de esta manera es algo que se establecerá en futuras investigaciones. Sin embargo, ciertamente la lectura hegeliana y crítica a Kant parecen haber marcado a la propia filosofía de Kant.

En cualquier caso, la investigación que concluyo permite adentrarse en el difícil —a la par que célebre— tema hegeliano del Concepto y en los presupuestos interpretativos de Kant de los que nace. Quizás la historia de la filosofía post-kantiana no siga un camino, sino que se asemeje a borgiano jardín de los senderos que se bifurcan.

La segunda conclusión que extraigo de este trabajo no versa sobre los presupuestos interpretativos de la filosofía hegeliana, sino sobre su posible contribución al debate post-kantiano sobre la libertad. Debate marcado por la interpretación de la libertad como abismo —*Abgrund*— que Heidegger encontró en Schelling. Hegel entiende la libertad del Concepto como basada —*Grundlage*— en el conocimiento de la necesidad y, por tanto, la creatividad y el poder del Concepto, es decir, la racionalidad lógica, natural y espiritual, se desarrollan —*Entwicklung*— autónomamente como un sujeto. Me parece que aquí opera una reducción de la razón a la subjetividad,<sup>21</sup> que apartó el sendero seguido por Hegel (el de la subjetividad y el espíritu) del que había emprendido Kant (en sus tres grandes críticas). Hegel cree seguir el camino de Kant, y, sin embargo, inaugura uno nuevo. Ya no filosofa sobre la razón puramente, sino sobre la subjetividad, haciendo que haya una filosofía del espíritu.

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<sup>21</sup> Leonardo Polo ha sostenido que esta es la "reducción fundamental" hegeliana. Véase: Polo (2015 a).

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## **From the Schematism to the Typic. How Can We Be moral?**

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*"Wir lehren nicht blos durch Worte;  
wir lehren auch weit eindringlicher durch unser Beispiel."*

*(Fichte, 4 Vorl., 1974)*

*En memoria de Jakub Kloc-Konkolowicz, mi maestro.*

### **Abstract**

Kant's chapter "On the Typic of the Pure Practical Power of Judgement" is one of the most obscure passages of the *Critique of Practical Reason* and it has often been regarded as a mere appendix. However, it deals with a fundamental question, namely, how can the pure practical law be applied to particular cases. In this paper, I would like to make an original contribution towards a better understanding of this chapter by comparing it to the Schematism chapter on the basis of their analogical relation and suggesting how the reference to a *sensus communis* could help in solving the (unsolved) aim of the Typic chapter.

### **Key words**

Typic, analogy, schema, common sense

### **1. How to be moral? The uncompleted task of the Typic chapter.**

In an essay from 1784, *Idea for a universal history with a cosmopolitan aim*, Kant alludes to the distinction between being cultivated, moralised and moral:

We are *cultivated* in a high degree by art and science. We are *civilized*, perhaps to the point of being overburdened, by all sorts of social decorum and propriety. But very much is still lacking before we can be held to be already *moralized*. For the idea of morality still belongs to culture; but the use of this idea which comes down only to a resemblance of morals in love of honor and in external propriety constitutes only being civilized. As long, however, as states apply all

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their powers to their vain and violent aims of expansion and thus ceaselessly constrain the slow endeavor of the inner formation of their citizens' mode of thought, also withdrawing with this aim all support from it, nothing of this kind is to be expected, because it would require a long inner labor of every commonwealth for the education of its citizens. But everything good that is not grafted onto a morally good disposition, is nothing but mere semblance and glittering misery. In this condition humankind will remain until, in the way I have said, it will labor its way out of the chaotic condition of the present relations between states. (G. i. weltbürg. Abs, 8: 26)

Kant's words can be interpreted in a mild sense, as if we are not "perfectly" moral but just half-way there (James 2002, p.341) or in a more radical sense, which puts blame on the lack of morality affecting humankind. But can humans be moral at all? If the answer is affirmative, then *how*?

The fact that we can be moral is demonstrated by Kant through his so-called Copernican revolution in ethics, which is a consequence of his defence of the autonomy of reason: if pure reason can determine the will, then good and evil are not objects already identified as morally good or evil in themselves. Rather, they are as such a consequence of their accordance with the pure practical law:

This is the place to explain the paradox of method in a *Critique of Practical Reason*, namely, that the concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (for which, as it would seem, this concept would have to be made the basis) but only (as was done here) after it and by means of it. (KpV, 5:62-63)

Yet, the question is: how can the will be determined only through the pure practical use of judgement (KpV, 5:69)? This is an important and distinctive problem since it is one thing to assert that there is a pure universal practical law (KpV, 5:43), and it is quite another to apply it, thus recognising which of the particular maxims can be made universal in accordance with the pure laws.

The problem of the Typic, then, is very similar to that of the Schematism chapter<sup>1</sup>, insofar

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Citations to Kant will be to the Akademie Ausgabe by volume and page, except for the Critique of Pure Reason where citations will use the standard A/B edition pagination. English quotations will be from the Cambridge edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant.

<sup>1</sup> The chapter on the Typic and the one on Schematism share a subject matter and suffer the same fate in the secondary literature dedicated to their study. Both deal with the same problem (the application of universal laws to particular cases) and both have been almost disregarded within Kantian research. There are many papers and chapters in works on Kant's ethical thought (Puls 2013, Dietrichson 1969, Dietrichson 2009, Paton 1947, Allison 1999, Korsgaard 1996, Beck 1960, Zimmermann 2011), but only one monograph is dedicated to the Typic (Westra 2016) and Ulrich Seeberg has dedicated an entry of less than a page to this important topic in the *Kant-Lexikon*, where he stresses the value of the Typic in guarding against the empiricism and mysticism of practical reason. In addition, there is a lack of continuity in the debate among Kantian scholars (the studies are few and scattered across different traditions and periods). An important first



as they both deal with a subsumption of particular cases under universal rules. However, in the chapter on the Typic the subsumption is more complicated because: “With pure practical judgement [...] the law is a law of reason, not of understanding, and no intuition can be adequate to it. We can never be sure, in any experience, whether the full terms of the moral law have been observed” (Beck 1960, p. 156). To deliver the subsumption, Kant relies on a method of testing our maxims involving questions such as: what kind of a world would this be if everybody acted the way I wanted them to? Would it be possible to act this way in the order of nature<sup>2</sup> laid down by law? As he puts it:

The rule of judgement under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will. (KpV, 5:69)

This solution has been regarded as problematic, because it might lead to mistakes or undetermined results. I believe that many difficulties could have been solved (or at least limited) if Kant had indicated a mediating function to help in delivering the mental experiment and detail how maxims can be made universal in accordance with the pure laws. To find this function, I will use the analogy to the Schematism and look for procedures analogous to transcendental time-determinations, able to “translate” particular maxims<sup>3</sup> in general and eventually – universal maxims.

Firstly, however, I will present an overview of the use and meaning of analogy in philosophy and of the similarities between the Schematism and the Typic to justify the legitimacy of interpreting this case study as an analogy.

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step has recently been made by Westra: his study, the first systematic monograph on this topic, provides not only an analysis of the Typic chapter but also an evaluation of several interpretations of the typic-procedure (e.g. teleological, logical, consequentialist) and has enlivened and fomented new debate on the chapter (Horii 2013, Kinser 2019). Before Westra, Paton (1948) and Beck (1960) made important contributions to elucidate difficult expressions and passages from the chapter (for instance, what is meant under “order of nature”), often thanks to referencing and contrasting it with the schematism chapter. Besides, Allison (2011) has underlined the fundamental role of the thought experiment presented in the Typic: “For purposes of practical judgement, we can consider a universalized maxim as if it were a law of nature and by this means judge its conformity (or lack thereof) with the imperative. Indeed, according to Kant, not only can we do this, we must, if we are to apply the moral law to particular cases; for this is the only way in which we can bring the law, as a product of pure practical reason, to bear on such cases” (Allison 2011, p. 178). Nevertheless, only a few pages are dedicated by the aforementioned commentators to the Typic chapter, the importance of which is overshadowed by the attention given to other topics (e.g. the categorical imperative, the notions of will, freedom and the concept of the highest good).

<sup>2</sup> Following Herbert James Paton (Paton 1948, pp. 150 ff.) and Lewis White Beck (Beck 1960, pp.159-61) I interpret Kant's reference to an order of nature as implying: 1) the universal uniformity of nature; 2) the idea of nature as an organic unity (the realm of ends).

<sup>3</sup> If such a function is constitutive of reason, then in principle all ethical judgements can be tested and therefore corrected. By this I do not mean that every reasonable being can de facto correct his own ethical maxims, but only that reason *can* be autonomous and determine the will so that it perfectly corresponds to the moral Law.

## 2. Analogy

Analogies are one of the fundamental kinds of reasoning. The history of science and philosophy provides innumerable examples of their fruitful use as a kind of ampliative reasoning<sup>4</sup>. However, a cautious evaluation of analogy – which was used already in ancient Greek thought, especially in the Aristotelian Logic – is found in many philosophical works: for instance, in his *Novum Organum* Bacon states that analogies are useful, although they should be used with discretion (Bacon 2000, p.180), whilst Newton stresses their value in the improvement of knowledge (Newton 1999, p. 795). Later on, Locke considers analogy as a way to drive considerations on missing, unknown elements that have effects in nature (Locke 1976, pp. 412-413)<sup>5</sup>.

Kant, who is in debt to Aristotle for most of his general logic, refers in his *Lectures on Logic* to analogy as being a procedure, similar to induction, delivered by the power of judgement<sup>6</sup>:

Induction infers, then, from the particular to the universal (*a particulari ad universale*) according to the principle of universalization: What belongs to many things of a genus belongs to the remaining ones too. Analogy infers from particular to total similarity of two things, according to the principle of specification [...] One in many, hence in all: Induction; many in one (which are also in others), hence also what remains in the same thing: Analogy. (Log. 9:133)

Apart from that, in the *Lectures on Metaphysics* analogy is regarded as a sort of mathematical proportion<sup>7</sup> or a way to infer unknown properties of a known term from known properties of another term that shares properties with the known term (L1, 28:287). Analogical arguments are structured as following<sup>8</sup>:

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<sup>4</sup> According to Joseph Priestley, a chemist and pioneer of electricity: “analogy is our best guide in all philosophical investigations; and all discoveries, which were not made by mere accident, have been made by the help of it” (Priestley 1769/1966, p. 14).

<sup>5</sup> “Concerning the manner of operation in most parts of the works of nature, wherein, though we see the sensible effects, yet their causes are unknown, and we perceive not the ways and manner how they are produced. Analogy in these matters is the only help we have, and it is from that alone that we draw all our grounds of probability” (Locke 1976, pp. 412-413).

<sup>6</sup> “The power of judgment, by proceeding from the particular to the universal in order to draw from experience (empirically) universal – hence not *a priori* – judgments, infers *either* from *many* to *all* things of a kind, *or* from *many* determinations and properties, in which things of one kind agree, *to the remaining ones, insofar as they belong to the same principle*. The former mode of inference is called inference *through induction*, the other inference *according to analogy*” (Log, 9:132).

<sup>7</sup> “Analogy is a proportion of concepts, where from the relation between two members that I know I bring out the relation of a third member, that I know, to a fourth member that I do not know” (L1, 28:292). As Callanan puts it: “an analogy is a principle which functions to combine appearances in a specific manner, relating non-given appearances to given ones, and warranting an inference regarding the existence, if not the characteristic features, of that former non-given appearance. The motivation mathematical analogy, as a ‘proportion of concepts’ reflects the manner in which such principles are applied to experience and warrants a particular type of inference being made” (Callanan 2014, p.764).

<sup>8</sup> Formulations of analogies are found in texts on argumentation theory (e.g. Govier 1999, Guarini 2004, Walton and Hyra 2018) and in the literature on critical thinking (e.g. Copi and Cohen 2005).

- (1) S is similar to T in certain (known) respects.
  - (2) S has some further feature Q.
  - (3) Therefore, T also has the feature Q or some feature Q\* similar to Q.
- (1) and (2) are premises. (3) is the conclusion of the argument. In this ampliative argument – the conclusion of which is not guaranteed to follow with necessity<sup>9</sup> from the premises – we begin by indicating the most significant similarities (and sometimes differences) between S and T.

I will now identify the main similarities and some differences between the Typic and the Schematism chapters, and then construct the analogy between them.

### 3. Similarities between the Schematism and the Typic chapters

The analysis of these very short and dense chapters – which are part the Analytic, because only after the presentation of the draft of categories (of pure understanding in the first *Critique* and of freedom in the second *Critique*) was it legitimate to investigate how they can be applicated – the following similarities can be found: a) absurdity, b) homogeneity and subsumption, c) the role of the power of judgement, d) obscurity and the emergence of psychological topics.

#### a) Absurdity

Both chapters are regarded as dealing with an impossible or absurd problem. In the Schematism chapter, understanding and sensibility are so heterogeneous that, considered as such, they cannot belong to a common kind. However, the Transcendental Deduction demonstrates that the empirical use of the categories is not only possible, but it is also the only use which can provide categories with a meaning. But then, the question is: *how?* *How* are categories applicable to intuitions (KrV A138/B177)? Given the necessity of the application of categories to the intuitions and the impossibility of an immediate subsumption, what is needed is a mediating function, something homogeneous<sup>10</sup> to both faculties:

Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and on the appearance on the

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<sup>9</sup> Although useful in extending cognition, these reasonings are not provided with necessity and because of this: “we must make use of them with caution and care” (Log, 9:133).

<sup>10</sup> The reference to homogeneity is confusing. Concepts and intuitions are completely inhomogeneous: the former are active and general, the latter – passive and individual. If homogeneity is a necessary condition of subsumption, then subsumption between the two is in principle impossible. Curtius underlines that this is not the conclusion of Kant, who, once aware of the problem of heterogeneity, asserts that a “third” must be given, a medium that is pure, on the one hand, and sensible – on the other (KrV A138/B177). Why does Kant proceed in this way? There are two possibilities: Kant is contradicting himself (at first, he states that no subsumption is possible between terms that are not homogeneous, and then he claims that subsumption between inhomogeneous terms is possible) or he uses the notion of subsumption and of heterogeneity in a particular way: “The heterogeneity which Kant here asserts is merely the difference of nature which follows from the diversity of their functions. The category is formal and determines structure; intuition yields the content which is thereby organised. Accordingly, the ‘third thing’, which Kant postulates as required to bring category and intuition together, is not properly so describable; it is simply the two co-operating in the manner required for the possibility of experience” (Kemp Smith 1918, p. 334).

other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet **intellectual** on the one hand and **sensible** on the other. Such a representation is the **transcendental schema**. (KrV A138/B177)

This absurdity of the distinction between two heterogeneous functions that must nevertheless cooperate is addressed in the Typic chapter, too, where Kant states that the judgment of pure practical reason is subject to the very same difficulties as pure theoretical reason, insofar as a non-empirical rule (a law of freedom) has to be applied to the empirical level:

all cases of possible actions that occur can be only empirical, that is, belong to experience and nature; hence, it seems absurd to want to find in the sensible world a case which, though as such it stands only under the law of nature, yet admits of the application to it of a law of freedom and to which there could be applied the supersensible idea of the morally good, which is to be exhibited in it in *concreto*. (KpV, 5:67)

#### b) Homogeneity and subsumption

As anticipated, the problem that the Typic and the Schematism chapters aim to solve seems absurd. Both chapters deal with a mismatch between elements that are not homogeneous and must be subsumed one under the other. But what is meant by homogeneity? ‘Homogeneity’ (*Homogenität*) is used by Kant to refer to things sharing qualitative properties (KrV A657/B685; 14: 366; 14:410). For instance, ‘table’ belongs to the kind of the empirical concepts, while ‘quadrangle’ to that of geometrical ones: they do not belong to the same class, but rather are inhomogeneous and therefore cannot be subsumed one under the other.

Unfortunately, in Kant’s texts the terms implied in the subsumption are very ambiguous: some passages of the Schematism chapter suggest that it refers to the relation between (empirical) intuitions and categories (A137/B176), while others address appearances and categories (A138/B177) or objects and concepts (A137/B176). Within the debate concerning the nature of the heterogeneity of the terms presented in the Schematism chapter, Kemp Smith and Curtius deny that schemata deal with subsumption of a particular case under class concepts, instead stating that schemata concern the relation between form and content. As Curtius stresses, Kant’s example<sup>11</sup> of the homogeneity between the roundness thought in the empirical concept of a plate and that what is intuited in the

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<sup>11</sup> “Now pure concepts of the understanding, however, in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition. Now how is the subsumption of the latter under the former, thus the application of the category to appearances possible, since no one would say that the category, e.g., causality, could also be intuited through the senses and is contained in the appearance? This question, so natural and important, is really the cause which makes a transcendental doctrine of the power of judgement necessary, in order, namely, to show the possibility of applying pure concepts of the understanding to appearances in general” (KrV A137-138/B176-177).

geometrical concept of circle is completely misleading<sup>12</sup>. The two are not connected in terms of the relation between class and member: taking Kant's passage literally, it suggests that the homogeneity regards not a class concept and a member but rather what is intuited in the pure concept of a circle and what is thought in the empirical intuition of a plate, i.e. the roundness. The procedure of subsumption<sup>13</sup> described here concerns, therefore, elements that share a relation to a common characteristic term *Merkmal*, which permits to relate them, thus delivering a sort of translation/mediation from one level to another.

In the Typic chapter, the subsumption encounters even more difficulties than in the theoretical use of the judgement because, as Kant puts it: "the morally good as an object is something supersensible, so that nothing corresponding to it can be found in any sensible intuition" (KpV, 5:68). In a similar way to the schematism, some unclear passages in the text had sparked a large debate concerning the identification of the terms of the inhomogeneity. The discrepancy could be interpreted as concerning:

- 1) natural causality and freedom (Beck 1960 p.156-7; Pieper 2011 p.109)
- 2) form and matter (Johnson 1985, p.270; Marty 1997, p.248; Dietrichson 1969, p. 167ff)
- 3) subjective and objective ends (Johnsson 1985, p. 270)<sup>14</sup>
- 4) characteristics of human beings belonging to two worlds. (Westra 2018)

This last interpretation is in my view more comprehensive and helpful in understanding the practical problem of the chapter. Namely, human beings – insofar as they are characterised by both empirical and non-sensible dimensions – are affected by a sort of epistemic finitude, according to which the need to exhibit thoughts through sensible intuition and the inability to exhibit them in any other way go together. These are two sides of the same coin, which constitutes a specific limitation of the human mind interpretable as *representational finitude* (Westra 2018, p.38). As Kant puts it:

Now, a human being really finds in himself a capacity by which he distinguishes

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<sup>12</sup> According to Curtius, from the viewpoint of the traditional notion of subsumption, this Kantian example can be considered as a "complete misunderstanding (*ein völliger Missgriff*)" (Curtius 1914, pp. 346-347, transl. L.S.) that increases the obscurity of the chapter.

<sup>13</sup> Kant's definition of "inferences of reason" (*Vernunftschlüsse*) in the Jäsche Logic is somehow close to subsumption: "What stands under the condition of a rule also stands under the rule itself" (Log. 9:120). An inference is composed of a major premise (a general rule), a minor premise, i.e. the subsumption of the condition of a proposition under the condition of the rule, and finally – the conclusion, i.e. the affirmation or negation of the rule in the given case of the subsuming judgement.

This structure can be reasonably related to schemata as rules of the judgement. Allison points out that the first usage of the term 'schema' in the chapter is given in the definition of the power of judgement as a "faculty of subsuming under rules", in the sense that while the understanding provides the rule as the faculty of rules intended, the judgement indicates whether a given case falls under a rule. "His (Kant's) intent is not to suggest that the act of judging can be adequately analysed in terms of subsumption; it is rather to call attention to a set of synthetic a priori judgements (the Principles of Pure Understanding) which, unlike, ordinary judgements of experience, do not merely make use of the categories but actually subsume all appearances under them. Kant's concern is with the possibility of such judgements" (Allison 2004, p.212).

<sup>14</sup> "How can a particular maxim that specifies subjective ends [...] be evaluated by a moral principle [...] that does not depend on subjective ends?" (Johnsson 1985, p. 270).

himself from all other things, even from himself insofar as he is affected by objects, and that is *reason*. This, as pure self-activity, is raised even above the *understanding* by this: that though the latter is also self-activity and does not, like sense, contain merely representations that arise when we are *affected* by things (and are thus passive), yet it can produce from its activity *under rules* and thereby to unite them in one consciousness, without which use of sensibility it would think nothing at all: but reason on the contrary, shows in what we call “Ideas” a spontaneity so pure that it thereby goes far beyond anything that sensibility can ever afford it. (GMS, 4: 452)

c) The power of judgement

In both the Schematism and the Typic chapters, the power of judgement plays a fundamental role. The former belongs to the Transcendental Doctrine of the Power of Judgement (KrV A137/B156f.); since categories are valid and necessary but lack content, they are still insufficient to justify judgements that are objective (i.e. determinately true) or false criteria to evaluate actual cases of truth or falsity. To achieve this purpose, a Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement is required as part of a Transcendental Logic<sup>15</sup>. As Kant stresses, one of the peculiarities of Transcendental Logic<sup>16</sup> lies in its capacity to indicate a priori the cases to which the rules (pure concepts) must be applied. In order to apply a rule while avoiding the reference to another rule (and then a *regressus ad infinitum*), Kant introduces a special talent (KrV A133/B172), which allows the application of the rules: “[...] the power of judgement is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced. Thus is also what is specific to so-called mother-wit, the lack of which cannot be made good by any school” (KrV A133/B172).

Judgement<sup>17</sup> is involved in the Typic chapter in a similar way: “The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will” (KpV, 5: 69). The moral Law and its object (the highest good) are still not sufficient for the actual moral appraisal (Silber 1966, p. 198):

[laws a priori] still require a power of judgment sharpened by experience, partly to distinguish in what cases they are applicable and partly to provide them with

<sup>15</sup> “Transcendental Logic must therefore be able to give us what Kant calls a Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement. It must tell us what the transcendental schemata are, the necessary and universal characteristics of sensible objects in virtue of which the pure categories can be applied. It must also tell us what are the synthetic a priori judgements which arise when we apply pure categories to sensible objects in virtue of the transcendental schemata” (Paton 1936, p. 23).

<sup>16</sup> Transcendental logic differs from general logic insofar as it deals with the truth: general logic abstracts from content and can be used to evaluate only the form of judgements, while transcendental logic deals with content itself (namely pure a priori cognition *überhaupt*). It is in this sense that Kant claims the conditions of the possibility of experience possess “transcendental truth”.

<sup>17</sup> There is a debate concerning whether the use of the judgement in the Typic is determinative or regulative. Makino states that it is determinant insofar as the moral Law is already given (Makino 1997 p. 159). Tsuburaya points out that both the Schematism and the Typic presupposed a reflective use of the judgement and its principle of purposiveness (Tsuburaya 2012), whilst Pieper stresses that it is not clear, and the practice judgement seems to be something in between the two uses (Pieper 2002).

access to the will of the human being and efficacy for his fulfilment of them; for the human being is affected by so many inclinations that, though capable of the idea of a practical pure reason, he is not so easily able to make it effective *in concreto* in the conduct of his life. (GMS, 4: 389)

Here, like in the Schematism chapter, the faculty of judgement cannot make use of the determinate rules *ad infinitum* (if a rule to use the judgement is needed, then another one is necessary to apply the rule, etc.) nor merely try to reply examples<sup>18</sup>. Therefore, Kant does not introduce rules or commandments, but rather a procedure the judgement must follow to determine the will in a sort of a moral schematism (Silber 1966, p. 200)<sup>19</sup>.

d) Obscurity and the emergence of psychological topics

Another point of similarity is provided by the general obscurity affecting the procedures to which the Schematism and the Typic chapters refer. More specifically, in the Schematism chapter, the concrete process of time determination cannot be unravelled, and Kant himself admits that it is something difficult to understand and mysterious (KrV A141–142/B180–181). He limits himself to focusing on the transcendental determination of the domain of the possible experience, thus providing a criterion for discriminating among possible objects of experience and other kinds of objects (ideas, objects of thoughts with no actual realisation in experience). Kant, then, leaves the empirical/psychological question aside, because it is not relevant nor necessary to fulfil coherently the aims of the first *Critique*. In this way, he leaves it to psychologists to determine the specific topic of their investigation<sup>20</sup>.

Similarly, obscurity affects the Typic chapter insofar as ultimately nobody can be sure<sup>21</sup> that his will is determined only by the pure laws: even if we can apply the test to universalise our maxims and determine our will according to the pure moral law, there is always a degree of self-obscurity concerning our profoundest motives. Kant sticks to this point repeatedly in his works, referring to the opacity and unfathomability affecting the depths of the human heart (GMS, 4: 398-9; KpV, 5:35; Rel, 6: 446-7). This resembles the obscurity of the Schematism chapter, opening one path towards a psychological investigation concerning self-knowledge and the analysis of our deepest motives.

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<sup>18</sup> Examples are not sufficient to exercise the power of judgement correctly, but are nevertheless helpful: “examples are the leading-strings of the power of judgement, which he who lacks the natural talent or judgement can never do without” (KrV A134/B173). Given our representational finitude, we need a sensible *analogon* for applying the law: in the Typic, namely, the law of nature is exemplar for applying the moral law. As Kant puts it: “Thus it has the law of nature always at hand, only that in cases where causality from freedom is to be appraised it makes that law of nature merely the type of a law of freedom, because without having at hand something which it could make an example in a case of experience, it could not provide use in application for the law of a pure practical reason” (KpV, 5:70).

<sup>19</sup> As Silber puts it: “Kant can introduce rules to guide judgment without being involved in an infinite regress because he does not offer a rule for applying the moral law; rather, the moral law is a principle which specifies the procedure which judgment must follow in order first to determine and then to attain the highest good. The moral law merely specifies the procedure of judgment in the act of moral schematism, that is, in the act of determining the embodiment of the highest good” (Silber 1966, p.200).

<sup>20</sup> Scaglia 2020.

<sup>21</sup> As he puts it: “The human heart is opaque and self-knowledge is not reliable. We cannot even know whether there has ever been a truly moral act”(Rel, 6:447).

### 3. Distinction between the Schematism and the Typic chapters

Having highlighted the main similarities, we can focus on the fundamental difference between the chapters – and the solution to their shared problem – which regards the use of and relation between the faculties in the first and the second critique. I shall not delve into a detailed comparison between the two, but just point out that while categories of the understanding have real significance only in their empirical use – i.e. sensibility and understanding are both necessarily implied in the process of objective cognition (KrV, B146f.) – categories of freedom do not need intuitions to be significant (KpV, 5:65-66;). Namely, they concern exclusively the determination of the will and not the natural conditions of the practical faculties: practical reason, which is the grounds of the categories of freedom, is pure. From this derives the impossibility to schematise the moral Law:

To a natural law, as a law to which objects of sensible intuition as such are subject, there must correspond a schema, that is, a universal procedure of the imagination (by which it presents a priori to the senses the pure concept of the understanding which the law determines). But no intuition can be put under the law of freedom (as that of a causality not sensibly conditioned) – and hence under the concept of the unconditioned good as well – and hence no schema on behalf of its application *in concreto*. Thus the moral law has no cognitive faculty other than the understanding (not the imagination) by means of which it can be applied to objects of nature, and what the understanding can put under an idea of reason is not a schema of sensibility but a law, such a law, however, as can be presented *in concreto* in objects of the senses and hence a law of nature, though only as to its form; this law is what the understanding can put under an idea of reason on behalf of judgment, and we can, accordingly, call it the type of the moral law. (KpV, 5:69)

A schema, then, cannot be useful<sup>22</sup> in the practical moral appraisal because: 1) it restricts an intelligible rule (the category) to sensibility, while the suprasensible nature of the law of freedom cannot be denaturalised; 2) it belongs to the theoretical use of the power of judgement, which deals with action in nature under the law of causality and not of freedom. In the Typic chapter, namely, Kant draws explicitly a sharp contrast between theoretical and practical judgment and the respective interests regarding actions:

Subsumption of an action possible to me in the sensible world under a *pure practical law* does not concern the possibility of the *action* as an event in the sensible world; for, it belongs to the theoretical use of reason to appraise that possibility in accordance with the law of causality, a pure concept of the understanding for which reason has a *schema* in sensible intuition. Physical causality, or the condition under which it takes place, belongs among the concepts of nature, whose schema transcendental imagination sketches. Here, however, we have to do not with the schema of a case in accordance with laws

<sup>22</sup> Zimmerman 2015 and Westra 2016 agree on this point.



but with the schema of a law itself (if the world ‘schema’ is appropriate here), since the *determination of the will* (not the action with reference to its result) through the law alone without any other determining ground connects the concept of causality to conditions quite other than those which constitute natural connection. (KpV, 5:68-69).

The mediating role of imagination in the schematism is replaced here by the understanding, which can present the law of freedom as a law of nature (according to its form), thus producing the “mental experiment” of which the Typic consists.

#### **4. An open problem**

There have been many criticisms concerning the validity and the meaning of the mediations developed through the Schematism and the Typic chapters. I will not delve into the details here, but rather present some open-ended debate points and then use the analogy with the Schematism chapter to elucidate the characteristics that maxims must have to be universalizable.

According to the lessons of the Typic chapter, in order to apply pure practical rules correctly, we should ask ourselves: should I, as the creator of a world of ends, wish that the maxims I am considering be laws themselves? However, this test has been regarded as problematic, insofar as it might lead to mistaken or undetermined results: Hegel, for instance, alludes to the uselessness of the test, insofar as it delivers no results or ones that are mistaken (NL: 127–8 [II: 465–6]; LHP III: 460 [XX: 368] NL: 127–8 [II: 465–6]; LHP III: 460 [XX: 368]).

Moreover, another difficulty concerns the conditions to develop the test: is a test delivered by means of a particular presupposed moral sense (“insight”) or arguments of the same kind as the epistemic judgements? More specifically, in his discussion with Martin Heidegger at Davos, Cassirer regards the Typic (that he contrasts with the Schematism) as an example of an approach to ethics through “insights” that are not “bits of knowledge”. As he puts it:

The extraordinary significance of the Schematism cannot be overestimated. [...] In the ethical, however, he forbids the Schematism. There he says: our concepts of freedom, and so on, are insights (not as bits of knowledge) that no longer permit schematizing. There is a schematism of theoretical knowledge but not of practical reason, there is in any event something else, namely, what Kant calls the Typic of Practical Reason. And he makes a distinction between Schematism and Typic. (Heidegger 1973, pp. 276-7)

Cassirer, then, seems to suggest a non-cognitivist interpretation according to which the main distinction between Schematism and Typic is given by the assumption that moral statements do not concern beliefs to which truth and falsity apply, but rather rest on specific “insights”, and that one could wonder what is the faculty or sense responsible for accessing these insights.

Moreover, Kant's theory of Typic can be considered in light of the debate between realists and constructivists<sup>23</sup>. While the former state that the moral Law is independent from reason (Ameriks 2003, Guyer 2000, Schönecker 2013, Stern 2012, Wood 1999), the latter emphasise that moral obligations are the result of a process of human cognitive activity (Rawls 1980, Hill 1989, Korsgaard 1996, O'Neill 1989, Reath 1994). The chapter on the Typic can provide useful arguments to enlighten this debate: as Kant states, we have to test the universality of our maxims and this test could be interpreted as a construction. Particular moral obligations, too, might be interpreted as the result of a kind of construction, but this does not necessarily mean that the moral Law itself is constructed (nor the contrary). That is to say, the question concerning realism or constructivism regards the maxims, not the moral Law (Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019).

Assuming that the moral Law is self-legislative and does not depend on something more fundamental, how can we determine the characteristics of possible moral judgements and deliver the test described in the Typic chapter?

### 5. In search of a mediating function

Both the Schematism and the Typic deal with a tension concerning inhomogeneous functions that must be mediated.

In the first *Critique*, the mediation works through the reference to time, which shares similarities with both categories and appearances (KrV, B177-178/A138-139)<sup>24</sup>. In the case of time, categories become a sort of general time determinations constituting the grounds for principles, i.e. synthetic a priori judgements. Schemata, then, can be regarded as being the most general characteristics (*Merkmale*) that objective judgements must have to be possible in reference to experience, which is unified through pure laws justified universally through the transcendental deduction.

In the Typic chapter, by contrast, the mediation works not through a “rule of time-determination” (KrV, B184/A145), but rather through a rule of the judgement to change our perspective in the moral appraisal:

The rule of judgment under laws of pure practical reason is this: ask yourself whether, if the action you propose were to take place by a law of the nature of

<sup>23</sup> I am sympathetic with Kleingeld and Willaschek's position: they regard the Moral Law as being grounded in nothing other than itself (Kleingeld & Willaschek 2019). This position provides a more consistent and coherent interpretation of Kant's lines, in contrast to both the realistic positions – regarding, for instance, moral maxims as being grounded in objective values, such as the value of humanity (Wood 2008) – and the constructivist ones, which consider the lines as dependent on a deliberative activity of human reason (Rawls 1980).

<sup>24</sup> “Time, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition. Now a transcendental time-determination is homogeneous with the category (which constitutes its unity) insofar as it is universal and rests on a rule a priori. But it is on the other hand homogeneous with the appearance insofar as time is contained in every empirical representation of the manifold. Hence an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter under the former” (KrV, B177-178/A138-139).

which you were yourself a part, you could indeed regard it as possible through your will. Everyone does, in fact, appraise actions as morally good or evil by this rule. Thus one says: if *everyone* permitted himself to deceive when he believed it to be to his advantage, or considered weary of it, or looked with complete indifference on the need of others, and if you belonged to such an order of things, would you be in it with the assent of your will? [...] Such a law is, nevertheless, a *type* for the appraisal of maxims in accordance with moral principles. If the maxim of the action is not so constituted that it can stand the test as to the form of a law of nature in general, then it is morally impossible. (KpV, 5: 69-70)

In contrast to the schemata, Kant does not provide a table of the types, but limits himself to the claim that we should use the universal form of the law of nature to deliver the test, thus imaging or representing a world in which our maxims hold the validity of principles of nature. Then, the function assumed by time in the Schematism chapter is assumed by the form of the law of nature that we should use to test our maxims. However, this is not sufficient to explain how this mediation actually works, i.e. how we can change the perspective. To do that, there must be a faculty through which we can elevate ourselves from a particular, egocentric perspective to a more general one.

In both the Schematism and the Typic chapters, the faculty of the judgement plays a fundamental function: in decision making, as well as in cognition, we use judgements to relate a subject and attributes or particular and universal perspectives. To elaborate the test in the case of moral appraisal, we elevate ourselves to the position of a lawgiver: while in the Schematism chapter pure laws are, so to say, temporalised (and thus realised), in order to apply moral laws according to the Typic chapter, we have to elevate ourselves to a noumenal dimension, i.e. assuming the position of a lawgiver. But how is that possible?

To answer this question, I will refer to the third *Critique*, where Kant refers to a particular sense through which we can try to assume the lawgiver's position.

### **6. *Sensus communis* as a mediating function**

As mentioned above, many critics regard Kant's formal ethics as insufficient to provide hints about elaborating judgments that can guide action. Onora O'Neill (O'Neill 1989) comments on this criticism by referring to Kant's discussion of a *sensus communis* (KU, 5: 293ff.; L, 9: 57, 63):

[...] the *sensus communis* consists of three principles or maxims that constrain understandings, indeed practices of communication, that can be shared in any possible community. These maxims do not presuppose that standards or principles of communication are either antecedently established or actually shared: They articulate the self-discipline of thinking that will be required if there is to be communication among a plurality whose members are not antecedently coordinated, who form a merely possible community. (O'Neill 1989, p.25)

That is exactly what is needed to develop further what Kant left undetermined in the Typic: namely the characteristics that maxims must have to be morally possible. To adopt these *Merkmale* means to make use of the three “maxims of common human understanding” (KpV, 5:294)<sup>25</sup> and change the perspective from a subjective-egocentric one, to a general-ethical one, thus making proper use of one’s own reason:

To make use of one's own reason means nothing more than to ask oneself, with regard to everything that is to be assumed, whether he finds it practicable to make the ground of the assumption or the rule which follows from the assumption, a universal principle of the use of his reason. (Was heißt: s. i. D. or.?, 8:146n)

I will not delve here into the details of the relation between common sense (*Gemeinsinn*) and common human understanding but just stress that they might be confused with each other insofar as they are both addressed to a *sensus communis* and are presupposed as grounds for communication<sup>26</sup>. However, while we judge by feeling using the former<sup>27</sup>, we always judge by concepts using the latter – although obscurely (KU, 5:238).

More specifically, the first is defined as being the feeling caused by the disposition of our cognitive powers when we are given objects bringing the imagination to a free play (KU, 5:218; 238), whilst the second is the healthy understanding, presupposed in every human being, no matter how cultivated he is. As Kant puts it:

By “*sensus communis*,” however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which,

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<sup>25</sup> These maxims do not belong to the critique of taste as parts of it, but rather aim to elucidate the critique insofar as they characterise the proper use of reason in general, independently from the specificity of the domain (aesthetic, logical, anthropological, etc.). The procedure of judgment in all its employments maintains specific characteristics or rules (the maxims of common human understanding). In the *Logic*, for example, it is stressed that to avoid error we should use the following general rules: “1) to think for oneself; 2) to put oneself in thought in the place or point of view of another; and 3) always to think consistently” (Log, 9:57). In the *Anthropology*, to attain wisdom (the perfect practical use of reason according to law) the following rules must be respected: “1) To think for oneself. 2) In communication with men to imagine (*sich denken*) oneself in the place of every other person. 3) Always to think in agreement with oneself” (Anth, 7:228-229).

<sup>26</sup> “Now since this disposition itself must be capable of being universally communicated, hence also the feeling of it (in the case of a given representation), but since the universal communicability of a feeling presupposes a common sense, the latter must be able to be assumed with good reason, and indeed without appeal to psychological observations, but rather as the necessary condition of the universal communicability of our cognition, which is assumed in every logic and every principle of cognitions that is not skeptical”. (KU, 5:239)

<sup>27</sup> Because *Sensus communis* is strongly associated with feeling, it might be considered to be similar to the insight to which Cassirer alluded. Besides, although Kant’s focus starts from the individual capacity to determine his ethical judgements, the reference to common sense and the change in perspective provides elements to respond to accusations of him not considering the social/communal sphere (Makino 1997).

from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. [...] Now perhaps this operation of reflection seems much too artificial to be attributed to the faculty that we call the common sense; but it only appears thus if we express it in abstract formulas; in itself, nothing is more natural than to abstract from charm and emotion if one is seeking a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule. (KU, 5:293-294)

Actually, the ambiguity of the expression *sensus communis* is helpful in underling its mediating function in analogy with the Schematism chapter, in which transcendental time determinations hold characteristics making them homogeneous to both sensibility and understanding. As I interpret the chapter, however, the schema is improperly regarded as a third thing, whereas it would better be described as a procedure by which inhomogeneous elements cooperate in grounding experience (Scaglia 2020). Just as transcendental time determinations are sensible and universal, the common sense is double-sided: both a disposition of faculties and the feeling accompanying this disposition.

Given the sensible and intellectual nature of the *sensus communis*, its maxims can help in elucidating *how* it is possible to deliver the test exposed in the Typic chapter and change the perspective from a mere subjective one to a general one. More specifically, the first maxim concerns thinking for oneself:

The first is the maxim of a reason that is never **passive**. The tendency toward the latter, hence toward heteronomy of reason, is called **prejudice**; and the greatest prejudice of all is that of representing reason as if it were not subject to the rules of nature on which the understanding grounds it by means of its own essential law: i.e., **superstition**. Liberation from superstition is called **enlightenment**, since, although this designation is also applied to liberation from prejudices in general, it is superstition above all (*in sensu eminenti*) that deserves to be called a prejudice, since the blindness to which superstition leads, which indeed it even demands as an obligation, is what makes most evident the need to be led by others, hence the condition of a passive reason. (KU, 5:294)

This maxim remarks not only that we are and have to be autonomous, i.e. can determine our will independently from empirical motives, but also that our process of judging cannot but start from our individual position. It is we – with our particular motives, impulses and stories (our rooted rationality) – that are on stage. Those who do not reason for themselves elude their status as thinking subjects, thus rejecting the very nature of rationality, namely autonomy. It is not surprising that this maxim (called the “never passive reason” KU, 5:294) is the core of the motto of enlightenment (W. i. Aufklär.?, 8:35)

The second maxim addresses the capacity to think from the standpoint of everyone else:

As far as the second maxim of the way of thinking is concerned, we are accustomed to calling someone limited (**narrow-minded**, in contrast to **broad-minded**) whose talents do not suffice for any great employment (especially if it

is intensive). But the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the **way of thinking** needed to make a purposive use of it, which, however small the scope and degree of a person's natural endowment may be, nevertheless reveals a man of a **broad-minded way of thinking** if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a **universal standpoint** (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). (KU, 5:295)

Through such a maxim "of enlarged thought" (KU, 5:294), the subject reflects on his own judgement by shifting from a private position to the standpoint of others (KU, 5:295): reasoning, then, does not depend on external standards but is the result of an autonomous process delivered by (and possible for) the individuum.

Finally, the third maxim regards consistency:

The third maxim, namely that of the consistent way of thinking, is the most difficult to achieve, and can only be achieved through the combination of the first two and after frequent observance of them has made them automatic. One can say that the first of these maxims is that maxim of the understanding, the second that of the power of judgment, the third that of reason. (KU, 5: 295)

This maxim is more difficult to achieve than it might appear: each change<sup>28</sup> in the standpoint brings with itself the possibility of new inconsistencies. That is why Kant states that it is the hardest maxim to attain and that doing so is only possible in union with the other two maxims (KU, 5:295).

A perfect application of the maxims should be regarded as a possible – although never-ending – task: the more accurate and broader our capacity to enlarge our perspective and be coherent and consistent, the more adequate our maxims will be to the moral Law. In this way, we hope to moralise the natural world assuming the realm of ends as a task. Teleology plays a fundamental role here: as is well known, assuming purposes is subjectively necessary for Kant to interpret nature as well as history (KU, 5:397-98; G. i. weltbürg. Abs, 8:18). Since, however, history consists of external deeds, inner moral progress cannot be perceived nor demonstrated, but only hoped (Rel, 6:76). In turn, inner morality set as a goal of human history can be trained and inspired through legal and external means, such as institutions, culture and education. From this perspective, empirical forms of historical progress are necessary preparatory steps for moral progress, which is to be regarded as a long-term goal provided by history to moral agents (Louden 2000, p.152). Therefore,

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<sup>28</sup> One could argue that such a change is impossible: the standpoint of the other is still my standpoint – the standpoint which I imagine the other holds. However, the exercise is worthy: in the praxis, gaining knowledge and experience, learning different languages, meeting other people, etc., are ways to broaden our perspective and give us tools for elaborating more successful tests to generalise our maxims. In this sense, it cannot be but a never-ending task and the impossibility of perfect adequacy to the perspective of the others is not sufficient grounds for claiming the worthiness of the enterprise (cf. Kant's reference to teaching ethics in MS, 6: 477f).

suprasensible noumenal dimension should be regarded as prior or more fundamental to the natural one, but not in a metaphysical-mystical sense: there is no pre-established harmony, but rather it is our duty to harmonise the world<sup>29</sup> according to the Law.

### Some conclusions

Recently, Westra and Kisner have presented their interpretations of the Typic chapter: while the first tends to interpret the type of the law as a third thing (Westra 2016, p. 61), the second rejects the tripartite view (in which there are two elements that need to be mediated through a middle term) and regards the mediation in light of an analogy between the law of nature and the moral law. Both laws are formally the same (as laws, they share the same objective validity), but are differentiated insofar as the law of nature is not merely formal – it also has a sensible representation and a schema of sensible intuition. Therefore, on the basis of its analogical relation to the law of nature, the moral Law can be applied by the practical judgement representing it through the reference to the law of nature:

Consequently, we can represent the moral law, which is per se non-sensible and non-representational, only through reference to the law of nature. So in the process of representing the moral law the practical judgment borrows via the analogy from the law of nature its material part which is missing in the moral law. (Kinsler 2019, p. 150)

I am sympathetic to this interpretation, because it helps in understanding the procedure behind the moral appraisal to which the Typic alludes. The maxims of the common understanding provide constraints on the moral appraisal, indicating how we can change our standpoint: to put ourselves in the positions of lawgivers, namely, means to abandon our private standpoint and formulate maxims that are sharable by a plurality of rational subjects as if it were a law of nature. The *sensus communis*, then, provides characteristics that every judgement must have to be morally possible: if a maxim is incoherent, non-sharable and derived from a passive use of reason, then it cannot be properly moral.

One could wonder whether these constraints are exclusive to the moral judgement. Since, as already stated, they are recurrent in Kant's works as criteria to avoid error (Log, 9:57; Anth, 7:228-229), they should be regarded as identifying the correct use of reason in general. More specifically, the three maxims give normative orientation to all kinds of bottom-up rational exercises: to corroborate the legitimacy of judgements, their coherency, shareability and derivation from an active use of reason must be verified. Nevertheless, I am convinced that it is not by chance that in the third *Critique* Kant ascribes these maxims to the common sense (and not, for instance, to pure reason or the understanding): the question on moral appraisal, namely, concerns subjects "situated" in a context that has particular features – not relevant for scientific or aesthetic assessment – which are salient in the case of practical judgements. Therefore, the reference to a *sensus communis* as a

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<sup>29</sup> As Kaulbach puts it, the supersensible world has to be realised ("*vergegenwärtigt*") through the praxis (Kaulbach 1982, p. 224; see Schwemmer 1971).

capacity to abstract from subjective charm and look for a judgment that is to serve as a universal rule (KU, 5:294) can be regarded as a point of departure to identify what Barbara Herman regards as procedural rules of moral salience (RMS) that help in identifying the aspect of a situation that raises moral questions and find their source of legitimation in the respect for persons as ends-in-themselves (Herman 1985, p.428-429). To treat others as ends-in-themselves implies considering humanity in all its features: not only in its rationality, but also its emotional, historical and social dimensions. The self-discipline promoted by the maxims of the common human understanding as local and context-sensitive, however, does not threaten the formality and universality of Kant's ethics and leaves the way open for a manifold of different contents: the moral appraisal does not rest on a dictate<sup>30</sup>, rather it is reason putting formal constraints on itself and thus preserving the authority and autonomy of reason. Kant's ethics is an ethics of autonomy. One's duty is not defined by some set of legalistic or substantive duties (Silber 1966, p. 221), but rather consists in exercising and realising one's own rational and autonomous capacities in the natural, emotional and social dimensions (see Herman 1996).

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<sup>30</sup> "A critique of reason is possible only if we think of critique as recursive and reason as constructed rather than imposed. The constraint on possibilities of construction is imposed by the fact that the principles are to be found for a plurality of possible voices or agents who share a world. Nothing has been established about principles of cognitive order for solitary beings. All that has been established for beings who share a world is that they cannot base this sharing on adopting unsharable principles. Presumably many specific conformations of cognitive and moral order are possible; in each case the task of the Categorical Imperative is not to dictate, but to constrain possibilities for acting and for cognition. Theoretical rationality constrains but does not determine what can be thought or believed, just as practical rationality constrains but does not dictate what may be done)" (O'Neill 1989, p. 27).



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## On the Kantian distinction between Ethics and Right: Linearity and Mediation

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### Abstract

The aim of this paper is to provide an original account of the distinction between the spheres of *Sitten* that goes beyond the traditional one based on the nature of incentives, since this underestimates some of their characteristics. First, the paper identifies in *obligatio* a common source between Ethics and Right. Then, it explores how in the *Metaphysics of Morals* the *connection* between law and incentive constitutes a more relevant criterion to distinguish ethical lawgiving from juridical lawgiving. Specifically, it demonstrates that such connection: (a) to be ethical should be *linear*, understood as a necessary self-determined process of connecting law to incentive; (b) to be juridical should be *mediated*, namely it comprises an inclusive disjunction between two modalities of connecting law to incentive: a non-necessary linear and a divergent one. It concludes by exploring the implications of such perspective on the notions of internalisation and externalisation associated to each lawgiving.

### Key words

Ethics, Right, obligation, incentive, lawgiving

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## Introduction

Much has been discussed about the respective nature and relationship between Kantian conception of right and his ethical theory. The main aim of this paper is to show how and to what extent Kant gives a more detailed account of ethical and juridical lawgiving and their respective duties, compared to the one that has been often associated to them.

As a matter of fact, the consideration of *Sitten* has basically been subdivided into two distinct tracks. On the one hand, the ethical lawgiving has been widely associated to a totally inner matter, whose concern lies exclusively on formal features, rather than their content. On the other hand, the juridical lawgiving has been often associated to a totally outer matter, whose concern lies exclusively on the performance of external acts.

However, Kant is neither focused exclusively on external elements when he analyses the juridical lawgiving, nor he can endorse an ethical lawgiving completely detached from a material and concrete side. Therefore, this paper derives its arguments from a textual analysis, by giving a more comprehensive account of the theoretical framework articulated by Kant. Specifically, it provides an original account of the distinction between the two normative processes that goes beyond the more traditional distinction based on the nature of incentive, understood as internal in the case of ethical lawgiving and as external in the case of juridical lawgiving.

The paper is divided as follows. First, we explore Kant's complex understanding of obligation (*obligatio*) as a common source between the two spheres of *Sitten*. Second, we demonstrate that the presence of the internal incentive does not constitute the only valid criterion able to distinguish ethical lawgiving from juridical one. As a matter of fact, we argue that a predominant focus on the nature of incentives risks neglecting two other distinct features of lawgivings: the possible *agreement* between them, and what we may call their *indirect sharing*.

Then, we focus on the introduction of the *Metaphysic of Morals*. This allows us to identify in the nature of the *connection between law and incentive* a more relevant and meaningful criterion to distinguish Kant's conception of ethical lawgiving from that of juridical lawgiving. Indeed, this paper claims that such peculiar *discrimen* between ethical and juridical lawgiving requires for the former a linear connection between law and incentive, understood as a necessary self-determined process, while for the latter a mediated connection.

With the term "mediated" we imply that the juridical lawgiving comprises an inclusive disjunction between two modalities of connecting law to incentive: a non-necessary linear and a divergent one. We conclude by raising some open issues and by exploring the implications of such proposed perspective on the two notions of internalisation and externalisation when referring to the normative spheres of *Sitten*.

## 1. *Obligatio*. A common source for ethical and juridical lawgiving

To discover the common root between *Tugendpflichten* and *Rechtspflichten* it is necessary to shift our attention to the work which was at the very basis of the *Metaphysics of Morals*. We are of course alluding at *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785), which was intended as an exposition of the general underlying principles of that work as a whole. To hark back to the definition provided in the *Architecture of Pure Reason*, the “metaphysics of morals” contains “the principles that predetermine and necessitate *deeds and omissions* [*Tun und Lassen*]”. It is therefore “a purely isolated metaphysics of morals, mixed with no anthropology [i.e., an empirical condition]” (*KrV*, B 869-870).<sup>1</sup>

In accordance with the author’s intentions, therefore, two main theses should be derived from those preliminary statements. First, the *Grundlegung* should be regarded as a metaethical work, namely as a “foundation” for the philosophical domain which he considers the science of the «laws of liberty» (*GMS*, IV 387). Second, the *Groundwork* constitutes a preliminary theoretical stage to the *Metaphysics of Morals*, a project which Kant would only manage to complete in 1797 though the idea itself had originated in the mid-1760s and is evidenced in many of Kant’s correspondences.<sup>2</sup>

Putting aside the various reasons for this postponement<sup>3</sup>, we shall focus on the theoretical links between the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* and the *Metaphysics of Morals* itself. As we know, the *Metaphysics of Morals* is composed of two parts dealing respectively with the *Metaphysical principles of the doctrine of right* and the *Metaphysical principles of the doctrine of virtue*. Whilst the first part discusses the application/fulfilment of the same “laws of freedom” in those institutions that govern the coexistence of rational beings, the latter part deals with the application of the same principles in the subject agent through the establishment of fundamental behaviours and attitudes such as virtues.

Concerned as it is to determine the structures in which reason manifests itself in practice, the *Groundwork* moves beyond the distinction between *right* and *ethics* that is so explicitly drawn up in the *Metaphysics of Morals*, concentrating instead on the definition and elaboration of those principles that would apply in both spheres of pure practical reason.

By highlighting the peculiarity of the 1785 work, we are not arguing that Kant had not yet conceived of the distinction between *morality* and *legality*, between “internal

<sup>1</sup> For what concerns Kant’s use of the expression «*Tun und Lassen*»: implicit referring to Christian Wolff, *Vernünftige Gedancken von der Menschen Thun und Lassen, zu Beförderung ihrer Glückseligkeit* [1720] – now in Ch. Wolff, *Gesammelte Werke*, 1976, Vol. IV, I.

<sup>2</sup> See the following letters by Kant: to Johann Heinrich Lambert (31. December 1765; Ak. X, 56); to Johann Gottfried Herder (9. May 1768; *Briefe*, Ak. X, 74); again, to Lambert (2. September 1770; Ak. X 97); to Marcus Herz (7 June 1771; Ak. X, 123 and another one datable around end 1773 (Ak. X 145); to Moses Mendelssohn (16. August 1783; Ak. X, 346-347); to Heinrich Jung-Stilling (datable after 1. March 1789; Ak. XXIII 495).

<sup>3</sup> On this point see first Beck, 1960, pp. 5-18; Ludwig, 1998<sup>2</sup> (1986), pp. xiii-xxvi.

legislation” and “external legislation”, and ultimately between ethics and right, which would lie at the heart of the *Metaphysics of Morals*.

This distinction, in fact, is already apparent in the notebook relating to the *Course on natural law (Naturrecht Feyerabens)*, which was held by Kant in the summer term of 1784, that is at exactly the time when he was completing the *Groundwork* (whose production lasted from the autumn of 1783 to the summer of 1784). The same distinction is also made in the 1775-1780 *Course on ethics*, where Kant differentiates *obligations internae* and *obligations externae* whilst commenting on the idea of the *obligatio* in relation to the Baumgarten manual (*VE*, 41; *Collins*, XXVII 272).<sup>4</sup>

Indeed, such a distinction is present in the *Groundwork* as well, where moral actions intentionally undertaken for the sake of duty (*aus Pflicht*) are distinguished from actions that conform to duty (*Pflichtmäßig*), which are actions undertaken only for the sake of external conformity to the law and based either on a subject’s natural inclination or fear of punishment (*GMS*, IV 390, 397-398).

But besides outlining the distinction between ethics and the law, the 1775-80 *Course on ethics* also explicitly underscores their affinity:

The difference between the law and ethics does not lie in the nature of the obligation, but in the motives adopted for its accomplishment [...] Ethics takes into consideration all obligations as long as their motive is internal; it considers them, in other words, on the basis of duty, [...] paying no attention to their coercive aspect. The law, on the other hand, considers the fulfilment of an obligation not in terms of its dutiful motivation, but insofar as it depends on coercion (*VE*, 40; *Collins*, XXVII 271-272; Kant 1997, p.63).

Ethics and Right differ in terms of the motivation that underlies the same actions, be it pure intention or coercion. Nevertheless, the “nature of the obligation” remains identical in the case of both juridical and virtuous duties.

Moreover, the idea of the obligation (*Verpflichtung*) makes an important reappearance in the *Introduction to the Metaphysics of Morals*. Here Kant resumes and develops also the meta-ethical line of reasoning inaugurated in the *Groundwork*. In Section IV of the Introduction, whilst discussing those “concepts <that are> common to both parts of the metaphysics of morals”, Kant defines an obligation as “the necessity of a free action under the categorical imperative of reason” (*MS*, VI 222).

It is worth highlighting three considerations in this regard. *First*, in his *Introduction* Kant reiterates the point that the idea of the obligation is common to both ethical and juridical spheres, to which the *Metaphysics of Morals* devotes ample space. *Secondly*, it must also be pointed out that Kant discusses obligations in terms of the categorical imperative, which renders an otherwise free action – namely an action that is the product of subjective choice – necessary and therefore obligatory. As a *third* consideration, we can assume that the categorical imperative, which is extensively treated in the *Groundwork* and

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<sup>4</sup> See also Kant’s courses on Moral Philosophy: *Mrongovius II*, XXIX 611-619; *Powalski*, XXVII 131-133, *passim*. Furthermore: *Feyerabend*, XXVII 1326.

subsequently in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, justifies its application on both an ethical and juridical level.

Accordingly, the *categorical imperative*, which is the formal reshaping of the *obligatio* in Kantian terms, is an unconditional obligation which transcends any distinction between internal and external legislation. Just like ethics then, the law “commands categorically” and does so in a way that is not “technical” or “pragmatic”, although it differs from ethics insofar as it holds up the threat of coercion. The duties that the law imposes on me as a man and citizen of the state do not allow me to evaluate the usefulness of obedience and to weigh up the advantages that I could gain from it. Rather, they command in an absolute manner, for they are *laws* in the more common sense of the word.

It is worth drawing attention to Kant’s remarks concerning the syntactic formulation of the imperative in the *Introduction to the doctrine of right* (that forms part of the *Metaphysics of Morals*), and, in particular, to his definition of the “universal law of right”: “Act externally in such a way that the free exercise of thy will may be able to coexist with the liberty of all others according to a universal law” (*MS*, VI 231).<sup>5</sup> It should also be stressed that one can find at least three explicit references to the juridical role of the categorical imperative in the 1797 work.<sup>6</sup>

By focussing on the categorical imperative, the *Groundwork for a Metaphysics of Morals* furnishes Kantian thought with a key idea, which the author himself would implement in both an ethical and juridical context. This characterisation of the *Groundwork* and its important position within Kant’s moral system remains a point of reference, even if the work deals almost exclusively with the moral dimension and even if it appears to lose sight of its original preliminary intention when read alongside the second *Critique*, which was written a mere three years later.

## 2. An indirect sharing: duties of Right as indirectly ethical and duties of Virtue as indirectly juridical

The concept of obligation in the foundational sphere of Morality allows to conceive Ethics and Right as complementary parts, even if formally distinct. Then, one way to describe the nature and the scope of the distinction between Ethics and the Right is to focus on the different kind of motivation they imply in their respective lawgiving. Indeed, as Kant states in the *Metaphysics*, both ethical and juridical lawgiving (*Gesetzgebung*) comprises two elements: the objective element of law (*Gesetz*), and the subjective and motivational element of incentive (*Triebfeder*). The former is defined by Kant as the representation of dutifulness of an action, while the latter is described as a subjective element that unites the ground of determining the choice of the agent with the

<sup>5</sup> On this topic see: Goyard-Fabre, 1996, pp. 17-60; Id., 2004, pp. 64-70; pp. 120-149.

<sup>6</sup> See *MS*, AA 06, pp. 318; 336-337; 371.



representation of the law (MS AA 6:218; Kant 1996, p. 19). The incentive is the motivational part of each lawgiving, it is what enforces the law subjectively.

The term *Triebfeder* was already present in the *Critique of Practical Reason*, as “the subjective determining ground of the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the object law” (KpV 5:72).<sup>7</sup> Thus, the receptivity to duty, namely to an object law, requires for the human will the presence of a subjective element as source of moral action: the incentive.

Compared to the text of *Critique of Practical Reason*, where the term *Triebfeder* is often equivalent to ethical incentive, in the *Metaphysics* there is the further distinction between *Wille* as practical reason and *Willkür* as power of choice, and the term *Triebfeder* is declined in a twofold sense: as an internal and ethical one, or as an external and juridical one.

In the *Metaphysics*, the ethical *Triebfeder* is the one that implies a direct relation to practical reason as *Wille* and moral law, and thus it is characterised as intrinsic because of the same nature of the law. In fact, it derives its inner nature from the self-motivating force of law: the unconditionality of the categorical imperative as *Gesetz* is also the source of action in Ethics.<sup>8</sup> Ethical lawgiving requires that duty constitutes the incentive.

The ethical incentive is intrinsically related to law, rather than stems from externally coercive sources the law can make use of. The latter can be the case for juridical incentives, that can be considered external and contingent rather than intrinsic.<sup>9</sup>

To sum up, the constraint expressed by law can be described as an internal one, where internal means self-imposed; or, conversely, as coercively and externally grounded.<sup>10</sup> On the one hand, the ethical lawgiving involves a self-constraint (*Selbstzwang*, MS 6:381), exercised upon one’s choice by one’s own will with the idea of duty; on the other hand, the juridical lawgiving involves an external-constraint or coercion (*äußere Zwang*, MS 6:220). We can summarise this distinction in this way: ethical norms require to be internally enforced by the incentive of duty, while juridical norms admit to being externally enforced by coercion.

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<sup>7</sup> The term *Triebfeder* was already present in the *Groundwork*, where Kant describes it as the subjective ground of desire, in opposition to motive (*Bewegungsgrund*), that is the objective ground of will. As such, it is a distinction between subjective ends that rest on incentives, and objective ends that depends on motives, which hold for every rational being (GMS AA 4:427; Kant 1998a, p. 36). Then Kant changed the denotation of *Triebfeder* in the KpV, intending with this term not only a purely sensuous interest, but also a practical one.

<sup>8</sup> It is what Potter (2002, p. 374) called the “identity of justifying and motivating reasons” in ethical lawgiving.

<sup>9</sup> Nonetheless, there is an intrinsic character in juridical lawgiving as well, that is the law’s necessitating and unconditional character as *Gesetz*. This holds independently of the nature of incentives that enforce it (internal or external). On this point, see next paragraphs.

<sup>10</sup> “Obligatio externa est necessitatio moralis per arbitrium alterius. Obligatio interna est necessitatio per arbitrium proprium.” *Vorlesung*, AA 27, p.270; Kant, 1997, p. 62. Apart from the distinction between external or internal obligation, what emerges is a distinction between another choice (*arbitrium alterius*), and own choice (*arbitrium proprium*). The distinction between the two different ways of intending the constraint [*Zwang*] by law goes in the same direction: self- constraint for ethical lawgiving, or constraint by another for the juridical ones [*Selbstzwang oder Zwang durch einen Andern*], MS, AA 06, p. 394; Kant, 1996, p. 156.

The distinction between different incentives is without doubt a useful criterion for differentiating ethical lawgiving from the juridical one, because it helps to conceptualize them through the intension of their definitions.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, such distinction encompasses one of the properties that constitute the definition of duties as ethical or juridical and their respective lawgiving, namely the presence of internal or external incentive.

However, the distinction between incentives is not the only valid criterion able to define the two normative processes. Such distinction grasps one of the differences between them, but arguably does neglect two other distinct features of ethical and juridical lawgiving: the possible *agreement* between them, and what we may call their *indirect sharing*.

First, the fact that ethical and juridical lawgiving can *reach an agreement* (*übereinkommen*) is described by Kant in this way:

All lawgiving can therefore be distinguished with respect to the incentive (even if it agrees with another kind with respect to the action that it makes a duty [*sie mag auch in Ansehung der Handlung, die, sie zur Pflicht macht, mit einer anderen übereinkommen*], e.g., these actions might in all cases be external)” (MS, AA 6: 218-219; Kant, 1996, p. 20)”.

The incentive is only the subjective element, but there is also an objective element in lawgiving. The latter is law as *Gesetz*, that provides a representation of “an action that is to be done as objectively necessary” (MS, AA 6: 218; Kant, 1996, p. 20).<sup>12</sup> Both ethical and juridical lawgiving can prescribe to keep a promise, and thus the representation of an action to be done could coincide.<sup>13</sup> The dutifulness to “keep a promise” can be the same, even it is enforced by an internal incentive, or alternatively by an external incentive.

Second, in a more fundamental way, a distinction based on incentives has the disadvantage of neglecting another point, that we may call the *indirect sharing* between lawgivings. Such term implies that Ethics and Right can share in certain cases the same area of obligation. But what does it mean exactly? Such sharing is often implicit in the Kantian text, but in a passage from the *Metaphysics of Morals* Kant states that juridical lawgiving is not only external, but also internal, in full accordance with the ethical lawgiving:

Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be external) is that which *cannot* be external; juridical lawgiving is that which can also be external [*die juristische (Gesetzgebung) ist, welche auch äußerlich sein kann*] (MS, AA 6:220; Kant 1996, p.22).

<sup>11</sup> This distinction proves to be unsatisfactory if we consider its *extension*, the things to which it applies: ethical and juridical duties, as also Kant notes: “The doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are therefore distinguished not so much by their different duties as by the difference in their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with the law” (MS AA 6: 119). There are duties in common between the two spheres: “*Die Ethik [...] hat (Pflichten) doch auch mit dem Rechte Pflichten*” (MS, AA 6: 220).

<sup>12</sup> “die Handlung, die geschehen soll, objective als notwendig vorstellt”.

<sup>13</sup> This aspect of *Gesetz* is recognised also by Boot, 2017.

This statement makes the distinction between the two lawgivings more complex, because the conditionality of the verb “*sein kann (äußerlich)*” provides a case in which the juridical lawgiving may turn out to be internal. A further signal to reinforce this thesis is provided by the presence of the “also (*auch*)” conjunction. Such internal side is then specified:

It is an external duty to keep a promise made in a contract; but the command to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard for any other incentive, belongs to *internal* lawgiving alone [...] while there are many *directly ethical* duties, internal lawgiving makes the rest of them, one and all, *indirectly ethical* (MS, AA 6:220; Kant 1996, p. 22. Italics is ours).

To define a duty as a duty of right is irrelevant the presence of an inner incentive [*Triebfeder*]. Even in those cases in which the incentive is internal and based on the idea of duty itself, this does not change the duty’s characterization, because it is the fulfilment or omission of an action to constitute its juridical nature.

When the internal incentive is present, it is considered irrelevant by juridical lawgiving because it has nothing to do with the assessment of a good action, namely its conformity with right. Sharing a feature – as the internal incentive based on the idea of duty itself – with duties of virtue is not essential to the definition of duties of right.

However, the irrelevance of an inner incentive does not mean that this inner incentive (*innere Triebfeder*) cannot exist in juridical lawgiving. Thus, duties of right can be enforced by the inner incentive of duty and be “indirectly ethical”, providing an example of indirect sharing between ethical and juridical lawgiving that allows them to occupy the same area of obligation. Moreover, one may wonder whether some duties of virtue can be conceived as “indirectly juridical” as well.

Kant never mentions such term, but the further distinction he draws between *Moralität* and *Legalität* can be useful here. These two terms refer to different conformities of an action to a normative standpoint or a law:

The mere conformity or nonconformity of an action with law, irrespective of the incentive to it, is called its *legality* (lawfulness); but that conformity in which the idea of duty arising from the law is also the incentive to the action is called its *morality* (MS AA 6: 219; Kant 1996, p. 20).<sup>14</sup>

In indirectly ethical duties of right what is *indirect* is the *Moralität*, the fact that they show a “conformity with ethical laws”, which requires that the law be also the subjective ground of determination. In other words, these duties can be compliant to *Moralität*.

Similarly, if we want to investigate the possibility for “indirectly juridical” duties of virtue, the term *indirect* can be referred to the possible *Legalität* of these duties. Possible

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<sup>14</sup> On *Moralität* and *Legalität* see also MS AA 6:225; KpV AA 5:81.

candidates are meritorious duties (*verdienstliche Pflichten*), duties that “goes beyond the law of duty for actions and makes the law itself also the incentive”. These are duties of virtue that implies a respect for Right [*Achtung für das Recht*]. This kind of duties goes beyond the concept of juridical duty and presupposes it<sup>15</sup>, or in Kant’s words “widens one’s concept of duty beyond the concept of what is *due* (*officium debiti*)” (MS, AA 06: 391; Kant, 1996, p. 153).

Meritorious duties and indirectly ethical duties of right are two sides of the same coin. While in the case of indirectly ethical duties of right the law as incentive is present but implicit (as *Moralität*), in meritorious duties the implicit element is the action in conformity with law (as *Legalität*). Thus, meritorious duties can be labelled under the term “indirectly juridical” in the sense that they require duties of right as their precondition, even if those are not considered a necessary aspect of their definition as ethical duties. “Ethical lawgiving [...] does take up duties which rest on another, namely an external, lawgiving by making them, *as duties*, incentives in its lawgiving” (MS, AA 6: 219, Kant 1996, p. 20). In this sense, ethical lawgiving can imply *Legalität*.<sup>16</sup>

Meritorious duties and indirectly ethical duties of right are examples of the fact that juridical and ethical lawgiving can develop a relation of *indirect sharing*, which occurs when they occupy the same area of obligation. The distinction between incentives proves to be unsatisfactory since it fails to grasp implicit but important features of ethical and juridical lawgiving: their agreement and their indirect sharing. Therefore, in the next sections this paper aims to provide a comprehensive and more detailed account of the whole process that Kant calls lawgiving (*Gesetzgebung*) and its specification in ethical or juridical.

### 3. Linearity and Mediation

In the introduction of the *Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant analyses the main differences between the ethical and juridical lawgiving:

That lawgiving which makes an action a duty and also makes this duty the incentive is *ethical* [*welche eine Handlung zur Pflicht und diese Pflicht zugleich zur Triebfeder macht, ist ethisch*]. But that lawgiving which does not include [*nicht im Gesetze mit einschließt*] the incentive of duty in the law and so admits an incentive other than the idea of duty itself [*andere Triebfeder als die Idee der Pflicht selbst zuläßt*] is *juridical* [*juridisch*]. It is clear that in the latter case this incentive which is something other than the idea of duty must be drawn from *pathological* determining grounds of choice,

<sup>15</sup> This is what Höffe has called the *Moralität* as “*Überbietung*” of *Legalität*, see Höffe, 1983, p. 185; see also Höffe, 2001, p. 111.

<sup>16</sup> There is neither full identification of Legality with Right, nor full identification of Morality with Ethics. On this point, see also Höffe, 2001, pp. 105-118; Ponchio, 2011, pp. 141-148.

inclinations, and aversions, and among these, from aversions; for it is a lawgiving, which constrains, not an allurements, which invites (*MS*, AA 06, 219; Kant, 1996, p. 20).

The specific nature of each lawgiving is given not so much by the incentive, but more specifically by the *connection* between law (*Gesetz*) and incentive (*Triebfeder*). As Kant states in another passage: “The doctrine of right and the doctrine of virtue are distinguished [...] by the difference in their lawgiving, which connects one incentive or the other with the law [*Triebfeder mit dem Gesetze verbindet*]” (*MS*, AA 06: 220, Kant 1996, p. 20).

In ethical lawgiving objective and subjective ground of determination must have a necessary connection, which Kant describes in the shape of a coincidence. The ethical incentive is characterised by the idea of duty as subjective ground of determination of our choice. Duty requires a self-motivating force and Kant defines “the cultivation of morality” [*Cultur der Moralität*] as the ability “to do his duty *from duty* (for the law to be not only the rule but also the incentive [*die Triebfeder*] of his actions)”.<sup>17</sup>

On the contrary, the description of juridical lawgiving seems to imply that in its process there is no such necessary coincidence between duty as a subjective incentive and objective law. Kant describes as a *non-inclusion* – Kant uses the verb *nicht einschließt* – the connection between law and the idea of duty as internal *Triebfeder*.

Indeed, as the passage above states, juridical lawgiving admits (*zuläßt*) different incentives, those derived from pathological determining grounds. The verb “admits” regarding juridical lawgiving implies the same possibility suggested by the verb “may be (external)” regarding duties of right. The juridical lawgiving can have the idea of duty as inner incentive, but it also implies a broader range of incentives, that stem from a non-exhaustive list of sources, even inclinations and aversions, whose common attribute is to be considered pathological.

In summary, the ethical lawgiving is described as a linear process, which directly unites duty to action. Duty becomes incentive, which is in turn the principle upon which the agent chooses to act and whose linear effect is logically represented by the action. We call this process *ethical linearity*. With this term, we imply necessary coincidence, namely a direct and straight connection, between the subjective principles of action in the agent and the objective law.

Conversely, the juridical lawgiving gives rise to an “inclusive disjunction”, as even Baiasu (2016, p. 38) has pointed out recently. The disjunction implies two alternatives: a linear process, that directly connect duty to incentive and action, or a different and divergent process in the connection of *Gesetz* and incentive and action. However, it is inclusive: the disjunction is true when either or both of its constituent modalities are true.

Thus, it involves a meta-enforcement process that we call *juridical mediation*, which can consist in either or both of two different modalities of enforcement for the law.

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<sup>17</sup> In ethical lawgiving “the law makes duty the incentive [*daß das Gesetz die Pflicht zur Triebfeder macht*]” implies an identification of duty as *law* and duty as *incentive*, in the sense that the ethical categorical imperative displays its self-motivational force (see *MS*, AA 06, p. 218; Kant, 1996, p.19).

It leads to the possibility of non-coincidence and dissimilarity between the subjective principles of action in the agent and the objective law, resulting in a divergent process between those two. When this happens, the representation of the law is mediated and enforced by incentives that are a *datum* – they must be drawn (*hergenommen sein müsse*) – for the agent, who receives them from an external source. Fig. 1, below, shows the differences between the two lawgivings:




Diagram showing the differences between juridical and ethical lawgiving starting from MS, AA VI 219.

**Fig.1**

The element of law [*Gesetz*], as the objective element of representation of a law, is present in both processes. Thus, we can find a connection between law – represented in the concept of duty in the diagram above – and incentive also in the process of juridical mediation. In this scenario, the distinction in internal or external is applied to the incentive, to the subjective principle in lawgiving. And the incentive is also the changing element between a linear form and a divergent form.

However, the notions of mediation and linearity that we are proposing in this paper have the advantage of individuating a peculiar difference between ethical and juridical lawgiving. Such difference lies in the fact that the ethical is a necessary self-determined and direct modality of lawgiving (linearity), whereas the juridical can involve a divergent modality. Namely, it is a partially self-determined modality of lawgiving, in which external elements can be introduced to facilitate and direct the process (mediation).

Nonetheless, this does not imply that the juridical lawgiving excludes a linear form between law and incentive. Indeed, such linear connection between law and incentive can take place in the juridical lawgiving, but without being characterised by the same necessary nature that is inherent in the ethical lawgiving. The notions of linearity and mediation emphasize also that the peculiar difference (*die Verschiedenheit*) between ethical and juridical lawgiving is described as a *connection* (MS, AA 06: 220, Kant 1996, p.20), and does not merely rely on the nature (internal or external) of the incentive.

From a normative perspective, what we call “juridical mediation” is a term that allows two modalities of enforcement that are not excluding to one another: a linear form with an internal incentive or a divergent one with external incentives. The strict linearity is

necessary in the case of ethical lawgiving, which requires the law to be coincident with the incentive. Instead, juridical lawgiving can conform its process to either a linear or divergent form, or both. The coincidence between law and incentive (i.e., linearity) is a non-inclusive property in a strict juridical divergent form, but this does not mean that it is an excluding property in juridical lawgiving as such.

One might be tempted, according to the distinction between internal or external subjective principles or incentives, to conclude that the whole process and the other elements in each lawgiving are thus characterised as internal or external. Kant himself seems to admit that.<sup>18</sup> Such a distinction is just one of the available perspectives to describe these two modalities, or these two forms of obligation (*Art der Verpflichtung*) as Kant calls them (*MS*, AA 06: 220; Kant 1996, p. 22). According to such specific perspective, Kant is then authorized to distinguish between an *internal* or *external* obligation.<sup>19</sup>

However, even if the distinction between internal or external in relation to incentives does constitute a valid criterion to understand the functioning of each lawgiving, it risks neglecting some of their peculiar aspects. Kant's insistence on incentive has been often mistaken in the literature for a claim that Right excludes inner elements *per se*, while Ethics excludes external elements *per se*.

This relevance of the incentive is also one of the core assumptions in the debates on the relation between the universal law of Right and the categorical imperative. In fact, much has been discussed on the possibility or impossibility of grounding coercive external incentives – as the juridical ones – on the unconditionality and necessity of the categorical imperative. The most interesting positions are divided between pro-independence perspectives, such as those of Willaschek (1997; 2002; 2009; 2012), Wood (2002) and others, and pro-dependence perspectives, such as those sustained by Höffe (1989), Guyer (2002), Baiasu (2016) and others. In the last part of the paper, we specify the nature of this relation according to our perspective and clarify the complex relation between juridical lawgiving and “internalisation” on the one side, and ethical lawgiving and “externalisation” on the other.

#### **4. Internalisation and Juridical Lawgiving**

The incentive in juridical lawgiving is mainly a pathological one, where choice can be affected through *stimulus*, sensible impulses.<sup>20</sup> However, with this statement Kant does

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<sup>18</sup> *MS*, AA 06:220; Kant, 1996, p. 21. However, in this passage Kant claims that “Ethical lawgiving (even if the duties might be external) is that which *cannot* be external; juridical lawgiving is that which can also be external”. Accordingly, there is neither a *full identification* of ethical lawgiving with internal, nor of the juridical with external.

<sup>19</sup> *VE*, 41; *Collins*, XXVII 272. On this point, see the first paragraph. See also Kant's courses on Moral Philosophy: *Mrongovius II*, XXIX 611-619; *Powalski*, XXVII 131-133, *passim*. Furthermore: *Feyerabend*, XXVII 1326.

<sup>20</sup> *MS*, AA 06:213; Kant 1996, p. 13. See also *KrV*, A 534/B 562. Punitive prudential incentives and other natural [*physisch*] means are present in juridical lawgiving, *MS*, AA 06:381; Kant, 1996, p. 146.

not want to reduce the juridical sphere to a mechanism, whose laws are similar with the laws of nature. Juridical and ethical are both normative processes of freedom, they are both laws of freedom (*Gesetze der Freiheit*).<sup>21</sup>

Instead, the term “pathological” describes a modality through which the representation of the law becomes mediated and not considered a spontaneous activity of the agent. In other words, the universal law of right, that is the norm governing the juridical sphere, admits to being mediated: it may be enforced in its proper activity by instrumental elements that are outside it, as pathologically determined incentives.

Nonetheless, the coercive aspect in juridical lawgiving does not lead us to conceive the juridical as dependent upon those instrumental and external elements. In fact, the juridical lawgiving has its own inner objective validity, i.e., its rightness, due to the presence of law, *Gesetz*. This latter in the juridical sphere is the universal law of Right, that is in turn grounded on obligation, on law that commands categorically before any distinction.

The *Gesetz* does not provide mere rules of skills (*Regeln*) or counsels of prudence (*Ratschläge*), but the unconditionality, necessity and universality of the categorical imperative (GMS 4:416; Kant 1997, p. 27). Thus, even if accompanied and enforced by external incentives, it provides to the juridical sphere its inner and objective normative status. Both juridical and ethical spheres are expressions of autonomy and pure practical reason, and the distinction between incentives is still only a subjective distinction between two objective moral lawgiving.<sup>22</sup>

Moreover, the specification of juridical lawgiving as a *mediation* provides the possibility of alignment. In fact, this alignment is given in all those cases in which the universal law of Right is not followed out of external incentives, but for the sake of its own normative status. To put it in concrete terms, from a juridical perspective, agents can conform their incentives to duty, adopting the same linearity of ethical lawgiving. However, in this way the juridical process is not simply turned into an ethical one. This is the thesis sustained by Willascheck (1997, p. 86; 2009, p. 49), who argues that the prescriptive and normative character of juridical lawgiving can be considered only from an ethical perspective. There are two reasons for rejecting such thesis.

First, as we have seen in the case of indirectly ethical duties of right, the legal compliance is still the most relevant aspect, even if the presence of the internal incentive makes these duties a matter of *indirect sharing* between ethical and juridical lawgiving.<sup>23</sup>

Thus, from a perspective on action [*Handlung*], there is not an identification of juridical linearity with ethical linearity *tout court*. Indeed, these kind of duties does not lose

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<sup>21</sup> MS, AA 06:214; Kant, 1996, p. 14. On this point, see also the first paragraph.

<sup>22</sup> See also Baiasu, 2016, who raises this point addressing the limited scope of independentist accounts of Right.

<sup>23</sup> However, this is not equivalent to say that an overlapping of lawgivings occurs in all cases. There is a space where “it does not follow that the *lawgiving* for them (duties of right) is always contained in ethics: for many of them it is outside ethics” (MS, AA 06: 219; Kant, 1996, p. 20). This is the case of strict right, on which we return later.



what Right is supposed to ensure in the first place: *Legalität*, the conformity of external actions with law, irrespective of the incentive (internal or external).

The *Legalität* remains in indirectly ethical duties of right; beyond this, the perspective of the *Moralität* is added. In the case of keeping a promise in a contract, “the command to do this merely because it is a duty, without regard for any other incentive, belongs to *internal* lawgiving alone” (MS AA:220; Kant 1996, p. 22). Kant does not use the attribute ethical, but *internal*.

The element that allows an *indirect sharing* between ethical and juridical lawgiving is the common ground they have in common: Morality, in the shape of moral obligation. This latter is the peculiar feature of an *internal* lawgiving as such. Thus, a second way to criticise the thesis according to which the normative nature of juridical lawgiving can be such only from an ethical perspective is to show how the juridical lawgiving has its own prescriptive nature. The subjective modality of enforcement of the categorical command *admits* to being mediated in the juridical sphere, but this does not change the objective nature of the juridical sphere.

What we define as “juridical linearity” is not equivalent to “ethical linearity”, because within the former it is normatively contained the character of contingency in relation to its subjective modality of enforcement: its linearity is not necessary, because there is always the possibility that incentives can be drawn from the outside and its law can be mediated. However, this does not imply that the law loses its own normative and prescriptive force.

By contrast, ethical linearity implies a necessary subjective modality of enforcement, that does not contain the character of mediation. What we call “strict juridical divergent form” is what Kant defines as *strict right*, that requires only external grounds for determining choice and is “not mingled with anything ethical” and “any precepts of virtue” (MS, AA 6:232, Kant 1996, p. 25). Strict right depends upon coercion, which seem at first incompatible with the categorical imperative and its prescriptive nature.

This argument is often used to ground a full independence of the universal law of Right from the categorical imperative (Wood, 2002), or also a relative dependence (Ripstein 2009; Guyer 2002; Habermas 1996), which relies on the assumption that the categorical imperative must be limited or extended in its scope in the case of juridical lawgiving, due to the coercive and external nature of the latter. However, in those theories on the relation between the two spheres of *Sitten* there is often an undue identification between moral obligation and ethical obligation, where the latter requires necessarily to be enforced by the inner incentive of duty, i.e., the ethical incentive (Willascheck 1997).

Instead, in Kant “internal obligation” as moral obligation is not an equivalent to “ethical obligation” *tout court*, because the latter is just a sub-part of the former, that we have called *ethical linearity* and requires that the internal obligation constitutes necessarily also the internal incentive. Thus, from the necessary character of ethical linearity does not stem an ethical account of obligation and its normativity.<sup>24</sup> As a matter of fact, the juridical

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<sup>24</sup> On this point, see also Pauer Studer, 2016, who argues that there is a motivational internalist account of first-personal ethical obligation but not for normative validity in general.

lawgiving remains an internal one, even if it is accompanied and mediated by external incentives, because in Kant there is an internalist account of obligation. The external obligation of the juridical lawgiving is larger than internal, because it is at the same internal (v-Mo/Collins, AA 27:271; Kant 1997, p. 62).<sup>25</sup>

The internal obligation for each lawgiving is given by *Gesetz*, the objective law, that provides the representation of dutifulness of an action (MS, AA 6: 218; Kant 1996, p. 19). These laws are respectively the universal law of Right and the ethical categorical imperative, and both stem from moral obligation, whose formal reshaping is the categorical imperative.<sup>26</sup>

The Universal law of Right and the ethical categorical imperative involve the same constraint (*Zwang*) of moral obligation, and they differ from each other regarding the different subjective modalities of enforcement. The ethical categorical imperative commands that the incentive is necessarily characterised as a *Selbst-Zwang*; the universal law of Right commands that the incentive is an *äußere Zwang*. However, this does not exclude the possibility of a *Selbst-Zwang*.<sup>27</sup>

When this happens, the self-modality of constraint is considered contingent and silent. Nonetheless, this is still an option on the table because juridical lawgiving stems from the moral internal obligation. The inner character related to *Zwang* is present in both modalities of enforcement for the universal law of Right. Thus, the coercive and external nature of the juridical lawgiving is not in contrast with moral obligation, rather it is one of its possible modalities of enforcement.

## 5. Externalisation and Ethical Lawgiving

Ethical lawgiving is devoted to “laws for maxims and not for actions” (MS, AA 06:389; Kant 1996, p. 152). Actions in ethical lawgiving are internal, where internal means that they deal with the dynamics between will and choice, between law and maxims. In ethical actions there is a kind of *Legalität*, as a conformity with law, even if this legality is not a conformity of external actions with law as in juridical lawgiving. It is indeed a

<sup>25</sup>“External obligations are greater than internal, for they are simultaneously internal, whereas the latter are not simultaneously external. *Obligatio externa* already presupposes that the action as such is subordinated to morality and is therefore interna; for the *obligatio externa* is an obligation because the action is already one in the internal sense. For in that the action is a duty, that makes it an internal obligation, but because I can still compel a man to this duty at my own behest, it is also an *obligatio externa*” (V-Mo/Collins 27:270; Kant 1997, p. 62).

<sup>26</sup> Höffe identifies the relation of Right and Ethics as a juxtaposition and introduces a general categorical imperative from which the two can be derived. See also Bacin 2016; Ludwig 2002 on such relation of normative continuity between the two. On the notion of a categorical imperative of Right (*Kategorische Rechtsprinzipien*) as promoted by Höffe, see Höffe 1990 and for a comprehensive overview on such notion and Höffe’s works see Pirni 2005 (pp. 27-80) and 2020.

<sup>27</sup> See on this point MS AA 6:381; MS AA 6:220.

lawfulness that is related to one of the two aspects of law: the letter of the law as legality, rather than to the spirit of the law as morality.<sup>28</sup>

From a normative perspective, the legality as conformity (*Gesetzmäßigkeit*) is a presupposition to morality (MS AA 6:219). The legality of ethical actions consists in “the immediate representation of the law and the objectively necessary observance (*Befolgung*) of it as duty” (KpV AA 5:151; Kant 2015, p. 121). An agent can act ethically according to a law (*Gesetz*) that gives the representation of the dutifulness of an internal or also of an external action, even if this representation remains inner: “Ethical lawgiving, while it also makes internal actions duties, does not exclude external actions, but applies to everything that is a duty in general” (MS, AA 06, p. 219; Kant, 1996, p. 20).<sup>29</sup>

The law represents an action as objectively necessary and it can be “a possible determination of choice” (MS AA 6:218; Kant 1996, p. 19), as Kant states in the introduction to the *Metaphysics*. As we already noted, in ethical lawgiving this possibility must be turned into a necessity: objective and subjective ground of determination must have a necessary connection, that Kant describes in the shape of a coincidence.

Nonetheless, this does not lead to endorse the objective necessity of the action and, thus, a normative and consequentialist interpretation of the ethical process.<sup>30</sup> In Ethics laws are of wide obligation and leaves a *latitudo* for the choice in observing and fulfilling duties (MM 6: 390). Laws of wide obligation determine only the type of obligation to the action, not its degree (*Vigilantus*, 27:536).

Exercising latitude in performing a duty does not exclude the normative significance of ethical actions.<sup>31</sup> We have rationally optional “good” actions that stems from the incentive of duty, and whose representation is objectively necessary. However, the ethical necessity does not rely on the output of the process but rather on the form this process has. The distinction between the output and the form is also the distinction between many *Tugendpflichten* as the material and concrete side of the incentive based on duty, and the *Tugendverpflichtung*, “as the subjective ground of determination for fulfilling all one’s duties” (MS, AA 06: 410). This latter must be supported by a direct and straight

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<sup>28</sup>This point is also highlighted by Ponchio (2011, p. 142), who individuates three possible meaning of legality in Kant.

<sup>29</sup>For example, as Kant states, benevolent maxims have the possibility to result in an act of beneficence, with “physical results [*physische Folgen*]” (MS AA 06:455; Kant 1996, p. 203). On beneficence [*Wohltun*] as beneficent action or deed, see Moran, 2017, p. 323.

<sup>30</sup>This interpretation is endorsed for example by Cumiskey, 1990, who claims that the starting point of ethical lawgiving are some given ends and that there is no role for agents in the prioritization of some ends in respect to others.

<sup>31</sup>We argue that the action as *Tugendpflicht* is rationally optional *and* is performed by the motive of duty. We agree with Lockhart, 2017, when she claims that an action can be necessary and rationally optional at once, so the latitude of ethical duties is not in conflict with the cognition of the objective necessity of the law, given by the incentive of duty. Lockhart relies on an *a priori* conception of rational necessity, according to which “necessary actions are those that can be justified (cognized as good) without reference to a contingent *motivational source* on the part of the agent” (Lockhart, 2017, p. 28). This latter is expressed in the concept of negative freedom of the *Willkür*, but in this paper we rather prefer to give relevance to the positive conception of freedom of the *Willkür*- i.e., choice can be determined [*bestimmt werden kann*”, MS, AA 06: 213] by pure practical reason- and identify in it the reason why a rational necessity of moral action could follow. This serves us to strengthen the conception of ethical lawgiving as an activity.

connection between the representation of the law in the will, and the adoption of duty as incentive in the maxims by the power of choice.

In the possible connection between incentive and law, agents have “no way to measure the degree [*Grad*] of a strength [*Stärke*] except by the magnitude of the obstacles [*Größe der Hindernisse*] it could overcome (in us, these are inclinations) [*in uns die Neigungen sind*]” (MS, AA 06:396-397; Kant 1996, pp. 157-158). Agents cannot measure the grade of their external actions but can experience the magnitude of obstacles inside them. These obstacles are inclinations that stem from sensible impulses, from pathologically and externally determined incentives. There may be an opponent [*Gegner*] that is experienced inside the dynamics of choice (*Willkür*) and that leads to a conflict between two sources of determination: inclinations and reason (MS AA 06: 380; Kant, 1996, p. 45). The adoption of a *Triebfeder* requires in its *a priori* process an external dimension inside its own inner perspective.<sup>32</sup>

What we call *ethical linearity* must be always informed by an autonomous and self-determined choice from within, in every moment.<sup>33</sup> The possibility of deviating from ethical linearity is an inner nemesis that can never be eliminated completely. Therefore, with the term “externalisation” in relation to ethical lawgiving we are referring to two different issues.

First, there are external incentives that are experienced even inside the dynamics of human will, in the connection of incentive to law. This is a negative perspective on externalisation when we refer it to ethical lawgiving.

Second, there may be a positive perspective on externalisation in ethical lawgiving. This implies that the ethical lawgiving has a material and concrete side in its normative process when the representation of the objective necessity of law – its cognition and awareness – becomes self-imposed through its adoption as an inner incentive. This self-imposition of the observance (*Befolgung*) of law is decided within choice (*Willkür*), independently from any inclinations and external incentives and determined by pure practical reason alone.<sup>34</sup>

Thus, the *externalisation* of this observance does not refer to the nature of its source, but in the fact that it requires a proper *activity* to carry out its content: the *making* of duty also the incentive, and the formulation of maxims that are in conformity with duty. As sustained in the paper, such activity constitutes the process of ethical linearity.

Ethical linearity gives a normative indication: the advance and progress of the ethical process is given and conditioned by the form it has. If a deviation occurs, it happens because the connection between law and incentive is not anymore self-imposed exclusively

<sup>32</sup> See on this point also Pirni, 2006, pp. 145-155. Virtue consists in “the capacity and considered resolve to withstand [*Widerstand zu thun*]” obstacles, MS, AA 06:380; Kant, 1996, p. 145. The resolve to withstand [*Widerstand*] in opposition to obstacles [*Hindernisse*] can be found also in the juridical sphere, see MS, AA 06:231; Kant, 1996, p. 24.

<sup>33</sup> See also MS, AA 06:383; Kant, 1996, p. 147 on this point.

<sup>34</sup> This is the positive conception of freedom of the *Willkür*- i.e., choice can be determined [*bestimmt werden kann*], MS, AA 06:213] by pure practical reason. On this point, see also Pirni 2006, p. 147.

within the agent's own will but is instead a form that is accompanied in its functioning by other sources outside the agent's will. Formally regarded, actions in the ethical lawgiving are the material and concrete side of practical reason's activity, whose direction is given and established by the inner and straight relation between the agent's will and choice. Ethical lawgiving relies on the possibility of "drawing a line"<sup>35</sup> and on the capacity to autonomously exercise rational self-determination.

## Conclusions

According to the analysis carried out, we have seen how the distinction between ethical and juridical lawgiving can be re-described, starting from a thorough analysis of the Kantian text. In the first paragraph we showed how the ethical and the juridical lawgiving stem from a common source identified in the concept of *obligatio* (§1).

Then we demonstrated how and to what extent the distinction between the two lawgivings cannot be conceived as a distinction based exclusively on the nature of their incentives, since in this way there is the risk to neglect two of their fundamental characteristics: (a) lawgivings can *reach an agreement* (*übereinkommen*) and, thus, the representation of an action to be done could coincide in ethical and juridical lawgiving; (b) lawgivings can have an *indirect sharing*, namely they can share the same area of obligation, as happens in the cases of indirectly ethical duties of right and meritorious duties (§2).

Subsequently, we recognised the peculiar *discrimen* between ethical and juridical lawgiving in the different *connection* they establish between law and incentive. We described the form of ethical connection as *linearity*, understood as a necessary self-determined process between law and incentive. Conversely, we called *mediation* the juridical form of connection, defining it as a partially self-determined process between law and incentive (§3).

Indeed, juridical lawgiving allows an inclusive disjunction between two possibilities of enforcement: a non-necessary self-determined form between law and incentive (*juridical linearity*) or a divergent form between law and incentive (*strict juridical divergent form*). This led us to explore whether and in which ways the juridical

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<sup>35</sup> In a passage of the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant explicitly uses the analogy of "drawing a straight line", when at stake is the relation between reason's ideas as ideas of totality on one hand, and phenomena in the sensible world at the other. Kant states that the indefinite progress is the kind of progress in which the idea of the totality is not a presupposition, a *datum*, but something that is capable of being given, *dabile*. We can compare this passage to our conception of ethical linearity, whose advance does constitute an indefinite line, with no quantifiable and precise content, and in which the representation of the law is not mediated, a *datum*, namely it is not received as a presupposition from an external source (as in the case of juridical mediation). In the ethical sphere, there is not the prescription of a precise phenomenal content (i.e., "to stop extending"), but the possibility for a latitude in free and self-legislated actions (i.e., "as far as you want"). The predominant focus is on the form that agents may give - as lawgivers - to this positive space. See Kant *KrV*, A510-12/B 538-40; Kant, 1998b, pp. 521-523. See also Munzel, 1999, p. 171 on this point, who analyses such passage in the Kantian text and relates it to the progress of moral character.

lawgiving comprises an element of internalisation, understood as an own inner normative validity that does not depend upon instrumental and external elements. Indeed, even if juridical lawgiving involves the possibility of being enforced and mediated by external incentives, we showed how it still has its own inner and normative force in the objective principle of law (*Gesetz*), in the shape of the universal law of Right that derives its normativity from the inner moral obligation (§4).

Similarly, even if the ethical lawgiving does not allow an external and pathological incentive, we asked whether there was an element of externalisation in such lawgiving. We identified such element in the self-imposition of the observance (*Befolgung*) of law as incentive, that we understood as the activity of the faculty of the will as a whole (§5).

In conclusion, we decided to describe the distinction between the two normative processes as a distinction of forms of moral obligation (*Art der Verpflichtung*, MS 6:220) in the connection between law and incentive, and we individuated such forms in the two notions of linearity and mediation. The traditional distinction between the nature of incentives is merely a subjective distinction between two objective moral lawgivings, whose respective nature and peculiarities stand in need of a thorough re-consideration starting from the moral obligation they share.

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**Estratos de lo social: reconstrucción de un concepto de sociedad  
presente en la filosofía práctica de Kant**

*Strata of the social: a reconstruction of a concept of society  
present in Kant's practical philosophy*

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**Resumen**

El artículo reconstruye tres estratos de un concepto de lo social que puede encontrarse en la filosofía práctica de Immanuel Kant sin recurrir a sus textos de antropología e historia. Para ello se especifican las nociones de coexistencia humana (derecho natural) y coacción recíproca universal (derecho civil) que describe en su *Metafísica de las costumbres*, con el fin de indicar que con ellas no cabe referirse a una sociedad, sino a la forma de una. Posteriormente se reconstruyen algunas coordenadas de la “comunidad ética” presentes en *La religión...*, para argumentar, por una parte, que aquí puede hablarse de una sociedad como tal, y por otra, que esta puede conformar un puente entre la forma de la sociedad jurídica y la formación ética de las personas, *i.e.*, entre el uso externo de la libertad y su uso interno, al (a) socializar máximas morales (b) y abrigar estas una peculiar normatividad intrínseca

**Palabras clave**

Immanuel Kant, lo social, política, filosofía del derecho, religión.

**Abstract**

The article reconstructs three strata of a concept of the social in Immanuel Kant's practical philosophy without recurring to his anthropological and historical works. For it, the notions of human coexistence (natural right) and universal reciprocal coercion (civil right), that Kant describes in *The Metaphysics of Morals*, are specified to indicate that with them it is not possible to refer to a society, but to a form of it. Subsequently, some of the coordinates of the “ethical

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community” present in *The religion...*, are rebuilt to argue, on the one hand, that here we can speak of a society as such, and on the other hand, that it can form a bridge between the juridical society and the ethical education of people, that is, between the external and the internal use of freedom, because it allows to (a) socialize moral maxims and (b) harbour these a peculiar intrinsic normativity.

### Key words

Immanuel Kant, the social, politics, philosophy of right, religion.

### Introducción

La filosofía práctica de Kant no se ha distinguido por ser una de las más sensibles para con lo social. Sin embargo, es usual que aquellos que creen que su *Fundamentación para una metafísica de las costumbres* concentraba todo lo que aquel filósofo tenía para decir acerca de lo práctico dejen de lado los enfoques sociales que abrigan sus conocidas ideas políticas y jurídicas, y en materia de filosofía de la historia y antropología. A estas alturas, ningún lector avezado en sus textos aseguraría que lo social no se encuentra allí, a veces de fondo, otras veces en la superficie, aunque es bien cierto que conviene distinguir la mera coexistencia humana de lo social dentro de su filosofía práctica: digamos que, en rigor, no toda noción de coexistencia puede devenir por *motu proprio* en algo atinente a lo social. De ahí la importancia que reviste discriminar entre los planteos de Kant que remiten a la coexistencia humana forzada (por habitar un planeta que no es plano hasta el infinito), a la forma de la sociedad, y a las sociedades como tales, sin abandonar completamente el ámbito metafísico. En el § 41 de su *Doctrina del derecho*, por ejemplo, se afirma que la unión civil (*unio civilis*) no puede catalogarse como sociedad en virtud de que sus miembros (para Kant: el soberano y el súbdito) no están “coordinados, y los que se coordinan entre sí han de considerarse precisamente por eso como iguales, en la medida en que se encuentran sometidos a leyes comunes. Por tanto, aquella unión no es una sociedad, sino que más bien la *produce*” (MS, RL, 307).<sup>1</sup> Algo curioso de este pasaje es que la unión civil, según la plantea el propio Kant, constituye con certeza una forma de convivencia regida por leyes compartidas a través de una voluntad general que unifica a priori los libres arbitrios de los seres racionales y finitos. Esto quiere decir que la comunidad política es, cuando menos, una forma de convivencia humana en la que los integrantes “se encuentran sometidos a leyes comunes”. Sin embargo, al atender la última afirmación podemos darnos cuenta de que Kant no parece estar hablando de leyes engendradas por el uso externo de la libertad, sino por su uso interno, y que en virtud de ello, una sociedad sólo puede ser un modo de coexistencia humana en la que sus miembros comparten, a foro interno, una estructura fundamental de mandatos prácticos (máximas). De ahí que, como lo sugiere la última afirmación del pasaje, la unión civil sea una idea metafísica de la forma (o

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<sup>1</sup> Las traducciones de los pasajes textuales de Kant son extraídas de las versiones disponibles en nuestra lengua. En la bibliografía se encuentra el detalle de las ediciones empleadas.

condición de posibilidad) que debe tener una sociedad para poder gestionar el espacio compartido y no un sino de la naturaleza humana.

Impulsado en parte por la antecedente observación preliminar, sugiero que es posible reconstruir en el pensamiento práctico de Kant una serie de *estratos de lo social* que ni son esferas, ni son ámbitos, ni son formas de socialización que puedan inducir una interpretación evolutiva, sino momentos teóricos de la conformación de un concepto de lo social. De modo similar a como Reinhart Koselleck (2001) delimita estratos de tiempo con el propósito de identificar diferentes ritmos y movimientos dentro de la univocidad de las dinámicas sociales históricas, cabe delimitar al menos tres momentos conceptuales de lo social dentro del pensamiento práctico de Kant que, como he mencionado, refieren a las formas de coexistencia humana, a la forma de lo social, y a lo social como tal. Para ello reconstruiré, en primer lugar, las instancias política y jurídica de su planteo que remiten tanto al derecho natural como al civil, para poner de relieve la conexión que allí se establece entre la noción kantiana de coacción universal y una *forma* específica de sociedad (1). En segundo lugar, analizaré algunas de las analogías matemáticas, físicas y químicas que sirven de andamiaje conceptual para la comprensión de los usos externo e interno de la libertad, con el objetivo de realzar los diferentes órdenes de lo social que se imbrican entre lo político y jurídico, y luego lo ético (2). Posteriormente navegaré por algunas de las coordenadas más destacadas de la “comunidad ética” que Kant presenta en su *La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón*, para poner de relieve dos asuntos de gran importancia: en primer lugar, que aquí es donde Kant puede hablar sin reservas de una sociedad como tal, y en segundo lugar, que la comunidad ética parece ser una bisagra conceptual entre lo jurídico y lo ético (3). Para detallar cómo puede crearse una articulación de estas características argumentaré que es necesario tener presente, por una parte, la normatividad intrínseca de las máximas morales, y por otra, el destacado rol cultural que para Kant desempeñan las “iglesias visibles”, o fes eclesiales históricas, al socializar las máximas morales y con ello incrementar la posibilidad de que las personas puedan apropiárselas y eventualmente confirmarlas a foro interno (4). Finalmente, contextualizaré esta reconstrucción dentro de algunas nociones kantianas más generales (como la de moral), ya aceptadas por una parte significativa de la discusión especializada (5). Como se verá, la intuición de la presente reconstrucción resuena en múltiples estudios contemporáneos sobre Kant, aunque por el momento no sea posible encontrar una identificación de los estratos de su concepto de lo social.

### **1) Primera y segunda instancias de lo social: la voluntad política y el derecho**

Para reconstruir el proyecto ilustrado que Kant pudo haber tenido en mente durante la elaboración de su filosofía práctica, conviene comenzar por aquella forma de interacción que a sus ojos parecía ser la más básica: la política. Esto se debe a que es la voluntad general la única que, desde un punto de vista práctico, puede conformar las garantías mínimas que requiere la convivencia de seres finitos y racionales dentro de un mismo espacio; y como veremos a continuación, aquella voluntad presupone una particular forma de interacción humana. El § 13 de la *Doctrina del derecho* se titula “Todo suelo puede ser

adquirido originariamente y el fundamento de la posibilidad de esta adquisición es la comunidad originaria del suelo en general”; y allí dice Kant que la primera afirmación del título se justifica por un postulado de la razón práctica ya presentado en el § 2, mientras la segunda se funda en la siguiente prueba. Conviene citarla *in extenso*:

Todos los hombres están originariamente (es decir, antes de todo acto jurídico del arbitrio) en posesión legítima del suelo, es decir, tienen derecho a existir allí donde la naturaleza o el azar los ha colocado (al margen de su voluntad). Esta posesión (*possessio*), que difiere de la residencia (*sedes*) como posesión voluntaria y, por tanto, adquirida y *duradera*, es una posesión *común*, dada la unidad de todos los lugares sobre la superficie de la tierra como superficie esférica: porque, si fuera un plano infinito, los hombres podrían diseminarse de tal modo que no llegarían en absoluto a ninguna comunidad entre sí, por tanto, ésta no sería una consecuencia necesaria de su existencia sobre la tierra. –La posesión de todos los hombres sobre la tierra, que precede a todo acto jurídico suyo (está constituida por la naturaleza misma), es una *posesión común originaria* (*communio possessionis originaria*), cuyo concepto no es empírico ni depende de condiciones temporales, como por ejemplo el concepto inventado, pero nunca demostrable, de una *posesión común primitiva* (*communio primaeva*), sino un concepto práctico de la razón, que contiene a priori el principio según el cual tan sólo los hombres pueden hacer uso del lugar sobre la tierra siguiendo leyes jurídicas.

Como es bien sabido, la *communio possessionis originaria* de la tierra constituye una de las premisas de la *Doctrina del derecho* más importantes para poder luego argumentar que es la reciprocidad universal entre los seres humanos la única fuente de normatividad jurídica: Kant asegura que cuando “declaro que cualquier otro está obligado a abstenerse del objeto de mi arbitrio” (MS, RL, § 8, 256), cabe entonces contar con algo propio, poniendo así de relieve una reciprocidad universal a priori que no está atada al arbitrio personal; y es precisamente esta reciprocidad entre los seres humanos la que entronca luego con el principio de la igualdad innata de sus libertades externas, pues, si deseo generar una obligación para las demás personas que les prive de acceder a algo mío sin mi permiso, estoy “obligado recíprocamente con cualquier otro a una abstención pareja, en lo que respecta a lo suyo exterior; porque la obligación procede aquí de una regla universal de la relación jurídica exterior” (MS, RL, § 8, 256).<sup>2</sup> De manera que, como puede apreciarse, el carácter social que revela el ser humano al tener que lidiar con el derecho público, así como con el de gentes y cosmopolita, es evidente.<sup>3</sup> Sin embargo, no es tan evidente el *tipo* de sociabilidad que Kant le atribuye a aquella reciprocidad.

<sup>2</sup> Véase una propuesta que conecta la premisa de la comunidad del suelo con la apropiación adquirida posterior, y la constitución de la soberanía y consecuente voluntad política dentro de *Metafísica de las costumbres* en Macarena Marey 2021, caps. 4 y 5.

<sup>3</sup> Katrin Flikschuh (2010) acierta al recordar que dentro del planteo de Kant los derechos público, de gentes y cosmopolita se imbrican en una relación simétrica tal, que no pueden siquiera llegar a pensarse de forma independiente; todas ellas son instancias jurídicas de una misma voluntad política unificada a priori dentro de un irremediable contexto espacial esférico: “Uno y otro de consuno [los conceptos de derecho estatal y de derecho de gentes, M.F.], puesto que la tierra no es ilimitada sino que es una superficie limitada por sí misma, conducen inevitablemente a la idea de un *derecho político de gentes* (*ius gentium*) o un *derecho cosmopolita* (*ius cosmopoliticum*), de modo que, con tal de que a una de estas tres formas de estado jurídico

En la medida en que la *Metafísica de las costumbres* pretende ser una metafísica y no una crítica o una antropología de las costumbres (MS, 215-7), Kant no cree que en este momento teórico deba considerarse al ser humano como un animal social (propio del ámbito de la antropología), o como una abstracción de carácter trascendental (propio de las críticas), sino como un curioso ente facultado para socializar dentro de circunstancias concretas. De manera que cuando Kant asegura que “si [la superficie de la tierra] fuera un plano infinito, los hombres podrían diseminarse de tal modo que no llegarían en absoluto a ninguna comunidad entre sí, por tanto, ésta no sería una consecuencia necesaria de su existencia sobre la tierra”, se puede preguntar si acaso de verdad creía que ante la posibilidad de evitar la interacción recíproca tiene sentido imaginar seres humanos que no tuvieran ya *necesidad* de conformar asociación alguna. Si echamos un vistazo al planteo de Hegel sin perder de vista las evidentes diferencias contextuales y metodológicas que ofrece, se puede observar cómo este contrapone al pueblo como un a priori antropológico: las personas siempre provienen del vientre de una comunidad, y siempre dentro de ella se buscan recíprocamente para confirmarse unos a otros el estatus moral que creen poseer, o en todo caso, merecer. En el § 36 de la *Filosofía del derecho*, por ejemplo, puede leerse que “el mandamiento jurídico es: *sé una persona y respeta a los otros como personas*” en virtud de que, al igual que Kant (MS, TL, § 38), Hegel entiende el derecho “abstracto” como algo relacional, *i.e.*, como una cuestión de reconocimiento recíproco (§§ 71 y 73).<sup>4</sup> De hecho, en la *adición* del § 37 apunta que todo el que persista en la intención de rehuir de las relaciones sociales que subyacen al derecho abstracto no puede sino caer en el error de tomar la parte por el todo, pues la “personalidad jurídica” no es más que un “aspecto de la relación total”.<sup>5</sup> Sin embargo, Hegel asegura que el “saberse persona de derecho” se gesta dentro de una trama social de igualdad: “Pertenece a la cultura, al *pensar* como conciencia del individuo en la forma de la universalidad, el que yo sea concebido como persona *universal*, en la que *todos* son idénticos” (§ 209, Observación). De modo que no parece importar demasiado si el día de mañana la humanidad logra desperdigarse a lo largo y ancho del sistema solar: siempre es esperable que las personas se soliciten mutuamente el reconocimiento de sus dignidades.<sup>6</sup> Para Kant, sin embargo, la comunidad política es una idea a priori que la razón produce espontáneamente *frente a algo* externo que, curiosamente, cuenta con un estatus a priori similar: un entorno que nos obliga a cohabitar, a estar próximos y que, en consecuencia, prohíbe nuestro aislamiento.<sup>7</sup> Y en este contexto,

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le falte el principio que restringe la libertad externa mediante leyes, el edificio de las restantes queda inevitablemente socavado y acaba por derrumbarse” (MS, RL, § 43, 311).

<sup>4</sup> Este principio del derecho ya lo había establecido Hegel en el § 4 (y § 3) de su *Propedéutica filosófica* de 1809-1811, donde aseguraba que “en la medida en que cada uno es reconocido como un ser libre, es una persona. El teorema del Derecho se puede por ello expresar también así: cada uno debe ser tratado por el otro como persona”.

<sup>5</sup> La perspectiva bélica del reconocimiento intersubjetivo, como bien han apuntado algunos contemporáneos (Honneth 1997, caps. 2 y 3), se encuentra en sus escritos de juventud (Hegel 2006).

<sup>6</sup> Sigo aquí las reconstrucciones de Frederick Neuhouser (2000, caps. 4 y 5) y Robert B. Pippin (2008, cap. 7).

<sup>7</sup> En lugar de enfatizar aquí el *factum* de la esfericidad de la tierra, Höffe (2004, pp. 21-9) se limita a apuntar (algo imprecisamente, según creo) que los conflictos dentro del estado natural se originan, según Kant, por compartir “el mismo ámbito vital”.

la noción de “reciprocidad universal” que sostiene su doctrina del derecho se construye en base a analogías físicas que remiten a cuerpos que se afectan sin ser por ello porosos, lo que hace de la sociabilidad humana una condición de posibilidad, más no un rasgo antropológico:

La misma *unión civil* (*unio civilis*) no puede denominarse adecuadamente *sociedad*; porque entre el *soberano* (*imperans*) y el *súbdito* (*subditus*) no existe una relación propia de socios; no son compañeros sino que están *subordinados* uno a otro, no *coordinados*, y los que se coordinan entre sí han de considerarse precisamente por eso como iguales, en la medida en que se encuentran sometidos a leyes comunes. Por tanto, aquella unión no es una sociedad, sino que más bien la *produce* (MS, RL, § 41, 307).

Si bien es cierto que en otro pasaje (de polémica autoría kantiana: Ludwig 2009) de *Doctrina del derecho* se afirma que tanto el derecho natural como el civil son formas de coexistencia humana dignas de ser calificadas como sociales,<sup>8</sup> aquí se nos dice específicamente que la comunidad civil debe ser entendida como un momento sustantivamente diferente y en gran medida discontinuo de aquel que conforma el derecho natural. Existe un *hiatus* entre estas formas de concebir la coexistencia en la medida en que la unión civil realza la universalidad de la forma de la interacción, mientras el derecho natural se concentra en la particularidad de sus contenidos (demandas).<sup>9</sup> Con todo, aquella unión civil que “no es una sociedad” sino la basa para la producción de una (*macht vielmehr eine Gesellschaft*), se presenta como una condición de posibilidad del derecho (en esto consiste, precisamente, el tratamiento metafísico del derecho), y junto a él, de la gestión del espacio compartido.

El a priori de la comunidad política es concebido por Kant en base a la premisa de la comunidad universal del suelo, y ante la posibilidad de que los seres humanos podamos desperdigarnos a lo largo y ancho del sistema solar cabe preguntarse cuánto puede estresarse aquel a priori. Para ilustrar esto insisto en contraponer el enfoque político y jurídico de Kant con el de Hegel: mientras Hegel entiende que el a priori de la socialización no se cimienta sobre la base de una cosa externa compartida, sino sobre la apetencia (*Trieb*) interna de las consciencias a la hora de autoconstituirse,<sup>10</sup> Kant parece fundar el a priori de la comunidad política sobre la base de una cosa externa (o más bien sentido externo) que es inevitablemente compartida; y es precisamente esta inevitabilidad

<sup>8</sup> “La división suprema del derecho natural no puede ser la división en derecho *natural* y *social* (como sucede a veces), sino la división en derecho natural y *civil*: el primero de los cuales se denomina *derecho privado* y el segundo *derecho público*. Porque al *estado de naturaleza* no se contraponen el estado social sino el civil: ya que en aquel puede muy bien haber sociedad, sólo que no *civil* (que asegura lo mío y lo tuyo mediante leyes públicas), de ahí que el derecho en el primer caso se llame derecho privado” (MS, RL, 242).

<sup>9</sup> Alberto Pirri (2016), además de apuntar este mismo hiato, argumenta que puede ser superado a través de la tercera formulación del imperativo categórico (la del reino de los fines) al sostener que, al igual que la primera formulación, también constituye una fórmula metaética (de hecho, una que es tanto *deon* como *telos*: GMS, 437) que puede correr tanto para la ética como para el derecho.

<sup>10</sup> Cabe agregar aquí una precisión: el deseo (*Trieb*) de reconocimiento es tratado por Hegel como tal en su *Filosofía Real II* (de 1805-1806) y *Fenomenología del espíritu*, y no en su *Filosofía del derecho*. En este último, como es bien sabido, el objeto de estudio se conforma por las figuras de la Idea de libertad.

del caso la que vuelve forzosa la tarea de dirimir racionalmente cómo gestionar y convivir en torno a aquella cosa (o sentido externo). Mientras Hegel percibe un a priori antropológico plural que traspasa deliberadamente las célebres distinciones críticas entre fenómeno y noúmeno al conectar lo gnoseológico con lo ontológico (Hegel 1995, pp. 53 y ss.), Kant evita apelar a premisas antropológicas y ahonda en los mecanismos que ofrece la razón práctica para gestionar la convivencia humana *una vez que esta se hace forzosa*, sin llegar a sostener que esta convivencia es para los humanos forzosa. De ahí que el enfoque metafísico ensayado en la *Doctrina del derecho* se estructure sobre la base de un préstamo metaético no muchas veces observado, proveniente de la *physica generalis*.

Cuando atendemos al sentido que Kant le confiere a la “ley de una coacción recíproca que concuerda necesariamente con la libertad de todos bajo el principio de la libertad universal”, nos encontramos con una “*construcción* de aquel concepto; es decir, la exposición del mismo en una intuición pura *a priori*, siguiendo la analogía de la posibilidad de los movimientos libres de los cuerpos bajo la ley de *igualdad de la acción y la reacción*” (MS, RL, § E, 233).<sup>11</sup> Aquí Kant explica que el *concepto* de derecho no puede deducirse de sí mismo, sino de la noción de “coacción recíproca e igual, sometida a leyes universales, y coincidentes con él”. Y así como la noción dinámica de movimiento subyace en la geometría en tanto parte de la matemática pura (afirmación que parece remitir a la noción trascendental del movimiento: B 154, nota), “la razón ha cuidado de proveer en lo posible también al entendimiento con intuiciones *a priori* para construir el concepto de derecho”:

Lo recto (*rectum*), como lo *derecho*, se opone en parte a lo *curvo*, en parte a lo *oblicuo*. En el primer caso tenemos la *constitución interna* de una línea, de tal modo que entre dos *puntos* dados sólo puede haber *una*, pero en el segundo caso tenemos la *posición* de dos *líneas*, que se cortan o chocan entre sí, de las cuales también sólo puede haber *una* (la perpendicular) que no se incline más hacia un lado que hacia el otro y que divida el espacio en dos partes iguales; siguiendo esta analogía, también la doctrina del derecho quiere determinar a cada uno lo *suyo* (con precisión matemática), cosa que no puede esperarse de la *doctrina de la virtud*, que no puede rehusar un cierto espacio a las excepciones (*latitudinem*) (MS, RL, § E, 233).

De modo similar a como la ley de gravitación entre los “movimientos libres” de los cuerpos a través de atracciones, acciones y reacciones, “el derecho entraña un equilibrio entre la acción y la reacción, fruto de la ley de la libertad” (Refl., 135; TP, 293). No parece tratarse, desde este punto de vista, de una reciprocidad coactiva constitutiva de las personas (antropológica), sino de una cualidad inevitable acorde a la inevitabilidad física y geométrica que presupone la convivencia humana al estar encerrados en un mismo espacio: se trata de una reciprocidad humana (o forma de una sociedad) atómica, no porosa, pero forzosa, que sin embargo debe ser mantenida a toda costa sin caer en la injusticia:

<sup>11</sup> Para el asunto de si Kant emplea un método matemático en su doctrina del derecho, o si lo hace de forma analógica, véase Felipe González Vicén (1952, pp. 42-3) y Friedrich Kaulbach (1982, pp. 59-65).

La voluntad universal del pueblo se ha unido para configurar una sociedad que ha de conservarse perpetuamente y se ha sometido al poder estatal interno con el fin de conservar a los miembros de tal sociedad incapaces de mantenerse por sí mismos. Por tanto, gracias al Estado es lícito al gobierno obligar a los poderosos procurar los medios de subsistencia a quienes son incapaces de ello, incluso en lo que se refiere a las necesidades más básicas (MS, RL, 326).

## 2) Sobre lo cuantitativo y lo cualitativo en la filosofía práctica de Kant.

Si seguimos de cerca algunas de las connotaciones que traen consigo las analogías físicas y geométricas que le sirven a Kant para referirse a la comunidad política, podemos observar que el uso externo de la libertad no presupone agentes porosos a la intersubjetividad y a las circunstancias, sino agentes en cierto modo “cerrados”, ya autoconcluidos, que si bien se influyen físicamente por el *factum* de ocupar un espacio dentro de un suelo común (MS, RL, §14, 263), y coordinan sus acciones a través del uso público de la razón, no se conforman como personas recíprocamente. Con esto quiero decir que el carácter político que descansa en la soberanía conformada por la unión a priori de los arbitrios de todos los individuos presupone una peculiar concepción de estos, una en la que se consideran ya formados y no en proceso social de conformación. Aquí las diferencias entre los planteos de Kant y Hegel vuelven a ser ilustrativas: las libertades externas, según Kant parece entenderlas, colisionan entre sí con diversas intensidades y resultados como si de cuerpos físicos se trataran. De ahí que el *concepto* de derecho parezca querer jugar un rol familiar al que desempeña la ley gravitacional dentro de la física de Newton: el primero desde las capacidades trascendentales de la razón práctica, el segundo desde la ciega teleología natural. Hegel, por su parte, insiste en que las conciencias se conforman entre sí al desafiarse y exigirse mutuamente diversos tipos de confirmaciones morales: la *bildung* de estas es tanto formal como ontológica.

La ausencia de porosidad intersubjetiva que parece tener Kant en mente en su *Doctrina del derecho* no sólo se ve sostenida por aquella “construcción” analógica del concepto de reciprocidad universal conforme a la *physica generalis*, sino también cuando insiste en que no sólo no es posible imponerle un fin a alguien, sino que, de ser esto posible, aquel acto incurriría en la falta moral de violar el principio de la autonomía. Esta insistencia cobra sentido dentro de la distinción que Kant establece entre los usos interno y externo de la libertad, y las características cualitativas y cuantitativas que se adivinan en uno y otro. El uso externo de la libertad no promueve, en principio, dinámicas cualitativas que modifiquen en algún sentido la subjetividad de los integrantes de la comunidad política, sino más bien el comercio de fuerzas: “La resistencia que se opone a lo que obstaculiza un efecto fomenta ese efecto y concuerda con él”, dice Kant, al intentar explicar por qué el derecho está ligado a la facultad de coaccionar (MS, § D, 231). Esto no quiere decir que Kant se aleje de Rousseau y se acerque en su lugar a Hobbes a la hora de determinar si el contrato social es o no un momento de autoconstitución de la agencia individual, sino que esquivo el asunto al prescindir, fundamentalmente, de cualquier



componente antropológico que perjudique su tratamiento metafísico del derecho.<sup>12</sup> Sin embargo, Kant parece deslizar una comprensión puramente matemático/física de la subjetividad política cuando insiste en que las personas no pueden (ni deben) imponerse fines entre sí. Esto se debe a que Kant estuvo la mayor parte de su vida convencido de que era física y psicológicamente imposible imponerle un fin a alguien desde fuera, dado que la tarea de imponernos fines a perseguir corre por cuenta exclusiva de nuestra racionalidad práctica. Sin embargo, no es menos cierto que nuestro filósofo pudo apreciar cómo aquello no era del todo imposible (en especial por lo que generó en su tiempo el conocido edicto de Johann Ch. von Wöllner), y por ello tuvo que agregar que de ser posible, pues no sería ético (TP, 290-1; RGV, 134, nota; SF, 18-9 y 21-2). De todas formas, la imagen original del ciudadano que tiene Kant en mente es la de una entidad finita y racional poco porosa, y a ello se debe su convicción acerca de este asunto, con lo cual se realza el carácter contrapuesto y cualitativo que presenta el uso interno de la libertad.<sup>13</sup>

Cuando Kant se propone dar cuenta de cómo la ley moral ética es capaz de generar en nosotros ciertas transformaciones (sedimentaciones) antropológicas tendientes a la virtud y al carácter, emplea analogías químicas, y con ellas parece describir procesos de constitución de la subjetividad.<sup>14</sup> Recuérdese, por ejemplo, cuando enlaza el proceder del químico que “añade álcali a una solución calcárea en espíritu de sal” con el proceder de alguien que le muestra a “un hombre honrado (...) esa ley moral en que reconoce la indignidad de un mentiroso”:

(...) al instante su razón práctica (...) abandona el beneficio, se fusiona con aquello que le infunde respeto hacia su propia persona (...) y el beneficio, tras haber sido separado y enjuagado de todo apego a la razón (...), se ve sopesado por cada cual para entablar eventualmente negociaciones con la razón en otros casos, excepto cuando pudiera contrariar a esa ley moral que la razón jamás abandona por hallarse íntimamente fusionada con ella (KpV, 92-3).<sup>15</sup>

Da la impresión de que, por aquel entonces (mitad de la década de 1780), Kant creía que la acción moral era capaz de subproducir “reacciones” antropológicas, y dejar en nosotros residuos caracterológicos que propician la conformación de una virtud siempre defectuosa y provisional; pues “de una madera tan retorcida como la de la que está hecho el hombre

<sup>12</sup> Mientras Rousseau (2009, Parte I, cap. viii) veía en el contrato social una irreversible transformación moral de los hombres naturales (véase Neuhouser 2011), Hobbes (1982, Parte I, cap. xiii) parece no apreciar allí modificación antropológica alguna por tratarse de una suerte de “experimento mental” (McLean 1981, p. 341; Höffe 2004, p. 22).

<sup>13</sup> Como es bien sabido, Kant plantea en su primera *Crítica* el problema de la libertad en términos cosmológicos antes que antropológicos y psicológicos, ya que el desafío primario consistía en determinar si acaso era posible conciliar la causalidad de la libertad (*Kausalität durch Freiheit*) con la de la naturaleza dentro de un mismo sistema metafísico. Lo curioso, sin embargo, es que entonces ofreció el célebre caso de la acción de levantarse de una silla (B 478) para ilustrar la causalidad de la idea de libertad, recurso argumental que siempre estuvo asociado al optimismo y voluntarismo moral y, en lo que aquí nos interesa, a una idea autosuficiente (y por tanto poco porosa a lo circundante) de la agencia individual.

<sup>14</sup> Owen Ware (2014) ya había observado este aspecto para apuntar el proceder filosófico que Kant parece ensayar en la segunda *Crítica*, a diferencia de la que ensaya en *Fundamentación*. Me alejo un poco, sin embargo, de su buen estudio, al señalar el carácter cualitativo que Kant expresa en estos pasajes.

<sup>15</sup> Véase también KpV, 163.

no puede tallarse nada enteramente recto” (IaG, 23-4; RGV, 101). De manera que si Kant se representa el funcionamiento de la racionalidad práctica ética a través de analogías químicas,<sup>16</sup> y a través de analogías físicas construye el proceder de la racionalidad jurídica, cabe preguntarse si en algún momento los dos usos de la libertad se conectan o influyen; y si es así, cómo lo hacen.

### 3) Tercera instancia de lo social: la religión racional

Aquel curioso pasaje en el que Kant afirma que situados en un suelo plano e infinito los seres humanos no entrarían en comunión alguna, sino que tenderían a dispersarse, hace pensar que la sociabilidad subyacente a su noción de reciprocidad universal no es más que la *forma* que debería tener una sociedad; razón por la cual nada se dice acerca de los contenidos éticovitales que deberían orbitar dentro de ella. Con esta forma de sociabilidad se parece referir, como he intentado mostrar, a entes racionales y finitos que no son porosos entre sí, a cuerpos que una vez forzados a cohabitar se ven envueltos en la necesidad de gestionar su convivencia espacial y temporal de acuerdo a la razón práctica.<sup>17</sup> Si bien es difícil de creer que el propio Kant juzgase realmente que los seres humanos no son inevitablemente sociables desde el punto de vista antropológico, y que asumiera que en algún punto tiene sentido pensarnos como una “ligera paloma” que “podría imaginarse que volaría mucho mejor aún en un espacio vacío” (B 9), no hay muchos pasajes dentro de su *Metafísica de las costumbres* que lo dejen claro, en virtud de que, en tanto metafísica y no crítica o antropología de las costumbres, no desea comprometer su sistema con concepciones de la naturaleza humana; algo que no ocurre con una *Tugendlehre* que consagra cierto *ethos* concreto y hasta avanza notas para una “antropología metafísica” (Heller 1984, pp. 21-96). Su *Doctrina del derecho* es un sistema que deriva su aprioridad de su posibilidad, respetando el proceder del imperativo categórico, y al mismo tiempo pretendiendo no comprometer a la razón teórica con alguna afirmación epistémica acerca del mundo.<sup>18</sup> De ahí la posibilidad teórica de pensar al ser humano tanto social como asocialmente.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Disciplina que elogia como más avanzada que la física de Newton en lo que a la metafísica de la naturaleza se refiere (MS, 215).

<sup>17</sup> En particular, la preocupación de Kant es la de cómo gestionar el *uso* de las propiedades privadas, y de entre ellas, el de la tierra, puesto que a sus ojos ser propietario era algo constitutivo del concepto de ciudadano. En torno a este asunto conviene no olvidar que los textos políticos de Kant (MS, RL, §§ 8-9) y Hegel (2006, pp. 97-9; 2000, §§ 182-256) emplean recurrentemente el término *Bürgerliche* para hacer referencia a aquello que en español se suele traducir por “sociedad civil”. El término no discrimina lo “civil” de lo “burgués”, y por esta razón es que más tarde Marx observará que su lengua entrelaza injustificadamente la “sociedad civil” con la “sociedad burguesa”. Como es sabido, Marx tuvo que acudir al francés para recoger los términos *bourgeois* y *citoyen* (2012) y así poder formular la contradicción que él percibía entre el burgués y el ciudadano luego de la Revolución Francesa. Esto tiene, ciertamente, varias implicaciones dentro del pensamiento político de Kant, como lo es el polémico asunto de su distinción entre ciudadanía pasiva y activa (MS, § 46), sobre lo cual no puedo ocuparme aquí. Para la discusión de esta distinción remito al/la lector/a a Nuria Sánchez Madrid y Alessandro Pinzani (2016), Ma. J. Bertomeu (2019), y Macarena Marey (2021, cap. 6).

<sup>18</sup> Pues no es del todo evidente la aprioridad de la siguiente afirmación: “La posesión de todos los hombres sobre la tierra, que precede a todo acto jurídico suyo (está constituida por la naturaleza misma), es una

Ahora bien, entre la perspectiva de la *physica generalis* que permite elaborar el concepto de la reciprocidad universal (uso externo de la libertad) y la analogía experimental que Kant extrae de la química para dar cuenta de la posibilidad de la acción ética (uso interno de la libertad) existe una esfera de socialización que intentó abordar en términos de crítica de la religión. No son pocos los que han visto en *La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón* las bases de una especie de “ética política”<sup>20</sup> que tiene por objetivo fundamental gestionar (no eliminar) el mal radical, en virtud de que este, según lo entiende Kant, puede aflorar del libre arbitrio de individuos aun insertos en sociedades legítimas y equitativas (RGV, 93-4). El carácter externo del derecho le impide a este ingresar en el mundo de las actitudes (*Gesinnungen*) que dan vida a nuestra voluntad, y por esta razón es que precisamente allí, en el uso interno de la libertad, el mal radical puede brotar y volverse algo normal a pesar de participar de una estructura institucional justa. Dentro de este contexto, la ausencia de porosidad intersubjetiva que subyace a la forma de la sociabilidad jurídica permite que los individuos puedan entablar tratos orientados por la instrumentalización mutua al no poder decir demasiado acerca de lo ético (RGV, 98-9).<sup>21</sup> Y así entra en escena el desafío de delimitar cómo se puede abandonar el estado de naturaleza ético que sobrevive a la superación del estado de naturaleza político cuando no existe un imperativo evidente que nos obligue a hacerlo (RGV, 96).

Aquella comunidad ética que Kant intenta delimitar en la Primera sección de la Tercera parte de *La religión* remite a una forma de sociabilidad que le permite a sus miembros llevar adelante una ética de la virtud ya no pensable, sino concreta, históricamente situada, y culturalmente imbuida.<sup>22</sup> Esto se debe al hecho de que el mal radical es un producto social del libre arbitrio de personas concretas, no es un rasgo antropológico, y por tanto, ahistórico de estas; y ante un desafío concreto e histórico de estas características Kant tuvo que concebir aquella sociedad ética como un medio (no un mecanismo) de conversión “del corazón de los hombres”. Se trata de una forma de sociabilidad específica que ofrece los recursos necesarios para que cada persona pueda emprender y sostener en el tiempo su autoconformación virtuosa sin estar forzado a ello: “La virtud hacia uno mismo cobra fuerzas en la misma medida que se fortalecen las

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*posesión común originaria (communio possessionis originaria)*, cuyo concepto no es empírico ni depende de condiciones temporales”. La comprobación de que nuestro planeta es geoide tenía entonces poco más de dos siglos y medio, y tras su fallido *Principios metafísicos...* de 1786, Kant no había podido construir una metafísica conformada por conceptos medios (*Mittelbegriffe*) que permitiera anticipar a priori la cientificidad (o sistematicidad) de las leyes de la física. Él mismo confiesa haber descubierto esta “laguna” en su sistema en una carta que le dirige a Christian Garve el 21 de setiembre de 1798 (inmediatamente después de haber publicado las dos partes de su *Metafísica de las costumbres* [!]). Para el abordaje del problema de la *Übergang* véase Félix Duque (1991).

<sup>19</sup> Tal vez podría decirse que aquí se plantea la “insociable sociabilidad” humana en términos espaciales, a diferencia de aquella célebre formulación que la plantea en términos temporales (históricos) (laG, 21-2).

<sup>20</sup> Esta es la expresión que emplea Macarena Marey (2021, cap. 7).

<sup>21</sup> Instrumentalización que no implica una reificación mutua: para el caso del matrimonio, por ejemplo, véase Bárbara Herman 1993. Por otra parte, aquí también ingresa el curioso asunto de la autopropiedad: mientras Kant desecha esta idea en su *Doctrina del derecho* por considerarla analíticamente contradictoria (MS, RL, 270), la enmarca como una de las faltas éticas más graves para con uno mismo (V-Mo/Collins, 341-4).

<sup>22</sup> Aquí sigo las lecturas de *La religión* de Philip J. Rossi (2005, cap. 4), Arthur Ripstein (2009, pp. 6 y ss.), James DiCenso (2011, cap. 3) y Macarena Marey (2021, cap. 7).

virtudes para con los demás, si bien estas amansan y moderan el vigor” (escribía ya en 1772: Refl., 6763).

Como bien se sabe, el deber de conformar esta clase de sociedad no descansa en las personas individualmente consideradas, sino que se trata de un deber del “género humano para consigo mismo” que consiste en “la promoción del bien supremo como bien comunitario” (RGV, 97-8). Sin embargo, Kant agrega que el deber de esta promoción colectiva sabe bien de las dificultades ligadas a la finitud humana que enfrenta, y por ello es que “Se sospechará ya de antemano que este deber necesitará del supuesto de otra idea, a saber: la de un ser moral superior mediante cuya universal organización las fuerzas, por sí insuficientes, de los particulares son unidas en orden a un efecto comunal” (RGV, 98). El concepto de una sociedad ética es, nos dice Kant, el “concepto de un pueblo de Dios” conforme a leyes éticas: de esta forma, la iglesia “invisible” que oficia el imperativo categórico sirve de tamiz crítico para dirimir entre las bondades y las perversiones de las iglesias “visibles” (históricas) pues, por una parte, estas pueden vehiculizar con sus diversas fes religiosas la “fe pura” que necesitan las personas para llevar adelante una ética de la virtud (RGV, 107), aunque por otra, pueden también convertirse en un mecanismo eficiente para la conformación de subjetividades obedientes, o de “fe pasiva” (Refl., 6903; RGV, 134, nota). De hecho, es precisamente este último rostro de las iglesias históricas el que nos permite apreciar con cierta claridad cómo Kant plantea las instancias de lo social desde fuera hacia dentro, comenzando con la voluntad política y el derecho (libertad externa), pasando luego por la comunidad ética (engarce entre la libertad externa e interna), y alcanzando finalmente la agencia ética (libertad interna). La comunidad ética sería, desde esta perspectiva, un estrato teórico de lo social dentro del cual puede hablarse con propiedad de lo social sin abandonar el campo de la metafísica, en virtud de que en ella los miembros “se encuentran sometidos a leyes comunes” que no fueron producidas por el uso externo de la libertad, sino por su uso interno. Por esta razón sugiero que se podría ver en esta concatenación de ámbitos un proceso civilizatorio que coincide con una especie de *bildung*, o proceso de conformación de la subjetividad moral, aunque para ello habría que explicar, entre tantos otros asuntos que no puedo abordar aquí, por qué la sociedad ética, y en este caso, las iglesias “visibles”, tienen la capacidad de posibilitar las bases de la ética de la virtud. Para ello intentaré precisar en lo que sigue la importancia que creo que Kant le concedía a la socialización de las máximas morales.

#### 4) El realismo moral de las máximas y su socialización

Sugiero que colocando las piezas del modo en el que lo vengo haciendo se pueden apreciar componentes de un proceso de conformación de la subjetividad que va de fuera (uso externo de la libertad) hacia dentro (uso interno de la libertad), y que tiene en la noción de “comunidad ética” una de sus bisagras más destacables.<sup>23</sup> Esto se debe a que

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<sup>23</sup> En varios sentidos, creo que el desafío teórico que aquí me propongo iluminar es similar al que enfrenta Pierre Bourdieu (1985) con su noción de “habitus”, y su intento de superar el objetivismo y subjetivismo de las ciencias sociales de su época.

Kant confiere capital importancia a todas aquellas esferas de socialización dentro de las cuales los individuos tienen la oportunidad de conocer máximas afines a la ética de la virtud: trátase de las religiones históricas (RGV, 46-7, 112, 132-3), de la enseñanza cotidiana (V-Anth-Mron, 111 y ss.), o de la enseñanza formal (Päd, 499 y ss.), Kant parece convencido de que la formación moral de las personas se inicia con el acceso al acervo cultural históricamente disponible, en la medida en que sólo allí se pueden hallar los recursos necesarios para entender, ensayar, y elaborar las máximas de acción propias. Dentro de unas condiciones de socialización favorables, los miembros de una comunidad tienen la oportunidad de desarrollar sus capacidades racionales a través de la apropiación del saber público que se ha ido forjando de generación en generación; aunque, lejos de tan sólo promover la absorción y reproducción de aquel saber, Kant insiste en que los individuos deben confirmarlo una y otra vez por medio de sus juicios particulares sin renunciar, asimismo, a la tarea de compartir las razones que orientan sus entendimientos. De ahí que las religiones históricas constituyan una de las vías de “conocimiento del hombre acerca de sus deberes *como (tanquam) mandatos divinos*” (Refl., 646-7; RGV, 154) aún disponibles en las sociedades modernas. Y para comprender por qué la socialización de las máximas morales es tan importante dentro del proyecto ilustrado de Kant destacaré dos aspectos importantes de su teoría de la agencia ética: por una parte, la normatividad intrínseca de las máximas, y por otra, el marco de sentido dentro del cual las personas pueden efectivamente apropiárselas, elaborarlas, y luego autoatribuírselas para enmarcar sus acciones como suyas, *i.e.*, como intencionales.<sup>24</sup>

En lo que se refiere al primer asunto es preciso no olvidar que, desde el punto de vista de Kant, aquellos “principios subjetivos del obrar” contienen las formas judicativas apropiadas para luego convertirse en leyes universales: “la propia idoneidad de la máxima de toda buena voluntad para convertirse ella misma en ley universal es la única ley que se impone a sí misma la voluntad de todo ser racional, sin colocar como fundamento de dicha voluntad móvil e interés algunos” (GMS, 445). En este punto Kant parece afirmar que el imperativo categórico evalúa las pretensiones de validez de las máximas a través de la confirmación de sus estructuras internas o *formas*. El célebre caso de la falsa promesa ilustra parte de lo que nuestro filósofo tiene en mente a la hora de mostrar por qué la máxima que le subyace no satisface los estándares éticos de su propuesta: es precisamente su fallida pretensión de validez universal la que la delata. A diferencia del énfasis material que presenta la *Tugendlehre*, el imperativo categórico que Kant formula en la década de 1780 hincó sus dientes evaluativos en la forma o disposición interna de los contenidos de la máxima; y en virtud de ello, sus exigencias son exclusivamente metaéticas. De manera que lo considerado por la prueba de universalidad no es tanto el contenido de la máxima (la falsa promesa, el suicidio, devolver los depósitos, etc.) sino la forma en la que esta articula

<sup>24</sup> Como notará el/la lector/a, a continuación navegaré de forma apresurada entre espinosos y consabidos tópicos de la teoría de la agencia moral de Kant, tales como los de su formalismo, la relevancia de las objeciones de Hegel a Kant, y las fuentes de la normatividad de los mandatos éticos. Por cuestiones de circunscripción temática remito al/la interesado/a en estos asuntos a Christine M. Korsgaard (2009) y Martín Fleitas (2017).

su pretensión de validez. En cierto modo, esto quiere decir que las máximas son, al decir de Christine M. Korsgaard, “intrínsecamente normativas”.<sup>25</sup> Si bien estas tienen que pensarse como un producto socialmente generado y disponible (aspecto que desarrollaré en breve), las máximas tienen que ser cuando menos inteligibles y efectivamente comprendidas (inteligidas) por los agentes para poder luego considerar sus autoridades (razones) y conforme a ellas evaluar posibles justificaciones prácticas. No cabe duda de que parte del contenido (lingüístico, semántico, y axiológico) de las máximas ya está disponible en las esferas de socialización que se habitan, pero esta no se constituye como candidata a ley moral si el agente no logra considerarla como un posible “principio subjetivo” de *su* obrar. De ahí que la enseñanza de las máximas sea algo tan caro: si estas en sus disposiciones internas ya son “intrínsecamente normativas”, resulta conveniente entonces socializar el acceso a ellas para ser apropiadas y eventualmente asentidas reflexivamente, vía imperativo categórico, por los individuos. En esto reposa, precisamente, parte de la publicidad de los contenidos que promueve aquella sociedad ética de *La religión*.

Veamos un caso ilustrativo para examinar más detenidamente el asunto: en rasgos generales, en la mayor parte de las sociedades occidentales se considera que la acción de no decir la verdad constituye una falta ética. A pesar de que la mentira parezca revelar procesos de aprendizaje filogenéticos (Garrett et al 2016), y que desde el punto de vista instrumental sea más fácil justificar la mentira que decir la verdad, su estatuto ético occidental parece ser siempre el mismo, a saber, el de suponer un daño a la confianza mínima que requiere cualquier forma de convivencia humana exitosa (O’Neill 2002).<sup>26</sup> Sin embargo sabemos que para Kant no es suficiente decir la verdad, puesto que la acción debe ser animada por una máxima satisfactoria según los estándares del imperativo categórico: uno puede evitar la mentira por temor al castigo que sobreviene a su descubrimiento (sobre todo por la omnisciencia divina o de la propia consciencia), o puede decir la verdad por mor del deber. Lo importante aquí no es tanto apuntar el célebre bisturí deontológico que dirime entre la inmoralidad de una acción y la moralidad de la otra, sino que Kant parece creer que de no estar socializada la máxima de no mentir, el desafío práctico de tener que reflexionar acerca de las razones que justifican nuestra acción no puede surgir. Aquel abismo que experimenta el individuo al saberse libre de la autoridad de las inclinaciones (MAM, 112) no le convierte en un dios, pues no puede crear por sí mismo sus cursos de acción, sino que le convierte en un ente que nada más (y nada menos) es capaz de asentir, rechazar y reconstruir reflexivamente aquellos candidatos motivacionales; se trata de un ente facultado para revisar y sopesar racionalmente máximas aspirantes a ley moral ya disponibles en el entorno cultural que se habita. De ahí la importancia de las esferas religiosa, educativa, y pedagógica, en lo que a la socialización de las máximas se refiere:

<sup>25</sup> Sin mencionar pasaje textual alguno, Korsgaard (2000, pp. 139-145) realiza una reconstrucción similar (sobre todo de la teoría del alma virtuosa de Platón) que la lleva a asumir un particular “realismo procedimental”.

<sup>26</sup> Conviene recordar aquí las diferencias que mantienen el conocido y polémico tratamiento ético que Kant hace de la mentira, y su tratamiento jurídico (VRL; MS, 238, nota, y 429).

una vez disponibles las máximas adecuadas en el horizonte simbólico que se habita, puede confiarse en que el individuo podrá eventualmente confirmarlas mediante su asentimiento reflexivo mientras desarrolla sus capacidades cognitivas dentro de entornos de socialización saludables, y así dar paso, precisamente, a la producción/reproducción de una sociedad como tal.

Lo anterior me permite pasar sin demasiada violencia hacia la segunda característica de la teoría kantiana de la agencia ética que reviste interés para el asunto que analizamos; y es que para comprender y revisar una máxima que aspira a convertirse en ley es necesario, entre otras cosas, (i) comprender el sentido de la acción que esta abriga, (ii) confirmar su autoridad (razones) como justificante de la acción, y (iii) considerar la posibilidad de que aquel posible “principio subjetivo del obrar” sea susceptible de convertirse en *nuestro* principio subjetivo del obrar. La confirmación de la máxima considerada (lo que significa satisfacer el examen de la universalidad) implica al mismo tiempo asumir que esta puede efectivamente convertirse en nuestra voluntad, y que conforme a ella podemos (podremos) atribuirnos la autoría de la acción exhortada. Sin embargo, la intencionalidad de nuestras acciones morales no se reduce exclusivamente a la constatación de las máximas que creemos que animan nuestra voluntad, precisamente porque Kant (al menos en su período crítico) no confiaba en absoluto en la capacidad de la razón para, por medio de la introspección, descubrir nuestros auténticos motivos de acción (GMS, 471, 11-31; RGV, 138-9; Anth, 143, 4-12).<sup>27</sup> Si interpretamos el sentido de nuestras acciones *tan sólo* en base a las declaraciones que hacemos acerca de sus contenidos, tendríamos que asumir que tarde o temprano nuestras intenciones pueden volverse transparentes a nuestros ojos, y esto es algo con lo cual Kant polemizaba decididamente, incluso para el caso de la felicidad (GMS, 418). Sin importar el conjunto de razones que se tenga para compartir, el *homines phaenomena* siempre será para sí mismo un *homines noumena*.<sup>28</sup> Asimismo, el escepticismo epistémico de Kant frente al contenido de nuestras intenciones tampoco corre solamente para la introspección, sino también para el modo en el que a través de ella podemos dar cuenta del horizonte simbólico dentro del cual tenemos la oportunidad de, en primer lugar, comprender y considerar la máxima. Las declaraciones del contenido de las intenciones que podamos realizar, sin importar cuan profunda sea nuestra autorreflexión, dejaría por fuera el hecho de que, al igual que sucede en las tragedias griegas, siempre se puede estar convencido (*i.e.*, tener razones) de estar haciendo algo correcto cuando en realidad se está protagonizando un horror indecible. La acción siempre implica una externalidad, o un “para otros”, que no está en las manos del agente

<sup>27</sup> En este asunto sigo de cerca las propuestas de Luis Placencia (2018; 2020).

<sup>28</sup> Como bien apuntaba Felipe Martínez Marzoa en su estudio introductorio a la edición española de *La religión...* de 1981 (nota 14), reviste importancia recordar que *Gesinnung* (al menos en el uso que Kant hace de la palabra) no remite a la interioridad que se capta a través del sentido interno, ni a ningún otro tipo de interioridad visible, sino a la interioridad humana en tanto perteneciente al reino nouménico. De ahí que en los *Principios metafísicos...* Kant negara la posibilidad de que la psicología empírica pudiera llegar a conformarse como una ciencia de la naturaleza del sentido interno: “Pues la pura intuición interna, en la que deben construirse los fenómenos del alma, es el tiempo, pero éste sólo tiene una dimensión”, y en este contexto, “incluso la observación en sí misma altera y distorsiona ya el estado del objeto observado” (MAN, 471).

que actúa, a pesar de que no se pueda dejar de recurrir (y de volver) a ella a la hora de comprender correctamente el sentido de la acción que entraña la máxima considerada. Al igual que sucedió con Edipo, puede que el auténtico sentido de las intenciones sea accesible para el agente con el tiempo, *i.e.*, retrospectivamente, aunque también puede que esto no suceda jamás (lo que ocurre para el caso de la felicidad). Esta realidad social “independiente”, de hecho, es la que le permite a Kant establecer como uno de los pasos del examen de universalidad la necesidad de imaginar un mundo en el cual la máxima considerada sea aplicada por los individuos cual si fuese una ley de la naturaleza (GMS, 421; KpV, 69), pues, desde su perspectiva, las máximas siempre deben ser estimadas dentro de un marco social en el que todos los individuos se comportan como fines en sí mismos. Siendo un poco más audaces, tal vez podría decirse que el examen de la universalidad no se aboca a dirimir su sentido cotidiano, pues este ya viene dado por el entorno histórico que se habita, sino su sentido estrictamente (lógico y) moral (su normatividad intrínseca): una máxima que no cumple con los estándares del imperativo categórico no tiene sentido de ser (si se me permite la ambigüedad) en un hipotético reino de los fines.

Así las cosas, la normatividad intrínseca de la máxima y el marco “externo” (social y simbólico) que posibilita su comprensión y ponderación permiten, en primer, revisar la célebre crítica formalista que desde Hegel (2000, § 135, Observación) a la fecha se le ha dirigido a la ética de Kant, y en segundo lugar, incorporar una de las notas más destacables de aquellos estratos de lo social que descansa en la comunidad ética. Y es que las iglesias visibles, con sus sagradas escrituras, sus eruditos y sus explicaciones de ellas, sus estatutos, y consecuentes fes eclesiales, pueden vehiculizar el sentido interno de la ley ética en la medida en que se acerquen progresivamente a la *universalidad*:

Hemos observado que, si bien una iglesia carece de la señal de mayor peso de su verdad —a saber: la de una pretensión legítima de universalidad— cuando se funda sobre una fe revelada, la cual, en cuanto fe histórica (aunque muy extendida mediante una Escritura y asegurada así a la más tardía posteridad), no es susceptible de ninguna comunicación universal que produzca convicción, sin embargo, a causa de la necesidad natural que tienen todos los hombres de exigir siempre para los supremos conceptos y fundamentos de Razón algún *apoyo sensible*, alguna confirmación empírica o similar (a lo cual efectivamente hay que atender cuando se tiene la mira de *introducir* universalmente una fe), ha de utilizarse alguna fe eclesial histórica, que generalmente uno encuentra ya ante sí (RGV, 110).<sup>29</sup>

En este contexto, tanto las ideas del reino de los cielos, del infierno, las profecías, la noción de felicidad asociada a la instauración del reino de Dios, y de *Apocalipsis* son, a fin de cuentas, *representaciones simbólicas* orientadas “sólo a la mayor vivificación de la

<sup>29</sup> Sigo aquí la interesante lectura de James DiCenso (2011, pp. 9-10): “An understanding of the ethical-political along these dynamic or interactive lines helps clarify how Kant negotiates an innovative approach to questions of religion. Even as he develops formidable epistemological critiques of metaphysical, theological, and religious systems disconnected from testable public and empirical realities, he also argues that many of the ideas and ideals conveyed by these traditions, *if ethically interpreted and applied*, can have a transformative effect within social and political realities”.



esperanza y del denuedo y ambición en orden a ese reino” (RGV, 134) moral que manda perseguir la suprema ley ética, pues:

El andador de la tradición santa con sus colgantes, los estatutos y observancias, que hizo buen servicio en su tiempo, se hace poco a poco superfluo y finalmente llega a ser una cadena cuando el hombre entra en la adolescencia. Mientras él (el género humano) «era un niño, tenía la cordura de un niño» y sabía ligar con los estatutos que le fueron impuestos sin su intervención una erudición e incluso una filosofía que podía servir a la iglesia; «pero ahora llega a ser un hombre, aparta lo que es pueril» (RGV, 122).

## 5) Notas finales

Como ya varios/as estudiosos/as han apuntado, a diferencia de lo que se percibe en la década de 1780, en la de 1790 Kant emplea “moral” (*moralisch*) en un sentido estrictamente metaético que comprende tanto la esfera jurídica como la ética. De ahí lo confuso que puede ser a veces leer en su *Doctrina del derecho* que los mandatos jurídicos son también imperativos categóricos, o leyes morales. En este contexto, lo moral parecería, de hecho, comenzar por la voluntad política que cimenta, como hemos visto, al menos la forma de una sociedad (a través de sus nociones de voluntad general y coacción recíproca) para hacer posible dentro de ella el desarrollo de actitudes apropiadas (*Gesinnungen*) que lentamente logran trascenderle: lo moral se asienta con lo político y el derecho y luego va más allá de ellos.<sup>30</sup> Esto es todo lo que puede decirse desde la metafísica de las costumbres, puesto que entrar en detalles acerca de cómo el uso externo de la libertad podría favorecer la formación de las capacidades individuales necesarias para el uso interno de la libertad implica descender al fangoso territorio de la antropología. Sin embargo, y aún sin caer en este fango, la noción de “comunidad ética” que se presenta en *La religión dentro de los límites de la mera razón* supone un paso hacia esa dirección. No es mi intención, sin embargo, afirmar que el propio Kant vio estos estratos de lo social en este orden, o si quiera de este modo. Respetando los ámbitos de su propio sistema de filosofía práctica conviene no perder de vista que el metafísico y el antropológico son, en principio, comunicables, aunque nunca quede del todo claro cómo es acaso esto posible: “social” se dice de muchas maneras y acerca de muchas cosas diferentes, y en virtud de ello no podemos sino tomar con cuidado los diversos objetivos que persigue el propio Kant al tratar algún aspecto “intersubjetivo”, “recíproco”, “interactivo”, o de coexistencia humana. Un modo de exposición diferente de todo este asunto podría comenzar con la teoría de la agencia ética de Kant, en virtud de que, como lo he sugerido ya, parece concentrar tanto aspectos internos (la normatividad intrínseca de las máximas) como externos (marcos de sentido). Con ello se podría ir más directamente al problema del hiato que separa los usos externo e interno de la libertad aunque, al mismo tiempo, se vuelva la atención sobre el sujeto. Con el modo que he escogido aquí, sin embargo, me he propuesto alcanzar una mayor claridad en la exposición del carácter externo que asumen los diferentes estratos de lo social dentro de la filosofía práctica de Kant, sin tener que descender al territorio de la

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<sup>30</sup> Otfried Höffe (1986, cap. 9), Katrin Flikschuh (2000, cap. 3), Adela Cortina (2008, pp. XXXIII y ss.), Rivera Castro (2003, pp. 162-3), Manfred Baum (2006), Macarena Marey (2021, caps. 1 y 2).

antropología, incluida aquí la historia; el objetivo es apreciar al menos parte del papel que los entornos (espaciales, sociales, simbólicos, y culturales) parecen desempeñar entre líneas dentro de su sistema práctico. En este contexto, la socialización de las máximas que promueven las iglesias visibles oficia de bisagra, y permite visualizar un proceso formativo de la agencia ética de fuera hacia adentro, *i.e.*, del uso externo al uso interno de la libertad; de lo geométrico y físico a lo químico y temporal. Las religiones parecen desempeñar en este punto del planteo de Kant un papel que entiendo de vital importancia: se presentan como centros de generación de metáforas, conceptos, y símbolos que tienen la capacidad de abrigar ideas éticas importantes para Kant, de un modo en el que no le sea extraño al común de las personas. Si bien es cierto que esta generación cultural de representaciones éticas debe ir siempre acompañada de explicaciones y precisiones afines a la ley ética, la intención de nuestro filósofo era introducir un tamiz crítico hacia el interior de las tradiciones religiosas de su tiempo para dirimir entre sus bondades y perversiones, y desde allí impulsar la construcción de una religión pura que facilitara la formación moral de las personas. Siempre dentro de configuraciones sociales, jurídicas y políticas específicas, creo que esta mediación histórica del supremo principio ético es digna de ser atendida sin con ello tener que descender al infierno de la casuística.<sup>31</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Las ideas que impulsaron originalmente la realización del presente trabajo se gestaron durante la lectura del borrador de *Voluntad omnilateral* de Macarena Marey (CONICET, Argentina), y mi participación en la posterior discusión que sobre él organizó Paola Romero (Universidad de Friburgo, Suiza) hacia fines de Octubre de 2020. Sirva esta nota para expresar mi profunda gratitud hacia ellas.

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## L'estetica come filosofia critica

### *Aesthetics as Critical Philosophy*

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La crisi profonda che investe il mondo della cultura e dell'editoria italiana fa sì che solo in rari casi i libri superino la prima stampa e che ancor più raramente vengano riproposti lavori magistrali anche del più recente passato. Per questo motivo Stefano Velotti, curando la ripubblicazione di *Estetica. Uno sguardo-attraverso* di Emilio Garroni, con l'aggiunta in appendice del testo inedito della relazione *Senso e non-senso*, realizza un'operazione culturale importante e significativa.

Come ha rilevato Amoroso (2006: p. 107), Emilio Garroni, “rileggendo Kant, ha rifondato l'estetica come filosofia”. Garroni, negando che l'estetica sia una *filosofia speciale*, che si occuperebbe dell'oggetto specifico *arte*, mette in luce come essa, pur nelle sue molteplici declinazioni, sia piuttosto *filosofia del senso*, studio delle condizioni della sensatezza dell'esperienza, attraverso esempi paradigmatici. Questa prospettiva è evidente in *Estetica. Uno sguardo-attraverso*, nelle cui pagine la lettura di Kant si intreccia – senza mai plasmarvisi – a una prospettiva teorica ricca e personale, che d'altro lato emerge e si struttura anche grazie al confronto con numerosi altri momenti della storia del pensiero

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moderno e contemporaneo. Come sottolinea Velotti (pp. 5-6), Garroni propone un'estetica "come compimento di un modo critico di pensare, cioè di una filosofia critica che va emergendo nel XVIII secolo e che trova nella riflessione kantiana la sua sintesi più elaborata e a tutt'oggi imprescindibile". Se il richiamo alla filosofia di Kant è quanto mai evidente, con due capitoli ad essa dedicati (III. *Kant e il compimento estetico della critica*, pp. 112-153; V. *Kant e la filosofia del senso*, pp. 189-225), e se la lettura dell'estetica del Settecento si rivela fondamentale (IV. *Burke e Batteux: l'estetica, veicolo della critica*: pp. 154-188), non meno importante appare il confronto con autori quali Hegel, Heidegger (in part. pp. 94-106), Croce, Gentile (pp. 77-87), ma anche Derrida (pp. 41-42 e 63-66) e Merleau-Ponty (*passim*).

Garroni, richiamandosi fin dal titolo al *durchschauen* di Wittgenstein (1953: § 90), si rivolge all'esperienza guardando-attraverso, prendendo le distanze da, e mettendo in questione, il semplice guardare, all'interno però dello stesso guardare (p. 38). Garroni rifiuta la prospettiva metafisica, che si illude di guardare l'essere dall'esterno, per descriverlo e derivarne i principi primi: egli suggerisce invece un "osare di dire l'indicibile attraverso il dicibile" (p. 249) – che ricomprende in sé anche quello che Carabellese aveva chiamato il "problema interno della filosofia". Al contempo, egli si confronta dialetticamente con l'ermeneutica gadameriana: "senza dubbio il pensiero non si instaura mai nel vuoto di sapere [...] e quindi non può fare a meno del pregiudizio", purtuttavia esso deve essere "*critica del pregiudizio in quanto già pensato-e-non-propriadamente-pensato-o-ripensato in direzione di un propriamente-pensare*" (p. 60). Garroni accoglie la rivalutazione ermeneutica del pregiudizio, in quanto il pensiero non si instaura mai su una *tabula rasa*; parallelamente, però, esso non può essere *solo* interpretazione: ogni tentativo del pensiero è plasmato da un'esigenza normativa che di esso è costitutiva. Il desiderio di "dire l'indicibile attraverso il dicibile", quindi di cogliere gli orizzonti dell'esperienza, lo sfondo imprescindibile di senso, per mezzo di esperienze che non possono che essere singolari e determinate, fa volgere lo sguardo all'estetica e all'arte. In anni in cui l'estetica angloamericana di tradizione analitica conduceva un tanto inane quanto fallimentare tentativo di fornire una definizione di arte, Garroni fa sua la lezione di Croce (1909) e Baeumler (1923) e propone una filosofia estetica che non consideri le arti attraverso un'analisi separata, ma che anzi le *ri-comprenda* quali enti privilegiati nell'ambito di un più generale "risalimento dell'esperienza verso le sue condizioni di possibilità, determinabili non dall'esterno di un non-luogo, ma solo dall'interno stesso dell'esperienza" (Garroni, 1986: p. 225).

Come ha correttamente rilevato Velotti, Garroni, contro l'idea che il sapere o la cultura siano già da sempre depositati analiticamente nelle cose stesse, mostra come la prospettiva critica, proprio grazie alla tematizzazione della condizione di senso, permetta "non solo l'emergere della nozione di arte come propria manifestazione esemplare, ma la stessa possibilità di proiettarsi sul passato per tessere quell'intreccio di somiglianze e differenze a partire da cui si costituisce un sistema delle «belle» arti" (p. 15). Nonostante talune inesatte

semplificazioni (ad esempio, la musica antica e medievale considerata semplice scienza armonica, pp. 73-74), Garroni segue la via già prospettata da Croce (1972) e mette in luce, relativamente al problema della nascita dell'estetica, la possibilità di segnalare, tra le due alternative possibili – l'arte è sempre esistita e l'arte comincia a esistere solo con il sorgere di un'estetica (p. 76) –, “*idee*, tra le quali è dato di ritrovare analogie notevoli, *da riportare però in campi almeno in parte diversi*” (pp. 75-76). Garroni, non privo talvolta di una certa retorica narcisistica, mostra come l'estetica quale *sguardo-attraverso* riesca a rintracciare la condizione per la quale determinati enti sono stati considerati in epoca moderna come depositari della condizione del senso, per se stesso inesprimibile. In tal modo, egli individua la ragione per la quale l'arte contemporanea (dissolta la propria esemplarità, come già notarono Hegel e Heidegger) sembra caratterizzata dal suo stesso essersi-messa-in-questione-dovunque, non solo nei suoi prodotti tradizionali, ma nelle attività più diverse. Da un lato, di contro al senso perduto dell'arte tradizionale, le avanguardie hanno esasperato “la propria contingenza, la propria situazionalità, la propria non-riconoscibilità, proponendosi [...] come rischio – rischio eroico e calcolato – di riconquistare, perdendola, la propria esemplarità”. Dall'altro lato, “oggi, di fronte all'arte-rischio, che sottrae il senso per restituirlo in negativo, c'è non più l'arte tradizionale e tradizionalista, che donava il senso [...], ma potrebbe esserci piuttosto l'arte d'intrattenimento [...] che semplicemente accompagna il senso, ignorando radicalmente il non-senso, come se il senso trasparisse naturalmente da ogni fatto, importante o trascurabile, della vita e dell'arte” (pp. 229-230).

All'interno di questo complesso sfondo teorico, tracciato nel primo e secondo capitolo (*Sul guardare-attraverso*, pp. 31-68; *Il circolo estetico*, pp. 69-111), la lettura della *Critica della facoltà di giudizio* acquisisce un ruolo fondamentale. In quest'opera si manifesta emblematicamente la raggiunta consapevolezza, da parte del pensiero, della natura non intellettuale (indizio di un guardare l'esperienza dall'esterno), ma estetica del suo principio – natura estetica che segnala così lo *sguardo-attraverso* della riflessione immersa nell'esperienza stessa. Garroni ribadisce la critica scaravelliana all'idea, mai del tutto accantonata, di un'opera venuta a completare dottrinarmente il sistema attraverso “*un insieme eterogeneo di problemi*” (p. 115). L'opera del 1790 sarebbe piuttosto “un'apertura [...] al comprendere il pensare e il significare nelle sue varie forme, strettamente scientifiche, quasi scientifiche o osservative, poetiche e anche speculative” (p. 122). Tale approfondimento viene condotto a partire dall'occasione esemplare del bello, la cui analisi consente l'individuazione di un principio “che non può non avere un ruolo necessario in qualsiasi altra esperienza, in primo luogo conoscitiva” (p. 128). Tenendo conto che l'esperienza estetica non è una regione separata dalle altre esperienze possibili, ma è anzi anticipazione dell'*esperienza in generale*, Garroni è lapidario nell'affermare, in maniera incisiva, seppure forse imprecisa, che “*in questo senso non esiste affatto un'estetica di Kant*” (p. 116): una teoria del gusto di Kant esiste eccome, non quale dottrina, magari descrivente le caratteristiche fisiche dell'oggetto, bensì come critica trascendentale del bello, atta a individuare il vero fondamento del peculiare piacere estetico; ma è da credere che su questo Garroni avrebbe sicuramente convenuto (si vedano anche le pp. 126-130).

Proprio la nozione di *Bestimmungsgrund* è al centro della lettura delle pagine kantiane e consente a Garroni di contrastare efficacemente (come anche Marcucci, 1976) l'antica accusa di intellettualismo estetico in voga in Italia nella prima metà del secolo scorso e sostenuta da De Ruggiero (1935), De Ruvo (1941) e Aliotta (1950). Secondo lo studioso, nella seconda e nella terza *Critica* il problema del principio di determinazione viene in primo piano (si cfr. pure Garroni 1989): sia nel caso della morale sia nel caso del gusto non esistono criteri oggettivi, tali che sia possibile dimostrare precisamente che un'azione o una rappresentazione sia rispettivamente morale o bella: lo è, morale o bella, non per caratteristiche esterne e concettualizzabili, ma in rapporto al suo *Bestimmungsgrund*.

Per sostenere la sua lettura, Garroni dedica un importante capitolo a Burke e Batteux (pp. 154-188), al fine di mostrare come la riflessione kantiana da un lato è *al seguito* del suo contesto e dall'altro lato è un'emergenza creativa rispetto ad esso: Kant ricomprende e riformula in una *unità sintetica*, dunque non già contenuta nel materiale, le precedenti riflessioni estetiche. E alla possibile obiezione se l'estetica delineata sarebbe per caso l'*unica vera* estetica, a dispetto delle variazioni storiche, Garroni risponde: “*in un certo senso* bisognerebbe rispondere di sì [...] *in un altro senso* bisognerebbe invece rispondere di no, dato che qui non è in gioco il possesso di un sapere” (p. 191). L'estetica – quale riflessione sulla condizione di senso dell'esperienza in genere a partire dal caso esemplare dell'arte – è infatti anzitutto un'*esigenza primaria*, volta a ricomprendere in modo critico ciò che si è già sempre in qualche modo compreso (p. 192). Non ha torto dunque D'Angelo (2020: p. 191), quando, in un saggio dedicato al sublime, rileva la tendenza del secondo Garroni a rimarcare la connessione che l'estetica instaurerebbe con la morale (che, è bene aggiungere, non va nella direzione di una fondazione normativa dell'estetica sulla morale, come talvolta si crede), rispetto a quella con la conoscenza, messa in rilievo ad esempio in *Senso e paradosso. L'estetica, filosofia non speciale*, 1986. Il bello mette in luce l'*esigenza*, non la mera speranza, né la garanzia della sua verità, della sensatezza dell'esperienza, tuttavia allo stesso tempo, anticipando a priori l'esperienza in generale, attesta *in un sentimento* che “stiamo a casa nostra”, e così ci consente di sentire che “*ha senso* fare esperienze e che da queste *può* sorgere una conoscenza effettiva”. La componente morale e quella epistemologica trovano il loro punto di convergenza nella nozione di *senso comune*, quale facoltà naturale e allo stesso tempo da acquisire, necessaria e contingente, condizione e insieme richiamo a realizzare il senso nell'esperienza. La particolarità del suo principio, il sentimento, rispetto ai principi delle altre facoltà, che può solo essere esibito, non esposto, è il risultato di un impressionante sviluppo della nozione di “gusto naturale” di Batteux, svolto con una imparagonabile consapevolezza e profondità. Se Batteux è semplicemente fiducioso del circolo estetico, Kant è consapevole che per comprenderlo propriamente è necessaria una “reinterpretazione dell'intera filosofia critica orientata verso una condizione, il senso, più interna all'esperienza, più originaria, e per ciò non esplicitabile” (p. 201). Per questa via si arriva allo *superamento* (*Hebung*) dell'apparente contraddizione che caratterizza la natura apriori-aposteriori della facoltà di giudizio (*KU*, § 22, ma sulla quale Kant torna più volte



nel corso dei successivi paragrafi, fra cui quelli della *Dialettica*) attraverso una ridefinizione della nozione di principio: “è un principio per ogni singolo giudicante che fa esperienza del bello – tale da esigere il consenso altrui senza poter fondarsi su tale consenso [...] – cui ci si può richiamare solo [...] *nel momento stesso in cui lo si pratica* individualmente, pur formandosi nello stesso tempo anche attraverso i giudizi degli altri giudicanti”. Così si giunge alla terza nozione di sovrasensibile quale “principio dei fini della libertà e principio dell’accordo di questi con la [libertà] stessa nella moralità” (*KU, Nota seconda* succ. al § 57). Questa definizione, che raccoglie le due precedenti, consente di ricordare l’esigenza teorica al dover essere della volontà: il senso comune “è il vero e proprio principio della facoltà di giudicare – estetico [come sentimento], e solo come tale legittimabile – che rende praticabili [senza garantirle], esprimendole simbolicamente, tre semplici idee, ma proprio per ciò è un far-senso che è piuttosto un dover-far-senso” (p. 223). Dunque, la componente epistemologica richiede l’esigenza morale, di cui anzitutto garantisce la possibilità, al fine di realizzarsi, e così di non rimanere indeterminata.

Infine, come già detto, il volume si chiude con la pubblicazione del testo inedito della relazione *Senso e non-senso*, presentata al convegno dell’Associazione italiana di studi semiotici, svoltosi a Siena il 23, 24 e 25 settembre 1988. Questo testo può essere considerato come l’esposizione preliminare e generale dei problemi affrontati più in dettaglio nel libro: qui Garroni, torna sul “problema interno della filosofia”, prendendo le mosse da problemi semiotici, attraverso la prospettiva del circolo.

Rileggere oggi l’opera di Garroni vuol dire dunque tornare a interrogarsi e sull’esperienza, in tutta la sua complessità e multiforità, e, con uno *sguardo-attraverso*, sul significato più intimo della filosofia trascendentale, quale prospettiva critica non dottrinale. Si realizza allora quel ricomprendere, che lo stesso studioso romano definiva come ripensare “il già-pensato e già-compreso, ritrovando la “verità” nell’“errore”, e viceversa, come sempre accade”, inevitabile per chi non vuole riproporre un uso metafisico del pensare “dall’esterno dell’effettivo pensare” (p. 66), e dell’effettivo vivere. Per tutti questi motivi, la ripubblicazione del presente volume, arricchita dalla prefazione di Velotti e dalla appendice *Sul dover essere del senso* è da salutare con vivo entusiasmo. Sarà possibile permettere soprattutto alle nuove generazioni di conoscere il ricco pensiero garroniano, e c’è da augurarsi che la strada da lui tracciata torni al centro dei dibattiti sull’estetica e sulla filosofia kantiana.

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### **CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS**

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## **Diferentes formas de normatividad en la filosofía práctica kantiana**

### *Different forms of normativity in Kantian practical philosophy*

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Ansgar Lyssy / Christopher Yeomans (Eds.), *Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality*, Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 280 pp. ISBN 978-3-030-54049-4.

El reciente libro *Kant on Morality, Humanity, and Legality*, editado por Ansgar Lyssy y Christopher Yeomans, comprende trece capítulos orientados a la explicación y relación de las diferentes dimensiones de la normatividad en la filosofía práctica kantiana. Los distintos trabajos monográficos se agrupan bajo tres formas de normatividad: la moralidad, la humanidad y la legalidad.

La moralidad es quizás la forma de normatividad más reconocida en la filosofía práctica kantiana, a saber, actuar desde el deber. Para los seres racionales el único motivo moral es actuar por respeto a la ley moral. El imperativo categórico es el único criterio de moralidad, el cual es independiente de las inclinaciones sensibles de los sujetos racionales

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y de las expectativas o consecuencias de sus acciones. Para Kant debemos actuar de acuerdo a máximas que puedan ser concebidas y queridas como leyes universales.

La humanidad se refiere al sujeto racional encarnado, es decir, con sentimientos, deseos, impulsos e intelecto finito. El desarrollo de la humanidad tiene la normativa de desarrollar todo nuestro potencial como seres humanos, lo que en palabras de Kant refiere al desarrollo del germen del bien y de las disposiciones que están en nuestra naturaleza. Tal desarrollo requiere el esfuerzo de la especie en su conjunto y no del individuo aislado. Los seres humanos tienen el deber de conformar tanto una comunidad cosmopolita de pueblos y Estados como una comunidad ética bajo las leyes de Dios.

La legalidad está dirigida a lograr la coexistencia de las libertades externas, de modo que la libertad de uno no sea un obstáculo para la de los demás. La legalidad está referida a las normas del ciudadano. Para Kant la autoridad del Estado como legislador no es otra cosa que la voluntad omnilateral, es decir, la voluntad general unida del pueblo.

Teniendo en cuenta el criterio utilizado por los editores para la agrupación de los trabajos, en lo que sigue ofreceré un resumen de cada uno de ellos.

La primera parte del libro reúne los trabajos referidos a la dimensión de la moralidad:

En “‘Why be moral?’: How to Take the Question Seriously (and Why) from a Kantian Perspective”, Katerina Deligiorgi se propone utilizar la pregunta “¿Por qué ser moral?” para identificar los compromisos teóricos centrales de la ética kantiana. En principio considera que dicha pregunta puede ser una expresión, no del escepticismo, sino de la agencia moral reflexiva. Según la autora el agente moral reflexivo no se pregunta para qué sirve ser moral, sino que pregunta sobre la naturaleza del bien moral y si lo que es moralmente bueno es concebible o no aparte de todos los demás bienes indexados. Una segunda interpretación de dicha pregunta es que puede usarse para expresar a los deberes morales como requisitos prácticos y por qué obligan. Por último, la autora analiza que la pregunta se dirige a lo que se necesita para reconocer y someterse a la autoridad de los deberes morales.

El artículo “The Disunity of the Self” de Lucy Allais, ofrece una relación entre la normatividad moral y política y expone las consecuencias para la moralidad. La autora se propone demostrar que no existe una tensión sino un complemento entre la descripción a priori de la agencia moral y las condiciones reales de la agencia moral de los seres

humanos. Principalmente, Allais explora cómo las condiciones de injusticia estructural en la que nos encontramos dificultan nuestra comprensión de las obligaciones y afectan a nuestro yo moral.

Por su parte, en “It’s All About Power: The Deep Structure of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Its Three Formulations”, Jacqueline Mariña analiza la equivalencia de las tres formulaciones kantianas del imperativo categórico en *Fundamentación* (la Fórmula de la Ley Universal, la Fórmula de la Humanidad como fin en sí mismo y la Fórmula del Reino de los Fines). Sostiene que las fórmulas son intensionalmente equivalentes en el sentido de que cada una implica conceptualmente o contiene analíticamente a las otras dos. En la primera parte del artículo, Mariña se ocupa de analizar la voluntad como razón práctica y su relación con las leyes. Luego, analiza la estructura de la primera Fórmula a través de un análisis detallado de los cuatro ejemplos de Kant. Por último, la autora argumenta que las diferentes fórmulas comparten un núcleo intensional y que cada una de ellas desarrolla analíticamente una característica específica de la agencia racional.

En “The Categorical Imperative and Human Nature”, Oliver Sensen investiga la relación entre la ley formal y la materia natural en dos dominios diferentes, la moralidad y la legalidad. Su propósito es mostrar que la metafísica pura de Kant y su antropología empírica no son dos empresas aisladas, pues la normatividad debe ser universal y aplicable, comprendiendo así tanto una forma a priori como una materia empírica.

La segunda parte del libro reúne los artículos referidos a la dimensión de la humanidad:

El trabajo de Patrick Kain “Motivating Humanity” explora por qué y cómo Kant se centró en la dignidad de la humanidad y la buena voluntad antes de la obra de *Fundamentación*. El autor encuentra que en las obras de la década del 1760 Kant centra la motivación para cumplir con las obligaciones en un sentimiento de la belleza y la dignidad de la naturaleza humana, en un afecto generalizado hacia la humanidad. Luego, al examina las conferencias de Kant sobre ética de 1774 a 1775, el autor muestra como Kant deja a un lado la motivación afectiva y pasa a asumir un motivo cognitivo o crítico, aunque permanece basada en una apreciación de la humanidad como una especie de bondad.

En “Humans-Only Norms: An Unexpected Kantian Story”, frente a la pregunta de si hay algún espacio para la antropología moral dentro de la teoría ética de Kant, Robert Loudon sostiene que para el propio Kant la teoría ética correctamente construida no se trata

solo de normas puras o transhumanas, sino que también contiene normas exclusivas para los humanos. Y estas normas son impuras, a posteriori y empíricas, pues se basan en hechos generales sobre la naturaleza humana y el mundo en el que viven. Son normas específicas de la especie. Louden sostiene que si bien Kant no lo expresa en esas palabras, podemos encontrar claros ejemplos de esto en las distintas áreas de su filosofía práctica, como ser la Antropología, la Pedagogía y la Estética.

El artículo “Beyond Our Given Nature: Kant on the Inviolable Holiness of Humanity” de Ansgar Lyssy, ofrece un análisis del concepto de santidad constituida por la razón. El autor sostiene que Kant rechaza como especulación metafísica cualquier ética que derive sus obligaciones de la intervención divina. No es Dios quien ha dado santidad a los seres humanos, sino más bien la ley moral que sirve de base para la santidad de la humanidad. Para demostrar que la santidad está relacionada con la forma de nuestra razón práctica y, por tanto, con la normatividad práctica, Lyssy trata dos cuestiones interrelacionadas: cómo se concibe la santidad en el contexto de la discusión de las normas del razonamiento moral; y cómo podemos entender esta distinción particular entre humanos impíos y humanidad santa. Por último, argumenta que esta perspectiva particular nos permite relacionar la filosofía moral de Kant con la filosofía de la religión en un sentido más amplio.

En “How Common is Common Human Reason? The Plurality of Moral Perspectives in Kant’s Ethics”, frente a la pretensión de Kant de sistematizar y fundamentar una concepción de la moral con la que todo ser humano ya está comprometido en virtud de su razón humana común, Martin Sticker analiza la posibilidad de que la razón humana común, de hecho, no sea compartida universalmente en todas las culturas y épocas históricas. En este artículo, primero, el autor se propone mostrar por qué esta cuestión debe ser atendida por los kantianos, y en segundo lugar, ofrece cinco recursos para abordar la cuestión de la variabilidad cultural e histórica de la razón y salvar el compromiso de Kant con una razón humana común.

Por su parte, Krista Thomason en “The Fragility of Reason: Kant’s Account of Mental Illness” atiende la superposición de la normatividad antropológica con la normatividad lógica. Para ello, analiza la explicación de Kant de la enfermedad mental, la cual resulta esclarecedora con respecto a sus puntos de vista sobre la normatividad del pensamiento. Thomason sostiene que la explicación de Kant sobre la enfermedad mental se

comprende mejor como parte de su lógica aplicada. Es decir, Kant entendió principalmente la enfermedad mental como un obstáculo para la correcta aplicación de las reglas del pensamiento en la vida de las personas, cuya superación es tarea de la lógica.

La tercera y última parte del libro presenta los artículos referidos a la dimensión de la legalidad:

En “*Eleutheronomy: The Esoterically Political Character of Kant's Practical Philosophy*”, Günter Zöllner explora el trasfondo jurídico formativo de la ética de Kant colocando su pensamiento legal y ético en el contexto del discurso normativo moderno sobre el derecho y la libertad. Primero, el autor describe el perfil intrínsecamente republicano de gran parte de la filosofía política moderna. Luego, presenta la distinción terminológica y conceptual entre los conceptos normativos de *freedom* y *liberty*. Finalmente, aborda la analogía jurídico-ética que subyace a la naturaleza normativa de la filosofía práctica de Kant.

En su artículo “*Kant and the Right to Privacy*”, Helga Varden se propone contribuir a los debates sobre la naturaleza y la importancia de la privacidad por medio de la filosofía práctica de Kant. La autora considera que tal filosofía ofrece los recursos para abordar los problemas modernos de las personas sin tierra, la importancia de la privacidad para los seres humanos y la estructura (con sus diferencias) de los derechos y deberes éticos y jurídicos con respecto a la privacidad. Para ello, primero, Varden describe cómo podemos usar la teoría de la naturaleza humana de Kant para obtener estructuras e ideas con las que analizar la privacidad. En segundo lugar, se ocupa de analizar los escritos de Kant sobre la virtud para desarrollar una idea ética de privacidad. Y por último, analiza los escritos de Kant sobre el derecho para desarrollar una idea jurídica de privacidad.

Finalmente, en “*Kant and the Provisionality of Property*”, Christopher Yeomans sostiene que la comprensión del contexto social alemán de los escritos de Kant en el período *Sattelzeit* (1770-1830) ayuda a aclarar la naturaleza de la provisionalidad del derecho privado. Yeomans resalta dos características de ese período. En primer lugar, el problema práctico de los derechos de propiedad no es el de determinar los límites de los títulos exclusivos, sino más bien el de desenredar y volver a tejer un conjunto complejo de relaciones de propiedad. En segundo lugar, el contraste relevante al que se refiere la distinción entre estado de naturaleza y condición civil no es entre una situación sin autoridad política y una con autoridad política, sino entre una sociedad que tenía muchas

autoridades políticas diferentes y una en la que solo el Estado tiene autoridad política. El autor sostiene que una comprensión adecuada de la provisionalidad debería cambiar nuestra concepción tanto del significado como de los límites de las diferentes esferas de normatividad de Kant.

Este compendio de artículos sobre las dimensiones de la normatividad ofrece nuevas lecturas para los estudiosos de la filosofía práctica kantiana en particular e ilumina sobre la importancia y vigencia que tiene el pensamiento kantiano para las discusiones contemporáneas, como ser en torno a la ética de la virtud, al consecuencialismo, a los derechos humanos y a la privacidad. Por último, he de mencionar que resulta sumamente provechoso para los lectores la discusión que se puede establecer entre los distintos trabajos presentados, dado que ello contribuye a enriquecer aún más la relación transversal entre las distintas esferas de la filosofía práctica kantiana.





## **Entre la moralidad y la humanidad: Dimensiones prácticas de la normatividad en Kant**

### *Between Morality and Humanity: Practical Dimensions of Normativity in Kant*

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**Reseña de:** Lyssy, A., Yeomans, C., (eds.), *Kant on Morality, Humanity and Legality. Practical Dimensions of Normativity*. Cham, Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 280pp. ISBN 978-3-030-54049-4.

Este excelente libro reúne una serie de artículos basados en unas jornadas que tuvieron lugar en febrero de 2018 en la Universidad de Purdue (Indiana, Estados Unidos). Como escriben en la introducción los editores Angsar Lyssy y Christopher Yeomans, la temática común de todos ellos es el estudio del “*estatus, naturaleza e interacción* de normas y normatividad en Kant” (p. 2).

Los diferentes artículos de este libro -un total de 12- han sido agrupados en tres secciones o partes. Cada una de ellas está dedicada a una “dimensión” de la normatividad: la de la moralidad, la de la humanidad y la de la legalidad. No obstante, esta división, que da el título al libro, no deja de ser una simplificación a la vista de la notable variedad de normas y normatividades abordadas en cada uno de los artículos. A título de ejemplo, los artículos

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de Lyssy, Martin Sticker, Krista K. Thomason y Günter Zöller tematizan la normatividad religiosa, cultural, lógica y política, respectivamente.

Con todo, el estudio de la relación precisa entre la moralidad -las normas morales que, para Kant, deben ser puras y *a priori*- y la humanidad -las normas humanas, que aportan un elemento empírico- es el que da más unidad y coherencia al libro. Tradicionalmente, la filosofía kantiana ha sido interpretada como excesivamente abstracta, universalista y rigorista. La mayoría de artículos contenidos en este libro subrayan cómo la ética kantiana, apoyándose en la naturaleza humana y sus normas, puede acomodar obligaciones concretas, responder a la particularidad de las normas humanas, y adaptarse de manera flexible a diferentes circunstancias.

Empecemos reseñando la primera sección, titulada *Morality*. Incluye cuatro artículos, dos de ellos (Katerina Deligiorgi, Jacqueline Mariña) más bien centrados en un estudio del estatus y la naturaleza de la normatividad moral *per se*. Los dos restantes, en la *interacción* entre la moralidad, por un lado, y la normatividad política y la humana, por otro (Lucy Allais y Oliver Sensen, respectivamente).

Katerina Deligiorgi escribe el primer capítulo de la sección, titulado “‘Why be moral?’: How to Take the Question Seriously (and Why) from a Kantian Perspective”. En él, la autora responde a la pregunta metaética por las razones que justifican el cumplimiento de una norma moral. En suma: ¿por qué ser moral? Esta pregunta -cuya mera formulación pareció al kantiano Prichard (1912) una expresión de escepticismo moral radical- es considerada por Deligiorgi, en cambio, como una pregunta legítima que se plantea todo agente moral reflexivo (p. 22). La autora ofrece diferentes respuestas: según la primera, el agente que se hace la pregunta reflexiona sobre el fundamento [*Grundlage*] de su deber y establece, como Kant, una distinción entre la bondad moral (bondad incondicional y racional) y la bondad de otros bienes (bondad condicional, basada en la inclinación). De acuerdo con otra, el agente que se pregunta “¿por qué debo ser moral?” está preguntándose “¿por qué debería interesarme cumplir las normas?”. Deligiorgi subraya aquí cómo la razón que tiene todo agente reflexivo para acatar las normas éticas -y actuar no solo *conforme a* ellas, sino motivado *por* ellas- tiene que ver con su libertad trascendental.

El segundo artículo, a cargo de Lucy Allais -“Deceptive Unity and Productive Disunity: Kant’s Account of Situated Moral Selves”- explora de manera lúcida las consecuencias que tiene para el yo moral de los agentes la tensión entre las normas éticas y las circunstancias políticas. Por un lado, los agentes morales deberían cumplir, de acuerdo con Kant, todos los requerimientos *a priori* dictados por la razón práctica. No obstante, los agentes, al mismo tiempo, están “situados” políticamente. En condiciones de injusticia política sistémica, los agentes morales se verán involucrados en una relación de dominación, que viola el requerimiento moral de tratar a todos los seres humanos con respeto. Allais subraya que esta situación es incompatible con una idea del yo moral unificado, consciente, coherente y transparente a sí mismo, ya que, para exculparse, los

agentes recurrirán a formas sutiles de autoengaño. Para ilustrar su argumentación, Allais toma como ejemplo la posición moral de los blancos en la Sudáfrica postapartheid, quienes tendrían un yo dañado porque están, incluso si no lo desean, involucrados en una relación de dominación estructural en una sociedad racializada (p. 57).

Jacqueline Mariña plantea en el tercer capítulo de la sección -“It’s All About Power: The Deep Structure of Kant’s Categorical Imperative and Its Three Formulations”- un análisis de la estructura “profunda” del imperativo categórico. La autora sostiene que dicho análisis muestra la equivalencia de las tres fórmulas del Imperativo Categórico (Fórmula de la Ley Universal, Fórmula de la Humanidad, Fórmula del Reino de los Fines), una equivalencia afirmada por Kant (*GMS*, AA 4: 436) pero disputada en la literatura. En cada una de las fórmulas, mantiene Mariña, Kant apunta, cada vez que una máxima es rechazada, a una contradicción *lógica* en la estructura de la voluntad -no solo una contradicción conceptual o una contradicción en la voluntad-. El análisis de Kant de la prohibición del suicidio es considerado por Mariña, en este sentido, como central y paradigmático, puesto que revelaría el “requisito *lógico* de que la voluntad no se contradiga a sí misma en su propia volición” (p. 75, cursiva de la autora). La máxima de una voluntad que se propone como fin acabar con la propia vida destruye, al ser universalizada, la misma condición de posibilidad de cualquier volición. Mariña concluye que las restantes fórmulas exhiben una estructura similar. En la Fórmula de la Humanidad, la máxima no debe entrar en contradicción con la voluntad de otra persona. En la Fórmula del Reino de los Fines, la capacidad legislativa de cada voluntad no debe entrar en conflicto con las demás voluntades racionales de dicho reino.

El último capítulo de la primera sección, escrito por Oliver Sensen -“Categorical Imperative and Human Nature”- trata la interrelación entre la normatividad de la metafísica moral y la normatividad de la antropología empírica. Para Kant la separación entre ambas normatividades es estricta. Sin embargo, Sensen argumenta que dicha separación solo tiene como objetivo aislar una sola obligación general, el imperativo categórico, del resto de obligaciones particulares. La metafísica pura es indispensable para acceder a un abstracto “principio supremo de la moralidad”: pero para derivar obligaciones concretas, Kant subraya que requerimos de antropología. “[...] toda moral necesita, para su aplicación a los seres humanos, de la antropología” (*GMS*, AA 04: 412). Sensen critica luego lo que llama el modelo estándar de derivación de los deberes (p. 93). Este supone un proceso en tres pasos: i) la adopción de una máxima, ii) la universalización de dicha máxima y iii) la búsqueda de una contradicción. Entre otros, este procedimiento genera el conocido problema de los falsos positivos y los falsos negativos. Para evitar estos, Sensen propone un modelo alternativo de derivación de deberes (p. 98) consistente en hacer estas dos preguntas: i) ¿la máxima propuesta supone hacer una excepción para uno mismo con respecto a una ley universal?, ii) ¿esta ley de la que me exceptúo constituye una ley objetivamente necesaria? Este procedimiento evitaría, según Sensen, falsos positivos y negativos, y requeriría -por medio del concepto de ley *objetivamente necesaria*- tanto el conocimiento de los fines esenciales de la humanidad, como, sobre todo, de los medios

*necesarios* para alcanzarlos. Este conocimiento de los medios es empírico, no *a priori*, y solo puede proporcionarlo la antropología.

El segundo bloque de artículos se dedica a la normatividad humana. De ellos, dos se plantean la interacción entre las normas morales y la antropología *stricto sensu* (Patrick Kain y Robert B. Louden), mientras que los tres restantes se ocupan de la relación entre las normas morales y las normas humanas específicamente religiosas (Lyssy), culturales (Sticker) o lógicas (Thomason).

El primer artículo, a cargo de Patrick Kain, se titula “Motivating Humanity”. En él, el autor plantea la clásica disputa en torno a la primacía del bien (*good*) o de lo correcto (*right*) en la determinación del imperativo categórico. En la literatura anglosajona hay partidarios de la prioridad de lo correcto, como C.D. Broad y John Rawls, y partidarios de la primacía del bien, como Allen Wood. Kain se posiciona a favor de la primacía del bien, identificando a este con la dignidad de la naturaleza humana. El argumento de Kain se centra en una reconstrucción del desarrollo de la filosofía moral de Kant previa a la publicación de la *Fundamentación*, reconstrucción que toma, como punto de referencia, la relación entre motivación y humanidad. Kain repasa, primero, el Kant sentimentalista de las *Observaciones*, en las que este basa “todo el deber” (*gesammte Pflicht*) en “el afecto general para con el género humano” (*BBGSE*, AA 02: 216). Más tarde, indaga las lecciones de filosofía moral que imparte Kant en el 1774-1775 (lecciones Kaehler). En este periodo, hay un tránsito del sentimiento al entendimiento como fuente de la motivación pero, aun así, la motivación sigue refiriéndose al aprecio por la humanidad como un bien que suscita, a la vez, respeto y admiración. Este enfoque se mantiene, de acuerdo con Kain, en la *Fundamentación*.

El capítulo de Robert B. Louden, titulado “Humans-only Norms: An Unexpected Kantian Story” plantea la tesis de que la normatividad moral está basada en Kant en la normatividad humana. Poniendo en duda la “historia oficial” acerca de la ética de Kant -de acuerdo con la cual las normas éticas deben ser válidas para todo ser racional, no solo para los seres humanos, o de lo contrario, las normas éticas perderían su pureza, necesidad y estatus *a priori*-, Louden sostiene que para Kant sí existen normas genuinamente morales y, a la vez, específicamente humanas (aplicables tan solo a los miembros de la especie *Homo Sapiens*). Para apoyar su tesis, Louden desarrolla una batería de argumentos ingeniosos. Uno es pragmático: puesto que desconocemos todavía la existencia de seres racionales no humanos, no es muy prudente fundamentar la ética en una “hipótesis extraterrestre” (p. 139). Otro apela a la evidencia textual en Kant de deberes estrictamente humanos [*Menschenpflichten*]. Estos deberes, como por ejemplo, el deber de cultivar la experiencia estética -con el fin ulterior de promover la moralidad- serían aplicables solamente a la especie humana, ya que la belleza es válida tan solo para los seres humanos [*Schönheit [gilt] nur für Menschen; KU*, AA 05: 210]. Este deber humano, y otros análogos, tendrían la siguiente forma: “Si eres un ser humano, entonces tienes que hacer Y”. Aunque formalmente hipotéticos, estos imperativos serían inescapables, según

Louden, ya que no están basados en ningún deseo, sino en la misma naturaleza humana (p. 140).

El capítulo de Ansgar Lyssy -“Beyond Our Given Nature: Kant on the Inviolable *Holiness* of Humanity”- se centra en la noción religiosa de la santidad [*Heiligkeit*] o lo sagrado. Pese a que la ética de Kant es considerada generalmente como secular, Lyssy subraya de manera sugestiva cómo este concepto -opuesto a lo profano (p. 154)- adquiere un valor normativo para el ser humano. Por un lado, la santidad de la voluntad representa un modelo para los agentes morales finitos, ya que santidad, aplicada a la voluntad, significa perfección moral ilimitada o absoluta. Por otro lado, tanto la ley moral como los derechos del ser humano son sagrados, en la medida en que, para Kant, son inviolables [*unverletzlich*]. En ambos casos, la santidad fundamenta deberes -alcanzar la perfección moral, no violar la ley moral o los derechos humanos- cuya omisión sería considerada un sacrilegio. Lyssy también destaca la dimensión política de la idea de santidad: los derechos humanos -o “derechos humanos más sagrados” [*heiligste Menschenrechte*; TP, AA 08: 307]- no son dependientes de su establecimiento por un soberano (p. 163). De esta visión de los derechos humanos Lyssy extrae por último la conclusión que Kant está introduciendo, en su ética y política aparentemente seculares, una *teología política*. Aunque el artículo de Lyssy es sumamente instructivo, esta conclusión me parece excesiva, ya que como el propio Lyssy indica (p. 164), la mera creencia en la inviolabilidad de la humanidad no presupone necesariamente una creencia en Dios.

El artículo de Martin Sticker -“How Common Is Common Human Reason? The Plurality of Moral Perspectives and Kant’s Ethics”- debate en qué medida la moralidad en Kant depende de la normatividad de la cultura. Sticker aborda esta pregunta examinando la noción kantiana de “razón humana común” (*gemeine Menschenvernunft*). La universalidad de esta razón presupone que todos los seres humanos son capaces de conocer mediante su razón cuáles son sus deberes morales. Esto podría resultar sin embargo una mera ilusión, dado que la razón ni es compartida universalmente, ni es inmutable, sino particular y variable, de acuerdo con diferentes culturas y épocas históricas. Martin Sticker trata de atenuar esta objeción mediante cinco argumentos que resumimos con la máxima brevedad: i) hay culturas que no “están en posesión de su razón”, culturas resueltamente irracionales (este sería el caso de la Alemania nazi); ii) Kant podría conceder que algunos de sus ejemplos de deberes concretos no son universales, sino que dependen de su cultura (prusiana, europea, etc.) y son revisables (los deberes relativos a la ética sexual, por ejemplo) (p. 179); iii) los deberes imperfectos son latitudinarios, y cada cultura puede aplicarlos de acuerdo con sus propias normas; iv) incluso los deberes perfectos admiten cierta variedad: una misma acción puede ser descrita en una cultura como “eutanasia autoinducida”, en otra como “suicidio”, y v) Kant asume que las normas tomadas como universalmente válidas pueden ser meramente el reflejo de los prejuicios de una cultura, dada la tendencia de la razón humana a autoengañarse y a racionalizar [*vernünfteln*].

El artículo de Krista K. Thomason -“The Philosopher’s Medicine of the Mind: Kant’s Account of Mental Illness and the Normativity of Thinking”- aborda la normatividad del

#### **CON-TEXTOS KANTIANOS**

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pensamiento, o normatividad *lógica*, examinando para ello la visión de Kant sobre la enfermedad mental. Las patologías mentales [*Gemüthskrankheiten*] son consideradas por el filósofo de Königsberg precisamente como un obstáculo para el pensamiento claro y lógico. Por esta razón, Kant incluye el estudio de la enfermedad mental como parte de la lógica aplicada (p.197), dado que esta forma de lógica (definida en la *Crítica de la Razón Pura* como “una catártica del entendimiento común”; *KrV*, AA 03: 76.25), se ocupa, entre otros menesteres, de identificar las causas del error en el pensamiento (*KrV*, AA 03: 77.10). Thomason revisa las taxonomías de Kant sobre la enfermedad mental y sus causas (hereditarias, físicas...) pero está más interesado en mostrar cómo Kant enfoca la enfermedad de manera pragmática, proponiendo una “dieta de la mente”. Esta dieta tiene dos componentes: en primer lugar, prescribe que razonemos con los demás, ya que la locura es “la pérdida del sentido común (*sensus communis*) y su sustitución por el *sentido lógico privado* (*sensus privatus*)” (*Anth*, AA 07: 219). En segundo término, recomienda que los pacientes participen en su propia recuperación, ya sea recurriendo a la medicina filosófica (procurando razonar mejor) o acudiendo a la medicina empírica (intervención quirúrgica o fármacos). El artículo de Thomason advierte oportunamente, además, sobre posibles malentendidos: las enfermedades mentales no son curables por un mero acto de voluntad, ni son responsabilidad de las personas que las padecen (*Anth*, AA 07: 217). Al contrario, Kant considera que atribuir al paciente la causa de su enfermedad es muy desconsiderado (*sehr lieblos*: *VKK*, AA 02: 270.30).

La tercera sección incluye tres capítulos que tratan de temas políticos y legales. El primero, a cargo de Günter Zöllner -titulado “‘Eleutheronomy’: The Esoterically Political Character of Kant’s Practical Philosophy”- basa la normatividad ética -sobre todo el concepto de ley moral- en la normatividad política. Utilizando un método “genealógico”, apunta a un origen político de los principales conceptos éticos kantianos, tales como libertad, voluntad, y el ya mencionado de ley moral. Así, la filosofía práctica de Kant estaría impregnada por el léxico e ideas de la filosofía política moderna, que Zöllner repasa de manera enciclopédica (de Maquiavelo a Rousseau, pasando por Bodino, Hobbes, Locke, Montesquieu, etc.). El concepto político central aquí es el de libertad, que suele dividirse, desde Isaiah Berlin, en positiva y negativa. Kant asumiría la libertad en el sentido del republicanismo moderno (libertad positiva, libertad *para*) con el fin de desarrollar su concepto de voluntad autolegislativa. Libre, en el sentido republicano, no es solo aquel que no está sometido a otro (libertad negativa), sino -siguiendo a Montesquieu- aquel que somete su voluntad al imperio de la ley (libertad positiva). A esta distinción corresponde, también, la distinción terminológica que establece Kant entre *Willkür* (libre albedrío no sometido a una ley) y *Wille* (libre albedrío sometido a una ley). La tesis de Zöllner es interesante, aunque es dudoso hasta qué punto el método genealógico tiene un sólido apoyo textual, o bien, se basa en exceso en paralelismos y analogías entre el ámbito político y el ético, que tanto podrían demostrar la derivación de los conceptos éticos a partir de los políticos, como a la inversa (aunque Zöllner invoca en favor de su metodología el precedente platónico de *La República* [p. 213], se podría argüir que la justicia es

principalmente, para Platón, una virtud ética, o virtud del alma, y solo secundariamente, por analogía, una virtud política, o virtud de la ciudad).

El segundo artículo de esta sección, escrito por Helga Varden -y titulado “Kant and Privacy”- explora el moderno derecho legal a la privacidad desde la ética kantiana. Partiendo del pesimista diagnóstico de Hanna Arendt en *La condición humana*, Varden sugiere que la filosofía occidental habría preterido el aspecto animal de la naturaleza del ser humano, devaluando por un lado la esfera *privada* -y sus funciones íntimas, autoconservadoras y reproductivas, desarrolladas todas ellas en el ámbito doméstico- y privilegiando, por otro, la esfera pública o la vida contemplativa. En Kant encontraremos, sin embargo, según Varden, los recursos necesarios para corregir esta tendencia, y valorar y respetar debidamente la esfera humana privada. Para ello, y basándose en la distinción kantiana entre animalidad, humanidad, y personalidad (RGV, AA 06: 26), Varden arguye de manera original que la privacidad constituye, en cada uno de estos aspectos del ser humano, un valioso bien a preservar. Varden muestra, por ejemplo, que la animalidad -que incluye la autopreservación, el instinto sexual (*sex drive*), y las relaciones afectivas o amorosas- está formada por una serie de elementos -nuestra intimidad, información personal, casas privadas, etc.- cuyo carácter privado debe ser preservado contra posibles exposiciones públicas. Estas, en caso de ocurrir, podrían dañarnos emocionalmente de manera severa. (Varden ilustra este posible daño con el ejemplo de lo que se conoce como *revenge porn*, una violación de la privacidad especialmente atroz [p. 239]) Por último, Varden explora cómo encontramos, en cada una de las divisiones de la filosofía práctica de Kant, recursos para fundamentar el derecho a la privacidad. Así, en la filosofía moral, hallamos el deber perfecto de proteger nuestra propia privacidad; en el ámbito del derecho, las normas jurídicas deben asegurar y proteger el derecho a la privacidad, y, finalmente, en el ámbito de la normatividad política, el Estado debiera garantizar las condiciones mínimas necesarias -tener una vivienda propia, por ejemplo, algo que durante una gran parte de la historia les fue negado a las mujeres (p. 249)- para que los individuos puedan mantener y desarrollar su esfera privada.

Por último, en el último capítulo -titulado “Kant and the Provisionality of Property”- Christopher Yeomans debate un problema interpretativo de la doctrina kantiana del derecho a la propiedad (*Sachenrecht*). Dicho problema -el “problema de la provisionalidad”- consiste en la yuxtaposición en la *Doctrina del Derecho* de Kant de las siguientes dos tesis: i) la propiedad de algo externo solo es posible en un estado civil, y ii) en un estado de naturaleza, es posible tener una propiedad externa real, pero solo provisional (MS, AA 06: 255-266). El autor considera que la mejor solución a este problema interpretativo pasa por atender al específico contexto social y político de la época de Kant. Esta época, conocida en la historiografía alemana como época de transición o *Sattelzeit*<sup>1</sup> (1770-1830), designa el paso de una sociedad de Antiguo Régimen (temprano-moderna, posfeudal) a otra moderna (industrial, capitalista y liberal). A la luz de este contexto, Yeomans sugiere que la tesis de la provisionalidad de la propiedad dentro del

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<sup>1</sup> El término fue acuñado por el historiador Reinhart Koselleck.

estado de naturaleza, en Kant, no se refiere a una situación hipotética y ahistórica en la que no hay autoridad política alguna, y en la que no existen derechos exclusivos sobre la propiedad. Al contrario, refleja el estado de una sociedad en la que coexistían diferentes autoridades políticas y el régimen de propiedad era confuso e impreciso. Por su parte, la determinación de los derechos de propiedad en el estado civil se corresponde con el deseo -considerado por Yeomans problemático- de que las estructuras de propiedad sean clarificadas y fijadas públicamente, de una vez por todas, por una sola autoridad política. Ahora bien, según Yeomans, “el problema es que la visión de la propiedad, básicamente liberal, de los reformadores” [reformadores prusianos entre los que se hallaría Kant] “estaba pensada no para el capitalismo sino para una sociedad que nunca llegó a crearse” (p. 274). La conclusión paradójica del autor es que la provisionalidad de los derechos de propiedad no ha terminado -de hecho es interminable, permanente-.

En definitiva, esta obra ofrece un repaso de las diferentes normas que encontramos en la filosofía práctica de Kant. Al mostrar su pluralidad y su interacción, se pone de manifiesto cómo la filosofía práctica kantiana es más rica y compleja de lo que se pensaba, y cómo de flexible puede resultar para acomodar diferentes perspectivas sin renunciar a la universalidad. *Kant on Morality, Humanity and Legality. Practical Dimensions of Normativity* es sin duda un libro de gran interés para los especialistas en Kant, pero también los no especialistas podrán encontrar en él un tratamiento atractivo de diferentes debates contemporáneos, tanto éticos, políticos como jurídicos.





## Hacia una (mejor) comprensión de la capacidad del juicio en Kant

*Towards a (better) understanding of Kant's power of judgement*

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Reseña de: Filieri, Luigi *Sintesi e giudizio. Studio su Kant e Jakob Sigismund Beck*, Pisa, Edizioni ETS, 2020, pp. 342, ISBN 978-884675869-9.

El libro de Luigi Filieri, resultado de su investigación de tesis doctoral, se propone analizar y presentar sus reflexiones sobre la interpretación que hace Beck de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura*, tal como se pone de manifiesto en la correspondencia intercambiada entre Kant y Beck, así como en el *Standpunkt*. Encargado por el propio Kant de redactar un compendio oficial de su pensamiento, Beck ofrece en su obra una interpretación del espíritu de la filosofía de Kant que es digna de ser considerada para sacar a la luz cuestiones teóricas de gran importancia como la función del juicio y del esquematismo

El libro consta de tres capítulos: el primero se centra en las epístolas intercambiadas entre Kant y Beck; el segundo en el *Standpunkt* y sus contenidos más teóricos (el contraste con Reinhold, el representar originario); el tercero propone unas consideraciones críticas de la obra de Beck a la luz de una interpretación normativa de la función del juicio en Kant.

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El objetivo general de Filieri no es solamente histórico, sino también teórico: la lectura de la obra de Beck se revela aclaradora de la teoría de Kant y puede dar nuevo material para la interpretación de Kant a la luz del debate entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas.

En el primer capítulo Filieri considera orgánicamente el intercambio epistolar entre Beck y Kant, discutiendo puntos problemáticos como la función de la intuición y el juicio. En particular, el autor se propone describir el origen y el desarrollo de las cartas intercambiadas entre Kant y Beck (en total 27, redactadas entre el 1789 y el 1797) que se revelan muy útiles para enfocar y profundizar aspectos problemáticos en la interpretación de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura*.

Filieri pone en evidencia las confusiones interpretativas de Beck (influenciado por su formación matemática) y se propone comprender las respuestas de Kant a Beck reconociendo los límites de sus argumentaciones y la utilidad del diálogo entre los dos para el debate contemporáneo. La perspectiva de Beck, efectivamente, se revela como un útil y sutil instrumento para sacar a la luz argumentos débiles o no claros en el texto de Kant y contribuir a discusiones contemporáneas sobre la función de la intuición y del juicio. El autor comenta las cartas y los textos de Beck para entender la perspectiva de Kant: solamente a través de las críticas es posible contribuir a clarificar el espíritu más auténtico del pensamiento de Kant.

Un tema de gran importancia es el juicio. Filieri interpreta el juicio en Kant a la luz de una lectura normativa que en Beck no está presente: Beck reduce el juicio a una expresión proposicional y no entiende en profundidad el valor legislativo de los juicios sintéticos a priori y sus condiciones. Kant dedica su investigación crítica al análisis de las facultades que hacen posible la legislación de la naturaleza y la libertad, proponiendo así un punto de vista normativo en el que el juicio y la noción de ley son centrales. El problema de la interpretación de Beck, según el autor, consiste en no advertir este papel del juicio y, en general, en no comprender la función autolegisladora de la razón.

De modo específico, en el intercambio epistolar se puede apreciar cómo Beck duda de la posibilidad de una referencia inmediata de la intuición a un objeto posible al margen de las categorías: al hacerlo, se pierde la distinción entre referencia a un objeto y referencia objetiva. Además, Beck interpreta la referencia al “yo pienso” en términos de necesidad y no de posibilidad necesaria. El resultado es que toda intuición se refiere a un objeto solamente a través de las categorías y que la función objetivadora de las categorías coincide con la necesidad de que el “yo pienso” acompañe a toda representación posible. En Beck no hay distinción entre la síntesis posible y la unidad necesaria (EA I, pp. 34-35): si el “yo pienso” debe acompañar (y no, como escribe Kant, debe poder acompañar) a toda representación, y el “yo pienso” es la fuente de la unidad de las representaciones, entonces toda intuición es unidad, y por lo tanto la sensibilidad y el intelecto se confunden y ya no podemos hablar de su heterogeneidad. Esta posición deriva, según el autor, del enfoque matemático-geométrico de Beck en el que no tiene sentido separar la intuición de un objeto (referencia a un objeto) y su construcción objetiva (referencia objetiva). De este modo, no se puede captar la distinción de Kant entre procedimiento por conceptos y construcción.

Las réplicas de Kant, lamentablemente, no son lo suficientemente incisivas y quizás no captan del todo la gravedad de la posición de Beck, que emerge en el *Standpunkt*, obra en la que Beck sistematiza su método enfrentándose a Reinhold.

Como ya se ha indicado, el objetivo de Filieri no es ofrecer una imagen completa del pensamiento de Beck como divulgador de la obra de Kant, sino comprender las razones que motivaron la redacción de *Standpunkt* (especialmente las secciones I y II, las más teóricas), en las que Beck pretende proponer un punto de vista sobre la filosofía crítica que es el único auténtico. Sin embargo, como ya se ha señalado en los análisis de la correspondencia intercambiadas entre Kant y Beck, Beck malinterpreta el estatuto de la sensibilidad, proponiendo una visión conceptualista que pierde de vista el valor de la distinción entre sensibilidad e intelecto y, en consecuencia, devalúa la función del esquematismo.

Este tema surge en el segundo capítulo del libro de Filieri, que se centra en el *Standpunkt*, en particular en las partes que incluyen la discusión crítica del *Versuch* de Reinhold. Beck no solamente pretende superar las dicotomías de la *Crítica de la Razón Pura* con su perspectiva de un representar original, sino también con la tripartición de Reinhold que divide la síntesis en: sujeto representativo, objeto representado y representación. Beck propone una perspectiva basada en una representación original antepredicativa que coincide con la estructuración inmediata de su objeto, como ocurre en la geometría: donde, en efecto, el espacio se representa como un acto original y luego procede a predicar sus propiedades. Lo primario se debe al acto representativo, mientras que la predicación se refiere a las relaciones entre las representaciones derivadas. En esta perspectiva, el problema que debe resolver el esquematismo (cómo aplicar las categorías) se vuelve prescindible: las categorías, según Beck, sin esquemas no representan nada. En Beck, la síntesis puede remontarse a un único momento original, mientras que en Kant consta de varios momentos y se realiza gracias al juicio, en un proceso mediado por formas y reglas heterogéneas. En esta perspectiva la cosa en sí pierde sentido: desde el punto de vista de una síntesis original ya no tiene sentido admitir una dimensión en sí, independiente de este representar original. Entonces, se puede decir que Beck interpreta la *Crítica* en una perspectiva que hoy se podría definir conceptualista.

En el tercer capítulo, Filieri reivindica la validez normativa del juicio, que, a diferencia del punto de vista de Beck, no es una mera expresión de la síntesis, sino su fundamento: el juicio no describe sino que hace posible normativamente la propia síntesis a priori. Entonces la discusión con Beck tiene un papel fundamental para permitir individuar la función autolegislativa de la razón y la perspectiva normativa que Kant asume en la *Crítica*.

El libro de Filieri, entonces, es de gran utilidad no únicamente para poner en luz históricamente la relación intelectual entre Kant y Beck, si no para todos los estudiosos que investigan temas como el esquematismo, el juicio, y se ocupan del debate entre conceptualistas y no conceptualistas. Sería interesante, profundizar la intuición de Filieri concerniente al papel de la formación matemático-geométrica de Beck, sacando a la luz la

relación entre la concepción de las matemáticas en el tiempo de Kant, su recepción y la noción de procedimiento por conceptos.



***Lecciones de derecho natural-Feyerabend: taller del pensamiento kantiano***

***Natural Right Course - Feyerabend: Kantian Thought Workshop***

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**Reseña de: Hüning, Dieter; Klingner, Stefan und Sadun Bordoni Gianluca, *Auf dem Weg zur kritischen Rechtslehre? Naturrecht, Moralphilosophie und Eigentumstheorie in Kants Naturrecht Feyerabend*, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2021, pp. 273. ISBN 978-90-04-43261-1 (hardback); ISBN 978-90-04-44819-3 (e-book)**

La lectura del libro *Auf dem Weg zur kritischen Rechtslehre?* nos sitúa ante la necesidad de llevar a cabo dos tareas relevantes en el ámbito de la investigación kantiana. La primera de ellas es profundizar en el estudio de la *Lecciones sobre derecho natural* de Feyerabend, en tanto que nos muestran el pensamiento de Kant en acción y desarrollo, como si de un taller de pensamiento se tratara (Bordoni, 2021, 84). Esta labor ya fue emprendida en castellano por las profesoras Macarena Marey y Nuria Sánchez Madrid, a partir de la traducción y presentación que publicaron en esta misma revista en el año 2016, “La “Introducción” a las *Lecciones sobre derecho natural* de Kant anotadas por Feyerabend” (Marey, Sánchez Madrid, 2016). Sin embargo, la incorporación y profundización en el estudio de estas lecciones en el marco de estudios kantianos es todavía un trabajo por realizar, más si cabe si hablamos de la investigación en lengua castellana.

La segunda tarea no es, evidentemente, como se verá a continuación, algo propuesto ni explícita ni implícitamente en la redacción de este libro; es más bien una tarea de denuncia tras comprobar que su forma, método de trabajo y composición reafirma la dolorosa ausencia de investigadoras kantianas entre las lecturas de los académicos que publican en alemán (aunque como sabemos no es una tendencia limitada a esta lengua), ausencia ante

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la que no queda sino plantearnos si los capítulos de este libro representan el escenario real de las discusiones kantianas contemporáneas respecto de la doctrina del derecho y la filosofía moral. La presencia marginal de Arendt, Jensen, Kleingeld, Korsgaard, Mensch, Ruffing, Schielicke, no deja de ser, además de necesaria, una mera anécdota en el largo listado de compañeros citados, y una carencia en la nómina de los diez autores que firman este libro. La ausencia de algunas investigadoras kantianas que se han ocupado de los temas abordados en los capítulos que componen la obra es, por ello, muy representativa y sería de justicia citar los trabajos de Flikschuh, Grapotte, Holtman, Hulshof, Kisner, Kryshtop, Loriaux, Marey, Pinheiro Walla, Sánchez Madrid, Satne, Stiliz, Ypi, Varden, por citar sólo algunas de las investigadoras con trabajos publicados en inglés y alemán y accesibles, por lo tanto, para la investigación internacional. Algunas de ellas colaboraron en otro libro imprescindible para la interpretación de estas lecciones: *Kant's "Naturrecht Feyerabend": Analysen und Perspektiven* (Ruffing, Schlitte, Bordoni, 2020).

La primera parte del libro recoge los capítulos escritos por Gideon Stiening, Michael Städtler y Gianluca Sadun Bordoni y trazan la relación de las lecciones de Feyerabend con la tradición del derecho natural. Encontramos en estas páginas un interesante trabajo de comparación entre las propuestas de Kant y el manual de Achenwall, *Elementa Iuris Naturae*, que el primero seguía en sus lecciones. Además de conocer el desarrollo y los cambios en el pensamiento kantiano, Stiening nos mostrará cómo hemos de tener en cuenta también el desarrollo del pensamiento de Achenwall que puede ser rastreado en las diversas ediciones de su manual. Nos encontramos así con una minuciosa labor de erudición que no por ello menoscaba la concisión y claridad en la expresión. Stiening se detiene, además, en el estudio de los conceptos de dios y guerra, en tanto que son dos de los conceptos respecto de los que Kant y Achenwall presentan diferencias más notables en sus respectivas reflexiones. El concepto de dios es puesto en relación con el premio y el castigo que podrían fundamentar, en el caso de Achenwall, la obligación moral, algo a lo que Kant se opone de forma clara ya en estas páginas. El concepto de guerra es estudiado desde el estado de naturaleza y se introduce el tema de la guerra justa, un concepto posible para Achenwall, pero un sinsentido para Kant en tanto que no podríamos buscar la justicia en tal estado de naturaleza (Stiening, 2021: 38).

De entre las propuestas que introduce Städtler en su reflexión en torno al monarca en el segundo capítulo del libro me gustaría destacar las últimas páginas que tratan el tema del derecho a la resistencia frente a la tiranía y frente al déspota (Städtler, 2021: 72). A pesar de que un monarca que cayera bajo estas conductas suprimiría todo estado de derecho, esto no justificaría el derecho a la resistencia, que parece que sólo tendría sentido si se pudiera garantizar la absoluta conformidad de todos los individuos en una conducta de oposición al poder establecido, pero nunca nos encontramos con la totalidad de los individuos en conformidad, sino con intereses de grupo que podrían dirigir de nuevo a otras tiranías. La posición de Kant nos muestra así interesantes espacios de confrontación con la filosofía de la historia y la idea de progreso y libertad. Bordoni firma el último de los capítulos de la

primera parte que nos ayuda a orientarnos en el mapa cronológico de las obras de Kant escritas especialmente en la década de los 80 como son *Idea de una historia universal en sentido cosmopolita*, y *Respuesta a la pregunta ¿Qué es Ilustración?*; ambas obras aparecidas en el mismo año (1784) en que Feyerabend asiste a estas lecciones de derecho natural. También nos muestra Bordoni la relación de estas lecciones con la elaboración de la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*, obra que también tenía Kant en curso en ese momento, así como con las obras más tardías en las que encontramos ecos de estas líneas como en *Sobre la paz perpetua* o la *Metafísica de las costumbres*. El tema principal de la investigación de Bordoni será la libertad y el modo en que se va declinando en estos escritos (Bordoni, 2021: 84).

La segunda parte del libro se ocupa del derecho natural de Feyerabend y la filosofía moral crítica. Se recogen en este caso las aportaciones de Manfred Baum, Franz Hesse, Markus Kohl y Stefan Klingner. La contraposición entre las leyes de la naturaleza y las leyes de la libertad es un tema relevante en las lecciones de Feyerabend, como se señala en casi todos los capítulos que estamos comentando, así como la presencia del concepto de autonomía que Kant introduce por vez primera en estas lecciones; una autonomía que se pone en relación con esas leyes de la libertad. En el texto de Baum la oposición entre ambas legislaciones adquiere un valor relevante, que resalta por el reflejo que proyecta en la *Crítica del Juicio* y en la *Fundamentación de la metafísica de las costumbres*. Hesse establece una investigación en torno al concepto de libertad a partir, en gran parte, del pasaje de las lecciones en que Kant otorga una finalidad en sí al ser humano, y por lo tanto una dignidad, no en razón de su razón, sino en razón de su libertad, porque la primera es meramente un medio que sin libertad se confundiría con el instinto. A partir de este pasaje se recuerda lo que tres años antes había publicado Kant en la *Crítica de la razón pura* para trazar las líneas de desarrollo de su concepción de la libertad. El capítulo de Kohl es tal vez el más polémico de los escritos que aquí nos encontramos, pues no propone un diálogo de Kant con otros autores, ni tampoco muestra el desarrollo propio de las ideas kantianas, sino que defiende la hipótesis de que la propuesta subjetivista de Kant en la fundamentación de la moral según aparece en las lecciones de Feyerabend es incompatible con el resto de su obra (Kohl, 2021: 150). Klingner cierra esta parte segunda del libro con un comentario comparativo entre la *Moral Mrongovius II* y las lecciones de Feyerabend que dan cuenta, como vemos en general en todos los estudios que componen este libro, de la importancia de la labor docente de Kant para entender el decurso de su sistema.

El libro concluye con una tercera parte dedicada al derecho natural en los apuntes de Feyerabend y su relación con la doctrina del derecho. Estos artículos están firmados por los investigadores Philipp-Alexander Hirsch, Gabriel Rivero y Dieter Hüning. Comienza esta tercera parte con un atractivo análisis acerca del concepto de finalidad en sí y su relación con el valor interno o dignidad del ser humano, lo que sitúa la doctrina del derecho en el marco general de la moral kantiana (Hirsch, 2021: 200) y apunta, como se ha mostrado en el resto de capítulos, a la importancia de estas lecciones para la comprensión de los

cambios que los conceptos kantianos van sufriendo a lo largo de las décadas. En este caso me gustaría destacar la relación que Hirsch establece entre la posibilidad del derecho, que requiere la concordancia y delimitación de las voluntades, con la consideración del ser humano como un fin en sí. El estudio de Hirsch en torno a la finalidad, e inevitablemente en torno al concepto de medio, es de una gran claridad para la comprensión del imperativo categórico, mostrando la necesidad de atender a esa primera tarea a la que me refería al comienzo de esta reseña: incluir las páginas de las lecciones de Feyerabend como base para la comprensión de la filosofía moral kantiana. Las lecciones de Feyerabend son imprescindibles en la investigación académica que necesita trazar los caminos que llevaron a Kant desde la primera *Crítica* a la ‘Doctrina del derecho’ (Hirsch, 2021: 204-205); en ese sentido me parece digna de mención la propuesta en torno al concepto de persona que Hirsch nos hace. A partir de 1784 este concepto incluiría entre las notas necesarias de su contenido la consideración de la finalidad en sí, por lo que siempre que se trate el concepto de persona, especialmente en la *Metafísica de las costumbres*, se estaría tratando el tema de la finalidad (Hirsch, 2021: 210).

Los dos últimos capítulos de Rivero y Hüning tratan con detenimiento un tema que ha ido apareciendo en algunas de las páginas que les preceden, el tema de la propiedad. Rivero nos muestra la diferencia entre la teoría de la propiedad y su adquisición que encontramos en Kant, respecto de la propuesta de Achenwall (Rivero, 2021: 237- 238). La pregunta acerca de cómo es posible pasar de los objetos sin dueño a lo mío y lo tuyo según derecho representa un problema para Kant que no ve suficiente la teoría de la mera ocupación como justificación de la adquisición primera defendida por Achenwall. Con su teoría del trabajo como fundamento determinante de la propiedad muestra Kant una crítica a la propuesta de los *Elementa Iuris Naturae* que utilizaba para sus lecciones. Por último, Hüning se detiene, no ya en las diferencias entre las propuestas de Kant y Achenwall, cuanto en las diferencias entre las teorías de la propiedad que podemos encontrar en las lecciones de 1784 respecto a lo que podemos encontrar en la *Metafísica de las Costumbres*, así como en el diálogo que se puede establecer entre Kant y su crítico Rehberg que nos lleva al final abierto de esta investigación: la respuesta a la pregunta de cómo es posible una propiedad legal queda aún por resolver.

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Ejemplos:

*Libro:*

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

*Artículo:*

Parra París, L. (1987), “Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant”, *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

*Capítulo en una obra colectiva:*

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), “Kant y la filosofía de la religión”, en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

*Trabajos disponibles en la web:*

Waldron, J. “The Principle of Proximity”, *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19 [http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu\\_plltwp](http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp), acceso mes, día y año).

### **Editorial Policy**

We would like to acquaint you with a journal project that can only go forward with the greatest possible participation of Kant scholars, without exclusions of any kind.

This periodical will be a biannual electronic journal in Kantian studies, which will alternate between open-submission issues and single-topic issues coordinated by one or two editors. All submitted manuscripts would undergo peer review.

Though Spanish is the Journal's primary language, manuscripts in English, German, French, Italian, and Portuguese are also welcome.

Submissions must not have been previously published, nor should they be under consideration anywhere else in any language. Please send your manuscript as a Word attachment to the following e-mail address:

[contextoskantianos@gmail.com](mailto:contextoskantianos@gmail.com)

### **Manuscript Preparation**

Articles must not exceed 12.000 words, discussions 8.000 words, and book reviews 4.000 words (including footnotes and bibliography in all cases). Longer manuscripts could also be considered by the editorial team, if the interest and quality of the contribution justifies its acceptance.

Articles and discussions should include an abstract both in the language of the submitted paper and in English that should not exceed 150 words as well as three to five keywords, with the title also in English. The title of articles, in the language of the submitted text and in English, and the author (in SMALL CAPS) will appear in *Times New Roman* 16 and in **bold type**. The institutional affiliation will have font *Times New Roman* 14. The *abstract* and *key words*, also in the language of the submitted and in English, will have font *Times New Roman* 11. If the language of the article or discussion is English, the title, abstract and key words will be also translated into Spanish.

Book reviews should have a title both in the language of the submitted paper and in English. They should also refer to the work under review as follows: Author, *title*, place, publishing house, year, and number of pages.

Please include a brief biographical note (250 words) that includes institutional affiliation, the titles of some publications, areas of specialization, and an e-mail address. Please prepare the manuscript for blind review deleting all self-references.

### **Style**

For any contribution, the author should use letter type *Time New Roman* 12 and lines should be spaced 1.5 (text and notes). Notes should be numbered consecutively (superscript, no brackets) and appear as footnotes, using *Times New Roman* 10. The number of the annotation which points to the bibliographic information contained in the footnote has to appear directly after the quotation mark closing the citation.

Stress required in the text should be done through the use of *italics*, never in **bold type**.

### **Citations and references**

References without excerpting throughout the manuscript must appear in parenthesis in the main text with the following information: author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Example:

(Jáuregui 2008, p. 25)

Excerpts cited throughout articles will use *Times New Roman* 11, without quotation marks and 1,5 left indented. Reviews shall not include indented excerpts, only brief citations, if necessary, with quotation marks and the reference in parenthesis of author's last name, year of publication, and quoted pages.

Omissions in citations are marked by three dots placed in square brackets which are separated from the preceding and the following word by a single space.

When citing Kant's Complete Works the usage within the *Akademie Edition* is mandatory [http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134\\_Instructions\\_for\\_Authors\\_en.pdf](http://www.degruyter.com/view/supplement/s16131134_Instructions_for_Authors_en.pdf)

\*Bibliography must be included at the end and organized alphabetically. Several works by the same author must be ordered chronologically beginning with the most recent one.

Examples:

*Book:*

Stepanenko Gutiérrez, P. (2008), *Unidad de la conciencia y objetividad: ensayos sobre autoconciencia, subjetividad y escepticismo en Kant*, Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas UNAM, México.

*Article:*

Parra París, L. (1987), "Naturaleza e imperativo categórico en Kant", *Ideas y valores*, no. 74-75, pp. 35-60.

*Chapter in a collective work:*

Gómez Caffarena, J. (1994), "Kant y la filosofía de la religión", en D. M. Granja Castro (coord.), *Kant, de la "Crítica" a la filosofía de la religión: en el bicentenario de "La religión en los límites de la mera razón"*, Anthropos, España, pp. 185-212.

*Paper available in websites:*

Waldron, J. "The Principle of Proximity", *New York University Public Law and Legal Theory Working Papers* 255 (2011), p. 19 [http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu\\_plltwp](http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1256&context=nyu_plltwp), accessed month, day year).

