


## Kramnick, Jonathan B. 2023. *Criticism and Truth: On Method in Literary Studies*. The University of Chicago Press. 129 pp. ISBN: 978-0-226-83054-4 (e-book).

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*Criticism and Truth: On Method in Literary Studies*—a title that echoes Barthes's *Criticism and Truth* (1966)—constitutes a work of literary criticism which reflects on the nature and function of this discipline. Here Jonathan B. Kramnick develops ideas that can be found in the articles “Criticism and Truth” (2021a) and “The Humanities after Covid-19” (2020), as he recognises in “Acknowledgements.” In relation to these precedent publications, gathering their ideas together in a lengthier book even enables Kramnick to integrate John Brenkman's response to “Criticism and Truth” (2021a) as a source of reference, particularly in association with the latter's discussion of the limits of Gadamerian hermeneutics (2023, 118).

*Criticism and Truth* (2023) is divided into “Preface,” an introduction titled “Craft Knowledge,” five central chapters—“Method Talk,” “Close Reading,” “Skilled Practice,” “Interpretation and Creativity,” and “Verification”—, and a coda under the title “Public Criticism for a Public Humanities.” The “Preface” opens by outlining the motivations behind Kramnick's undertaking: the ongoing crisis in the literary humanities and the impact of austerity policies which—in the wake of COVID-19—have cut down job prospects for emerging scholars (2023, viii). This situation is so extreme that “we should contemplate the end of intellectual continuity and transformation from one generation to the next” (Kramnick 2020). The book, thus, intends to dignify literary studies discussing its peculiar methodology and its relation to knowledge to prove that the discipline is worthy of social and economic attention.

The introduction, divided into two sections and titled “Craft knowledge,” lays the foundations of the book. In the first section Kramnick presents the core elements that recur throughout the whole argument: the centrality of his conception of close reading; the dread of the devaluation of literary humanities; the relation of criticism to truth as a methodological question; the interplay between skill and knowledge—or “knowing *how*” and “knowing *that*”—; the institutional determination of what counts as good and bad work; and the shared linguistic medium between object of study and discipline—literature and literary criticism. The second section posits that *Criticism and Truth* is demarcated from the method wars inasmuch as it is argued that these debates have nothing to do with methods. These are rather discussions about attitudes and the possible relevance of criticism, at a time when criticism is seen in its last moments (2023, 11). Rather than engaging with these polemics, Kramnick delves into what is distinctively characteristic of literary criticism, namely, the understanding of close reading as a writing activity whose main practice is “quotation,” accompanied by “unmarked procedures of *sounding like* the text one is writing about,” such as critical free indirect discourse, or interpretive plot summary (2023, 11-12). Once the main elements have been established, the thesis of the book is clearly articulated: “the book moves through a discussion of close reading as method, method as skilled practice, practice as creative action, and creative action as justified truth” (2023, 12). The closing pages of the introduction are dedicated to the coda, a section on the role of literary criticism as part of public humanities outside the academia.

In the first chapter, “Method talk,” Kramnick sets forth the principle that the pursuit of truth in literary studies hinges not on what we say, but on how we formulate our ideas into arguments. His interest lies in the procedures through which literary critics make statements, rather than in the content of those statements themselves. For this reason, “we need to talk about method” (2023, 16). In doing so Kramnick insists that the so-called “method wars” were, in fact, debates over critical stance, rather than methodological aspects, and that “the procedures in which arguments were made and the manner in which texts were treated remained the same across both sides of the divide” (2023, 16). This divide alludes to the confrontation between those views which prioritised pleasure and those which turned their attention to politics (2023, 16).

Method, thus, refers to the common denominator shaped by the object of study and shared by all practitioners of a given discipline. For Kramnick, “every one of them [disciplines] has a distinctive way of presenting and evaluating evidence, of telling the truth in other words” (2023, 17). Regarding literary criticism, one

engages with texts in the context of the classroom and the domain of written criticism, and in both one mingles one's own words with another's in order to create arguments and participate in critical discussion. This intermingling of voices is what characterises literary criticism and is what Kramnick defines as *close reading*. This combination of one's expression with the words taken from another source leads Kramnick to consider close reading as a writing practice. In contrast with the methods of scientific disciplines, close reading does not comply with the same requirements, especially that of replication—which demands that any experiment can be repeated with the same results from any perspective—, due to the fact that literary criticism precisely stems from the interplay of different perspectives: the writer's and critic's (2023, 25). Moreover, the nature of the materials analysed in literary criticism differs significantly, which determines how they are to be studied. Provided that methods entail skilled practices, “these practices just vary according to the specific nature of what is being studied” (2023, 26). Kramnick concludes the chapter by distinguishing between *practical method* and *topical focus*. Whereas the former is said to constrain and to provide “sure footing” for the discipline, the latter expands its boundaries to new concerns. It is because of method's compactness that inquiry can proliferate endlessly (2023, 29).

Chapter two, “Close reading,” is divided into three sections. The chapter firstly remarks that close reading is a method which does not admit abstractions from its practice. As Kramnick puts it, “close reading just doesn't afford general characterization” (2023, 32). In addressing close reading's specific demands of shaping one's expression to that of the source of study, he observes that “the practice of writing about writing that results from this adjustment is just too various for a comprehensive definition of how it works as a method to seem anything other than inadequate or hubristic” (2023, 32). Thus, for Kramnick the method is defined by its practices. Chief among these is quotation, in the sense that “embedding, pointing to, and writing in the style of another's language are practiced means of attuning one's language to language that precedes and limits one's writing” (2023, 32-33). In this sense, “much of literary criticism turns on the art of quoting well” (2023, 33). As has been argued above, Kramnick insists that close reading is not a reading activity with special attention to the eyes, but it is a hands-on writing practice (2023, 36).

The second section sheds light on the types of quotation. Firstly, *in-sentence quotation* is emphasised because of its weaving together of two voices: the adjust of one's commentary to the words taken from another's text. In-sentence quotation “is steeped in norms of perspicuity, elegance, and evidence—norms of explanation that govern any field of study even as they vary according to field of study” (2023, 36). Other types of quotation are *block*, and *between-sentence quotation*, which do not integrate another's language. The critic's argument is constructed so that the quotation is left with its own space: “his gloss distances and then turns back to the quoted words” (2023, 41). Another type of quotation is *critical free indirect discourse* which, according to Kramnick, “is interpretive in this respect, too, and likewise hits or misses its mark to the degree that the voice or, better still, the style is gotten right” (2023, 43).

The third section of “Close reading” focuses on how concrete readings of specific texts—what Kramnick terms *microscale practice*—can actually be applied to broader domains of inquiry. The structure of his argument is clear: “from the formal to the cognitive to the political and ethical” (2023, 47). He further maintains that “every one of my examples, in other words, grapples with the thisness of particular artifacts in order to derive from them some more capacious argument, set of concerns, or register of significance” (2023, 47). In other words, Kramnick argues that critics start from the literary material at hand, and then, those words are turned into a part of an argument, an assessment, or an interpretation. The study of the particular lets us hear new echoes into the general. The micro-level, everyday, ordinary practice of close reading offers invaluable and distinctive knowledge that would be lost if excluded from critical inquiry (2023, 48-49).

Chapter three “Skilled Practice” revolves around the epistemology of skill. Kramnick's thesis is that proficiency in practice demonstrates deep knowledge of the discipline. In his terms, “knowing *how*” means “knowing *that*” (2023, 51). He thereby sets himself against the “intellectualist” error, which is said to give preference to thought (knowledge) before activity. From this perspective, “the performance of the intelligent act is merely the execution of a well-thought-out plan” (2023, 52). Drawing on Gilbert Ryle, Kramnick argues that one does not mull over the process of an action before carrying out an activity. “The only thing before an intelligent act of one form or another is the capacity to do the act well that we refer to as skill. Skills are not easy to acquire... Thinking and doing are not two separate things. Every time one acts intelligently, the actual thinking is in the performance” (2023, 53). The consequences of identifying practice and knowledge bearing are various. First, it entails *field demarcation*, since concrete skills are dedicated to specific activities: “to conceive of ‘knowing *how*’ as a particular kind of knowledge is thus to imagine the world divided into particular domains” (2023, 54). Second, it introduces the idea of *skill hierarchy*, acknowledging that some practitioners will perform better than others. This leads to the appearance of skilful experts and further, the recognition that this expertise is worth being recognised (2023, 55). And third, it affirms *medium dependence*, because the object of study crucially determines the method to be followed. As Kramnick puts it, “expert practice in this context varies according to its particular objects and ends” (2023, 55). With regards to the relation between medium and its study, Kramnick extrapolates scientific empiricism to critical empiricism inasmuch as “literary critical skill is empirical in a way that is required by its medium. We can see this vividly in quotation where the medium pushes back and shapes what you can do with it in any one instance. The skill of criticism is just to reach out to the world in such a way that the grasp holds”; in a nutshell, “criticism is empirical” (2023, 65).

Chapter four unfolds through a threefold structure. In order to tackle “Interpretation and creativity,” Kramnick draws on Gadamer's reformulation of Schleiermacher, since their hermeneutics view criticism as a re-creation “not of the creative act but of the created work, which has to be brought to representation in accord with the meaning the interpreter finds in it” (qtd. in Kramnick 2023, 70). This perspective entails that

there is a mutually dependent relationship between the created work and criticism. Whereas the work needs to be interpreted so that it comes to life, criticism is moulded upon the idiosyncrasy of literary language. Kramnick, following Gadamer, states that “the goal of the talented hermeneut is not so much to re-create the circumstances in which a work was written as to place aspects of the work within a field of inquiry” (2023, 70). This field, criticism, is free and open, and creativity plays a crucial role always expanding the boundaries of the discipline. Yet the only fence line is the dependence on the literary work. With regards to interpretation and creativity, Kramnick points out that “the critic brings the work to representation as she binds her words to its words, asking whatever questions fit the inquiry, her creativity as absolute as it is restricted. All interpretation composes something new within the constraints of what it is given” (2023, 71). Here Kramnick brings back the idea that literature and literary criticism share the same medium. Unlike other disciplines, “only in the study of literature, however, does the raw material of the work enter into and define the scope of the sentence itself” (2023, 73). In contrast to art history—whose use of language is ekphrastic—and linguistics and philosophy of language—whose use of language leads to estrangement instead of integration—, “only the literary disciplines sustain closeness and medium at once” (2023, 74).

In the second section, Kramnick discusses that, even if Geoffrey Hartman views literature and criticism as a hendiadys—that is, two texts on the same level—, “what Hartman describes after all is not two separate but equal texts; it is the single work that joins the two. There is only the text created by criticism” (2023, 76). This is justified by the metaphor of stuttering, which implies that “to begin where another stutters is to add words where another’s stop and then to stop so another may continue” (2023, 77). The voices of both critic and writer fluctuate so that the argument is benefitted from this interaction. Regarding the relation between criticism and truth, Kramnick argues that every statement in criticism aims to seek truth. There is no need to start a sentence with “it is true” because “the rest of the sentence remains true or false in virtue of its aptness to compel our assent, our appraisal of it as well-formed, perspicuous, or adroit” (2023, 78). These seem to be the criteria for truth. Kramnick closes the second section by turning to the practice of interpretive plot summary as determining the direction of the interpretation. As a matter of fact, “the summary is itself a story written in miniature, drawn from the larger pile of events in the unstated background” (2023, 79). This selection of specific details, provided that it remains accurate, directs the reader’s attention towards those aspects which will be fundamental for the argument. The brief third section reflects on the post-COVID crisis in the humanities. Given that creative writing courses have increased their enrolment, Kramnick opts for considering criticism part of creative writing: “criticism is a form of creative writing in the full sense of the term” (2023, 82). This might be a solution in the future if we reconceptualise the practice and value of criticism.

The fifth chapter, “Verification,” starts by examining how truth is regulated in literary studies. As has been pointed out in chapter three, if there is skill, there are experts who outperform novices. Hence, the task of evaluating truth—or “appraisal” in Ryle’s terms (2023, 83)—is reserved for “a group or population who has the experience” and who can “judge whether someone has gotten it right or is good at what they aim to achieve” (2023, 83–84). Those works which stand out in their proficiency are said to be “dexterous and adroit” (2023, 84), the latter term having already appeared in chapter four as one of the criteria to assess truth. One of the sites in which such adroitness is expected to be watched and guaranteed is the academia, specifically, “disciplines of teaching and research whose task it is to understand some part of the world” (2023, 84).

Kramnick then challenges Stanley Fish’s view of *interpretive communities* inasmuch as this perception limited truth in literary criticism to the social adscription of its reading and made the discipline “epistemically inert” (2023, 85). Even though Kramnick recognises that the focus on the context was relevant, “the very nature of the skill, however, lies in its relation to what is given, whether that is thread, nematodes, or sonnets. Fish and others were mistaken to refer skill back only to the community” (2023, 85–86).

The second section points to the key point that “if, in the case of criticism, the truth or falsity of a given assertion is inseparable from how well the assertion is made, how well the assertion is made is inseparable from how well its objects are handled” (2023, 88). Nevertheless, when it comes to develop the idea of how one should handle literary objects well, the argument goes back to the fact that truth is to be found in what is told, and Kramnick dictates that “the words fit the explanandum, or they don’t” (2023, 89). This leads to the “criterion of fit,” which entails that every act of criticism is as unique as the sentences from which it is made, each a singular composite of two orders of writing” (2023, 89), thus proving that the criterion of replication typical of the sciences could not be applied to criticism.

Bringing back *appraisal* in truth claims, “validation is not a singular activity, but spread across the range of institutions and practices that constitute the structure of peer review” (2023, 92). Whereas earlier in the chapter Fish was criticised for having stripped literary criticism of its epistemic grounding by reducing it to “interpretive communities,” Kramnick now acknowledges that, once truth is understood as context-bound, these communities “in this respect at least... [were] on the right track” (2023, 92). What is intriguing of Kramnick’s understanding of interpretive communities is not their social component—their imagining a reader as a fellow critic—but that this shared space of interpretation implies that the critic and the reader “possess the same intuitions” (2023, 93). This is an idea repeated later: “members of an interpretive community, on this view, share a set of intuitions more than they follow the same rules or point at the same things” (2023, 93). These intuitions even constitute the core of literary criticism: “to strip the evaluation of its intuitive basis would be to deprive it of its very nature; to call it mere bias would be to miss its public grounds” (2023, 93). Yet these intuitions are never defined nor explained. While the appeal to intuition seems to support the public character of criticism, its formulation as a kind of natural capacity for critical activity risks narrowing its cultivation. If an interpretive community shares “a vocation, outlook, feeling, training, and skill” (2023, 93), what seems to be assumed is not the intuition of a general readership, but the institutional framework of the academia.

Indeed, this is the main topic of the last chapter, the coda: “Public Criticism for a Public Humanities.” Kramnick defends criticism in journals addressed to the wide public, arguing that the main difference with academic criticism is that of “platform” (2023, 102). On the one hand, public-facing criticism is said to be open, more immediate, always trying to reach more public and to have editors who decide what is to be published. On the other hand, academic criticism is more restrictive, mainly directed toward scholarly circles, aims at being more sustained in time, and goes through more filters before being published. While Kramnick views both forms of criticism as complementary, he ultimately claims that the defining practice of the discipline is that of academic criticism because it “responds to what has come before it” and contributes “to the ongoing, medium-specific continuation and transformation of inquiry” (2023, 107).

Jonathan Kramnick’s choice of title, *Criticism and Truth*, mirrors Barthes’s *Critique et vérité* (1966). The reason why Barthes decided to publish his text, however, does not correspond with Kramnick’s defence of the discipline in times of economic and social inattention in the aftermath of COVID-19. The French *Critique et vérité* appears in the middle of a polemic concerning the interpretation of Racine: Barthes’s *Sur Racine* (1963), which sparked harsh criticism from Sorbonne professor Raymond Picard. Among other charges, Picard accused Barthes of distorting Racine’s words to his own interest, and of passing his own subjectivity as objective. Barthes responded that Picard’s defence of objectivity carried underlying ideological assumptions ([1966] 2007, 2). Kramnick’s part in this confrontation is to take Picard’s accusation of Barthes’s subjectivity and to transform it into a principle of the discipline. Since every critical assertion aims at truth, Kramnick claims that there is no need to open every sentence with “it is true that” (2023, 78). It is likely that Kramnick would assent to rather than refute the statement that “s’il [Barthes] écrit sur Racine et s’il publie ce qu’il écrit, c’est qu’il juge que sa subjectivité est universalisable et qu’il croit à la valeur de ce qu’il apporte”<sup>1</sup> (Picard 1965, 13). What for Picard is part of the criticism against Barthes, Kramnick makes it into a foundation condition of literary criticism in general.

As Barthes is completely absent from Kramnick’s book, it might seem at first that Barthes’s and Kramnick’s explorations of criticism and truth had very little in common. McLemee asserts that, even if he suspects that “the shared title and manifesto-like brevity of the newer book is more than coincidence... the differences between them are more striking.” On the one hand, “Kramnick neither advocates nor denounces any particular approach to literary studies” and, on the other hand, his writing style is never as contentious as Barthes’s (McLemee 2023). Provided that Kramnick intends to comment on the foundational method of the discipline, it is expected that he does not engage in theoretical disputes. And as *Criticism and Truth* (2023) is not a reply to another scholar’s accusations but a response to a reality and a demand of change, one might logically expect that the style is more discursive than polemical.

Nevertheless, the title and the format of the book are not the only elements which can be related to Barthes’s *Critique et vérité*. The French critic proposes ideas which can be reflected in Kramnick’s text. Indeed, the absence of any direct reference to Barthes may suggest that certain principles from *Critique et vérité* have permeated the foundations of Kramnick’s view of literary criticism to the extent that there is no need to cite him. One of these ideas is that criticism continually welcomes new voices, new questions that push critical inquiry further, and new ways of expressing this truth. This can be seen in Kramnick’s emphasis given to younger scholars and in the insistence that literary criticism needs to be a field in constant evolution. Similarly, *Critique et vérité* claims that “the old” or traditional must give way to “the new” so that criticism is still meaningful in the present ([1966] 2007, 2). There is no sense in enclosing meaning in a concrete interpretation since meaning itself is to change over time. Criticism, thus, is always undergoing renovation.

The second similitude lies in Barthes’s perception that being a writer is not a status, but is derived from the possession of “awareness of discourse” ([1966] 2007, 23). Writers, according to Barthes, notice that “language constitutes a problem” ([1966] 2007, 24), it is not univocal, but multifarious. The recognition of language as problematic leads to the assertion that “the writer and the critic come together, working on the same difficult tasks and faced with the same object: language” ([1966] 2007, 24). The centrality of language is as well present in Kramnick’s work in the fact that literature and criticism share the same medium. Moreover, any time Kramnick claims that criticism tells truths about “the world,” he of course means “language, the only kind of thing one could embed or extend in a sentence” (2023, 97). Language thus is central in both critics’ perspectives to the point that it determines the role of the writer and conditions the procedures of the critic.

In the second part of *Critique et vérité*, Barthes deals with the three possible discourses which can be adopted in criticism. Of these three discourses—*science*, *criticism*, *reading*—the latter two influence some aspects of *Criticism and Truth*. With regard to the discourse of *criticism*, Barthes proposes three constraints, namely, intelligibility, coherence, and consistency of the approach to the work ([1966] 2007, 33–35). Kramnick’s argument that criticism is to follow “the constraints of what it is given” (2023, 71) seems to bear a particular resemblance to Barthes’s idea. In relation to the discourse of *reading*, contrary to the French critic, Kramnick does not distinguish between reading and writing: it is one and the same process. For this reason, Kramnick insistence that reading is not an activity done by the eyes, but that it is a hands-on activity seems to be a concealed reply to Barthes. Indeed, *Criticism and Truth* seems to reverse Barthes’s own terms: “‘approaching’ a text, not with one’s eyes, but with writing, creates an abyss between criticism and reading” (Barthes [1966] 2007, 39). Contrary to this, as has been pointed out, in Kramnick’s unitary perspective there is no such an abyss between criticism and reading.

<sup>1</sup> “If he writes about Racine and if he publishes that which he writes, this means that he thinks that his subjectivity is universalisable and that he believes in the value of what he offers” (my translation).

Besides Barthes's presence, *Criticism and Truth* is remarkable for having found common ground in the discipline of literary studies. Yet while reading the book one has the impression that apart from the threat of the economic and social repercussions of COVID-19, literary studies might be losing its *raison d'être*. Kramnick's need to write this book entails that too much influence from other disciplines upon criticism might be dangerous for the continuing existence of literary studies as an independent discipline. Kramnick tells that criticism generates truth, whilst at the same time, advocates the independence of the field. He stresses on several occasions that close reading and the practice of quotation are particular to literary criticism. And he contrasts criticism's approaching use of language with linguistics' and art history's distancing so that criticism is gauged according to its own value.

Nonetheless, this clear-cut delimitation of the discipline is not accompanied by a similar determination of the object of study. Kramnick consistently repeats that criticism elaborates truths about the world. In relation to the specificity of literary criticism, Kramnick states that "beyond the rudimentary sense that every kind of inquiry attaches a practice to a corner of the world, there is no single method that applies to the whole of learning, nor even within any branch of learning" (2023, 27); he later insists on this same idea since "the only special feature of the disciplines is the goal they have to explain and so transform the world" (2023, 65), or in other words, "the practice creates something from the materials it works with and so transforms as it explains the world" (2023, 66); or the case not just of criticism but of academic disciplines in general whose research and teaching try to "understand some part of the world" (2023, 84). These are some examples of the numerous instances in which Kramnick makes use of the term "world" in order to allude to the object of study of criticism. This enigma is solved at the end, where he claims that "when I have used the term 'world' in formulations like this, I of course have meant language, the only kind of thing one could embed or extend in a sentence. What is gotten right in this respect are usually works of literature, however we may choose to define the term" (2023, 97). It might be symptomatic that a text which articulates a forthright defence of a discipline has nevertheless to wait until the penultimate page to define the object of study of this discipline. And it might be even more symptomatic that this object of study cannot be defined. Indeed, the book is rightly titled *Criticism and Truth* (2023), because the term *literary* constitutes a problem. The same could well be said about literary studies. Provided that *literary* is complicated to define, one wonders what is left to study specifically in this domain. In relation to Kramnick's argument, the particular method of criticism—close reading—is clear by the end of the book, but there remains one question unanswered, namely: close reading is the method used to understand linguistic artifacts, but what is specific of literary artifacts that we should keep seeking truth there in literature departments?

Not only is it a question of defining the object of study so that we can determine what part of the world is approached, but also on what grounds truth is judged. The institutional practice of academia sets itself as an arbiter; the presence of experts in it helps distinguish expertise from novelty; the peer review process passes judgement of quality collaboratively. Yet what determines a *true* reading from a *false* one is not that clear. Kramnick invokes the criteria of truth, such as the fact that in-sentence quotation "is steeped in norms of perspicuity, elegance, and evidence—norms of explanation that govern any field of study even as they vary according to field of study" (2023, 36). In the article "Criticism and Truth" (2021a) Kramnick defines truth in note five as "perspicuity, elegance, and persuasiveness in an explanatory context" (2021a, 220) and in the reply to Brenkman's response, Kramnick claims that "without any claim to truth, without any sense of what is apt, adroit, and perspicuous, we are left merely as a discipline of persuasion" (2021b, 175). All these criteria might be summed up into "much of literary criticism turns on the art of quoting well" (2023, 33). Nonetheless, these criteria are never explained. It seems that the book decides to dodge the question of how truth is evaluated, possibly because it is so clear that it does not need further comments, or due to the self-imposed restrictions of planning to write a short book and avoiding overcomplicating its contents. Yet the argument seems to be incomplete without this explanation. Taking into account that *Criticism and Truth* (2023) is presented as a bulwark of literary criticism as an epistemic discipline, these qualities of aptness, adroitness, perspicuity, and elegance might have been developed so that a reductionism such as "the words fit the explanandum, or they don't" (2023, 89) could be avoided. Moreover, this delimitation could help explain why experts in the skill are so, besides their position as scholars. Otherwise, one has the impression of coming across a circular argument in the sense that renowned experts justify their status on their experience and capacity to recognise truth, and at the same time, it is this capacity to recognise truth what sets them as experts.

At this point, it is clear for everyone that the literary humanities are in crisis. *Criticism and Truth* (2023) is an attempt to reverse the situation with the intention of procuring a future to new generations. Kramnick as an established professor at Yale did not have the need to speak up, and still he wrote this book. Before anything else, this effort and involvement must be appreciated. The book sheds light on how literary critics work. Its democratic perspective as well serves as a point of encounter from different approaches and spaces; it is not just limited to the academia. While reading it, one feels directly addressed, the style never becomes tedious, and there is no doubt that it contributes to the reappraisal of literary criticism. However, a limitless object of study—literature—, and indefinite criteria to assess truth might be considered the only aspects that could refrain this book from becoming a breakthrough in literary criticism. It has set the path, though.

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