

The Role of *Fortuna* in Sallust's *Bellum Catilinae*

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The word *fortuna* occurs sixteen times in the *Bellum Catilinae* (hereafter, *B. C.*). As with its most obvious English counterpart, the term lends itself to a variety of nuances, in recognition of which the *OLD* lists twelve subdivisions of meaning. I propose not to discuss five of Sallust's instances¹; from the other eleven appearances², however, it will be argued that the various shades of meaning visible in *fortuna* constitute a coherent whole which serves as a major literary theme in the monograph, is philosophically consistent with the principles Sallust establishes in the preface, and is inextricably linked with the conduct of human affairs. Others have treated this subject³ but in all cases Sallust's technique and argument as a comprehensive unit has not, I believe, been made clearly or forcefully enough⁴.

¹ At 16.2 (*fidem fortunas pericula vilia habere*), 33.1 (*sed omnes fama atque fortunis expertes sumus*) and 52.12 (*sint sane, quoniam ita se mores habent, liberales ex sociorum fortunis*), the plural forms are to be translated, as usual, «property, possessions»; at 51.12 and 13 (*qui demissi in obscuro vitam habent, si quid iracundia deliquere, pauci sciunt, fama atque fortuna eorum pares sunt; qui magno imperio praediti in excelso aetatem agunt, eorum facta cuncti mortales novere. ita in maxuma fortuna minuma licentia est*), «condition, situation (financial and/or social, good or bad)» makes the best sense. The Teubner text of A. Kurfess (Leipzig, 1976) is employed throughout.

² 2.5; 8.1; 10.1; 20.14; 34.2; 41.3; 51.25; 53.3; 57.5; 58.21; although *fortuna* at 39.6 is akin to its occurrences at 51.12 and 13, I have set it apart to demonstrate Sallust's literary skill in juxtaposing and elucidating two pivotal elements in his thought (*fortuna* and *mores*). See also at 52.12 in note 1, above.

³ The studies to which I shall refer (by author) most frequently are: K. Buchner, *Sallust*² (Heidelberg, 1982); H. Erckell, *Augustus, Felicitas, Fortuna: Lateinische Wortstudien* (Göteborg, 1952); P. McGushin, *C. Sallustius Crispus, Bellum Catilinae: A Commentary* (Leiden, 1977); G. Schweicher, *Schicksal und Glück in den Werken Sallusts und Caesars* (Köln, 1963); D. Stewart, «Sallust and Fortuna», *History and Theory* 7 (1968), 298-317; E. Tiffou, «Salluste et la Fortuna», *Phoenix* 31 (1977), 349-360; K. Vretska, *Sallust: De Catilinae Coniuratione*, 2 vols. (Heidelberg, 1976).

⁴ It needs to be stated that this study does not purport to examine the reliability of Sallust's narrative; see further n. 33.

First (and most extensively) to be treated is *B. C.* 41.3 where the author appears to be attributing to *fortuna* a decisive role in a crucial stage of the conspiracy:

Haec illis volventibus, tandem vicit fortuna rei publicae

Any attempt to discern the reasons for the failure of the conspiracy must reckon with the incident of the Allobroges. There is no denying that the aftermath of the initial encounter between Catiline's associate, Umbrenus, and the envoys of the Gallic tribe provided the consul Cicero with the irrefutable evidence he had sought finally to arrest the rebels. Yet Cicero's own account assigns relatively little importance to the actual participation of the Allobroges in this crisis, and we may encapsulate his evaluation of the affair in the following statement (*In Cat.* 3.22).

Quibus ego si me restitisse dicam, nimium mihi sumam et non ferendus: ille, ille Iuppiter restitit; ille Capitolium, ille haec templa, ille cunctam urbem, ille vos omnis salvos esse voluit...

ut homines Galli... spem imperi ac rerum maximarum ultro sibi a patriciis hominibus oblatam neglegerent vestramque salutem suis opibus anteponebant, ID NON DIVINITUS ESSE FACTUM PUTATIS? (my italics)

Of course the consul had his motives for crediting Jupiter with the success of his own manoeuvres against the traitors. By doing so, he invested his role with a sort of divine sanction whereby he might blunt opposition at a time when his career was in jeopardy⁵. Sallust, on the other hand, allows the Allobroges a larger and more active involvement⁶. With the conspirators they share similar characteristics, the notable exception being rationality, and it is in the course of their deliberations to side with Rome or Catiline that *fortuna* appears to intervene⁷ (41.3, the analogue to Cicero's *id non divinitus esse factum putatis?*).

After Cicero's brilliant oration against him in the Senate (31.6: *orationem habuit luculentam atque utilem rei publicae*), Catiline joined the forces of Manlius and furthered his preparations for conflict. Accomplices *quorum cognoverat promptam audaciam* (32.2) were stationed in Rome to carry out his instructions. Lentulus, for instance, was to solicit *quoscumque moribus aut fortuna novis rebus idoneos credebat* (39.6; see above, n. 2). Meanwhile, envoys of the Allobroges had travelled to the capital to complain about the

⁵ The Catilinarian speeches were published in 60; *ad Att.* 3.1.2, cf. Dio 46.7.3. On Cicero and «divine assistance», see vol. X of the Loeb *Cicero*, transl. C. Macdonald, 98.

⁶ In cataloguing and characterising the adherents of Catiline, Sallust and Cicero offer similarities; *B. C.* 14, 16, 21 and *in Cat.* 3.8; 17-23.

⁷ For McGushin (215), Erkell (149), and Schweicher (26), *fortuna* at 41.3 is luck. Vretska (*loc. cit.*) allows more: «Wieder tritt im gehobenen Stil wie 10.1 —*fortuna rei p.* als wirkende Kraft ein. Das ist hier wie dort aufgelegtes Pathos, nicht geschichts-theologisches Bekenntnis». Tiffou (353-354) criticises Sallust for employing *fortuna* as a last resort to explain the inexplicable. Stewart alone (307) recognises the connection with *ingenium*, but his treatment of this incident is not at all comprehensive and many implications are omitted.

avaritia of Rome's magistrates which had burdened them with huge debts. When we learn that the Gallic race is also *natura... bellicosa*, the conclusion seems inescapable that they will be targeted. In fact, Lentulus' lieutenant, Umbrenus, feigns sympathy for their financial woes and fills them with hope (*in maxumam spem adducti*, 40.4) by promising a remedy to their plight, if only they will participate in the conspiracy.

A warlike nature (*mores*), economic straits (*fortuna*, as in n. 2), and high hopes for relief —such descriptions are remarkably similar to those of Catiline and of the individuals he has already ensnared. For example, at *B. C.* 14 and 21 we read, *inter alia*, of his cohorts' impoverished state and of their belief in better prospects by supporting his coup. The *natura* of a leading rebel, Cethegus, is termed *ferox* and *vehemens* (43.4); Catiline himself is *ferox* (5.7) and he too has squandered his wealth, only to become debt-ridden (5.4; 5.7). What is more, he has extravagant hopes for the outcome of his scheme (20.2). The Allobroges, then, fit neatly into the pattern and we believe, with Umbrenus, that they really are suitable candidates for revolution. *Aes alienum, studium belli, magna merces in spe victoriae* (41.2), all recommend union with Catiline; but the Senate controlled greater resources, cooperation with it involved no risk⁸, and in return the Gauls could expect *pro incerta spe certa praemia* (41.2). This final consideration is quite at odds with the attitude of their would-be partners, for the youths so favorable to Catiline's designs are portrayed as preferring *incerta pro certis* (17.6). It is while the Allobroges are weighing their options (*haec illis volventibus*), that Sallust can assert *tandem vicit fortuna rei publicae*.

The decision is made to disclose the proceedings to Cicero who, in turn, directs them to pose as genuine collaborators (an ironic parallel to the behaviour of Umbrenus earlier) in order to secure incontrovertible proof of the conspiracy. This is achieved due to the foolhardiness of several rebels who, in providing written pledges, hopelessly compromise themselves (44.1-3). They are apprehended and the Gauls acquire their *certa praemia* (50.1).

While these events were transpiring in Rome, other Catilinarians were carrying out their instructions in the outlying regions, *inconsulte ac veluti per dementiam* (42.2); the impatient Cethegus urged *facto, non consulto* (43.3). The Allobroges have parted company with the conspirators not only in their preference of *certa pro incertis* but more significantly in the very act of deliberation, of not adopting measures *inconsulte*. That the barbarians are represented as having superior intellect is surely more irony. A trio of rebels is later assailed by Cato for their lack of *pensi* (52.34); another of the troop, Q. Curius, is similarly characterized (*neque dicere neque facere quicquam pensi habebat*; 23.2), while the corrupt youths of Rome are spoken of as having *nihil pensi neque moderati*; 12.2. Catiline himself is lacking, for in his desire to seize control of the state, *neque... quicquam pensi habebat* (5.6)⁹. The

⁸ *Tuta consilia* compared with the rebels' *audacia* at 32.2.

⁹ Also, 5.5: *sapientiae parum*, while the senators of early Rome despite *corpus annis infirmum* possess *ingenium sapientia validum* (6.6).

pairing of *fortuna* with the notion of rationality and therefore of not acting precipitously can be seen to be no accident; rather, it is a method of presentation intended to convey a fundamental feature of Sallust's thought.

The priority of the mind over the body is celebrated in the preface of the *B. C.* Among the endeavours of man requiring *ingenium* (*virtus animi*)¹⁰ for success is *lubido dominandi* (2.1-2). Catiline's *lubido maxuma... rei publicae capiundae*, coupled with his defective *ingenium* (5.1., and above) bodes failure in Sallust's *schema*. In addition, the exhortation of Cethegus for *facto, non consulto* runs counter to a principle established in the prologue at 1.6: *nam et prius quam incipias, consulto, et ubi consulueris, mature facto opus est*.

Virtus animi embraces *bonae artes*¹¹ such as *labor, continentia, aequitas* (2.5; their opposites, *desidia, lubido, superbia* are, naturally, *malae artes*). One's *mores* are reflected in the presence of these traits and *fortuna*, we learn at 2.5 *simul cum moribus immutatur*. The *mores* of Catiline and his henchmen are a microcosm of the general depravity of contemporary Rome (14.1), fallen so drastically from her former virtuous condition (5.9; 10.6). The attempted coup is tainted by a great deal of thoughtlessness and of *malae artes*. Against it are ranged the «thought» of the Allobroges and of Rome's representative Cicero, whose lead they followed. The respective *fortunae*¹² of the conspirators and of Rome¹³ (*fortuna... vicit*) are directly attributable to the exercise and quality of the *mores* and *ingenium* involved. *Fortuna*, then, cannot be simple, random intervention or blind chance.

tempus dies fortuna, quouis lubido gentibus moderatur (51.25)

At this point, Caesar is pleading that the arrested conspirators not be executed for, while the punishment might be considered condign, the precedent it will set is fraught with danger.

McGushin considers *fortuna* here as the «chance factor», while Vretska sees another instance of «*fortuna* als Wirkkraft der Geschichte» and depicts it as «eine Macht». Erkell (155) discounts this passage entirely («Das hat aber mit dem Problem nichts zu tun, mit dem wir uns hier beschäftigen») and for Schweicher (56-7) this is the only section in the *B. C.* «wo wir in Reden von der allherrschenden *fortuna* hören». As others, he detects a connection with 8.1 (*sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur*; see below), but adds that «freilich vermisst man die dort evidente *virtus*-Bezogenheit». Lacking in these commentators is the realization of the continuity inherent in sections 25-27 of

¹⁰ D. C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Cambridge, 1961), 9-11.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² Here translated as «outcome, result». It is apparent that affixing one meaning to all the instances of *fortuna* under investigation is impossible. Sallust has cleverly manipulated its flexibility to literary advantage. Beyond dispute is its link to *virtus/ingenium/bonae artes*.

¹³ I have encountered no other occurrences of *fortuna rei publicae*; see I. Kajanto, «Fortuna», *ANRW* II.17.1, 502-558, who translates «the good luck of the state» (525). Isolating *fortuna rei publicae* from other citations of an unqualified *fortuna* does not alter the thrust of my argument.

B. C. 51. Caesar, having introduced the notion of the precedent, elaborates, uttering a sentiment which clearly echoes 2.6, *mutatis mutandis*.

sed ubi imperium ad ignaros eius aut minus bonos pervenit (51.27).
ita imperium semper ad optimum quemque a minus bono transfertur (2.6).

For Caesar too *fortuna* is linked to the quality of human conduct; men of virtue might be judicious in decreeing a death penalty now, but since power is constantly in a state of flux, it may in future be abused by those less conscientious¹⁴.

sed profecto fortuna in omni re dominatur; ea res cunctas ex lubricine magis quam ex vero celebrat obscuratque (8.1).

These words introduce a chapter in which Sallust acknowledges the merits of Greek historiography and the reluctance of the Romans to apply fully their talents to the same ends.

McGushin (80) views *fortuna* here as the equivalent of *τύχη*, representing that «arbitrary power which lies beyond the control of man», though he notes that this is by no means Sallust's own attitude to *fortuna*. For Erkell (151-152), B. C. 8 reveals an illogical and inconsistent author, while Büchner (307), granting the significance of *ingenium* in the interpretation of these remarks nevertheless allows that we are encountering «der gröbste Widerspruch». Schweicher (45-50) and Vretska argue for a *fortuna* opposed to *virtus/ingenium*, i. e. of negative value; in their estimation, the Romans' preference for actions to words was directly (and unjustifiably) responsible for the greater fame of (lesser) Greek exploits. This, they conclude, resulted from a waning *virtus*.

At first reading this text may well appear startling and at odds with a fundamental precept of Sallust. Has he not, at 1-2, manifestly asserted the preeminence of *virtus* and *ingenium*? How then can *fortuna* be assigned higher rank? The problem, however, is only apparent and it stems from perceiving *fortuna* as an element in constant conflict with *virtus*. It is, in reality, neither good nor bad¹⁵ but a mirror-image of the *artes/mores* characterizing an enterprise or event. Stewart (311-314) clearly appreciates the causal relationship between the application of *ingenium* by Greek historians to Greek deeds and the disproportionate fame of those deeds. To be sure, the choice of the Romans in exercising their skills in areas other than historiography resulted in the comparative obscurity (cf. *obscurat*) of their achievements. There is no ground for believing that *fortuna* compelled this different behaviour but there is, in Sallust's judgement at any rate, for recognising that the felicitous

¹⁴ R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley, 1964), 122 detects disapprobation: «a hint of Octavianus, insidious and sinister».

¹⁵ Hence my rejection to Schweicher's positive «persönliche» and negative «allgemeine» *fortuna*.

decision of the Greeks to apply their *ingenium* (*ex lubidine*) effected a glory which did not accord with the truth (*ex vero*)¹⁶.

cognoveram parvis copiis bella gesta cum opulentis regibus, ad hoc saepe fortunae violentiam toleravisse, facundia Graecos, gloria belli Gallos ante Romanos fuisse (53.3).

Sallust desires to ascertain that quality which enabled Rome to attain greatness and concludes that it was *virtus*. *Fortuna* is coupled with *violentiam* not because it is intrinsically malicious (as Büchner, 151 and Schweicher, 40)¹⁷, but because on occasion it paralleled conditions in Rome. The *imperatorem atque magistratum vitia* (53.5) would have created situations whereby Rome's very mettle was tested, when the quality of circumstances could rightly be designated 'violent'. The clause *facundia... fuisse* is thematically bound to this negative appraisal, for *facundia* and *gloria belli* are deemed two spheres in which Rome had been surpassed and, hence, had suffered (*toleravisse*). But even here, in the course of time and through the exercise of *virtus* (53.4), Rome triumphed.

Sed ubi labore atque iustitia res publica crevit, reges magni bello domiti, nationes ferae et populi ingentes vi subacti, Carthago aemula imperi Romani ab stirpe interiiit, cuncta maria terraeque patebant, saevire fortuna ac miscere omnia coepit (10.1).

The interpretation of this passage¹⁸, the origin of its concepts, and its relationship with the *B. C.* as a whole, have all vexed commentators. In the extreme, criticism has been levelled at Sallust for resorting to a *deus ex machina*¹⁹ or for relying «all'irrazionale»²⁰ to explain away the following paradox: why is it that a virtuous Rome (*virtus omnia domuerat*; 7.6) undergoes gradual deterioration after the fall of Carthage in 146? Büchner (322) discerns «die dämonische Macht der *fortuna*» as the intrusive element responsible for the introduction of *malae artes* (e. g. *ambitio*, *avaritia*, *superbia*, *crudelitas*) in an era of unchallenged power and of peace. This position is often bound to the notion of the existence of a *metus hostilis*, a

¹⁶ It may be that Sallust has set out to rectify this imbalance. Now retired from an unsuccessful political career where *mala ambitio* held sway, he will not waste *bonum otium* in the *malae artes* of *socordia* and *desidia*; rather, he will pursue *ingenium* to better ends.

¹⁷ Erckell (155) dismisses this passage as of no value and McGushin relegates *fortuna* to «the chance factor». As many have noted, *violentiam fortunae* is reminiscent of *saevire... fortuna* at 10.1.

¹⁸ Erckell (155) notes: «die Schilderung der tragischen Entwicklung wird feierlich eingeleitet». Vretska (*loc. cit.*) sees dramatic treatment, a *peripeteia* in the style of Hellenistic historians; further, R. Ullmann, «Essai sur le Catilina de Salluste», *RPh* 48 (1918), esp. 10-13.

¹⁹ F. Klingner, «Über die Einleitung der Historien Sallusts», *Hermes* 63 (1928), 166: to explain the «Entwicklung nach unten», Sallust has recourse to a «von aussen eingreifenden *deus ex machina*». Similarly, Tiffou (353): «La *fortuna* est donc un *deus ex machina* qui rend compte de façon formelle de difficultés inextricables». On page 352 he employs the world «subterfuge».

²⁰ A. La Penna, *Sallustio e la rivoluzione romana* (Milano, 1968), 127.

threat which constituted a pressure upon Rome to remain alert and 'virtuous'. The removal of that menace ushered in a slackening of *virtus* and consequently permitted *fortuna* to rage²¹. However, as Earl rightly objects²², a genuine *virtus* ought to be «independent of external compulsions» and «vague references to *fortuna*» are certainly inadequate²³.

The genesis of the *metus hostilis* theme is not a concern of this study²⁴, but an elucidation of this particular text within the monograph is. Now, if in fact *fortuna* was liable for the moral decline subsequent to 146, that would blatantly contradict a principle explicitly elaborated by Sallust, viz. the supremacy of *virtus* (and its accompanying *bonae artes*). Two points, however, ought to be emphasised: (a) 2.3-6, is based upon the hypothesis that *virtus* remain constant; otherwise, deterioration will follow, and (b) *fortuna* is conditioned by both *bonae* and *malae artes*²⁵. The opposition which has not been noticed is not one between *virtus* and *fortuna* but between the presence and absence of *virtus*. This sliding from grace is not a case of arbitrary behaviour by a capricious and evil *fortuna* but a natural consequence of the progressive abandonment of those attributes which achieved greatness for Rome. Thus Steidle (7) makes the attractive suggestion of a colon after *coepit* in 10.1, so that our passage looks forward to the enumeration of those *malae artes* whose presence occasion decline. But this does not fully satisfy the objection raised by Earl. Why does decline occur after the events of 146? It is necessary to scrutinise the structure of *B. C.* 10 and its thematic relationship with other portions of the monograph. The focal point is surely the eradication of enemy forces, most notably Carthage, before whose destruction *labor* and *iustitia* were in evidence but after which the state underwent a metamorphosis (*civitas immutata, imperium ex iustissimo atque optumo crudele intolerandumque factum*: 10.6). In the first place, there is a clear echo of 2.5: *fortuna* has deteriorated for the very reason that *mores* have. Secondly, it seems reasonable to concentrate on the very acts of destruction and not simply on their effect, viz. a Rome utterly at peace and unchallenged. *Vi subacti* and *ab stirpe interiit* resound with violence and we may recall that even in military affairs *gloria* is more rightfully gained *ingeni quam virium opibus* (1.3), while at 2.2 it is asserted that *in bello plurimum ingenium posse*. *Lubido* and *superbia* are contrasted with *continentia* and *aequitas* (2.5) and Sallust later claims (9.3-5) that before 146 *aequitas* and tolerance of wrongdoing were the norm. Sallust is rendering a subtle criticism of Roman policy, quietly denouncing a lack of *continentia* (a failure to employ *ingenium*) in the military sphere. It may be that he considered the hostilities

²¹ See e. g. Vretska, McGushin, *loc. cit.*

²² D. C. Earl, *op. cit.*, n. 10, 51-52.

²³ Note Stewart's cautionary remarks, 302 n. 11.

²⁴ Fully discussed by Earl, *op. cit.* n. 10, 42ff. See also W. Steidle, *Sallusts Historische Monographien* (Wiesbaden, 1958), 16ff.

²⁵ That *fortuna simul cum moribus immutatur* surely implies the transformation of good *fortuna* to bad when *mores* degenerate.

unnecessary or, what is more likely, that Rome displayed arrogance and immoderation in victory. This latter idea appears elsewhere: in comparing *maiores nostri* with his contemporaries, Sallust praises the former's lenient treatment of the vanquished (12.4: *neque victis quicquam praeter iniuriae licentiam eripiebant*) and chastises the latter for abusing *imperium* (12.5: *proinde quasi iniuriam facere, id demum esset imperio uti*). Sulla's troops were earlier criticised in a similar fashion (11.7: *igitur ii milites, postquam victoriam adepti sunt, nihil relicui victis fecere. quippe secundae res sapientium animos fatigant: ne illi corruptis moribus victoriae temperarent*)²⁶. Moreover, after tribunician power had been restored in 70, both *optimates* and *populares* deserved censure (38.4: *neque illis modestia neque modus contentionis erat: utriusque victoriam crudeliter exercebant*). *Fortuna* for Rome began to sour *in*, not *after*, 146 precisely because the state inaugurated unacceptable conduct and the public followed suit²⁷.

On four occasions, *fortuna* is associated with Catiline's words or deeds and it will not surprise us to discover that an individual tainted with *ingenio malo pravoque* (5.1) should have a corresponding link with *fortuna*.

(a) *fortuna omnia ea victoribus praemia posuit* (20.14).

(b) *quoniam factioni inimicorum resistere nequiverit, fortunae cedere* (34.2).

(c) *optimum factu ratus in tali re fortunam belli temptare, statuit cum Antonio quam primum conflagrare* (57.5).

(d) *quod si virtuti vestrae fortuna inviderit* (58.21).

These citations, for the most part, have received rather short shrift from commentators and Stewart comes closest to the mark in recognising an ironic twist in Sallust's presentation of *fortuna* as it relates to Catiline. Still, more can be said.

The first passage²⁸ is excerpted from a speech of Catiline as he seeks to inspire his followers *maximum atque pulcherrimum facinus incipere* (20.3). *Tantummodo incepto opus est* (20.10) and those perquisites of power for which they all long, *libertas, divitiae, decus, gloria* (20.14), will be assured; such are the *praemia* of *fortuna*. But Catiline is doubly misguided for this reliance on *tantummodo incepto* and on *fortuna*. The former discards any notion of deliberation, an ingredient considered a prerequisite to activity (1.6)²⁹, while

²⁶ It appears that what Sallust abhorred in Sulla was not his form of government *per se* which was launched *bonis initiis* (11.4), but his subsequent behaviour marked by an excess uncharacteristic of the *maiores*; *neque modum neque modestiam habere, foeda crudeliaque in civis facinora facere, and exercitum... contra morem maiorum luxuriose nimisque liberaliter habuerat* (11.4, 5).

²⁷ Schweicher (52-53) argues differently: the destruction of Carthage eliminated a sphere of activity (military) in which *virtus* had traditionally been exercised and thus allowed *fortuna* free rein.

²⁸ McGushin (89) devotes one sentence to this text, although he does detect the irony involved. Erkell does not discuss the passage at all, while Schweicher (25) is content to simply label it as a personification of *fortuna belli*. Vretska's comments are of little value.

²⁹ We are reminded of the exhortation of Cethegus for *facto, non consulto* (43.3). See commentary of 41.3, above.

the latter is adjudged an independent force which is responsible for success. In fact, however, *fortuna* is conditioned by the quality of the conduct affiliated with an undertaking; without *bonae artes/ingenium* an enterprise is discredited and will prove fruitless. To cap the irony, Catiline is made to utter the possibility of self-deception: *nisi forte me animus fallit* (20.17).

Text (b)³⁰ concerns Catiline, complaining of the treatment accorded him and confessing inability to endure it, and his determination to *fortunae cedere* by departing for Massilia. This dependence on *fortuna* without the contribution of *bonae artes* (as above) bodes failure.

Text (c) refers to the rebel leader before his final battle. It receives significant attention from Vretska alone³¹ and his analysis is acceptable only in part. His proposal that *fortuna* be perceived as simply the unpredictable against which it may be necessary to struggle (kämpfen) is akin to one already refuted. Correct, though, is the insight that Catiline, in his desperate condition, might attain some glory by adopting «the Roman solution», viz. conduct *per virtutem* to the death.

Text (d) introduces the last sentence of Catiline's final speech to his men before engaging the Roman army and it notably (one could almost say predictably) pits *virtus* against *fortuna*. This opposition³² is contrary to Sallustian principles but in harmony with the behaviour of Catiline.

In all four instances the *virtus-fortuna* interdependence has been twisted and misunderstood by Sallust's Catiline. This unreflective and corrupt man, leading a pack of malcontents imbued with every form of *malae artes*, met an end commensurate with a trust in *fortuna* as a last resort when no *virtus* was evident.

Sallust has had his detractors. To be sure, there are issues about which he has been proved historically unreliable³³, but this paper has other objectives. Among the other charges levelled at him are those of being a propagandist³⁴, a philosophical hack³⁵, and of writing an inappropriate preface³⁶. These

³⁰ Erckell (148) categorizes *fortuna* here, «Schicksal=Geschehen, Lage (bes. ungünstige Lage)»; Schweicher (23), as «unglückliches Schicksal, Unglück»; McGushin (89), as «the chance factor». Vretska (*loc. cit.*) acknowledges an «ironischen Ton tragischer Pathetik» in this conventional application of Hellenistic τῶν; see also n. 18.

³¹ Schweicher (25) denotes it as an instance of «Glück».

³² So regarded by Erckell (149f.), who claims *fortuna* to be a personification of «Glück», and Vretska, for whom *fortuna* here is the «aussermenschliche Kraft» which prevents victory. For McGushin (89) this is yet another example of «the chance factor»; even Stewart (306-307), who makes acute observations on Catiline as the inversion of Sallustian ideals, views *fortuna* as a malicious entity to be overcome by *virtus*. Schweicher (23) argues that the words are literary adornment, a *topos* of a speech before military engagement which ought not to be used for purposes of characterization.

³³ E. g. Syme, *op. cit.*, n. 14, 83-102. An overview is provided by H. Drexler, *Die Catilinarische Verschwörung* (Darmstadt, 1976), 303-308.

³⁴ This Mommsen-Schwartz thesis is still in evidence; most recently, H. H. Scullard, *From the Gracchi to Nero* (London, 1982⁵), 424, n. 4.

³⁵ M. L. W. Laistner, *The Greater Roman Historians* (Berkeley, 1947), 52f.

³⁶ This charge originates with Quintilian, *Inst. Orat.* 3.8.9: *C. Sallustius in bello Iugurthino et Catilinae nihil ad historiam pertinentibus principiis orsus est*. Syme (241) believes that if *historia* is to be translated as «the subject-matter, the stricture is more or less valid». I follow, among

criticisms have, in varying degrees, formed tangents to my primary concern. For instance, mention has been made of Sallust's indictment of both *optimates* and *populares* for abuse of power, and it has been demonstrated that principles established in the prologue are intimately and consistently linked with the narrative proper³⁷. This is not to claim that Sallust was a philosopher of the first rank, nor even that philosophy was his guiding principle, but it is apparent that he has blended philosophy (a very Roman notion of *virtus*)³⁸, history, and literary artistry³⁹. That he viewed history from an ethical standpoint is no secret; but that *fortuna* functions as a vehicle in this perspective has not been recognised. Even those commentators who unequivocally deny *fortuna* any causative influence in Sallust⁴⁰ have failed to note the consistency with which *fortuna* is presented as a theme. The many different terms employed in efforts to elucidate Sallust's conception of *fortuna* attest to a belief in his careless application of it: «aufgelegtes Pathos», «Widerspruch», «dämonische Macht», «*deus ex machina*», «irrationale», «allherrschenden», «subterfuge»⁴¹. A common feature of the commentators has been a presumption in the basic opposition between *virtus* and *fortuna*⁴², as if the latter should be assigned both an independent and evil nature. To paraphrase Büchner (307), the more *virtus* is absent, the more its «Hauptgegner», *fortuna*, dominates⁴³. Not surprisingly, then, this relationship has been characterised as war-like⁴⁴.

Previous commentators have been either incorrect in their assessments or incomplete in their investigations, or both. Briefly stated, *fortuna*, for Sallust, is a neutral term (not a force) which mirrors but does not control human affairs. In fact, he who, like Catiline, entrusts himself to *fortuna* in the hope of achieving success is manifestly inverting Sallustian precepts which are carefully and consistently applied to Rome's past in general and to the conspiracy in particular. In Sallust's thought, *fortuna* operates as a decisive literary principle, not as an historical agent.

others, Earl, *op. cit.*, n. 10, 5 and M. Rambaud, «Les Prologues de Salluste et la Démonstration Morale dans son Oeuvre», *REL* 24 (1946), 115-130.

³⁷ W. Steidle, *op. cit.*, n. 24, 9, asserted the significance of 2.3ff. (for the monograph).

³⁸ Earl, *op. cit.*, n. 10, 18-40.

³⁹ W. Schur, *Sallust als Historiker* (Stuttgart, 1934), 208-213 was properly critical of efforts concentrating on the political Sallust to the exclusion of the thinker and writer.

⁴⁰ Schweicher (173), borrowing a phrase from Erkell (71): *fortuna* was not intended «als einen in die Geschichte wirksamen Faktor». Most of the others are not so assertive.

⁴¹ Vretska, 458; Büchner, 307, 322; Klingner, *op. cit.*, n. 19, 166; La Penna, *op. cit.*, n. 20, 127; Schweicher, 57; Tiffou, 352.

⁴² Schweicher (38) speaks of *virtus* «als Antithese zu *fortuna*».

⁴³ Adopted by McGushin (89). Cf. Stewart (306, n. 23): «*virtus*, in the Sallustian sense, disdains *fortuna*, or welcomes it only to prevail over it».

⁴⁴ Vretska on 57.5, «kämpfen»; F. Egermann, «Die Proömien zu den Werken des Sallust», *SAWW* 214.3 (1932), 10, «im Kampf»; V. Pöschl, *Grundwerte römischer Staatsgesinnung in den Geschichtswerken des Sallust* (Berlin, 1940), 25, «der Kampf gegen die *Fortuna*».