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Suárez y algunos escotistas barrocos sobre la autoconciencia perceptual

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Resumen. Este artículo trata la cuestión de la autoconciencia sensible, específicamente la cuestión de si una teoría plausible de la autopercepción sensible que requiere sensaciones externas como objetos implica que se necesiten a su vez especies sensibles que representen esos actos. Introduciré en primer término dos perspectivas distintas de Aristóteles, tomadas de *Sobre el alma* y *Del sueño y la vigilia* (las que definen el *status quaestionis* escolástico). En segundo lugar trataré los enfoques de Francisco Suárez (1548-1617), Bartolomeo Mastri (1602-1673) y Bonaventura Belluto (1600-1676), y Hugo McCaghwell (1571-1626). Mostraré primero que la postura de Suárez –que no puede corroborarse con los textos de Escoto– es rechazada por Mastri/Belluto y por McCaghwell en una de sus conclusiones. Después argüiré que la segunda conclusión de McCaghwell debe ser tenida por suareciana. Esto muestra que la filosofía de la percepción de Suárez fue recibida con aprobación también por los escotistas del s. XVII.

Palabras Clave: Autoconciencia sensible, sentidos externos, sentido común, Suárez, Mastri y Belluto, McCaghwell, Escoto.

[en] Suárez and Some Baroque Scotists on the Perceptual Self-Awareness

Abstract. In this article I deal with the topic of perceptual self-awareness, focusing on whether a plausible account of sensory self-perception having exterior sensations as its objects requires sensible species representing these acts. I first introduce Aristotle's two distinct views from *On the Soul* and *On Sleep and Waking* as defining the scholastic *status quaestionis*, then bring in Francisco Suárez's (1548–1617), Bartholomeo Mastri's (1602–1673) and Bonaventura Belluto's (1600–1676), and Hugh McCaghwell's (1571–1626) accounts. I show, first, that Suárez's view, which cannot be substantiated by Scotus's *littera*, is rejected by Mastri/Belluto and by McCaghwell in one of his conclusions. Second, I argue that McCaghwell's second tenet is to be assessed as Suarezian. This shows that Suárez's philosophy of perception was positively received also by seventeenth-century Scotists.

Keywords: Perceptual self-awareness, external senses, common sense, Suárez, Mastri and Belluto, McCaghwell, Scotus.

Sumario. 1. Introduction. 2. Aristotle's Doctrinal Dichotomy and the Second Scholastics' Common Assumptions. 3. The Mechanism of the Interior Sense's Cognition of External Acts. 3.1. Suárez. 3.2. Mastri/Belluto. 3.3. McCaghwell. 4. Conclusions: Scotus, Suárez, and Baroque Scotists

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1. Introduction

While our knowledge of the scholastic influences on Francisco Suárez's cognitive theory is quite extensive, less is known about the immediate impact of his epis-

temology on seventeenth-century scholasticism.² This holds especially for the reception of his ideas among Baroque Scotists. In this paper, on the example of the theories of the perceptual self-awareness³ developed by the Italian Conventuals Bartholomeo Mastri (1602–

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³ The topic of (self-)consciousness in the sensory arena has been recently described as "an unexplored territory." For this, see Therese S. Cory, "Consciousness," in R. Cross, J.T. Paasch (eds.), *The Routledge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, New York: Routledge, 2021, 249–262, at 249.

1673) and Bonaventura Belluto (1600–1676) and by the Irish Observant Hugh McCaghwell (1571–1626),⁴ I will show that the Scotists' relation to Suárez's doctrine is far from being uniform. While they share the assumption that the sentient soul via its powers can apprehend only the powers' acts, and not the powers themselves, habits and the soul (apprehension of these is reserved to the intellect that as an immaterial power is the only perfectly reflexive capacity), they differ in their replies to the question *how* these acts are apprehended. To account for this sensory self-cognition, must a proper species representing these acts be posited in the common sense⁵ in addition to the species representing the external qualities, or not?

I will proceed in three steps. First, I will outline Aristotle's two views of the perceptual self-consciousness, which sets the basic context of the Second scholastic debate. I will put forward two doctrinal agreements shared by our scholastics based on these two positions. Second, I will lay out Suárez's, Mastri/Belluto's, and McCaghwell's views of the interior sense's perception of the exterior sensations with a focus on the issue of the (non) existence of the species representing these acts. Third, in the conclusion I will claim that while Mastri/Belluto's view and one of McCaghwell's two tenets are in line with Scotus's doctrine as formulated in his *Quaestiones super tertium De anima*, q. 9 and *Ord. IV*, dist. 45, q. 3, the Irish Observant's second tenet can be evaluated as fully Suarezian.

⁴ For a detailed bio-bibliography of Mastri (and briefly also of Belluto), see Marco Forlivesi *Scotistarum princeps. Bartolomeo Mastri (1602–1673) e il suo tempo*, Padova: Centro studi antoniani, 2002. McCaghwell is less known. He was an Irish Observant born in 1571 in Downpatrick, County Down, Ireland. In 1603 or at the beginning of 1604 he received the Franciscan habit at the Convent of San Francisco in Salamanca, where he studied under the direction of the Spanish Scotist Francisco de Herrera (1551–1609). In Salamanca he had the opportunity to become familiar with Suárez's philosophy and with the Thomist tradition. Later he was sent to Louvain to the newly established Saint Anthony's College, where he taught theology for many years. In 1623 he was called to Rome to the Convent of Saint Mary in Ara Coeli. In 1626 Pope Urban VIII (pontificate 1623–1644) appointed him Archbishop of Armagh in Ireland. He died several months after his episcopal consecration. He is buried in the College of St. Isidor in Rome, near Luke Wadding (1588–1657) and Antony Hickey (1586–1641). McCaghwell is known as a close collaborator of Wadding (and Hickey) on his famous edition of Duns Scotus's *Opera omnia* (1639). Importantly, in 1625 McCaghwell published *Annotationes et Supplementum ad Scoti Quaestiones in libros De anima*, which were included in the second volume of Wadding's edition (published in 1639). Both are also included in the third volume of the 1891 Vivès edition. For a brief note about his life, see Michael Dunne, "Aodh Mac Aingil (Hugh Cavellus, 1571–1626) on Doubt, Evidence and Certitude," in S. Nolan (ed.), *Maynooth Philosophical Papers*, Issue 5 (2008), Maynooth: Department of Philosophy, National University of Ireland, Maynooth, 2009, 1–8, at 1–2; for a more detailed exposition, see Cathaldus Giblin OFM, "Hugh McCaghwell, OFM, Archbishop of Armagh (+ 1626): Aspects of His Life," *Seanchas Ardmhacha: Journal of the Armagh Diocesan Historical Society* 11/2 (1985), 258–290.

⁵ Traditionally, this perceptual self-awareness was attributed to the common sense as its second main cognitive function, alongside the discrimination of the various sensibles coming from distinct sensory modalities. For this, see, for instance, Ioannis Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super II et III De anima* (Op. Ph. V), edited by C. Bazán, K. Emery, R. Green, T. Noone, R. Plevano, A. Traver, Washington, D.C., St. Bonaventure University, St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006, q. 9, 69–78.

2. Aristotle's Doctrinal Dichotomy and the Second Scholastics' Common Assumptions

Although the first object of sense perception in the Peripatetic tradition is an external sensible quality, such as colour, sound, etc., and the powers of sight, hearing, etc., are specified by them, exteroceptual perception is not all there is to the external senses' cognition for Aristotelians. Besides their being directed to the outside, the senses are also "bent to on themselves." We have sensations not only of objects seen "from outside" but, however imperfect and implicit, also of those noticed "from within," from a first-person perspective. Aristotle brought attention to this: "[...] it is through sense that we are aware that we are seeing or hearing [...]."⁶ Considering the issue of how this self-perception originates, in the *De anima* he formulates this dilemma: "[I]t must be either by sight that we are aware of seeing, or by some sense other than sight."⁷ He then introduces two arguments against the second horn of the dilemma, which posits a separate internal monitoring capacity. According to the first reasoning, which does not seem to be much convincing, if an additional power were perceptive of this seeing, this power would have to be sentient of both the act and the object. If this were the case, we would get an implausible duplication of the cognitive function. A red colour would have to be perceived by both the visual power and the common sense.⁸ On the

⁶ Aristotle, *On the Soul*, III.2, 425b11, in J. Barnes (ed.), *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, The Revised Oxford Translation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995, 677. Given that for Aristotle perception is nothing else than a passive undergoing of a change (*On the Soul*, II.12, 424b17–8, 675): "What is smelling more than such an affection by what is odorous?", in *Physics* VII.2, 244b15–245a1, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, 411, the Stagirate says that "[...] the inanimate is unconscious of being affected, whereas the animate is conscious of it [...]."

⁷ *On the Soul*, III.2, 425b12–13, 677. This dilemma's articulation is based on what has been called the "capacity reading," according to which Aristotle's argument aims to answer the question by which *capacity* we perceive that we are seeing. For this exposition of Aristotle's passage, backed by the Oxford translation, to which I refer, see Pavel Gregoric, "Perceiving That We Are Not Seeing and Hearing," in P. Gregoric and J. L. Fink (eds.), *Encounters with Aristotelian Philosophy of Mind*, New York/London: Routledge, 2021, 119–137; for a distinct interpretation called the "activity reading," according to which Aristotle aims to determine through which *act* we perceive that we are seeing (by the very act of seeing, or by some further act?) since the Greek *αἰσθησις* can mean also the activity of this capacity, see Victor Caston, "Aristotle on Consciousness," *Mind* 111/444 (October 2002), 751–815, at 761–762. In my presentation of Aristotle's view, I cannot do justice to all their appealing comments on the Stagirate's passage. In my formulation of the *status quaestionis* I am guided by Suárez who determines the issue of perceptual awareness in two main questions: Which sensory powers perceive these exterior acts? And how are they perceived? For Suárez's reading, according to which Aristotle oscillates between two different views in his reply to the first question, see Francisco Suárez, *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima (= CDA)*, vol. 2, edited by S. Castellote, Madrid: Editorial labor, 1981, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 3, 504: "Aristoteles vero in hac re dubius videtur, nam *De somno et Vigilia*, cap. 2, aperte confirmat secundam opinionem D. Thomae [viz. only the interior sense can perceive the external senses' operations], tamen, hic [De anima], lib. 3, cap. 2, insinuat primam [the external senses themselves can perceive their own acts], nam quaestionem disputat, an sensus exterior percipiat suam operationem, et pro utraque parte arguit, et postea solvit argumenta pro parte negativa. Unde relinquit quaestionem quasi decisam pro parte affirmativa."

⁸ If this duplication were to be implausible because colour is the proper object of sight and cannot be the object of any other faculty, then, clearly, this argument would make it impossible to endorse any

second (more cogent) argument, if this extra power were posited, an infinite regress of higher-order acts would result. If a lower-order act became conscious only due to a higher-order act that is intentionally directed to the first act, this second-order act would turn out to be conscious only in the same way, namely due to a third-order act, etc. The result would be *either* an infinite regress in these acts, or it would be necessary to stop at some level and say that at this point the sensory act is aware of itself, is conscious “from within.” In the *De anima* Aristotle suggests that it is best to stop at the first level, namely at the level of the visual power. On this view, sight will be perceptive of both colours and its acts at the same time.⁹ This conclusion is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement that “we discern darkness and light by vision.”¹⁰ By perceiving darkness or by perceiving that we are not seeing anything we are aware that our sight is not under operation. Without light and illumination, no visual perception is possible. However, such perception of non-operation assumes an awareness of the opposite, sc. of operation. But how can the power of sight be aware of its acts if its proper object is only colour? Some lines below Aristotle explains. The reason is that the operation or what it sees is “coloured.” An act of seeing will get intentionally coloured through the reception of an external form of colour.¹¹

Despite this *De anima* position, Aristotle comes with a different view in his *On Sleep and Waking*:

Now, since every sense has something special and also something common; special, as, e.g., seeing is to the sense of sight, hearing to the auditory sense, and so on with the other senses severally; while all are accompanied by a common power, in virtue whereof a person perceives that he sees or hears (for, assuredly, it is not by *sight* that one sees that he sees [...])¹²

Since every sense has its special function and object, by which it is individuated and distinguished from the others, the perceptual self-awareness, as this text from *On Sleep and Waking* states, cannot be attributed to the external senses. It should be rather ascribed to a distinct power, sc. to the common sense, or to “a part common

to all the organs of the sense.”¹³ While the objects of the external sensory modalities are the external qualities, the common sense’s object must be (also) the exterior sensations.

This doctrinal dichotomy framed the scholastic controversy over the proximate principle (power) generating this self-perception, and the debate about the nature and the manner of the origin of this introspective consciousness. Exegetes have raised questions as to how these two theories of Aristotle are related. Are they compatible, or inconsistent? Not only Aristotle but also Aquinas espoused both theories in various *loci* of his *Opera omnia*,¹⁴ and much exegetical effort has been devoted to render his formulations consistent.¹⁵

The Second scholastics regarded both tenets as points of departure in their debate. These two views led them to posit two distinct kinds of the perceptual self-awareness. They agree that an act can be cognized (a) properly through the *formal* reflection, i.e., intentionally as the object (*quod*) of a higher-order act, mostly associated with a higher-order power, such as the common sense or the intellect. A first-order act representing an apple can be intentionally apprehended through a distinct second-order act that reflexively turns to the lower-order act. If the first-order act is apprehended in this way, it is known expressly and directly in a designated act (*in actu signato*). This kind of proper reflexivity has a counterpart in the contemporary philosophy of mind. It is called ‘higher-order consciousness’ (HOC). A perceptual act that objectively terminates in an apple can be (b) also cognized improperly, implicitly, and indirectly

¹³ *Ibid.*, 455a19–20, 723.

¹⁴ Aristotle’s two views are mirrored in Aquinas who wavered between these two positions at various points of his career. In the early III *In Super Sent.*, d. 23, q. 1, art. 2, ad 3 [URL: <https://www.corpusth-omisticum.org/snp3023.html>] Aquinas says: “Hoc autem non potest esse ita quod aliqua potentia utens organo corporali reflectatur super proprium actum, quia oportet quod instrumentum quo cognoscit se cognoscere, caderet medium inter ipsam potentiam et instrumentum quo primo cognoscebat. Sed una potentia utens organo corporali potest cognoscere actum alterius potentiae, in quantum impressio inferioris potentiae redundat in superiorem, sicut *sensu communi* cognoscimus visum videre” [italics mine]. In *STh. I*, q. 78, art. 4, ad 2, vol. 5, Rome: ed. Leonina, 1889, 256 he defends a similar view: “[...] a quo [the common sense] etiam percipiuntur intentiones sensuum, sicut cum aliquis videt se videre. Hoc enim non potest fieri per sensum proprium, qui non cognoscit nisi formam sensibilis a quo immutatur; in qua immutatione perficitur visio, et ex qua immutatione sequitur alia immutatio in *sensu communi*, qui visionem percipit” [italics mine]. However, for the opposite view, see *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, t. 22, vol. 1, fasc. 2, qq. 1–7, Rome: ed. Leonina, 1970, q. 1, art. 9, 29: “[...] quamvis enim *sensus* cognoscat se sentire, non tamen cognoscit naturam suam, et per consequens nec naturam *sui actus*, nec proportionem eius ad res, et ita nec veritatem eius” [italics mine]; *Quaestiones disputatae de Veritate*, t. 22, vol. 2, fasc. 1, Rome: ed. Leonina, 1970, q. 10, art. 9, 328: “[...] sicut videmus quod *visus* primo dirigitur in colorem, sed in actum visionis suae non dirigitur nisi per quandam reditorem dum videndo colorem *videt se videre*” [italics mine].

¹⁵ For an alert to this Aquinas’s doctrinal inconsistency, see Cory, “Consciousness,” 253. Dominik Perler has recently argued that in these two theories Aquinas (and Aristotle) aim to explain two distinct mental phenomena. While one is “Vigilanzbewusstsein” (awareness of wakefulness), the other is “Aufmerksamkeitsbewusstsein” (awareness of attention). While the former is a subliminal and non-selective kind of awareness, for which no higher-order act is necessary, the latter is an explicit attention and involves a higher-order operation. For this, see Dominik Perler, *Eine Person sein. Philosophische Debatten im Spätmittelalter*, Philosophische Abhandlungen, Band 119, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2020, 172–173.

interior sense. For scholastics this duplication was not a problem, though: While the object of each external sense is limited to its proper sensibles, the interior senses can cognize all the sensibles coming from all the modalities. In *Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis de anima* (= *CDA*), vol. 3, edited by S. Castellote, Madrid: Fundación Xavier Zubiri, 1991, disp. 8, q. 2, n. 1, 46, Suárez states that “Obiectum ergo istius sensus [the internal sense] est omne sensibile quod sensu externo percipitur.”

⁹ *On the Soul*, III.2, 425b13–18, 677: “But the sense that gives us this new sensation must perceive both sight and its object, viz. colour: so that either there will be two senses both percipient of the same sensible object, or the sense must be percipient of itself. Further, even if the sense which perceives sight were different from sight, we must either fall into an infinite regress, or we must somewhere assume a sense which is aware of itself. If so, we ought to do this in the first case.”

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 425b21–22, 677.

¹¹ By saying that we perceive that we are seeing and we are hearing, Aristotle *ipso facto* suggests that this self-cognition is (implicitly) self-referential and evinces the subjective feature of “ownness.”

¹² Aristotle, *On Sleep and Waking*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ch. 2, 455a13–17, 723.

in an exercised act (*in actu exercito*). It can be immediately apprehended by the same first-order act as a ‘quo’ through which an external object is apprehended. When I perceive an apple I am indirectly and experientially aware also of this act, through which I see the apple. In contemporary philosophy, this manner of self-awareness is called ‘same-order consciousness’ (SOC).¹⁶

Accepting this distinction, Suárez, Matri/Belluto, and McCaghwell, first, in line with the intention of Aristotle’s *De anima*, agree that the external senses are aware of their acts by means of SOC.¹⁷ Sometimes they call this SOC ‘virtual reflection’ since the act has a *virtus* to produce the cognition of both an external object and itself.¹⁸ This kind of awareness must be a part of the visual experience since these acts are vital operations through which we attend to the objects known. Second, all authors endorse a Neoplatonic axiom according to which no extended thing can as a whole revert upon itself as a whole, for only a single part can be reverted to another part.¹⁹ In line with this premise, they agree that no external sense can have HOC of its present act. They apply this principle to both the external senses and the interior sense, even though in Matri/Belluto and in one of McCaghwell’s two views this principle as applied to the latter is valid only with a qualification.

3. The Mechanism of the Interior Sense’s Cognition of External Acts

Despite these agreements, an important doctrinal difference can be detected in Suárez’s, Matri/Belluto’s, and

McCaghwell’s accounts of the mechanism of the interior sense’s cognition of external acts. This difference concerns the query whether explaining this self-awareness necessarily assumes the existence of a proper species of the acts, or not.

3.1. Suárez

In his first two conclusions in *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 4, devoted to the topic of the sensory self-awareness, Suárez, following the aforesaid Neoplatonic axiom, manifests his negative attitude to the *factum* of the higher-order (proper) sensory self-awareness.²⁰ In his first upshot, he affirms that “No sense power can properly and expressly (in a distinct act) cognize its own act.”²¹ This holds for both the external senses and the interior sense.²² This cognition exceeds the capacity of material powers of which the object is limited and cannot include sensations. In the second conclusion, then, Suárez notes that “No sense through its own act can perceive an act of a distinct sense through its sensible species and as part of its proper object.”²³ As we will see in greater detail below, with this upshot he explicitly rejects Scotus’s view, according to which the interior sense apprehends and remembers the acts of the external senses because these acts imprint their proper species to the interior sense.²⁴ Suárez insists that the vision of white colour does not impress its proper species to the interior sense. He argues that if it did imprint it, two species would have to inhere in the same power, one representing the white colour, the other the act. Consequently, two acts would have to be produced by the sense power at the same time. Although he deems the simultaneous existence of two inherent species and two acts possible,²⁵ it is not in harmony with our experience and with the interior sense’s proper mode of operating. Epistemologically speaking, this view is also too optimistic. If a distinct act intentionally tending to a first-order act were produced, a proper and distinct concept explicating the quiddity of this act would necessarily result. This consequence jars

¹⁶ For this distinction, see Suárez, *CDA*, vol. 2, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 2, 502–504; Bartholomew Matri, *Disputationes theologicae in Primum librum Sententiarum*, Venice: Balleoni, 1719, disp. 6, q. 9, art. 2, n. 266, 369; Hugo Cavellus, *Quaestiones in libros De anima*, Paris: Vivès, vol. 3, 1891, q. 9, Conclusio I, n. 11, 519. For the contemporary debate about these two kinds of consciousness, see, e.g., Uriah Kriegel, “The Same-Order Monitoring Theory of Consciousness. Second Version,” *Synthesis Philosophica*, 22/2 (2007), 361–384.

¹⁷ See below the quotes from their *opera*.

¹⁸ See Francisco Suárez, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3: De opere sex dierum. Tractatus De anima, Paris: Vivès, 1856, book 3, ch. 11, n. 1, 652–653; Suárez, *Opera omnia*, vol. 25: *Disputationes metaphysicae* (=DM), vol. 1, Paris: Vivès, 1861, disp. 25, s. 1, n. 39, 909–910. For the term ‘virtual reflection’ as intrinsic to the will’s elicited act, see also Suárez, *Opera omnia*, vol. 4: *De voluntario et involuntario*, Paris: Vivès, 1856, disp. 1, s. 1, nn. 5–6, 160–161. In his paper “Virtual Reflection: Antoine Arnauld on Descartes’ Concept of Conscientia,” *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 28/4 (2020), 714–773, at 724–725, Daniel Schmal has recently proposed an interesting explanation of this phrase. He argues that the expression ‘reflexio virtualis’ is to be understood as related to the notion of virtual distinction, which is the distinction between two or more perfections (grades) within a single thing. It is by virtue of virtually distinct perfections that a thing that is *realiter* not structured, such as the Sun, can produce two or three really distinct effects, such as heating, illuminating, and drying. Accordingly, it is due to the virtually distinct perfections inherent in the first-order act that the act can deliver us information not only about the external objects but also about itself.

¹⁹ This axiom can be found in Proclus’s *The Elements of Theology*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963, Proposition 15, 17–19: “For it is not in the nature of any body to revert upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is conjoined with that upon which it reverts: hence it is evident that every part of a body reverted upon itself must be conjoined with every other part—since self-reversion is precisely the case in which the reverted subject and that upon which it has reverted become identical. But this is impossible for a body, and universally for any divisible substance [...]”

²⁰ For an analysis of Suárez’s perceptual self-awareness (without a comparison to Scotus, though), see Dominik Perler, “Suárez on Consciousness,” *Vivarium*, 52/3–4 (2014), 261–286, at 264–273; cf. also Daniel Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism: Francisco Suárez’s Philosophy of Perception*, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol. 28, Cham: Springer, 2021, 114–121.

²¹ Suárez, *CDA*, vol. 2, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 4, 504: “Nulla potentia sensitiva cognoscit proprie et actu distincto suam propriam operationem.” Unless otherwise stated, all the translations from Latin are mine.

²² All the authors discussed in this paper endorse the theory of the single interior sense exercising various cognitive functions. See Bartholomeo Matri, Bonaventura Belluto, *Philosophiae ad mentem Scoti cursus integer*, vol. 3 (ed. Pezzana, Venice 1727), *In libros de anima* (henceforth: *In DA*), disp. 5, q. 8, art. 5, 124–126; Hugo Cavellus, *Quaestiones in libros De anima*, q. 9, Conclusio III, n. 14, 521–522; Suárez, *CDA*, vol. 3, disp. 8, q. 1, n. 21, 40.

²³ *Ibid.*, n. 6, 508: “Nullus sensus potest proprio actu percipere actum alterius sensus per propriam illius speciem, et tamquam partem proprii obiecti.”

²⁴ In *ibid.*, n. 3, 504 Suárez introduces Scotus’s theory as follows: “Et Scotus, in 4, d. 45, q. 3, apertius ait quod sensatio externa potest imprimere speciem sui sensui interiori, immo quod ipse sensus interior potest cognoscere actum suum et memorari illius.”

²⁵ *CDA*, vol. 2, disp. 5, q. 7, n. 6, 442: “Non repugnat unam potentiam cognoscitivam habere simul duos actus cognoscendi, sive res cognitae cognoscantur per modum unius, vel plurius.” For this, see also Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 104–114.

against Suárez's second premise of the debate. While the first premise has to do with the abovementioned distinction between HOC and SOC, the second is related to the fact that the sensory self-awareness can attain only the existence of the act, not the quiddity.²⁶

But if the external senses' act does not cause the sensible species in the interior sense by imprinting its species to the higher-order capacity in a bottom-up manner, how can the interior sense become aware of this act? Should we say (as Aquinas seems to do²⁷) that no species needs to be posited since this act, whether sensory or intellectual, is an accidental form and no reception of a form is necessary for its knowledge since as such it is cognitively immediately present to the perceiver? With respect to the intellectual self-reflection, Suárez does not think so. Unlike Aquinas, he assumes a special species representing the lower-order acts.²⁸ However, comparing his view of the perceptual self-awareness with his account of the intellectual cognition of one's own acts, Suárez's view of the former is more parsimonious. His reply to the question about the mechanism through which the common sense becomes aware of the external senses' acts is essentially motivated by his third conclusion: "Every sense power somehow perceives its own act but not through a reflection but imperfectly and in a quasi-exercised act."²⁹ In line with this SOC, when exercising a first-order act we are not only aware of the sensed object but experientially of the act too. In his fourth conclusion Suárez capitalizes on this SOC spelled out in the third conclusion. As regards the issue of how the interior sense apprehends the external senses' acts, he concludes as follows:

The interior sense cognizes the external senses' operations in a special way, not through the proper species but through the species of the external sensibles which get somehow modified in the external senses.³⁰

Suárez agrees with Scotus that to explain the behaviour of non-rational animals, the sensory memory of the acts must be granted also in them.³¹ This memory must

be applied as to the objects not only to the external senses' acts, but also to the sensory appetite's and the interior sense's acts. I do not remember only Peter sitting yesterday; I also sensorily remember that I saw him sitting.³² Unlike Scotus, however, Suárez makes it clear that these operations can be apprehended only indirectly and implicitly, i.e., through the interior sensed species's *mode*. The representations of these acts do not require special species but can be attached to the likenesses of the external objects. But how does this mode representing the external acts arise? How can it accrue to the likenesses of the external qualities? With a reference to *CDA* disp. 6, sect. 2, in which Suárez *ex professo* introduces the theory of the soul, which is conceived as "an agent sense" (*sensus agens*), in this case a vehicle producing the interior sensible species,³³ he shows that the external sense's act serves as an exemplary or occasional cause, according to which the soul (through the interior sense) produces in the interior sense the sensible species representing both the white colour and the act through which this colour has been perceived. Since the exemplary act is not perceptive only of the external objects but is indirectly aware of the acts too, the representation of the resulting species will concern not only the external quality but also this (improper) self-awareness.³⁴ Importantly, comparing the external senses' cognitive *radius operandi* and that of the common sense, the interior sense's cognition of these acts will not be more perfect than the apprehension of the external senses since the former fully receives the self-awareness from the lower senses. It will not add an additional cognitive perfection to the external senses' self-cognition. For Suárez, an additional perfection will come only with intellectual cognition.³⁵

3.2. Mastri/Belluto

The two Italian Conventuals deal with the topic of the (non)existence of the proper (special) species representing the external senses' acts (in fact, of all the sensory acts including those of the interior sense and the sensory appetite) in two main contexts of their *In de anima*, which is included in the third volume of their *Cursus ad mentem Scoti* (1643). While the first context in disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2 is specified by the issue of the interior sense's adequate object, the second one in disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2 is characterized by the topic of the production of the interior sense's species. The latter has close bearing on Mastri and Belluto's critique of the theory of the agent sense employed, as we have seen, by Suárez in his theory of the origin of the interior species.

²⁶ *CDA*, vol. 2, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 2, 502–504.

²⁷ For this exposition of Aquinas, see Perler, *Eine Person sein*, 175.

²⁸ For Suárez's acceptance of the intelligible species in the cognition of one's intellectual and volitional operations, see *CDA*, vol. 3, disp. 9, q. 5, nn. 6–7, 174–176; for this distinction between Aquinas and Suárez, see Perler, "Suárez on Consciousness," 277–279.

²⁹ *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 7, 510: "Omnis sensus percipit aliquo modo actum suum, non per reflexionem, sed imperfecto modo et quasi in actu exercito."

³⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 8, 510: "Sensus interior speciali modo cognoscit operationem sensuum externorum, non per proprias species, sed per species sensibilibus externorum, quasi modificatas in ipsis sensibus externis."

³¹ Ioannis Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* (= *Ord.*) IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 111 (ed. Vat. XIV, 2013), 172: "Positio Aristotelis contraria, quae probabilior est. Sustinendo tamen intentionem Aristotelis in isto libelli quod memoria sit in parte sensitiva [...]" *Ibid.*, n. 117, 174: "[...] licet probabilior possent actus brutorum salvari non ponendo memorativam proprie in eis, sed solam imaginativam cognitivam obiecti quod est praeteritum, licet non ut praeteritum, tamen ea quae videmus in actibus eorum facilius salvantur ponendo in eis memoriam." For an analysis of Scotus's theory of memory including the sensory one, see Perler, *Eine Person sein*, 260–268; cf. also McCord Adams and Wolter, "Memory and Intuition: A Focal Debate in Fourteenth Century Cognitive Psychology," *Franciscan Studies*, vol. 53 (1993), 175–192, at 175–179.

³² *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 8, 510–512: "[...] ut ego memini me vidisse Petrum. Quod si dicas id fieri in intellectu, contra est, quod exterior ego quod eadem virtute habere me memoriam Petri et visionis Petri: memoria autem Petri sensitiva est; ergo et visionis illius. Item, in brutis experientia habetur iste actu, nam appetunt videre et tangere; ergo aliquo modo percipiunt actus istos. Et hoc fuit necessarium [...] ad complementum naturae sensitivae, quia isti actus sunt nocivi et [proficui parti] sensitivae, et ideo oportuit cognosci a brutis, ut possent [nociva] fugere, et commoda prosequi."

³³ See especially *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 13, 486; and n. 16, 492.

³⁴ *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 8, 512.

³⁵ For Suárez's general inhibition of the interior sense's functional scope as compared with Aquinas, and in this case also with Scotus, see Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 240–254.

Although the Scotists do not seem to lay much emphasis on SOC in the external senses, in several places (once with a direct reference to McCaghwell³⁶) they admit its existence. They agree with Suárez³⁷ in their denial of the agent sense at the level of the production of the external senses' species. However, unlike him, they reject this elevator also in the production of the interior species. They are clear that this top-down model as applied to the explanation of the origin of the interior species cannot be true to the Aristotelian theory.³⁸ Not concerned much with the Augustinian axiom according to which a less perfect entity cannot cause a more perfect item,³⁹ they espouse the assimilative bottom-up model according to which items from a lower power cause items in a higher-order capacity. Even though they agree that the Suarezian view, which does not multiply species, follows Ockham's razor more, they are clear that there must be a special species representing the external senses' acts.⁴⁰ And this species can be caused only by these acts. For Mastri and Belluto, the likenesses of these acts are the sensory memory's main principles since (like Scotus before them) they take these acts to be the proximate objects of memorative acts and only through them the remote external objects can be remembered.⁴¹ In this sense, the two Scotists endorse a more

optimistic view about the memory of our sensations than Suárez does. Following Dominik Perler's evaluation of Scotus's theory of memory (against the background of Aquinas's view), their view, also when compared to Suárez's, can be seen as "eine Subjektivierung der Erinnerung."⁴² Unlike Suárez, Mastri and Belluto see no problem in the existence of two species triggering two simultaneous acts representing the object and the act. Just the opposite is true. The existence of these two species seems to be an explanatory advantage for them. The theory affirming the existence of these two distinct species stands on a firmer phenomenological ground than the opposite view: We often remember our acts, namely *that* we heard something, without remembering *what* we heard.⁴³

They bring two kinds of arguments in favour of this view. While the first cluster is based on denying the arguments in favour of Suárez's theory of the agent sense, the second represents an extenuation of the abovementioned Neoplatonic claim. As we have seen, in his reasoning for the existence of the agent sense conceived as a vehicle producing the interior species, Suárez laid a decisive emphasis on the impossibility of transeunt inter-power causation. For him, the coordination between the acts of the distinct powers can proceed only indirectly through the mediating soul in which all the capacities are rooted. Their acts are in harmony due to this rootedness. When one power is operating, the others are active too.⁴⁴ Although one power can produce in itself a habit by recurrent acts, Suárez leaves no doubt that one power cannot directly cause some item in another. This holds not only for the relation between the intellect and the will⁴⁵ and for the relation between the interior sense and the intellect,⁴⁶ but also for the relation between the external senses and the interior sense. When compared with Suárez, our Scotists are much less strict. Although they agree that a cognitive act is an immanent operation belonging to the category of quality, which does not have an endpoint (*terminus*) since it is an endpoint of a distinct categorial action, they do not accept Suárez's claim that the operation of an external sense cannot cause anything in a distinct power.⁴⁷ In addition, they refuse to apply the principle according to which a less perfect entity

³⁶ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 7. n. 218, 114: "Dices, Arist. 2 de Anim. 138 docet visum se videre, quia coloratus est; immo esse perceptivum tenebrae, sicut auditus percipit silentium, ergo supra se reflectit, quod etiam videtur affirmare Scotus in 4. d. 45 qu. 3 art. 1. in fine. Respondet Cavellus super quaest. de Anim. citat. visum cognoscere se non per reflexionem, sed in actu exercito, seu non ut rem cognitam, sed ut rationem cognoscendi [...]"; Mastri, *Disputationes theologicae in Primum librum Sententiarum*, disp. 6, q. 9, art. 2, n. 266, 369: "[...] neque controversia est ex reflexione virtuali, nam in hoc sensu qualibet cognitio est reflexa, quatenus habet talem naturam ut potentia eam quoque percipiat, dum ipsa mediante objectum percipit; etenim dubio procul potentia vitalis sensibiliter suos experitur actus, nullum alium actum eliciendo, quo formaliter ipsos percipiat, quia sic daretur processus in infinitum; & plane nihil obstat, quin actus qualibet virtualiter seipso percipiatur, non quidem, ut *quod*, & per modum objecti percepti per ipsum actum, sed ut *quo*, hoc est, tanquam illud, quo cognoscit objectum [...]"

³⁷ *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 6, 474: "In sensibus exterioribus, species producuntur ad obiectis. Quare non est necessarius in illis sensus agens."

³⁸ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 4, q. 5, art. 2, n. 55, 72: "Dicimus non dari sensum agentem; haec conclusio communis est in Peripatho."

³⁹ For this important axiom of Suárez's theory of perception, see Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 72–93, and other places. For this axiom of the impossibility of bottom-top causality, and for a limitation of the causal role of a sensible object in the production of sensations in medieval Augustinianism, see José F. Silva, "Medieval Theories of Active Perception: An Overview," in J. F. Silva and M. Yrjönsuuri (eds.), *Active Perception in the History of Philosophy. From Plato to Modern Philosophy*, Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, vol. 14, Cham: Springer, 2014, 117–146.

⁴⁰ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 250, 119: "Dicimus 3. sensum internum cognoscere actus sensuum externorum, appetitus sensitivi, & probabiliter proprius actus [...]"

⁴¹ *In DA*, disp. 4, q. 5 art. 2, n. 70, 74: "Quarto, dubitatur, num actus sensitivi externi proprias producunt species in sensibus internis, cui dubitationi affirmative respondemus cum Scoto [...] probari potest ex actu recordationis, qui habet terminum ad actum externum ut praeteritum, ut cum Scoto cit. dicimus disp. seq. Ergo necessario in nobis erit species impressa illius actus, antec. patet experientia, in parte enim sensitiva habetur memoria praeteritorum, etiam in brutis, conseq. patet, quia ad actum cognitionis exigitur concursus potentiae, & objecti, vel alterius gerentis vices illius, objectum proximum recordationis, quod est actus praeteritus externus, nequit concurrere ad recordationem, quia non est in se praesens, aliter non

esse recordatio praeteriti ut sic, sed praesentia, ergo species illius concurrat, & consequenter erit propriae speciei productivus; non enim poterit assignari alia causa magis proportionata, quam actus ipse."

⁴² For this characterization, see Perler, *Eine person sein*, 262.

⁴³ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 251, 119: "[...] quandoque recordamur nos audisse aliquid ab aliquo, non tamen distincte reminiscimur rei audita, quod est habere species actus, non tamen obiecti [...]"

⁴⁴ Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 13, 486–488.

⁴⁵ His libertarian theory of free will is based on the notion of indifference, according to which only the will, and no other external force, can be conceived as an exclusive principle of contingent self-determination. For this, see *Disputationes metaphysicae*, vol. 1, in *Opera omnia*, vol. 25, Paris: Vivès, 1861, disp. 19, s. 2, n. 15, 697–698.

⁴⁶ For Suárez's theory of the origin of the intelligible species (*species intelligibilis*) where phantasms are only exemplary or occasional causes, see *CDA*, vol. 3, disp. 9, q. 2, n. 12, 94–98.

⁴⁷ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 70–71, 74: "[...] quia cognitio, cum sit actio immanens, non est productiva alterius distincti [...]. Cognitio dicitur actio immanens sine termino per illam producta, quia non est actio de genere actionis, sed tantum grammaticaliter, potest tamen esse causa effectiva speciei."

or an item in a less perfect power cannot cause anything in a more perfect capacity. For Suárez, the items of the external senses are less perfect because in their conservation they depend on the existence of the *hic et nunc* existent objects. If the external sensible disappears, the external sensation vanishes too.⁴⁸ The Scotists formulate a similar objection, no doubt inspired by the Jesuit's argument. But they reply in a manner that Suárez would, no doubt, have found unsatisfactory. They say that external acts can cause the species representing them in the interior sense since, in general, it does not belong to the formal concept of the sensible species to depend in its conservation on the here and now existent objects.⁴⁹

But what about the Neoplatonic maxim stating the impossibility of reflection at the level of the material powers? If the external acts imprint their species to the common sense, then this power seems to apprehend these acts by HOC, and consequently this sensory power turns out to be a perfectly reflexive capacity. Is this traditional axiom not binding for Mastri and Belluto? In part it is, in part it is not. They are clear that although the external sensation is not a sensible object for the external senses, contrary to Suárez who is clear that this act as such more approximates spirituality (*magis ad spiritualitatem accedit*),⁵⁰ they argue that this act, in fact, *is* a sensible object for the interior sense.⁵¹ Nevertheless, in many places they explicitly state that sensory powers cannot be *perfectly* reflexive. But what do they mean by this *perfect* reflectivity? And why cannot their way of reflecting be perfect? With this term they intend to indicate nothing else than that the sensory capacities cannot turn through a higher-order act to a *present* act of an external sense, even if this turn were generated by a higher-order power. If the act of external sense, say, a vision, is present, the common sense is captivated by an external object through this vision. Accordingly, the interior power is primarily directed to the outside. Due to this (exteroceptual) orientation, the common sense cannot perfectly reflect upon its existent and present act by HOC. In this respect, the Scotists agree with Suárez. However, they differ from him with respect to the cognition of *past* acts. For them, an occurrent external act can and must impress its species to the interior sense even though it is not noticed at the time of its impression. Nevertheless, due to this species, this act can later be reactivated and become explicitly conscious in the sensory memory. The Scotists speak about an *imperfect* reflection, or elsewhere about a reflection *to some extent*

(*aliquantiter*). While they agree that due to extension a material item cannot as a whole turn to itself, they say that in this memorative way a material power can reflect upon past acts, whether they have been produced by a distinct power (the external senses and the sensory appetite), or by the same power (the interior sense).⁵²

3.3. McCaghwell

In his *Annotationes* to question 9 “Utrum sit ponere sensum communem” of Scotus's *In libros Aristotelis De anima*, Hugh McCaghwell offers a twofold account of the perceptual self-awareness. He formulates his stance in two *Conclusiones*. While the first is called “The external senses do not cognize their acts,” the second is titled “It is probable that the phantasy perceives external sensations through their own species.” At the end of the second conclusion he notes that the issue (*viz.* whether the interior sense is aware of the external acts through their species, or not) is a difficult one since the arguments for both tenets are not entirely cogent.⁵³ No matter which view is preferable for him in the end, both evince a clear impact of Suárez's theory, whether negative or positive.

Like Mastri/Belluto and Suárez, Cavellus says that an act of seeing is not cognized by sight through the formal reflection, *i.e.*, through its species. At the same time, like them, he concedes that sight apprehends its operation in *actu exercito*. Since it is a vital act attending to its object, this operation must be perceptive of itself too. As a vital act it requires an active engagement in the form of attention from the side of the power, which is unthinkable without this self-awareness. As McCaghwell notes, this implicit self-awareness was also endorsed by Scotus in his *Ord.* IV., dist. 45, q. 3. He also conforms with Suárez and our two Scotists in that the interior sense's cognition of the external senses' acts must be posited. We remember both the remembered things and our past acts of seeing these things. The controversial point, however, lies in the query whether this self-perception proceeds *with*, or *without*, the proper species representing these acts.⁵⁴

⁴⁸ See Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 2, n. 13, 488, where he argues against the thesis that the external sensation (the less perfect item) can produce a quality in the interior sense (the more perfect entity) as follows: “Item, quia non redditur sufficiens ratio, quare species interior non [pendeat] in conservari a sensatione externa, si est imperfectior [effectus].”

⁴⁹ Mastri and Belluto, *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 70–71, 74: “Tum 3. species dependet a suo objecto in fieri & conservari, ergo nequit species interna ab actu produci, si ab eodem postea non conservatur [...] Ad 3. dicemus art. seq.” In this next article (*In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 3, n. 86, 77) he then only says that “[...] species sensibiles de sua ratione formali non dependere in conservari ab objectis.”

⁵⁰ Suárez, *CDA*, disp. 6, q. 4, n. 4, 506.

⁵¹ *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 7, art. 3, n. 259, 121: “[...] negando sensationem non esse per se sensibilem, & qualitatem secundam, licet non sentiat a sensibus externis.”

⁵² *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 260, 120: “[...] sensum non esse perfecte reflexivum supra proprios actus, ut est intellectus, sed aliquantiter tantum, ut dicemus art. seq. cui reflexioni non obstat extensio, quantitas enim est ratio, cur una pars non possit propter extensionem reduci in loco alterius, non tamen impedit, quin potentia organica cognitiva per alium actum non possit supra se quasi reflectere, & cognoscere actum praeteritum [...] sensus non est perfecte reflexivus, ut advertat ad proprium actum existentem, ut facit intellectus, ideoque quando actus est praesens, solum advertit sensus ad objectum, a quo rapitur, non ad actum propter imperfectionem potentiae [...]; *ibid.*, art. 3, 121–2: “Si perfecte reflecteret sensus supra proprius actus, scilicet percipiendo actum ipsum, conformitatem, vel disconvenientiam cum objecto, dependentiam a potentia, & ipsam potentiam cognoscentem, utique posset iudicare, & discurrere [...] ad reflexio sensus solum cadit supra actum praeteritum, quatenus repraesentat objectum, nec ultra progreditur [...] ideoque sicut imperfectus est reflexivus, ita est imperfectus iudicativus.” See also *In DA*, disp. 5, q. 8, art. 2, n. 71, ad 1, 74.

⁵³ Hugo Cavellus, *Quaestiones in libros De anima*, in Ioannis Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, vol. 3, Paris: Vivès, 1891, q. 9, Conclusio II, n. 14, 520: “Fateor rem esse difficillimam, neque rationes pro hac vel illa parte quidquam convincere posse.”

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, n. 11: “Objicies, Aristoteles 3. De Anima, text. 138. ait quod visus videt se videre, quia quodammodo colore delibutus est. Respondetur visionem a visu cognosci non per reflexionem, vel speciem ejus, sed quia est vitalis actio cognoscitiva, per illam in actu exercito, videmus nos videre, et postea experimentalem habemus

In his Conclusion II, McCaghwell proposes a theory which was later to be advocated by Matri and Belluto,⁵⁵ namely that the interior sense apprehends these acts through their own proper species, and indicates it as probable. He claims that this theory “is more in line with Scotus’s mind in *Ord.* IV, dist. 45, q. 3.”⁵⁶ He puts forward three arguments “ex ratione” for this position. First, the human intellect does not apprehend anything that has not been perceived before by the phantasy. However, since the intellect knows these sensations, they must have been cognized by the interior sense prior to that. In his second and third argument he comes back to Suárez’s view (denied in this conclusion), according to which the external senses’ acts are represented by the interior species’s modes. On this theory, these modes are caused by the soul through the interior sense which functions as “the agent sense” with the external senses’ acts taken as their exemplary or occasional causes. In his reasoning for the opposite view, the Irish Observant argues that one and the same species cannot represent diverse objects, such as a white colour and an act of vision. He also argues that this modification cannot be sufficient for explaining the necessary assimilation of the interior sense to the external act. This assimilation requires a more robust principle, namely a special species. When replying to the opposite, sc. Suarezian, view he says that sensation, unlike the sensory power, is a sensible item. It can become the sensible object of the interior sense because as such it is “coloured.” Moreover, it is not inconvenient to assume the existence of two species impressed to the interior sense productive of two acts simultaneously, one of the colour and the other of the act, even though the latter is often subliminal and we do not notice it. We do not notice it because we are often captivated by the external objects, which make us introspectively “blind” to our sensations. Lastly, McCaghwell also admits that these acts produce the expressed species called *idolum* in the interior sense.⁵⁷

While in his *Conclusio* II McCaghwell expounds this non-Suarezian theory, in *Conclusio* I he puts forward a fully Suarezian account, which he assesses as “satis probabile.” As in many other issues of cognitive theory, such as that of the agent sense, the number of the interior senses, the production of the intelligible species, and

notitiam, non solum quid est album, quod vidimus, sed etiam quid est vidisse album ex quo habetur, quod aliquo modo visa est visio: et sic intelligendum puto Scotum 4. dist. 45. quaest. 3. Etsi quoad secundam partem conveniatur, nempe sensationes externas percipi a sensu interno, quod etiam experientia constat, quia recordamur rei visae, et visionis. Controvertitur tamen an id fiat per species proprias sensationum [...].”

⁵⁵ In my exposition, I do not proceed chronologically. To highlight the tensions between the discussed authors I have preceded Matri/Belluto’s view to that of McCaghwell.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, n. 13, 520.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, n. 13–14, 520: “[...] sensationem quodammodo esse sub objecto sensus, quia ait Aristoteles supra, visio est quodammodo colorata [...] ipse sensus non est qualitas sensibilis, neque intentionalis similitudo ejus, secus est de sensatione [...] non est inconveniens in sensationibus externis duas species interno sensui imprimi; neque est contra experientiam duos actus ab eodem elici, etsi saepius hoc non contingat, et quando contingit, non semper advertitur. Ad secundam, tale idolum formatur, sed quia magis occupatur potentia circa objectum sensibile, quam circa sensationem ejus, quia in hanc per quamdam consequentiam ad illud, tendit, ideo non ita patenter experimus nos efformare tale idolum, vel simulacrum.”

the intellectual cognition of material singulars, Suárez’s influence on McCaghwell is significant.⁵⁸ He introduces two arguments for the view that the interior sense does not cognize the external act through its species but only through a mode of the sensed species representing the external quality. First, if two species were impressed to the common sense, one representing the external object and the other the act, two simultaneous acts would have to be produced. Second, if these two acts were produced, an *idolum* of the external act would have to be produced, which is at odds with our experience.⁵⁹ From these McCaghwell concludes as follows:

For this reason, it is sufficiently probable that the external sensations are perceived by the interior sense through the modified sensible species in the manner in which, as it has been said above, the common sensibles are perceived through the same species that are differently modified: This is not against Scotus, since he argues for both sides, and without inclining to one or another opinion [...].⁶⁰

In line with Suárez,⁶¹ McCaghwell makes it clear that not only common sensibles such as size and figure are perceived through modifications of the species representing the proper sensibles, namely colour, but also the external senses’ acts. As I have argued elsewhere,⁶² this view is fully in line with McCaghwell’s (again Suarezian) theory based on the interior agent sense, which accounts for the interior species’ production.⁶³

4. Conclusions: Scotus, Suárez, and Baroque Scotists

As some scholars have claimed, Scotus’s post-sensory psychology is “underdeveloped” since he never elaborated systematically his philosophy of perception.⁶⁴ Ob-

⁵⁸ For the first two topics, see Heider, “Suárez and Matri/Belluto on the Internal Sense’s Species,” forthcoming in C. A. Andersen and D. Heider (eds.), *Cognitive Issues in the Long Scotists Tradition*, Basel/Berlin: Schwabe Verlag, 2022; for the latter two topics, cf. Anna Tropicia, “McCaghwell’s Reading of Scotus’s *De Anima* (1639): A Case of Plagiarism?,” *The Modern Schoolman* 89–1/2 (January/April 2012), 95–115.

⁵⁹ Cavellus, *Quaestiones in libros De anima*, q. 9, Conclusio I, n. 12, 519: “[...] sequeretur quod videndo album, duae species imprimerentur sensui interno, scilicet albi et visionis, et consequenter haberet duos actus, quod est contra experientiam. Item, si haberetur propria species sensationis, formaretur proprium ejus idolum, quod est contra experientiam.”

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*: “Propter haec satis probabile videtur sensationes externas percipi a sensu interno per species ipsorum sensibilium modificatas, quomodo superius dictum est, sensibilia communia percipi per easdem species aliter modificatas: nec hoc est est contra Scotum, quia ibi in utramque partem disputat, nihil resolvens [...].”

⁶¹ For Suárez’s view of the perception of the common sensible, see Suárez, *CDA* disp. 6, q. 1, nn. 8–10, 462–466; cf. also Heider, *Aristotelian Subjectivism*, 123–126; for McCaghwell’s Suarezian theory, cf. *Quaestiones super libros Aristotelis*, q. 6, Conclusio IV, 501–502.

⁶² Heider, “Suárez and Matri/Belluto on the Internal Sense’s Species.”

⁶³ Cavellus, *Supplementum ad Quaestiones Scoti De anima* (in: John Duns Scotus, *Opera omnia*, t. 3, Paris: Vivès, 1891), disp. 2, sect. 1, n. 6, 690: “Dico quarto, probabilius forte est ipsum sensum internum producere suam speciem.”

⁶⁴ See Nicholas H. Steneck, *The Problem of the Internal Senses in the Fourteenth Century*, Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1970, 132; in *Duns Scotus’s Theory of Cognition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014, 18, Richard Cross says that “[...] Scotus is

viously, compared to intellectual cognition, perception was for the Subtle Doctor of secondary significance. This does not mean, however, that Scotus did not take a stance on various issues from philosophy of perception. Some of Scotus's formulations clearly show that Matri and Belluto's theory and McCaghwell's view from *Conclusio* II are more faithful to Scotus's position than Suárez's tenet and McCaghwell's doctrine from *Conclusio* I. And while Suárez's philosophy, as is well-known, is strongly marked by the Scotistic influence, and one could thus expect that those who follow Suárez will not doctrinally miss Scotus's point of view too, in this case Suárez's and McCaghwell's Suarezian views do not seem to be in line with the Subtle Doctor's texts. Two quotes in favour of the doctrine endorsing species of sensory acts should do justice to this evaluation. In *Ord.* 4, dist. 45, q. 3, where he argues for the existence of memory in the sentient part of the soul (a claim advocated by Aristotle⁶⁵), Scotus says:

[...] some sense can receive the species of the act of sensing and retain this species after the act passes away and, consequently, it can by that species have an act after a passage of time and so remember [...].⁶⁶

Aware of the (Neoplatonic) argument that the sense power does not reflect back on itself or its act,⁶⁷ Scotus says:

[...] memory of its proper act does not belong to a sense, just as neither does it belong to any other sense to remember its proper act [...] but this belongs only to a superior sense with respect to the act of a lower sensitive part.⁶⁸

In the *Commentary on Aristotle's De anima*, q. 9, however, Scotus extends this self-perception to the interior sense's cognition of its own acts. To do so, he formulates the following objection:

[...] the common sense either perceives its act, or another sense is required to cognize it. If [the common sense] apprehends its proper act, then by the same token a particular sense must perceive its operation since both [powers] are organic powers. If another sense is required to perceive the act of the common sense, then it is enquired whether this capacity apprehends its proper act, and then there will

either be an infinite regress in the senses, or we will have to stop in some sense that will be perceptive of its act.⁶⁹

With an intention to accommodate the abovementioned requirement, according to which perceptual self-awareness can be attributed only to a superior sense with respect to the act of a lower sensitive part, Scotus replies by explicitly attributing this self-cognition, as to its object, also to the interior acts:

[...] the imagination perceives its own act; we imagine that we imagine or that we have imagined, and we remember that we have remembered, and we dream that we dream, as we experience manifestly. Therefore, it can be said that the common sense perceives its own act by one of the abovementioned ways. But how is this possible? It should be said that in the same way as a species, being the likeness of an act of imagination, flows back down from the act of imagination into the organ of some sense, whether exterior or interior, and it [intentionally] immutes the power of imagination, the same holds for the common sense too. From its act a species, retaining its likeness, flows back down into the organ of the particular interior sense, from which then the common sense can be intentionally affected. This is not a direct reflection upon its act, but [a reflection] through the species which flows from it.⁷⁰

Leaving aside the rather complicated mechanism of the production of the interior species based on flowing back from one power to another (while Scotus mentions both the interior and the external senses as those to which the act's species flow, only the latter could accommodate the requirement adduced in note 66), the Subtle Doctor makes it clear that there *are* special species representing the acts of the interior powers.

We may conclude: As manifested by the doctrinal difference in Matri/Belluto's position and McCaghwell's "sufficiently probable" upshot from *Conclusio* I, Baroque Scotism in the field of philosophy of perception cannot be regarded as a doctrinally monolithic scholastic stream. Clearly, Suárez's philosophy stands out as a crucial point of reference in this dynamic process of the doctrinal diversification in seventeenth-century Scotism.

not much interested in sensation as such, and he never discusses it systematically."

⁶⁵ Scotus refers to Aristotle, *On Memory*, in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, vol. 1, ch. 1, 450a13–14, 715: "Thus memory belongs incidentally to the faculty of thought, and essentially it belongs to the primary faculty of sense-perception."

⁶⁶ Scotus, *Ord.* IV, dist. 45, q. 3, n. 113 (ed. Vat. XIV, 2013), 173: "[...] aliquis sensus potest recipere speciem actus sentiendi et speciem illam retinere transeunte actu, et – per consequens – per illam speciem potest habere actum post tempus, et ita recordari." The translation is taken over from Peter L.P. Simpson, *The Translation of Book IV dd. 43-49 of the Ordinatio*, 98 (URL: <https://aristotelophile.com/Books/Translations/Scotus%20Ordinatio%20IV%20d.43-49.pdf>).

⁶⁷ For this objection, see *ibid.*, n. 99, 168–169.

⁶⁸ *Ibid.*, n. 114, 173: "[...] recordatio actus eius non competit alicui sensui, sicut nec alicui alii sensui competit recordari proprii actus [...] sed tantum hoc competit superiori respectu actus inferioris sensitivae."

⁶⁹ Scotus, *Quaestiones super II et III De anima*, q. 9, n. 4, 70: "[...] sensus communis aut sentit actum proprium, aut requiritur alius sensus illum actum cognoscens. Si sentit actum proprium, igitur et eadem ratione sensus proprius, quia uterque est potentia organica. Si sensus alius requiritur ad sentiendum actum sensus communis, quaeratur de illo utrum sentiat actum proprium, et tunc erit processus in infinitum in sensibus, vel erit standum in aliquo sentiente actum proprium."

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, n. 16, 77: "[...] imaginatio sentit actum proprium, imaginatur enim nos imaginari vel imaginatum fuisse, et memoramus nos memoratum fuisse, et somniamus nos somniare, sicut experimur manifeste. Ita potest dici quod sensus communis sentit actum proprium per aliquem praedictorum. Sed per quem modum est possibile? Dicendum quod sicut ab actu imaginationis defluit quaedam species in organo alicuius sensus, sive exterioris sive interioris, in qua specie est similitudo actus illius, a qua specie potest potentia imaginativa sic immutari; sic est de sensu communi, quod ab eius actu defluit quaedam species in organo sensus particularis interius, a qua specie, retinente similitudinem actus eius, potest sensus communis immutari. Et hoc non est reflecti super actum eius directe, sed mediante specie ab eo defluxa." For a brief comment on this difficult passage, cf. Cory, "Consciousness," 253–254.

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