

The Linguistic Image of the World and Image Schemas: an attempt at their delimitation and comparison

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Abstract. This article is a review of a few essential aspects of one of the famous Slavic linguistic schools —the Polish ethnolinguistic school of Lublin. This school developed the theory of *językowy obraz świata* (in Polish) or *языковaja kartina mira* (in Russian), which is generally translated in English as ‘Linguistic Image of the World’ (LIW). The Linguistic Image of the World takes into account the sociocultural embeddedness of language and cognition. We will compare this theory with embodiment models —Image Schemas. The paper is organised in four parts: (1) a brief review of relevant studies related to the Theory of Linguistic Image of the World; (2) an introduction to some essential aspects of Image Schemas, as representative of the standard Cognitive Linguistics approach, together with a brief analysis of some examples; (3) a description of LIW, highlighting some basic notions such as the stereotype and clarifying its relationship with the prototype; and (4) conclusions on the central role of culture in the process of conceptualization.

Keywords: Linguistic image of the world, image schema, prototype, stereotype, cognitive definition.

[es] La imagen lingüística del mundo y esquemas de imagen: un intento de delimitación y comparación

Resumen. Este artículo es una revisión de los aspectos esenciales de una de las célebres escuelas lingüísticas eslavas: la escuela etnolingüística polaca de Lublin. Esta escuela desarrolló la teoría de *językowy obraz świata* (en polaco) o *языковaja kartina mira* (en ruso), que se suele traducir en inglés como “Linguistic Image of the World” (LIW). La Imagen Lingüística del Mundo tiene en cuenta la posición sociocultural del lenguaje y de la cognición. Compararemos esta teoría con los modelos corporeizados: Esquemas de Imagen. El artículo está organizado en cuatro apartados: (1) estudios relevantes de la Teoría de la Imagen Lingüística del Mundo; (2) introducción a algunos aspectos esenciales de los Esquemas de Imagen, como representante del enfoque estándar de Lingüística Cognitiva, junto a un breve análisis de algunos ejemplos; (3) descripción de la Imagen Lingüística del Mundo, destacando algunas nociones básicas como el estereotipo y aclarando su relación con el prototipo; y (4) conclusiones sobre el papel central de la cultura en el proceso de conceptualización.

Palabras clave: Imagen lingüística del mundo, esquema de imagen, prototipo, estereotipo, definición cognitiva.

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1. Introduction

The notion of the *językowy obraz świata* (in Polish) or *языковaja kartina mira* (in Russian), translated in English as *Linguistic Image of the World* (LIW), is a major principle of the Ethnolinguistics School of Lublin, whose main representative is Jerzy Bartmiński. Ethnolinguistics investigates language in its relation to culture, group mentality, people’s beliefs and behaviours (Niebrzegowska-Bartmińska 2013: 199). Lublin ethnolinguistics is close to other Slavic ethnolinguistic schools, particularly Nikita Tolstoy & Svetlana Tolstaja’s dialectological school and Vyacheslav Ivanov’s & Vladimir Toporov’s etymological school.

Some significant features of the theory of the linguistic image of the world are subjective, anthropocentric and cultural ways of interpreting the world and checking the meaning through the analysis of linguistic data (grammar, vocabulary, texts). In studies of the linguistic image of the world, relevant and inspiring terms developed by modern cognitive semantics are *stereotype theory* (Putnam 1975), *prototype theory* (Rosch 1973, 1975, 1978), *ICM* (Lakoff 1987), *conceptual metaphors* (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), *image schemas* (Johnson 1987, Lakoff 1987), *cognitive grammar* (Langacker 1987) and the famous *conceptual/semantic frames* (Minsky 1980, Fillmore 1984). Frame theo-

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ry describes standard types of situations that can be defined as collections of cases (*case frames*). Fillmore proposed a new level of generalization when he explored deep cases (i.e., semantic roles). Also worth mentioning are the considerable similarities between some crucial ideas of Frame theory and certain Russian studies, for instance, those independently developed earlier by Ju. Apresjan (1967). Furthermore, in 1967, Ju. Apresjan explicitly formulated some key points that later appeared in Fillmore's Construction Grammar:

It turns out that in 1967, Ju. D. Apresjan explicitly formulated at least some key points of Construction Grammar: the interaction of semantics and syntax (the restructuring of syntactic models by analogy and coercion types of semantic shifts), as well as the interdependence of restrictions between different variables in the construction (author's translation) (Rakhilina & Plungian 2010: 551-552).

Moreover, in studies on the linguistic image of the world, Apresjan's notion of *naive image* is also relevant and inspiring. The linguistic image of the world is "naive" in Apresjan's understanding. Additionally, the naive image has a connection with Folk Theories (Tolstaja 2006, Bartmiński 1980), which were later used by Bartmiński to define the linguistic image of the world:

...the interpretation of reality encoded in a given language, which can be captured in the form of judgements about the world. The judgements can be either entrenched in the language, its grammatical forms, lexicon and 'frozen' texts (e.g. proverbs) or implied by them [...] It unites people in a given social environment, creates a community of thoughts, feelings and values (Bartmiński 2009: 23, 76).

Hence, language is considered in the context of culture. In cognitive linguistics, this interpretation of reality is quite different in the basic form of schematization, the *image schema*. According to Johnson, the image schemas "emerge as meaningful structures for us chiefly at the level of our bodily movements through space, our manipulations of objects, and our perceptual interactions" (Johnson 1987: 29). In this paper, we attempt to delimit and compare *linguistic image of the world* and *image schema* as well as the relationship between the auxiliary terms *stereotype* and *prototype*.

2. Image schema

Image schema is a notion that first appears in the works of M. Johnson & G. Lakoff in the 1980s. The authors built a theory on a close connection between our everyday experience of repeating patterns and image schemas. The concept of the image schemas is ultimately derived from Kant's term *Schema*.

2.1. Theoretical basis

The image schema is one of M. Johnson's most important contributions (1987). He considers the notion and term *image schema* as an extensive, "more basic" form of schematization and "continuous structures of an organizing activity" (Johnson 1987: 30). The theoretical basis of the image schema is contained in the *embodied mind hypothesis*. According to Johnson, the image schema is a general pattern or an abstract structure that exists in our minds, based on our everyday experience of repetitive patterns:

...in order to have meaningful, connected experiences that we can comprehend and reason about, there must be pattern and order to our actions, perceptions, and conceptions. A schema is a recurrent pattern, shape, and regularity in, or of, these ongoing ordering activities (Johnson 1987: 29).

Such models represent the primary resources by which we create or establish order. Image schemas often do not exist as separate entities, but rather as basic mental structures that reveal a high degree of compatibility (Johnson 1987).

Lakoff (1987) uses the term *image schema* as a structuring principle for *idealized cognitive models* (ICMs), which are mental representations of our knowledge. Basically, in the cognitive process ICMs organize our everyday experiences and previous knowledge, thus leading to categorization and reasoning. ICM is a "complex structured whole, a gestalt, which uses four kinds of structuring principles: propositional structure, image-schematic structure, metaphoric mappings and metonymic mappings", and the activity of each of them is a source of prototype effects (Lakoff 1987: 68). In this sense, prototype effects are an indirect effect of categorization. Oakley, using Lakoff's concepts, describes the ICM of *library*:

...an idealized cognitive model for library consists of a prototype and several less-than-prototypical instances (e.g., noncirculating libraries) constituting a radial semantic network of interrelated meanings. Image schemas and their transformations operate as structuring principles of the idealized cognitive model: they 'glue' these complex networks together (Oakley 2010: 218).

This “glue” plays the structuring role in various types of ICMs. For example, image-schematic models are specific schematic representations of images, such as trajectories or long, thin shapes or a container. Moreover, Lakoff and Johnson work on conceptual metaphor, where the metaphorical understanding of our experience is analysed in terms of image schemas. Thus, image schemas serve as the basis for metaphorical and metonymic models and represent the idealized abstraction of certain patterns in our bodily experience, which we use every day to conceptualize aspects of our life.

2.2. Examples

Oakley (2010) provides one example of analysis of complex conceptualizations in terms of the image schema, where the library routine represents an image-schematic profile:

...performing a mundane activity, such as walking to a library, selecting a book from the collection, bringing it to the circulation desk, checking it out, and taking it home, is of complexity far outstripping any known formal description of it. Such routines involve the coordination of multiple acts of sensing, perceiving, moving, and conceptualizing in a three-dimensional world (Oakley 2010: 214).

Oakley goes on to explain that these activities depend on a long history of simpler experiential patterns filtered through culture that still are not well understood, but for many cognitive linguists image schema has become a supporting structure for human thought and language. This process “going to the library” appropriates the following image-schematic profile: SOURCE-PATH-GOAL-CONTAINER-COLLECTION-PART-WHOLE-TRANSFER-ITERATION. Oakley proposes several approaches: why not specify image schemas for BALANCE, COUNTERFORCE, CONTACT, COMPULSION and NEAR-FAR as a part of the profile if we can represent that “walking entails BALANCE, opening the library doors entails COUNTERFORCE, transfer entails CONTACT, estimating one’s progress along a path to a destination entails certain NEAR-FAR orientations” (Oakley 2010: 229). In Oakley’s opinion, an image-schematic profile is insufficient, and there is no consensus on the exact number of image schemas. Moreover, he doubts that an image-schematic account can be exhaustive. Currently, we do not know what the most essential schemas are and how we can group them, if indeed levels of schematization exist and if systematic investigation is even possible.

Krzeszowski (1993, 1997, 1999) made some attempts at systematization, building on the work of Lakoff and Johnson. In his theory he developed an important element, which he called “axiological parameter”, and he assumed a closer connection between language and values. The GOOD-BAD opposition is all-important and has already appeared in preconceptual image schemas. These schemas are based on the orientational oppositions UP-DOWN, FRONT-BACK, LEFT-RIGHT, as well as on a small number of basic oppositions such as PART-WHOLE, CENTRE-PERIPHERY and SOURCE-PATH-GOAL. In the domain of values, Krzeszowski distinguishes two coordinates: horizontal (a scale of positive and negative values) and vertical, hierarchical, based on the experience of reality as a Great Chain of Being, in which God and people are at the “top”, whereas animals, plants and non-organic beings are at “lower” levels (Bartmiński 2009: 39). Oakley (2010: 230) writes that “image schemas seem to exhibit such a wide variety of instantiations with these distinguishing and common features, that systematic investigation may seem impossible”. Even so, the *axiological parameter*, which we will turn to below, is sufficiently developed in the theory of the Linguistic Image of the World.

Moreover, some linguists raise objections concerning the origin of image schemas. Sinha & Jensen de López (2000), in their linguistic research on first language acquisition, do not agree with a rigid version of the embodiment hypothesis, which affirms that bodily experience structures most, if not all, psychological and interpersonal spheres through metaphors. They also suggest a strong role for sociocultural context and the artefactual composition of cultural settings in cognitive development. Their studies focused on children’s acquisition and use of English, Danish and Zapotec locatives, for example *in* or *under*. Danish- and English-acquiring children, for the most part, have a world of richly diverse sets of artefacts, and most of them have specific functions. Zapotec-acquiring children, on the other hand, largely grow up in material cultures with few artefacts, which generally have many uses. One such artefact is a basket, a useful object for Zapotec cultures in southern Mexico. The baskets can be used to *cover something up* (e.g., tortillas, for storage, for catching chickens) or *place an object in*. Therefore, in Zapotec culture, containment in an “inverted” basket (*under*) is equally as important as canonical orientation (*in*). This is not the same for English- or Danish-speaking cultures (Oakley 2010). Although Image Schemas Theory asserts its universal character, it is evident that different cultures have different conceptualizations even in the language acquisition process.

The study of the relationship between language and culture long predates the emergence of Cognitive Linguistics. This relationship plays, from the beginning, a fundamental role in the Theory of Linguistic Image of the World on which our work is based. Even so, it is necessary to mention the work of Zoltán Kövecses (2005, 2015), Ning Yu (2009) in Cognitive Linguistics and the work of Strauss, and Quinn (1997) in anthropology, all of them within the area of study of this paper.

2.3. Cultural aspects

As stated above, image schemas serve as the basis for metaphorical models. Zinken (2003: 131) explains the assumed chain in Conceptual Metaphor Theory (CMT) (Lakoff & Johnson 1999) as a process that goes “from sensori-motor experience to image schemas to abstract concepts to linguistic expressions”. Similarly, Fontecha & Jiménez Catalán describe features that characterize a metaphor:

First, it is systematic, since in each and all of its possible instantiations we identify an identical type of structure made up of a mapping of correspondences between a *source* (animals) and *target domain* (people). Second, it is grounded in our experience with people and animals, and, as a result, with our understanding of the nature of things and its relation to behaviour. Third, it is based on the Generic is Specific Metaphor which allows the mapping of generic information from the *source domain* to a specific instantiation in the *target domain*. Fourth, it implies a vertical hierarchical organization of beings (Fontecha & Jiménez Catalán 2003: 774).

Fontecha & Jiménez Catalán use Lakoff & Turner's (1989) theory: "the mechanism upon which the Animal Metaphor is based is the Great Chain Metaphor". However, the Ethnolinguistics School of Lublin, which we are following in this paper, thinks somewhat differently about metaphor:

The ESL (Ethnolinguistics School of Lublin) understanding of metaphor is indeed more traditional than the CMT understanding. Instead of regarding as metaphorical everything that is not directly available to sensori-motor experience, it regards as metaphorical such linguistic acts in which a speaker actively remoulds an aspect of the culturally situated, conventional picture of the world (Zinken 2003: 132).

Thus, we will analyse the following examples in terms of the image schema model: *source domain* (animal) and *target domain* (human being). These models indicate that the person referred to embodies the characteristics of a certain animal, at least in American English: *She is a cow* ('she is fat'). The *Collins Dictionary* (2019) gives seven meanings of "cow":

1. A cow is a large female animal that is kept on farms for its milk. People sometimes refer to male and female animals of this species as cows.
2. See also cattle.
3. Some female animals, including elephants and whales, are called cows.
4. If someone describes a woman as a cow, they dislike her and think that she is unpleasant or stupid [informal, offensive, disapproval].
5. If someone is cowed, they are made afraid, or made to behave in a particular way because they have been frightened or badly treated.
6. See (do sthg) until the cows come home.
7. See also mad cow disease, sacred cow (*Collins Dictionary* 2019).

However, the meaning 'she is fat' is not included. The *Urban Dictionary* (2005) gives one meaning of *cow*: "Some girl who is being a total bitch, particularly offensive as it is basically calling them fat, and we know they don't like that". Also, in López Rodríguez we can find the definition of cow as a "nasty or fat woman" (2007: 24): "the names of big animals usually imply fatness and ugliness, as observed in the figurative usages of cow/vaca (an ugly fat woman)" (2009: 88). So, the fact that the definition 'she is fat' cannot be found in a *scientific definition* (*Collins Dictionary*) suggests the existence of a *cognitive definition*, as introduced by Bartmiński, as a part of linguistic image of the world. We will turn to this point in section 3.

In the case of the metaphor *she is a cow*, only one part of the general knowledge about cows is selected, that represents the external appearance and general physical characteristics.

For some European cultures, for example in Spain, when a woman is compared to a cow, as in the frequently used phrase *está hecha una vaca* (literally 'she looks like a cow', used as an insult to mean 'she is fat'), the metaphor refers to features of the animal not included in the standard normative dictionary (*DRAE*). According to Fernández Fontecha & Jiménez Catalán (2003: 791), in Latin America, comparing a woman to a cow is equivalent to calling her a prostitute. But this is not the only case. In Italian, in the *Grande Dizionario Italiano Hoepli* di Gabrielli Aldo (2015), we can find not only overall size and overall physical characteristics as the features taken into account for the metaphors, but also a negative meaning similar to that existing in Latin America: "3. fig., spreg. Donna sciatta e sformata; 4. fig., spreg., volg. Donna priva di pudore || Prostituta". Considering metaphors as cultural constructs reveals that culturally determined interpretations are quite common and show striking differences. These two variants 'she is fat' in Spain and 'prostitute' in Latin America represent two diverse linguistic images of the world.

In India, the cow is a sacred animal. As such, it exemplifies a very distinct linguistic image of the world from the previous ones. The Rgveda are the texts of the ancient collection of *Vedic* hymns. In these texts, the cow metaphors are among the most popular and most frequently used. Cows evoke the kindest, warmest, most peaceful feelings in people, and they are admired for their restraint and generosity. A cow symbolizes fertility and abundance, together with wealth and feelings of gratitude towards nature and admiration for the nutritional properties of their milk. The metaphor of the cow is used to represent vital phenomena in people's lives: the morning dawn and its rays, the Sun, the Earth, day and night, etc. These phenomena take on the characteristics of a real cow. Sacred speech, which was created by poets in hymns, also incorporated the metaphor of the cow. Thus, sacred speech was united with the most valuable material thing: a cow. Poetic inspiration also correlated with a cow and its milk. For example, rain clouds are bulls and milk cows from Indra (a Vedic deity in Hinduism), while rain is milk: "...The divine shakers milk the divine udder, they make earth swell with milk, running around" (Rgveda in Joanna Jurewicz 2014: 108).

The blend of udder and womb is expressed in the examples where *udder* denotes the birthplace of the Rgveda gods of rain, the Maruts, the sons of the god Rudra: "...when Rudra, the bull, gave birth to you in the udder of the dappled cow, O Maruts..." (Rgveda in Joanna Jurewicz 2014: 103).

In this last example, the cosmos is understood in terms of a bull and a cow: the earth is a cow, and the sky is a bull. This is not surprising since farming was one of the main occupations of the Rgveda people and farm animals played a crucial role in the conceptualization of cosmic, ritual and cognitive processes. It is evident that without a cultural approach, it is impossible to understand these expressions. If hypothetically we were to compare a woman to a cow in India, the reaction would be positive. Obviously, it implies that image-schemas (and metaphors) have an essential cultural component.

If we look further at animal metaphors in Lakoff's terms, *source domain* and *target domain*, we observe the same lack of a cultural component for comprehension between different languages. If we consider the example *she is a fox* ('she is attractive'), the first thing that calls our attention is the male form being used for a woman, which is employed to speak positively about her. However, if we use the female form *vixen*, it holds a negative connotation: "vixen 1. a female fox. 2. an ill-tempered, shrewish, or malicious woman" (*Collins Dictionary* 2019).

In English, the characteristic of craftiness, which belongs to the male form *fox*, in the metaphorical use of *vixen*, moves towards negative features such as spitefulness. When we say that a woman is a *vixen*, we mean that she is spiteful, shrewish and ill-tempered. Also, in Spanish the metaphorical meaning of the masculine term *zorro* does not connote characteristics that are as negative as those connoted by the feminine ones. The metaphor's formation with the female *zorra* (as in, *ella es una zorra*) means she is a prostitute. Interestingly, in Italian only the female form *volpe* exists, and is defined as a very astute person, shrewd: "Persona molto astuta, scaltra: essere una vecchia v.; l'opere mie non furon leonine ma di v. Dante" (*Grande dizionario Hoepli italiano* 2015).

In Russian, the metaphor *ona lisa* ('she is a vixen') is used to refer to a female. This animal is portrayed by a female image in Slavic mythology, where she personifies Mokosh, the goddess of the harvest. Mokosh is the protector of women's work and women's destiny, and the vixen was her sacred animal. The expression *khitraja kak lisa* (literally 'sly as a vixen') has long existed in Russian. The trickiness of the fox is not considered a negative quality. In Russian culture, cunning is associated with ingenuity, wit. The Slavs revered the fox for this, and she is a common character in Russian folklore. While this happens in Slavic cultures, in Western Europe those positive values are exclusive to the male. There are a lot of folk tales in Russian culture with this character, that is why she has different affectionate names such as *кума*, which means Godmother Fox, *Lisa Patrikeevna* (meaning Vixen Patrikas's daughter, named after knyaz Patrikas, who was known as a very sly politician), *Lisička-sestrička* ('Vixen-sister'). In fact, expressions such as *kuma* and *Patrikeevna* can be used in speech without the first part *lisa* ('vixen') as can be expressions such as *Nu, ty Patrikeevna!* ('You are Patrikeevna!'). The cultural component of this metaphor is obvious in this example. The naive image of the world in different cultures —as for example the Spanish and the Russian ones— opens significant perspectives, as we can see relevant cognitive changes depending on the cultural and social environment.

But the example *she is a fox* versus *she is a vixen* is not the only case in English where exclusively the male form is used to speak in positive terms. For example, *bachelor party*, a "stag party held for a bachelor (usually on the night before he is married)" (*Collins Dictionary* 2019), has a long history due to a long use of *bachelor* as "a man who has never been married" (*Collins Dictionary* 2019), and its meaning is positive. The female equivalent of *bachelor* is *spinster*, whose definition has negative connotations: "a woman who has never been married; used especially when talking about an old or middle-aged woman" (*Collins Dictionary* 2019). Thus, a *spinster party*, were the concept to exist to describe a party for a woman on the eve of her marriage, could never have a positive connotation. The term *bachelorette party* has a short history, because the word *bachelorette* did not exist until recently. This term was derived from the masculine form "bachelor" to preserve the positively valued elements of fun and party, among others. An article from the American Association for the Advancement of Science was titled "Bachelorette parties a sign of a new sexuality for women":

The very existence of the bachelorette party is evidence of women's status transformation. Men had bachelor parties because they were about to be trapped in marriage. Prior to the past approximately 30 years, women did not have similar parties because it was not believed that they were giving anything up in marriage [...] As the sexual double standard lost some of its power and as women's rights and freedoms became more pronounced, it has become more socially acceptable for women to acknowledge that they, too, are entitled to a "last night of freedom" (American Association for the Advancement of Science).

As we see, in this way, associated values within the different cultures have a major influence on the language. Without this cultural approach, it is impossible to understand these expressions. For instance, a Polish follower of Lakoff & Johnson and their embodiment hypothesis, Krzeszowski (1993, 1997, 1999) worked on the *axiological parameter*, which can include values, but this part still has not received sufficient attention. Significantly, the axiological parameter was well developed within the theory of the Linguistic Image of the World. Image schemas need an underlying "institutionalized" cultural "world view" (Hampe 2005: 6). A "naturalistic, biologically informed approach to human cognition" does not preclude "the recognition of a constitutive role in it of culture" (Sinha 2002: 273). When we are analysing image schemas and metaphors, we need for them to have an essential cultural component.

The theory of the image schema was further developed in Sharifian's *Cultural Linguistics* (2011), where he formulates the concept of *cultural schema*, a new notion related to image schema: image schemas are "recurring cognitive structures which establish patterns of understanding and reasoning, and are often formed from our knowledge of our body as well as social interactions" (Sharifian 2011: 4), while cultural schemas reflect beliefs, norms, rules

and expectations of behaviour, as well as values related to various aspects and components of experience. Cultural categories are primarily reflected in the vocabulary of human languages: “Cultural metaphors are cross-domain conceptualizations that have their conceptual basis grounded in cultural traditions such as folk medicine, worldview, or a spiritual belief system” (Sharifian 2017: 4).

An idea closely related to Sharifian forms part of Bartmiński’s theory, on which this paper is based. While analysing examples of *she is a cow*, *she is a fox* in different languages, we attempt to create the cognitive definition proposed by Bartmiński. He introduced a few key “conceptual tools”, such as the stereotype, and the cognitive definition, and we will turn to these points in section 3.

3. Linguistic image of the world

J. Bartmiński pays special attention to the conceptual organization of lexico-semantic fields, and the semantic and cultural content of many words, with some of his contributions referencing the work of Apresjan (1995). Bartmiński’s ethnolinguistics is based on a linguistic foundation that allows us to reconstruct the linguistic image of the world, which is always oriented towards, and related to, the subject in a specific cultural community.

In 2009, Jörg Zinken (Bartmiński & Zinken 2009) proposed the term “ethnolinguistics” as “cognitive ethnolinguistics”, focusing on the reconstruction of the LIW of a given linguistic community and on the central notion of stereotypes as socially entrenched images of people, things and events. A key analytic tool is the *cognitive definition*.

3.1. Cognitive definition

Cognitive definition is a new understanding of definition, where language is considered in the context of culture. Besides, the content and the form of the definitions are based on subject-oriented reconstruction principles, which reflect common experience, as well as colloquial conceptualization, categorization and colloquial (or popular) knowledge of the world:

The cognitive definition aims to portray how an entity is viewed by the speakers of a language, to represent socio-culturally established and linguistically entrenched knowledge, its categorisation and valuation [...] The defined entity is a ‘mental object’ (Bartmiński 2009: 67).

Moreover, with the *cognitive definition*, Bartmiński introduces the concept of *encyclopaedic (scientific) definition* that allows to distinguish the linguistic lexicon from the encyclopaedic lexicon, folk knowledge from scientific knowledge. The encyclopaedic definition is purely objective: it describes things in the real world, but not the way in which they are called and the form in which they are represented linguistically. A definition of a cognitive type takes into account not only what is necessary and sufficient (to identify the object denoted by the word), but, in general, all the attributes of the object that are relevant for perception. Furthermore, these attributes are fixed in the speaker’s language and grounded in a certain culture. For example, Bartmiński illustrates summarized cognitive definitions of Polish *strzygón* (‘vampire’) in *Aspects of Cognitive Ethnolinguistics*:

STRZYGÓN ‘vampire’
a fright with double rows of teeth, a pale face, livid marks on the back, blood behind fingernails, closed eyes
comes out of the coffin at midnight and roams the earth in silence, strangles people
appears at night and disappears when the rooster crows
can be made powerless by driving an aspen pin or a nail into its head
(Bartmiński 2009: 29).

In Bartmiński’s view the word “meaning” is a culturally determined interpretation of the world, and definitions should bring this interpretation to the surface. On the contrary, the *image schema* in animal metaphors allows for analysis only in *source domain-target domain* terms: they indicate that the person embodies the characteristics of the animal. In the case of a *fox*, as in *she is a fox*, in English this metaphor refers to a person’s appearance, while in Spanish *ella es una zorra* refers to the behaviour. But the *cognitive definition* includes stereotyped features and assists in reconstructing the traditional image of the world, the *linguistic image of the world*. The *cognitive definition* implies different interpretations, depending on the culture; for instance, the following could be a brief cognitive definition of *cow* for the Rgveda people:

(1) COW
a sacred animal
denotes the earth
gives milk, which represents rain
symbolizes fertility and abundance

Culture is part of the language, because the language that has grown with the community was also shaped to express the culture of that community: “cultural concepts are embedded in language, and the architecture of each language contains culturally specific features” (Janda 2007). These include both lexical and grammatical characteristics, as seen in some of the examples we highlighted in section 2.

3.2. Stereotypes and prototypes

According to Bartmiński, *stereotypes*, following Putman and Lippman, are segments of the LIW, mental images of how something looks, what something is like and how something functions (Lippmann 1922, Putnam 1973):

... kind of collection of trivial bits of information about an object, accompanied by the establishment of the place of the object's name in the lexical system of the language, gives an extensive characteristic of the subject, involves it into an extensive network of relationships, reconstructs its socially entrenched linguo-cultural picture (Bartmiński 2009: 31).

Bartmiński suggests studying stereotypes as a stable (reproduced from memory) combination of semantic and/or formal characteristics, because stereotypes encompass the semantic and formal level of language (Bartmiński 2009: 62-65). In some semantic works, the stereotype converges or even coincides with Rosch's *prototype* (1973, 1975, 1978). Geeraerts, in *Prototypes, Stereotypes and Semantic Norms* (Geeraerts 2008: 26), defines the prototype as an essentially psychological notion, whereas the stereotype is sociolinguistic: “A socially determined minimum set of data with regard to the extension of a category”. Prototypes are psychological notions with an individual status. Stereotypes, on the other hand, are social entities; they indicate what a speaker belonging to a linguistic community is supposed to know about the referents of the categories he uses, due to the principle of the division of linguistic labour (Putnam 1973). The division of linguistic labour is Putnam's hypothesis according to which experts know the scientific criteria for defining extension, and the rest has only the minimum amount of information (including the stereotype) sufficient to understand and to use the word. So, semantic knowledge is distributed unevenly among members of the linguistic community. For example, the Chinese use the term “jade” to refer to two different minerals, jadeite and nephrite.

According to Popovich (2010), the prototype is formed in childhood and is relevant to the learning process. As we integrate ourselves into society, the stereotype displaces the prototype in the process of the conceptualization of reality.

For Bartmiński, stereotypes are a stable combination of semantic, formal characteristics and a part of the LIW; they differ from the prototype in their essentially cultural, supra-individual character (Bernárdez 2019). As stated above, the Indian idea of a *cow* is distinguished from the European one. This difference is based on culturally specific features. A collection of trivial bits of information about a *cow* will come together in stereotypes developed from a system of norms and values. Therefore, stereotype is a flexible tool that can change depending on the culture. The stereotype's properties are the coupling of the descriptive characteristics of the object and the speaker's value system. This determines the subjective nature of the *naive image* of the world (Apresjan 1995), in which objective knowledge goes through a process of transformation in the public consciousness according to a point of view, which includes a system of norms and evaluations.

3.3. Linguistic Image of the World

Stereotypes are fragments, “building blocks” (Zinken 2004: 116) of the LIW. As such, they are more relevant to the specifics of linguistic image of the world that exist in cognition, and they are fixed and manifest in language. As people integrate into society, they see the world according to the parameters of a given image of the world. Lotman writes, “The world of ideas is inseparable from the world of people, and ideas are inseparable from everyday reality” (Lotman 1994). Apresjan emphasized the prescientific nature of the LIW, calling it a *naive image*. In his view, the LIW supplements the objective meanings of reality, often distorting them (Apresjan 1995: 350). *Naive*, however, does not mean primitive. The naive image of the world is the experience of many generations, so *naive* is related to the reflection of everyday life, the ordinary perception of things, which is contrary to their scientific understanding and explanation. It is constructed by a human being, subjective, adapted to social needs and an ethnocentric mentality. In Apresjan's term, language is a specific way of conceptualizing reality (worldview), which is partly universal, partly nationally specific.

Sharing this view, we can also refer to Vygotsky's hypothesis of *cultural signs*, according to which a “person and a perceived object are seen not only as ‘directly’ connected but simultaneously as ‘indirectly’ connected through a medium constituted of artefacts (culture)” (Cole 1996: 119). The conception that unites language and thinking, with their linguistic and mental components, is the linguistic image of the world conception. Bartmiński (2009: 23) defines *the linguistic image of the world* (he uses the term *linguistic worldview*) as follows:

... a language-entrenched interpretation of reality, which can be expressed in the form of judgements about the world, people, things or events [...] It is clearly subjective and anthropocentric but also intersubjective (social) [...] It unites people in a given social environment, creates a community of thoughts, feelings and values (Bartmiński 2009: 23).

LIW is relativized by the accepted system of values from a culture. In Polish linguistics, the concepts of *value* and *axiological parameter* were partly formulated by Krzeszowski (1997, 1999). Bartmiński (2009) considers values to be the foundation of linguistic worldview, where values are a part of language as a distinct inventory of linguistic facts. For example, “the identification of categories such as weeds and corn derives from the pragmatic outlook onto the plant world typical of a farmer” (Bartmiński 2009: 29).

Thus, for instance, it seems obvious to Russian native speakers that human mental life is divided into intellectual and emotional, where the *head* is responsible for the intellectual work, and the *heart* for the emotional. Russians use the metaphor *svetlaja golova* (‘bright head’) and think about the head as an information storage device (Zaliznjak, Levontina & Shmelev 2005). It is true that in Russian *heart memory* exists, but it only takes into account emotional memory, not intellectual. If *vykinut* (‘to throw’) from the head means ‘forget’ or ‘stop thinking’ about someone or something, then *vyrvat’ iz serdtsa* (literally, ‘to tear [someone] out of the heart’) does not mean to ‘forget’, but rather means *razljubit* (‘stop loving’ or ‘attempt to stop loving’). Another example is the Russian proverb *S glaz doloy - iz serdtsa von* (equivalent to ‘out of sight, out of mind’). The second part of this proverb (*iz serdtsa von*, literally ‘out of heart’), in English is substituted by *out of mind*, which emphasizes the difference in conceptualization. For the Russian, the mind is a part of the *head*.

Also, when Russians get excited, they clutch their hearts, they feel with the heart. It could not be otherwise, and they cannot imagine a different image of the world. In the African language Dogon (West Africa, the Republic of Mali), the role that the heart plays is assigned to another internal organ—the liver:

Tommo-So
 Kindé m=mò bànáá wò.
 liver 1SG=POSS redder.PFV be
 ‘I am angry.’ (Lit. ‘My liver has become red.’) (McPherson, Prokhorov 2010).

So, when Dogon speakers worry, get angry or get excited, they feel discomfort in the liver; the expression *sweet liver* is used to express happiness. Of course, this is not related to peculiarities of their anatomy, but rather to the linguistic image of the world to which they are accustomed.

Differences in conceptualization are also manifested in the use of times of day in etiquette. For instance, the Russian *Dobroje utro!* (‘Good morning’) does not exist in Spanish, which instead uses *Buenos días* (which literally means ‘good day’, but in Spain is only said before lunchtime). Any equivalence here is strictly imaginary, because each language has its own principles to divide the day into periods. In Spain or England, a Russian may feel a cultural shock from a greeting. The fact that a stranger greets someone and asks him *How are you?* on the street, but then continues on their way with a completely apathetic face, is absolutely incomprehensible to Russians. In Russia, if someone asks somebody *How are you?*, the person is expected to answer. Otherwise, the person asking the question will feel that he has received an incomplete reaction to a stimulus.

Returning to the linguistic image of the world, we can conclude that this interpretation of reality can describe specific spaces that include judgements about the world, people, things or events. The fuzzy borders of LIW are the different languages, which are considered in the context of culture. It is also a fact that language is one of the main identifiers of ethnic groups and expresses their culture. Conversely, although it is widely thought that *image schemas* are universal, this idea falls apart when we begin to analyse various linguistic phenomena such as metaphor models and image schemas, where the lack of a cultural component is brought to the surface. As a result, the presence of essential cultural components in image schemas and metaphors is confirmed.

4. Conclusions

This paper has briefly reviewed Jonson’s and Lakoff’s image schemas and conceptual metaphors in comparison with Bartmiński’s linguistic image of the world. The aim of this paper has been to attempt to delimit and compare image schema and linguistic image of the world and provide a short analysis of some language data in the framework of Cognitive Linguistics. The theories of the LIW and the Image Schema can contribute to discussions concerning the role of culture.

The image schema is considered a basic mental structure predicated on our everyday experience of repeating patterns. Also, the metaphorical understanding of our experience is analysed in terms of image schemas. Oakley (2010) questioned if an image-schematic profile is sufficient, if levels of schematization exist and if systematic investigation is possible. Moreover, in first language acquisition, Sinha & Jensen de López (2000) suggest a strong role for sociocultural context and the artefactual composition of cultural settings. Continuing this idea, we have analysed metaphors in English *she is a cow*, in Spanish *está hecha una vaca*, and in Vedic, where the *cow* is conceptualized as a sacred animal, and we have concluded that we need to take into account the cultural component from diverse cultures and, consequently, different forms of metaphor conceptualization. Also, *she is a fox* in English, *ella es una zorra* in Spanish and *ona lisa* (‘she is a vixen’) in Russian provide further evidence of parallels between language and culture. If we want to speak in positive terms in Western Europe, we exclusively choose the male, with the female having a negative value. While this happens in Western Europe, in Slavic cultures the female has positive value.

So, in Conceptual Metaphor Theory, metaphor is regarded as a conceptual structure on the basis of an individual experience. However, the work of Bartmiński (2009) leads us to conclude that metaphor is a conceptual activity built on an image of the world. It would be reasonable to expect that languages and cultures develop and evolve together. The linguistic image of the world is a type of conception that unites language and thinking, with their linguistic and mental components. The LIW, with stereotypes (“building blocks”), is entrenched in language. Stereotype differs from prototype in its essentially cultural, supra-individual character, while prototype is a psychological notion with an individual status.

Universal metaphors or image schemas are based not only on universals of the human body, but also on universals of human culture. Therefore, the reconstruction of the LIW helps to gain new knowledge about the mind and our world, which we observe through the prism of experience, culture and society.

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