

The Art of Negotiation A Lesson in the Diplomatic Negotiation Techniques during the Reign of Felipe II

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Received: 15/07/2020 / Accepted: 11/09/2020

Abstract. The art of diplomacy is being developed in parallel to the emergence of political power and the foundation of the State. The diplomatic negotiation, which is the essence of the relations among States for the protection of national interests, systematized its techniques during that process. The negotiation conducted by Philip II and Cristobal de Moura to defend the Spanish rights to the succession of the Portuguese throne at the end of XVI century seems to be a relevant example of a clever use of the diplomatic negotiation techniques. In this article, we analyze the correspondence between the Prudent King and his representative in Portugal to see if it could be considered as an early lesson of the art of negotiating.

Keywords: Diplomacy; negotiation; trust; succession; Portugal.

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How to cite: Colomer de Selva, M. (2020) The art of negotiation. A Lesson in the Diplomatic Negotiation Techniques During the Reign of Felipe II, in *Government and Public Administration Journal* 7-2, 63-74.

1. Introduction

The extensive correspondence that Felipe II maintained with his representative in Portugal, Cristóbal de Moura, at the end of the 16th century, can be considered a relevant example of a successful diplomatic negotiation. The art of diplomacy can be considered as old as political power. Beyond some relevant references and writings, in parallel to the formation of the states, their systematization and articulation of methods and techniques with which to endow them with a certain scientific dimension, has only been achieved in more recent times. Nevertheless, in the long and rich exchange that King Felipe held with his envoy in Portugal regarding the defense of Spanish succession rights to the crown of that kingdom, many of these techniques can be appreciated, prior to their subsequent systematization. Hence the relevance that the subject studied has, as an example of their use in Felipe II's diplomacy, of negotiation tools that, sometime later, would become part of the classic treatises on the subject¹. Its use, somewhat intuitive, even if it was part of a tradition of negotiation, most probably helped the final outcome in the interests of the Spanish king, who eventually was the successor to the Portuguese crown. This article will analyze the correspondence, identifying the elements that related to diplomatic negotiation techniques. The ultimate objective would be to determine to what extent the use of these negotiating tactics favored the resolution of the crisis in favor of the Spanish monarch as well as avoiding a war of epic proportions.

From a methodological point of view, we will resort to a comparative analysis between the epistolary exchange between Philip II and Cristobal de Moura and the classical techniques of diplomatic negotiation formulated by pioneering treatises on the subject. In this sense, the main primary source of this study has been a collection of manuscripts from the Archive of the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Archivo del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores Español). Found in this collection are four manuscripts (80, 81, 82 and 83) that with an approximate length of 1,000 pages, contain the diplomatic correspondence from 1566 to 1580 sent by King Felipe regarding succession to the Portuguese crown. Correspondence consisted in a valuable list of letters that were exchanged mainly between Felipe II and Cristóbal de Moura. The existence of this Archive, of what is possibly the most complete copy that remains of the manuscript correspondence between the king and Moura, allows for the analysis of the development of negotiation and the subsequent actions related to the union with Portugal. These unpublished sources will allow for analysis of signs that help identify the fundamental elements of the negotiation carried out by Felipe II and his representative, regarding the defense of the king's succession rights to the Portuguese crown.

Traditionally, Spanish historiography has emphasized negotiation as the main element explaining Philip II's assumption of the Portuguese crown. Julián Rubio Esteban, Alfonso Danvila, or more recently, Fernando Bouza, would be in this line. However, Rafael Valladares, in his work, which is significantly, entitled *The Conquest of Lisbon*, presents a version of the events which emphasizes the importance of military action. It is difficult to determine whether it was the negotiating route that was decisive or whether it was the military route that was decisive. It is more likely that both were important, and that negotiation bore fruit to the extent that it was accompanied by the threat of the use of force, a recurrent pattern in different scenarios throughout history. This seems to be deduced from the historical documentation on this episode in the archives.

In the analysis of this correspondence, first to be discussed is the historical context in which the intense epistolary exchange between the monarch and his representative took place. Without an heir, King Sebastián of Portugal's sudden death gave Felipe II, along with other Portuguese candidates who also held succession rights, the possibility of inheriting the Portuguese kingdom. In a second phase, we will proceed to analyze King Felipe's reaction to the succession dispute among the different candidates for the throne. How Did the Spanish Monarch React? What were the measures he used to defend his right to the Portuguese crown? We will see that the election of Don Cristóbal constituted a key measure to advance Spanish candidacy. Also, in his contacts and negotiations to defend the rights of Felipe II, the king's representative used different methods, from persuasion to the threat of force, to bribery and granting various favors. After the analysis of the negotiation process initiated with the mandate by Cristóbal de Moura, a final conclusion section will address how concurrences throughout the process of these diplomatic negotiation techniques make this episode an exemplary manifestation of the art of negotiation.

2. The Context in which Negotiation Takes Place

The diplomatic negotiation that Cristóbal de Moura undertook in defense of Felipe II's succession rights held to the Portuguese throne acquired fierce intensity after King Sebastián died without an heir. This king, the posthumous son of Juan III and Archduchess Juana of Austria, *infanta* of Spain, was the grandson of Carlos I and therefore Felipe II's nephew. Sebastián I died in 1578 in the battle of Alcazarquivir, in this offensive against the kingdom of Fez, an action Felipe II had unsuccessfully tried to dissuade him from. After King Sebastián's death, his elderly uncle, the cardinal *infante* Don Enrique, inherited the crown. The near total destruction of the Portuguese army provoked a crisis of grave consequences. The country had become impoverished in both men and money. After the battle, most of the nobles had also disappeared, whether captive or dead. Faced with King Enrique's old age, the question of succession arose. There were three aspirants to the throne, the three grandchildren of King Manuel the Fortunate: Catalina of Braganza, daughter of the *infante* Duarte; Don Antonio, the Prior of Crato, illegitimate son of the *infante* Luis; and Felipe II, son of the *infanta* Isabel. Some positions defended Catherine of Braganza as having the best

¹ Traditionally included among the classical theorists of diplomatic negotiation are François de Callières (1645-1717), negotiator of Louis XIV and author of *Negotiating with Princes*, published in 1716 and considered one of the first manuals on diplomacy; and Abraham Wicquefort (1606-1682), author of *The Ambassador and his Functions*, a work published in two volumes between 1680 and 1681. Among our sources, we can also cite Juan Antonio de Vera y Zúñiga (1583-1658), author of *El Embajador*, a work published in 1620 and a pioneer in the study of the figure and qualities that ambassadors should have.

claim as she was a descendent of Manuel the Fortunate's legitimate male bloodline. For others, Felipe II was the best positioned, as Don Antonio was an illegitimate child and males over females were prioritized in the Portuguese succession, as in the case of the Duchess of Braganza. Although in face of the traditional reservations against the possibility of a Castilian king, an attempt was made to obtain the papal dispensation to King Enrique's holy orders so that he could marry and eventually have an heir. Although the king's advanced age casted doubt on the real possibility of continuing the Avis dynasty, the papal dispensation was not granted, thanks, in large measure, to the efforts made by Felipe II and his effective diplomatic network, especially, in this case, thanks to the work of his ambassador in Rome, Juan de Zúñiga. The cardinal king also did not accede to Don Antonio's request to recognize him as a legitimate child. Although popular support was initially directed at Catherine, it was subsequently channeled to the prior of Crato, who also tried, unsuccessfully, to obtain the holy orders dispensation.

This was the moment King Felipe had been waiting for; an opportunity to achieve the realization of the old dream of the Trastámaras, the Iberian Union and that the dense network of marriage alliances, for decades sponsored by the Habsburgs, was finally coming to fruition. However, as Fernández Álvarez pointed out, "in history great characters also count". For a historian and an academic it is "the moment to bring Felipe II to the forefront, with his firm desire to make good on his rights to the Portuguese crown" (Fernández Álvarez, 1998: 519). For Fernández Álvarez, apart from the fact that the king counted with solid succession rights, he had "very personal stimuli" and it is in this case where "the son of the Portuguese woman", traditionally considered indecisive, "would act with the greatest decisiveness" (*ibi-dem*). It was, according to this author, the most personal operation and the most exciting of those undertaken by Felipe II. King Felipe laid out his plans with the utmost care. The immediate task was to get Cardinal Enrique and the Portuguese ruling class to recognize his right to the throne. He sent a delegation to the neighboring kingdom with instructions to represent him. The delegation was headed by the Duke of Osuna, whose sister had married the Duke of Aveiro, who was a member of the Portuguese nobility, and traditional enemies of the other main noble dynasty, the Braganza, candidates to the throne. He was accompanied by Cristóbal de Moura. Portuguese by birth, Moura had arrived at the Spanish court with the entourage of Juan III of Portugal's widow, Doña Juana, Felipe II's sister and King Sebastián's mother. Soon he became one of the closest officials to the Spanish king and the main artificer of the negotiation in favor of Felipe II's succession rights to the Portuguese throne, as will be shown below.

3. Negotiation

Diplomacy has traditionally been regarded as the science of interstate relations. For Callières (2002), the art of diplomacy consisted in the pursuit of the interests of a state in its relations with others through civilized behavior.

Insofar as these relations are governed by a continuous negotiation in defense of each state's interests in order to jointly seek their mutual accommodation, diplomacy has also been regarded as the science of negotiation. Felipe II's defense of his succession right to the Portuguese throne can be considered as a manifestation of special interest into the art of negotiation. The science of diplomacy lacked in the 500s an orderly systematization of its methods and tactics. However, the analysis of the negotiation promoted by the Spanish monarch and executed by his agents, reveals elements that largely correspond to mechanisms identified as key in a diplomatic negotiation by theorists sometime later. What would these elements be that would allow us to speak of the early education on the art of negotiation by a Prudent King and his representatives? We have identified and go on to analyze four elements that, constituting traditional tactics of the diplomatic negotiation, we consider that they occurred in the specific case in question in favor of the defense and ultimately, the achievement of the desired result. It would be about the generation of confidence-building, information, the creation of favorable conditions and the threat of the use of force.

3.1 Building Trust

Guicciardini attributes to Duke Ludovico Sforza the comparison of princes to crossbows, in the sense that princes like crossbows are judged by the arrows they shoot (quote collected in Ochoa, 2002: 73). Thus, princes would be valued according to the representatives they send. The envoys were thus assumed to possess the qualities and virtues associated with a good ruler, whose reputation these delegates represented and had to uphold.

In monarchies in the 500s, the figure of the prince personified the sovereignty of the state. The king held political power, so peace or war depended on his decision. He appointed representatives in whom he placed his trust to represent him. In turn, his representatives were to gain the trust of the princes to whom they exercised their legation, for what it was necessary to comprehensively know the country where they had been sent, and to identify the potential risks to the interests of their prince, who they were to protect and defend. In his diplomatic work, and with the purpose of achieving the objectives mandated by his representative, the envoy's main instrument was trust. For Callières, the undermining of trust between states made the defense of interests difficult. Wicquefort believed that there was nothing in diplomacy or politics that could replace trust (Wicquefort, 2011). In this way, the main purpose of diplomacy was to build trust. The ability to build trust has, as seen, is a two-way street, between the person whose interests are represented and the person who is to defend them. To build this trust, the negotiators must possess special qualities. The figure of Cristóbal de Moura as a negotiator deserves special reference. He was not a theorist, but rather had a practical and pragmatic profile, being knowledgeable and familiar. His own provenance favored this profile. He did not come from a lineage of high nobility, like the Duke of Osuna did, Grandee of Spain. Moura's condition was closer to that of a counsel and aspirant to a nobility of service, which was later secured by the king declaring him the marquisate of Castel-Rodrigo. In that sense, the status of being a "man of letters" was precisely what Callières recommended. The representative of Louis XIV was suspicious of envoys from the upper classes, whether outside the "*noblesse d'épée*" or from the high clergy. Callières preferred lawyers to be the ones to deal with diplomatic work, considering that they were more prepared. In this regard, he advocated very early on for a certain

professionalization of diplomatic work.

In a society founded and determined by birth, Felipe II seemed to prefer Cristóbal de Moura's professional competence anticipating by a few decades the same position Callières would later take. However, this decision could generate certain misgivings among the representatives of the Greatness of Spain, accustomed to their preeminence and subsequent precedence. In this sense, it is worth mentioning the letter that Juan de Silva addressed to Gabriel de Cayas on the origin of the ambassadors and the distinction between the nobility "of cloak and sword" and lawyers, which is relevant in relation to the will of the monarchs to reduce the influence of the high nobility by relying on the lower nobility and lawyers: "I never think that it was seen that the one with cloak and sword would not precede, nor does it seem that the good order of things would allow it because it is considered that a knight of his rank and profession represents the person of the king with more decorum and propriety than a learned person."²

There is no doubt that with or without precedence, Don Cristóbal managed to win Felipe II's trust given ample achievement in the initial phase of diplomatic work. Endowed with the confidence that the king reiterated and recognized repeatedly in his letters, he deployed all the efforts that he possessed to defend the rights of the Spanish monarch. Nevertheless, he proceeded with great caution. Disciplined in complying with the instructions received, he vehemently defended the arguments that founded Felipe II's succession rights, identifying himself, as sometimes happens, with the values that the king projected onto the negotiation: the search for justice, defense of honor and reputation and determination and bravery. In this sense, the words through which King Felipe II justifies his appointment as envoy in Portugal can be highlighted. Words that denote the good consideration that he has in his representative for the high mission that was entrusted to him, which in turn testified to the importance of the figure of the ambassadors and representatives of the king in that period: "Appearing to me by letter you cannot finish these things, I have agreed to send my own person to it and choose you so for the confidence that I have that you will serve me in the office of conscience".³

In the intense negotiation process that began after the death of King Sebastián, Felipe II showed his full confidence in the loyalty and ability of his envoy, to whom he expressed this repeatedly in the instructions he sent him on a regular basis. Thus it follows, for example, from the instruction addressed to him on his mission in Portugal: "I have agreed to send you to do the function declared to you in this one, bearing in mind that by your sanity and good understanding you will serve me in this commission as wisely as you have done in all the others and that we have entrusted to you."⁴ King Felipe entrusted Cristóbal de Moura as his representative to speak to and convey his messages before the Portuguese monarch, to whom Felipe entrusted to rely on Don Cristóbal ("I pray very much to thee to believe him in everything as to myself"⁵). It is revealed the dual nature of trust, between the represented and the recipient, necessary for the diplomatic emissary's work to be successful.

As they say, trust must be earned. King Felipe's conviction and trust in his representative in Portugal arises in parallel to the demonstration of Moura's honesty, fidelity, and vocation for service. "The real pay for my services, however great, would be to understand that Your Grace is satisfied by them", as Cristóbal de Moura would say. This line in the letter that the Duke of Alba sent to Moura is also significant in the way that he expresses the satisfaction of the king for the service provided by Don Cristóbal and expresses his appreciation for his good performance in his profession, as if he had been born for it ("His Majesty has been very satisfied with the offices and certainly puts Your Grace in the chair, as if he were born in it adapted for the office"⁶). The monarch repeatedly expresses this recognition to his servant in Portugal, praising his work and management ("because God has given him so great talent and wit so feverish that every day, he proceeds new fronts"⁷; "the kind of person I have is the one who deserves his hobby, job and is very diligent"⁸). The letter dated March 24, 1579, presents another example of the king's respect for his envoy's advice. Incorporated in his own letter is also, meticulously and in detail is recognition of the good work of Don Cristóbal: "It has been very good to warn me that it is not convenient to write to these soft people (...) and so in this too it is I will follow your lead."⁹

The confidence and satisfaction with his representative were also manifested in the desire expressed by the king to reward him for his good services: "And in everything will be of great benefit, your assistance for the business that is dealt with and having understood how well you are willing for what concerns me persuaded of the truth of my right I have wanted with all thanks for it assuring you that in time you will receive from me the honor and favor that you deserve."¹⁰

For Callières, the king's representative was not the artificer of his policy and positions before the court. The diplomatic emissary was merely the maker of that policy, its implementing agent. However, this did not prevent the representative from conveying his advice and opinion on how best to defend these positions and interests before the

² General Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Manuscripts, "Embaxadas: De las de Don Christóbal de MORA", Volume III, Year 1579, Manuscript (Ms.) 82, page (pag.) 239.

³ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1576, Ms. 80, "Instruction of His Majesty Felipe II by Don Cristóbal de Moura sending him to Portugal".

⁴ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, "Instructions that D. Cristóbal de Moura took with him to Portugal visiting King Don Enrique following the death of King Don Sebastián, his nephew", dated August 18, 1578.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, fol. 58.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter that the Duke of Alba sent to Cristóbal de Moura on September 8, 1578.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, Year 1580, Ms. 83, fol. 320

⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, Year 1580, Ms. 83, fol. 320

⁹ *Ibid.*, Volume III, Year 1579, Ms. 82, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura March 24.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura, fol. 243

court in which he rendered his services. The art of persuasion was also to be employed before the prince whom it represented. The building of trust, so necessary for the proper functioning of legation, precisely enables a space for the representative to question and give advice and to the represented. This trust, together with his knowledge of the Portuguese reality and his good political judgment, encouraged Cristóbal de Moura to give Felipe II, his opinion or criticism before certain decisions or actions, when de Moura deemed it necessary. It is important to emphasize in this sense that Moura did not hide negative issues from the king, demonstrating in turn his responsibility and integrity. In this way, Moura conveyed the criticisms that circulated through Portugal about what they considered a lack of help from Felipe II to King Sebastián during Sebastián's African enterprise, although he did not stop pointing his efforts of appeasement to that respect: "They pointed out some complaints that Your Grace had not helped his nephew with galleys and with people and as I was aware of everything that had happened in this I tried to put them right with gentleness because at all times it is good not to scandalize us more in this"¹¹.

Within the framework of that trust created between representative and represented, Cristóbal de Moura did not fail to communicate to the king the desirability of granting him the title of ambassador: "When I arrived at this court, I informed Your Grace that they had treated me here with the same ceremony as ambassadors, which is not customary for envoys. They did it thinking that I would stay only a few days, and thus it could not set a precedent for the future. They wanted me to be pleased if they bestowed the title on me, even if it is only for the two days that I am here."¹² On the subject of the title of ambassador, another letter recounts when Don Cristóbal reiterates this question to the king "with the truth and plainness with which I have always dealt with the things in service of Your Grace " and because it considers it necessary for a more effective performance of its mission. He points out that "the king and all these men show satisfaction in having me here", but adds: "May Your Grace grant me the title that suits me to be in possession, and I say this with truth and candor, as I have always treated matters concerning Your Grace's service without thinking of my own gain and I take God as my witness that Your Grace employing me in any position is the greatest favor I could wish for."¹³ In this way, he recognizes that serving His Majesty is an honor and privilege, of which he is proud of, and he does not expect to obtain benefit from it but considers it more useful in that service to have the title of ambassador in the face of the difficulties and strangeness that his situation caused among the Portuguese. Therefore, he felt obliged to convey it to the king based on the relationship of trust they maintained. In any case, he left it to Felipe II to decide in this regard, finalizing the letter reiterating again his willingness to serve the king: "Your Grace will do as it pleases, for I desire nothing but to serve, and with this, I am content."

At another time, Don Cristóbal raised a complaint about the treatment he had received from Cayas, who seemed to have relegated him to management, and instead of accompanying the Duke of Osuna as had been the criteria until then, had been asked to "stay in the inn": "So far in all the proposals that have been made, Your Grace has sent me to accompany him and the Duke has been very pleased as was reason. I intended nothing else but to accompany him as all the ordinary ministers of Your Grace usually do. Now that we were trying to settle accounts and heal wounds, does Cayas want that I stay at the inn, who has been working, who has suffered and who has been stabbed?"¹⁴ Moura adds that he does not intend to gain recognition in his service, but neither does he intend to lose what he has achieved, sincerely expressing his rejection of the treatment that he considers undeserving ("I do not want to gain honor but I do not want to lose what Your Grace has given me because I do not deserve it nor do I have to deserve it by helping God for it"¹⁵). His honor and sense of duty seem also to encourage him not to fail to convey to the king his dissatisfaction when he considers that things have not been done as they should have been.

Callières expressed his disagreement with the Machiavellian thesis that diplomacy's purpose is to deceive, emphasizing that such approaches are inclined to achieve ends by any means and at any cost. On the contrary, he considered that the art of diplomacy consisted in the building of trust, through which to defend one's interests through negotiation based on good faith and courtesy. The king's representative was to be reasonable and conciliatory. Firm in principles and flexible in tactics. Always ready for dialogue, but without ceasing to act with determination and conveying his advice and criticism when suited.

Remaining neither triumphalist nor fatalist, always prudent and restrained. He was forward-looking, identified possible areas of confluence in which to move forward and left aside conflicting areas that would block negotiation. All this based on the recognition and trust granted to his representative for the exercise of his mission with full powers.

Cristóbal de Moura embodied to a large extent the qualities of a good negotiator, especially highlighting the trust that the king, always quick to praise his work, professed. Also, the trust built with the Portuguese ruling classes, through the knowledge he had of them, facilitated establishing the conditions in favor of the Spanish monarch's succession rights, as will be seen below.

3.2 Information

The second element relevant to the successful conclusion of a diplomatic negotiation would be the importance of information. The need to be well informed was also highlighted by Callières. He advised the emissaries to study and gather information about the countries and people where they were stationed. It was a matter of knowing the

¹¹ Ibid., Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. on the coronation of the new king of Portugal of September 2, 1578.

¹² Ibid., Volume I, Year 1578. Ms. 80. letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. of September 25, 1578, fol 115.

¹³ Ibid., Volume I, Year 1578. Ms. 80. letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. of September 25, 1578, fol 115. 116.

¹⁴ Ibid., Volume III, Year 1579, Ms. 82, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M, fol. 41.

¹⁵ Ibid., Volume III, Year 1579, Ms. 82, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M, fol. 41.

positions of those one would negotiate the defense of one's own interests with. Throughout history, the essential nature of information in diplomatic performance has led to frequent conflation of diplomats and spies. If through persuasion and negotiation one is going to try to advance the interests of the prince they represented, it is relevant to know the context in which to deploy the necessary skills to convince the other party of the goodness of their position. Hence the importance of knowing the areas where there may be room for concession or negotiation, that facilitate their own volition. It will also be essential to know who the satisfaction of the represented party's interests depends on. Knowing their way of thinking and acting, their motivations, fears, and desires. Identifying the appropriate interlocutor and trying to satisfy their claims; maintaining calm and tranquility despite provocations (for example as by presented the prior of Crato on the issue of Portuguese succession, as will be seen). Basing one's claim on justice and good faith, insofar as the pursuit of unjust causes weakens the reputation of the negotiator and his representative. In the face of coercion, diplomatic negotiation seeks in the first instance to convince based on information and on the aptitude displayed. Whoever has the most thorough information on a situation has an advantage and superiority over the other party. As so often is the case in diplomatic negotiation, information is power. Although it is important to know how to manage time and wait for the right opportunity to share it. It is often desirable to provide available information in measured and selective doses. Without showing too much or at least never more than necessary, in the beginning. Conveying it progressively in order to advance one's own positions. Negotiation is also a privileged source of information that will also be progressively acquired throughout the negotiating process. Information is likewise necessary in and of itself. It is essential to thoroughly know the position that is to be defended. In addition, knowledge of one's own interests and positions also includes a necessary understanding of the wishes and inclinations of the prince whom one represents. Knowledge of the passions and weaknesses of the leaders also constitutes relevant information for the work of a diplomatic negotiator. It is up to him to reach an agreement that is satisfactory to the opposing party, but provided that he has the approval of his representative. It is therefore important to know to what extent can bargain or how much can be granted without contravening the instructions received nor the positions to be defended. In this regard, in the analysis of the correspondence with his envoy in Portugal, it can be perceived that King Felipe acted with great magnanimity. He seemed to have fully trusted Don Cristóbal's advice, whether to seek his judgment, to accept his proposals or even his complaints. For his part, Cristóbal de Moura also denoted a good knowledge of the monarch, accurately presenting its positions and vehemently defending its rights, abiding by his criterion ("nothing of these I have dared to hasten or treat of them without order of Your Grace for being such a delicate matter"¹⁶), although without this preventing him from also expressing his recommendations or disagreements.

In the letter¹⁷ Moura sent to Felipe II following the death of King Sebastián, he appears very affected by the news. But then he shows himself aware of his mission and informs the king about the measures he should take that would favor his claim. In this sense, he respectfully indicates to the Cardinal "that he should try to position himself to reign" and warns about the measures that could be taken before his pretensions, especially with the Papacy ("to warn Rome later for the concerns that prevented the dispensation"). He does not deny the difficulty of negotiation because of the "general hatred that everyone naturally has for this nation." Hence the need to activate the negotiating tools, showing Don Cristóbal as confident in the chances of success ("There are so many and such great comforts that can be offered to them that I think it will be a way to bring them back.") Our negotiator believes, denoting again his good work of observation and knowledge of the other party that the nobility could lean in favor of the claim of Felipe II: "Those who are not on the side of Bergança seem to think that in Your Grace the law is clear and so I have seen him talk to many of them."

For his part, the king expresses his appreciation for the knowledge and effective service of his agent, which shows that the condition of reporting would be fulfilled, as mentioned key in diplomatic negotiation: "I longed so much to have reliable information about what happened during the campaign in Africa and the state of affairs in this kingdom afterwards, that it was very fortunate to dispatch the courier who brought a letter dated the 26th of the last month. Through that letter, I have learned both in detail, which clearly shows the diligence you employed in finding out and writing about it just a few hours after your arrival."¹⁸

It is also important to be able to identify the interests of the other parties in the negotiation to try to seek formulas for agreement, based on that knowledge of their positions, but also of their weaknesses. In this regard, Moura does not hide from the monarch the initial difficulties of earning the trust of the Portuguese who see him as a spy for the Spanish king ("it is convenient to go with them with great restraint and proceed, with... softness that they come to be persuaded that I am a friend and relative and not a spy as they say"¹⁹). As a good professional and loyal servant, he does not intend to deceive the king by obviating the problems he faces. On the contrary, he communicates them openly, although adding details of the efforts he is making to try to remedy the situation, and showing his hope that they will progressively accept him ("I will not lose the opportunity to advise them as friends and thus I will not lose hope of bearing fruit"²⁰). For this reason, also found in this communication are elements of the two functions that are understood as key in a diplomatic negotiation. On the one hand, the importance of building trust, both with the authority that is sent, in this case the Portuguese king (for which Don Cristóbal spares no effort), and with the represented, Felipe II (by virtue of which Don Cristóbal does not hesitate to convey his concerns). On the other hand, the need to obtain information and have knowledge of the environment in which the work of the diplomat is carried out (Moura shows good knowledge of the Portuguese which allows him to understand the misgivings about his work, Felipe II's succession rights, and in general the Spanish aspiration of a unified Ibérica). Within the framework of this

¹⁶ Volume I, *Ibid.*, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to Your Grace. on September 29, 1578.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, fol. 53 et se

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura September 2, 1578.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. September 2, 1578.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. September 2, 1578.

informative task, Don Cristóbal conveys ²¹ to the king the status of the inheritance rights. In that sense, he mentions the following aspects: the custom that some allege that it is up to the people to choose the king in case of doubts ("he has asked the one who has the Archive of this kingdom to give him certain papers by which he intends to prove that this kingdom is not by custom and immemorial possession of power the people choose the king when such doubts are offered"); the best right of Felipe II as a male over the Duchess of Braganza ("Your Grace and that of Bergança are in the same degree more than Your Grace is more able to inherit because he is male"); the desire for the heir to be a son of Felipe II who married the daughter of the Dukes of Bergaza ("Your Grace is asked to give them a son so that they can raise him and speak Portuguese which is what they put a lot of force... that son with the daughter of the Duke"); the claim of Don Antonio ("Don Antonio came and they say that he is legitimate and if that is the case he has great right"). From this information, Moura, as a good negotiator, makes his recommendations to the king: that he study his rights well and put them in writing to facilitate his defense by whoever was sent in this regard ("Your Grace should order a thorough study of your rights, so that whoever comes can use and present what they bring in writing, as it will be necessary."). It is worth noting his recommendations on how to conduct the negotiation. It evokes the traditional technique and so recurred throughout the history of the "stick and the carrot". However, he insists on putting the weight more on the "softness" than on the "firmness", which he recommends only "at times" given the inconveniences associated with fear: "One must proceed with gentleness and sometimes with firmness because fear will make them practice virtue. However, this fear must be presented in such a way that it does not scandalize them or make them feel disrespected. Always emphasize that Your Grace is the true heir."²²

The function of information is often carried out by a diplomatic representative. However, it is also sometimes induced by the authority who sent him. In that sense, in the case at hand, the king transfers to Don Cristóbal his own indications and recommendations on how to advance in the defense of his rights ("these Counselors... perhaps it will be good to undertake some negotiation with them, and make some offer so that they look at my right in better eyes, because there is no doubt that it would matter a lot if the declaration made by the Portuguese lawyers themselves were in my favor"²³). These details show the King's interest in assisting rather than merely demanding during the negotiation in defense of his succession rights. Cristóbal de Moura presents himself ²⁴, for his part very aware of the fundamental nature of the information ("I have always been listening") as a key element to advance one's positions in a diplomatic negotiation ("I could have good reason for what happens and inform Your Grace of everything I would have understood"). Equally, it would be crucial to win the goodwill of the Portuguese. In this regard, Moura details to the king how he has proceeded to ensure that they had confidence in him and began to "speak" even if it was "some in secret and others in public": "Upon my arrival, I encountered a sense of suspicion and reserve among these individuals regarding my presence. They were convinced that sending Your Grace here at this time was intended to probe the mood and intentions. Recognizing this, it became essential to approach them with greater tact and gentleness, ensuring they perceived me as a friend and ally rather than the alleged spy they suspected. Consequently, they gradually became more amenable, engaging in discussions with me—some in private and others in public—allowing for a more open exchange of ideas."²⁵

In short, Cristóbal de Moura's loyalty and vocation for service largely explains his activity and his multiple efforts to fulfill his diplomatic mission. This did not prevent him from also conveying to the king when deemed it appropriate, his opinion, criteria and criticisms, fruit of the extensive information and knowledge he had on the Portuguese side.

4. Creating Favorable Conditions

The qualities of the diplomatic emissary, as highlighted in the previous points, constituted an essential element for the proper performance of his duties of representation and negotiation. As seen, the skills and virtues of the diplomat, with which to gain the confidence of the authorities of the country of origin and thanks to which to obtain the greatest knowledge and information of that country and its leaders, were very relevant in the diplomatic work. The work mentioned at the beginning, *The Ambassador* of De Vera and Zúñiga, would precisely feature those qualities and prerogatives to which a perfect ambassador would have to aspire. Although all these qualities were not always sufficient to ensure success whether of management or diplomatic negotiation. Machiavelli considered that often, pure persuasion was not enough to achieve the objectives pursued by the diplomatic emissary in his defense of his prince's interests. It was necessary that the persecutory labors of the diplomatic representative should be supported by weapons, money, and the determination of the prince who sent them. Mere words did not make the missions automatically successful. Callières, for his part, focused his manual, not so much on the qualities and prerogatives of the ambassador, necessary for the exercise of his function, but on the execution of that function itself. What were the techniques and tactics to be employed for this function to be successful? François de Callières drew on his own experience to develop his work on diplomatic negotiation. In addition to his missions on behalf of Louis XIV in various European courts, he participated in the negotiations of the Treaty of Ryswick in 1697. Callières defended, as mentioned earlier, a professional diplomatic service involving technical competence. He defended a discreet and serene profile of the diplomatic emissary who should focus on protecting and defending his prince's interests. Within the framework of his function, it was also essential that, in parallel with essential elements as raised in the previous sections trust and information, the diplomat favored the establishment of conditions that would help to achieve the purposes intended in the negotiation. The Prussian war strategist, Clausewitz, would recommend, on his part, in his analysis of military strategy, to negotiate from a position of strength. To do this, it was necessary to

²¹ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms.80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. September 2, 1578.

²² *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. September 2, 1578.

²³ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms.80, letter from S.M to Cristóbal de Moura September 13, 1578.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. on September 29, 1578.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M. on September 29, 1578.

strengthen the negotiating position in advance.

It is seen that these negotiating tactics were also employed by Felipe II in advance of their expressed formulation and conceptualization by diplomatic strategy theorists. How would the Spanish king strengthen his negotiating position in relation to succeeding to the Portuguese throne? What conditions, favorable to his cause, would the king and his representative pursue to achieve this, as Callières would recommend a century later? The Prudent King and Cristóbal de Moura resorted to various elements. Highlighted among them were, the threat of recourse to force, the diligent work carried out by Don Cristóbal to “win votes” or the activation by the king of his effective diplomatic network, among others. To the extent that the threat of the use of force, which was ultimately the most decisive factor in tipping the scales in Felipe II's favor, will be addressed in the following point, this section will focus on other conditions that the Spanish king and his diplomacy sought to favor the acceptance of his right of succession on part of the Portuguese.

Diplomatic negotiation techniques identify as important matters to favor one's own interests in a negotiation, build trust between the parties, and build support on the opposing side. Along these lines, Don Cristóbal demonstrated great pervasive gifts to appeal to the goodwill of the Portuguese to the Philippine cause. To this end, he did not rely solely on his skillful diplomatic abilities. He had the backing and royal concessions to convince the Portuguese side of the advantages of the Spanish proposal and thus generate favorable conditions for Felipe II's subsidiary rights in certain instances of Portuguese society. Despite much effort, his incisive work of information and persuasion with the cardinal king, who was seemingly convinced of the benefits of the union of both crowns, Don Cristóbal did not get King Enrique to formalize his support in writing before the elderly king's death. More productive was his work of persuading the Portuguese elites. Cristóbal de Moura acted from Lisbon with great skill, establishing the conditions that ended up favoring the expected result. He carried out multiple actions to defend the rights of the Spanish king and attract the Portuguese nobility and urban oligarchy in his favor. In the face of threats to their commercial interests and control over their colonies that English and the Dutch represented, the mercantile oligarchy eventually became convinced of the advantages of having the protection of the Spanish king and his powerful army and navy. Regarding nobility, as a negotiating asset, Felipe II and his representative resorted to the rescues of nobles held captive in Africa, after the failure of the battle of Alcazarquivir. The Spanish crown paid the majority of the ransoms to free the Portuguese nobles imprisoned following the failed North African campaign, where King Sebastián died. In this sense, cited is the letter in which the king conveys the measures taken to help in the rescue of the captives in Africa: “Fernando de Silva asked me yesterday for a license to take forty thousand ducats in money from Andalusia with an order to the Marquis of Santa Cruz to receive them and take them in my galleys to Africa (...), efforts will be made to arrange for the rescue of those held captive”²⁶.

Felipe II was involved and supported the rescue of the Portuguese nobles who had been held captive after the defeat at Alcazarquivir. This route was also used to reinforce Spanish interests. In this way, in the case of the duke of Barcelos, heir of the house of Braganza, once free, the young duke was sent to Castile, to the house of his relative the Duke of Medinaceli, preventing him from returning to his land.

In the offensive deployed to assert his rightful succession, the Prudent King also tried to assert the will of the inhabitants of the neighboring kingdom. One of the recipients of their communications and actions would be the procurators of the cities to the extent that, unlike the nobility more prone from the beginning to the union of the crowns, the common people, as a result of the traditional suspicion of Castilian power, showed greater resistance. Hence the king addressed the representatives of the cities and regions. In this sense, in his communication “to the governors of the King of Portugal in the loss of King Sebastián”²⁷, after expressing his regret for what happened, he informed them of the sending of “Don Cristóbal de Mora my gentleman” so that they could convey what could be done on my part”, to which he would go “with the will and work that you will understand from Don Cristóbal to whom I refer”. Months later, Felipe II sent an emotional letter to the States of Portugal²⁸, commiserating the death of King Sebastián and noting his right to the succession of that kingdom. It is striking that, in addition to basing his right on solid and fair bases, the monarch mentions issues that had been suggested by Don Cristóbal in his letters to the king to win the support of the Portuguese people. This is the case of the desire to dispel criticism for the lack of support for King Sebastián (“and I well believe that the many and great diligences that I did to hinder the day are notorious, I yearn for my own person in Guadalupe, as before and after by my ministers”) or to present himself not as a foreigner but as “natural”, as a grandson and son of a Portuguese woman (“for the love that I have for all and in particular for the great garments of friendship and debt that has always been between that crown and this one, and between me and the lords kings of that kingdom, for being all of the same blood I and my children, grandchildren of the most serene king Don Manuel and having raised me the Empress my lady in this love and friendship”; “it is not a foreign king who is to inherit you, but as natural as it is said, because I am a grandson and son of your natural princes and of his own blood”). In addition, Felipe II offers to preserve and increase the privileges and freedoms of the cities (“you are looking at and pointing out all those things in which I can do to honor and favor you, not only in preserving your privileges and freedoms, but in increasing all of them and of each one in particular”); as well as his help to the nobility who still had captive members in Africa (“I beg you and charge you to look at all that I can do for the people who are still in captivity”). Within the framework of this strategy of persuasion of the Portuguese side, Felipe II expressed his conviction of the joint benefit that would derive from the union of both kingdoms: “A great power is necessary, and it joins that of Castile with weapons and your courage opens few or none that resist or hinder the pursuit of your

²⁶

Ibid., Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura September 8, 1578.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter of S.M. to the governors of August 18, 1578.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from His Majesty to the States of Portugal, fol. 39.

attempts throughout the world”²⁹.

Felipe II's diplomacy also acted effectively to defuse processes that could have jeopardized the succession rights of the Spanish monarch. That was the case of the request for pardon formulated by the cardinal king to be able to contract marriage and try to conceive an heir for the Portuguese crown. He also sought dispensation from Don Antonio. Neither was accepted by the Pope, thanks in large measure to the pressure exerted before the Pontiff by Felipe II's ambassador in Rome, Juan de Zúñiga, duly persuaded from the timely information and communication of the Spanish diplomatic network, the one established triangularly between Lisbon, Madrid, and Rome. In this way, throughout the correspondence between the king and Cristóbal de Moura, Felipe II's recourse to his diligent diplomatic network is observed, which put into play the defense of his interests and succession rights. The role played by Felipe II's ambassador to Rome, Juan de Zúñiga, can be highlighted in this regard. In that sense, the Spanish monarch expressed his full confidence in Zúñiga to whom he entrusted the defense of his rights before the Pope: “I write to Don Juan de Zúñiga, my ambassador, to convey to Your Holiness what he understands about the matters of Portugal. I beseech Your Holiness to listen to him and believe in him as you would in myself. Please be assured that the reason that prompted me to inform Your Holiness of what is happening regarding that matter is related to the service of God and the well-being of Christianity. Don Juan will also communicate to Your Holiness, on my behalf, the pretension I have to that kingdom.”³⁰

Other actions are aimed at persuading the other contenders of the Spanish king having the greatest right to the throne. Diplomatic negotiation techniques recommend always negotiating with alternatives. This refers to the need to have or prepare different scenarios in order to reach an agreement. One of these scenarios is to offer the other party a way out that can be considered dignified for them. In this way, that party could be persuaded to accept the offer made to it in exchange for recognizing the other party's right. For all this, it is important to know the others' position well. In the present case, on the negotiation in favor of Felipe II's succession rights to the Portuguese crown, it can be considered that this negotiating tactic was also resorted to achieve the confirmation of the Spanish position. In this sense, we find indications of the support that King Felipe gave to the other candidates in an attempt to dissuade them from their claim and accept his right.

In the document that is called “Memory of the things that Don Antonio intends to be fulfilled and the causes and reasons that he alleges”³¹), the will of the king to support Don Antonio can be appreciated (“I have offered him that I would try to ensure that the Queen and the Cardinal order the fulfillment of what has been promised to him.”). He reiterates his conviction to act according to what he considers to be founded on justice (“seeming fair and reasonable”). He seeks the support of Don Antonio, making reference to it and expressing, in an attempt to win him over to his cause, that, on the contrary, if the prior of Crato had a better right, he would have supported him. ‘Speak to Don Antonio a little clearly, telling him, among other reasons, one that seems very good to me: if he had a better right to the throne, I would help and support him very willingly. However, since I have the right I possess, the best thing he can do is to assist and support me, as various benefits can follow for him through my part that may not be achieved through any other means. Additionally, this helps to uphold the truth and justice.”³². On the management with the Dukes of Braganza³³, Moura would inform the king with satisfaction of the good terms he reached with them (“you cannot believe the consent and good looks with which everything went”). However, the prospects with the prior of Crato, were not as favorable (“do not think Your Grace that we are neglected in what concerns reducing Don Antonio more so a man of so little judgment and so much bad trickery it can be concluded the bad things it leads, it is not possible to end up with the one who gets off his pretension”³⁴). His dealings in “England, France and Barbary” were also feared. Don Antonio seemed to have been represented in the negotiations on the succession to the Portuguese crown what is known in terms of diplomatic negotiation as a demanding profile. These profiles present an egocentric and impulsive attitude, a need for survival using an all or nothing strategy.

In short, Cristóbal de Moura, as a faithful servant of the Spanish king, was thoroughly employed in trying to persuade the Portuguese side of Felipe II having the best successor right. He tried to generate the most favorable conditions for this, subtracting solvency from the claims of the other contenders, as he did in relation to the rights of the Duchess of Braganza and Don Antonio; weakening the opposing positions by hindering the granting of dispensations; deploying a wide network of contacts, as Moura did well to win the work of the elites to the Philippine cause, insisting that, for his benefit, he was giving in and opting for that option, insofar as it was the only one that ensured the protection of their interests; assuring them, in parallel, preservation of their privileges. The ultimate aim of the extensive and diligent efforts deployed by the king's presenter would be to direct the wills in the desired direction, favorable to the recognition of Felipe II as successor. That was the art of persuasion that Cristóbal de Moura knew how to carry out so well.

5. The Threat of the use of Force

The last of these key elements in a diplomatic negotiation would be the possibility of resorting to force, as an *ultima ratio*. The goal of diplomacy is to achieve its ends by peaceful means. Clausewitz, in his classic quote stated that

²⁹ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from S.M. for the city of Lisbon, fol. 174.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter of S.M. to His Holiness October 25, 1578.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1566, Ms. 80, letter from His Majesty to the States of Portugal, fol. 6-8.

³² *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura of the “last of October” of 1578.

³³ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, Year 1580, Ms. 83, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to S.M., fol. 105-106.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura of June 29, 1578, fol. 318

"war is the continuation of politics by other means." War would therefore show the failure of diplomacy to achieve the objectives pursued by the parties in a peaceful manner. That is why throughout history, diplomatic negotiations have been used frequently to maintain the use of force as merely a last resort.

Although from the beginning of the negotiations in defense of his succession right to the Portuguese crown Felipe II insisted on his desire to avoid the use of weapons, this possibility was present from the onset. In modern Europe, recourse to force was internalized as a means by which to impose the wills of kings and kingdoms when other possible means, such as negotiation, did not bear fruit, as was often the case. The Portuguese were not deceived about the possibility that the Spanish king could resort to his powerful army if his claim to the Portuguese throne was not satisfied. In any case, it is necessary to insist on the *ultima ratio* nature of the recourse to force in the negotiation initiated by Felipe II and his representatives to achieve the satisfaction of their interests. On numerous occasions, both the king and Cristóbal de Moura reiterated, in their continuous messages and efforts with the Portuguese authorities, the desire not to resort to weapons. The king considered his right so founded on "justice and reason" that he considered that this legitimacy should be sufficient to achieve recognition of his greater succession rights compared to the rest of the candidates. In his communications to Moura, King Felipe, in a significant sign of his desire for peace, bets on a negotiated outcome, hoping it is not necessary to resort to force: "There is no doubt that this path of negotiation and good means is the best and gentlest and so we must not treat...the agent of the guards nor much less to prevent infantry because I hope in God that it is not necessary"³⁵. Even more decisive is the mention made in March 1580: "I would greatly like the business to settle with satisfaction and conformation of all and the universal benefit of this kingdom and avoid the damages that would follow if I were forced to use force"³⁶.

Despite King Felipe's desire to avoid the use of force, Don Cristóbal's communications showed the difficulties faced by the Philippine cause to be fully accepted. This was due to Don Antonio's obstinacy of not recognizing Felipe II's succession rights, him resorting to possible support from other powers (France and England) and having the support of the Portuguese people, who were suspicious of a union with the Castilians. Moura was not mistaken and expressed his doubts about the reception that a king from Castile in Portugal could have ("and despite being the king of a rare Christianity and virtue, Your Grace should be certain that it will seem very novel, harsh, and difficult to them.") Hence, Don Cristóbal himself saw the final recourse to force as inevitable ("the fear they have is so great that they will never come to a resolution until they see Your Grace so powerful that it can be done without danger"³⁷). In this way, he considered that despite all the efforts and conviction of the cardinal king, the nobility and the urban oligarchies, the historical suspicion of the neighboring kingdom prevented the natural and immediate acceptance of Felipe II's right. The only alternative left was to resort to the threat of force, to the reputation and power of their monarchy and army to either reinforce that acceptance, or to support the position of those who were favorable to the Philippine cause but feared to express it openly ("to encourage friends and restrain those who are not"³⁸).

The last resort to force was not so much a deceptive ruse but rather a real threat. The threat of the use of force was intended to dissuade the Portuguese side from persisting in its resistance in recognizing the Spanish monarch's succession rights. In the case of the succession to the Portuguese crown, the defense of Felipe II's succession rights made it clear that, although it was not the initial claim of the monarch, recourse to force was a possibility if the Portuguese party did not agree to recognize Felipe II as heir ("if the king of Portugal declared whoever other than me to be the successor of that kingdom it is not to be seen what I must do and it will be enough cause to take up arms in defense of my right"³⁹). A cause that Don Cristóbal also considered sufficient for a fair war ("the king of Portugal proceeding to make a declaration of another successor will certainly be able to make a just war"⁴⁰). Also contributed the conviction of the help that the Portuguese would receive from the enemies of the Spanish Crown: "Suspicion by reason of state and of all good prudence of not wanting the king to declare successor by working this after intelligences with the French and English and trying to rely on their help and put people by force of those nations in that kingdom and what may happen from this endangers my right"⁴¹.

This presence and possibility of recourse to weapons constituted an important negotiating asset, especially in view of the capabilities and established reputation maintained by the Spanish army. Moreover, what in the negotiating process was a considerable element of pressure eventually became the determining element of the process that tipped the balance in favor of the Spanish monarch's interests. Faced with the indecisiveness of the cardinal king who died without having recognized Felipe II as heir, and the proclamation of Don Antonio as king of Santarem, the Spanish monarch had no choice but to react with the use of force to prevent an imposition of facts contrary to his interests, which he believed were based on greater justice and reason. In this way, he brought the army under the command of the Duke of Alba who defeated the prior of Crato, who left Portugal ending the brief, but decisive war action.

After the period of arduous negotiations diligently conducted by Cristóbal de Moura and the pressure of force exerted by the Duke of Alba, the oath of fidelity of the procurators of the kingdom of Portugal gathered in courts to

³⁵ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from S. M to Cristóbal de Moura November 14, 1578.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, Volume III, Year 1580, Ms. 82, letter from S. M. to Cristóbal de Moura March 1580.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to HM, fol. 250 et seq.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Volume IV, Year 1580, Ms. 83, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to HM, fol. 250 et seq.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from HM to Cristóbal de Moura, May 29 fol. 288

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 80, Letter from Cristóbal de Moura to HM, fol. 296

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, Volume II, Year 1579, Ms. 81, letter from HM to Cristóbal de Moura, fol. 288

S.M. Felipe II, who solemnly swore to observe the customs of Portugal, its laws, and statutes, would take place in the convent of Tomar on April 20, 1581. The fact that the war threat worked in favor of Felipe II's position is due to the military superiority of the Spanish army over the Portuguese. An important element in a diplomatic negotiation is the analysis of the correlation of forces of the parties to the dispute. Undoubtedly, this analysis in relation to the opposing parties in the Portuguese succession question was very difficult for the powerful Spanish crown, whose armies had carved a reputation for efficiency and superiority in their numerous Mediterranean and European victories. Felipe II emerged victorious from the defense of his cause to the succession of the Portuguese crown. The power of the Spanish monarchy managed to impose itself, leaving its prestige intact and reinforcing its reputation. The personal commitment of the monarch and the skill of his servants, especially Don Cristóbal, asserted that power and weight of the Spanish monarchy without the need to reach serious confrontations.

6. Conclusion

Felipe II, despite his desire to resolve the Portuguese question by peaceful means, could not fail to resort to the threat of force, which in diplomatic negotiation is frequently an element of *ultima ratio*. However, this final circumstance does not invalidate the arduous negotiating process that was carried out especially by his representative in Portugal, Cristóbal de Moura.

As seen throughout this article, Moura knew how to wisely employ tactics that were later deemed essential by theorists of diplomatic negotiation. This is evident in the building of trust, both with the Spanish king who sent him and with the Portuguese monarch and important figures in Portuguese society or his deep understanding of that society and the timely information he conveyed about events and the opinions of various individuals was also remarkable. Also, and fundamentally, the conduct of efforts to gain the support of the Portuguese to the Philippine cause. All of it from the skillful management of persuasion through which to approve of interest differing from one's own interests. Moura is shown as a master in an art that requires cunning, discretion and certain gifts of imagination. Therefore, it can be said that, from the evidence present in the extensive correspondence maintained between King Felipe and his representative in Portugal, the actions carried out in order to achieve satisfaction of the Spanish succession rights, constitute to a large extent an exemplary exercise of the art of diplomatic negotiation. Art that received in any case the encouragement of a king determined to assert his succession right, which he believed was based on "justice and reason". Felipe II could not renounce it without undermining his reputation, that of his monarchy and the rights of his successors "I have thus placed before myself the obligation in conscience and in any other reason not to lose my right and more so having successors to whom it would be unjust to harm in any way, I could not stop returning for him and do so as not to lose everything that suits those who"⁴²). In this sense, the defense of honor and reputation are also important elements in the diplomatic performance of what both the Prudent King and his representative in Portugal bequeathed such a valuable heritage. In short, the historical case analyzed reveals good practices in the exercise of diplomacy that could be somewhat inspiring at a time when great and complex challenges threaten international peace and security.

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⁴² Ibid., Volume I, Year 1578, Ms. 80, letter from S.M. to Cristóbal de Moura dated 20 November 1578.