

Diodorus, Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, and the End of the Emmenids

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<https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/geri.95427>

Recibido: 5 de abril de 2024 • Aceptado: 18 de junio de 2024

ENG Abstract: In relation to the great quantity of information that Diodorus offers, available is a highly detailed historical narrative regarding the end of the Emmenid Dynasty in Akragas. Having said this, the article highlights the historical value of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, which offers three pieces of information not present in the rest of the tradition, and useful for the general reconstruction of the relations between the tyrannical dynasties of Akragas and Syracuse from 478 BC to the fall of Thrasydaios, the last Emmenid. A comparison with other testimonies –which include, in addition to the other Pindaric scholia and Diodorus, also Callimachus and the Suda lexicon– also reveals a duration of the tyranny of Thrasydaios, the last of the Emmenids, which differs from that commonly accepted by critics.

Keywords: Akragas; Thrasydaios; Pindaric scholia; Diodorus; Emmenids; Deinomenids.

^{ESP} Diodoro, Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, y el fin de los Emménidas

Resumen: En relación a la gran cantidad de información que ofrece Diodoro, se dispone de una narración histórica muy detallada sobre el final de la dinastía Emménida en Agrigento. Dicho esto, el artículo destaca el valor histórico de Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, que ofrece tres datos que no están presentes en el resto de la tradición y resultan útiles para la reconstrucción general de las relaciones entre las dinastías tiránicas de Akragas y Siracusa desde el 478 a.C. a la caída de Trasideo, el último Emménida. Una comparación con otros testimonios (que incluyen, además de los otros escolios pindáricos y de Diodoro, también Calímaco y el léxico de Suda) revela también una duración de la tiranía de Trasideo, el último de los Emménidas, diferente de la comúnmente aceptada por los críticos.

Palabras clave: Agrigento; Trasideo; sch. Píndaro; Diodoro; Emménidas; Dinoménidas.

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Cómo citar: Dimauro, E. (2024): “Diodorus, Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, and the End of the Emmenids”, *Gerión*, 42(2), 407-420.

1. Introduction

1.1. What Diodorus says about the end of the Emmenids

In 11.53.1-5, Diodorus links the year 472 BC to the events that determine the end of the tyranny of the Emmenids in Akragas. As he tells in this chapter, Theron, the ruler of Akragas, died and was succeeded by his son Thrasydaios; Theron's rule had been fair and unoppressive, "but his son, even while Theron still lived, was given to violence and murder, and after his death ruled the country in a lawless and tyrannical manner" (ὁ δὲ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ζῶντος ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς βίαιος ἦν καὶ φονικὸς καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἤρχε τῆς πατρίδος παρανόμως καὶ τυραννικῶς, 11.53.2), and he "had a miserable existence, universally hated and the target of continual plots; and indeed, his life very soon came to a disastrous end well suited to his lawless nature" (διετέλεσεν ἐπιβουλευόμενος καὶ βίον ἔχων μισούμενον· ὄθεν ταχέως τῆς ἰδίας παρανομίας οἰκείαν ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου καταστροφὴν, 11.53.3); after his father Theron's death, he attacked the Syracusans, but was defeated by Hieron, and "after suffering this humiliation, Thrasydaeus was driven out of office and fled to the city known as "Nisaian" Megara, where he was arraigned, condemned, and put to death" (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Θρασυδαῖος μὲν ταπεινωθεὶς ἐξέπεσεν ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ φυγὼν εἰς Μεγαρεῖς τοὺς Νισαίους καλουμένους, ἐκεῖ θανάτου καταγνωσθεὶς ἐτελεύτησεν, 11.53.5); then the Akragantines restored their democracy.

A few chapters before, Diodorus introduces the last exponent of the Emmenids, Thrasydaios. In 11.48.3-8, in effect, Diodorus narrates the premise and the events that lead to the end of the Emmenid Dynasty: "Hieron, king of the Syracusans after the death of his brother Gelon, seeing the popularity of his brother Polyzelos among the Syracusans, and convinced he was simply waiting to usurp the kingship, very much wanted to get him out of the way" (Ἰέρων δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Γέλωνος τελευτὴν τὸν μὲν ἀδελφὸν Πολύζηλον ὀρῶν εὐδοκιμοῦντα παρὰ τοῖς Συρακοσίοις, καὶ νομίζων αὐτὸν ἔφεδρον ὑπάρχειν τῆς βασιλείας, ἔσπευδεν ἐκποδῶν ποιήσασθαι, 11.48.3); after having refused the role of directing an expedition against Kroton, Polyzelos, to escape from his brother's anger, searched for protection in the hands of Theron, the tyrant of Akragas; some time after these events, "it happened that Theron's son Thrasydaios, the governor of Himera, was using undue severity in the exercise of his office, to a point at which the Himerans had become totally alienated from him. They turned down the idea of going to his father and formally accusing him, in the belief that they would not get an impartial hearing" (Θρασυδαίου τοῦ Θήρωνος ἐπιστατοῦντος τῆς τῶν Ἰμεραίων πόλεως βαρύτερον τοῦ καθήκοντος, συνέβη τοὺς Ἰμεραίους ἀπαλλοτριωθῆναι παντελῶς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸν πατέρα πορεύεσθαι τε καὶ κατηγορεῖν ἀπεδοκίμαζον, νομίζοντες οὐχ ἔξιν ἴσον ἀκουστῆν, 11.48.6-7); the Himerans sent ambassadors to Hieron and offer to join him in his attack on Theron, but "Hieron had already decided to enter peaceful relations with Theron, and so betrayed the Himerans" (ὁ δὲ Ἰέρων κρίνας εἰρηνικῶς διαλύσασθαι πρὸς τὸν Θήρωνα, προὔδωκε τοὺς Ἰμεραίους, 11.48.8).

In these two chapters, the following two aspects need to be highlighted:

- a) The succession of Hieron and Gelon is presented as something taken for granted and undisturbed, apart from the potential threat represented by Polyzelos;
- b) Diodorus affirms the personality and procedures of Thrasydaios in governing with an unequivocal tyrannical style that appears accentuated by a comparison with the abilities of a good governor demonstrated by his father Theron (see also §3), as well as from a particular insistence relating to the topic of *παρανομία*, which belongs to the last of the Emmenids.

With this contribution, I propose a series of reflections on these aspects, putting them in relation with another line of tradition, that it is possible to individualise in a scholium pindaricum (Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c).

1.2. The three peculiarities of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c

Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c is worthy of careful consideration, because it includes three pieces of information which are not present in the rest of the tradition, that however have not been the

subject of a particular study. These three pieces of information are: Theron's personal initiative in deciding, on Gelon's death, to marry his daughter Damarete to Polyzelos; the direct contact between Polyzelos and Theron's son Thrasydaios, who urges the Deinomenid to attack his elder brother by offering him support in gaining power; and finally, Simonides' ambiguous *modus operandi* as "peacemaker" at the time of the crisis that occurred in 476 BC at Himera. This is the text of the scholium:

ὁ Θήρων θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ ἐξέδωκε πρὸς γάμον Πολυζήλῳ τῷ ἀδελφῷ Ἰέρωνος, ὃς πεμφθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἰέρωνος πολεμῆσαι τοῖς περιοίκοις Σικελιώταις βαρβάροις, ἔπαυσε τὸν πόλεμον χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ Ἰέρωνος γνώμης, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν ὑφοράσει ἦν. Θρασυδαίου δὲ τοῦ Θήρωνος υἱοῦ πείσαντος τὸν Πολύζηλον ἐπιθέσθαι τῷ Ἰέρωνι, ὑπισχνουμένου αὐτοῦ τοῖς πράγμασι συναντιλήψεσθαι, γνοὺς ὁ Ἰέρων ἔκρινεν αἰρήσειν τὴν Ἀκράγαντα καὶ Θήρωνα καὶ Θρασυδαῖον. μελλόντων δὲ τῶν φίλων ... ἔπεμψε Σιμωνίδης ὁ λυρικός πρὸς αὐτὸν συμβουλευῶν, ἔκταράξει μᾶλλον βουλόμενος τῷ μνηεῖν τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτῶν προδοσίαν ἔσεσθαι καὶ τοὺς προδιδόντας. ὁ δὲ εὐλαβηθεὶς ἐξεχώρησε τῶν πραγμάτων τῷ Ἰέρωνι, ὕστερον δὲ ἀπέλαβεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τὴν τυραννίδα, καὶ διελύθησαν τῆς ἔχθρας, ὡς καὶ κηδεῖαν τιὰ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ποιήσασθαι, ἀδελφιδῆν Θήρωνος Ἰέρωνος λαβόντος γυναῖκα.

Theron gave his daughter in marriage to Polyzelos, Hieron's brother, who, sent by Hieron to wage war against the surrounding barbarian Siceliot, interrupted the conflict contrary to Hieron's intentions, and because of this fell under suspicion. Thrasydaios, son of Theron, on the other hand, persuaded Polyzelos to attack Hieron, with the promise of giving his support, and Hieron, on learning of this, decided to get Akragas, Theron and Thrasydaios under his power. Since the *philo*i were then about to [...] the lyric poet Simonides sent him a warning, intending rather to upset him by revealing the imminent betrayal and the names of the traitors. The latter, then, put in a state of circumspect apprehension, yielded power to Hieron but then regained autocratic power from him, and they reached a peaceful settlement, so as to establish a mutual kinship, Hieron having taken for his wife one of Theron's nieces.

The first detail (the marriage between Damarete and Polyzelos decided by Theron) is provided at the opening of the text of the scholium. The second (the pressure put by Thrasydaios on Polyzelos to attack Hieron) follows information on an incipient disagreement between Hieron and Polyzelos, who had become suspect (ἐν ὑφοράσει ἦν) because of the interruption of a war assignment his brother had given him. The third (the ambiguous action of Simonides) is preceded by a textual lacuna that follows the mentioning of an initiative on the part of φίλοι, which could refer to the plot of the Himerans against Thrasydaios (at that time ἐπιστάτης of Himera), recounted by Diodorus in 11.48.6-7. This initiative of φίλοι seems to be a direct consequence of the decision to get Akragas, Theron and Thrasydaios under his power, taken by Hieron after he had learned of the agreement between Polyzelos and Thrasydaios.

The scholium has been the subject of analyses aimed primarily at identifying a specific source, mostly identified as being Philistus;¹ or, on a historical level, at following the evolution of the story of Polyzelos.² Only this scholium actually attributes to Polyzelos the conducting, on Hieron's mandate, of a war against "the barbaric Siceliot":³ for not having carried it out, contrary to Hieron's opinion, Polyzelos would seem to have fallen under suspicion. Diodorus and the tradition of the scholia 29b and 29d (Tim. *FGH* 566 fr. 93b) speak, however, of an expedition to Magna

¹ See in particular, Zambelli 1952-1954, 162; Piccirilli 1974, 73-77, followed by Bonanno 2010, 45 n. 61, 53-68. Cf. however, the caution, in my opinion well founded, of Luraghi 1994, 330 n. 240.

² Luraghi 1994, 322-332; Haillet 2002, 154; Vanotti 2007, 209-210; Bonanno 2010, 56-69, 93, 110-115.

³ Σικελιώται βαρβαροί is apparently a contradiction in terms. However, rather than raising questions about the origins and general reliability of the scholion, the expression Σικελιώται βαρβαροί shows, if anything, that the tradition followed in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c had a specific aim: to point out that an assignment had been given to Polyzelos (in bad faith, as the other line of traditions admits) and that this had been the cause for Hieron's suspicion towards him.

Graecia,⁴ which Hieron is said to have entrusted to his brother with the aim, in actual fact, of turning him away, and counting on the likelihood of him being killed in combat (D.S. 11.48.4).

The three particularities of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, are, in my opinion, to be emphasised more than they have been to date, because they allow us to identify a coherent dynamic in the intertwined events of the Emmenids and Deinomenids between the death of Gelon and the end of the Akragantine tyranny. The other testimonies in our possession, on the other hand, tend to represent this dynamic in a tendentious and discontinuous manner.⁵

2. Opposite lines of traditions and propaganda

Diodorus, who fails to mention Damarete's marriage to Polyzelos and evokes the transmission of βασιλεία by Gelon to the eldest of his brothers as a matter of course,⁶ in 11.48.3-5 develops the theme of the contrast between Hieron and Polyzelos. Concerned about the popularity Polyzelos enjoys in Syracuse and seeing him as a potential contender for the βασιλεία, Hieron makes every effort to get him out of the way. In addition to hiring foreigners and mercenaries to stay firmly in power, he entrusts his brother with a military action in response to an appeal by the Sybarites, assuming that he would be killed by the Krotoniates. But this arouses the suspicion and wrath of Polyzelos, who rejects the appointment and takes refuge with Theron. This results in Hieron making preparations to completely subdue Theron. At this point Diodorus goes on to describe the situation in Himera (11.48.6).

It is important to note that the line of traditions to which Diodorus refers to, separates the moment in which the Himeran crisis came to a head—placing it at a chronological level subsequent to Hieron's decision to attack Theron—⁷ from the actual moment in which the dispute between the two Deinomenid brothers began. The objective of this dispute was to obtain power after Gelon's death. Consistently, this line of traditions does not include, among the constituent aspects of this dispute, Theron's initiative (as stated instead explicitly in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c), which had, in fact, helped to strengthen Polyzelos, the younger of the two brothers, associating him with the position that Damarete had earned in the years of marriage (and collaboration)⁸ with Gelon, and, above all, making him the guardian of the underaged son and potential heir of Gelon.⁹

In Diodorus, Hieron's succession of Gelon is presented as peaceful, and untouched by interference or problems (11.38.7; 48.3). The latter were to appear only after Polyzelos' rise in popularity and his refusal to take charge of an expedition which was in fact a trap. Similarly, Thrasysdaios' problem appears to have been an independent issue, raised by internal opposition in Himera, the *polis* which Theron had placed under the control of his son. It is not hard to imagine that this internal opposition in Himera might have arisen not only because of the alleged misgovernment of Thrasysdaios, and not only after Hieron made his intention to attack Theron clear, following Polyzelos' move to Akragas. The interference in the question of Gelon's succession, in the giving of marriage of Damarete to Polyzelos by Theron, which is suggested by Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, seems to point to a situation which had already existed since 478 BC, where contacts

⁴ According to Diodorus (11.48.4) to rescue Sybaris under attack by Kroton; according to the scholia, to achieve the ἀνοικισμός of Sybaris (Sch. Pi. O. 2.29b) or to make war against Sybaris (Sch. Pi. O. 2.29d). On this topic, see the ample discussion of Bugno 1999, 56-86.

⁵ On the differences between Sch. Pi. O. 2.29d (FGH 566 fr. 93b) and the tradition followed by Diodorus see Piccirilli 1971, 65-66, 73-77, who assumes that Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c derives from Philistos. It seems appropriate to reflect on the historiographical traditions transmitted by the *scholia vetera*. This approach applies to τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων in Pi. O. 2, v. 29.

⁶ Γέλων ... τὴν μὲν βασιλείαν παρέδωκεν Ἰέρωνι τῷ πρεσβυτάτῳ τῶν ἀδελφῶν (D.S. 11.38.3); Ἰέρων δὲ ὁ βασιλεὺς τῶν Συρακοσίων μετὰ τὴν τοῦ Γέλωνος τελευτὴν (11.48.3). The use of the terms βασιλεία and βασιλεὺς in Diodorus referring to Gelon and Hieron see now Santagati 2022.

⁷ Cf., with a different perspective, Bonanno 2010, 109.

⁸ Cf. D.S. 11.26.3; Sch. Pi. O. 2.29d; see in particular, Galvagno – Seminara 2014, 274-292 with bibliographic references.

⁹ Luraghi 1994, 321-334; *contra*, Vanotti 2007, 207-208; cf. Dimauro 2021, 163-168.

between Hieron and the dissidents of Himera (φίλοι and relatives) may also have developed.¹⁰ And again, the direct understanding between Thrasydaios and Polyzelos, evoked only by our scholium, cannot but suggest a *de facto* situation, determined in agreement and in parallel with the initiative implemented by Theron as soon as he could count on his daughter's widowhood. As we shall see in a moment, it is symptomatic that the line of tradition, referred to by Diodorus and the other scholia in Pi. O. 2.29, insists on Gelon's alleged last will and testament regarding the assignment of his consort.

The Diodorean narrative then focuses on the evolution and solution of the Himeran crisis (D.S. 11.48.7-49.3). Hieron betrays the conspirators of Himera, who had offered him the surrender of the city and support in the war against Theron. In fact, he reveals to the Akragantine dynast the plot, with the aim of achieving a reconciliation (11.48.8). Particular emphasis is given in Diodorus to the punitive and repressive measures taken by Theron against the Himeran opponents. What occurred was the extermination of the Chalcidian population, and an inflow of Dorian population¹¹ which produced a *de facto* reinforcement of the position of Thrasydaios as ἐπιστάτης of Himera.¹²

In Diodorus, the reconciliation between Theron and Hieron does not put the mediation of Simonides into play, an element that is found in common, but with a divergent tone, in the scholia in Pi. O. 2.29c and 29d, and indirect mention of which, as we will see, can be found in Callimachus and in the Suda lexicon (§ 3).

As for the other two scholia in Pi. O. 2.29, the second of which admittedly is derived from Timaeus through Didymos,¹³ a trait they share goes in exactly the antithetic direction of what we are focusing on in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c. It is the insistence, in my opinion acting as a revelation, with which the nature of a testamentary bequest and Gelon's exclusive initiative in giving Damarete in marriage to Polyzelos is stressed.

The compiler of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29b states that, at his deathbed, Gelon gave Polyzelos not only the strategy but also his wife Damarete by means of a ἐγγύη: Πολυζήλω (...) Γέλωνος [μετὰ] τὴν στρατηγίαν καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα Δημαρέτην κατὰ τὴν τελευταίην ἐγγυήσαντος. He then specifies "so that she that Gelon got from Theron, this Polyzelos got from Gelon" (ὥστε ἦνπερ εἶχε Γέλων πρὸς Θήρωνος, ταύτην εἶχε ὁ Πολύζηλος πρὸς Γέλωνος). This scholium thus refers to a tradition particularly interested (in direct antithesis to what we read at the opening of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c) in affirming the right which Gelon would have claimed, while he was still alive, to assign his future widow. What instead Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c makes clear is that Theron, upon the death of Gelon, asserted his own rights as a father in relation to the marital status of Damarete. This can be explained by referring to the principle, as Claudine Leduc clarifies, whereby "lo sposo assume la tutela della sposa, ma il padre di lei la mantiene come figlia. Pertanto essa ritorna automaticamente sotto la sua autorità se, per una ragione o per l'altra (morte del marito, [...]), si ha la rottura del contratto di matrimonio".¹⁴ Which, as we suggest, leads us to formulate the hypothesis that Theron,

¹⁰ See also, § 3.

¹¹ D.S. 11.49.3. Cf. Bonanno 2010, 116-120.

¹² Cf. Micciché 1992, 189 n. 4. Theron's action in Himera demonstrates the tendentious and distorted nature of the tradition regarding an alleged cleft between Thrasydaios and his father when the latter was still alive (D.S. 11.53.2, on which extensively Dimauro 2021, 165-169).

¹³ Cfr. Piccirilli 1973, 77.

¹⁴ Leduc 1990, 289. This is evidently a plausible principle in terms of ancient Greek law. In my opinion, the account transmitted by Sch. Pi. O. 2.29b and d is a product of Syracuse's propaganda, even though Gelon is of course not unique in history as a monarch arranging for his succession. The main point is that Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c clearly differs from the other scholia in this aspect. This divergence reflects the opposed aims of Akragas' and Syracuse's propagandas. Cf. Dimauro 2021, 166-167: "Con la sua precisazione introduttiva, Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c riproduce (...) una tradizione motivata dall'intenzione di contrapporsi ad un diverso filone di tradizioni che, viceversa, sulle circostanze reali, e sul ruolo di Terone nella trasmissione del legame matrimoniale della vedova di Gelone a un fratello che non era Ierone, stendeva un opportuno velo. Nella narrazione del momento in cui erano in gioco i diritti di tutela per il figlio minore di Gelone, la tradizione si divaricava. È chiaro che ben altro significato riveste una decisione programmata dallo stesso Gelone rispetto a una vera e propria intromissione del tiranno di Agrigento

by choosing Polyzelos, wished in this way to interfere in the succession dispute between Gelon's brothers.¹⁵

In a perfectly analogous way, the *ιστορία* that Didymus expounded while quoting Timaeus (*FGH* 566 fr. 93b), and which is referred to in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29d, attributed to Gelon absolute will and legitimacy in the granting of Damarete to Polyzelos in marriage. This is a *διαδοχή*. After recalling Theron's kinship with Gelon, to whom the Akragantine tyrant had given his daughter Damarete in marriage (Θήρων ὁ τῶν Ἀκραγαντίνων βασιλεὺς Γέλωνι τῷ Ἰέρωνος ἀδελφῷ ἐπικηδεύσας γάμω συνάπτει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα Δημαρέτην), the scholium recalls a double gain by succession for Polyzelos. In addition to the function of military commander, Polyzelos receives, by way of hereditary transmission, the woman married to his elder brother (Πολύζηλος ὁ ἀδελφὸς τὴν στρατηγίαν καὶ τὴν γαμετὴν τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ διαδέχεται). This event is linked to the time when "Gelon was about to end his life" (τοῦ δὲ Γέλωνος τελευταῖον τὸν βίον μέλλοντος) and is fully in accordance with Gelon's instructions (κατὰ τὰς Γέλωνος προστάξεις). The consequence is that Theron's kinship with Gelon is transferred to Polyzelos: ὥστε τὸ Θήρωνος εἰς Γέλωνα κῆδος εἰς τὸν Πολύζηλον μετατεθεῖσθαι. These words clarify the meaning of what we read in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29b, thanks to the idea that what was of Theronian origin (the κῆδος, the kinship by marriage bond) is something that formally seems to remain of Theronian management, passing from an εἰς Γέλωνα assignment to an εἰς τὸν Πολύζηλον one. In any case, the tradition upstream of these scholia contains, with the clear indication of something decided by Gelon when he was still alive, an element of strong divergence from the equally clear ὁ Θήρων θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ ἐξέδωκε πρὸς γάμον Πολυζήλω τῷ ἀδελφῷ Ἰέρωνος which we read in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c.

The scholium in Pi. O. 2.29c, therefore, shows characteristics that are not shared by the rest of the evidence. In particular, as we have said, the indication of Theron's claim to be Damarete's guardian is very significant, as it is linked to and provides an immediate premise of the military appointment which started the quarrel between the two Deinomenid brothers.¹⁶

What our scholium provides in contrast to a *vulgata* represented by the other scholia (and Diodorus, cf. § 1.1) opens up a coherent scenario. It is the scenario of an agreement between Polyzelos and the compact Theron-Thrasydaios Emmenid front, close to Gelon's death.¹⁷ In essence, of the two Emmenids, the father (Theron) arranges a double marriage pact with Polyzelos,¹⁸ which in the case of the marriage pledge of Damarete also means for Polyzelos the *de facto*

nella problematica della successione della tirannide siracusana. (...) In realtà, ὁ Θήρων θυγατέρα ἑαυτοῦ ἐξέδωκε πρὸς γάμον Πολυζήλω è più che una semplice (o generica) frase introduttiva: è in diretta e organica relazione con quanto esposto di seguito nello scolio; costituisce cioè la premessa della dinamica che include lo scontro imminente ma sventato tra Ierone e Agrigento". About Emmenid propaganda see *i.a.* Adornato 2008 and Anello 2013.

¹⁵ Dimauro 2021, 163-168.

¹⁶ That the indication cannot be dismissed with "dans *Schol. in Pind. Carm., Olymp., 2.29 c*, il y a confusion" (Van Compernelle 1960, 366, n. 9 and 386, n. 1) is, in my opinion, validated by the connection, which I consider logical and thematic, with what the scholium introduces next, namely the news —this too, as we have seen, ignored by the other testimonies— of the agreement made between Polyzelos and Thrasydaios on the latter's initiative.

¹⁷ Dimauro 2021, 159-169.

¹⁸ The marriage pact sealed by Theron's marriage to a daughter of Polyzelos is in all probability also part of this agreement, which leads us to consider this too an element of the anti-Hieronian strategy set up by the two Emmenids in agreement with Hieron's younger brother. The chronological placement of this marriage pact after the death of Gelon, and not in synchrony with the marriage of Gelon and Damarete, has been supported with sound arguments: *pace* Van Compernelle 1960, 367-368; 392, and 1992, 72, the only evidence concerning the marriage between Theron and Polyzelos' daughter (Tim. *FGH* 566 fr. 93a *ap.* Sch. Pi. O. 2 Inscr.: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Θήρων τὴν Πολυζήλου τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Ἰέρωνος [θυγατέρα] ἔγημε, καθὰ φησι Τίμαιος) does not provide chronological landmarks, and later studies have clearly identified reasons for placing the marriage pact in the time span 478-476 BC (see, in particular, Miller 1970, 51 and Luraghi 1994, 260-261 with n. 141-146; Vanotti 2007, 209 n. 24 and *bibl. ref.*). Regarding Theron's union with Polyzelos' daughter, Green 2006, 108 n. 185 again speaks of "an earlier marriage"; however, he acknowledges that through this marriage Polyzelos carried out the operation of "setting up a close alliance with the Akragantine dynasty of the Emmenids".

appointment as guardian of Gelon's heir; and the son (Thrasydaios) offers him military support for direct action against Hieron.

One has the distinct feeling that upstream of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c there may be a line of tradition with knowledge of a network of understandings which had been planned from when a dispute arose over Gelon's succession in 478 BC. An opposing line of traditions, on the other hand, set out to provide an alternative picture of events: it normalised the question of the marriage bond between Damarete and Polyzelos, making it part of Gelon's alleged *ante mortem* arrangements, and passed over in silence the connection of Thrasydaios with Polyzelos. Judging by the small volume of evidence at our disposal, this is a *vulgata* of Syracusan origin which is fully reflected in Diodorus. The Diodorean narrative is the only one to focus specifically on Thrasydaios, but only with the intention of confining him within the narrow limits of the tyrannical cliché. Here we can understand the weight of pro-Syracusan political propaganda that flowed into Diodorus. This propaganda aimed to emphasize Syracuse's political and military capacity, as shown in the narrative of the decisive battle between Thrasydaios and Hieron (11.53.3-5, see §1.1 and 5).

3. Thrasydaios: an appointed victim

The one who, so to speak, paid the costs of the systematic action of what I have called the Syracusan *vulgata* was undoubtedly Thrasydaios, the last of the Emmenids. Unlike the political situation in which the Pindaric scholium in O. 2.29c inserts Thrasydaios —and in contrast to the signals which the Diodorean narrative itself filters through regarding the substantial political-military planning which can be attributed to the Akragantine dynast—, the image portrayed by Diodorus, which reflects the trend of this *vulgata*, corresponds only to the stereotype of the tyrant's irrational degeneration. The Diodorean narrative (11.48.6-7 and 53.1-5; see above, § 1.1) does in fact fulfil the task of blurring (and submerging) the figure of Thrasydaios in the nebulousness of this stereotype. The first means used is a comparison: the exaltation of Theron appears directly proportional to the denigration of Thrasydaios. Diodorus, as is well known, for the battle of Himera in 480 BC follows the pro-Syracusan tradition which, by making Gelon the only true victor, presents Theron as a rather unresolute and timorous ally (11.20.5; 21.3).¹⁹ In 10.28.3, however, he gives a positive assessment of the Akragantine tyrant, and thus probably lays the groundwork for the later confrontation between Theron and Thrasydaios:

Θήρων ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος γένει καὶ πλοῦτῳ καὶ τῇ πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος φιλανθρωπία πολὺ προεῖχεν οὐ μόνον τῶν πολιτῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ πάντων τῶν Σικελιωτῶν.

Theron of Akragas, in terms of his birth and wealth, as well as the humanity he showed towards the common people, far surpassed, not only his fellow citizens, but also the other Sicilian Greeks.

This is how Theron is introduced to us in Diodorus' narrative.²⁰ Quite different is the way Thrasydaios appears in 11.48.6-7. Thrasydaios reveals to be responsible, for his exercising βαρύτερον τοῦ καθήκοντος of the ἐπιστατεία in Himera, for the total alienation of the Himerans from him. This indicates a situation of anti-Theronian conspiracy, Thrasydaios being a ἐπιστάτης appointed by Theron, but it is in any case as a result of Thrasydaios' misrule that the Himerans turn to Hieron, offering him the city and support against Theron. Thrasydaios enters the scene, in short, as ἐπιστάτης unable to maintain control over of the city which his father has entrusted to him. The comparison between father and son, as we have seen, becomes more explicit in 11.53.2-3 (ὁ μὲν οὖν Θήρων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐπιεικῶς διωικηκῶς ... καὶ τελευτήσας ἡρωικῶν ἔτυχε τιμῶν ... ὁ δὲ υἱὸς αὐτοῦ καὶ ζῶντος ἔτι τοῦ πατρὸς βίαιος ἦν καὶ φονικὸς καὶ τελευτήσαντος ἤρχε τῆς πατρίδος παρανόμως καὶ τυραννικῶς ... ὅθεν ταχέως τῆς ἰδίας παρανομίας οικεῖαν ἔσχε τὴν τοῦ βίου καταστροφὴν).

¹⁹ See Van Compernelle 1992, 72-73; Luraghi 1994, 258-260.

²⁰ Cf. Van Compernelle 1992, 71.

As in the case of Thrasyboulos, the last Deinomenid tyrant,²¹ Thrasydaios is a paradigm of tyrannical degeneration compared to his immediate predecessor.²² Diodorus, nevertheless, inserts a detail which, in my opinion, is revealing, namely the idea of Thrasydaios' behaviour already being antithetical to that of his father, ever since the latter was still alive (καὶ ζῶντος ἐπὶ τοῦ πατρὸς, "even while his father was still living"). This would imply an absence of coordination between Theron's political planning and that of his son, and a situation of disagreement between the two. But the strategy set up by Theron after Gelon's death and the involvement of Thrasydaios, who in fact supports his father by entering into an agreement with Polyzelos, decisively disproves of such a situation.²³ Diodorus himself furnishes a clear hint in this sense in 11.48.7, when he strictly points out that the Himerans deciding to free themselves from the autocratic government of Thrasydaios, disregarded the idea of turning to Theron "in the belief that they would not get an impartial hearing" (above, § 1.1). This leaves one to understand that there was a substantial sharing of intentions and not contrast between father and son.

In 11.53.3-5, Diodorus recalls a large-scale military organisation set up by Thrasydaios, after the death of his father, aimed at an imminent war against Syracuse. This organisation involves the recruitment of μισθοφόροι and the additional enlistment (προσκαταλέξας) of citizens from both the *poleis* under his control, Akragas and Himera. But Hieron puts together a big army and marches against Akragas. A fierce pitched battle ensues in which two thousand men under Hieron's command lose their lives; but those killed under Thrasydaios' command are twice as many. After this (μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα), Thrasydaios, humiliated (ταπεινωθείς), is deposed from power. He escapes to Megara Nisea, and it is there that he is condemned to death. The Akragantines send ambassadors to Hieron and make peace. All this produces the objective impression of an evolution of events that seems to have taken longer than the scant year of rule which Diodorus seems to attribute to Thrasydaios. Anyway, a circumstance escapes the overall devaluation in which the character is embedded by Diodorus' reference tradition. Thrasydaios turns out to have been a tyrant capable of conceiving a vast and ambitious project aimed at defeating Syracuse once and for all. A project that required a far-reaching organisational effort, carried through to the end, and failed only because of the superiority of the Syracusan war machine at the time of the decisive clash. The mysterious end of the tyrant, put to death in Greece in circumstances that Diodorus does not specify, must lead us to ask a further question about the reasons why Thrasydaios goes to Megara. The most logical hypothesis is that he went where he thought he would find support. Apart from the negative outcome of his transfer to Greece, the story sheds light on the network of "foreign" connections that the tyrant had managed to secure during his period in power.

We can say that, even if there is the possibility that the vicissitudes of Thrasydaios in power after Theron's death was actually over in little less than a year, during which repeated conspiracies took place against him (D.S. 11.53.3), it seems plausible to assume that the events recalled by Diodorus in 11.53 took place, starting in 472 BC, over several years. On closer inspection, the only *terminus ante quem* available to us is the year of Hieron's death, 467/6 BC (D.S. 11.66.4): not surprisingly, two attempts have been made²⁴ to assign to a year between 472 and 467 BC the final moment of the Emmenid tyranny. We will discuss this shortly. For now, let us simply say that Diodorus' well-known tendency to compress events lasting various years into the same Attic year—a tendency repeatedly emphasised in studies, but not taken into particular consideration in this case—,²⁵ in 11.53 was probably fostered, and perhaps already fixed in form and detail, by a specific orientation of the tradition from which Diodorus drew. The pro-Syracusan *vulgata* was marked by

²¹ D.S. 11.67.5-7.

²² A topos which Diodorus probably took from Timaeus: cf. Asheri 1992, 96; Luraghi 1994, 103; Lachenaud 2017, xxix-xxx.

²³ On this point, see in greater detail Dimauro 2021, 164-171.

²⁴ Barrett 1974 and Bicknell 1986.

²⁵ Explicit instead is Bicknell 1986, 30-31: "(...) it is unlikely, indeed impossible, that all the developments recounted could have taken place within the space of twelve months and there is no reason for supposing that Diodorus Siculus considered that they did".

a tendency to *deminutio* of Thrasydaios, to devaluate and minimise the importance of all his initiatives. The result was an image inversely proportional to the strong presence Thrasydaios actually had during the period of his tyrannical power. Thrasydaios must have been a greater and more pressing problem for Hieron than is apparent from Diodorus' succinct and hasty exposition in 11.53.1-5. In essence, of this uncomfortable last Emmenid scion, a representation was given which made him a tyrant who was already finished –as was right, badly– practically soon after he had just begun to act.

The hypothesis of lowering the chronology of the end of the Emmenids proposed in 1986 by P. J. Bicknell seems to be consistent with the orientation of a tradition which compresses time and simplifies the complexity of events. The news, provided by Callimachus (fr. 64 Pfeiffer) and the Suda lexicon (Σ 441 Adler), concerning the dismantling of the tomb of Simonides in Akragas for use in the city's defence system by a military commander named Φοῖνιξ,²⁶ according to Bicknell, refers to the war between Thrasydaios and Hieron. This war must consequently be dated after the death of Simonides. Simonides died in 468 BC (*Marmor Parium*, FGH 239 A 57); Hieron, according to Diodorus (11.66.4), in the archontal year 467/6 BC. Hieron's expedition against Akragas may have begun in the spring of 467 BC, while the flight of Thrasydaios seems to have taken place during the summer, and Hieron, who had been ill for some time, appears to have died shortly after the victory.²⁷

Bicknell's proposed interpretation has not met with unanimous approval,²⁸ but the objections that have been raised do not seem decisive. The fact, pointed out by N. Luraghi, that “dal testo dello storico di Agrigiro non risulta che Akragas venisse cinta d'assedio da Hieron”²⁹ can be again explained, in my opinion, by the nature of a brief (and tendentious) compendium that has the Diodorean narrative on Thrasydaios. Although he does not mention a siege, Diodorus nevertheless says that Hieron is marching to attack Akragas (11.53.4). The possibility of a manoeuvre to approach the city after the battle on the field,³⁰ which may have culminated in the breach in the defensive system of Akragas to which the Suda lemma alludes, does not seem to be excluded. Diodorus, however, in summarising and wanting to present it as a great Syracusan victory in a clash of Greeks against Greeks, which cost the lives of so many among them, concentrates solely on the decisive μάχη ἰσχυρά and its consequences for Thrasydaios. There is, however, room to admit an incursion of Hieron's forces at Akragas, close to and in order to seal the great, but suffered, victory on the field. And in the final stages of a resistance, the ineffectiveness of which was easy to foresee, the powerful lord of Akragas may have taken, *in extremis*, the resolution (of a paradigmatic and propagandistic sort: see below, § 4) to dismantle the tomb of Simonides, entrusting its execution to a Punic mercenary, before embarking on an escape that he had presumably already planned.

Diodorus' summary glosses over this appendix to the great battle and moves on to the circumstances of the fall and the just end of the Akragantine tyrant. In Diodorus' synthesis (which limits the space of Thrasydaios' presence to the sequence of the great battle–defeat–flight) even a fact such as the destruction of Simonides' sepulchre, despite its being generally well known, could have been excluded.³¹

²⁶ Probably the Phoenician name of an officer of the mercenary forces in which many of the prisoners of war were placed after the battle of 480 BC (Bicknell 1986, 35 n. 14).

²⁷ Bicknell 1986, 32-35. De Waele 1971, 47-49, again on the basis of the Suda lemma and the Callimachean fragment, identified the war event to which the dismantling of Simonides' tomb was linked with the Carthaginian siege of 406 BC (D.S. 13.86.1). De Waele's perspective is taken up by Livrea 2006, 54-55; cf. the problems of this interpretation pointed out by Magnani 2007, 20-22, on the basis of Lehnus 2004, 31-32.

²⁸ Cf. Vanotti 2007, 215 n. 58.

²⁹ Luraghi 1994, 262 n. 150.

³⁰ As noted by Bicknell 1986, 30, “the distinct impression that flows from the Diodorean narrative is of a *blitzkrieg* Syracusan operation which culminated in close proximity to the loser”.

³¹ Similarly, the objection to Bicknell's reconstruction, which considers the time lapse between the erection of the tomb and its destruction to be too short (the tomb of Simonides “in ogni caso non sarebbe esistita

The *vulgata* from which to a large extent, as we are arguing, the content of Sch. O. 2.29c differs, draws a veil, therefore, over the ability to act which Thrasydaios demonstrated for some five to six years after Theron's death. It "submerges" him, compressing even the chronology. Hence the Diodorean picture, in which, as we have seen, the beginning of Thrasydaios' activity coincides, practically, with his end. This excessively reduces, strictly speaking, even the time available to him to cruelly provoke his fellow citizens, as this *vulgata* claims Thrasydaios did. In actual fact, one can see signs of the consensus which the last Emmenid enjoyed up to the moment of his defeat against Hieron, as well as of activism and achievements against barbarians (the Akragantine enterprise at Motya mentioned by Paus. 5.25.5).³² But what the *vulgata* reflected in the prevailing tradition avoids, is, precisely, any recognition of the validity of his action, including any anti-Barbarian merits.

Diodorus, in any case, records that in the decisive battle against Thrasydaios, Hieron's Syracusans also suffered heavy losses (11.53.4). For Hieron, beating Thrasydaios was not easy, and it cost him dearly. The matter must have been outstanding for a long time. There are in fact good reasons to believe that Thrasydaios acted early to overturn the situation that had been determined by the conclusion of the crisis of 476 BC. And while it is possible to formulate the hypothesis that the situation of belligerence between the Emmenid Thrasydaios and Hieron became clear as from 472 BC, and yet did not end in that same year, it is also possible to think that the premises for the inevitable clash had already been outlined earlier, starting from the agreement that sealed the crisis of 476 BC, when Thrasydaios was still only ἐπιστάτης of Himera; in actual fact, it had been Theron's acceptance of a *de facto* subordination, imposed by the insurmountable internal difficulties of the time. A further clue to this hypothesis is provided by the third element of differentiation that distinguishes Sch. O. 2.29c.

4. Ambiguous and hypocritical Simonides?

The third particularity of Sch. O. 2.29c concerns Simonides, and confirms the picture we are proposing. In fact, we can see a clear gap between the way the poet is represented in this scholium and in Sch. O. 2.29d. In the latter, Theron's decision is recalled to take action against Hieron, as he was "angry about his daughter and his son-in-law at the same time" (ὑπεραγανακτήσαντα θυγατρὸς ἄμα καὶ γαμβροῦ); speaking of a πόλεμος near the Gela river,³³ the circumstances of the solution to the conflict are evoked:

μή γε μὴν εἰς βλάβην, μηδὲ εἰς τέλος προχωρήσαι τὸν πόλεμον· φασὶ γὰρ τότε Σιμωνίδην τὸν λυρικὸν περιτυχόντα διαλύσαι τοῖς βασιλεῦσι τὴν ἔχθραν.

In this way, an exclusive mediator and peacemaker role exercised by Simonides is emphasised with regards to an armed conflict about to take place in the field, with *deus ex machina* overtones which have been appropriately pointed out in studies.³⁴ Quite different, in Sch. O. 2.29c, is the

che per brevissimo tempo, troppo poco per originare un aition", Livrea 2006, 54 n. 4), does not, in my opinion, seem to carry any weight. Thrasydaios' decision may have been taken on the emotional wave of an extreme emergency, to mark a strong stance towards those aristocratic circles which had previously had the idea of erecting a sepulchre for the poet. These aristocratic circles were, in all likelihood, at the time more directly linked to Xenokrates, the illustrious brother of Theron, who in 476 BC had commissioned Simonides an epinicion for his victory at the Isthmian Games. These circles, on whose consent Thrasydaios had counted, were now preparing to negotiate with Hieron. Difficult, indeed, to think that the resolution whereby οἱ δ' Ἀκραγανῖνοι κομισάμενοι τὴν δημοκρατίαν, διαπρεσβευσάμενοι πρὸς Ἰέρωνα τῆς εἰρήνης ἔτυχον (D.S. 11.53.5) arose suddenly, only after, and only because, Thrasydaios was executed at Megara.

³² Hints of Thrasydaios' intense activity can be detected in Diodorus' unfavorable representation of Trasydaos (Dimauro 2021, 158-171). Even though a more favorable portrait of Thrasydaios is not explicitly painted in Sch. O. 2.29c, some details of the narrative seem to derive from Akragas' propaganda: indeed, the agreement between Thrasydaios and Polyzelos as well as the lack of disagreement between Thrasydaios and his father Theron are significant and cannot be referred to Syracuse's *vulgata*. On the origins of the dedication by the Ἀκραγανῖνοι of the Olympic monument in honour of Thrasydaios' victory at Motya, see Dimauro 2021, 172.

³³ A river mentioned by Callimachus (fr. 361 Pfeiffer).

³⁴ Piccirilli 1971, 77; Bonanno 2010, 52-53.

context which introduces the intervention of Simonides, and the intentions that appear to underlie the intervention itself. Here the implication of Simonides clearly has to do with the internal problems which Theron had to face in 476 BC, in particular, in Himera (D.S. 11.48.6-8), and which were caused to by persons belonging to his political and family entourage.³⁵ The situation which the textual lacuna after μελλόντων δὲ τῶν φίλων suggests is that of a difficult position in which Theron found himself: it is precisely at this point that Simonides intervenes. The message of the poet, whom we know to be as close to Hieron as were those who plotted against Theron (ἐπεὶ οἱ προδιδόντες αὐτὸν Ἰέρωνι φίλοι ἦσαν, Sch. Pi. O. 2.173f),³⁶ seem to be ambiguous and hypocritical.³⁷ More than informing Theron of the plot under way and of the identity of the conspirators, the poet's aim is, in fact, to ἐκπαράξαι the Akragantine tyrant ("his main intention was to disturb him, to upset him"): evidently, in the first place, by putting him in the corner, faced with the harsh reality and the internal threat represented by a betrayal by relatives and φίλοι who have taken sides with Hieron. It is in fact εὐλαβηθεῖς, in a psychological state of vigilant circumspection, that Theron decides to put back into Hieron's hands the management of "things" (ἐξεχώρησε τῶν πραγμάτων τῷ Ἰέρωνι), i.e. "of his things", that is, of what had been, until then, under his control.³⁸ His tyrannical power is restored to him by Hieron afterwards, thanks to the cessation of hostilities sanctioned by Hieron's marriage to one of Theron's nieces, the daughter of his brother Xenokrates.³⁹ The restitution of control over Himera and Akragas, however, had to be compensated by a condition of effective subordination, as has been properly pointed out and argued.⁴⁰

The scholium is, in short, the only explicit evidence of Simonides' behaving in bad faith towards Theron, at a time when we know that Theron's difficulties were the same as those of the ἐπιστάτης whom he had appointed at Himera, his son Thrasydaios. The "reconciliation" of 476 BC between Theron and Hieron is presented with all the characteristics of a necessity imposed by circumstances, and these circumstances are directly related to the action performed by Simonides. There is every reason to suppose that Simonides' bad faith might have motivated, even after some time, a reaction in Theron's successor, such as that implied by Bicknell's proposed chronology.

Everything points to the postulation of a substantial continuity between the outcome of the 476 BC crisis, the death of Theron and the subsequent action of Thrasydaios. The large-scale military build-up mentioned by Diodorus in 11.53.3 suggests a more or less latent state of belligerence that was prolonged over time. The genetic moment for everything which Thrasydaios starts to implement after succeeding Theron in 472 BC is in any case that of the conditions imposed by Hieron at the end of the crisis in 476 BC.

Starting from the indications of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, it can be deduced that Thrasydaios, like his father,⁴¹ must have been disappointed by the failure of the operation set in motion after 478 BC

³⁵ For the connection between Diodorus' account of the Himeran situation in 476 BC (11.48.6-8) and the indications of the Pindaric scholia, especially regarding the conspiracy of Kapys and Hippokrates, cousins of Theron (Sch. Pi. O. 2.173fg; Sch. *recens* Pi. O. 2.173, p. 173 Abel), the analyses of Caserta 1995, 43 and Bonanno 2010, 113-115, with bibliographical references, in my opinion go in the right direction; cf. Daude *et alii* 2020, 21; 166-168. In contrast, Luraghi 1994, 251-252.

³⁶ "Un ruolo fosco nella sedizione imerese svolse Hieron di Siracusa" (Catenacci 2013, 46).

³⁷ Cf. Daude *et alii* 2020, 20: "(...) un conflit entre Hiéron et Théron dans lequel, nous dit la scholie 29c, intervint le poète Simonides, soit pour l'apaiser, soit au contraire pour l'envenimer (il serait intéressant de savoir le lieu d'origine et le moment de naissance de chacune de ces deux versions)"; cf. 169.

³⁸ Another way of interpreting the Greek is that the poet, out of concern for Theron, sought to bring him to his senses by making him aware of the great danger he was facing from traitors at home: however, if that were the case, the expressions ἐκπαράξαι μάλλον βουλόμενος and εὐλαβηθεῖς would not make sense.

³⁹ The marriage bond of Hieron with a relative (ἀνεψιά) of Theron is also mentioned in Sch. Pi. P. 1.112. Cf., *i.a.*, Luraghi 1994, 261, 267, 330; Bonanno 2010, 115-116; Bruno Sunseri 2010, 133; Galvagno – Seminara 2014, 296-297.

⁴⁰ Luraghi 1994, 330; Bonanno 2010, 115.

⁴¹ In Pi. O. 2, on Theron's victory at the Olympics in 476 BC, one can perhaps hear an echo of the disappointment Theron felt, despite the advantages that the agreement imposed by Hieron preserved for him (15-22). In the reflection on the "deeds" (τῶν δὲ πεπραγμένων) of central importance is the idea of

with the involvement of Polyzelos. Thrasydaïos, moreover, must have been particularly frustrated by the agreement imposed by Hieron in 476 BC, because of his direct and personal relationship with Polyzelos, who, not by chance, effectively disappeared from the scene in 476 BC. In all likelihood, Thrasydaïos planned from the outset (and presumably pursued for more than only one year) the overthrow of the state of fundamental subordination to Hieron established at the conclusion of the Himeran crisis. The continuity and consistency of Thrasydaïos' action had an epilogue (before the fatal transfer to Megara) precisely in the reactive and demonstrative gesture of the dismantling of the tomb of Simonides. Thrasydaïos had clearly never forgotten (and never forgiven) the fact that Simonides, in 476 BC, had played an intermediary role that masked, in fact, that of a hired intimidator.⁴² Among the last provisions before fleeing, Thrasydaïos, in a sort of last stand as Hieron approached Akragas, ordered the cancellation of a symbol of the never accepted "agreement" of 476 BC, through the "disavowal" of Simonides. This, on the eve of a change of regime⁴³ and a new agreement with Hieron, which are a direct consequence of the defeat on the field.⁴⁴

5. Conclusions

As has been seen, the Pindaric scholium *O.* 2.29c offers a concatenation of consistent clues that point to an alternative line of traditions, compared to the one prevalent in the documentation available to us. I believe that an explanation in terms of pure coincidences, errors, arbitrary creations, confusions and misunderstandings on the part of the drafter of the scholium should be ruled out, since, as I have tried to show, it is possible to identify a significant interrelationship between: 1) Theron's initiative interfering in the succession problem of Syracuse by giving his daughter Damarete, Gelon's widow, in marriage to Polyzelos, as suggested by Sch. *Pi. O.* 2.29c, in clear contrast to the line of tradition (Sch. *Pi. O.* 2.29b and d) which insists on the exclusive will of Gelon in assigning his wife, together with the related rights, to his brother Polyzelos; 2) the

something which, in any case and in the Emmenid perspective, must have been *παρὰ δίκαν*, and for which one hopes an oblivion (*λάθη*) favoured by *πτόμος εὐδαίμων* and *ἄλβος ὑμηλός*. The latter connection may refer to the preservation of control over Akragas and Himera, which the agreement imposed by Hieron guaranteed to Theron. The Pindaric verses seem to me to have a consolatory intent towards the Akragantine tyrant, and it seems logical to assume that Theron's feeling was shared by his son. On these Pindaric verses see Catenacci 2013, 392; Daude *et alii* 2020, 168-169.

⁴² On the economic reasons for Simonides' close ties with the circle of Hieron, see Bonanno 2010, 187-188; 192-193 with bibl. ref. (cf. 233-238). On the general theme of Simonides' *φιλοκέρδεια* see Bell 1978, 34-43.

⁴³ οἱ δ' Ἀκραγαντῖνοι κομισάμενοι τὴν δημοκρατίαν (D.S. 11.53.5). It was in fact, as is generally acknowledged, a republican-type regime run by the old aristocratic class (Musti 1984-1985, 345-347; Asheri 1992, 101-2; 106; 109-110).

⁴⁴ Starting from the idea of a consistent engagement of Thrasydaïos in the preparation of the clash with Hieron until the conclusion of 467 BC, the partial validity can be recovered of the theory of Barrett (1973), who proposed 470 BC as the year the tyranny of the Emmenids ended, on the basis of *Pi. P.* 1.50-52. These verses speak of a war engagement of Hieron who, like Philoktetes (allusion to Hieron's precarious state of health during a number of war campaigns: cf. Bicknell 1986, 32 n. 8; Cingano 1995, 345, 347), recently forced a "haughty man" (*μεγαλάνωρ*) to flatter him as a friend. According to Barrett, Pindar may be referring to the defeat of Thrasydaïos, which should therefore be dated shortly before Hieron's victory in the quadriga at Delphi (Barrett 1973, 29: hypothesis echoed by Maddoli 1979, 99 n. 114, and Cingano 1995, 346). Bicknell objects that Thrasydaïos, at the time of the defeat, did not seek an agreement, offering his *philia*, and considers it "most unlikely" that Pindar would have labelled Theron's reckless and feckless successor a "mighty lord" (Bicknell 1986, 31). In fact, Pindar may be referring not to the *μάχη ἰσχυρά* of D.S. 11.53.4 and the actual end of Thrasydaïos' power, but to a moment, not otherwise known, of the continuous state of more or less open belligerence with Hieron which marked the period of Thrasydaïos' rule. The definition *μεγαλάνωρ* fits well with Thrasydaïos when, at around 470 BC, the matter was not yet irrevocably resolved, and Thrasydaïos' activity could still be perceived as the significant and enduring threat of an overweening dynast. Probably the Pindaric reference is to one of the possible repeated minor confrontations that preceded the decisive battle of 467 BC, a minor confrontation at the end of which Thrasydaïos was forced to accept the persistency of the *status quo* of 476 BC. This obligation, this "flattering of Hieron as a friend", was what from which Thrasydaïos constantly set out to free itself, until the crucial event of 467 BC.

three-way agreement between Theron, Polyzelos and Thrasydaios, in which the latter has a proactive role; 3) the representation of Simonides' intervention in Akragas in 476 BC not as that of a *deus ex machina*, but rather an ambiguous supporter of Hieron.

We are faced with the echo of an alternative version to a *vulgata* rooted in Syracusan-Hieronian propaganda. I also think that it is a rather uncertain operation to try to identify a specific source among those known to us. The impression is that of an original core of Hieronian propaganda that passed through the filter of a subsequent ideologically anti-tyranny re-elaboration,⁴⁵ which, incidentally, should lead us to exclude Philistus himself as a direct source of Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c. This explains the, so to speak, osmotic presence, of motifs that cannot be classified as pro-Hieronian in this as in the other scholia: in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c, in particular, the fundamentally Akragantine view, which includes the Theronian interference in the Syracusan succession, the supporting initiative of Thrasydaios and the "repudiation" of Simonides; in Sch. Pi. O. 2.29b and 29d (Timaeus, *FGH* 566 fr. 93b), the reading of the story of Polyzelos through the key of Hieron's φθόνος.

What is certain, is that Sch. Pi. O. 2.29c recovers an Akragantine point of view and, above all, it does not undertake to eliminate the presence and the role of Thrasydaios; an operation instead systematically pursued by an original Syracusan line of traditions. Diodorus, in fact, takes a series of compressed events which is that of a *vulgata*, in general, of Syracusan origin, aimed at eluding the reality of true activism constantly pursued by Thrasydaios in the space of several years. The dynamics underlying Thrasydaios' initiatives are summarised in a cause and effect relationship between tyrannical, megalomaniac and aggressive behaviour and an end presented as just punishment: everything is included in the expression "his life very soon came to a disastrous end well suited to his lawless nature" (11.53.3).

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⁴⁵ A mechanism identified in Timaeus' approach to Philistus: cf. Bearzot 2002, 93; 114; 121-122; 124; with bibl. ref. 132; 135.

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