



Metaphoric and metonymic motivation in the Light Verb Construction with GIVE

Zbigniew Kopec

Institute of Linguistics, Jan Dlugosz University in Czestochowa, Poland ✉ 

Pilar Guerrero Medina

Department of English and German Studies, University of Córdoba (UCO) ✉ 

<https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/cjes.103616>

Recibido: 26/6/2025 / Aceptado: 11/09/2025

ENG Abstract: This article demonstrates that the English Light Verb Construction (henceforth LVC) with GIVE is motivated by generic-level metaphors and metonymies. Following Brugman (2001) and Cetnarowska (2012, 2014), LVCs are defined based on criteria that are notably less restrictive than those outlined by Dixon (2005) and Wierzbicka (1982). The study examines the GIVE LVC as a representative case to illustrate the broader pattern of metaphor-driven LVCs. In an LVC, the light verb evokes the source domain of a conceptual metaphor, while its nominal complement indicates the target domain. Thus, in the GIVE LVC, GIVE evokes the transfer schema. This schema, serving as the source domain of metaphors, is mapped onto the conceptual structures underlying the nominal complements of the light verb. Since event schemas represent distinct types of situations, each characterized by unique configurations of thematic roles, metaphoric mappings occur between these roles. However, in the absence of generic-level metonymies, such metaphoric mappings would not be viable. The Correlation Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez 2003) and the Mapping Enforcement Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005) facilitate metonymic mappings within the target domain, ensuring that conceptual projection from source to target remains systematically constrained.

Keywords: GIVE Light Verb Construction (LVC); generic-level metaphor and metonymy; metaphoric and metonymic mappings; thematic roles; transfer schema.

ES Motivación metafórica y metonímica en la Construcción de Verbo de Apoyo con GIVE

Resumen: Este artículo demuestra que la Construcción de Verbo de Apoyo (CVA) con GIVE está motivada por metáforas y metonimias de nivel genérico. Siguiendo a Brugman (2001) y Cetnarowska (2012, 2014), las CVAs se definen atendiendo a criterios notablemente menos restrictivos que los propuestos por Dixon (2005) y Wierzbicka (1982). El trabajo examina la construcción con GIVE como un caso representativo para ilustrar el patrón más amplio de CVAs motivadas por metáforas. En una CVA, el verbo de apoyo (denominado "light verb" en inglés) evoca el dominio fuente de una metáfora conceptual, mientras que su complemento nominal indica el dominio meta. Así, en la construcción con GIVE, GIVE evoca el esquema de transferencia. Este esquema, que sirve como dominio fuente de las metáforas, se proyecta sobre las estructuras conceptuales subyacentes a los complementos nominales del verbo de apoyo. Dado que los esquemas de eventos representan tipos distintos de situaciones, cada una caracterizada por configuraciones únicas de roles temáticos, las correspondencias metafóricas ocurren entre estos roles. Sin embargo, en ausencia de metonimias a nivel genérico, dichas correspondencias (o mapeos) no serían viables. El Principio de correlación (Ruiz de Mendoza y Santibáñez 2003) y el Principio de refuerzo del mapeo (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005) facilitan las correspondencias metonímicas dentro del dominio meta, asegurando que la proyección conceptual del dominio fuente al dominio meta permanezca sistemáticamente restringida.

Palabras clave: Construcción de Verbo de Apoyo (CVA) con GIVE; metáfora y metonimia de nivel genérico; correspondencias metafóricas y metonímicas; roles temáticos; esquema de transferencia.

Contents: 1. Introduction. 1.1. GIVE as a *light verb*: some preliminary assumptions. 1.2. Methodological framework and scope of the study. 2. Types of the GIVE LVC; 3. The Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient). 3.1. The Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC (physical affectedness). 3.2. The Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness). 4. The Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication). 5. The Monotransitive GIVE LVC. 5.1. The Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (bodily response). 5.2. The Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication). 5.3. The Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission). 6. Conclusion and final remarks.

How to cite: Kopeć, Zbigniew and Guerrero Medina, Pilar (2025). Metaphoric and metonymic motivation in the Light Verb Construction with GIVE, in *Complutense Journal of English Studies* 33, e103616. <https://dx.doi.org/10.5209/cjes.103616>

1. Introduction

1.1. GIVE as a light verb: some preliminary assumptions

Light Verb Constructions (henceforth, LVCs) are grammatical structures that consist of *light verbs* such as GIVE, HAVE, or TAKE, and predominantly deverbal nouns usually derived by conversion, denoting an event but sometimes a state, e.g., *give someone a push / a scare, give a sigh; have a walk / a fall; take a look*, etc. Although these verbo-nominal combinations (a more general term that may also encompass MAKE and DO as light verbs) have been referred to as “composite predicates” (Cattell 1984; Trousdale 2008) or “complex predicates” (Butt 2010; Traugott 1999), we adopt the more widely used term *light verb construction*, following authors such as Brugman (2001), Gradečak-Erdeljić and Brdar (2012), Cetnarowska (2014), and Martínez Caro and Arús Hita (2020).¹

In (1)–(4) we present some illustrative corpus examples of the LVC with GIVE in spoken and written English. Our examples in this corpus-informed study are drawn from the *Corpus of Contemporary American English* (COCA).²

(1) My foster mother came up and *gave me a hug* (...). (COCA SPOK 2005)

(2) You *gave me a scare* there. (COCA SPOK 2019)

(3) Jerry *gave him a look* that said he wasn't sure (...). (COCA FIC 2007)

(4) He *gave a cry* and began groping at his cloak pin. (COCA FIC 2002)

Wierzbicka (1982) and Dixon (2005) characterize these verbo-nominal combinations using tightly specified criteria. They claim that the nominal complement of the light verb is not a derived nominal but a verb, preceded by the indefinite article *a*. Similarly, Kearns (2002), as cited in Cetnarowska (2014, 29–34), suggests the term “stem noun” to emphasize the formal identity of the nominal complement with the stems of corresponding verbs. Kearns embraces this perspective because the nominals within the combination do not align with the diagnostic criteria for nouns, that is, they cannot undergo WH-movement, pronominalisation, passivisation, or pluralisation. Furthermore, some of them have a limited distribution, being restricted exclusively to particular LVCs and not occurring as independent nouns outside the construction (e.g. *give it a think* or *have a think*, but not **take a think* or **it was an interesting think*).³

Following Brugman (2001) and Cetnarowska (2012, 2014), in this article we regard the right-hand element of the LVC with GIVE as a deverbal noun, predominantly derived by conversion.⁴ We also agree with Goossens (1993, 22) when he argues that “[a]lthough the connection with the verb is still obvious, the use of the indefinite article signals assimilation to the category noun”.⁵

Jespersen (1942, 117) was the first to identify *light verbs* in “everyday combinations” where the “really important idea” is placed after *have*, *give* and similar semantically empty verbs. However, we assume that light verbs, although fairly abstract, are not devoid of meaning (see also Wierzbicka 1982; Brugman 2001; Cetnarowska 2012, 2014; Gradečak-Erdeljić and Brdar 2012). Rather, they are used metaphorically and point to the source domain of a generic-level conceptual metaphor, which operates at a more abstract or schematic level within the conceptual hierarchy.⁶ For instance, the light verb GIVE indicates the source domain of TRANSFER, which is a generic-level event schema, along with its abstract thematic roles – AGENT, RECIPIENT, and THEME – as its constituent elements. Furthermore, light verbs appear to impart certain Aktionsart properties to the LVC, as well as grammatical aspect and tense.

We view nominal complements (predominantly deverbal nominals) as instances of ontological metaphor licensing nominalizations. In Langacker's (1991) terms, these nominalizations construe processes as having all phases activated simultaneously and as being bounded – a phenomenon known as “summary scanning” – in the case of periphrastic predicates. Thus, they can hardly be accompanied by temporal adverbials such as

¹ As argued by Mehl (2017, 55), the term *light verb construction* is useful as “it accommodates perspectives of construction grammar”, allowing us to consider LVCs as form-meaning pairings at varying degrees of abstraction in the Goldbergian sense (Goldberg 2013, 17).

² Davies, Mark (2008-). *The Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA): One billion words, 1990-2019*. Available online at <https://www.english-corpora.org/coca/>. The source information for COCA examples includes the date and the section of the corpus from which the example was extracted: FIC: Fiction; MOV: Movies; TV: Television; SPOK: Spoken; WEB: Web. Most of the COCA examples in this paper – particularly those in which the deverbal head noun includes premodification and/or postmodification – come from the Fiction section of the corpus.

³ Kearns (2002, 2–5) differentiates between “true light verbs” and “vague action verbs” with richer semantics. True light verbs take nominal complements which are categorially ambiguous (“verblike stem nouns” in her terminology), while vague action verbs take unambiguous nominal complements (see Cetnarowska 2014, 30).

⁴ Note that the noun *fright* in *give a fright* is not derived from *frighten*.

⁵ Goossens' (1993) study explores the HAVE LVC (his *have a* + deverbal Noun construction) within the framework of Functional Grammar.

⁶ See Kövecses (2010) on generic-level metaphors as schematic conceptual mappings that operate at a high level of abstraction.

for *X time* (Cetnarowska 2014, 35). On the other hand, simple verb predicates can be understood as unfolding in their successive phases (“sequential scanning”) over the course of time and can readily co-occur with the *for X time* adverbial. For example, compare *John walked for three hours* and **John had a walk for three hours*. Licensed by the generic-level metaphors EPISODIC EVENTS ARE OBJECTS and EPISODIC STATES ARE OBJECTS, it seems that nominal complements in LVCs require an episodic interpretation and refer to restricted time domains (bounded events or states), with the concept of time “wiped out”, to use Cetnarowska’s (2012, 190) words. As Cetnarowska (2012, 191; fn. 10) goes on to argue, “episodic nominalizations do not normally allow modifiers which make them appear internally ‘uneven’, i.e. discontinuous or unstoppable”.

More importantly, we propose that LVCs are motivated by both generic-level metaphors and metonymies. Specifically, the light verb evokes the source domain of the metaphor, while its nominal complement indicates the target domain. In the case of the GIVE LVC, the target domain is understood in terms of the transfer schema.

1.2. Methodological framework and scope of the study

Our methodology is based on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff 1993; Dancygier and Sweetser 2014) and conceptual metonymy (Panther 2005; Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007). In general terms, conceptual metaphor is defined as a set of unidirectional mappings that project conceptual material from one discrete domain onto another, “while metonymy is seen as a domain-internal mapping where one of the domains involved provides a point of access to the other” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 33). Conceptual metaphors and metonymies, each varying in their degree of schematisation, operate at different levels of conceptualisation and, in doing so, motivate grammatical constructions at multiple levels. Consequently, metaphoric mappings (across domains) and metonymic mappings (within domains) occur at various levels of schematicity. Our analysis of LVCs, which are motivated by generic-level metaphors and metonymies, necessitates that schematic levels be clearly recognised as event schemas. By event schemas, we mean types of situations characterised by a unique configuration of thematic roles and expressed in language through the grammatical constructions that characterize basic sentences (Radden and Dirven 2007, 339). We posit that metaphoric mappings obtain between thematic roles in the schemas. As for metonymic mappings, such as EFFECT FOR CAUSE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT, they occur between constituent elements in the target domain of the metaphor, facilitated by the Correlation Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez 2003) and the Mapping Enforcement Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005). Our main aim is to illustrate how these mappings emerge between the thematic roles that define the schemas. To achieve this, we focus specifically on the GIVE LVC, its types (see section 2), and subtypes (see sections 3, 4 and 5).

Our labels for thematic / participant roles are primarily based on Bierwiazzonek (2016). We also find Van Valin’s (2005) continuum of schematicity in semantic roles useful, as it progresses from verb-specific semantic roles (e.g., Giver), increasing in schematicity through thematic relations / roles (e.g., AGENT), and culminating in highly schematic semantic macroroles.⁷ Following Bierwiazzonek (2016, 17–19), we employ the (more schematic) participant role of CAUSE in our analyses, defined as “involving direct or indirect causation of an event”, and further subdivided into the following subtypes: AGENT – “the performer (...) of an activity, usually a volitional (i.e. human) being”; EFFECTOR – “the doer of an action that is not wilful or purposeful”; FORCE – “a causative power which is beyond human control [...]”; and STIMULUS – “a thing or situation that causes a perception, a cognitive state or an emotion”, with all except FORCE used in our discussion.

As for EXPERIENCER, Bierwiazzonek (2016, 18) defines it as “a sentient being that experiences some internal states”, and further distinguishes five subtypes: PERCEIVER – “a sentient being that experiences a perception”; COGNIZER – “a sentient being that experiences a cognitive state”; EMOTER – “a sentient being that experiences an emotion”; WILLER – “a sentient being experiencing a volitional state”; and SENSOR – “a sentient being that experiences a bodily state or sensation”. In our analyses, we employ EXPERIENCER, SENSOR, EMOTER, and PERCEIVER. In addition, we draw upon Bierwiazzonek’s (2016, 18) participant role of AFFECTED PATIENT, defined as “a thing / person that undergoes a change of state or condition, usually under the influence of some CAUSE”, which is contrasted with EFFECTED PATIENT – “an entity that comes into being as a result of, usually, an AGENT’s activity”. Moreover, the role of LOCATION is posited within the transfer schema as the LOCATION of an object before and after the transfer, as explained at the end of section 3.1.

We also propose the roles of COMMUNICATOR and COMMUNICATEE as more specific, yet still abstract, subtypes of AGENT and EXPERIENCER, respectively. These roles capture participants engaged in communication through bodily signals, such as gestures, facial expressions, or other non-verbal cues. In our analyses, we use the thematic role of COMMUNICATOR in parallel to the frame element Communicator as specified in FrameNet,⁸ which employs this label consistently across relevant frames. In the Communication frame, “a Communicator conveys a Message to an Addressee” with no specification of the modality involved (e.g., speech, writing, gesture)⁹. In the more specific Gesture frame, the Communicator is specified as

⁷ In this article, verb-specific semantic roles are written in regular upright font with initial capital letters, whereas more abstract semantic or thematic roles are rendered in small capitals. Likewise, the names of conceptual domains and the labels for conceptual metaphors and metonymies are also written in small capitals.

⁸ FrameNet is a lexical database based on frame semantics, documenting how words evoke conceptual structures (frames) and the roles (frame elements) associated with them.

⁹ Communication frame: <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Communication> (accessed June 8, 2025).

“the sentient entity that communicates a Message non-verbally”.¹⁰ While our terminology aligns with FrameNet in using COMMUNICATOR, we opt for COMMUNICATEE rather than FrameNet’s Addressee in order to maintain terminological symmetry and to foreground its role as the experiencer of communicative signals, irrespective of modality.

In the following sections, we will demonstrate that the LVC with GIVE is experientially motivated by schematic metaphoric mappings between event schemas and metonymic mappings within these schemas. Our classification identifies three main types of the GIVE LVC, as outlined in section 2: the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient), discussed in section 3; the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication), presented in section 4; and the Monotransitive GIVE LVC, discussed in section 5. Since we distinguish between two ways in which the PATIENT can be affected – physically or emotionally (e.g., *give someone a push* vs. *give someone a scare*) – we introduce two subtypes of the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC: subsection 3.1 presents the Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC (physical affectedness), while subsection 3.2 deals with the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness). We also propose three subtypes of the Monotransitive GIVE LVC: the Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (bodily response), discussed in subsection 5.1, the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication), presented in subsection 5.2, and the Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission), described in subsection 5.3.

2. Types of the GIVE LVC

Dixon (2005: 470–73) distinguishes two types of the LVC with GIVE, which he terms the GIVE A VERB construction. Type I (ditransitive) prototypically consists of the light verb GIVE, an NP with a noun or pronoun as its head in the indirect object position (first object), and a countable noun in the direct object position (second object), which is derived from a monotransitive or prepositional verb and is formally identical to a verb, e.g., *She gave me a punch/push/kiss/smile/look* (Dixon 2005, 470). Dixon maintains that “[t]he GIVE A construction of type (I) describes something being ‘transferred’ from subject to object (a metaphorical extension of the ‘transfer of possession’ in lexical use of *give*) [...]” (Dixon 2005, 471–72). He characterises the type I construction with the following features (2005, 473):

- (i) something done voluntarily by the subject; (ii) to ‘transfer’ something to an object, either affecting the object in some physical way, or communicating with another person; (iii) the activity being ‘done a bit’, at the subject’s whim – and often, if the verb refers to an activity that can be incremental, just one unit of the activity is performed.

We claim that characteristic (i) does not always apply to the Ditransitive GIVE LVC in our classification, which parallels Dixon’s type I – for instance, someone might give you a scare inadvertently and unintentionally (see example (ii) in Table 1 below) – and never applies to our Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (see example (viii) in Table 3 below), which parallels Dixon’s (2005, 473) type II examples with non-human subjects (see section 5). Dixon’s type II (monotransitive) involves GIVE followed by a single NP, which is a countable noun formally identical to a verb but derived from an intransitive verb, e.g., *give a laugh/cry/sob/sigh/cough/shout/roar* (Dixon 2005, 470). We argue that, while it follows monotransitive syntax, it may exhibit ditransitive semantics – that is, the metaphorical Recipient remains unnamed. A metaphorical transfer of the possessed object, characteristic (ii), is therefore also operative in the type II construction, although the meaning element in (i) is not necessarily present. Finally, semantic characteristic (iii) also applies in the monotransitive construction (see section 5).

As Radden and Dirven (2007, 298) observe, “expressions such as *give a cry*, (...) illustrate that, in its metaphorical usage, the transfer verb *give* can be used without naming a recipient. It is only in the metaphorical world that an object can be thought of as being transferred out into the air”. This type occurs with various nominalizations that, in general terms, denote *bodily responses* such as *a cough*, *a sigh*, *a laugh*, or *a sob* – which, we claim, can be produced either voluntarily or involuntarily by animate entities, typically humans – and are referred to as verbs of “the CORPOREAL type” in Dixon’s (2005, 470) terminology. It also includes nominalizations of *vocal outbursts* (Radden and Dirven 2007, 297), such as *a cry*, *a moan*, *a shout*, *a roar*, *a groan*, or *a whistle*, typically produced by animate entities and classified as “the SHOUT subtype of SPEAKING” verbs, according to Dixon (2005, 470). Additionally, this type may encompass nominalizations of some of the verbs of sound emission (Levin 1993, 234–35), such as *a hiss*, *a bang*, *a ring*, *a buzz*, *a rumble*, *a thud*, *a clang*, and similar sounds, usually produced by inanimate entities.

In our classification of the GIVE LVC, Dixon’s type I construction is further subdivided into two main semantic types: the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient with additional distinctions) and the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication). The proposed three types of the Monotransitive GIVE LVC, in turn, parallel Dixon’s type II construction. In what follows, we delve into the three main syntactic patterns of the GIVE LVC and their semantic subtypes.

The Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC (physical affectedness) and the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness) share the same syntax. Thus, the syntactic structure of the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient), illustrated in Table 1 below, is as follows:¹¹

¹⁰ Gesture frame: <https://framenet.icsi.berkeley.edu/fnReports/data/frameIndex.xml?frame=Gesture> (accessed June 8, 2025).

¹¹ The elements in bold are obligatory, while those in regular font are optional. The abbreviations used are as follows: ADJ: Adjective; N: Noun; NP: Noun Phrase; iO: Indirect Object; dO: Direct Object; PP: Prepositional Phrase; S: Subject.

Table 1. The Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient)

<p>NP(S) + GIVE_{TENSE/ASPECT} + NP(iO) + [a/an (ADJ) N (PP)](dO)</p> <p>The Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC: physical affectedness (i) Alivia held the box to her ear and <i>gave it a small shake</i>. (COCA FIC 2019)</p> <p>The Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC: emotional affectedness (ii) You <i>gave us a real scare</i> there, little buddy. (COCA TV 2018)</p>

Table 2. The Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication)

<p>NP(S) + GIVE_{TENSE/ASPECT} + NP(iO) + [a/an (ADJ) N (PP)](dO)</p> <p>(iii) He <i>gives her a quick nod of acknowledgement</i> as he gets to his feet. (COCA FIC 1992) (iv) Rosemary <i>gave him a long look of grateful acknowledgment</i>. (COCA FIC 1990)</p>
--

In both the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC and the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC, the head noun in the second object slot can be premodified by an adjective and postmodified by a prepositional phrase. Adjectival premodification in the NP is a key motivating factor in the GIVE LVC and other LVCs. For example, the use of the adjective ‘quick’ in example (iii) in Table 2 is metonymically motivated: ‘a quick nod’ is a nod in which a person nods quickly. The head of the NP denotes the action through the metonymy EFFECT OF ACTION FOR ACTION (RESULT FOR ACTION). The adjective ‘quick’ premodifies the action of ‘nodding’ and thus specifies the manner through the ATTRIBUTE FOR MANNER metonymy.¹² The same metonymic motivation in the modifier-noun pattern can be found in the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (communication) and the Monotransitive GIVE LVC (see Table 3 below).

What is interesting in the Ditransitive GIVE-2 (communication) and the Monotransitive GIVE LVCs is the relationship between the head noun in the second object and the head noun in the NP of the prepositional phrase – e.g., between a *nod* and *acknowledgement* in example (iii) in Table 2. It seems that this relationship involves causation, and is possibly metonymic, although this interpretation may be questioned, as both the metonymic vehicle *nod* and the metonymic target *acknowledgement* are explicitly mentioned. Nevertheless, the relationship between the two is one of conceptual contiguity: *acknowledgement* as expressing the intended meaning (the cause), and *nod* as expressing the bodily signal (the effect) that conveys that meaning. The use is unquestionably metonymic when the content of the bodily signal remains unexpressed, such as ‘acknowledgement’ or any other message that *nod* can contextually convey, as in *He gives her a quick nod as he gets to his feet*.

The Monotransitive GIVE LVC appears syntactically monotransitive but semantically ditransitive: the semantically ditransitive verb GIVE is used without an indirect object, which would denote a metaphorically construed, unnamed PERCEIVER or unnamed COMMUNICATEE–PERCEIVER (both metaphorically mapped from the RECIPIENT role), as discussed in more detail below and as suggested above, quoting Radden and Dirven (2007, 298).

The construction can be ambiguous, situated between expressing a bodily response or vocal outburst on the one hand, and conveying an act of communication on the other. Nevertheless, we tentatively propose three subtypes of the Monotransitive GIVE LVC: one that expresses bodily responses or vocal outbursts (Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC); one that conveys an act of communication (Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC); and one that expresses sound emissions produced by inanimate entities (Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC). The first subtype accounts for the vast majority of corpus examples. If the nominal complement is deverbal, as in almost all cases, it is derived from an intransitive verb, in contrast to the Ditransitive GIVE LVC, where the nominal complement is derived from a monotransitive verb.

As shown in Table 3 below, the three subtypes share the same syntactic pattern.

Table 3. The Monotransitive GIVE LVC

<p>NP(S) + GIVE_{TENSE/ASPECT} + [a/an (ADJ) N (PP)]</p> <p>The Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC: bodily response (v) This time, Churkin <i>gave a deep sigh</i> before answering. (COCA WEB 2012) (vi) As he reached for it, he <i>gave a soft cry of pain</i>. (COCA FIC 1999)</p> <p>The Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC: communication (vii) He glanced at Charles and <i>gave a quick nod of dismissal</i>. (COCA FIC 2011)</p> <p>The Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC: sound emission (viii) The door <i>gave a rusty screech</i>. (COCA MAG 1991)</p>
--

In general, nominalizations significantly facilitate the modification of the event or state expressed by the nominal complement (Brugman 2001, 556). In particular, the adjectival premodification of the nominal

¹² For hypallage and hypallactic noun modifiers, see Peña and Ruiz de Mendoza (2022, 166–67). For attribute transfer and transferred modifiers, see Panther (2022).

complement in the LVC acts as its major licensing force (Gradečak-Erdeljić and Brdar 2012, 31). It is often easier to express the qualities of an event or state conceptualised as an object by means of an adjective rather than an adverb. In many instances, the use of a premodifying adjective is motivated by the metonymy ATTRIBUTE FOR MANNER, which can be further elaborated AS ATTRIBUTE OF THE RESULT OF AN ACTION FOR THE MANNER IN WHICH THE ACTION IS CARRIED OUT (Peña-Cervel and Ruiz de Mendoza 2022, 166). This, together with the ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy, underlies the interpretation of *gave a deep sigh* as *sighed deeply* in example (v) in Table 3.

We argue that the nominal complements in LVCs may involve generic-level metonymy, such as CAUSE FOR EFFECT, instantiated by ACTION FOR RESULT OR ACTION FOR THE EFFECT OF ACTION (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 39). For example, *a laugh* in *give a laugh* may be interpreted metonymically, where the action of laughing provides access to the sound it produces (metonymic reduction).¹³

In the following sections, we will demonstrate how the interaction of metaphor and metonymy leads to metaphoric mappings between conceptual domains. More specifically, we explain how the different types (and subtypes) of the GIVE LVC are motivated by generic-level metaphors and metonymies by illustrating the mappings that occur between participant or thematic roles in the schemas, which, in fact, constitute the source and target domains of the conceptual metaphor.

3. The Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient)

As mentioned above, the PATIENT can be affected in two ways – physically or emotionally – resulting in two (semantic) subtypes of the Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC (affected patient): the Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC (physical affectedness), presented in subsection 3.1, and the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness), discussed in subsection 3.2.

3.1. The Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC (physical affectedness)

Cetnarowska (2012, 193), following Kövecses (2010) and Lakoff (1993), notes that metaphorical mappings from the domain of TRANSFER to the domain of CAUSATION are not always complete. Kövecses (2010) examines cases in which the mapping of potential entailments appears to be blocked. He provides the example of the prototypical verb *give* as used in the TRANSFER domain: *She gave him a book* (2010, 130), where the act of transferring ('giving') a THEME / OBJECT¹⁴ ("a book" occurs as it moves from an AGENT / Giver ("she") to a RECIPIENT ("him"). This literal transfer involves specific entailments, including the fact that when the RECIPIENT receives a book, they have it. In Kövecses's words:

If the entailment is carried over, we should be able to say that the "he" [our Affected Patient] in both [(5a) and (5b)] has the metaphorical objects (the headache and the kiss) after they have been metaphorically handed over. But this does not seem to be the case [...] (Kövecses 2010, 131)

Below are his examples (Kövecses 2010, 130):

- (5) a. She gave him a headache, and he still has it.
b. *She gave him a kiss, and he still has it.

It appears that example (5a) relies on the potential metaphorical entailment that what is given to you is now in your possession, whereas (5b) does not exhibit this characteristic. According to Kövecses, the difference between (5a) and (5b) lies in the fact that "a headache" is a state and "a kiss" is an event and events are momentary, while states last for some time. He proceeds to assert that:

If the target experience that is caused is a state, the entailment of the source (you have the object that was given to you) will apply; if however, the target experience is a momentary event, the entailment of the source (you have the object that was given to you) will not apply. (Kövecses 2010, 131)

Relying on the Invariance Principle (Lakoff 1993, 215–16), Kövecses proposes that the image-schematic structure of the target domain cancels or "overrides the entailment that arises from the source" (Kövecses 2010, 131), because the image-schematic structure of the source is incoherent with the image-schematic structure of the target. He argues that "long-term states like having a thing after getting it cannot be imposed on momentary events like the experience of a kiss" (2010, 131), suggesting that when one receives 'a kiss' (or 'a kick'), the experience fades immediately, leaving no residual sensation. Thus, according to Lakoff (1993), as followed by Kövecses (2010), the Invariance Principle constrains the mapping by discarding the transferred object due to the absence of a corresponding element in the target domain.

However, this does not appear to be entirely unproblematic. The Correlation Principle, formulated by Ruiz de Mendoza and Santibáñez (2003), imposes limitations on metaphoric mappings based on the implicational structure of elements in both the source and target domains (see also Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 38). This means that to be a counterpart in the target domain, a metaphoric source element (a physical object) must share the relevant implicational structure of the target element (a reified event or state). The implication

¹³ Similarly, *a cut* in *She had a small cut on her forehead* (COCA FIC 2009) is understood metonymically as the visible result of the action of cutting.

¹⁴ Throughout, we use the labels OBJECT and THEME interchangeably, with THEME being defined in Bierwiaczonek (2016, 18) as "an entity which (...) is moved or located".

of giving is having an object, while the implication of kissing or kicking is about feeling their effects, which can be conceptualised as objects. Furthermore, the Mapping Enforcement Principle (Ruiz de Mendoza 2005) guarantees that no element in the target will be excluded from a mapping system as long as a corresponding element can be identified in the source.

Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal (2007, 38–39) analyse the sentence *He gave John a kick*. They argue that Lakoff's (1993) proposal to discard the transferred object from the mapping is problematic, as a key aspect of the meaning conveyed by *giving someone a kick* is that the recipient of the kick is affected by it. This means that they do not possess the kick itself but rather experience its effect. They thus propose “a metonymic mapping from ‘kicking’ to the ‘effects of kicking’ (i.e. ACTION FOR EFFECT OF THE ACTION) in the target” (Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 39), as a result of the activation of the Correlation Principle and the Mapping Enforcement Principle, which also apply to metonymy. Moreover, the OBJECT / THEME transferred to the RECIPIENT must exist beforehand, prior to its transfer. The Giver is expected to possess the OBJECT / THEME before transferring it to the RECIPIENT, which appears to be a necessary precondition for the transfer schema. Yet another aspect of the meaning conveyed by *giving someone a kick* is that the Kicker does not possess ‘the kick’ itself beforehand but rather has ‘the ability to kick’. We thus postulate a metonymic mapping from ‘a kick’ to ‘ability to kick’ in the target, motivated by the ACTION FOR ABILITY TO ACT metonymy, which is once again based on the activation of the Correlation and Mapping Enforcement Principles. Hence, the two principles allow us to retain the OBJECT / THEME element in the metaphorical source, both as possessed beforehand by the Giver and as possessed by the RECIPIENT after its transfer (see Figure 1 below).




Figure 1. AN ACTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT

In LVCs, the nominal complement in the direct object slot is an example of reification through ontological metaphors, already referred to as the generic-level metaphors EPISODIC EVENTS ARE OBJECTS and EPISODIC STATES ARE OBJECTS. This allows us to view events and states as objects which can be possessed (e.g., *have a walk* or *have a nap*) or transferred (e.g., *give someone a push* or *a kick*). Hence, following Lakoff (1993, 216), we postulate the metaphor AN ACTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT, which underlies the Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC. It is worth recalling that the activity is construed as being “done a bit” in the GIVE construction (Dixon 2005, 473; see section 2). If the nominal complement in the GIVE construction refers to an activity that can be incremental, such as ‘a kick’, then it typically denotes “just one unit of the activity” (Dixon 2005, 471). For example, consider *He gave John a kick* in comparison to *He kicked John*. The former refers to a single kick, while the latter can imply that the AFFECTED PATIENT was subjected to a barrage of kicks. That is the reason why we do not include the ‘kicking’ element in the target domain of the metaphor AN ACTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT (cf. Ruiz de Mendoza and Mairal 2007, 38–39); instead, we propose ‘a kick’.

The ACTIONS AS OBJECTS metaphor or mapping can further undergo metonymic operations, as suggested above. In addition to their conceptualisation as objects, which implies boundedness, internal heterogeneity, and countability (e.g., *a few kicks*), an action construed in this way, such as ‘a kick’ in *He gave John a kick*, can also be interpreted metonymically. Thus, in the target domain, the element ‘a kick’ can undergo metonymic reduction both to ‘the ability to kick’, receiving its mapping from OBJECT LOCATION WITH AGENT / Giver, and to ‘the effect of a kick’ on the AFFECTED PATIENT, receiving its mapping from OBJECT LOCATION WITH RECIPIENT. The former metonymic reduction is motivated by the metonymy ACTION FOR ABILITY TO ACT, while the latter is motivated by ACTION FOR RESULT OF, more specifically, ACTION FOR EFFECT OF THE ACTION, both of which are instantiations of the generic-level metonymies EFFECT FOR CAUSE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT, respectively.

The transfer schema can be seen as a combination of different schemas: the possession schema, the action schema, and the motion schema. Since there is a conceptual link between POSSESSION and LOCATION – that is, POSSESSION can be conceptualized as LOCATION – we label one thematic role in the transfer schema as OBJECT LOCATION. In the metaphorical mapping, this is referred to as OBJECT LOCATION WITH AGENT / Giver, indicating the initial stage of the transfer, and as OBJECT LOCATION WITH RECIPIENT, indicating the final stage of the transfer. We prefer the term OBJECT over the term THEME, which is typical in the transfer schema, primarily to align it with the labels used for the source domains of ontological metaphors, such as EPISODIC EVENTS ARE OBJECTS, ACTIONS ARE OBJECTS, and IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, among others. The action schema accounts for the use of the more schematic label AGENT. The motion schema consists of the transfer itself, which involves the motion of the OBJECT / THEME along a path from the AGENT / Giver to the RECIPIENT, thus entailing a change of LOCATION. The change of LOCATION

then constitutes the metaphoric source for the change of state, that is, the change of POSSESSION. We thus arrive at the metaphor CHANGE OF POSSESSION IS CHANGE OF LOCATION, from OBJECT LOCATION WITH AGENT / Giver to OBJECT LOCATION WITH RECIPIENT.

3.2. The Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness)

We argue that the Ditransitive GIVE LVC encompasses not only activities but also states. This expansion goes beyond the more stringent criteria introduced by Wierzbicka (1982) and Dixon (2005). In this respect, we follow Brugman (2001, 553) who claims that “definitional to the light verb construction is that the VP internal, morphosyntactically nominal, argument is a predicate denoting usually an activity but sometimes a state.”

In addition to the metaphor AN ACTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT, which licenses the Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC denoting events, we assume the existence of the CAUSING AN EMOTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT metaphor, which underlies the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC denoting states. Interestingly, it is worth recalling Kövecses’s claim that if the resulting experience in the target is a state, the entailment of the source – that “you have the object that was given to you” – will apply (Kövecses 2010, 131). Therefore, if someone gave you a scare, you might still have it. As with activities, the metonymic operations appear to be at work in the target domain. Specifically, an act of scaring undergoes a metonymic reduction to the effect of scaring, licensed by the generic-level metonymy CAUSE FOR EFFECT, or more precisely, ACTION FOR EFFECT OF THE ACTION. This metonymy operates irrespective of whether the STIMULUS subject is agentive or not, whether it acts voluntarily and deliberately or not, or even whether it is animate or inanimate. Examples (6) through (8) below demonstrate varying degrees of agency. In (6), the STIMULUS subject appears to be maximally agentive, acting with volition and deliberation. In (7), it exhibits less agency as the volition and deliberation of the STIMULUS subject are ambiguous. Finally, in (8), it displays no agency at all in the act of scaring, as “the old engine” cannot be construed as a volitional, animate AGENT.

(6) I just wanted to *give them a scare*, remind them to take their study seriously. (COCA FIC 2011)

(7) You know you really *gave me a scare*. (COCA TV 2008)

(8) The old engine *gave him a scare* outside Corpus Christi. (COCA FIC 2008)

Another metonymic reduction at work in the target domain involves the ACTION FOR THE POTENTIAL TO ACT mapping, which, more specifically, takes the form of CAUSING AN EMOTION FOR THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN EMOTION – both of which are instantiations of the generic-level EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. Hence, in the target domain, the element ‘causing an emotion’ undergoes metonymic reduction to ‘the effect of causing an emotion’, with OBJECT LOCATION WITH RECIPIENT as its corresponding element in the source, and to ‘the potential to cause an emotion’, with OBJECT LOCATION WITH AGENT / Giver as its corresponding element in the source (see Figure 2). However, the ACTION FOR THE POTENTIAL TO ACT mapping cannot apply to non-agentive, usually inanimate, entities, as in example (8), whereas its more specific mapping, CAUSING AN EMOTION FOR THE POTENTIAL TO CAUSE AN EMOTION, is readily applicable.

Dixon (2005, 471) argues that “the GIVE A construction of type (I) is limited to human subjects acting with volition”. However, what corpus examples show in the case of causing emotions is that: first, subjects do not necessarily have to be human, animate, or agentive (see example 8); and second, even if they are human and act as AGENTS, they do not have to be acting voluntarily and deliberately (see example 7). This is why we use the more schematic label CAUSE instead of AGENT for the elements in the source and target domains in Figure 2. Example (6) involves an agentive subject that simultaneously assumes the thematic role of the STIMULUS, a role characteristic of all examples of the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC.




Figure 2. CAUSING AN EMOTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT

4. The Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication)

The corpus examples in (9), (10) and (11) below illustrate the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC. For purposes of comparison, in (12) and (13) we include examples of the ditransitive construction with verbs other than *give*, such as

send and *shoot*, found mostly in fiction writing. Notice that *shoot* in (13) undergoes constructional *coercion* (see Michaelis 2003, 2004), as this verb does not inherently signify transfer.¹⁵

(9) Lili gave him a look. (COCA FIC 2019)

(10) She tugged Agatha away, who gave Sophie a shrug. (COCA FIC 2019)

(11) Randy gave Williams a wave. (COCA FIC 2005)

(12) Hayden sent her a worried glance. (COCA FIC 2006)

(13) Dannette shot her a glance but for once said nothing. (COCA FIC 2005)

As illustrated by example (9), the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC differs from the HAVE LVC, as in *I had a look at Nigel*, in that “Lili” in (9) is communicating with a person referred to by the pronoun “him”. She gives him a look, and he is aware of it, being communicatively affected. In *I had a look at Nigel*, the speaker indulges herself in looking at Nigel for a bit. Whether or not Nigel notices that he is being looked at is irrelevant.

With the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC, we postulate the COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT METAPHOR as its primary motivational force (see Figure 3), which aligns well with Reddy’s (1979) conduit metaphor. The conduit metaphor consists of a set of metaphors such as IDEAS ARE OBJECTS, LINGUISTIC EXPRESSIONS ARE CONTAINERS, and COMMUNICATION IS SENDING. Similarly, the metaphor COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT is accompanied by the ontological metaphoric mappings IDEAS ARE OBJECTS and BODILY SIGNALS ARE CONTAINERS FOR IDEAS, which, for simplicity, are not shown in the mappings in Figure 3. In this framework, ‘objects’ are mapped directly onto ‘bodily signals’.

De novo, the two generic-level metonymies, EFFECT FOR CAUSE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT, emerge in the target domain depending on the viewpoint. From the perspective of the COMMUNICATOR (encoding), the COMMUNICATOR holds an intended meaning (CAUSE) in their mind and performs a bodily signal (EFFECT) to convey it. Thus, we observe the ACTION (EFFECT) FOR THE CAUSE OF THE ACTION metonymy, or, more specifically, A BODILY SIGNAL (EFFECT) FOR ITS INTENDED MEANING (CAUSE).

From the perspective of the COMMUNICATEE (decoding), the COMMUNICATEE perceives a bodily signal, which triggers an inferred, metonymically activated, meaning in them. Therefore, we observe A BODILY SIGNAL (CAUSE) FOR ITS INFERRED MEANING (EFFECT), which instantiates the ACTION (CAUSE) FOR THE EFFECT OF THE ACTION metonymy or, more schematically, the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy. In other words, from the COMMUNICATOR’s (encoding) viewpoint, an INTENDED MEANING (CAUSE) leads to a BODILY SIGNAL (EFFECT), making manifest the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy, while from the COMMUNICATEE’s (decoding) viewpoint, the BODILY SIGNAL (CAUSE) triggers an INFERRED MEANING (EFFECT), making manifest the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy.




Figure 3. COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT

5. The Monotransitive GIVE LVC

As mentioned above, the Monotransitive GIVE LVC is syntactically monotransitive but semantically ditransitive. The direct object refers to a single bodily response or vocal outburst, e.g., *give a laugh/cry/cough/shout/roar* (Dixon 2005, 473), or a single instance of sound emission, e.g., *give a hiss/bang*. These single bodily responses or vocal outbursts tend to be interpreted differently in the HAVE LVC. For example, *have a laugh/cry/cough/shout/roar* “is likely to refer to someone indulging in the activity for as long as they need” (Dixon 2005, 473).

We distinguish three subtypes of the Monotransitive LVC headed by GIVE: the Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (bodily response), the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication), and the Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission).

The Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (subsection 5.1) involves an involuntary, non-deliberate bodily response or vocal outburst, understood as the result of an emotion or sensory experience, which usually arises from

¹⁵ In Construction Grammar *coercion* can be understood as “the resolution of conflict between constructional and lexical denotata” (Michaelis 2003, 263), such that the conflicting element ultimately conforms to the semantico-pragmatic profile of the construction. See also Michaelis’ *Override Principle*, formulated as follows: “If a lexical item is semantically incompatible with its morphosyntactic context, the meaning of the lexical item conforms to the meaning of the structure in which it is embedded” (2004, 25).

a STIMULUS, e.g., *give a sigh of relief, a shudder of joy, a grunt of resignation, or a cry of delight/dismay/surprise*. When a particular emotion or sensation is unexpressed, as in *give a sigh, give a shudder, give a grunt, or give a cry*, such expressions appear to be licensed by the metonymy A BODILY RESPONSE FOR AN EMOTION, which is an instance of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. By contrast, the examples that name an emotion or sensation make the relationship between the head noun in the object NP (e.g., *sigh*) and the head noun in the NP of the prepositional phrase (e.g., *relief*) no longer metonymic, but still causal and based on conceptual contiguity.

The Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (subsection 5.2) involves an act of communication, where the unexpressed metaphorical RECIPIENT corresponds to the COMMUNICATEE. Dixon (2005, 473) illustrates a possible scenario by suggesting that one may *give a cough* to warn a friend to be careful about what they say or, more generally, to show what one feels or thinks about what has just been said. However, it is “possible for someone to *give a cough* (or *a laugh*) spontaneously, without planning to do so” (Dixon, 2005, 473), as illustrated in (14) and probably in (15):

(14) She kept at it, losing track of the time, when suddenly the child *gave a cough* and *a sigh* and abruptly opened her eyes. (COCA FIC 1990)

(15) The old man glanced down at the stack, *gave a laugh* that turned into a long, hacking cough. “They send me all that stuff,” he managed finally, his eyes glistening. (COCA FIC 2001)

The Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (subsection 5.3) includes examples of sound emissions produced by non-human, inanimate entities, e.g., *The machine gave a long hiss / a loud bang and suddenly stopped* (Dixon 2005, 473).

5.1. The Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (bodily response)

Bodily responses are reifications of acts (e.g., *a sigh/gasp/laugh/cry/cough/shout/roar*) by means of ontological metaphor. They can be thought of as the auditory effects of these acts through the ACTION FOR RESULT metonymy. For example, ‘a laugh’ as an act can undergo metonymic reduction to the sound produced by this act and, as such, can perform the semantic role of the STIMULUS for the unnamed PERCEIVER. Hence, in addition to the metonymy A BODILY RESPONSE FOR AN EMOTION in the target domain of the metaphor A BODILY RESPONSE IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT (see Figure 4), we posit the activity of the metonymy A BODILY RESPONSE FOR STIMULUS. Once again, the generic-level metonymies are operational in the target domain: the former is an instantiation of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy, whereas the latter is an instantiation of the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy.

The corpus examples of the Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC in (16)–(22), all used in fiction writing, illustrate the use of optional adjectival premodification and/or postmodification by a prepositional phrase in the NP (see Table 3).

(16) He takes it, tears it open, and *gives a laugh of relief*. (COCA FIC 1996)

(17) Rowan *gave a cry* and sagged onto her back. (COCA FIC 2018)

(18) He *gave a little cry of surprise* which was situated halfway between ‘Oh!’ and ‘Ah!’ (COCA FIC 2018)

(19) Duane *gave a sigh* and hustled back outside. (COCA FIC 2005)

(20) She *gave a sigh of relief*, her face still stiff. (COCA FIC 2019)

(21) She knew her grandfather was glued to his radio, and she *gave a shudder* as the harangue continued. (COCA FIC 2016)

(22) She fixed her eyes of fire on me for a moment and then *gave a little shudder of disgust*. (COCA FIC 1995)

Figure 4 shows the set of mappings in the metaphor a bodily response is a transfer of an object, which provides the primary motivation for the construction.




Figure 4. A BODILY RESPONSE IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT

5.2. The Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication)

In the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC a simple bodily response can be understood as an act of communication and can function as a bodily signal. If the head noun in the object NP is postmodified by a prepositional phrase, then the head noun in the NP of the prepositional phrase explicitly denotes the semantic content of a bodily signal / response, e.g., *understanding* and *approval* in examples (24) and (25) below.

The construction appears to be licensed by the COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT metaphor, and since it has ditransitive semantics and expresses an act of communication, it is very similar to the ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication). The only difference lies in the COMMUNICATEE being unexpressed and unnamed in the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC, and overtly expressed in the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (see Figure 5). As for generic-level metonymies, these operate in the same fashion. In a nutshell, in the target domain of the metaphor, from the perspective of the COMMUNICATOR, the metonymy A BODILY SIGNAL FOR ITS INTENDED MEANING is activated, which can be schematised as the ACTION FOR THE CAUSE OF ACTION metonymy, which, in turn, is an instantiation of the EFFECT FOR CAUSE metonymy. From the perspective of the unnamed COMMUNICATEE, the metonymy A BODILY SIGNAL FOR ITS INFERRED MEANING is operative as a specification of the ACTION FOR THE EFFECT OF ACTION metonymy, which, in turn, constitutes an instantiation of the CAUSE FOR EFFECT metonymy.

Presented below are some corpus examples of the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC, followed by an illustration of the set of mappings within the COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT metaphor (see Figure 5), which underpins the primary motivation for the construction.

(23) He *gave a nod* and went into the hallway with the other security guards. (COCA FIC 2019)

(24) After a moment's blankness, LeBlanc *gave a nod of understanding*. (COCA FIC 2003)

(25) The lieutenant *gave a nod of approval* and turned away. (COCA FIC 2011)

(26) Charlie *gave a sharp bark of warning*. (COCA FIC 2014)

(27) Traz *gave a short snort of derision*. (COCA FIC 1993)

(28) When Glace *gave a wave of dismissal*, Sully turned and strode out of the office. (COCA FIC 2010)




Figure 5. COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT

5.3. The Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission)

Although the Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission) displays relatively low frequency in the COCA corpus, its structural and semantic coherence warrants detailed analysis. This limited frequency can be attributed to the aspectual constraints imposed by the light verb GIVE, which, as an achievement verb, tends to favour punctual or bounded events, as well as to the inherent lexical aspect (Aktionsart) of the verb from which the corresponding deverbal noun is derived. Crucially, this inherent lexical aspect is expected to be semantically aligned with the aspectual constraints imposed by the light verb GIVE. Accordingly, this subtype is mostly attested with sound emissions expressed as a single *hiss*, *creak*, *beep*, *buzz*, *click*, *ping*, or *clang*, as illustrated in examples (29)–(35), which are understood as nominalisations of either acts, with a punctual or momentary character, or of iterative activities.

The Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC conveys sounds produced by inanimate entities, mostly artefacts, which occupy the subject position. It denotes an event that occurs without volition or agentive control. Illustrative examples from the corpus include the following:

(29) Then the belt *gave a hiss* that became a hum that grew louder (...). (COCA FIC 2006)

(30) Madison put the platter away, the old cupboard *giving a familiar creak*. (COCA FIC 2013)

(31) Patricia heard her cell phone *give a beep*. (COCA FIC 1999)

(32) Vanessa's phone *gave a short buzz*. (COCA FIC 2015)

(33) (...) the key quivering in my grip until the mechanism *gave a click* (...). (COCA FIC 2006)

(34) The door *gives a loud ping*. (COCA FIC 1992)

(35) The doorbell *gave a loud clang*. (COCA FIC 2016)

Since the event occurs non-volitionally and without control, we propose the thematic role of **EFFECTOR** (Bierwiaczonek 2016, 18) for the emitter of the sound. The **EFFECTOR** receives its metaphoric mapping from the **AGENT / Giver** in the domain of **TRANSFER**. While the prototypical **AGENT** is volitional, in this metaphorical extension the **EFFECTOR** lacks volitionality and intentionality, as it refers to inanimate emitters that metaphorically inherit the role of **Giver** without agentive control. The **RECIPIENT** is mapped onto the **Unnamed PERCEIVER**, who, though not overtly expressed, experiences the emitted sound. This metaphoric mapping preserves the transfer schema by treating the perceptual uptake of sound as analogous to receiving a transferred object. As all elements in the target domain receive their metaphorical mappings from the domain of **TRANSFER**, the sound emission itself is conceptualised as a transferred object.

Moreover, in the target domain, the sound emission is metonymically linked to the sonorous capacity of the material the **EFFECTOR** is made of. The sound itself, e.g., a *hiss*, *click*, *bang*, or *clang*, serves as a perceptible effect and functions as the vehicle entity providing mental access to the material's capacity to produce sound. This relationship can be described as a metonymic chain: the sound produced (effect) evokes the material (cause), which in turn gives access to its sonorous capacity (property). More specifically, different types of sounds provide mental access to specific types of **EFFECTORS**. For instance, *clink* and *clang* typically suggest hard metallic surfaces, *buzz* points to electronic or mechanical devices, and *creak* evokes wood under strain. Thus, naming or hearing a particular sound allows the hearer to infer the kind of material involved, based on embodied knowledge and experience. Cotton wool, for example, lacks the sonorous capacity that would support such inferences, whereas metal, with its high sonority, naturally lends itself to this construction. In cognitive terms, this metonymic structure consists of two contiguous mappings: **SOUND FOR MATERIAL**, an instance of the generic level **EFFECT FOR CAUSE** metonymy, and **MATERIAL FOR SONOROUS CAPACITY**, an instance the **MATERIAL FOR PROPERTY** metonymy.

As mentioned above, the **Unnamed PERCEIVER**, a metaphorical **RECIPIENT**, experiences the emitted sound, which is accessible to them as an auditory **STIMULUS**. This is made possible by the activation of a metonymy in which a single unit of **SOUND EMISSION** stands for a perceptual **STIMULUS** for the **Unnamed PERCEIVER**. This relation can be phrased as **EVENT FOR PERCEPTUAL INPUT**, or, more abstractly, as **CAUSE FOR EFFECT**.

Both the **SONOROUS CAPACITY** and the **STIMULUS** in the target domain are also metaphorically motivated by distinct components of the **TRANSFER** schema in the source. The **SONOROUS CAPACITY** receives its metaphoric mapping from the source-domain configuration of **OBJECT LOCATION WITH AGENT / Giver**, as it presupposes the presence of a material capable of emitting sound. In contrast, the **STIMULUS** derives its metaphoric mapping from **OBJECT LOCATION WITH RECIPIENT**, reflecting its construal as the perceptual input accessible to the **Unnamed PERCEIVER**, i.e. the metaphorical **RECIPIENT** of the transferred **OBJECT**.

Taken together, these observations show that the **Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC** is motivated by the **SOUND EMISSION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT** metaphor, as illustrated by the set of metaphorical mappings presented in Figure 6 below. As in the above analyses, the metaphoric mappings are made possible by the activation of the **Correlation Principle**, the **Mapping Enforcement Principle**, and the generic-level metonymies **EFFECT FOR CAUSE** and **CAUSE FOR EFFECT**.




Figure 6. **SOUND EMISSION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT**

6. Conclusion and final remarks

This paper has explored the intricate metaphoric and metonymic motivations underlying the **GIVE LVC**, providing a detailed examination of the interplay between generic-level conceptual metaphors and metonymies.

Our analysis has identified three primary types of the **GIVE LVC**: the **Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC** (affected patient), the **Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC** (communication), and the **Monotransitive GIVE LVC**. The **Ditransitive GIVE-1 LVC** includes two subtypes: the **Ditransitive GIVE-1a LVC** (physical affectedness), motivated by

the metaphor AN ACTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT, and the Ditransitive GIVE-1b LVC (emotional affectedness), motivated by the metaphor CAUSING AN EMOTION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT. The Monotransitive GIVE LVC includes three subtypes: the Monotransitive GIVE-1 LVC (bodily response), which is motivated by the metaphor A BODILY RESPONSE IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT; the Monotransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication), motivated by the metaphor COMMUNICATION BY A BODILY SIGNAL IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT, which also underlies the Ditransitive GIVE-2 LVC (communication); and the Monotransitive GIVE-3 LVC (sound emission), which is motivated by the metaphor SOUND EMISSION IS A TRANSFER OF AN OBJECT. Notably, the metaphoric mappings are facilitated by the Correlation Principle and the Mapping Enforcement Principle, as well as by generic-level metonymies such as EFFECT FOR CAUSE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT.

The critical role of the Correlation Principle, the Mapping Enforcement Principle, and generic-level metonymies in enabling the metaphoric mappings within the identified metaphors cannot be overstated. These cognitive principles and processes are indispensable, as they provide the structural and conceptual completeness and coherence required for the metaphoric mappings to occur. The Correlation Principle ensures the alignment of implicational structures between the source and target domains, thus establishing the foundation for meaningful correspondences. Similarly, the Mapping Enforcement Principle guarantees the inclusion of all relevant elements within the target domain, ensuring the conceptual integrity of the metaphoric mappings. Generic-level metonymies, such as EFFECT FOR CAUSE and CAUSE FOR EFFECT, serve as the crucial intermediary mechanisms that bridge the conceptual gaps, enabling the metaphorical transfer of meaning. Without these principles and generic-level metonymies, the intricate and systematic mappings underlying the identified metaphors would simply not be possible. These findings underscore the interconnectedness of metaphor and metonymy, as well as their synergistic role as cognitive mechanisms.

We propose building on our findings by extending the analysis to other light verb constructions, such as the HAVE LVC and its subtypes, and the TAKE LVC and its subtypes. These constructions exhibit unique patterns of metaphoric and metonymic motivation, which could reveal further subtleties in the operation of cognitive processes within verbo-nominal structures. We tentatively propose that, in the case of the HAVE LVC, the target is conceptualised in terms of the possession schema. As for the TAKE LVC, in a manner similar to the GIVE LVC, the conceptualisation is also achieved in terms of the transfer schema, with the main difference being the directionality of the transfer. With the light verb TAKE, both “self-oriented” and “other-oriented transfers” (Brugman 2001, 563, 568) are possible in different contexts. With the light verb GIVE, however, only “other-oriented” transfers are involved.

In addition, we suggest analysing LVCs at lower levels of schematicity as well. This would encompass a wide range of idiomatic examples, such as *give it a shot / a whirl*, *give someone a hand*, *take a stab at something*, or *have a bash at something*, among others. In all of these cases, the direct object NP is interpreted metaphorically and/or metonymically, warranting further analysis.

In conclusion, this study has demonstrated the centrality of metaphor and metonymy in the GIVE LVC and its subtypes, providing a model for analysing other verbo-nominal constructions. By elucidating the cognitive mechanisms that underlie these structures, the research may have contributed to a broader and more nuanced understanding of the interplay between linguistic constructions, on the one hand, and conceptual metaphor and metonymy, on the other.

Acknowledgements

This article is a revised and expanded version of our co-authored paper presented at the *2nd Conference on Linguistics Research and Dissemination, Language and Cognition: Theoretical and Empirical Perspectives*, held at the University of La Rioja in November 2023, within the framework of the research project PID2020-118349GB-I00, funded by MICIU/AEI/10.13039/501100011033 (Spain).

We would like to express our sincere thanks to Professor Bogusław Bierwiaczonek for his insightful and encouraging comments on an earlier version of this article.

References

- Bierwiaczonek, Bogusław. 2016. *An Introductory English Grammar in Constructions*. Wydawnictwo UJD.
- Brugman, Claudia. 2001. “Light Verbs and Polysemy.” *Language Sciences* 23: 551–578. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0388-0001\(00\)00036-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0388-0001(00)00036-X).
- Butt, Miriam. 2010. “The Light Verb Jungle: Still Hacking Away.” In *Complex Predicates: Cross-Linguistic Perspectives on Event Structure*, edited by Mengistu Amberber, Brett Baker, and Mark Harvey, 48–78. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511712234.004>.
- Cattell, Ray. 1984. *Composite Predicates in English*. Academic Press. <https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004373136>.
- Cetnarowska, Bożena. 2012. “On English Verbo-Nominal Constructions and Different Construals of Situations.” In *Image, Imagery, Imagination in Contemporary English Studies*, edited by Bożena Cetnarowska and Olga Glebova, 189–207. Wydawnictwo UJD.
- Cetnarowska, Bożena. 2014. “How Light Are ‘Light’ Verbs in Composite Predicates?” In *Dimensions of the Word*, edited by Andrzej Łyda and Grzegorz Drożdż, 28–46. Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
- Dancygier, Barbara, and Eva Sweetser. 2014. *Figurative Language* (Cambridge Textbooks in Linguistics). Cambridge University Press.
- Dixon, R. M. W. 2005. *A Semantic Approach to English Grammar*. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780199283071.001.0001>.

- Goldberg, Adele E. 2013. "Constructionist Approaches." In *The Oxford Handbook of Construction Grammar*, edited by Thomas Hoffmann and Graeme Trousdale, 15–31. Oxford University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195396683.013.0002>.
- Goossens, Louis. 1993. "Have in a Functional Grammar of English". *Working Papers in Functional Grammar* 54: 1-33.
- Gradečak-Erdeljić, Tanja, and Mario Brdar. 2012. "Constructional Meaning of Verbo-Nominal Constructions in English and Croatian." *Suvremena Lingvistika* 38 (73): 29–46. <https://doi.org/10.22210>.
- Jespersen, Otto. 1942. *A Modern English Grammar on Historical Principles, vol. VI: Morphology*. George Allen and Unwin Ltd.
- Kearns, Kate. 2002. *Light Verbs in English*. Manuscript. Cambridge, MA: MIT. http://reference.kfupm.edu.sa/content/I/i/light_verbs_in_english_86486.pdf
- Kövecses, Zoltán. 2010. *Metaphor: A Practical Introduction*. 2nd ed. Oxford University Press.
- Lakoff, George. 1993. "The Contemporary Theory of Metaphor." In *Metaphor and Thought*, edited by Andrew Ortony, 202–251. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173865.013>.
- Langacker, Ronald. 1991. *Foundations of Cognitive Grammar, vol. 2: Descriptive Application*. Stanford University Press.
- Levin, Beth. 1993. *English Verb Classes and Alternations: A Preliminary Investigation*. University of Chicago Press.
- Martínez Caro, Elena, and Jorge Arús-Hita. 2020. "Give as a Light Verb." *Functions of Language* 27 (3): 280–306. <https://doi.org/10.1075/fof.16036.mar>.
- Mehl, Seth W. 2017. "Light Verb Semantics in the International Corpus of English: Onomasiological Variation, Identity Evidence and Degrees of Lightness." *English Language and Linguistics* 23 (1): 55–80. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1360674317000302>.
- Michaelis, Laura A. 2003. "Word Meaning, Sentence Meaning, and Syntactic Meaning." In *Cognitive Approaches to Lexical Semantics*, edited by Hurbert Cuyckens, René Dirven, and John R. Taylor, 163–209. Mouton de Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110219074.163>.
- Michaelis, Laura A. 2004. "Type Shifting in Construction Grammar: An Integrated Approach to Aspectual Coercion." *Cognitive Linguistics* 15 (1): 1–67. <https://doi.org/10.1515/cogl.2004.001>.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe. 2005. "The Role of Conceptual Metonymy in Meaning Construction." In *Cognitive Linguistics: Internal Dynamics and Interdisciplinary Interaction*, edited by Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza and María Sandra Peña-Cervel, 353–386. Mouton de Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110197716.4.353>.
- Panther, Klaus-Uwe. 2022. "Attribute Transfer: The Figurative Interpretation of Shifted Modifiers." *Review of Cognitive Linguistics* 20 (1): 130–155. <https://doi.org/10.1075/rcl.00104.pan>.
- Peña-Cervel, María Sandra, and Francisco J. Ruiz de Mendoza. 2022. *Figuring Out Figuration: A Cognitive Linguistic Account*. John Benjamins. <https://doi.org/10.1075/ftl.14>.
- Radden, Günter, and René Dirven. 2007. *Cognitive English Grammar*. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. <https://doi.org/10.1075/clip.2>.
- Reddy, Michael. 1979. "The Conduit Metaphor." In *Metaphor and Thought*, edited by Andrew Ortony, 284–324. Cambridge University Press.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, Francisco J. 2005. "Construing Meaning through Conceptual Mappings." In *Lengua y Sociedad: Aportaciones Recientes en Lingüística Cognitiva, Lingüística del Corpus, Lenguajes de Especialidad y Lenguas en Contacto*, edited by Pedro Fuertes, 19–38. University of Valladolid.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, Francisco J., and Ricardo Mairal. 2007. "High-Level Metaphor and Metonymy in Meaning Construction." In *Aspects of Meaning Construction*, edited by Günter Radden, Klaus-Michael Köpcke, Thomas Berg, and Peter Siemund, 34–49. John Benjamins. <https://doi.org/10.1075/z.136.05rui>.
- Ruiz de Mendoza, Francisco José, and Francisco Santibáñez Sáenz. 2003. "Content and Formal Cognitive Operations in Construing Meaning." *Italian Journal of Linguistics* 15 (2): 293–320.
- Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1999. "A Historical Review of Complex Predicate Types." In *Collocational and Idiomatic Aspects of Composite Predicates in the History of English*, edited by Laurell Brinton and Minoji Akimoto, 239–260. John Benjamins. <https://doi.org/10.1075/slcs.47.74clo>.
- Trousdale, Graeme. 2008. "Constructions in Grammaticalization and Lexicalization: Evidence from the History of a Composite Predicate in English." In *Constructional Approaches to English Grammar*, edited by Graeme Trousdale and Nikolas Gisborne, 33–67. Mouton de Gruyter. <https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110199178.1.33>.
- Van Valin, Robert D., Jr. 2005. *Exploring the Syntax-Semantics Interface*. Cambridge University Press. <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610578.001>.
- Wierzbicka, Anna. 1982. "Why Can You Have a Drink When You Can't *Have an Eat?" *Language* 58: 753–799. <https://doi.org/10.2307/413956>.

