Poetic Metaphor and the Questioning of Analytic Truth

Peter Crisp
The Chinese University of Hong Kong

ABSTRACT

Although Lakoff & Turner and Samuel Levin both see poetic metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon, their understandings of this conceptuality are very different. Levin's approach can however be accorded an important, supplementary, role in the Lakoff & Turner theory. Levin sees poetic metaphor as creating strange, underspecified, poetic worlds. Although Lakoff & Turner show that poetic metaphor is to a large degree an extension of 'ordinary', unpoetic, metaphor, Levin accounts for an important dimension of it that they miss. His theory can be incorporated into the Lakoff & Turner framework by allowing their asymmetrical mapping relation from source to target domain to become in some instances symmetrical, thereby erasing conceptual boundaries and so creating strange, new, conceptual categories. The basis of this incorporation is the severe curtailment of the scope of analytic truth that is common to both Levin and Lakoff & Turner. Finally, there are very important limitations to the application of Levin's theory to abstract personification.

INTRODUCTION

The approaches to poetic metaphor of George Lakoff and Mark Turner, in More than Cool Reason (1989), and Samuel Levin, in Metaphoric Worlds (1988), might seem to share a lot, for they both emphasise poetic metaphor's conceptual nature. In reality however there is a great deal that separates them. They display two specific, major differences of analysis. The first of these is that for Lakoff and Turner all metaphor, whether poetic or non-poetic, is
conceptual, is never a matter of mere language. Levin (1977:33-77, 127-139; 1988:1-12) by contrast views non-poetic metaphor as precisely a matter of mere language. His account of it is a pure instance of what Black (1981:68-70) terms the substitution theory of metaphor. Thus, for Levin, poetic metaphor, which he thinks is conceptual, is sharply marked off from non-poetic metaphor, which he thinks is not. For Lakoff and Turner, by contrast, both poetic and non-poetic metaphor share a common conceptuality. The second difference separating these analyses is in the kinds of conceptuality that they each attribute to poetic metaphor.

As to the conceptual or non-conceptual nature of non-poetic metaphor, the balance of the evidence, due to the work of Lakoff and his colleagues, supports Lakoff and Turner rather than Levin. The issue between Lakoff and Turner and Levin is thus reduced to the question of what kind of conceptuality to attribute to poetic metaphor. Lakoff and Johnson (1980), as is well known, see non-poetic metaphor as constituted by a vast web of automatized, conceptual metaphors. These give rise to expressions containing terms, such as «down» in «I'm feeling down», with conventionalised metaphorical senses or to new metaphorical expressions which are interpretable in a virtually automatic fashion. The automatic nature of such interpretability is strong evidence for the existence of underlying metaphorical concepts, as Lakoff (1990:50) observes. While seeing poetry as containing both conventionalised and 'new', automatically interpretable metaphors, Lakoff and Turner also see that it contains something else, namely, new metaphors which are not automatically and effortlessly interpretable, that is, de-automatised metaphors which the interpreter is keenly aware of as metaphor. For Lakoff and Turner this de-automatisation has two sources. One is language, which may, due to foregrounding or other factors, make the metaphor difficult to interpret. The other, which they mainly emphasise, is conceptual: a poet may elaborate, extend, criticize or compose established metaphorical concepts, and at times even create new ones (Lakoff & Turner, 1989:67-72). De-automatised poetic metaphor thus for Lakoff and Turner shares a common, though extended, conceptuality with non-poetic metaphor. For Levin things are very different. Even if he accepted the Lakoff and Turner view of non-poetic metaphor, they would still be very different. For, since his theory of poetic, metaphorical concepts is quite different from Lakoff and Turner's, he would still see poetic metaphor as being fundamentally different from non-poetic metaphor in that the kind of its conceptuality would be different.

Lakoff and Turner see metaphorical concepts as constituted by a conceptual mapping from source to target domain. Levin, we shall see, effectively proposes that such concepts merge conceptual domains. Levin's analysis only has interest if it has some, at least initial, plausibility. I shall argue that it has some strong, initial plausibility. I shall not, however, argue that it is plausible as an account of all poetic metaphor. Lakoff and Turner (1989) give strong
linguistic evidence for their contention that much poetic metaphor is an extension of everyday conceptual metaphor. Yet Levin still seems to catch vital aspects of some poetic metaphor. I shall explore the possibility that his approach might serve as a supplement to Lakoff and Turner’s. This is not, I think, utterly farfetched. Levin’s analysis, we shall see, involves at least a severe curtailment of the scope of analytic truth. The Lakoff and Turner approach, through its commitment to prototype semantics (Lakoff 1987), is likewise committed to at least a severe curtailment of the scope of analytic truth. There may be a significant meeting point here for these very different theories of conceptual metaphor.

I. STRANGE WORLDS AND SELECTION RESTRICTIONS

Levin (1993:122) takes a poem of Emily Dickinson’s to illustrate his approach to poetic metaphor. In this poem a mountain is described as sitting upon a plain in his eternal chair, as observing and questioning, as being prayed to by the seasons, and as being the grandfather of the days and the ancestor of the dawn. Levin points out that to regard all of this as a roundabout way of saying that the mountain rises above the plain, is unchanging, very old and so on is obviously inadequate. The poem’s impact is such that we experience the mountain as if it actually were in some strange way a living, conscious being. In fact, though Levin does not make this point, the mountain comes very close to being God, for it is effectively sitting upon a throne, knows and judges everything, is being prayed to, is referred to by a phrase, «Grandfather of days,» that echoes the «Ancient of Days» of Daniel 7:9 & 13, and, due to dawn’s functioning as a metonymy for all beginnings, is the origin of time. All of this contributes to the mysterious sense of the mountain being powerful, conscious and alive. Levin plausibly claims that the only phenomenologically adequate account of the experience that this poem gives rise to is one that sees it as a conceiving of the mountain as actually being conscious, alive and so on. Nothing else can do justice to our apprehension of the mountain. This is not to say that we picture the mountain as an old man with a beard sitting upon a chair or throne. That would be a concretely specific imaging like that of a Disney cartoon rather than the vivid but mysteriously unspecified apprehension that the poem creates. This apprehension is, for Levin, what poetic metaphor is all about.

Levin proposes that with poetic metaphor a poem’s language is taken quite literally. When a poem says that «The mountain sat upon the plain/In His eternal chair», the reader takes it to mean exactly what it literally says. He or she then attempts to conceive of the mountain under the given descriptions, even while it retains all of its usual, most obvious forms of appearance. This can never of course be fully done, and so the resulting apprehension
never achieves full specification (Levin 1988:61-81). Sentences such as «The mountain sat upon the plain», taken literally, involve selection restriction violations. Levin’s whole proposal turns upon the contention that such violations, though they go against our everyday conceptions of what the world is like, do not give rise to sentences that are meaningless or necessarily false. We can therefore use such sentences as a basis for partially conceiving of possibilities, however strange and farfetched these may be. Poetic metaphor leads us precisely to project or entertain such strange possibilities.

Levin’s approach fits in well with contemporary linguistic approaches to selection restrictions. Andrew Radford (1988:10-11), for instance, is quite typical in seeing these as involving pragmatic rather than semantic or linguistic constraints. Levin (1988:27-60) in fact argues explicitly that «semantically anomalous sentences» are not analytic contradictions. He does this however in such a way as to separate, or to attempt to separate, the general issue of analytic necessity from that of selection restrictions and semantic anomaly in particular. He takes three sentences, «This gold is green», «This algebraic number is green», and «This blue raven is green», and argues that, while the first and third are analytic contradictions, the second is not (Levin 1988:33-34). In the third, he says, «the contradiction appears on its face», while «in the first it derives from the definition of gold as yellow». The second, «This algebraic number is green», he says, is not an analytic contradiction because ‘there is nothing in the definition of «(algebraic) number» that explicitly excludes greenness.’ The assumption made here that only a so-called explicit definition could give rise to analytic contradiction is however highly questionable. Those, such as Ruth Kempson or Hurford and Heasley, who have argued that selection restriction violations do give rise to analytic contradictions, have argued precisely that they do so indirectly or implicitly (Kempson 1977:112-117; Hurford and Heasley 1983:190-193). For them if an algebraic number is green it is visible, and if visible material, and if material concrete, and if concrete not abstract, yet since it is a number it is abstract and this means that the sentence «This algebraic number is green» entails a logical contradiction and so is itself an analytic contradiction. The point I am trying to make here is not that selection restriction violations really do produce analytic contradictions, but rather that Levin’s particular argument that they do not is invalid.

Levin attempts to separate semantically anomalous sentences from the general category of analytic contradictions, a category whose validity he appears to accept without question. Yet those such as Kempson and Hurford and Heasley show that there is no reason to make any distinction in principle between selection restriction violations and analytic contradictions. Selection restriction violations are, from this point view, merely especially implicit forms of analytic contradiction. This means that if, like Radford and Levin, you are willing to accept the possible truth of sentences containing selection
restriction 'violations', then you should recognise that you are thereby calling into question the general notions of analytic truth and necessity, as many philosophers ever since Quine in the nineteen forties have done. Instead of attempting to separate the particular issue of selection restriction from the general issue of analyticity, Levin should rather recognise that to argue for the possible truth of semantically anomalous sentences is to call into question the general notion of analytic truth. This is what I shall treat his theory of poetic metaphor as doing in the rest of this paper. After all, «This gold is green», is not, pace Levin, an analytic contradiction. Yellowness is only a prototypical property of gold. Pure gold is white. Moreover, if a chemist, amazingly enough, turned up an instance of the element with atomic number 79 giving off light with the wavelength of green, he might well say in surprise «This gold is green». For myself, I would be happy enough to say of gold that was merely painted green that it was green gold 2.

2. PUTTING THE THEORIES TO WORK AND TOGETHER

To explore further the plausibility of giving Levin's approach to poetic metaphor a supplementary role within the Lakoff and Turner approach to poetic metaphor, I shall look at personification in Blake's «Ah! Sun-flower». There are two reasons for selecting this poem. First, it is one of the greatest short lyrics in the English language. Second, both Lakoff and Turner (1989:95-96) and Levin (1988:96-97) analyse it, and so their approaches can be compared. Lakoff and Turner see the poem as being based upon a composition of the conventional, conceptual metaphors EVENTS ARE ACTIONS and A LIFETIME IS A DAY. The event of the sunflower's phototropic tracking of the sun is metaphorised as an action of counting, and that of the sun's crossing the sky as an action of walking. Through A LIFETIME IS A DAY, the sunflower's seeking after the West becomes a seeking after death and afterlife. (Surprisingly, Lakoff and Turner do not note that the mobilisation of A LIFETIME IS A DAY here can only be fully accounted for by the concomitant mobilisation, due to the clause «Where the traveller's journey is done,» of A LIFE IS A JOURNEY). The personification created by this composite structure of conceptual mapping gives rise, Lakoff and Turner state, to a further image mapping from the concrete image of a person onto that of the sunflower, face mapping onto flower, body onto stem and so on.

Lakoff and Turner's account of «Ah! Sun-flower» does not claim to be anything other than partial. As far as it goes, however, it seems to account for the poem's most basic metaphorical structures. Yet it contains two striking inadequacies. The first is that its account of image mapping seems too literal. It makes it sound almost as if we actually attributed a face and body and so on to the sunflower, as if it were the inhabitant of some banal Disney cartoon.
The personification of the sunflower is surely more mysterious, less specified, than that. The second inadequacy of the Lakoff and Turner account is that it draws no distinction between the personifications of the sunflower and of the sun, for these are surely different in kind. That of the sun is merely incidental, creating no real sense of it as a person. By contrast, the whole poem is dominated by a sense of the hopelessness of the sunflower's situation, hopelessness being a property of persons. There is no mystery about the linguistic origin of this intense personification of the sunflower, for the entire poem is one long extended vocative, preceded by an interjection, addressed to the sunflower. Vocatives of this length and complexity are very rare in English. The only stylistic variety in which they are regularly found is that of religion, in genres such as the prayer and credo (Crystal & Davy 1969:161-62; Payne 1991:52-53). In that variety, complexity is created in just the way that Blake creates it, by piling up sequences of relative and adverbial clauses, often embedded one within another, after the head noun. It may well be that Blake is evoking a religious context here, leading us to perceive the sunflower with religious seriousness and devotion; «Everything that lives is holy», he famously declared in 'The Marriage of Heaven and Hell'. However that may be, the poem certainly is one long continuous address to the sunflower, addressees being of course at least prototypically persons. The semantics of the vocative structure thus induce us to experience the flower continuously, and so intensely, as an addressed person.

When applied to Blake's sunflower, Levin's account of poetic metaphor becomes very plausible. The Lakoff and Turner idea of a conceptual mapping from source to target domain seems fully adequate to our experience of the sun in «Ah! Sun-Flower». We understand it in terms of a walker walking, but hardly experience it as a walker, a person. Something like this however is precisely what we feel about the sunflower; we feel compassion for it as for a person. Levin's claim that we conceive of it in some not fully specified way as a person seems exactly right. For the reader the strange possibility of the sunflower's personhood will probably be only entertained. For a metaphysically serious poet such as Blake, however, this fantastic possibility may well be taken to be actually true. Further evidence for the validity of Levin's approach to Blake's sunflower is given by the fact that Blake explicitly proclaims a number of times that all things, and hence logically sunflowers too, are alive, are in fact human persons. In 'Europe' (Blake 1966:237) a fairy cries that he will show Blake «all alive/The world, where every particle of dust breathes forth its joy.» Most famously of all, the prophet cries at the end of 'Jerusalem' (Blake 1966:747), «All Human Forms identified, even Tree, Metal, Earth & Stone:all/Human forms identified.» For Blake, to say that all entities, including trees and stones, were human was to say that every portion of the universe participated in the
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spiritual whole of its Divine Humanity. This is, if you like, an obscure, unspecified doctrine. It makes it clear however that for Blake sunflowers really were, however strangely, persons.

Lakoff and Turner account for the most basic metaphorical structures of «Ah! Sun-Flower». How could Levin’s approach be integrated, as a supplement, with theirs and so account for the way in which some forms of poetic metaphor seem to create strange, new, conceptual worlds? Levin’s brief observations upon «Ah! Sun-Flower» point the way. The sunflower’s personification, he says, also involves a depersonification of the semantic predicates applied to it (Levin 1988:96-97). The sunflower is a plant, albeit with certain personal properties, and so when personal property denoting predicates are applied to it they are inevitably, to some extent, depersonified. This is an interaction approach to metaphor, and interaction approaches are specifically rejected by Lakoff and Turner (1989:131-33). For them the source domain is always unchanged in mapping, being used to conceptually modify the target domain. What Levin is implicitly arguing is that fundamental sortal boundaries, such as that between persons and plants, can at times be erased and new, strange categories created. Technically, the Lakoff and Turner theory can without great difficulty be extended to allow for this; in some cases the effect of conceptual mapping becomes so strong that domain boundaries are erased; what was an asymmetrical mapping relationship becomes symmetrical and thereby constitutes the basis for defining a new conceptual domain. This technical extension can moreover be related to a theoretically deep property of the Lakoff and Turner theory. This, through its commitment to Lakoff’s notion of the Idealised Cognitive Model, sees natural language semantics as based upon structures or frames of human understanding that are contingent and interest related, rather than necessary, in nature. The notion of analyticity, at least in the standard form that sees it as involving a priori necessary truth or falsehood, is given short shrift by Lakoff (1987:130). Levin’s theory fits in here very well. For it, it is not an a priori necessary truth that sunflowers are not persons. Rather, our everyday, contingent frames of understanding, such as those for plant life and personhood, can be extended in strange, new, often only half understood, ways 3.

3. A MAJOR DIFFICULTY FOR LEVIN

So far I have argued that giving Levin’s approach a supplementary role in the Lakoff and Turner theory is both possible and plausible. There is however a big problem, that of abstract personification. Let us take two such personifications, both created by Charles Causley, that of Time as a saucy trooper and War as a casual mistress (see Appendix). The second of these is a new metaphor created to conceptualise the dangerously attractive aspects
of war. The first, where we immediately recognise Time the trooper's taking of the speaker's lover as a metaphor for her death, is a classic instance of metaphorical compounding, as analysed by Lakoff and Turner. EVENTS ARE ACTIONS is combined with TIME IS A CHANGER and the idea of a hostiley aggressive soldier taking away the woman definitively to create a reading of the event of the woman's death as an act of theft by Time. Both of Causley's abstract personifications are extended over four full lines, though the syntactic bases of the extensions are quite different from that of «Ah! Sunflower». The result is an extreme vividness in which, to this reader at least, the abstract entities Time and War seem to be experienced as if they too really were, strangely, persons. The problem is that it is very difficult to see how we can conceive of abstract entities as being persons, however unspecified such a conceiving might be. That is to say, there do seem to be some selection restrictions around which we find it at least very difficult to think our way at all.

We have returned to the problem of green algebraic numbers. Levin seems to get things precisely the wrong way round when he asserts that «This gold is green» is a priori necessarily false but «This algebraic number is green» is not. Surely, if any proposition is a priori necessarily false then the proposition expressed by the second sentence is? Yet is any proposition a priori necessarily false, or true? The answer to this question is obviously beyond this paper's scope. Suffice it to say that its author, like many, tends to think that logical and mathematical truth, and related truths about the nature of abstract entities, do involve a priori necessity, however obscure the origins of this may be. (Clearly, more than just an appeal to analytic convention must be involved, since, as Quine (1961) showed long ago, such an appeal says no more than that something must be true simply because we say it must be). Yet even if we go all the way with Quine and deny any serious logical content to the notions of necessity and possibility, there is still surely the brute psychological fact that we do not seem to be able to think our way around certain truths. How many people can literally conceive at all of Time being a soldier or War a mistress?

Time can be construed as the set of all times or the abstract concept of a time and War as the set of all wars or the abstract concept of a war. Either way they are both what Lyons (1977:438-52) terms third order entities, that is, entities that are eternal and lack spatial location. Lyons contrasts these with second order entities, such as events, which, while being abstract in that they are supervenient upon spatio-temporally related particulars, such as physical objects or persons, do also themselves have spatio-temporal location. We can state the where and when of an event. That is, second order entities are far more like first order entities, such as plants or persons, than are third order entities, for they share with first order entities the property of spatio-temporal location. In a classic paper arguing that selection restrictions
are purely pragmatic. Lakoff cites anthropological evidence for the idea that even events can be conceived, in some cultures, as persons and hence that the sentence «My birth enjoys tormenting me» if false is still only contingently false (Lakoff 1971:332). A birth is a second order entity and so, as we have seen, in many ways closer in nature to first than to third order entities. It is striking that Lakoff passes over without comment another sentence he cites that involves a third order entity, «My sincerity enjoys tormenting me.» On a metaphorical reading this sentence is of course easily interpretable as true, but a literal reading, equivalent to «The particular form of sincerity instantiated by me enjoys tormenting me», is a very different matter, so different that Lakoff does not even seem to consider it. Even if the anthropological evidence really does indicate that second order entities are not necessarily not persons, nobody seems willing to argue for or even to consider the possible personhood of third order entities. It does not look as if we can at all take Time literally as a soldier or War literally as a mistress.

Levin's theory, which turns on taking the language of poetic metaphor literally, does not seem able to account for abstract personification. If it is inconceivable that abstract entities can be persons, then their personification cannot involve Levin's 'conceiving as'. Although such personification seems to create for Time and War, as for mountains and sunflowers, the impression that they are, fantastically, persons, this can only involve a consciousness of 'as if' and not of 'is' or 'could be'. We are here in the realm of the experiences Wittgenstein (1972:193-214) discusses in relation to 'seeing as', which, as Davidson (1984:263) emphasises, are non-propositional in nature. Seeing some lines on a page as a duck or a rabbit cannot be reduced to grasping the proposition that they can be so seen, or to grasping any proposition at all. Likewise, experiencing an abstract entity as if it were a person cannot consist in grasping the proposition, or conceiving, that it is literally a person, for such experiencing is not propositional but aesthetic in nature. Something like this must be true to account for the vivid sense of abstract entities as persons that effective, poetic personification creates.

An obvious point arises here. If Wittgenstein's notion of seeing, or experiencing as is sufficient to account for the vivid sense of personified, abstract entities as persons, why should it not be sufficient to account for the vivid sense of personified, non-abstract entities as persons? Why should we not dispense with Levin's account for mountains and sunflowers as well as for Time and War? Although such a move appeals powerfully to the sense of intellectual economy, it would I believe constitute a false economy. We have already seen that Blake believed, however strangely, in the personhood of flowers, as of all existent entities. Levin (1988:206-37) makes out a powerful case for Wordsworth's also holding analogous beliefs and conceptions. In both these poets their spiritual metaphysics inform virtually every aspect of their poetry. It would be implausible to think that they had nothing to do with
the metaphoric animation and personification so important to that poetry. Levin's theory provides a convincing account of just how their metaphysics and much of their metaphor are linked. Moreover, no one can deny that poetry is full of elaborately developed fictional worlds in which, as in elegies both formal and informal, the dead speak and are spoken to, without any necessary belief in personal immortality, or in which, as in the fables of La Fontaine or the pastoral poetry of Spenser, animals, trees, plants, rivers, stones and mountains, and, in the Anglo-Saxon Dream of the Rood, the cross of Christ itself, are speaking persons. Such fantastic fictional worlds are, in terms of Levin’s theory, simply notably developed or extended poetic metaphors. The theory thus provides a unified explanation for a range of apparently different phenomena, allowing for the recognition of a natural continuum stretching from prototypical instances of poetic fiction to prototypical instances of poetic metaphor.

4. REFINEMENTS

Levin’s theory illuminates not only metaphysically serious poets such as Blake and Wordsworth but also more playful poets such as John Cleveland. In ‘Upon Phillis walking..’ (see Appendix) Phillis walks out before sunrise. She is surrounded by plants and trees evoked with elaborate, humanizing metaphors and so feeling vividly like persons. Yet at the same time, for this is a Metaphysical and not a Romantic poem, a game of fanciful compliment not a revelation of spiritual truth, the reader knows that this scene is really quite ordinary. The Marigold, whose relation to the sun recalls Blake’s sunflower, really opens up not in response to Phillis’s beauty but to that dawn light which always precedes the sunrise. The projection of the plant’s fantastic personhood via humanizing metaphor is a delightful but consciously unreal game played with quotidian reality. The role of metaphor here points to a way in which Levin’s theory might also illuminate, though never fully explain, even the experience of abstract personification. This, I have argued, has to be based on an ‘experiencing as’ a la Wittgenstein not a ‘conceiving as’ a la Levin. Yet maybe this is not the whole story. There is nothing fantastic about seeing a configuration of lines as a duck or rabbit, but in Causley’s poems there is, for this reader at least, something truly fantastic about experiencing War as a sexually alluring woman or Time as a contumacious trooper. The reader cannot really conceive of these abstract entities as literally persons, yet a game or pretense of thinking of them impossibly as such seems to be combined with the basic experiencing of them only as if they were persons. Whatever the exact psychological reality underlying this phenomenon, it seems to account for the felt, wild irrationality of these, and many other, metaphors of abstract personification. Levin’s theory thus links together a wide range of
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Poetic phenomena from poetic fiction to abstract personification via its central concern with concrete animation and personification.

Given the modifications made to Levin's theory here, how is its supplementing of the Lakoff and Turner theory itself modified? First of all, the idea of an asymmetric mapping relation being transformed into a symmetric relation that founds a new, strange, conceptual category obviously cannot apply to abstract personification. The limited, though perhaps important, role of 'Levin-type' phenomena there is a matter of a psychologically feigned, rather than real, 'conceptualisation'. With poetic fiction too this model of a switch from an asymmetric to a symmetric relation does not really apply. The personhood of Blake's sunflower or Dickinson's mountain is strangely unspecific: a new conceptual category is created because entities which have none of the standard properties of persons are nevertheless put into a common category with persons. When a tree or stone or wooden cross speaks, however, rather than a new category being created these entities are simply reassigned to the pre-existing category of persons via their unusual possession of important, personal properties. The direct formal link between the Levin and Lakoff and Turner theories is via the transformation of the asymmetric, metaphoric, mapping relation in the cases which are central for Levin's theory. Yet further, indirect, supplementary links are made by the extension of the Levin theory to its non-central cases of abstract personification and poetic fiction.

CONCLUSION

One final, major point needs to be made with regard to the integrating of Levin's theory with that of Lakoff and Turner. The Wittgensteinian notion of a non-propositional experiencing as has had to be given an important role in the account of abstract personification. This might seem to be incompatible with the Lakoff and Turner theory, which, like Levin's, sees metaphor as a conceptual phenomenon. This however is far from being the case. Lakoff (1990:65), like Mark Johnson (1987), argues that, though metaphor is conceptual, its ultimate basis is not propositional but rather a mapping of source domain, image schematic structure onto the target domain. This amounts to seeing experiencing as part of the basis of all propositional meaning, to seeing aesthetics, in the manner of Kant (1987), as being bound up with cognition. (For an argument in favour of this view, based upon a treatment of image metaphor in particular, see Crisp 1996) 9. The power of the Lakoff and Turner approach lies in its demonstration of how poetic metaphor is rooted in ordinary, everyday, non-poetic metaphor. Its weakness lies in the fact that it does not do sufficient justice to the distinctiveness of poetic metaphor. The phenomena that Levin's theory highlights and brings together can play an
important role in accounting for this distinctiveness. Both the Levin and Lakoff and Turner theories, we have seen, question any easy assumptions about analytic truth. Levin shows some of the implications of this common questioning, with its acceptance of the unpredictably extendable nature of human concepts, for poetic metaphor in particular.

NOTES

1 Some of the relevant research is contained in the following books and articles: Lakoff and Johnson (1980); Johnson (1987); Lakoff (1987); Lakoff (1990) Lakoff (1993); Turner (1990); Kovesces (1986); Kovesces (1990).

2 I must admit though that I would be more reluctant to say of it, 'This gold is green.' Adjectives in predicative position seem to let go of so called 'meaning postulates' with greater difficulty than those in attributive position. The easily conceivable situation of the scientist studying atomic element 79 however would, according to my intuitions at least, clearly support a predicative use of 'green'.

3 For a discussion of how what Lakoff and Fillmore (1982) refer to as 'frames' can be extended in strange and unpredictable ways, and for some of the philosophical implications of this, see Searle (1985).

4 Any doubt about the reading given here of the first verse of 'Time like a Saucy Trooper' should be allayed by the poem's second verse which clearly indicates, in its third line particularly, that the speaker's love now lies underground.

5 Lyons's threefold ontological classification was made in 1977, before Davidson's (1980a) contention that the semantics of natural language involves quantification over events became well known to linguists. If one accepts this notion as many contemporary, formal semanticists do, then of course events have to be seen as just one more set of first order entities (Davidson 1980b; 1980c). This however has the unfortunate consequence that we have to regard events as being ontologically just as basic as the general run of first order entities, such as tables, stones, dogs, atoms, cells and so on. This is something which most people, other than formal semanticists with a truth conditional axe to grind, will find frankly incredible.

6 With regard to the anthropological evidence for the supposedly possible personhood of second order entities, it needs to be noted that such evidence always involves questions of interpretation. Perhaps the culture in question believes not that events are persons but rather that every event has a tutelary spirit. That is, its apparent references to those events are really metonymic references to those events' tutelary spirits. Or, if this culture does believe in the personhood of events, perhaps we should conclude that this belief is incoherent and so irrational. (There is nothing epistemically absurd, for instance, about considering the possibility that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity is incoherent and so irrational). Yet even an incoherent belief in the personhood of events would still have some kind of psychological reality, however confused, and as such might provide the basis for an application of something like Levin's notion of poetical metaphor.

7 Cleveland's conception of the marigold's response to the dawn light is not of course the same as our 20th century concept of a hormonally based chemical response to physical light; it involves instead conceptions of occult influence and sympathy. However, although such conceptions seem to be closer to forms of personal explanation than the concepts of modern biochemistry, it is still true that the 'common sense' of the mid-17th century did not regard theories of occult influence as involving the attribution of consciousness or personhood to plants.

8 See the end of note 6 above for a closely related point.

9 Thus abstract personification, or any other metaphor mapping concrete onto abstract en-
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Department of English
The Chinese University of Hong Kong
Shatin, N. T., Hong Kong
Tel.: 2609-7007
Fax: 2603-5270

REFERENCES


APPENDIX

The selections from the two Causley poems, which contain the poems' opening two stanzas in both cases, are taken from Causley 1975:14&91. The selection from Cleveland's 'Upon Phillis walking in a morning before Sun-rising' is from Grierson 1959:47-48. (The Emily Dickinson poem cited by Levin is easily accessible in Levin 1993:122; Blake's 'Ah! Sunflower' is available in a myriad of editions and anthologies).

Time like a saucy trooper took my true love
In the stiff corn that stands above the bay.
Never a backward glance he gave his new love,
But whistled a tune and slowly rode away.
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About her brow my love winds the white hours
And binds her breast with sprigs of rosemary.
Through her thin hands she threads the winter flowers
And lies with eyes as pale as the snowy sea.

Charles Causley

A Ballad for Katherine of Aragon

Queen of England, 1509-1533
Buried in Peterborough Cathedral

As I walked down by the river
Down by the frozen fen
I saw the grey cathedral
With the eyes of a child of ten.
O the railway arch is smoky
As the Flying Scot goes by
And but for the Education Act
Go Jumper Cross and I.

But war is a bitter bugle
That all must learn to blow
And it didn't take long to stop the song
In the dirty Italian snow.
O war is a casual mistress
And the world is her double bed.
She has a few charms in her mechanised arms
But you wake up and find yourself dead.

Charles Causley

Upon Phillis walking in a morning before Sun-rising

The sluggish morn as yet undrest,
My Phyllis brake from out her East;
As if she'd made a match to run
With Venus usher to the sun.
The Trees like yeomen of her guard,
Serving more for pomp than ward,
Rankt on each side with loyall duty,
Weave branches to enclose her beauty.
The Plants whose luxury was lop'd,
Or age with crutches underpropt;
**Peter Crisp**

Whose wooden carkases are growne
To be but coffins of their owne;
Revive, and at her generall dole
Each receives his ancient soule:

The Marigold whose Courtiers face
Echoes the Sun, and doth unlace
Her at his rise, at his full stop
Packs and shuts up her gaudy shop,
Mistakes her cue, and doth display:
Thus Philis antedates the day.

John Cleveland