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Vocative use in Classical Greek narrative monologues: the case of Euripides and Plato

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Abstract: This work aims to analyse interaction management, and more specifically, vocative use within narrative monologues in Classical Greek. To do so, a corpus encompassing a number of Platonic myths and messenger speeches from Euripides' plays has been examined through the lens of narratology and Conversation Analysis. The results obtained prove that there is indeed a pattern in vocative use: they pop up in the more marginal parts of the narrative (*abstract, coda, evaluation*), when the speaker "returns home" to the starting point of the interaction, and also when introducing direct speech. The distribution of vocatives differs according to each author and the degree of overtness shown by the narrator.
Keywords: vocatives, narrations, monologues, Conversation Analysis.

ES Vocativos en monólogos narrativos en griego clásico: estudio de Eurípides y Platón

Resumen: Este trabajo se propone analizar la interacción, particularmente el uso de los vocativos, en textos de carácter monológico-narrativo en griego clásico. Para ello, se ha construido un corpus de mitos platónicos y de discursos de mensajero de Eurípides, al que se ha aplicado el instrumental teórico de la narratología y del Análisis de la Conversación. Los resultados arrojados prueban que hay un patrón de uso de vocativos: se dan en las partes marginales de la narración (sumario, coda o evaluación), cuando se regresa al punto de partida de la interacción (*return home*) y al introducir discurso directo. Hay diferencias en la cantidad de vocativos según el autor y según la implicación del narrador en la narración.
Palabras clave: vocativos, narraciones, monólogos, Análisis de la Conversación.

Summary: 1. Introduction. 2. Previous scholarship on monologues. 3. Previous studies on narrative. 4. Method and scope. 5. Data and results. 5.1. Euripides. 5.1.1. *Electra*. 5.1.2. *Helen*. 5.1.3. *Iphigenia among the Taurians*. 5.1.4. *Iphigenia in Aulis*. 5.2. Plato. 6. Conclusions and future directions.

[1] Proyecto GIGA-AGORA (PID2022-138136NB-I00): "Gramática de la Interacción en Griego Antiguo (I): Elementos Parentéticos en la Conversación-A Grammar of Interaction in Ancient Greek: Thetical Elements in Conversation". First and foremost, I would like to thank Rutger Allan for his invaluable help when I was writing this piece: it owes so much to his knowledge and kindness. I would also like to extend my gratitude to Camille Denizot and Emilia Ruiz Yamuza for their willingness to read this work and help me improve it. I also appreciate the referees' enthusiastic comments, which contributed greatly to making this article more readable and solid. For that I sincerely thank them both.

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1. Introduction

In one of the Platonic reflections on discourse, Socrates rejects Callias request to stay and continue debating with Protagoras:

(1) Pl. *Prt.* 336.b (Socrates-Callias): εἰ οὖν ἐπιθυμεῖς ἐμοῦ καὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούειν, τούτου δέου, ὥσπερ τὸ πρῶτόν μοι ἀπεκρίνατο διὰ βραχέων τε καὶ αὐτὰ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα, οὕτω καὶ νῦν ἀποκρίνεσθαι· εἰ δὲ μή, τίς ὁ τρόπος ἔσται τῶν διαλόγων; χωρὶς γὰρ ἔγωγ' ᾤμην εἶναι τὸ συνεῖναί τε ἀλλήλοις διαλεγομένους καὶ τὸ δημηγορεῖν.

So, if you desire to hear Protagoras and me, ask him to resume the method of answering which he used at first — in short sentences and keeping to the point raised. Otherwise, what is to be our mode of discussion? For I thought that to hold a joint discussion and to make a harangue were two distinct things[2].

Protagoras has been characterised as someone who is fond of holding the floor for a long time. In 320c, he himself compares his discourse to that of an old man addressing the youth (ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις), who would rather prove his point through telling a myth (μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω) than holding a conversation (λόγῳ διεξελθών)[3]. In his own words, he ties together monologues and narrations as forms of speech that sit very far from interaction and, therefore, hinder access to the truth and knowledge. But are monologues and narrations really that little interactive and long?

Most definitions of monologues highlight the idea of length: long turns uttered by one interlocutor. Nonetheless, lengthy turns do not prevent the interlocutor's participation in the conversation. In fact, the interlocutor is often addressed in monologues, even in narrations, for several reasons. Very recently, van Gils & Kroon (2024) have examined Cicero's fourth Catilinarian as a multi-unit turn, fraught with interactive marks (mainly vocatives), which attempt to create alignment and model the addressee's preferred response to Cicero's general request, a form of what they call *interaction management*. Following their example, the aim of this paper is to analyse interaction management, particularly, address usage in Ancient Greek narrated monologues. The main goal is to determine whether narrators follow particular patterns when it comes to addressing their narratee and, if so, to discover in what parts of the narration these addresses tend to occur. To do so, I have selected a corpus encompassing narrative texts from drama and philosophical dialogue, more specifically, from Euripidean messenger speeches from the Trojan cycle, and from a number of Platonic myths. Apart from observing particular patterns, I aim to detect distinctive features of each literary genre and examining the differences between both authors.

In Section 2, I conduct a critical review of the different definitions of monologue and, additionally, delve into the notion of *audience design*. In Section 3, I set out the theorical basis for narrations. In Section 4 I give an outline of the method adopted for the analysis, which combines Conversation Analysis with narratology, and determine the scope of the research. In Section 5, I discuss the results of the textual analysis. Finally, in section 6 I draw some conclusions and indicate future directions in which this piece may be complemented.

2. Previous scholarship on monologues

Linguistic studies focusing strictly on monologues to date are quite scarce, particularly when compared to dialogues. There have been a few attempts within the field of literary studies, such as Sessions (1947), or stemming from it, Byron (2003), neither of which can be considered instrumental in the study of the monologue, literary or not, since the characteristics are vaguely

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[2] All translations are from the LOEB editions, unless otherwise stated. The Greek text corresponds to Diggle's Euripides (1984) and Burnet's Plato (1962).

[3] For the explicit contrast between μῦθος and λόγος in this passage, *cf.* Ruiz Yamuza (1986: 23-24), Morgan (2000) and Denyer (2008: *ad loc*).

listed and there are no clear instructions as to identify a monologue by the wording or any other linguistic feature of the text. Through a more linguistic approach nonetheless, monologues may be defined from a *situational* perspective or from a *structural* perspective, consequently resulting in a binary or a gradual classification, respectively (Frobenius 2014b: 22-26). When it comes to literary dramatic monologue, also Pfister (1977: 180) distinguished the *situational* criterion from the *structural* one. The former implies that the speaker thinks they are alone on stage or is indeed alone on stage, or another character's presence is ignored. The *structural* criterion in turn states that a monologue is solely defined by the length and coherence of the speech.

The *structural* perspective was adopted by Mindt (2008), who considers monologues to be at one end of a spectrum, dialogue holding the opposite end. She identifies the features of monologue through the application of Koch and Oesterreicher's model (1985), meaning that monologues would correspond to the speech of distance (*Sprache der Distanz)* and dialogue would correspond to the speech of closeness (*Sprache der Nähe*). Admittedly, the speech of distance is more prototypically associated with the monologic "mode" (so to speak), but it is debatable whether the absence of an interlocutor or the public and planned character of a certain communicative situation could be defining characteristics of a monologic instance. In fact, Koch and Oesterreicher themselves adjusted their model in a later edition (1990), in such a way that both dialogue and monologue were brought down in the scale of importance that they once led as *Kommunikationsbedingungen* (López Serena 2021: 188). Ultimately, it is the relationship between the interlocutors that determines the monologic or dialogic quality of the text (López Serena 2021: 192).

Some of the scholarship on monologues departs from the notion that they are, in essence, based on conversational genres (Schegloff 1987: 222). Some have even claimed that «conversation is the natural home of narrative, and the most familiar context of storytelling for most of us» (Norrick 2007: 127). Others suggest narration to be a pre-genre, precursor to monologue (Swales 1990: 61). Havilland (2007: 150) noted that «interaction is a compelling model for talk, even apparently monologic talk». Some attempts of sequential analysis have been performed on monologues, which Conversation Analysis (henceforth: CA) defines as «long uninterrupted stretches of talk». These stretches cannot be segmented in turns, which is the base unit for CA (Hutchby & Woofftt 1998: 185-201). Similarly, Clark (1996: 5) defines monologue as «talk where the audience isn't expected to interrupt».

Monologues are not CA's primary interest, however, the concept of *storytelling*, coined in this framework, is certainly relevant to the study of the monologue (Mendelbaum 2013: 493-495). *Storytelling* is a type of sequence during which participants are oriented to a suspension of normal turn-taking rules such that a teller, once they have secured recipiency, has the right to bring the telling to completion (Mendelbaum 2013: 493, Jefferson 1978, Sacks 1974a, Schegloff 1982). It boasts the following features: it usually begins with with a story preface, designed to indicate the kind of story it is going to be and to give clues such as (i) when the telling will be recognizably complete, and (ii) the stance that the recipient should be prepared to take to affliate with the teller.

As previously mentioned, a story should be recognized as such by the recipient, who also needs to pick up the relevant points and, most importantly, be willing to momentarily suspend ordinary interaction. When *storytelling* holds the first place, the prospective narrator may simply begin the story, relying on the hearer's ability to recognise its incipiency or utter a pre-sequence to secure recipient alignment: the so-called *story preface*, usually an offer or a request, such as *You wanna hear a story my sister told me last night?* (Sacks 1974: 337-338). By contrast, some stories are produced in second position in the conversation and respond to a previous turn or sequence, thus yielded by the interlocutor's inquiry, invitation, or solicitation (Mendelbaum 2013: 495-497). Finally, there are some devices to indicate the end of storytelling: a *return home*, a term coined by Jefferson (1978: 231), referring to the practice of resorting back to the topic or segment that first originated the narration. The end can also be arrived at interactionally (Mendelbaum 2013: 504-505). The approach developed by CA differs widely from that of Mindt (2008), referred to above, and is, in my view, more comprehensive in that it considers it essential to describe the interactive mechanisms taking place in more monologic forms of speech. The collaborative process that enables *storytelling* is always a requirement in narrations, so much so that the conversational turns may not be fully suspended, but rather, transition into the so-called *conversational storytelling,* a scenario where the lines between teller and hearer are blurred (Norrick 2007: 127).

Consequently, monologue is to be distinguished from soliloquy. Soliloquy is defined as unaddressed speech, whereas monologue is indeed addressed to a recipient. In some languages, like Japanese soliloquy holds a special linguistic status, since it is by necessity, grammatically marked as unaddressed speech (Hasegawa 2010). Narrated prologues in tragedy, customary as they are for an author like Euripides, would certainly be considered soliloquies, since the character does not expect another character to respond, and has addressed no other character before commencing. The audience is never explicitly addressed and sometimes the character goes on to speak to themselves, to unseen gods or the landscape - all of them mute, non-communicative "addressees" (Lowe 2004: 272)[4]. At this point, it is vital that we draw a distinction between hearer roles. In her paper on audience design in vlogs, Frobenius (2014a: 60) used the model developed and applied to drama by Clark and Carlson (1982), to correctly explain the many sides to audience design. They proposed the distinction of four basic roles: *speaker*, *participants*, *addressees* and *overhearers*. These are all determined by the speaker at the time of the speech act. *Addressees* are participants «who are or could be designated vocatively in the utterance» (1982: 343) and are «the ostensible targets of what is being said» (1982: 344). Participants who are not addressed may be called *side-participants*. Clark & Carlson rightly observe that in some contexts, a speaker may be addressing a certain hearer (for instance, an interviewee) but «their primary aim is to inform the on-looking public of what they are saying to those hearers», which means that people watching or listening to the interview are *public side-participants* (1982: 339). By contrast, *overhearers* are not expected to take part in the illocutionary act, but may be taken into account by the speaker, in case they wish to design their utterance in such a way that the overhearer is able to form the correct conjecture about what they mean (1982: 344).

According to all of the above, during the performance of a play, the spectators are assigned the role of *public side-participant* (or *auditor* or *bystander*) by default and may only be deemed *hearers* (or *addresees*) when a character directly addresses them, thereby breaking the fourth wall. Hence, when examining interactive devices in Euripidean messenger speeches, one must solely look out for the vocatives referring to the *addressee* (another character)*.* As for Platonic mythical narrations, one must examine the vocatives referring to the addressee/narratee (another character).

As for Ancient Greek, not many studies on monologues have seen the light. An exception is Battezzato's (1995) exhaustive monograph on the conventions of tragic monologues in Euripides, in which he made a metrical differentiation between lyric monologues and non-lyric monologues. He devoted a third section to a study of the Euripidean conventions of the dirge. In his chapter on non-lyric monologues, he discussed the "indefiniteness" (*indeterminatezza*) of Aeschylean monologues: «È stato notato (...), che in Eschilo i personaggi parlano spesso senza un destinatario determinato. ma analisi come questa sono state lasciate nel vago, né sono stati indagati a fondo gli schemi retorici del passaggio dal monologo al dialogo» (1995: 92)[5]. His in-depth essay stresses the absence of pure forms of dialogue or monologue, which reminds us of the remarks by Conversation Analysts stated above, and also, of the importance of an addressee, to correctly label these texts.

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[4] In her chapter on the prologue in Sophocles' Trachiniae (vv. 1-48), de Jong (2007) defended that this prologue, which had been labelled a monologue, implied an audience — the nurse — and, most importantly for our study, that Euripidean prologues also involved an audience, namely, the spectators, and ought to be hence called "diaphonic monologues" (2007: 26). She took recourse to the concept of *diaphony*, as defined by Kroon (1995:112): «The label "diaphonic" (...) can be attached to any monological stretch of text that somehow displays the features of a communicative interaction, without having all formal characteristics of a dialogical discourse type (i.e. without having an actual exchange structure)». The notions of diaphony and polyphony date back to Bakhtin (1984) and the Geneva school of literary criticism. De Jong substantiates her conclusions with the narratological study of prologues, which would rupture the 'absolute autonomy' of the dramatic text, breaking the fourth wall. However, audience should not be equalled to addressee. I align in this matter with the notion by CA that the addressee must willingly help the narrator to suspend the turn-taking system until the story is brough to an end. I assume that dialogue is the default setting for spoken interaction, so naturally there will be some features evoking the conversational origin of every mode.

[5] The switching from monologue to dialogue and the character-depicting function of some monologues are, indeed, the main concerns of Batezzato, who goes on to conclude that: «A questo punto si deve concludere che il confine fra monologo e 'dialogo' non è rigidamente segnato, e che la loro separazione (anche in sede teorica) non può essere considerata netta; l'assenza di segnali dialogici, anzi la presenza di quelli che abitualmente sono considerati tratti tipici di una rottura della comunicazione (le esclamazioni, i lunghi brani gnomicoriflessivi), non impedisce che ci sia un passaggio al 'dialogo' tutt'altro che rigidamente marcato (...)» (Battezzato 1995: 97).

3. Previous studies on narrative

Narration is multifaceted and may be considered a “mixed” genre, since it can contain a variety of non-narrative elements, such as descriptions or character discourse (Allan 2009: 171). In essence, a narrative text is defined by the presence of a narrative agent, the narrator, who is in charge of telling the story (de Jong 2004: 1, Bal 1997 [1985]: 16, Genette 1979, 1988 [1983]: 14)[6].

Based on de Jong’s introductory work (2004: 2-4), we can make the following further distinctions: the narrator may be *external* if they are not a character of their own story, or *internal* if they are. There may be layers to the story, each of which incarnated by a different narrator (primary, secondary, etc.), in which case a narratorial hierarchy must be drawn. In addition, one can identify the narrator’s role and attitude towards the very story, that is, the degree of overtness that the narrator boasts in the narration. Accordingly, the narrator may display an *overt* or a *covert* character and this may be correlated with the frequency with which vocatives are deployed. There are crucial differences between *internal* and *external* narrators. In drama, all messengers present themselves as eyewitnesses of the events, whereas only a few of them are also characters in the story (for instance, the herdsman in *Iphigenia among the Taurians*)[7]. On the other hand, narrators of myths in the platonic dialogues are, obviously, almost never internal narrators. In *Gorgias* 524a, the narrator presents himself as the reenactor of hearsay: he heard a story, which he narrates, persuaded by its truth, and uses it to borrow some of its conclusions to promote his own point of view, *vid. infra* (19). Also in *Phaedrus* 274c, when Socrates reproduces the myth of Theuth, he claims that he heard that story from the ancients, who indeed knew the truth.

Together with the narrator, the other central feature of narrative is the presence of a sequence of fictional events[8]. As shown by the concept of *storytelling*, there is a tight relationship between monologue and narration. As an act of communication, a narration requires an addressee or, more properly, a narratee (de Jong 2004: 4).

Another key notion is that of *immersion*, as developed by Ryan (2015: 9): «the experience through which a fictional world acquires the presence of an autonomous, language-independent reality populated by live human beings». *Immersion* may be hindered or boosted depending on the narrators’ varying degree of visibility or *overtness*, that is, when making comments on the events, they draw attention to their own voice rather than to the story, thus disturbing *immersion* (Allan 2022: 281). In this paper, Allan assesses vocative use throughout the narration of Lysias 1, to conclude that they do not hinder immersion, *a fortiori* they play a somewhat hybrid role in reminding the audience of the communicative situation also serving to draw attention to the key parts of the story (2022: 289). A nuanced approach to *immersion* in mythic narrations is the one developed by Fossi (2024), who distinguishes between *immersion* for primary narratees (the ones receiving the whole Platonic dialogue, *i.e.* readers) and secondary narratees (the characters addressed by another character-narrator), thus highlighting that vocatives disrupt the immersion for the primary narratee (2024: 184).

Additionally, the internal narrator may choose to tell the story through an *experiencing focalization* (that is, reproducing the events as they underwent them), or through a *narrating focalization* (that is, elaborating the story from a retrospective stance and sprinkling in knowledge or feelings they possess at the moment of narration/telling). For instance, the second messenger in *Iphigenia in Aulis* declares that he is going to attempt at telling the story through an *experience*

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[6] Some narratologists and classicists (Gould 2001, Goward 1999: 10-13, Markantonatos 2002), however, work with a broader definition of narrative, which also accounts for drama. For a thorough assessment of the arguments for and against this view cf. de Jong (2004: 6-9).

[7] Conventions of the literary tradition of the messenger in messenger speeches have been studied intensively by Barrett (2002). De Jong’s work (1991) on messenger’s narratives remains essential. Fornieles Sánchez (2018) provides a classification of types of messengers.

[8] In truth, this statement is an overly simplified one. Stories may take place in many kinds of storyworlds, actual or fictional, realistic or fantastic, etc. This is what Herman labelled as (iii) *worldmaking/world disruption* and together with (i) *situatedness*, the characteristic of narrations being «situated in a specific discourse context or occasion for the telling», (ii) *event sequencing*, a «structured time-course of particularized events» and (iv) *what it’s like* «to live through this storyworld-in-flux, highlighting the pressure of events on real or imagined consciousnesses undergoing the disruptive experience at issue», they constitute the nuclear elements of narrations (2009: 9)

focalization (vv. 1540-1542): ἀλλ’, ὦ φίλη δέσποινα, πᾶν πεύσηι σαφῶς. / λέξω δ’ ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς, ἤν τι μὴ σφαλεῖσά που / γνώμη ταράξηι γλῶσσαν ἐν λόγοις ἐμήν, «Dear mistress, you shall learn all clearly; from the outset will I tell it, unless my memory fails me somewhat and confuses my tongue in its account».

Other relevant ideas for the theorical framework of this article concern the parts of a narrative and the narrative modes. Allan (2007, 2009: 187), building on the work of Labov (1972: 362–70) and Fleischman (1990: 135–54) put forth a schema of the global structure of the narrative, involving seven parts:

The Global Structure of Narrative
a. **Abstract**: Point of story or summary of significant events
b. **Orientation**: Identification of the time, place, circumstances and participants
c. **Complication**: Build-up of tension
d. **Peak**: Climax, decisive moment
e. **Resolution**: Outcome/result
f. **Coda**: Closure, bridge to time of narrating
g. **Evaluation**: Narrator’s comment

As stories may comprise multiple episodes, the overall structure may show some sort of recurrence of the sequence complication-peak-resolution. Likewise, the non-nuclear parts of the narration (*abstract, orientation, coda, and evaluation*) may be absent (Allan 2009: 189).

The relation between the narrator’s point of view and the presentation of the text conditions the narrative mode of the text (Allan 2009: 171). On the basis of a linguistic analysis (tense-aspect marking), Allan proposes four narrative modes: *displaced diegetic*, *immediate diegetic*, *descriptive,* and *discursive mode*. In the *displaced diegetic mode*, there is some distance between the Discourse-Now and the Story-Now and, as a result, the narrator has a comprehensive overview of the events. The *immediate diegetic mode* is characterised by the apparent lack of spatial and temporal distance between the events and the story, giving the impression of an «eye-witness report» (2009: 174). The *descriptive mode* is anchored on the spatial progress of a scene, person, or object (2009: 179-180), while the *discursive mode* is singularised because the events referred by the narrator are «directly related to the communicative situation (Discourse-Now)» (2009: 181-182). The most important repercussion for our own study stems from the *discursive mode*, because it may appear in two situations: when the narrator addresses the narratee and comments on the events or when characters of the story address one another, in direct speech (2009: 182). The different modes of narration show varying degrees of narratorial mediation, that is, of *overtness* of the mediating voice of the narrator. The *discursive mode* is the highest point of narratorial mediation, whereas the *immediate diegetic mode* holds the opposite end of the spectrum, and the *descriptive* and *displaced diegetic mode* hold the medium of the scale (2009: 184).

Because in tragedy boundaries between narrative and other modes of discourse are particularly blurred, Lowe (2004: 269) affrms that a more precise definition of narrative in drama must be formulated. According to him, delivering news is the most prototypical way of narrating in tragedy, whereby a narrator deals with events (not states of mind, judgments, etc.) and presents these events as fact. One must also bear in mind that «All narration in drama is *embedded* narration; that is, there is always a meaningful relationship between the embedded narrative content and the framing situation, especially the voice and intentions of the narrating figure in communication with the intradramatic narratees» (2004: 269, his italics). In addition, it is widely known that in Ancient Greek tragedy it was customary that all significant action happens off-stage and hence be presented by means of a certain kind of narration (de Jong 1991: 173-177).

Lowe (2004: 273) praises de Jong’s (1991) monograph on Euripidean messenger speeches, which tackled the presumed narratorial objectivity of the messenger examining diverse aspects of the speeches, the most important for our study being addresses to the on-stage narratees (*cf.* §4). Messengers are first-person narrators, eyewitnesses (de Jong 1991: 38). They adopt the perspective of a diegetic narrator and usually opt for the use of an *experiencing focalization*, trying not to anticipate crucial details when they decide to recount the events from the beginning (*cf. IA* 1541). Nonetheless, the norm is that the outcome is

stated at the beginning of the speech, in the *abstract*, thus resulting in a "double perspective" for the narratee and the audience, who are aware of the final outcome, but privy of the exact manner in which the situation has escalated (de Jong 1991: 61) in what has been labelled as *how-suspense* (Allan 2022: 284).

As far as Platonic dialogues are concerned, the classification between narrative dialogues and dramatic dialogues goes as far back as Diogenes Laertius (3.50), who actually did not approve of it (Morgan 2004: 357). This has triggered immense amount of scholarship and debate. Embedded narratives such as myths, however, have been subject to fewer objections. Morgan (2004: 369, 371) is bewildered by the "formality" with which embedded narratives are introduced and later matched with equally formal conclusions, which in her view harshly contrast with the informality of the dialogues that contain them (2004: 375). In this respect, Ruiz Yamuza (1986: 21) points out that the lack of interaction between the speaker and the hearer acts as a boundary between the mythic narration and the rest of the dialogue. It is also worth noting that the narrative format of the myths is apparently not very fixed when it comes, for instance, to direct discourse (Morgan 2004: 373).

4. Method and scope

It seems suffciently proved that the most prototypical and undebatable narrative passages of tragedy and philosophical dialogue are, respectively, messenger speeches and mythical narrations. De Jong (2004) and Allan (2009) applied the framework of narratology to Euripidean messenger speeches. Also, Most (2012: 24) composed a list of criteria to determine the prototypicality of a Platonic myth: they are almost always monological (Appendix A1), that is, that they usually consist of a description or narration (Appendix A7).

For this paper I have inspected a number of Euripides' plays belonging to the Trojan cycle and, based on the inventories of de Jong (1991: 179) and Most (2012: 24), I selected the following messenger speeches: *Andromache* (1070-1165), *Electra* (761-858), *Helen* (1512-1618), *Iphigenia in Aulis* (414-439 and 153n2-1612[9]), and *Iphigenia among the Taurians* (238-339 and 1284-1419), as well as a handful of myths extracted from Platonic dialogues: Protagoras' myth in *Protagoras* 320c-323a, the origin of cicadas in *Phaedrus* 259b-259e, and the myth of Theuth in *Phaedrus* 274d-275d, Aristophanes' myth on the Hermaphrodite in *Symposium* 189a-193e, and Diotima's narration in *Symposium* 203b-204a, and the Gorgias myth in *Gorgias* (522d-524c)[10]. Samples of each author represent about 4000 words.

A couple of preliminary caveats must be made. The selection includes the linguistic preparation that the narrator/speaker makes for the narratee/recipient: in tragedy, greetings and the abstract tend to occur in more dialogical sequences, through which the narration is interactionally arrived at. This is the reason why the exact selection of the passages in question does not completely coincide with that carried out by Most (2012: 24), because he rejects the dialogic exchange leading up to the myth. It is also vital to keep in mind that my analysis will only deal with vocatives. Other "signs of the you", as de Jong (1991: 195-197) puts it will not be taken into account. These signs of

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[9] The authenticity of this messenger speech has caused great controversy, on the grounds of its presumed clumsiness. On this matter, *cf.* Rijksbaron (1976 [2018]: 178, n. 21), who also claims that the speech gives "real news" and does not report a past event, but something simultaneous to it (Iphigenia's arrival). True as this may be, we ought not to overlook the words of the messenger on vv. 424-426, where he indeed states — arguably somewhat later than it is usually done — where he is coming from and for what reason: ἐγὼ δὲ πρόδρομος σῆς παρασκευῆς χάριν / ἥκω· πέπυσται γὰρ στρατός – ταχεῖα γὰρ / διῇξε φήμη – παῖδα σὴν ἀφιγμένην. This would nuance Rijksbaron's observation (1976 [2018]: 178) that «there are no introductory lines, indicating, e.g., where the messenger comes from; his entrance is so abrupt that he begins to speak in the middle of the line». These verses may not constitute the very beginning of the speech, but they are present.

[10] In his monograph about the styles of Plato, Thesleff (1967: 74-75) provided a detailed analysis of the formal features of mythic narrative style (Ionic vocabulary, monotony, circumstantiality, parataxis, occasional use of historical presents, etc.). As samples of this, he referenced *Prt.* 321c-322d, *Phdr.* 259b-d and *R.* II. 359d-360a. In his book, he put forth a thorough assessment of the styles of each dialogue (1967: 116-154). Every text I have inspected is classified as mythical in his work, too.

internal addressees are diverse: denomination *i.e.* «the way characters are referred to: by name, or by means of a periphrasis like 'your brother', my master, etc.» (de Jong 1991: 94)[11].

For the purpose of this research, I have sectioned the texts into the different parts of the narrative structure: *abstract*, *orientation*, *complication*, *peak*, *resolution*, *coda* and *evaluation* (Allan 2009: 187, *vid. supra* §3) to check if there is a tendency of appearance of vocatives in any of them. I have also considered the type of narrator and focalization as relevant factors. If there was direct speech involved, I set out to detect if there were any vocatives and in which parts of the narrative direct speech was introduced. I have also made use of the theoretical tools developed by CA to assess the ways in which the story was interactionally construed, checking the possible prefaces uttered by the prospective narrator, the — unlikely — recipient uptake happening during the narration and the mechanisms deployed to exit the narrative stretch.

5. Data and results

First of all, a substantial differentiation must be drawn between the vocatives functioning in the immediate interactive context and the vocatives used within direct speech in the narration. The former refer to the hearer of the *storytelling*, whilst the latter are deployed by the characters of the narrations, perhaps used by the primary narrator as means of quoting speech. I will deal with the data from each type separately.

5.1. Euripides

Within the Euripidean messenger speeches, interactive vocatives tend to appear in the *greeting* of the messenger, either by themselves (2) of followed by the *abstract* (3), underlined:

(2) *Andr.* 1070-1071 (Messenger-Peleus): {ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ} ὤμοι μοι· οἵας ὁ τλήμων ἀγγελῶν ἥκω τύχας / σοί τ', **ὦ γεραιέ**, καὶ φίλοισι δεσπότου.

Messenger. Ah me! What terrible news have I, unlucky man, come bearing for you, old sir, and for those who love my master!

(3) *IA* 414-419 (Messenger-Agamemnon): {ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ} **ὦ Πανελλήνων ἄναξ, / Ἀγάμεμνον, ἥκω παῖδά σοι τὴν σὴν ἄγων**, / ἣν Ἰφιγένειαν ὠνόμαζες ἐν δόμοις. / μήτηρ δ' ὁμαρτεῖ, σῆς Κλυταιμήστρας δέμας, / καὶ παῖς Ὀρέστης, ὥς σφε τερφθείης ἰδών, / χρόνον παλαιὸν δωμάτων ἔκδημος ὤν.

(*Enter by Eisodos A a messenger*). Messenger. Lord of all the Greeks, Agamemnon, I have Zcome bringing your daughter to you, the one you named Iphigenia in your halls. Her mother comes with her, your wife Clytaemestra, and also your son Orestes so that you may have the pleasure of seeing him: you have been a long time away from home.

The tendency is that the *abstract* (underlined) comes in a second turn, after the addressed character (chorus or protagonist) has responded to the messenger. Note that there is no vocative in the second turn by the messenger:

(4) *IT* 1284-1292 (Messenger-Chorus): {ΑΓΓΕΛΟΣ} **ὦ ναοφύλακες βώμιοί τ' ἐπιστάται,** / Θόας ἄναξ γῆς τῆσδε ποῦ κυρεῖ βεβώς; / καλεῖτ' ἀναπτύξαντες εὐγόμφους πύλας / ἔξω μελάθρων τῶνδε κοίρανον χθονός. / {Χο.} τί δ' ἔστιν, εἰ χρὴ μὴ κελευσθεῖσαν

[11] For instance, in *IT* 1304-1306 the messenger expresses his intention and addresses his preferred recipients, albeit not using a vocative but a dative, which is a linguistic sign that the utterance reformulates a failed address: ὠή, χαλᾶτε κλῇθρα, τοῖς ἔνδον λέγω, / καὶ δεσπότῃ σημήναθ' οὕνεκ' ἐν πύλαις / πάρειμι, καινῶν φόρτον ἀγγέλλων κακῶν. Other examples may be semi-fixed phrases such as: δεινὰς δ' **ἂν εἶδες** πυρρίχας φρουρουμένου / βέλεμνα παιδὸς in *Andr.* 1035-1036 or in σπουδῆς δ' ὕπο / ἔπιπτον, οἱ δ' ὠρθοῦντο, τοὺς δὲ κειμένους / νεκροὺς **ἂν εἶδες** in *Hel.* 1604-1606, but these do not show terms of address. This may also occur in the Platonic dialogues, for instance *Symp.* 193c, where Aristophanes speaks about Eryximachus, his narratee in the third person: καὶ μή μοι ὑπολάβῃ Ἐρυξίμαχος, κωμῳδῶν τὸν λόγον, ὡς Παυσανίαν καὶ Ἀγάθωνα λέγω— (...). Cases like the latter are beyond the scope of the present study.

λέγειν;/ {Αγ.} βεβᾶσι φροῦδοι δίπτυχοι νεανίαι / Ἀγαμεμνονείας παιδὸς ἐκ βουλευμάτων / φεύγοντες ἐκ γῆς τῆσδε καὶ σεμνὸν βρέτας / λαβόντες ἐν κόλποισιν Ἑλλάδος νεώς.

MESSENGER (*addressing those within*). Guardians of the temple and attendants of the altar, where is King Thoas to be found? Open up these bossed doors and call the country's king out of the temple! CHORUS LEADER What is wrong, if I may speak unbidden? MESSENGER The two young men have escaped: they have fled the country by the design of Agamemnon's daughter and taken the holy image with them in the hold of a Greek ship.

Sometimes vocatives can be inserted in the *coda* or *evaluation* as well, which is in keeping with the fact that *codas* return to the sphere of Discourse-Now, and that is where the speaker/narrator and the hearer/narratee are in the moment of the narration (Allan 2009: 187, *vide supra* §3). From the CA standpoint, these would clearly mark story closings (Norrick 2007: 132). This goes to show that a higher degree of narratorial overtness correlates with more interactive devices, *cf.* (5) and (6). Note also that the syntax around the term of address is highly contrastive: *we* took hold of the corpse and brought him quickly, so *you* are able to lament him and bury him:

(5) *Andr.* 1158-1160 (Messenger-Peleus): ἡμεῖς δ' ἀναρπάσαντες ὡς τάχος χεροῖν / κομίζομέν νίν σοι κατοιμῶξαι γόοις / κλαῦσαί τε, **πρέσβυ**, γῆς τε κοσμῆσαι τάφωι.

We quickly took him up in our arms and brought him back for you to mourn him, old sir, and give him burial.

The herdsman in *IT* seems to be implying that the priestess Iphigenia do something quickly with the foreigners, and also to be presenting this as a result of his and the other herdsmen's action:

(6) *IT* 336- 339 (Herdsman-Iphigenia): ηὔχου δὲ τοιάδ', **ὦ νεᾶνι**, σοὶ ξένων / σφάγια παρεῖναι· κἂν ἀναλίσκῃς ξένους / τοιούσδε, τὸν σὸν Ἑλλὰς ἀποτείσει φόνον / δίκας τίνουσα τῆς ἐν Αὐλίδι σφαγῆς.

Lady, foreign victims like these are what you should pray to receive. If you kill foreigners like these, Greece will be punished for your murder, paying the penalty for your sacrifice at Aulis.

The messenger, who is about to report the failure of their mission and thus stresses the involvement of their superiors (Thoas and Theoclymenus), expresses «implicit criticism» in his *evaluation* of the escape of Orestes and Iphigenia (de Jong 1991: 104):

(7) *IT* 1334-1335 (Messenger-Thoas): (...) καὶ τάδ' ἦν ὕποπτα μέν, / ἤρεσκε μέντοι σοῖσι προσπόλοις, **ἄναξ**. (...)

And this looked suspicious, but was accepted by your servants, master.

(6) and (7) are narratorial intrusions in which the narrator addresses the narratee by commenting on the event, hence examples of the *discursive mode*. Otherwise, vocatives serve the purpose of introducing direct speech[12] (mostly through verbs of speech in the aorist tense: εἶπε, προσεῖπε, ἐκάλεσεν, ἀνεβόησε, ἤρετο but also in the historic present: ἀνιστορεῖ, and, exceptionally, the imperfect ηὔχετο), thus shifting the narration to the *discursive mode* (Allan 2009: 182). The inclusion of direct speech in messenger speeches is distinctive of Euripides, going so far as to reproduce dialogues, thus rendering the story somewhat more vivid, in a similar fashion to Homeric speeches (de Jong 1991: 131-132). Underlined below we find the exchange between Aegisthus and Orestes. Note that the vocative is part of the salutation, hence, a call:

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12 When analysing direct speech in *storytelling*, Conversation Analysts have observed that terms of address or vocatives function as devices to bracket it: «When speakers construct dialogue with no explicit marker of direct speech, they often suggest quoted talk with terms of address (...) and discourse markers (...)» (Norrick 2007: 133).

(8) *El.* 777-782 (Messenger-Electra): κυρεῖ δὲ κήποις ἐν καταρρύτοις βεβώς, / δρέπων τερείνης μυρσίνης κάραι πλόκους· / ἰδὼν δ' ἀυτεῖ· Χαίρετ', **ὦ ξένοι**· τίνες / πόθεν πορεύεσθ' ἔστε τ' ἐκ ποίας χθονός; / ὁ δ' εἶπ' Ὀρέστης· Θεσσαλοί· πρὸς δ' Ἀλφεὸν / θύσοντες ἐρχόμεσθ' Ὀλυμπίωι Διί.

He turned out to be walking in a well-watered garden, plucking a wreath of tender myrtle-sprays for his head; when he saw us, he called out, "Welcome, strangers! Who are you and from where do you come? from what country?". Orestes said, "We are Thessalians, going to the Alpheus River to sacrifice to Olympian Zeus".

Within *Andromacha*'s messenger speech (Allan 2009: 201-202), we encounter three direct interventions in the *complication*, one by Neoptolemus addressing his comrades (vv. 1092-1095), an exchange between an anonymous Delphian fellow (vv. 1104-1105), and another by Neoptolemus (vv. 1106-1108). It is of utmost significance that only the speech by the Delphian, characterised as Neoptolemus' antagonist, incorporates a vocative:

(9) *Andr.* 1104-1108 (Messenger-Peleus): καί τις τόδ' εἶπεν· **Ὦ νεανία**, τί σοι / θεῶι κατευξώμεσθα; τίνος ἥκεις χάριν; / ὁ δ' εἶπε· Φοίβωι τῆς πάροιθ' ἁμαρτίας / δίκας παρασχεῖν βουλόμεσθ'· ἤιτησα γὰρ / πατρός ποτ' αὐτὸν αἵματος δοῦναι δίκην.

Someone said, "Young man, what shall we ask from the god on your behalf? Why have you come here?" And he replied, "I wish to give satisfaction to Phoebus for my earlier sin. For I demanded once that the god pay the penalty for my father's death".

The last piece of direct speech, again by Neoptolemus, is found in the *peak* of the narration (vv. 1125-1126); it does not show any vocative In the rest of the plays inspected, we can observe that the messenger/narrator tends to include direct speech predominantly in the *complication*, and less so in the *orientation* and the *resolution* of the story, and more scarcely in the *peak* of it. The latter is the case for *Hel.* 1579-1587 (*vid. infra* 11), *Andr.* 1125-1126 and *El.* 791-792 but, interestingly enough, the last two of those segments of direct speech do not incorporate any vocative whatsoever. In the following table I have summarized the results found in Euripides' plays:

	ABSTRACT	ORIENTATION	COMPLICATION	PEAK	RESOLUTION	CODA	EVALUATION
***Andr.* 1070-1165**	IVoc.		*/DSVoc./ *	*			Ivoc.
***EL.* 761-858**	IVoc.	DSVoc. (x2)/ *	DSVoc.	*	DSVoc.(x2)		
***Hel.* 1512-1618**	IVoc.	DSVoc.	*	*/DSVoc.	DSVoc.		
***IT* 238-339**	IVoc.	*/DSVoc.	DSVoc.	DSVoc.		IVoc.	
***IT* 1284-1419**	IVoc. (x2)	*	DSVoc.	DSVoc.	DSVoc.		IVoc. (x2)
***IA* 414-439**	IVoc.			*			IVoc.
***IA* 1532-1612**	IVoc.	IVoc. DSVoc.	DSVoc.		DSVoc.		

Table 1. Vocative distribution in Euripidean messengers' narrations. IVoc.: Interactive vocative. DSVoc.: Direct speech vocative. *: Direct speech not containing vocatives.

Let us now turn to a more detailed assessment of the direct speech segments contained in the messenger speeches analysed.

5.1.1. Electra

There are two separate episodes within the messenger speech in *Electra*. First, the ploy set up by Orestes to pass off as a foreigner, not willing to be treated as a guest in Aegisthus and Clytemnestra's house. Second, the murder of Aegisthus. The first episode is fairly dialogic: the

narrator reproduces several interventions by Aegisthus and Orestes in what I would deem the *orientation* (vv. 779-782) and the *complication* (vv. 784-787: Aegisthus' invitation to join them for the sacrifice to the Nymphs), *vid. supra* (8). The *peak* (vv. 791-792) consists of Aegisthus' preparation of a lustral bath for Orestes and Pylades but does not include any vocative. As for the *resolution* (vv. 793-796: Orestes declines the bath, on the grounds that he has already purified himself in a stream, closing his speech with a vocative in v. 797, **Αἴγισθ'**, ἕτοιμοι κοὐκ ἀπαρνούμεσθ', **ἄναξ**).

The second episode, on the other hand, is narrated from more of a diegetic perspective: there are some direct speech interventions in the *orientation* (vv. 805-807: Clytemnestra's addresses the Nymphs in her prayer to provide bad fortune for her enemies. vv. 815-818: Aegisthus' invitation to Orestes to show his Thessalian ability to butcher the victim of sacrifice), also in the *complication* (vv. 831-837: Aegisthus' confesses he is concerned about the evisceration of the calf, because it showed a bad omen and he has got Orestes to fear as an enemy. Orestes dismisses the omen and urges him to cut out the innards), and a *resolution* to a secondary complication, springing from Aegisthus' assassination, namely the unrest among the servants of the house, who want to capture Orestes, but through his introduction on vv. 847-851 he is recognized and celebrated as the freer of his father's house. Vocatives are found in every section: Νύμφαι πετραῖαι (v. 805), ὦ ξένε (v. 817, 831), πατρὸς παλαιοὶ δμῶες (v. 851).

5.1.2. Helen

The messenger in *Helen* introduces direct speech mainly by Menelaus in the storytelling of his flee in the *orientation* (vv. 1544-1545: Menelaus' feigned offer to bury his own fake corpse):

(10) *Hel.*1541-1544 (Messenger-Theoclymenus): ἰδὼν δέ νιν παρόντας Ἀτρέως γόνος/ προσεῖπε δόλιον οἶκτον ἐς μέσον φέρων·/ **Ὦ τλήμονες**, πῶς ἐκ τίνος νεώς ποτε / Ἀχαιίδος θραύσαντες ἥκετε σκάφος;

Atreus' son saw them arrive and called to them, producing a deceptive display of pity: "Poor men, from what Greek vessel were you shipwrecked?".

In the *resolution* of the first complication (vv. 1560-1564: Menelaus commands the crew to force the reluctant bull up the ship) and the first *peak* of the episode (vv. 1579-1587: a brief exchange between Menelaus and the steerman, who asks if he should row further from land, then Menelaus sacrifices the animal, praying to Poseidon for a good journey back)[13]:

(11) *Hel.* 1577-1588 (Messenger-Thoas): ἐπεὶ δὲ γαίας ἦμεν οὔτ' ἄγαν πρόσω οὔτ' ἐγγύς, οὕτως ἤρετ' οἰάκων φύλαξ· / Ἔτ', **ὦ ξέν'**, ἐς τὸ πρόσθεν – ἢ καλῶς ἔχει; – / πλεύσωμεν; ἀρχαὶ γὰρ νεὼς μέλουσι σοί. / ὁ δ' εἶφ'· Ἅλις μοι. δεξιᾶι δ' ἑλὼν ξίφος / ἐς πρῷραν εἶρπε κἀπὶ ταυρείωι σφαγῆι / σταθεὶς νεκρῶν μὲν οὐδενὸς μνήμην ἔχων, / τέμνων δὲ λαιμὸν ηὔχετ'· **Ὦ ναίων ἅλα / πόντιε Πόσειδον Νηρέως θ' ἁγναὶ κόραι,** / σώσατέ μ' ἐπ' ἀκτὰς Ναυπλίας δάμαρτά τε / ἄσυλον ἐκ γῆς· αἵματος δ' ἀπορροαὶ / ἐς οἶδμ' ἐσηκόντιζον οὔριαι ξένωι.

Now when we had put out from land, neither very far nor very near, the helmsman asked, "Shall we sail yet further, stranger, or is this far enough? For the command of this ship is yours." And he answered, "Far enough for me." Holding a sword in his right hand, he stepped into the prow; and, standing over the bull to slay it, with no mention of any dead man, he cut its throat and prayed: "O Poseidon of the sea, who lives in the deep, and you holy daughters of Nereus, bring me and my wife safe and sound from here to Nauplia's shore!" Streams of blood, a good omen for the stranger, darted into the waves.

Someone from the crew cries that the whole trip is a ploy, which leads to the *complication* of the story (vv. 1589) and to the second *peak*, the conflict between Menelaus and the barbarians

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[13] The term ὦ ναίων ἅλα πόντιε Πόσειδον Νηρέως θ' ἁγναὶ κόραι conforms a prayer, a very specific type of speech act, not equitable with regular conversation. I have treated it as the rest because it serves the purpose of introducing direct speech, but I am aware of its singularity.

(vv. 1593-1596: the boatswain rouses the Greeks to end the barbarians) and follows suit with his comrades (vv. 1597-1599) and finally Menelaus' reproach to his men (vv. 1603-1604):

(12) *Hel.* 1592-1596 (Messenger-Thoas): ἐκ δὲ ταυρείου φόνου / Ἀτρέως σταθεὶς παῖς **ἀνεβόησε** συμμάχους· / Τί μέλλετ', **ὦ γῆς Ἑλλάδος λωτίσματα**, / σφάζειν φονεύειν βαρβάρους νεώς τ' ἄπο / ῥίπτειν ἐς οἶδμα; ναυβάταις δὲ τοῖσι σοῖς / βοᾶι κελευστὴς τὴν ἐναντίαν ὄπα· (...)

But the son of Atreus, standing where he slew the bull, cried out to his comrades, "Why do you, the pick of Hellas, delay to slaughter and kill the barbarians and hurl them from the ship into the waves?" And the boatswain cried the opposite command to your rowers (...).

5.1.3. Iphigenia among the Taurians

The first messenger in *Iphigenia among the Taurians* is the herdsman, who rushes to inform Iphigenia of the arrival of two foreigners, who will be found to be Orestes and Pylades, that would make a good sacrifice to the goddess Artemis. Direct speech is used in the *orientation*, when the group of herdsmen first catch sight of the two youths at the hollowed cleft (vv. 267-274), then in the *complication*, when Orestes stands up and is misled by some portents — invisible to the watching herdsmen — and decides to attack the cattle (vv. 285-291):

(13) *IT* 281-287 (Herdsman-Iphigenia): κἀν τῶιδε πέτραν ἅτερος λιπὼν ξένοιν / ἔστη κάρα τε διετίναξ' ἄνω κάτω / κἀνεστέναξεν ὠλένας τρέμων ἄκρας, / μανίαις ἀλαίνων, καὶ βοᾶι †κυναγὸς ὥς†· / **Πυλάδη,** δέδορκας τήνδε; τήνδε δ' οὐχ ὁρᾶις / Ἅιδου δράκαιναν ὥς με βούλεται κτανεῖν / δειναῖς ἐχίδναις εἰς ἔμ' ἐστομωμένη;

At this moment, one of the strangers left the rock, and stood, shaking his head up and down and groaning, with hands trembling, wandering in madness; and like a hunter, he cried aloud: "Pylades, do you see her? Don't you see hell's dragon, how she wants to kill me, fringed with her dreadful vipers against me?".

And finally, at a second *complication* when Orestes, back in his senses, sees the herdsmen hurling and striking at him and harangues Pylades to draw his sword and die in the hands of the offending herdsmen (vv. 321-322). The second messenger in *Iphigenia among the Taurians* reports Iphigenia's flee to Greece, rescued by her brother Orestes. Examples (4) and (6) above belong to this passage. They lay eyes on a ship and seize Iphigenia to prevent her from leaving, at the *complication* of it all they rebuke Orestes that he is raping a priestess (vv. 1358-1360) to which he answers who he is and what his true intentions are (vv. 1361-1366). At the *resolution* of the conflict (vv. 1386-1389), an unidentified voice rouses the crew to set sail to Greece (v. 1386: ὦ γῆς Ἑλλάδος ναύτης λεώς) and Iphigenia prayers to Artemis (v. 1398: ὦ Λητοῦς κόρη), for her to provide a safe journey back (vv. 1398-1402).

5.1.4. Iphigenia in Aulis

The first messenger in *Iphigenia in Aulis* starts off abruptly (Rijksbaron 1976 [2018]: 178, n. 21) and reports the rumours circulating among the army, stirred up by the arrival of the young maiden Iphigenia. Some wonder if she has been brought to hand her in marriage or because Agamemnon missed her (vv. 430-432), and others assume she is going to be sacrificed to Artemis (vv. 433-434). There are no vocatives within his narration. The second messenger in *Iphigenia in Aulis* reports the portents he has seen upon Iphigenia's sacrifice. He reproduces the speeches of three different characters, Iphigenia in the orientation of the story (vv. 1552-1560), Achilles in the complication (vv. 1570-1577) and Calchas in the resolution (vv.1591-1601). All three deploy a vocative: ὦ πάτερ (v. 1552), ὦ παῖ Ζηνός, ὦ θηροκτόνε (v. 1570) and ὦ τοῦδ' Ἀχαιῶν κοίρανοι κοινοῦ στρατοῦ (v. 1591).

Out of all the passages examined, it is the predominant pattern that the forms of treatment used by the messenger hold the left periphery of the utterance *cf.* (3), (4), (9)-(13). The only prominent exception is the messenger in *Andromache*, who begins his speech with an exclamation of despair, and then he conveys the substance of his message (maybe because he is the only one

who is to bring the sad news of the death of a relative: Neoptolemus), *cf.* (2). Moreover, it is the messenger who always makes the first move in conversation (*first-pair part*[14]), as is conventional for this kind of entrances (Mastronarde 1979: 26). The messengers in *Electra* and *Iphigenia among the Taurians* (1284-1287) have to greet the chorus, before they can address the intended recipient of the news, *cf.* (4) and (8).

Upon inspection, it seems that narrators who are more invested in their stories turn to more frequent use of vocatives and interaction devices in the closure parts of the *coda* or *evaluation*. This is the case for the messenger in *Andromache* and both messengers in *Iphigenia among the Taurians,* who seem to wish to make clear that they played an important role in the outcome of the narrated events (transporting Neoptolemus' corpus) or that they were sent quickly to transmit the news, *cf.* (5). The first messenger in *Iphigenia in Aulis* delivers an atypical speech (*vid. supra* n. 9), in which he even turns to a different speaker towards the end (the other Atreid, Menelaus), whereas the second messenger in the play does not use any vocatives towards the end, perhaps because he does not want to imply that he took part in Iphigenia's sacrifice, as he highlights in vv. 1607-1608: ἐγὼ παρών τε καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμ' ὁρῶν λέγω· / ἡ παῖς σαφῶς σοι πρὸς θεοὺς ἀφίπτατο. («Now I was there myself and speak as an eyewitness; without a doubt your child flew away to the gods»).

Lastly, the messenger in *Electra* is a peculiar exception, since he is the only one in the whole Greek tragedy who is first not recognised by the protagonist Electra and, second, not believed right away (Roisman & Luschnig 2014: 188). In the ending of his delivery, he points to a remarkable deed by Orestes — he brings Aegisthus' head —, not trying to emphasise his own role and does not use any vocative.

5.2. Plato

As for Plato's myths, there is overall much less profusion of vocatives. The following table contains the data gathered from Platonic myths:

	Abstract	Orientation	Complication	Peak	Resolution	CODA	EVALUATION
Prt. 320C-323A		*		*	*	IVoc.	IVoc.
Phdr. 259B-259E							
Phdr. 274d-275d				DSVoc.	DSVoc.		IVoc.
Symp. 189A-193E	IVoc.				* / DSVoc.	IVoc.	
Symp. 203b-204a							
Gorg. 522d-524b				*	*	IVoc.	

Table 2. Vocative distribution in Platonic myths. IVoc.: Interactive vocative. DSVoc.: Direct speech vocative. *: Direct speech not containing vocatives

Let us now turn to the analysis of the examples. When Protagoras, the narrator-to-be, fabricates his *story preface* (*vid. supra* §2), he produces the following turn:

(14) *Prt.* 320b-c (Protagoras-Socrates): ἐγὼ οὖν, **ὦ Πρωταγόρα**, εἰς ταῦτα ἀποβλέπων οὐχ ἡγοῦμαι διδακτὸν εἶναι ἀρετήν· ἐπειδὴ δέ σου ἀκούω ταῦτα λέγοντος, κάμπτομαι καὶ οἶμαί τί σε λέγειν διὰ τὸ ἡγεῖσθαί σε πολλῶν μὲν ἔμπειρον γεγονέναι, πολλὰ δὲ μεμαθηκέναι, τὰ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐξηυρηκέναι. εἰ οὖν ἔχεις ἐναργέστερον ἡμῖν ἐπιδεῖξαι ὡς διδακτόν ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετή, μὴ φθονήσῃς ἀλλ' ἐπίδειξον. Ἀλλ', **ὦ Σώκρατες**, ἔφη, οὐ φθονήσω· ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, ὡς πρεσβύτερος νεωτέροις, μῦθον λέγων ἐπιδείξω ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών; (…) Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν.

[14] First-pair part or FPP is in CA the first turn of an adjacency pair (Schegloff & Sacks 1973), which is defined as the minimal unit of a sequence and consists of two turns uttered by two different interlocutors, placed in adjacency in a quite fixed order in which one can identify types of pair, such as summon-answer, greeting-greeting, invitation-acceptance/declination, etc. (Stivers 2013: 191-193).

> I therefore, Protagoras, in view of these facts, believe that virtue is not teachable but when I hear you speak thus, I am swayed over, and suppose there is something in what you say, because I consider you to have gained experience in many things and to have learnt many, besides finding out some for yourself. So if you can demonstrate to us more explicitly that virtue is teachable, do not grudge us your demonstration No, Socrates, he said, I will not grudge it you: but shall I, as an old man speaking to his juniors, put my demonstration in the form of a fable, or of a regular exposition? (...) Well then, he said, I fancy the more agreeable way is for me to tell you a fable[15].

From the CA perspective, Protagoras' turn is a complex one, since it contains two different moves: a *second-pair part*, Ἀλλ', ὦ Σώκρατες οὐ φθονήσω, uttered in response to the previous intervention and, in addition, the proper *story preface*, the *first-pair part*, an offer here expressed as a question ἀλλὰ πότερον ὑμῖν, (...) ἢ λόγῳ διεξελθών;, then insisting after the main narrator's interruption: δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι, ἔφη, χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν; this is a case of sequence enjambement. Accordingly, the form of treatment ὦ Σώκρατες would not be counted among the interaction devices in monologic sequences, because it is responding to a previous stretch. Interestingly, all the myths studied come in *second-pair parts*, usually after a request as *first-pair part*.

The tendency to use vocatives when introducing direct speech seems to be not so strong (*cf. Prt.* 320d). Some narratives do not even contain direct speech (*Phdr.* 259b-259e or *Symp.* 203b-204c). There are other devices that make up for the absence of a vocative in direct speech. In this case, Socrates glosses the speech he is about to reproduce and explicitly indicates who the speaker and the hearer are beforehand and then adds the subject to the parenthetical speech verb (underlined):

(15) *Prtg* 322c (Socrates-Protagoras): <u>ἐρωτᾷ οὖν Ἑρμῆς Δία</u> τίνα οὖν τρόπον δοίη δίκην καὶ αἰδῶ ἀνθρώποις· "Πότερον ὡς αἱ τέχναι νενέμηνται, οὕτω καὶ ταύτας νείμω; νενέμηνται δὲ ὧδε· εἷς ἔχων ἰατρικὴν πολλοῖς ἱκανὸς ἰδιώταις, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι δημιουργοί· καὶ δίκην δὴ καὶ αἰδῶ οὕτω θῶ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ ἐπὶ πάντας νείμω;" "Ἐπὶ πάντας," <u>ἔφη ὁ Ζεύς</u>, "καὶ (...)".

> Then Hermes asked Zeus in what manner then was he to give men right and respect: "Am I to deal them out as the arts have been dealt? That dealing was done in such wise that one man possessing medical art is able to treat many ordinary men, and so with the other craftsmen. Am I to place among men right and respect in this way also, or deal them out to all?" "To all," replied Zeus; "let all (...)".

Also, vocatives in direct speech may hold the insert position, instead of the left periphery, which is the trend observed for Euripides, *vid. supra* (8)-(14). The following is an example of hypothetical narrative, «(...) perhaps the most characteristically philosophical. It is the imaginative projection of a line of argument» (Morgan 2004: 375):

(16) *Symp.* 192d (Hephaestus-lovers) καὶ εἰ αὐτοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ κατακειμένοις ἐπιστὰς ὁ Ἥφαιστος, ἔχων τὰ ὄργανα, ἔροιτο· "Τί ἔσθ' ὃ βούλεσθε, **ὦ ἄνθρωποι**, ὑμῖν παρ' ἀλλήλων γενέσθαι;"

> And if Hephaestus were to stand over them as they lie together his tools at the ready and ask: "What is it, you people, that you want for yourselves from each other?".

In general, direct speech is placed by the narrator on the *peak* of the narration (when Zeus refers the frauds in the process on the dead on *Gorg.* 523c-d; when Zeus commands Hermes to allot the virtues to men on *Prt.* 322c; or when Theuth defends that letters are a remedy for the mind and memory on *Phdr.* 274e), or either on the *resolution* (the assignation of functions to three different judges in the afterlife on *Gorg.* 523d-524a; the law Zeus establishes to preserve virtue

[15] It should be remarked that this is the closure of an argumentative turn by Socrates and, unsurprisingly, he places a vocative ὦ Πρωταγόρα towards the end of his intervention, after switching to the resumptive assertion on himself: ἐγὼ οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα. The whole wording comes off as being very contrastive, and rightfully so, given the eristic nature of the dialogue.

in the city on *Prt.* 322d; king Thamous refutation on *Phdr.* 274e-275b; or Zeus' decision to cut the men in half to tame their madness on *Symp.* 190c-d). Exceptionally, they may appear on the opening *orientation* of the story (*Prt.* 320d when Epimetheus tells Prometheus that he will do the assignation) or on less typical places, such as the end of Aristophanes' narration on *Symp.* 192d, when Hephaestus questions the lovers on the nature of their desire, *cf.* (17). One cannot overlook the fact that vocatives marking the beginning of direct speech are only found on *Phdr.* 274e and *Phdr.* 274e-275b, *i.e.*, the conversation between Theuth and king Thamous:

(17) *Phdr.* 274e-275b (Theuth-Thamous): πολλὰ μὲν δὴ περὶ ἑκάστης τῆς τέχνης ἐπ' ἀμφότερα Θαμοῦν τῷ Θεὺθ λέγεται ἀποφήνασθαι, ἃ λόγος πολὺς ἂν εἴη διελθεῖν· ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἐπὶ τοῖς γράμμασιν ἦν, "Τοῦτο δέ, **ὦ βασιλεῦ**, τὸ μάθημα," ἔφη ὁ Θεύθ, "σοφωτέρους Αἰγυπτίους καὶ μνημονικωτέρους παρέξει· μνήμης τε γὰρ καὶ σοφίας φάρμακον ηὑρέθη." ὁ δ' εἶπεν· "**Ὦ τεχνικώτατε Θεύθ**, ἄλλος μὲν τεκεῖν δυνατὸς τὰ τέχνης, ἄλλος δὲ κρῖναι τίν' ἔχει μοῖραν βλάβης τε καὶ ὠφελίας τοῖς μέλλουσι χρῆσθαι· καὶ νῦν σύ, πατὴρ ὢν γραμμάτων, δι' εὔνοιαν τοὐναντίον εἶπες ἢ δύναται.

It is said that Thamous expressed himself at length about each art to Theuth on both sides, which would take a long discussion to go through in detail. But when it was on the subject of letters: "But this," said Theuth, "my king, is the study that will make the Egyptians wiser and improve their memory: for what has been discovered is a drug to enhance memory and wisdom." But the other replied: "My most artful Theuth, one man is able to give birth to the elements of an art, but it takes another to judge what measure of harm and benefit it has for those who are planning to use it. And now you, being the father of letters, through your affection for them have stated the opposite of their capabilities.

The following is one of the most evident differences between direct speech usage in Euripides and Plato: the former preferred to make the characters speak in the *complication* of the story, whereas the latter preferred to give voice to the characters in the *peak* of the narrative.

As for the rest of the narration, exactly like in messenger speeches, vocatives usually pop up in *evaluations* or *codas*:

(18) *Symp.* 193d-e (Aristophanes-Eryximachus): Οὗτος, ἔφη, **ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε**, ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐστὶ περὶ Ἔρωτος, ἀλλοῖος ἢ ὁ σός. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐδεήθην σου, μὴ κωμῳδήσῃς αὐτόν, ἵνα καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀκούσωμεν τί ἕκαστος ἐρεῖ, μᾶλλον δὲ τί ἑκάτερος· Ἀγάθων γὰρ καὶ Σωκράτης λοιποί.

This, Eryximachus, he said, is my speech about Love, of a different kind from yours. Therefore, as I asked you, don't make fun it in order that we may hear what each of those who are left will say, or rather what each of the two will say. For Agathon and Socrates are the ones left.

Particles, like οὖν in (14), or the anaphorics in (17)-(20) may be woven into resumptive paragraphs or transitional ones, that usually "return home", that is, go back to the argumentative conversation taking place in the big frame, where the narration of the myth has been introduced as an example. The narrator is coming to the main point of the story and the vocatives serve an attention-getter function. Something remarkable about these examples of vocatives coming up in the *codas* or *evaluations* is that none of them (at least the ones extracted from the platonic texts) pivots on any other linguistic element marked in the second person singular, as it is usually the case for parentheticals or theticals[16], *cf.* (2)- (7). As for (18), one could argue that in the utterance: Οὗτος, ἔφη, ὦ Ἐρυξίμαχε, ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος ἐστὶ περὶ Ἔρωτος, ἀλλοῖος ἢ ὁ σός, the last appositive structure,

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[16] Theticals are information units that contrast with the rest of the utterance in that they display the following properties: a) they are syntactically independent, b) they are prosodically set off from the utterance, c) their meaning is "non-restrictive", d) they tend to be positionally mobile and e) their internal structure is built on principles of the sentence grammar but can be elliptic. Formulae of social exchange, vocatives and interjections, amongst others, fall under the category of formulaic theticals, (Kaltenböck, Heine & Kuteva 2011: 857).

the only section containing an element coded in the second person singular ὁ σός, is in fact peripheral to the rest of the assertion.

In the following extract, Socrates culminates the narration going back to the dimension of the Discourse-Now (*coda*) by persisting on the truthfulness of the story he just told and then goes on to comment on the relevance and usefulness of the myth (*evaluation*). We should not overlook the anaphoric ταῦτα, referring to the previous myth told and the mechanism of "return home":

(19) *Gorg.* 524a-c (Socrates-Callicles): Ταῦτ᾽ ἔστιν, **ὦ Καλλίκλεις**, ἃ ἐγὼ ἀκηκοὼς πιστεύω ἀληθῆ εἶναι· καὶ ἐκ τούτων τῶν λόγων τοιόνδε τι λογίζομαι συμβαίνειν. ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὤν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλοιν·(…).

This, Callicles, is what I have heard and believe to be true; and from these stories, on my reckoning, we must draw some such moral as this: death, as it seems to me, is actually nothing but the disconnection of two things, the soul and the body, from each other (…).

Attending to the parameter of *immersion*, Fossi (2024: 184-185) suggests that the explicit interaction between Socrates and Callicles works on two narrative levels: first of all, it draws Callicles' (secondary narratee) attention towards the main point of the discussion and, secondly, it assists the primary narratee (reader of the Platonic work) to follow the exposition and take the cue that Plato is signalling the conclusion of the narration.

When Protagoras finishes telling his story, he ties back to the ample topic they were previously discussing, the exercise of politic virtue:

(20) *Prt.* 322d-323a (Protagoras -Socrates): οὕτω δή, **ὦ Σώκρατες**, καὶ διὰ ταῦτα οἵ τε ἄλλοι καὶ Ἀθηναῖοι, ὅταν μὲν περὶ ἀρετῆς τεκτονικῆς ᾖ λόγος ἢ ἄλλης τινὸς δημιουργικῆς, ὀλίγοις οἴονται μετεῖναι συμβουλῆς, καὶ ἐάν τις ἐκτὸς ὢν τῶν ὀλίγων συμβουλεύῃ, οὐκ ἀνέχονται, ὡς σὺ φῄς – εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι – (…). αὕτη, **ὦ Σώκρατες**, τούτου αἰτία.

Hence it comes about, Socrates, that people in cities, and especially in Athens, consider it the concern of a few to advise on cases of artistic excellence or good craftsmanship, and if anyone outside the few gives advice they disallow it, as you say, and not without reason, as I think: (…). This, Socrates, is the explanation of it.

Noteworthy are the anaphoric adverb οὕτω and demonstrative διὰ ταῦτα[17]. Then Protagoras insists on the general lines of his opinion, illustrated by the myth he just told. He is very adamant and concludes with another categorical sentence: αὕτη, ὦ Σώκρατες, τούτου αἰτία, where the vocative holds an insert position between the subject and the nominal predicate or, if we refer to information units, the focus and the topic, respectively. He returns to the argumentative tone and puts forth a new piece of argumentation for Socrates: τόδε αὖ λαβὲ τεκμήριον.

6. Conclusions and future directions

The study has shown that there is in fact a pattern of vocative use in monological narrated texts. In this respect, they tend to appear in the "marginal" parts of the narrative, namely *abstract* in the beginning and *codas* and *evaluations* in the ending. This is in keeping with the fact that in these sections the narrator switches back from the dimension of the Story-Now to the dimension of the Discourse-Now. Vocatives are additionally deployed by the narrator when introducing direct speech. There are substantial differences between Euripides and Plato in this regard: there is much less profusion of vocatives in the Platonic myths, and they tend to appear in the *peak* part of the story, whereas Euripidean messengers tend to insert direct speech in the *complication* part

[17] Ruiz Yamuza (1986: 25-26) flags these anaphoric expressions as transitional devices pulling from the mythic narration back to Protagoras' discourse. In her outstanding work, she highlighted the importance of these transitional formulas to demarcate the extent of the mythical narration. Together with the absence of dialogue, one can easily tell where the full-fledged narration ends and the final appendix or ἐπιμυθίον begins (1986: 20-21).

of the story, almost always incorporating vocatives. CA framework and the notion of return-home have proved instrumental in the analysis of the interactionally arrived at ends of *storytelling*. In fact, these vocatives may be interpreted as marking the transition from *storytelling* back to the main interactional frame governed by adjacency-pairs, *cf.* (5), (6), (7), (18), (19), (20). As such, vocatives might also be considered in relation to turn-allocation techniques, particularly "current-selects-next," in cases where the end of the narrative functions as the first pair-part. Plato seems to make use of these devices more than Euripides, perhaps because the exit of the messenger in tragedy is more conventional, and Platonic characters must continue with their "informal" conversations after the narrations.

Internal narrators (Euripidean messengers) tend to show interest in letting their narratee know how important a role they played in the reported event. To do so, they insert relatively more vocatives in the *codas* than external Platonic narrators do. These, on the other hand, boast skilful ways to resume the discussion taking place before the embedded mythical narration.

The conclusions reached in this paper have a limited scope: they only apply to the authors and types of text studied. Other scholars (Allan 2022) have observed that, for instance, in the narrative parts of classical oratory, the narrator utilises far more vocatives. This is the case for Lysias 1. This study must be contrasted in the near future with another one that focuses on vocative use in non-narrative parts of these tragedies and Platonic dialogues, in more argumentative texts, to provide a better understanding of the patterns of vocative use in different types of texts.

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