Intentional Structure and Free Phantasy in Edmund Husserl’s Ideas I
Abstract
This paper carries out a critical analysis of the methodological role played by free phantasy in
the first book of Ideas. Putting forward the close relation between consciousness modalization and the
noetic-noematic structure of intentional acts, the aim is to demonstrate the complementarity between
the methods of eidetic and phenomenological reductions for Husserl’s project of a phenomenological
critique of knowledge. By this, it will be stressed the decisive impact that the phantasy performance had
for the transcendental turn of phenomenology
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