



Violent radicalization of young people as a challenge in building safe societies: a proposal for a typology and scale of young people vulnerable to violent radicalization processes

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ENG Abstract. The concept of violent radicalisation is continually under review. One of the aspects under discussion is the relevance of each of its component terms: radicalisation and violence. This paper tilts towards the second term, attempting an approach to the risk/vulnerability to violent radicalisation of young people based on their disposition to violence. The main objective is to explore a typology and a scale of young people vulnerable to radicalisation processes taking as a starting point the youth's disposition to violence. The interest of this exercise is to segment the phenomenon of violent radicalisation in order to design more effective radicalisation prevention policies. The group studied is the young population, as it is the age group most vulnerable to radicalisation processes and the one on which the effects of policies can be most effective and long lasting. This group and its predisposition to violence is studied on the basis of a European on-line survey. Principal component analysis is used to construct the typology and a scale of risk/vulnerability to violent radicalisation is designed on the basis of the resulting types. Finally, its usefulness is illustrated with the sub-sample of young Spaniards. The proposed typology and scale of risk of radicalisation or development of violent behaviour allows us to change the starting point of policies to prevent the violent radicalisation of young people and to shift the emphasis from political, religious and politico-religious ideologies to actions, thus proposing policy measures and actions that allow us to approach the phenomenon in a different and holistic way. It is a work with a practical and empirical approach that advances in the classification of young people at risk or vulnerable to violent radicalisation, as well as proposing actions and response measures.

Keywords: Violence, extremism, youth, government policy.

Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. Violence and the concept of violent radicalisation. 3. Method to elaborate the typology and risk or vulnerability scale of radicalisation processes of young people. 3.1. Input data of the willingness to use violence. 3.2. Levels of the willingness to use violence. 4. Typology of radical young people and risk scale of violent radicalisation. 4.1. Typology of radical young people. 4.2. Risk scale of violent radicalisation. 5. Illustration of the typology and scale applied to Spanish young people. 6. Implications of typology and scale for the design of policies to prevent violent radicalization of young people

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1.Introduction

Following the “epidemiological approaches” in which concepts such as “risk factors”, “disease”, “infection”, “external agent”, etc., have been taken (Moyano, 2011: 132-135), spread and extension of radicalisation and violent extremism have been compared occasionally to the behaviour of a virus or a pandemic, like the one everybody suffers (Bermejo, 2020), a “psychological virus” (Neumann, 2013: 873). That “virus” is identified as the radical ideas (political, political-religious, or religious) which are spread by direct contact, making its way in the family, society, friend groups, etc., and lead to harmful effects; effects that are more harmful to people when they are exposed continuously and for a long time. These effects are especially serious on one’s psyche, as Trujillo describes an ideological indoctrination phase in which “new behavioural patterns based on new beliefs are established” (Trujillo, 2019: 100-101).

Nonetheless, this view of the violent radicalisation process, focused on radical ideas and its consequences, has been severely criticised. On one hand, there are those who declare that the emphasis on ideas can threaten the freedom of speech or marginalise and victimise certain ideologies. On the other hand, there are those who criticise this perspective due to its “soft” strategy, for example, the EU (Ruiz Díaz, 2017: 271). Among the criticism, Neumann stated in 2013 that “the European approach had its weaknesses. It can be overly vague and distracts governments’ attention from the prevention of violence as their top priority” (Neumann, 2013: 893).

In this context, it is important to remember that the ideas are a part of the equation of political violence and terrorism. The definition of terrorism has historically incorporated the concept of violence, violence exerted by the State (state terrorism), violence for political ends, pro-independence violence... violence that is not only aimed at individuals, but also involves breaches of public order, peace, safety, and institutions.

As Rapoport (1999, 2004) analyses, according to the historical place and moment, the terrorist threat assumes different characteristics. Regarding South America, state terrorism has been discussed during the different dictatorships of the 20th century, but also the structural and systematic violence against women (e.g., Rondon, 2003) or urban guerrilla warfare have sometimes been described as “terrorism” in the 21st century.

This paper does not intend to focus on a conceptual discussion about terrorism nor the role that political, religious, or political-religious ideas play in the “transformation to terrorists”, but to bring the spotlight on the second part of the pairing, violence, which is the less studied. The violence factor (as opposed to ideology) is, without a shadow of doubt, present in all those sorts of actions that fall under the concept of terrorist actions and are defined by a clear use of violence with different political and social ends. To this effect, this research will use the data of an online survey conducted in the following countries: Italy, Greece, Austria, Poland, Belgium, France, Spain, Portugal, Czech Republic, Ireland, Germany, and Denmark. The main target population is young people between 14 and 24 years of age, but it also includes an older age group (between 25 and 50 years of age) to have baseline results. It included a series of questions on attitudes towards violence and their degree of acceptance among European societies.

Based on the results of the mentioned survey, the objective of this research is to suggest a classification and group of different subjects regarding the concept of violence. To this end, different research and analysis tasks will be carried. First, the construction of a typology of “violent” young people is sought, as a tool to advance the study of violence in the field of extremism and violent radicalisation. It consists of creating a descriptive typology that, following the theory (Collier, Laporte and Seawright, 2008), addresses the global concept of radical young people, includes the variables in rows and columns (with an arrangement focusing on violence and a sociotropic arrangement), creates a 2x2 matrix and, after, works on and addresses the conceptualisation of four “ideal” types located in the cells, which correspond to four types of radical young people. These cells will be the “case containers” and categorical variables for the classification. These “ideal” types give a conceptual meaning to each cell, corresponding to its position with the row and column of variables. In conclusion, this typology gives a more empirical sense to a more complete and precise set of opinions and characteristics shown in the mentioned survey. Secondly, there is a risk or vulnerability scale to radicalisation processes of young people that places them in relation to the better chance of resorting to violence for conflict resolution and/or problem solving. Next, thirdly, this theoretical proposal is shown through results that, regarding the Spanish case, were gathered in the aforementioned survey and, finally, it undertakes the task of analysing the implications that these outcomes may have for policies to prevent the radicalisation, especially, among young people.

2.Violence and the concept of violent radicalisation

If the changes in contemporary terrorism, the transition to the new terrorism wave (Rapoport, 2001) or the evolution from old to new terrorism (Crenshaw, 2008) are analysed, the new age of terrorism is known to be more cruel, less reliant on state financing, new organisational forms, global campaigns, and the use of new communication technologies (Jenkins, 2006: 117-118). In such cases, violence, and threat of using violence, which the definition of the phenomenon includes (Hoffman 2006; Richardson 2006), continue to play a key role in the pursuit of the political objective.

When some specific characteristics of the “new” terrorism are examined, such as the new organisational forms of terrorist groups, it is worth recalling that, despite presenting an “individualisation” of terrorism, which

can be perceived in the frequency of individual radicalisation processes or lone participants, terrorism remains an inherently social and political phenomenon (Crone, 2016: 597 ss). On this matter, some authors have talked about “violence culture” which is rooted in cultural values or the exhibition of violent social models. That establishes it as a permanent characteristic of society, and allows it to create a framework where violence, political violence and terrorism find better justification. For example, Waldmann (2017) finds Colombia as an example where the culture can explain the use of violence.

In order to explain the cultural and social importance of violence, in contrast to an interpretation of the radicalisation pyramid (Moghaddam’s staircase model of 2005 or Baran’s conveyor belt, among others) which portrays radicalisation as an intellectual process through which an individual would be more bewitched by extremist ideas (cognitive radicalisation) to clear the way for action (behavioural radicalisation) (e.g., Wiktorowicz, 2005), different works have emerged that specify or prefer an “interpretation of the pyramid that is not a stage theory and does not require that each level of the pyramid is attained by passing through the level or levels below it” (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009: 241). These authors make a really relevant distinction for this paper: the willingness to participate in illegal and violent political actions (radicalism) is not the same as terrorism: “terrorists are the subset of radicals who use violence against civilian targets” (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009: 240). Even though they consider it important to analyse the relation between radicalism and terrorism, they recognised that it is not possible to study the probability of moving from violence against the military or the government to violence against civilians in their work.

Among the authors who have begun to highlight the importance of violence in violent radicalisation in the presence of or in conjunction with ideology, Crone declares that “ideology is not necessarily a precondition for violence, but that a prior experience with violence is more often a precondition for engaging an extremist ideology” (Crone, 2016: 598). Such authors question the consideration of radicalisation processes divided internally in two stages (ideological radicalisation and following radicalisation of behaviour), since that transformation of behaviour, leading to a condition in which a person accepts the use of violence or is willing to perpetrate it, would not necessarily come second, but its order appears to be reversed. The study of violent extremist milieu adopts this idea.

Crone goes beyond other authors who declare that ideology is not necessarily a prior condition to violence (Horgan and Taylor, 2011; McCauley and Moskalenko, 2008) in order to suggest that “violence can, on the contrary, be a prior condition to commit to an extremist ideology”. That “violent experience” (after the violent disinhibition) is also distinguished in the psychological area as a turning point from which it is more difficult to “radicalise” individuals (Victoroff, 2005; Trujillo-Mendoza, 2019). In the same spirit, different lines of work have appeared, trying to explain the reason why jails are radicalisation places or why there is a connection between criminality and terrorism (Basra et al., 2016; Kupatadze and Argomaniz, 2019). All these authors agree that it “is not the convergence of criminals and terrorists as organisations but of their social networks, environments, or *milieus*. [...] criminal and terrorist groups have come to recruit from the same pool of people, creating (often unintended) synergies and overlaps that have consequences for how individuals radicalise and operate” (Basra et al., 2016: 11).

This paper is situated at a halfway point in these theoretical debates because, while accepting the relevance of violence and focusing on the “tendency” and “justification” of violence by young people, it does not deny that violence is, compared to aggressiveness, a “deliberate and conscious action on the part of the perpetrator” (Trujillo, et al. 2006: 277). It seeks to draw attention to a possible “ideology of violence” which serves to justify violence, beyond political, political-religious, or religious ideologies. It is thus in line with Bartlett et al. who stated that “those who turned to violence often followed a path of radicalisation which was characterised by a culture of violence, in-group peer pressure, and an internal code of honour where violence can be a route to accruing status” (Bartlett, et al., 2010: 12).

In this context, ideology is the “ensemble of common and widely agreed rules that a person adopts and help them regulate and define their behaviour” (Trujillo, et al, 2006: 281) and when these rules and values include the use of violence, any violent radicalisation process may be more likely or even faster. These young people would not perceive violence as a rational choice, rather their violent behaviour would be rooted in a “culture of violence” and a value system that accepts the use of violence and even recommends its use in certain contexts. Defending their “sacred values” would justify violence (Gómez, et al.: 2016). These young people distance themselves from the model proposed by Nesser (2015), which talks about young people who “show violent tendencies from early adolescence and often have a criminal and problematic background”.

Accordingly, the aim is to find out whether the observed young people already have narratives or share messages that legitimises violence by justifying “violence on the basis of higher principles [...] (values, symbols, rules, roles, etc.)” (Trujillo-Mendoza, 2019: 102), so that any contact with an indoctrinating group or individual may be more dangerous than in other young people. The ultimate objective of this paper is to create a typology of young people who are “prone” to violence, or whose risk of engaging in violent actions, if they encounter a radicalising factor, is higher because they accepted the use of violence in their value system or ideology. Typologies are a classic instrument in social studies. In this case, the intention is to create an empirical-inductive typology based on the results of a survey. In this way, key dimensions that allow to identify individual subtypes are sought. This typology and conceptualisation of its essential types will allow to propose a risk or vulnerability scale of young people to radicalising factors or groups.

3. Method to elaborate the typology and risk or vulnerability scale of radicalisation processes of young people

The survey on which this paper is based was conducted online by Kantar Public Brussels through the panel provider Research Now in twelve European countries: Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Poland, Portugal, and Spain. The survey was conducted from February 28th to March 21st, 2018. 12,013 people were interviewed in total (1000 per country). A country representative of 14-24 years old (500 per country) and a representative national baseline sample of 25-50 years old in each country were drawn using quotas for age, gender, and region¹.

Hereafter, the data collected from the survey that indicate a possible willingness to use violence among young people will be analysed. Based on the 7 selected and collected variables, and with the purpose of decreasing the number of variables and the correlation between them, an analysis of the principal components will be carried out to analyse the two components that have emerged in the light of the original variables.

3.1. Input data of the willingness to use violence

In order to elaborate the typology and the risk scale of violent radicalisation, a sub-sample of the mentioned survey will be employed, corresponding to the Spanish case (N=708). Some previous psychological studies have addressed violent disinhibition among young people (Moyano, 2011), using four items: violence intentions to the self ("In the last month I have had the desire to end my own life") or to others ("In the last month I have had wishes to end the lives of others"), hatred toward others ("In the last month I have felt hatred for some people"), and exposure to models that favour violence ("My friends continually talk about fights and violent issues") (Lobato et al., 2018). In this case, the study includes two questions that are related to the willingness of young people to use violence. The first (table 1) questions the interviewee about their level of acceptance regarding violence. It is noteworthy to mention the importance of these attitudes and the justification of violence, even though, in the context of political violence, it should be borne in mind that "the great majority of those who justify political violence will never engage in political violence" (Moskalenko and McCauley, 2009: 257).

Table 1. Young Spaniards' acceptance of the use of violence.

To what extent is the use of violence acceptable to you?		
	Frequ ency	%
In many circumstances	22	3.1
In certain circumstances	80	11. 3
Only in extreme circumstances	277	39. 1
Under no circumstances	305	43. 0
N/A	17	2.4
DK	7	1.0
Total	708	100

Source: Author's own creation.

The table above shows that a 14.4% of young people interviewed finds acceptable the use of violence in many/certain circumstances.

The second question asked in the survey is the most useful since it informs the interviewees' greater or lesser willingness to personally use violence in several situations through a four-point scale (table 2).

From the highest to the lowest willingness to personally use violence, the results are as follows, if we add the categories "Yes, totally" and "Yes, to some extent": 73.1% would use it to defend their friends or family members; 49.8% to defend their rights; 46.2% to fight against injustice; 27.8% to defend their ideas and values; 23.8% to defend Spain, 14.5% to take political action or out of conviction; 11.2% to defend their religion. These figures show that the willingness to use violence varies significantly depending on the hypothetical cases.

¹ See: D2.3 Survey Report European Youth and radicalisation analysis and recommendations for policymaking purpose, Proyecto PRACTICIES: Partnership Against Violent Radicalisation in Cities.

3.2. Levels of the willingness to use violence.

Table 2. Young Spaniards' willingness to use violence.

Would you personally use violence in the following situations?							
	Yes, totally %	Yes, to some extent %	No, not really %	No, absolutely not %	N/A %	DK %	Total %
To defend their ideas or values	7.5	20.3	30.5	38.3	2.0	1.4	100
To defend friends or other family members	29.5	43.6	13.3	10.6	2.1	0.8	100
To take political actions or out of conviction	2.8	11.7	28.2	53.0	3.2	1.0	100
To defend their rights	11.7	38.1	24.7	22.7	1.8	0.8	100
To defend Spain	6.6	17.2	24.6	47.3	3.0	1.3	100
To defend their religion	3.4	7.8	22.6	61.3	2.4	2.5	100
To fight against injustice	10.7	35.5	29.7	20.2	2.7	1.3	100

This survey identifies seven different indicators that point out the same phenomenon: young people's willingness to use violence. What would be interesting would be to know if there is an underlying structure that connects them and assembles them in a smaller number of levels. To this effect, the data was submitted to an analysis of the principal components, which will allow us to explore if the willingness to use violence, in effect, sums up in a single or several factors. The analysis of the principal components shows the following results:

Table 3. Levels of willingness to use violence.

Matrix of rotated components	Component 1	Component 2
To defend their ideas or values	0.689	0.462
To defend friends and family members	0.018	0.875
To take political action or out of conviction	0.783	0.256
To defend their rights	0.399	0.777
To defend Spain	0.714	0.236
To defend their religion	0.882	0.055
To fight against justice	0.378	0.789

Extraction method: analysis of the principal components.

Rotation method: Varimax rotation following the Kaiser standard. The rotation has converged in three iterations.

Source: Author's own creation.

The procedure used to reduce the data assembles seven baseline indicators in two factors that represent, according to our interpretation, gathers two different levels of willingness to use violence. Component 1, referred to as sociotropic willingness to use violence, is linked to collective motives and values. At this level, individuals would be more or less willing to personally use violence to defend ideas, beliefs, political, religious, identity values, etc. It is an idealistic level of willingness to use violence. Component 2, referred to as egocentric willingness to use violence, reveals particular incentives and is associated with interests. In this case, individuals would be more or less willing to personally use violence to defend their loved ones, their rights and to protect themselves from injustice. It is a level of willingness to use violence based on individual interests and incentives. There are two variables: "To defend their ideas and values" and "To fight against injustice", which are present in both components, meaning they are connected to both levels of willingness to use violence, although it is true that they are more associated with either the first or second component, respectively.

4. Typology of radical young people and risk scale of violent radicalisation.

4.1. Typology of radical young people

If both identified levels of willingness to use violence are combined, a typology of radical young people can be traced, according to their reason to use violence, in four positions. The types would be the ones detailed in figure 1.

Then, a conceptual characterisation of the proposed types will be discussed. First, the *Pacifists* combine a low willingness to use violence in both identified levels. It is a segment that, when they mobilise in response to conflicts and grievances that affect them or to protest against injustice that they witness, they act through conventional political participatory mechanisms, resorting to institutional means and not by force. They show their disagreement with non-violent and sit-in protests, collection of signatures, passive resistance, festive events, initiatives to draw public attention, political means, and figures, and by joining together to have a voice and representative capacity.

Figure 1. Typology of radical young people based on the level of willingness to use violence.

LEVEL OF		Egocentric willingness to use violence	
		LOW	HIGH
SOCIOTROPIC WILLINGNESS TO USE VIOLENCE	LOW	PACIFIST	SELF-DEFENSIVE
	HIGH	ALTRUISTIC	DOUBLY WRONGED

Source: Author's own creation

Gay rights movement, feminist organisations and classical environmental movement are some examples of this sector. What makes pacifists different from the other sectors previously identified is precisely their trust in institutional solutions, involvement and non-violence as means for the resolution of grievances and injustices that are important to them.

Secondly, the sector of the *self-defensive*, people who use violence as self-defence, is the result of a high willingness to use violence in the egocentric level and a low level to use violence in the sociotropic level. They mobilise in a reactive way to resolve their own personal situations or against government actions they consider unfair and directly affect them and their surroundings. Within this type there are two subtypes: the resentful and outraged. The first subtype of the self-defensive are the resentful. They are people who mobilise as a reaction to the grievance and humiliation they suffer and that they keep for themselves, until they cannot longer stand them, and they consider that the only effective solution is to take revenge on the people who offended them. Teenagers are especially sensitive to personal grievances and humiliations. Sometimes they use violence against themselves by using self-harming or suicide as a form of protest and as a way of putting an end to their suffering; sometimes, to punish those who they blame for their suffering: classmates, stalkers, teachers, superiors, etc. Access to guns and other means of causing harm is a factor that multiplies the seriousness of the consequences of their acts of revenge, as seen in the mass shootings at high schools, universities, workplaces, etc.

The second subtype is the *outraged*, a sector that mobilises to attempt to restore their rights and confront unfair treatment or neglect by institutions. The reasons that drive them to this are diverse: sectoral regulatory changes, processes of transition to competition, technological changes, social cutbacks, increase of public

prices and taxes, drastic changes in their position towards the collective consumption of goods and services, etc. The effect of all of them is the same: a sense of relative deprivation, of losing rights and opportunities, of being left out of the mainstream of society. Some examples of this sector are the old, declining middle classes, workers of traditional sectors that cannot compete in a scenario controlled by large distribution platforms of goods and services, rural communities in decline, workers of declining or offshored industries, etc. The Yellow Vests in France are the spitting image of the outraged. Their protest began because of the rise in fuel taxes. The Umbrella Revolution in Hong Kong is a social response to a change in the rules of extradition to China.

Thirdly, we find the *Altruistic* type, which combines a high willingness to use violence in the sociotropic level and a low level in the egocentric level. It includes idealistic young people who mobilise for community motives: their country, religion, social causes, and political beliefs. These are people who fight for causes that do not affect them personally, thus acting selflessly, going as far as to kill/give their life for the cause they feel compelled to defend. The altruistic type is based on a commitment to a personal mission which seems mandatory and must be carried out by any means, even using force. Emotions are the key, or rather the interactions between values and emotions. An example that embodies this type are the Foreign Fighters: young people who went to fight for the DAESH in Syria or Iraq; or the International Brigades, who came to Spain as volunteers to defend the Second Republic and fight against fascism. The cause, as can be seen, may or may not be right, it makes no difference.

Lastly, the *Doubly Wronged* are a sector made up of people with a high willingness to use violence in both sociotropic and egocentric levels. They mobilise by common interests and values, by a mix of grievances to them and the community they feel part of. This sector is usually built up in opposition to other communities or powers they blame for the grievances they suffer. The solution to their problems cannot be individual but collective, linking their fate to that of their community: "in order to save myself, we all must be safe; to free myself, I must free all of us from the oppression we are subjected to". The enemy can be the West, Europe, other nations, savage capitalism, or foreigners (depending on whether we are talking about jihadists), anti-Europeans, nationalists, anti-system people, or far-right wingers. All of them believe they have an ultimate, utopian solution which must be carried out even by using force if necessary: the government of God, independence and full national sovereignty, a new global social and economic order, or an identity free from external contamination. The objective is to achieve a new situation in which there are opportunities for improvement and a future for all, once the threats and causes of the oppression have been removed. Many of these utopian solutions take a mythical happier past of the community they wish to come back to as a reference. The *Homegrown Terrorists* are a good example of this type and so are the white supremacists. They both feel personally and collectively threatened.

4.2. Risk scale of violent radicalization

Once the types have been described, it is possible to elaborate a scale expressing the probability of violent radicalization/use of violence by young people. The scale reflects the priority each group would have in order to create a preventing radicalization policy and it is a scale from least to most likely sector to use violence, on which the types identified before can be placed as reflected in Figure 2.

The pacifists represent the lowest level of risk and the doubly wronged represent the highest, combining both willingness levels to use violence. In the middle, first we have the Self-defensive and then the Altruists. Regarding the details in the three risk groups: of the two groups that make up the Self-defensive type, the resentful are the less dangerous for others, although it probably causes more victims among young people since some of them resort to suicide as a mean to eradicate injustices, abuses, and humiliations they are subjected to.

The resentful can become large groups of people who form and disappear depending on the circumstances. Their behavior depends mainly on the responses they get from institutions, adjusting the pressure they exert based on the government's receptiveness to their demands, combining legal and institutional means with the use of force when it is necessary. Depending on the level of formalisation and internal structuring of the movement, including the existence of recognized leadership, the likelihood of their actions becoming uncontrollable and escalating in the use of violence will vary greatly. Less organised and without spokesperson groups are more unpredictable and inconsistent. Another key factor to measure their responses is the clarity or particularity of their demands, that is, of the grievance they feel. If the reasons that move them are clear and concentrated, the management of the problem is simpler. If they are diffuse causes without an identifiable "enemy" in front of them, the situation can become more complicated, and the initial movement can be captured and used opportunistically to convey any other discontent.

The resentful use public space as a stage for the expression of their suffering: the city centre is their preferred location due to the attention that any event that disrupts its normal functioning receives. The main squares and streets that structure the city, transportation infrastructure, government buildings, and other emblematic sites of the urban landscape are typical locations for their actions. They generally employ forms of low to medium intensity violence, such as unauthorised demonstrations, "escraches" (public denunciations) of public officials and leaders, sabotage, boycotts, strikes, pressure on groups that do not join the movement, disobedience, clashes with law enforcement entities, vandalism, looting, violence against property, disturbance of public order, etc. Occasionally, these acts may lead to irreversible personal damage. The risk of them resorting to terrorism is low, especially if the conflict remains centred on partial interests.

Altruists represent a higher risk of violent radicalization than the former. They are a small sector, and only a minority try, let alone succeed, to turn their fantasies of justice into reality. Altruists act with all the fervour and determination that only conviction can inspire. Elements that can cause a transition from ideas of salvation to violent behaviour to implement them are a high willingness to use violence, combined with an unfavourable mix of protective and risk factors for radicalization and suitable circumstances. This sector may resort to forms of high-intensity violence, including armed struggle and attacks with casualties. Therefore, this group should be a priority for the violent radicalization of young people prevention policy.

Altruists are the perfect targets for networks that capture and indoctrinate young people and lead them towards their illicit goals and objectives. In this sector, indoctrination is easier, and its effect multiplies by the lack of personal experience on the realities and issues they join to: they fight for causes and groups they only know superficially and through manipulated speeches and narratives that distort reality, without the opportunity to contrast them. If the altruist self-radicalises, the lack of direct experiences is even worse: the individual himself builds a justifying excuse customised to their impulse to punish injustices. This does not happen to the doubly wronged, or not as easily, as they have information that comes from their own experience.

Figure 2. Risk scale of radicalization

Pacifists	Self-defensive	Altruists	Doubly wronged
Lower likelihood of violent radicalization		□	Higher likelihood of violent radicalization

Source: Own elaboration

The only advantage of this type is that both those who try to capture them and themselves leave many traces that provide information on the radicalization process they are undergoing, and therefore, it is possible to intervene at different stages of the process. Those who indoctrinate do not always succeed and are rejected, exposed, and detected by authorities, relatives, etc. Idealistic and radicalised young people do not always have enough determination to take action despite their tendency to violence, but they may reveal their intentions to a third party. If they decide to act, sometimes they will limit themselves to low-intensity violent actions with the objective of focusing the attention of the intelligence service on them. And when they want to escalate their actions, it is possible that they lack the means or opportunities to do so, but their movements to obtain them and adapt to the circumstances leave hints that can be followed. Altruists and those who try to incite them to commit violent acts are not completely diffuse to the eyes of friends, families, service professionals, police, etc.

The doubly wronged are most prone to use force since they combine both egocentric and socio-tropic willingness to use violence. The radicalization of this group is the most difficult to avoid as individual and collective motives merge, and as interests that justify mobilisation and higher values that legitimise it are mixed and mutually reinforce themselves. This mix results in strong personal commitments to the cause for which they opt to fight, which makes their possible deradicalization difficult. Leaving the cause means giving up certain personal benefits and interests and also betraying the community.

Fortunately, also a minority, this sector is the type of profile to which leaders of social, religious, political extremist parties and movements, etc. resort to as a shock force for their strategies. They are used as agents to start and intensify conflicts, raise tension, and polarise the community, mobilise sympathetic sectors, hinder their opponents' initiatives, intimidate and silence voices who criticise them, etc. Leaders point out their objectives and modulate the intensity of the force to be used, organising and supervising the processes, or through general calls to violent action that are managed independently by their followers according to the means and opportunities that arise. The role of leaders is key in the violent radicalization of this sector. Their influence over their followers can be used through different means: indoctrination, recruitment and integration into organised and hierarchical groups, coordination between similar violent groups that connect to form networks, calls to sympathetic collectives that toy with violence, narratives and discourses to promote the commitment and direct action of self-organised groups and isolated individuals, etc.

Organisations that promote these radical groups risk losing control over them and having them become a kind of militia, either commandos or individuals by themselves that end up operating independently. The coming to power of parties, political movements and extremist leaders increases the probability that the doubly wronged will become radicalised and commit violent acts. This sector can resort to force at all levels, including armed struggle and attacks if circumstances and means allow for it.

5. Illustration of the typology and scale applied to Spanish young people

If the typology and scale of the use of violence/violent radicalization are applied to Spanish young people, the results are what we can find in Figure 3.

The results are reasonably encouraging since young people with a sociotropic orientation towards violence mostly have a low willingness to use violence, and those who manifest an egocentric orientation are almost equally distributed between those who maintain a high and low willingness to use violence.

Figure 4 shows the data from the risk scale of violent radicalization.

Figure 3. Typology of radical young people in Spain

LEVELS		EGOCENTRIC WILLINGNESS TO USE VIOLENCE		TOT AL
		LOW	HIGH	
SOCIOTROPIC WILLINGNESS TO USE VIOLENCE	LOW	217 (30,6 %) PACIFISTS	292 (41,2 %) SELF-DEFENSIVE	509 (71,9 %)
	HIGH	92 (13,0 %) ALTRUISTS	107 (15,1 %) DOUBLY WRONGED	199 (28,9 %)
	TOTAL	309 (43,6 %)	399 (56,4 %)	708

Source: Own elaboration. Method of calculating: dichotomy of the variables generated from each factor, establishing a score that assigns the cases to one of the two categories (0 = LOW; 1 = HIGH) based on the analysis of distribution of each variable and possibility table calculation.

Figure 4. Risk scale of violent radicalization of Spanish young people

PACIFISTS	SELF- DEFENSIVE	ALTRUISTS	DOUBLY WRONGED	TOTAL
(217)	(292)	(92)	(107)	(708)
30,6 %	41,2 %	13,0 %	15,1 %	100 %
Lower likelihood > Higher likelihood of violent radicalization				

Source: Own elaboration

Figure 4 shows that the largest group is of the self-defensive, which makes sense if we consider that it includes those who are willing to defend their family and friends, their rights, etc. The next one is of the young pacifists. Then there are the altruists and the doubly wronged with very similar numbers.

6. Implications of typology and scale for the design of policies to prevent violent radicalization of young people

Focusing on the willingness to use violence when approaching the prevention of radicalization of young people leads to a set of public policy measures useful for all mentioned types. These measures can be classified around three basic objectives.

First, actions with the objective of detecting attitudes and predispositions to the use of violence like: (1) designing tools that allow for the early detection of the willingness to use violence in children and teens and (2) starting the development of instruments to help assess the risk that young people of resorting to violence to their goals. A second group of measures would be aimed at early prevention of violent radicalization. For this purpose, we must seek: (3) the promotion of a culture of peace and non-violence in educational institutions, (4) the promotion of non-authoritarian family and interpersonal relationships, (5) the diffusion of role models of masculinity that are not linked to aggressiveness, force, and domination, (6) the improvement of the ability of children and teens to manage their emotions, cope with frustration, anger, fear, hopelessness, etc. (7) as well as providing young people with critical thinking skills and tools that allow them to uncover the false objectives of those who call on them to defend causes by using force or justifying it, (8) reinforcing the capacities of children and young people to properly evaluate the consequences, for themselves and others, of using force in their daily relationships, (9) increasing the sensitivity and openness of governments to the agenda of issues and public policy preferences of young people, and (10) improving the analytical capacity of public policy makers and lawmakers so they can properly assess the consequences of the decisions they make and the rules they approve for children and young people. Lastly, to prevent the risk of being recruited and indoctrinated, we recommend designing responses aimed to slowing/stopping the advance of radicalization processes of young people with actions and measures that (11) control and prevent the spread of condescending speeches that admit, justify, or promote the use of violence among young people, (12) promote conflict resolution through discussion, negotiation, cooperation, and empathy, (13) improve knowledge and use of institutional means for the pursuit of interests, defence of individual rights, fight against injustices, etc., (14) promote and develop means and ways of political and social participation for young people in matters that interest them, and also (15) improve and take advantage of the radicalization prevention policy, specific

programs to intervene with young people who show aggressive, violent, or criminal behaviour.

In addition to these 15 measures which generally prevent radicalization in all young people, the typology allows us to think about orientations and public policy instruments for each one of the radical sectors. Thus, for example, pacifists are the least urgent sector for the radicalization prevention policy and should be studied in detail to understand the mix of values, ideology, personal situation, etc., that is associated with their low or no willingness to violence, to develop useful theories to address the treatment of the rest of the groups. This group of young people is a fundamental support for radicalization prevention policies by showing that it is possible to pursue goals, interests, and values through non-violent means. Support for peaceful means increases with their effectiveness; and the evaluation of effectiveness depends partly on the starting achievement expectations. In this sense, managing youth expectations -what can be achieved in a plural and diverse society- and improving the effectiveness of peaceful means for conflict resolution are key elements for the prevention of radicalization.

The policy for the prevention of violent radicalization should internally distinguish the two groups we have identified within the self-defensive: the resentful and the outraged, since they suggest very different challenges. The resentful tend to operate alone, while the outraged eventually recognize themselves in others and adopt group positions. There may be a gateway between both subtypes: resentful individuals who become outraged, young people who become aware that their problem is not only theirs but also affects a category of people they belong to.

Resentful young people are difficult to identify. They suffer grievances silently until they explode, damaging themselves and/or those who treat them unfairly, in order to release the pressure they feel. Young people who suffer from bullying are an example that embodies this situation. They may give signals about their situation, but they are either not detected or not adequately addressed. The priorities of the policy for preventing violent radicalization for this group are: early detection of cases and treatment of both victims and bullies. Family, school, and online space are the main contexts in which to address the problem. As mentioned earlier, in societies where young people have access to firearms, resentful youth can be particularly dangerous.

Outraged young people may have been pacifists before they got tired of seeing that peaceful means did not bring them closer to their objectives. Animal rights activists sometimes resort to violence, with more or lesser intensity, to draw attention and force institutional responses. The transformation of the outraged into doubly wronged is another possibility: young people who protest climate change already feel directly affected by the inaction and lack of commitment of governments, companies, and the previous generation. Avoiding the transition between "types" must be one of the priorities of the radicalization prevention policy. When dealing with the self-defensive sector, the advantage is that the grievances generated when one of their interests is affected are quickly deactivated when their cause ceases: for example, when the government backtracks on a measure considered unfair and violent protests on the streets cease. Violent protests linked to cuts in social rights, increases in public prices, etc., often stem from miscalculations by authorities who do not foresee the reactions of affected groups to the measures they adopt. The massive resistance of those affected forces the repeal of the most controversial decisions. Likewise, conflicts over interests, by their own nature, can be dealt with incrementally and through negotiations, partially admitting demands from aggrieved parties, deferring certain aspects for the future, etc. The partial admission of the demands of the outraged fractures the unity of the collective, fosters dissensions, and reduces support for violent solutions. The existence of clear leadership and certain structures within the groups of the outraged are key variables that help to achieve negotiated resolution of conflicts regarding interests. A counterpart with whom to reach agreements is needed.

Altruists are a group especially sensitive to what happens around their surroundings, always in search of a good cause to fight for. They easily adopt extreme positions and are susceptible to manipulation by third parties, and therefore, recruitment for violent and terrorist purposes. The theory of supply and demand can be fully applied in this case: I am looking for a cause that gives meaning to my desire for justice and someone offers it to me and paves the way for me to start the fight.

Given this scenario, the policy for the prevention of violent radicalization should have a type of "living agenda" of topics that could focus the attention of these young people on them. It would be convenient to elaborate a narrative for each topic that explains the reality of the underlying conflicts, the objectives of the parties and the interests they pursue, the institutional vias to address them, the lies and excuses used by those who encourage them to use force to resolve these objectives, and the strategies to confront them and not fall into their trap. The goal is to channel their idealistic energy and emotions towards peaceful ways of participation and fighting against injustices. The topics of the post-materialist agenda, those linked to international conflicts, and any issue that affects justice and equality and provokes strong emotional reactions have a high potential for mobilisation of this sector of young people.

At the same time, prevention will involve monitoring and control of organised groups and activists who express violent tendencies in their speeches and behaviours. The objective is to stop and repress the use of force in its early stages. Likewise, the prevention work will focus on detecting and neutralising the movements of those who try to indoctrinate and recruit them for their purposes.

The doubly wronged are the most difficult group to deal with for policies aimed to prevent violent radicalization. Everything we already said for the altruist sector applies to this type as well, but we must add a

couple of things. Firstly, controlling and neutralising the attempts of the elites who directly or indirectly try to point them what direction they should follow. The judicial power must intervene, without undermining freedom of expression and the free exercise of political rights, to prosecute and punish the behaviour of political, social, and religious leaders who call on young people to use force in the causes that affect them and with which they identify.

Secondly, applying programs to disengage them from violence at the first evidence of their use of force for their purposes. Young people in this sector pose a real challenge to deradicalization programs due to their dual orientation towards violence and the strength of the commitments they make.

Conclusions:

The typology and scale of the risk of radicalization or development of violent behaviours that we propose allow us to change the starting point of these policies aimed to prevent violent radicalization of young people and focus from political, religious, and political-religious ideologies to actions. As we described in the theoretical framework, different authors and the European radicalization prevention policy, and therefore, the Spanish policy, understand radicalization as a process that begins by embracing extremist ideas and values that, under certain circumstances, can end up being defended by violent means. In that model, ideas/ideologies are an engine towards violence, so prevention involves controlling the diffusion of these in their most extremist versions and intervening in the circumstances that contribute to their defence by using force.

This work makes progress in changing that causal chain of public policy, starting with the disposition/predisposition/willingness to use violence, understood not as an irrational or aggressive behaviour but as a consequence of a culture and value system that legitimises and sometimes promotes its use. In this sense, the survey results show that there are people more willing than others to use force to defend their ideas and interests. This willingness to use violence is enhanced and activated in certain circumstances. Therefore, the policy for the prevention of violent radicalization will consist of identifying individuals with a high disposition to use violence and intervening in the circumstances that lead to that disposition becoming violent behaviour, regardless of the ideas and interests that mobilise them.

The main advantage of this change is that it allows the formulation of radicalization prevention policies that are not linked to controlling radical ideas, whether they are of political, religious, or other nature. This control is controversial in democratic systems and often ineffective. Placing the issue of violence at the centre of policies facilitates obtaining support for the measures adopted, because it directly links the prevention of radicalization with a *sine qua non* goal of the state: ensuring the monopoly of legitimate use of violence.

Thus, this work is in line with authors who seek to reduce the risk of stigmatising one group or another, as it happens in some programs of prevention of violent radicalization that, inadvertently, end up raising suspicions about the entire group of people who share a certain ideology, political position, or religious beliefs.

In addition, this typology focuses the attention on prevention policies by adding to the issue of ideas sociotropic willingness to use violence and to the issue of interests, egocentric willingness, a space where violence is frequently resorted to, with severe consequences, and therefore a relevant issue that should be included to prevention policies.

Using a typology makes it possible to differentiate phenomena that may seem similar since they share some common aspects. The outraged, the altruistic, and those doubly willing to use violence are sometimes hard to distinguish, since they all tend to use force for their purposes and show similar behaviours. However, they represent different threats to coexistence. The outraged direct their anger at those in charge and their decisions and are usually satisfied if they get to change. The altruistic and, especially, doubly willing to use violence attack the system institutions, the democratic regime itself, and the political community. Their objectives and those of their supporters are to disrupt the institutional system, destabilise the regime, and fracture the political community. The challenge posed by each type is different in terms of its content and seriousness and must be addressed using specific instruments.

Having a scale makes it easier to establish objectives and adjust public policy responses to public problems. The risk scale for radicalization that we propose allows us to set two different goals for prevention policy: preventing radicalization within each type, that is, preventing individuals from a specific sector from resorting to the use of force more frequently, and/or with greater intensity and increasing their numbers every time. Another goal is to make it difficult to transform between types: committed pacifists who become altruistic; outraged individuals who become doubly wronged, etc.

Regarding the adjustment of responses, it is also helpful: self-defensives require more government receptivity and control than repression; altruists need guidance toward peaceful ways, protection against indoctrination and repression; and doubly wronged individuals need defence against irresponsible leadership, repression, and powerful deradicalization programs.

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