A semantic-pragmatic analysis
of the English imperative

Marta CARRETERO LAPEYRE
Universidad Complutense de Madrid

ABSTRACT

The most successful pragmatic and semantic characterizations of the English imperatives have possibly been as prescriptions imposed on the addressee by the speaker and as expressions of the speaker's acceptance of something coming true, respectively. However, exceptions to both accounts are not difficult to find. In this paper the claim is set forth that a semantic feature is shared by all imperatives: the expression of boulomaic modality, that is, the indication of the speaker's (positive or negative) concern towards the proposition being made the case. This common feature will acquire different nuances (obligation, permission, acceptance, wish), which correlate with different illocutionary forces, depending on certain situational factors, such as the relationship between the speaker and the addressee or the speaker's desire to be polite, or on linguistic factors, such as clauses appended to the imperative by coordination or juxtaposition. Nevertheless, the illocutionary modifications involved by such factors will not prevent the element of speaker's concern from being present in all imperatives.

1. PREVIOUS ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE SEMANTIC AND/OR PRAGMATIC ACCOUNTS OF IMPERATIVES

In this section I will describe some of the more successful attempts to provide semantic and/or pragmatic accounts of imperatives, and in Section 2 I will set forth an alternative approach which, in my view, could cover all imperatives.

A)   It has frequently been claimed that the distinctive feature of imperatives from other types of clause is the illocutionary force of a *directive*, that is, the speaker or writer (henceforth S) prescribes some course of action for the addressee (a)[1]. However, not all imperatives seem to conform to this force. For example, their aim could also be: to suggest that A can do what s/he wants (1); to consent to a proposal (2); to give permission (3); to express reluctant acceptance (4); or to inform that something could be done (5):

(1)   Study English or watch television: do what you prefer.
(2)   A: Could I help you?
       B: Help me if you like.
(3)   Smoke as much as you like.
(4)   OK, do invite them, but if I were you I wouldn't.
(5)   Sign at the bottom of the application form.

B)   Palmer (1986: 29-30) proposes another possible common feature for all imperatives: they express, in the most neutral way, S's favourable disposition towards the action. S merely «presents» a proposition, just as with the declarative, but for action, not merely for acceptance as true, by A. However, this definition has the disadvantage that the term «favourable» does not apply to cases like (4), where S expresses a reluctant acceptance for the action to be carried out.

C)   Davies (1986: 51) also states that imperatives share a common semantic feature: S's acceptance of the proposition being made true[2]:

> (...) the speaker who utters an imperative which presents a proposition p is conventionally assumed to accept p's (sic) being made true. (...) by uttering an imperative he usually intends to convey that he accepts something's (sic) being made the case   (Davies, 1986: 51)

Davies's account has the disadvantage that the notion of «acceptance» has to cover even those imperatives that express a command or a strong wish:

(6)   Go and visit Granny at once!
(7)   Get well soon.

Section 3 will set forth an account which covers all imperatives, but at the same time avoids the above mentioned shortcomings.

2.   AN ALTERNATIVE SEMANTIC ACCOUNT

The consideration whether «acceptance» can or cannot account for such imperatives as (6) and (7) is parallel to a question extensively discussed in modal logic (see Allwood et al. (1971: Ch. 7) and Lyons (1977: Ch. 17): whether

«possibility» is included in «necessity». Two positions are possible, depending on the interpretation of «possibility»:

1.   If we interpret that «possible that p» implies «possible that not-p», then:

given that necessary (p)	not-possible (not-p),
if possible (p)	possible (not-p),
then necessary (p)	possible (p).

2.   If, on the other hand, we interpret that «possible that p» does not necessarily imply «possible that not-p», then:

given that necessary (p)		not-possible (not-p),
if possible (p)	*Either*	possible (not-p),
	Or	not-possible (not-p),
then necessary (p)		possible (p)

The following notions, which correspond to different kinds of modalities, make pairs related to the logical pair possibility-necessity (see Carretero, 1991):

1.   *Belief-Knowledge* (epistemic modality);
2.   *Physical possibility-Physical necessity* (dynamic);
3.   *Permission-Obligation* (boulomaic-deontic);
4.   *Acceptance-Wish* (boulomaic-non-deontic).

Concerning the linguistic expression of these notions, the existence of conversational implicatures in speech acts seems to favour the first interpretation of the concept of «possible» and its correlates. That is, in natural languages the «possibility terms» (*Belief, Physical possibility, Permission* and *Acceptance*) are only used when the respective «necessity terms» (*Knowledge, Physical necessity, Obligation* and *Wish*) cannot be used. In fact, the uttering of (8) and (9) if (10) and (11) could be uttered, respectively, would mean a break of Grice's (1975) maxim of Quantity (according to which all the information available should be given if required for the purposes of the exchange):

(8)   I *believe* Tom has a new son.
(9)   We are *permitted* to leave now.
(10)   I *know* Tom has a new son.
(11)   We are *obliged* to leave now.

Therefore, «possible that p» implicates conversationally «possible that not-p», and this implicature applies also to all the correlates (for example, «believe that p» implicates «not know that p»), independently of the question whether this implicature corresponds to a logical implication.

The last two pairs of the above mentioned notions, *Permission-Obligation* and *Acceptance-Wish*, constitute the core of «boulomaic modality», that is, the

modality which concerns the attitude of a will (which may be S's or not) towards
the «content of the proposition being made true (henceforth PMT)». I believe
that boulomaic modality provides a clue to a semantic feature common to all
imperatives: *imperatives always express boulomaic modality, that is, they
indicate the degree of concern of a will towards the content of a proposition being
made the case.* They express then *Acceptance, Wish, Obligation* or *Permission*.
Therefore, I cannot agree with Davies (1986) in that *Acceptance* is a common
semantic feature to all imperatives, because, as we have seen, «*Acceptance* that
p» implicates «*Acceptance* that not-p», and consequently imperatives which
express *Wish* would have been excluded.

Imperatives have two additional defining characteristics, which distinguish
them from the rest of the expressions of boulomaic modality: 1) the will
concerned is *the speaker's*; 2) they refer to the *time of the speech act*[3].

The four types of imperatives form a system with two variables which
concern S and A:

1.   *degree of speaker's will.* The degree of S's will towards the PMT may be:
     a)   *weak (Permission, Acceptance)*: S accepts the PMT, but s/he does
          also accept the «propositional content not being made true»
          (PnotMT);
     b)   *strong (Obligation, Wish)*: S does not accept the PnotMT.
2.   *power of S to impose on A to carry out the PMT.* Two different cases can
be distinguished according to this variable:
     a)   S imposes over A: *Permission, Obligation*;
     b)   S does not impose over A: *Acceptance, Wish.*

The four main types of imperatives, which correspond to the four main types
of boulomaic modality, are defined by the combination of the two variables[4]:

	A. Weak will	B. Strong will
Imposition	*Permission*	*Obligation*[5]
non-imposition	*Acceptance*	*Wish*

(12), (13), (14) and (15) are instances of *Permission, Obligation, Acceptance*
and *Wish,* respectively:

     (12)   Leave the office if you like; you have already typed all the letters I needed.
     (13)   Come here at once! I need some help.
     (14)   Phone her if you like, but if I were you I wouldn't.
     (15)   Have a nice time at the party tomorrow.

3.   THE PRAGMATICS OF THE ENGLISH IMPERATIVE

The common semantic feature proposed in Section 2 is correlated by a pragmatic feature: all imperatives share an element of «fitting the world to the word», in Searle's (1976) terms. In the Imperatives of *Wish* and *Obligation,* S expresses her or his will to fit the world to the word; in those of *Acceptance* and *Permission,* S sets forth her or his acceptance of both the fitting and the non-fitting of the world to the word.

Moreover, the four semantic types of imperatives could also be considered as pragmatic types, which differ in terms of illocutionary force. These differences will be explained in terms of Brown and Levinson's (1987) concept of «face» and «face-threatening acts (FTAs)», and the sociolinguistic variables which interact with those. By *face* they understand «the public self-image that every member (of a society) wants to claim for himself (...)» (1987: 61). Face consists in two related aspects: *negative face,* the claim « (...) to freedom of action and freedom from imposition», and *positive face,* «the positive consistent self-image or "personality" (...)», that is, the claim that one's interests, wishes or claims should be taken into account.

The face-threatening acts (FTAs) are the acts (which may be speech acts or not) which intrinsically threaten S's or (more commonly) A's positive or negative face. In performing a speech FTA, S is likely to use politeness strategies, to assure the maintenance of a good relationship with A. The strategy to be used depends on the following factors:

a)   whether the FTA concerns positive face or negative face; in this respect, positive politeness (PP) strategies will be distinguished from negative politeness (NP) strategies;

b)   sociolinguistic variables: the relative power (P) and the social distance (D) between S and A, and the importance of the FTA (R, from «rating»).

At this point the differences between the four semantic types of imperatives in terms of politeness will be accounted for. Perhaps the most obvious difference is that between the imperatives of *Permission* and *Obligation* and those of *Acceptance* and *Wish* in terms of the P variable: in the latter, but not in the former, S has power to make A carry out the PMT or to let her or him do what s/he wants.

Nevertheless, these distinctions, especially that between *Obligation* and *Wish,* are not so straightforward as it seems at first sight. In fact, both terms could be conceived as the extremes of a continuum, in which instances of imperatives would be situated at different points. The following factors bring instances near the *Obligation* extreme:

a)   a high P variable (S has power over A);

b)   A's possibility to carry out the PMT (it is impossible to oblige anyone to do something s/he cannot do);

c)   the FTA threatens A's negative face (that is, S imposes on A to carry on a PMT which will be beneficial for S);

d)   S does not give A the option not to comply with the FTA.

Where these factors are present, S's imposition over A is maximized, and straightforward imperatives are uncommon because the FTA, which is strong *per se,* would seem stronger. For instance (16) is a more polite way than (17) to address to a subordinate:

    (16)   Would you type these letters for me?
    (17)   Type these letters for me.

Nevertheless, in certain situations where efficiency has priority over politeness, such as cases of emergency (18), task-oriented focus of interaction (19) and attention-seeking in conversation (20), imperatives of *Obligation* are less uncommon (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 95-98):

    (18)   Help!
    (19)   Give me the nails.
    (20)   Listen, I think I've got an idea.

Where one or more of the factors is not present, the relative deviation from the meaning of *Obligation* in the strict sense may turn imperatives into devices which enhance politeness instead of lowering it; the frequency of imperatives is thus higher (cf. Downing and Locke, 1992: 198-199):

1.   when S is not a superior to A, imperatives can convey intimacy (see Brown and Levinson, 1987: 108):

    (21)   Kiss me, darling.

2.   when the PMT is not under A's control, the imperative cannot be one of *Obligation;* then it is not part of an NP strategy, but of a PP strategy which strenghtens S's *Wish* that A's interests should be fulfilled:

    (22)   Get well soon.

3.   when the FTA does not affect A's negative face, the imperative does not express *Obligation.* If it concerns A's positive face (as in (23), where the PMT is beneficial for A), S stresses her or his care about A; if it concerns S's negative face (24) or S's positive face (25), the imperative minimizes the importance of the FTA (which will be an imposition on S and a benefit for A). Therefore, in these cases, the imperative enhances politeness:

(23)   Be careful while you drive.
(24)   Leave the cleaning for me.
(25)   Don't worry about me (ie. don't give too much importance to my interests).

4.   when S gives A an option not to comply with the PMT, there is no *Obligation* in the strict sense. This usually happens when the R variable is relatively high (ie. when the fulfilling the PMT is a serious imposition on A, as in (26)). Imperatives of *Permission* (27) or *Acceptance* (28) also give A possibility not to comply with the PMT, the difference between these two being that, in the former, A has the option because of the lack of S's power to impose on her or him, whereas in the former A's option is a result of S's permissive attitude:

(26)   Please help me with this difficult task. Would you be so kind?
(27)   Watch television if you like: you've already studied enough.
(28)   Go by car if you like: it's up to you, but remember the road is dangerous.

A wide variety of linguistic means may be used to express that S leaves it open to A whether to fulfil the PMT: overt indications that the PnotMT is also considered (29), conditionals with *you* as subject (30), the softener *please* (31)... Concerning tag questions, *won't* is suitable when the PMT is beneficial for A (in other words, when the imperative is part of a PP strategy (32)) and tentative modals like *would* or *could* are used as NP strategies, when the PMT is beneficial for S (33) (cf. Butler, 1988):

(29)   Watch the film or do what you want.
(30)   Watch the film if you like, but I think you should study.
(31)   Please write soon.
(32)   Sit down, won't you?
(33)   Pass me the salt, could you?

The following illocutionary types of imperatives, in which S leaves it open to A to comply or not with the PMT, fall in between *Wish* and *Obligation:*

1.   *request:* the PMT is beneficial for S, and S has relative power to impose on A: see example (31) above.

2.   *recommendation* and *suggestion:* the PMT being beneficial for A, the imperative is thus a PP strategy by which S expresses her or his concern about A's interests. *Recommendations* are often imperatives which emphasize only S's concern about A's needs (34-35). *Suggestions,* contrariwise, tend to maintain a balance between A's positive and negative face needs: S softens the imperative with some tentative expression, so as not to appear to be too familiar (and thus impositive) (36-37):

(34)   Take some of these books: there's no way of learning functional grammar without them.

> (35)   Don't go on with such an old crock.
> (36)   Take some of these books: they could give you ideas.
> (37)   *Try with my typewriter if you like.*

I will conclude Section 4 with the remark that its chief aim has been to provide a general account of the relationship between imperatives and pragmatic factors (especially politeness factors) rather than to propose a taxonomy of imperatives according to illocutionary force. (Examples of taxonomies of this kind are Quirk et al.'s (1985: 831-832) and Downing and Locke's (1992: 198-199).

The remainder of the paper will be a succint analysis of the influence, concerning illocutionary force, that the following features of the linguistic context exert on imperatives: subjects and vocatives (Section 5), emphatic *do* (Section 6) and coordinated and juxtaposed clauses (Section 7).

4.   THE ROLE OF SUBJECT AND VOCATIVE IN IMPERATIVES

Imperatives may have an explicit subject or a vocative[6] which may specify A when it is not clear who the utterance is addressed to (38-39).

> (38)   Some of you help me with this essay.
> (39)   Go to sleep, Mary.

However, both may also be used when it is clear who A is. Their function is then to strengthen the illocutionary force of the clause. For example, in imperatives of *Obligation,* the nuance of imposition is stressed (40-41). Notice that the vocative is more polite than the subject, in that it not only seeks A's complying with the PMT, but also A's collaborative attitude in order to satisfy S's PP needs (to be appreciated).

> (40)   You shut the door at once.
> (41)   Go to bed, John.

Contrariwise to other kinds of vocatives, the pronoun *you* as vocative is very impolite (Quirk et al., 1985: 828), because it provides the only information that S has authority over A:

> (42)   Don't move, you.
> (43)   You, listen to me now.

When the PMT is beneficial for A, no matter whether it concerns A's positive face (44-45) or S's positive face (46-47) or S's negative face (48-49), the subject and the vocative strenghten the politeness conveyed by the imperative: S enhances her or his interest in A's wants, or downtones the interest in her or his own.

> (44)   You don't mention it for now; that'll be the best possible thing for you to do.
> (45)   Get well soon, Helen.

(46)   You don't worry about me.
(47)   Don't worry about me, Helen.
(48)   You leave the cleaning for me.
(49)   Leave the cleaning for me, John.

When the imperative expresses reluctant *Acceptance,* the subject functions as what could be called a PP «counter-strategy» (a «dare»), by which S denies the importance of A's proceedings, thus expressing indifference about A's personality:

(50)   You comment that embarrassing event: I don't mind.

The subject of imperatives can also have a contrastive function (51), thus contrasting the tasks that S and A should perform:

(51)   You go to sleep while I stay up.

5.   EMPHATIC DO IN IMPERATIVES

In imperatives the use of affirmative *do* before the verb stresses the meaning that A should carry out the PMT. When the imperative affects A's negative face, emphatic *do* is an NP strategy which indicates that S's power over A is limited (if existent at all), so that S finds it necessary to insist on A's performing the PMT:

(52)   Do give John a prize: he's been great.

In all the other cases, emphatic *do* is a PP strategy which insists on A's complying with the PMT because it will be beneficial for A:

(53)   Do eat some sandwiches.
(54)   Do leave the cleaning for me.
(55)   Do have a good time.

In a few cases (see Davies, 1986: 84-85), emphatic *do* has a contrastive value, which stresses S's *Acceptance* of both the PMT and the PnotMT. It may be used as a PP «counter-strategy», just as the subject in examples like (50):

(56)   Do or don't write to John, that's not my business.

6.   IMPERATIVES IN COORDINATED CONSTRUCTIONS

In this section I will study the illocutionary modifications caused by appended clauses with *and* or *or* (henceforth *and-, or-*clauses) to imperatives. Concerning imperatives followed by *and-*clauses, Davies calls them «imperative-like conditionals» (ILCs) because they can be paraphrased, more or less roughly, by a conditional sentence:

> (57)   Give them a pound and they'll steal three from you.
>   (If you give them a pound, they'll steal three from you)

The illocutionary influence of the *and*-clause on ILCs depends on two factors: whether the utterance is directed to a specific addressee, and whether S's attitude towards the PMT is positive.

1.   In ILCs addressed to a specific addressee, if S's attitude towards the PMT is positive, the clause merely stresses S's *Wish* that the proposition should be made true, because the consequences would be beneficial for S, A or both:

> (58)   Behave yourself, and I'll be very happy.
> (59)   Be polite, and you'll persuade her.

If S's attitude towards the PMT is negative, the *and*-clause indicates which (undesirable) consequences will follow if the proposition becomes true. The semantic value of the imperative is reversed: the ILCs can be roughly paraphrased by a negative imperative, although ILCs put more emphasis in S's reluctance towards the PMT:

> (60)   Sit down on the cat's chair and you'll have hair all over your coat.
>   (Cf. Don't sit down on the cat's chair)

2.   In generic ILCs, S expresses her or his attitude not about the PMT of the imperative in isolation, but about its consequential relationship with the *and*-clause. Generic ILCs are often found in maxims which express how reality is. When S's attitude towards the consequential relationship is negative, ILCs have a nuance of irony (63):

> (61)   Be courageous and you'll succeed.
> (62)   Respect others and they'll respect you.
> (63)   Be rich and you'll have lots of friends: be poor and you'll have none.

Imperatives followed by *or*-clauses are called by Davies (1986) «imperative-like ultimatums» (ILUs), because the second clause conveys a kind of ultimatum, an indication of the undesirable consequences which will follow if the PMT is not performed. Therefore, in ILUs S's will is strongly oriented towards the PMT. They can be said to express *Obligation* if S is the source of the consequences indicated in the second clause (64): in these cases ILUs stress S's power over A, being thus rather impolite. When the source of the consequences is not S, ILUs express S's *Wish* that A should carry out the PMT (in other words, they are warnings to A), so as to avoid the consequences of not doing so (65). Generic ILUs (66), as well as those where A cannot control the PMT (67), are hardly used, if ever:

> (64)   Keep the dog calm or you'll be punished!
> (65)   Close the window or you'll get a cold.

(66)   ?Divide or you won't win.
(67)   ?Be clever or you won't be valued at all.

If the *or*-clause is also an imperative, the ILU is still more impolite, because S appears to have the same attitude about the PMT and the PnotMT, that is, S seems indifferent towards the undesirable consequences for A (ie. it is a breach of PP):

(68)   Close the window or get a cold.

7.   IMPERATIVES IN JUXTAPOSED CONSTRUCTIONS

Davies (1986) calls «imperative-like concessives» (the abbreviation ILCOs is mine) those constructions that consist of two juxtaposed clauses, the first being an imperative, because the sentence receives a concessive interpretation.

According to Davies, ILCOs serve S merely to state that the PMT will not have the consequences indicated in the second clause. However, I believe that in ILCOs S does also indicate her or his attitude towards the PMT. S/he may express: 1) a reluctant *Acceptance* of the PMT (69), because of its uselessness; 2) *suggestion* that A should carry out the PMT (70) just to confirm its uselessness:

(69)   Say what you think, you'll still be ignored.
(70)   Phone Granny if you like, she won't be at home.

This indication of S's concern towards the PMT distinguishes ILCOs from ordinary concessives, where S seems to be more neutral towards the PMT, as may be seen if (69) is compared to (71):

(71)   Although you (may) say what you think, you'll still be ignored.

Like ILCs, ILCOs may refer to a certain addressee or be generic. In the latter case, the PMT is nearly always under A's control (72). Generic ILCOs usually express, like generic ILCs, S's attitude (which is always negative) not towards the imperative PMT, but towards the absence of a conditional relationship between the two propositions (73):

(72)   Talk as much as you like, you won't be listened to.
(73)   Respect others, you still won't be respected.

Unlike in ILCs and in ILUs, the second clause in ILCOs may refer to a reality, which prevents the fulfilment of some expectations that could have derived from the PMT (74):

(74)   Check possible mistakes, there's none.

From what has been said of ILCs, ILUs and ILCOs, it can be deduced that

they, like imperatives in simple sentences, do indicate S's attitude towards the PMT, so that they may be considered as genuine imperatives, which fit in the general semantic characterization here proposed. In this respect, my account is more inclusive than Davies's (1986), where the ILCs and ILCOs not expressing S's acceptance of the PMT had to be excluded.

8. CONCLUSION

From the preceding analysis of imperatives, it follows that a common semantic feature seems to be found in all of them: the expression of boulomaic modality; in other words, imperatives give indications about the speaker's concern towards the content of a proposition being made true. This general meaning interacts with other factors, such as the strength of the speaker's will that the proposition comes true, the relationship between the speaker and the addressee, the linguistic and situational context and the addressee's power to make the proposition comes true; according to these factors, different types of imperatives can be distinguished (imperatives of *Acceptance, Which, Permission* or *Obligation*). These four semantic types are correlated by variations in illocutionary force, which may be modified by a wide variety of linguistic means, such as an explicit subject, the vocative, the emphatic *do* before the base form of the verb and the addition of a coordinate clause (by *and, or*) or of a juxtaposed clause.

It must also be stated that this account has been set forth not in opposition, but as one more contribution to the existing literature about imperatives. Possible suggestions for further research in the field are to test (especially with examples form corpora) whether all imperatives in English fit into the general characterization here set forth, and to refine these subdivisions by a deeper study of the semantic and pragmatic factors on which they are based.

<div align="center">NOTES</div>

[1] For example, Quirk et al. (1985: Ch. 11) distinguish «directives», that is, utterances that share the illocutionary force of instructing somebody to do something, from «imperatives», term used for the grammatical kind of clauses. However, from their illocutionary analysis of imperatives (pp. 831-832) it may be deduced that all of them have the illocutionary force of a directive.

[2] Davies (1986) states that interrogatives resemble imperatives in that a proposition which may or may not become true in future is presented, the difference lying in that in interrogatives the acceptance feature is not always present, but must be conveyed by stress and intonation, or by assertive terms («Would you like some biscuits?» as against «Would you like any biscuits?»).

³ It could be argued that the modal *may* shares these two features, but, contrariwise to the imperative, its boulomaic meaning is very concrete -it is nearly always restricted to *Permission.*

⁴ The names of the main semantic types of imperatives will be written in capital letters: Wish. The names of their subtypes will be underlined: *request.*

⁵ It could be thought that the term «command» would be more adequate for this kind of imperatives in which S lays an obligation. However, I will use the label *Obligation* because it refers to a semantic notion, like the other three labels, in contrast to «command», which refers a pragmatic category (the illocutionary force of laying an obligation).

⁶ Vocatives are distinguished from subjects «by their ability to stand not only in initial position but also in the middle and at the end of the clause» (Downing and Locke, 1992: 196).

REFERENCES

Allwood, J.; Anderson, L. G., & Dahl, Ö. (1971). *Logic in Linguistics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). *Politeness. Some Universals in Language Usage.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Carretero, M. (1991) (in press). «Una propuesta de tipología de la modalidad: la aceptación como categoría modal». *Dicenda,* 10.

Davies, E. (1986). *The English Imperative.* London: Croom Helm.

Downing, A., & Locke, P. (1992). *A University Course on English Grammar.* Hemel Hampstead: Simon & Schuster.

Grice, H. P. (1975). «Logic and conversation». In P. Cole & J. L. Morgan (eds.), *Syntax and Semantics,* vol. 3: *Speech Acts.* New York: Academic Press, 41-58.

Levinson, S. C. (1983): *Pragmatics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Lyons, J. (1977). *Semantics.* Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Palmer, F. R. (1986). *Mood and Modality.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Quirk, R.; Greenbaum, S.; Leech, G., & Svartvik, J. (1985). *A Grammar of Contemporary English.* London: Longman.

Searle, J. R. (1976). «The classification of illocutionary acts». *Language in Society,* 5, 1-24.