Cultural Migrations between Spain and Russia: Transnational Perspectives

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Abstract. This concluding essay interprets the other articles in the current issue of the journal by first providing an overview and comparison of older and more recent historiographical assessments of Spain and Russia. The article then briefly surveys the many parallels that existed between the two countries, which eased the transmission of ideas from one to the other. It identifies the main themes of these cultural exchanges as a utopian fascination with Russia on the part of Spaniards, and ideas about governance or rebellion that went in both directions depending on the time period. The article suggests that awareness of these cross-cultural ties is crucial for a deeper and more balanced understanding of the histories of Russia, Spain, and Europe as a whole.

Keywords: Russia; Spain; Cross-cultural ties; Cultural exchanges.

[es] Migraciones culturales entre España y Rusia: perspectivas transnacionales

Resumen. En este ensayo final se realiza una interpretación del resto de los artículos que componen este dossier de la revista, ofreciendo una visión de conjunto y una comparación con otras valoraciones, antiguas y recientes, sobre España y Rusia. Proporciona además una breve revisión de algunos paralelismos entre los dos países, que facilitaron la transmisión de ideas entre uno y otro. Se identifican los temas principales de estos intercambios culturales como una fascinación utópica hacia Rusia por parte de los españoles, y las ideas acerca del gobierno o la rebelión en ambas direcciones, según los tiempos. El artículo sostiene que el conocimiento de estos lazos interculturales es crucial para una comprensión más honda y ponderada de las historias de Rusia, España y el conjunto de Europa.

Palabras clave: Rusia; España; Relaciones interculturales; Intercambios culturales.


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Introduction: Old Perceptions, New Interpretations

“… that arid square, that fragment nipped off from hot
Africa, soldered so crudely to inventive Europe…."
W.H. Auden, “Spain” (1937)

“… we had the luck to see
A rare discontinuity,
Old Russia suddenly mutate
Into a proletarian state ….”
W.H. Auden, “A New Year Letter” (1941)

W.H. Auden’s geo-poetic commentary signifies that both Spain and Russia were once seen as outliers to the mainstream of European civilization. Academic specialists have labored to ensure that this is no longer the case, and the articles in this issue add heft to that endeavor. Yet the older point of view persists. As William McNeill once noted, despite the distinct decay in “the Victorian edifice”, his metaphor for the triumphalist Anglophone nineteenth-century historiography, plenty of people continue to dwell in that structure. To give one prominent example, in the bestelling and widely influential study of why some nations are “so rich and some so poor”, Harvard economic historian David S. Landes depicts both Spain and Russia (alongside a few other places) as countries whose cultures prevented them from adopting the Western models of development that generated growth and prosperity.

Where did these impressions come from? José Ortega y Gasset famously wrote that Russia and Spain are situated at “los dos extremos de la gran diagonal europea” – by which he suggested that they were deficient in the individualism found elsewhere on the continent. Maybe they were accounted for in part because Spain and Russia are, in J.G.A. Pocock’s formulation, “dark patch[es],” hard to square with the rest of European history due to the long presence of Islam in the former and the long-lasting heritage of the Byzantine Empire and the Mongol conquest in the latter.

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2 I would like to thank Raquel Anido, Sandie Holguín, Michael Meng, Sandra Pujals-Ramírez, and Aviel Roshwald for their helpful critical comments on the original draft of this article.
3 The first Auden stanza appears in BALFOUR, Sebastian: “The Spanish Empire and Its End: A Comparative View in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Europe,” in Alexei Miller and Alfred J. Rieber (eds.): Imperial Rule, Budapest, Central European University Press, 2004, p. 151, with a similar point, but about Spain alone.
7 ORTEGA Y GASSET, José: España invertebrada: Bosquejo de algunos pensamientos históricos, Madrid, Calpe, 1921, p. 146. GOODY, Jack: The Theft of History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006, chaps. 9-10, considers individualism to be a global phenomenon not limited to Europe.
well known, a negative assessment of Spain in the Western imagination strengthened with the arguments that were generated in the Dutch Revolt and resonated later on in the English Civil War and the American Revolution.\(^9\) Anti-Spanish views were perpetuated over the course of wars and imperial competition with Britain and France (and, briefly, the United States).\(^10\) These were exacerbated, especially in the minds of Protestants, by the real and imagined horrors of the Inquisition.\(^11\)

Likewise with Russia, fear of tsarist, then Soviet (and now Putinist) aggression and repulsion at internal repression have been a common thread since the eighteenth century, met with rhetoric that engendered a sense of Russia’s intrinsic difference from the rest of Europe.\(^12\) Russia has long been seen as the polar opposite of the Western political and economic system, badly managed but all the same a threat to its neighbors and the established order.\(^13\) Later, the marginalization of Spain and Russia resulted from the very real Francoist and Stalinist deviations from post-World War II Western norms. Russia and Spain are rarely spoken of in the same breath, but there has long been an overlap in external perceptions of the two countries that the articles under discussion directly and indirectly address as a cultural imaginary.

One of the motifs that crops up in the articles is an interrogation of the traditional view of Russia and Spain as exotic “Other.” That view was the legacy of the “Orientalizing” of Spain and Russia by Western commentators since at least the early nineteenth century. It was readily apparent in the popular books *L’Espagne sous Ferdinand VII* (1838) and *La Russie en 1839* (1843), both by the French Marquis de Custine, and in English writer Richard Ford’s *Handbook for Travelers in Spain* (1845) and *Gatherings from Spain* (1846). The authors explained the peculiarities of Spanish life by its Oriental nature, and Custine did the same with Russia.\(^14\) (In fact, Custine’s constant point of comparison in Russia was Spain, although he found Spain preferable: “In Russia life is as gloomy as in Andalusia it is gay…. In Spain, the absence of political liberty is compensated by a personal independence...”, whilst

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in Russia, the one is as little known as the other”). Along these Orientalist lines we can also cite Washington Irving’s literary sketches of The Alhambra (1832 and 1851), and the art of David Roberts, whose romantic-era depictions of Spanish landmarks were of a piece with his landscape and architectural paintings of sites in northern Africa and the Near East. John Dos Passos’ post-World War I writings on Spain fit in here, too, as he drew a sharp contrast between work-obsessed America and grim northern Europe on the one hand and Spain on the other, where the passionate spirit of lo flamenco reigned—“neither work nor getting ready for work.” The emphasis on the exotic endures today if Chris Stewart’s (admittedly charming) accounts of his home in rural Andalusia are any indication. Likewise, for many writers, artists, countercultural intellectuals, and cultural consumers in the West, the Russian “soul” amounted to a siren call from the East, promising liberation from the cash nexus spun by the soul-crushing bourgeoisie. Noteworthy also are the German scholar Max Weber’s works, over a hundred years old, which remain foundational texts for the social sciences in Britain and the United States. These categorized Russia with other “patrimonial” Oriental despotisms. (Spain appears less often in Weber’s writings, but when it does he maintains that it wandered off the path that would have taken it to modern capitalism).

Many of these views were internalized in Spain and Russia, whose intelligentsias frequently put forth a defensively nationalist position—and this was not only on the right of the political spectrum as socialists, too, considered Russian or Spanish backwardness to be a bulwark against Western capitalism. As Antonio Castro Villacañas, journalist of the Spanish Falange, insisted in 1948, the year the Marshall Plan was introduced: “No queremos el progreso, el romántico y liberal, capitalista y burgués, judío, protestante, ateo y masón progreso yanqui. Preferimos el atraso de España, nuestro atraso que nos lleva a considerar que ante valores fundamentales deben sacrificarse los intereses materiales.” The exact same kinds of sentiments by Russians about their own country have been routinely found from the nineteenth century to the present.

The recent historiographies of both Spain and Russia have taken us far from these Orientalizing days. Anglo-American academic scholarship in the past decade

16 See www.museodelprado.es/aprende/enciclopedia/voz/roberts-david/c6988ae-a3f3-4d57-a71c-424f10819502
17 DOS PASSOS, John: Rosinante to the Road Again, NY, George H. Doran, 1922, pp. 40-41.
21 WEBER, Max: General Economic History, Frank H. Knight (trans.), NY, Greenberg, 1927, pp. 175, 353, 354.
has integrated the two countries into broader continental and global frameworks. Spain is fundamental to conceptualizations of Mediterranean civilization, the Atlantic world, and the history of the (North) American West.²⁴ Maybe a “culture of tolerance” between Christians, Muslims, and Jews did not consistently prevail in medieval Spain, but as a number of recent works has revealed, this multi-ethnicity imprinted itself on the country and influenced the intellectual life of the rest of Europe in fundamental ways.²⁵ Early modern historians place Spain and its empire front and center in European affairs.²⁶ Whereas Peter Gay in his magisterial history of the Enlightenment dismissed Spain as representing “the other side of the eighteenth century—the victory of stagnation and clerical conservatism,” Jonathan I. Israel’s even more comprehensive surveys illustrate the great extent to which Spanish thinkers and political leaders were engaged with the ideas of the French and British philosophes.²⁷ Regina Grafe has rejected the notion of Spain in this era as rigidly centralist and backward by stressing its political polycentricity, with sovereignty contractually shared by the monarch and an array of local and regional authorities and institutions. Insofar as Spain mobilized adequate resources for defense without imposing tyrannical rule, she argues that it should be ranked among the most successful contemporary European states.²⁸ Relatedly, Marta V. Vicente undermines the narrative of Spanish economic retardation by telling the story of Catalonia’s entrepreneurial drive in the late eighteenth century, when Barcelona’s many calico manufacturers laid the foundation of the Industrial Revolution in Spain.²⁹ For the twentieth century, although his appraisals of Franco are disputed, Stanley G. Payne has consistently attempted to place the study of the Spanish Civil War in comparative perspective.³⁰ For Russia’s part, Christian Raffensperger contends that it was well incorporated into European political systems in the early Middle Ages, and scholars have improved contextualization with greater awareness of similarities and interactions with the

Ottoman and Chinese empires, which, like Russia’s, were also sprawling agrarian, multi-ethnic polities. Analogous to the above trends in Spanish historiography, Russian specialists have knocked down the stock image of the tsarist and Soviet autocracies by stressing the personalized nature of the ruler’s authority and constant negotiations between actors at all levels of society in a territorial-wide web of patron-client relationships. The very assertion of autocratic power was a mostly propagandistic projection of supreme power, rather than the reality, as in other absolutist regimes, too. In economic terms, we now know that market-oriented activities were prevalent early on, and that regional dynamism was the rule in the tsarist era. By the late nineteenth century, St Petersburg hewed closely to western social legislation, economic policies, and even governance. According to Melissa Stockdale, Russian patriotism and national mobilization during World War I suggest very little difference from other European states. Even many Soviet policies were close in nature to state practices across the continent, from social welfare and surveillance to public health measures. Indeed, in an important article Choi Chatterjee has proposed a comparative analysis of Russian prison exile in Siberia versus British penal systems in India. Her thesis is that Britain succeeded in giving the impression that it was a land of liberty because its brutality affected non-whites and was hidden in remote regions of its tropical empire, whereas the Russians’ offenses against human rights could affect people of any background and took place in their own territory for many to witness. In her view, strongly anti-Russian public opinion prevented us from seeing some of the kinship with other European imperial powers. Finally, as Donald J. Raleigh has shown, in the Cold War era the aspirations of the Soviet populace toward consumerism and popular culture were also in line with the rest of Europe, even if stores were comparatively undersupplied.
None of the scholars responsible for these historiographical thrusts would deny the distinctive features of either Spain (e.g. the agricultural, linguistic, and architectural heritage of Moorish rule) or Russia (e.g. political structures determined by the demands of governing the largest territory on earth; or, the tyranny of Stalin). But their work on the Iberian or eastern Slavic “peripheries” complicates the older concept of a European “core” which in fact is the northwestern periphery of the continent. The newer scholarship takes the uniqueness of Spain and Russia within Europe into account, but now also highlights how greatly they shared in the continent’s historical development. The articles at hand are in accord with these interpretations.

1. Parallels

Foreign prejudices and misperceptions once tarred Spain and Russia with the same brush, but there are intriguing parallels between Spain and Russia, which, when brought to light, can make us more mindful of the intricacies of modern European history.\(^{40}\) This is not to say that the two did not have significant differences: serfdom in modern Russia had no analogue in Spain, just as liberalism was more deeply rooted there than in Russia. Nonetheless, the parallels help to explain their openness to each other’s intellectual production and the subsequent connections between the two cultures, which is the theme of our articles.

What, then, are the major parallels? Both Spain and Russia have faced environmental constraints that affected the development of economic and social formations, and at certain moments in the twentieth century added stressors that worsened communal tensions.\(^{41}\) The Russian state emerged from Mongol rule as the tsardom of Muscovy around the same time that Spain completed the Reconquista and became a unified kingdom. Both simultaneously expanded outward into empire and were multi-ethnic polyglot polities. At times each was accommodating toward minorities in its midst, at other times oppressive to the point of engaging in ethnic cleansing.\(^{42}\) Prominent in both countries were large Muslim and Jewish populations, which, both there and in emigration, shaped the histories and cultures of their nations and the wider world.\(^{43}\) That circumstance called forth a tight alliance, however uneasy at times, between church and state, and generated a sometime messianic quality that also infused extremist political ideologies in the twentieth century.\(^{44}\) In the last two


\(^{42}\) NAIMARK, Norman M.: Stalin’s Genocides, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2010; sources on Spain in this regard are too numerous and well known to list.


centuries, changes induced from elsewhere in Europe strengthened the parallels. The French Revolution and Napoleonic invasions set off guerrilla wars and internal ideological and political conflicts that reverberated in each country throughout the nineteenth century, setting off cycles of pro- and anti-Western reactions.\(^{45}\) The two nations had epochal challenges in assimilating their respective peasantry—as Sebastian Balfour put it, to turn them into Spaniards or Russians.\(^{46}\) Heavy reliance on foreign investment to develop industrial infrastructure only heightened those tensions.\(^{47}\)

It is fair to say that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Spain and Russia were good examples of what the unorthodox Marxist philosopher Ernst Bloch meant when he posited the coexistence of “contemporaneity and non-contemporaneity,” whereby the social, economic, and political features of a given society are out of sync with each other and result in the build up of severe disparities and spiraling internecine hostilities.\(^{48}\) That condition occurs in every society to a certain extent, but it was especially pronounced in Russia and Spain, a parallel that is the backdrop for most of our articles. Consider the contrast in the 1920s between the life represented by the art-deco towers of the Gran Vía in Madrid and the impoverished, ultra-traditional existence in the rural south, as recounted in Gerald Brenan’s memoir of his sojourn there.\(^{49}\) Or, in late imperial Russia, the vibrant, consumer society in its cities that coexisted with a reactionary monarchy and a majority peasant population dwelling in agrarian communes with still tentative links to the modern sector.\(^{50}\)

The ineluctable forces of modernization made it difficult to manage societies undergoing wrenching change—which is when Bloch’s proposition of contemporaneity and non-contemporaneity becomes operative. Polarization and political upheaval were endemic. Both countries were wracked by horrific civil wars, followed by the consolidation of vicious dictatorships of the left in Russia and the right in Spain.\(^{51}\)


\(^{49}\) BRENAN, Gerald: *South from Granada: Seven Years in an Andalusian Village*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1957; BAKER, Edward: *Madrid cosmopolita: La Gran Vía, 1910-1936*, Madrid, Marcial Pons, 2009. One might argue that this was the same contrast that existed in the early twentieth century between the skyscrapers of New York and the hardscrabble shacks of Appalachia, but rural (and for that matter urban) poverty and isolation were far less extensive in the United States than in Spain or Russia. The relative prosperity is what led the German social scientist Werner Sombart to write a book addressing the question *Why Is There No Socialism in the United States?*, trans. HOCKING, Patricia M. and HUSBANDS, C.T., London, Macmillan, 1976, (1\(^{st}\) ed. 1906).


Hundreds of thousands of people on the losing side went into exile. And the memory of these tragic blood feuds remains contested to this day. After their civil wars ended, Spanish and Russian societies alike saw a rapid and unsettling "rural exodus" to the big cities.

Lastly, within a space of fifteen years in the later twentieth century, both countries experienced the collapse of their one-party regimes, although Spain cemented its democracy while Russia evolved into an authoritarian, crony-capitalist state under Vladimir Putin, whose ambition is to recoup his nation’s great-power status—another parallel with Spain and Franco, albeit from a different era. Today, regional secessionism inspired by “stateless nationalism” is still very much alive in Spain and Russia.

2. Empathy and Interaction

Because of these analogous circumstances it was natural that Spanish and Russian thinkers and artists would develop some degree of empathy for each other. As the present articles display, this was leavened in the modern era with a romanticized perception of certain “soulful” qualities in their respective national characters. Emilia Pardo Bazán premised her studies of Russian literature on the belief that “somos como Rusia, un pueblo antiguo y a la vez joven, que aún ignora a dónde le empujará el porvenir.” Miguel de Unamuno, who was a Spanish consul in tsarist-ruled Riga, claimed to have always been convinced de que existe una similitud esencial e indudable entre el carácter nacional del pueblo español y ruso: la resignación, la actitud ante la vida, la serena religiosidad de su gente, las aspiraciones e impulsos místicos de los elegidos, idénticas bases económicas para la existencia, ciertos elementos del «mir»... Incluso la doctrina de Tolstói nos resulta mucho más cercana que para los franceses o italianos cuyos países están latinizados en exceso y son demasiado paganos.

About Spain, Lev Tolstoi wrote that “this country was so similar [to my own] that it seemed I could have been born there.” The Symbolist poet Konstantin Bal’mont...
declared that “no one has ever used the psychological theme of repentance like the Russian and the Spaniard.”

The exchange intensified after the Napoleonic invasions awakened mutual sympathies in the two countries and new communications technologies spread word of cultural innovations and spawned more frequent comparison of like social conditions. Richard Stites’ article above testifies to the flow of inspiration from Spain’s liberal movement to Russia (and other places) in the wake of the Peninsular War. Political commentators both admired and warned of developments coming out of late-nineteenth century Russia, from imperial management to the activity of the Nihilists. Theater and literature saw an intense and richly productive cross-cultural fertilization, epitomized by Fedor Dostoevskii’s encomium to *Don Quixote* as “the most magnificent and saddest of books ever created by the genius of man” and what Cristina Patiño Eirín identifies as the literary “rusofilia” of Pardo Bazán. From well before the Civil War the deepest Russian impact on Spanish politics was in the anarchist movement, more widespread and robust than anywhere else in the world. When the Soviets entered the Spanish Civil War in force on the side of the Republic, they stimulated every imaginable artistic genre: Spanish art, graphic design, literature, film, and so on. In Russia at the same time, journalism, art, music, and films from Spain were avidly consumed and served as a window on the world for many citizens –Glennys Young calls it Soviet “espanophilia.” Decades later, a new Russian invasion of Spain occurred, but this time the Communist apparatchiki and military advisors were replaced by tourists, real estate investors, and a few mafiosi. For most of them the allure of Spain was not much different than expressed in Dostoevskii’s novel *Uncle’s Dream* (1859): “The magical Alhambra, the myrtles, the lemons, the Spaniards on their mules! –that alone would make an extraordinary impression on a poetical nature.”


As Vsévolod Bagnó observes, many, though not all, of the Spanish accounts of travel to Russia in the past century were guilty of idealizing and exoticizing the country (even while constantly complaining about the cold climate).\footnote{BAGNÓ, Vsévolod: “Para otra dimensión spiritual… (La imagen de Rusia en los diarios de los viajeros españoles),” in MATA INDURÁIN, Carlos and MORÓZOVA, Anna (eds.): Temas y formas hispánicas: arte, cultura y sociedad, Pamplona, Universidad de Navarra, 2015, pp. 20, 27-31, 38, and passim 11-42.} That is present in the articles here, too, and it was no different all over Europe and the world, wherever people were infected with “Russian fever” in the early twentieth century. Beatriz Martínez del Fresno’s contribution centers around the Spanish musical establishment’s interpretation of Russian music and dance as expressions of its soulfulness, its primitive folk barbarism, its revolutionary quest for freedom. Sometimes the critics viewed Russia as appealingly remote from Spanish existence, sometimes as nearly identical, but either way, as Martínez del Fresno astutely comments, their take on Russian music was a mirror of what they themselves wanted for their own society, namely existential regeneration at a time of deep political and social crisis. Of course, the whole social-renovation-through-music enterprise was managed by capitalist show business, which sold tickets to well-heeled representatives of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie and received critical feedback from well-educated elites. Such is the irony of the artistic rebellion that was Modernism in Spain as everywhere else. Regardless, the collaboration of Diaghilev and the Ballets russes with Picasso, María Lejárraga, and Manuel de Falla blended Russian and Spanish cultural elements to yield a creative fusion that augmented the world’s artistic heritage. In the same vein, Sandra Pujals-Ramírez’s article on Ángel del Río’s dalliance with communism portrays his zeal for an idealized revolutionary Russia—which he eventually discovered was a fantasy, as his scholarly humanism was confronted by doctrinaire party operatives and the blood lust of Stalinism. Pujals-Ramírez is certainly right to stress the quixotic “psychological, emotional, intellectual, and human” appeal of communist Russia in the aftermath of 1917, and to portray del Río as an exemplar of this wider phenomenon, which also involved the gradual shedding of those illusions.

None of the articles in this issue attests to this, but it is clear that a similar kind of idealizing of Spain was apparent on the Russian side, too, forming one of the Russian intelligentsia’s utopian visions—in the words of Bagnó, its “Mediterranean dream.”\footnote{BAGNÓ, Vsévolod: Rossia i Ispania, pp. 127-143, with quote on 128.} The prejudices Qualls’ article records as being held by Russians toward the Spanish exiles, whom they accused of being lazy, sloppy, violent, and dirty, were the concomitant of this dream, which consisted of romantic anti-establishment, anti-capitalist, and anti-bourgeois elements that were attractive from afar, but then were triggered at home in a negative fashion by resentments over the preferential treatment given by the Soviet state to the niños.

This idealization of other countries (as either threats or worthy of emulation) reflected a deeper process taking place in many parts of the modern world, namely the quest for political legitimacy in societies vulnerable to centrifugal forces and undergoing rapid change at the same time that there was also concerted resistance to the established order and a search for alternatives to it. In other words, these states were contending with societies experiencing the whiplash from the disjuncture of “contemporaneity and non-contemporaneity,” which also helped to produce an
inflamed nationalism among ethnic minorities. All states observe each other to learn new methodologies of governance. That is why Renaissance humanist education for courtiers and varieties of absolutism spread so rapidly across early modern Europe, why in the twentieth century Soviet communism became a model for dictatorships and developmental regimes, and why others emulated American or Western European political and economic systems. Especially during troubled times, thinkers in all societies have assessed, critiqued, and offered alternatives to those systems either from within the political establishment or from the outside. That push and pull has been an essential and parallel feature of Spanish and Russian history in recent centuries, and explains many of their cross-cultural exchanges. These are the thematic currents that lie beneath the surface of the articles herein, all of which provide concrete examples of these vital patterns of political behavior.

Stites’ article underscores the Spanish influence on Russian political thought: it directly inspired constitutional aspirations among young Russian officers and noblemen, as well as encouraged their 1825 Decembrist revolt against the Romanov monarchy after King Fernando VII crushed the movement spearheaded by Rafael del Riego. In this conflict over popular sovereignty versus royal authority, Tsar Nicholas I’s harsh crackdown thereafter was undertaken in part so as not to replicate what he perceived as the weakness of the Spanish monarchy.

As Stites asserts, there was a direct link between this post-Napoleonic revolutionary brotherhood and later generations of international socialist revolutionaries. For them, the source of political and ideological inspiration had reversed as many Spaniards began to follow the Russian lead, either affiliating with the ideologies articulated by the anarchists Mikhail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin or, after 1917, falling under the sway of Bolshevism. Martínez del Fresno richly documents how Spanish artists also formed an integral component of an international counterculture that adopted Russian modernist aesthetics, which, I would argue, helped to prepare the ground for Russia’s growing political influence. The articles in this issue do not deal with the anarchists, but Pujals-Ramírez presents del Río as a case in point of the complex motives involved in the Spanish attraction to communism in its globalized golden age. A telling segment of Qualls’ paper illuminates Spanish Communist leader Dolores Ibárruri’s embrace of the Stalinist government’s modalities for the creation of the new Soviet man and woman, features which she hoped would be inculcated from above in the exiled niños, who would one day return to be the vanguard of the new communist state and society in Spain. Qualls does not explain why the Spaniards were treated so well compared to other foreign exiles in Stalin’s Russia, but it is surprising that Ibárruri was able to advocate for her constituency without her or them being thrown into the Gulag. Was that a function of Stalin’s own espanophilia? The arbitrariness of the system? Or was this leniency a more frequent occurrence than we are led to believe?


Ibárruri’s vision came to naught when in the late 1950s the niños were allowed to return to Spain and forced to renounce their communist pasts, the subject of Glennys Young’s entry. It is not certain why Franco allowed that to occur, but it is likely that the explanation lies with Cold War realignments and the persuasion of the CIA, which was eager to interview the returnees about the workings of the Soviet system. If so, it is another example of the way in which Franco was ready to place his nationalist movement at the service of and to extract benefit from whichever world power led the fight against communism—whether Nazi Germany in its day or the United States during the Cold War.73 (An article could be written on Franco’s obsession with the specter of Russian communism as the obverse of Spanish Communists’ fascination with it). Although not stated explicitly, Young’s article shows that however awful Franco’s dictatorship was, it was more confident in its sense of legitimacy and less repressive than the Soviet Union, which never allowed its White exiles to return and never would have permitted them to form the kind of independent advocacy group that the niños did in Spain. On the other hand, the Spanish exiles brought with them an abundance of consumer goods that were not yet commonly seen in their poor and autarkic homeland. Perhaps that was a sign of the good treatment they received from the Soviets, where consumer goods were also scarce, or perhaps a small feint in the Soviet propaganda war with the West, in which the availability of consumer goods figured largely. But taken as a whole Young gives us a glimpse of the political and economic dispositions of the two societies.

3. Conclusion

The articles appearing in this issue represent new directions in the study of Spanish, Russian, European, and global histories. They sharpen and adjust the parallels between Spain and Russia. They blow apart stereotypes and put the Orientalizing of the two nations by foreign cultures in perspective. While detailing their particular and unique relationship, they also advance the new historiographies that emphasize the fundamental Europeanness of both countries: the articles convince us that our picture of European history is enlarged and enriched when Russia and Spain are included rather than marginalized. Their examination of cross-cultural influences contributes to the growing body of literature on transnationalism and furthers our understanding of globalization and its discontents (to borrow a phrase from the economist Joseph E. Stiglitz),74 which, as is evident here, are hardly new phenomena. The examples of Spain and Russia indicate that Europe has been contending with these impulses for a long time. And if that is the case, we can apply what we have learned from the articles to better comprehend the state of affairs among European Muslim radicals, who are reacting to the forces of contemporaneity and non-contemporaneity in an interconnected world that is plagued with social inequalities and new mythologies of the “Other.” They, too, seek forms of political legitimation and experiment with different modes of rebellion learned from abroad. One day, their international jihadist networks will be seen to represent a continuity with their revolutionary constitutionalist, anarchist, and communist predecessors. Thus, the historical

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73 On which, see PAYNE and PALACIOS: Franco: A Personal and Political Biography, passim.
relationship between Spaniards and Russians does not just illustrate something we have missed about Europe’s past, it also offers a key to making sense of its present.