RELATIONS ACROSS THE TAIWAN STRAIT: A NEW ERA

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Abstract:
The author analyzes the cross Strait relations of the Ma Ying-jeou administration from both international and bilateral perspectives. The positions of the US and EU bode well for a new beginning. Together with the compromise of the “1992 consensus”, Ma’s conception of a “special relationship” was not rejected by Beijing despite some remaining distrust of Taiwan. Thus, German experiences, where “special relationship” originated, could be used as a reference to the cross Strait relations, though only selectively. This could serve as a good basis for the further development of relations between both sides. Therefore, prospects for better ties, at least in the near future, seem promising.

Keywords: two-level game, United States, European Union, cross Strait relations, special relationship, German experiences, diplomatic moratorium.

Resumen:
El autor analiza las relaciones Taiwan-RPCh del nuevo gobierno de Ma Ying-jeou desde la perspectiva tanto internacional como bilateral. Las posiciones de los EEUU y la UE presentan buenos augurios. Junto con el compromiso del “consenso de 1992”, la concepción de Ma de una “relación especial” no ha sido rechazada por Pekín a pesar de cierta desconfianza latente hacia Taiwan. Así las experiencias de Alemania, donde el concepto de “relación especial” surgió, podrían ser usadas como referencia para las relaciones Taiwan-RPCh, si bien sólo de manera selectiva. Podría servir como una buena base para un ulterior desarrollo de las relaciones entre ambas partes. Por tanto, las posibilidades de mejores relaciones, por lo menos a corto plazo, parecen prometedoras.

Palabras Clave: Juego a dos-niveles, Estados Unidos, Unión Europea, relaciones Taiwan-RPCh, relación especial, Experiencias Alemanas, moratoria diplomática.

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1. Introduction

Since President Ma Ying-jeou assumed power in May 2008 a new chapter of consultation and cooperation instead of confrontation and consternation in the cross Straits relations has been launched. Both the PRC (mainland) and the ROC (Taiwan) have been showing their sincerity and good will to create mutual trust and to mend the fence which was damaged by the previous DPP government. However there still are some points of contention between the two sides and this article will examine those as well.

This article will analyze the cross Strait relations from both international and domestic perspectives. The impact of international dominants on domestic policies will be highlighted. In the international arena, the role of the United States (US) is the most significant, but the stance of the European Union (EU) will also be taken into account.

As for the domestic domain the article tries to take the bilateral interactions between Taipei and Beijing. Aspects between the two sides include: skeptics in Beijing, implications of German experiences and the re-definition of the cross Strait relations, the diplomatic tug-of-war between the two sides, as well as trade and cultural aspects.

For the international perspective, neo-realism in line with Kenneth Waltz will be adopted as an approach to explore the relevant players’ pursuit of peace and security. As for bilateral determinants, neo-functionalism of Ernst B. Haas and social constructivism of Alexander Wendt will be employed interchangeably to explore how the both sides approach each other. And the author argues that despite problems and difficulties between the two sides their prospects for improved ties seem rather rosy.

2. The International Environment

An analysis of the last period of the Bush administration and the EU’s stance toward China and Taiwan can make a contribution to better knowledge of present situation. 1.1. The Role of the US

According to the recent CRS Report, President Bush, from the very beginning of his first term in office, had been very supportive of Taiwan. But ever since the 9/11 attacks in

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2 “Improved in the Taiwan Strait, following the election of Ma Ying-jeou as President, who pledged to improve relations with China” See: International Crisis Group (ICG): Crisis Watch no.56, (01 April, 2008), at http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5368.


7 In order to counterbalance China, among others, arms sale programs were granted to Taiwan: “Taiwan-U.S. Relations: Recent. Developments and Their Policy Implications”, US Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, Most Recent Developments (September 22, 2008), at http://www.taiwansecurity.org/2008/CRS-0908.pdf.
2001 things began to shift in Beijing’s favor simply because of Washington’s desire for cooperation in combating terrorism. 8 With this change of attitude, the ever-increasing pro-independence propensity of the Chen Shui-bian administration, which had originally been spurred on by President Bush’s strong support for Taiwan constantly damaged the mutual trust between Taipei and Washington. 9

The strong protests of the Bush administration against the DPP-referenda in 2003/04 and again in 2007/08, 10 both seen as provocative to China, reflected clearly the concern of the US over the reaction of Beijing. Obviously it was a kind of proxy action for Beijing to put a damper on the DPP. For Chinese leaders had counter-productive experiences in the 1996 and 2000 Taiwan presidential elections as they bluntly tried to threaten the Taiwanese people away from independence. 11

Moreover, shortly before the March presidential election 2008 Washington dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups the Kitty Hawk (CV-63) and Nimitz (CVN-68) to the vicinity of Taiwan and stationed there till the inauguration of the new president on May 20. 12 What were the purposes of this US action and what does it indicate? Several possible outcomes of the election could help explain it.

First of all, Beijing could have reacted strongly based on the 2005 “Anti-Secession Law, (ASL)” if the DPP-referendum to join the UN under the name of Taiwan should have passed. The referendum had been attached to the presidential election which itself could be perceived as a further step towards Taiwan independence. However, in fact, during the campaign the referendum issue became controversial in and of itself and lost momentum within the pan-Green Camp. 13 Therefore, it was very unlikely that it had been the US’s major

8 It fits well to Wu’s argument which maintains that in the time between the US presidential elections Washington’s realist policy favorable to China will prevail over the idealist stance favorable to Taiwan before and after the elections. Wu Yu-shan: “Taiwan zongtong dashuan dueyu liananguanxi chanshengde yingxian: Xuanpiao jidahua muoshi yu chanluesanjiao tujin” (The Impact of Taiwan’s Presidential Elections on Cross Strait Relations: Vote-Maximizing Model and Strategic Triangle Approach), Prospect Quarterly, vol. 1, no. 3 (July 2000), pp. 1-33.
13 After the landslide debacle of DPP in the parliamentary election (27/113 seats or less then 1/4) in January 2008 it’s presidential candidate Frank Shieh and his running mate Su Jen-chang have more or less abandoned the issue of referendum in the campaign for dissociation with President Chen out of his corruption scandals. “Rulian

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concern during the election. Also the possible victory of Frank Shieh would not invoke an immediate reaction from Beijing because he was considered to be more moderate than Chen. In this case the Chinese leaders need at least some time for observation before they could really define him.

Consequently, to prevent the “two-bullet incident” from 2004 or some similar incident from happening again this time during the election campaign was most likely be the principal motive for the American military action. Many people have called the incident the chief reason for Chen’s razor thin success (less than 30,000 votes) four years ago. Although nothing happened this time, throughout the whole election process there were still two months to go to the inauguration. Then, could the assurance of a smooth and successful power transition be another reason for the US action? Beijing didn’t criticize Washington’s military action and both sides have been keen to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait since 2003.

Judging from the neo-realist perspective, for Beijing, it’s substantial to earn as much time as possible to create a peaceful environment favorable to China’s development. Especially security and stability in the cross Strait was capitalized when the Olympic Games were approaching. Also the US really didn’t need an extra crisis on top of Iraq, Iran, North Korea and Afghanistan at the time. Nonetheless, given all these US headaches Beijing could even be helpful to relieve pressure on the Bush administration.

For instance China has turned down Iran’s bid to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) since 2007. In addition, could the implosion of the nuclear cooling tower in North Korea in June 2008 have been another quid pro quo between Beijing and the US? Obviously there is no hard evidence to support these assumptions. But signs can be
found from various testimonies before the Senate and academic analysis on the current Sino-US relations. Well-known scholars such as Richard N. Haass, Robert G. Sutter and Kurt Campbell suggest that, like it or not, pragmatic approach of consultation and cooperation with China could be the optimal choice for the Bush administration.\(^{19}\)

On the other hand since April 2008, Vicent Siew, the then Vice President-elect, KMT honorary Chairman Lien Chan and ruling KMT-Chairman Wu Po-hsiung and many others have visited China and have all been well received by Chinese leaders.\(^{20}\) These were the first heavy weight contacts between Taipei and Beijing since the election. Also the weekend direct charter-flights began on July 4 the same year. Moreover, despite strong protests on the streets of Taipei the ARATS (Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait) Chairman Chen Yunlin signed four agreements with his Taiwan counterpart SEF (Strait Exchange Foundation) Chairman Chiang Pin-kung on direct air and sea links as well as the establishment of a food safety mechanism in November.\(^{21}\)

Under these circumstances, although the Bush administration had also accepted President Ma’s “three no policy” vis-à-vis China namely: no unification, no independence, no use of force, some of the decision makers in Washington started to worry about being marginalized by the rapid rapprochement between Taipei and Beijing.\(^{22}\)

In sum, I can argue that the current status of the Taipei, Beijing and Washington trilateral relations had been transformed from Dittmer’s model of a “romantic triangle” to a “ménage a trois”.\(^{23}\) From another perspective, on the Taiwan issue the Sino-American cooperation has never been progressed so smoothly. There’s more than enough evidence to establish the fact that external factors impact the cross Strait relations. This could mean a


good start for the Obama administration. Especially amid the global financial crisis which began in the US could be burden on China due to the close trade and economic relations between the two countries. Thus, there is too much at stake for the two nations to be at odds with each other over Taiwan.

2.1. The Role of the EU

The European Union of 27 member states, the largest supranational body in the world, has increasingly paid attention to cross Strait affairs since the last decade. Since the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1975 the EC/EU has adhered firmly to the one China principle and maintained only trade and cultural ties with Taiwan.

According to the statements of the Council of the European Union the EU expressed strong opposition to the referendum and any unilateral change of the status quo in the Taiwan Strait in 2007. On the other hand it advocated a peaceful resolution as well as political dialogue between the two sides. Between September 2007 and March 2008 there were four declarations concerning the cross Strait situation.

However, due to his moderate and reconciliatory attitude toward the mainland the victory of President Ma in the election and his inaugural speech were both highly welcomed by the EU. It was a relief for Brussels vis-a-vis Beijing and the EU also launched a new chapter in its relations with Taiwan. Right after the signing of the agreements between ARATS and SEF in November 2008 the EU Presidency delivered two declarations welcoming these efforts of the two sides. Again quantitatively, the frequency of the reaction from Brussels reveals clearly its sincere aspiration for peace and stability in the region.

In the 2008 US presidential election China was not an important topic as before very possibly due to the challenge of the global financial crisis. Although Obama agreed the arm sale program to Taiwan whether F16 and submarines are also included still remains uncertain. Hence realism is on the rise (cooperation with China) while idealism declines. It can be seen as an exception of the Wu Yu-shan’s argument. See: “2008 nien meiguo zongtong daxuen zhuanti – liananpien Obama zhichi duetaijunshou ranlichankuon cinxiandalu (Special report on the US Presidential election 2008 – cross Strait chapter, Obama supports arms sales to Taiwan but incline to mainland)”, My Little Garden, at http://lilicarol.pixnet.net/blog/post/22361310.

See 2.4. Trade Aspects.


Judging from all the EU documents, the EU’s increasing concern over the cross Strait issue is indisputable.

In fact, from neo-realistic point of view, for historical and geopolitical reasons the EU as a whole has less strategic interests in East Asia than the US in terms of containing or hedging China. Basically both China and Europe do not feel threatened by the other. Thus, since the stability and prosperity of the 1990’s serve Europe’s best trade interests in this region, the author would argue that it really doesn’t matter much to the Europeans if China and Taiwan reunite or separate from each other so long as it proceeds peacefully.

3. Bilateral Determinants

Firstly, it is important to examine the reasons why Beijing still feels reluctant and uncertain on Taiwan especially over the issue of its international space. Secondly, is there a re-definition of the cross Strait relations? To what degree could the “German experiences” have implications for the cross Strait relations? With illustration of some foreign events the continuity and change of the foreign policy tug-of-war between the two sides will be disposed. Lastly the trade and cultural aspects will wrap up this paragraph.

3.1. Despite Skeptics, Virtuous Interactions

Over the last several years, the leadership in Beijing has shown unease and doubt over Mr. Ma Ying-jeou for his participation in the annual June 4th Tiananmen incident commemoration activities in Taipei, his sympathy for the Falun Gong, his strong opposition to the “ASL”, and his steadfast anti-communist stance. Due to different political culture and practice between the mainland and Taiwan it is uneasy for the leaders in Beijing to define him. Especially Beijing is uncertain on his “no reunification” stance in his above mentioned three-no policy.

Moreover, in the year of 2008 Taiwan has just accomplished the so-called second turnover of power in terms of Huntington’s theses. After the first turnover in 2000 Taiwan is now to become a solid democracy. Unlike the political practice in China it is more than normal that in democracies ruling and opposition parties alternate. But just this alternation could present another great concern for Beijing. Should the DPP resume power in the near future would all the advantages and even franchise that the CCP intended to offer to the KMT, especially Taiwan’s international space be taken over by the separatists? Would that end up with a boomerang effect for Beijing itself to promote Taiwan independence which the Chinese have been struggling for so long?

Lastly is the question of the status of the ROC, or, in others words, the issue of sovereignty. Unlike the German case in the early 1970’s so long as the inner-German relations are settled per Ostpolitik GDR’s international status is also arranged.\(^{35}\) Both German states joined the UN in 1973. But for Beijing, it pursues a kind of vigilant two-level game policy vis-à-vis Taiwan to avoid embarrassing incidents from happening.

In fact, officially, the civil war between the KMT and CCP is not yet over. Therefore, neither the ROC nor the PRC can formally recognize each other before certain political and constitutional obstacles have been removed.\(^{36}\) But at least both sides have compromised on the issue of “1992 consensus” which is the so-called “one China principle” but with each side free to define the meaning of its own.\(^{37}\) Therefore channels of communication, consultation and even cooperation have been built between Beijing and Taipei to enhance bilateral relations.

Here are the best realms for neo-functionalist and constructivist approaches to prevail. But in the international arena, as mentioned before, Beijing still feels reluctant to give Taiwan any international space in order to prevent separation in the form of “one China and one Taiwan” or “two Chinas”.\(^{38}\) Hence, it can be seen as a kind of dialectical tactic to distinguish between external (multilateral) and internal (bilateral) matters (\(\text{内外有别}\)).\(^{39}\)

On the other hand, in their diplomatic struggle both Taipei and Beijing also separate dialectically the form (formality) from substance (\(\text{名實互用}\)). For instance Taipei has accepted the so-called “Olympic model” since 1981 which implies that formality (title, instead of ROC Chinese Taipei) had given way to substance (participation).\(^{40}\) It’s unsatisfactory but acceptable. In this regard Beijing just reciprocated recently. In its policy toward Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in the Latin American region the PRC didn’t insist on immediate switch of recognition (formality) before establishing state-to-state relations (substance) with them.\(^{41}\) Is it a kind of advance performance with good will from Beijing? On the other hand, at least it is


\(^{39}\) Xu, Shiquan: Liangan guanxi zhong de Taiwan ”guoji kongjian” wenti (The Problem of Taiwan’s ‘International Space’ in Cross Strait relationships) China Review News (September 2008), pp. 6-9.


to maintain that both sides have found a kind of modus vivendi in the international arena based on formal diplomatic moratorium.  

3.2. Re-Definition of the Cross-Strait Relations and the Implications of the “German Experiences”

In September 2008 president Ma Ying-jeou put forward his view on the status of cross Strait ties calling them “special relations”. This has multiple significances. Firstly, it is a clear break with the “special state to state relations” (兩國論) proposed by the former President Lee Teng-hui in 1999 and the “one state on each side of the Taiwan Strait” (一國兩制) proposed by former President Chen Shui-bian in 2002. Both had tried to pursue de jure independence of Taiwan, igniting vigorous reactions from Beijing.

Compared to the German policy of ex-Chancellor Willy Brandt literally both formulations are identical and both belong to the same category of the so-called “inter se” relations but still differ in various aspects. The current ROC constitution distinguishes between the “free area” and “mainland area”. Also “Taiwan area” and “mainland area” are both frequently used in various laws in Taiwan. On the mainland side, in the preamble of the PRC constitution, Taiwan is a sacred part of China’s territory. Also the ASL from 2005 brooks no division (Art. 2) and the reunification was repeatedly underpinned (Art. 5). Thus, de jure most parts of the PRC’s and the ROC’s territory of sovereignty overlap but their areas of de facto jurisdiction are separate.

Nonetheless, Ma’s conception of “special relations” (sui generis) resembles closely to that of Willy Brandts’ in terms of non-treatment of their respective counterparts as a foreign state. Thus, Brandt had defined the GDR as a “special area” since it was neither under the FRG’s jurisdiction nor a foreign state. And the relations to the “special area” can only be “special relations”. Although in the Cold War era the inner-German relations was able to develop relatively smooth for two decades until reunification. This effort of consent over dissent could also prevail between Taiwan and China.

As early as 2002, Beijing had already defined the airline routes between Taiwan and mainland as “cross Strait routes”. It deliberately distinguished such routes from domestic and

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42 See 2.3. Diplomatic Tug-of-War.
international courses.\textsuperscript{48} It fits perfectly into the “special relations” model of the Ma administration which differs from that of the DPP as it preferred to define the routes as international.\textsuperscript{49} Since Taiwan and the mainland cannot recognize each other, at least they can reach a consensus on peaceful coexistence and mutual non-denial as proposed by Ma administration.\textsuperscript{50} In other words, it’s a kind of modus vivendi with mutual tacit acceptance of the other’s existence. But still it’s less than the FRG’s recognition of the GDR, which was conducted in accordance with West German constitutional law instead of international law.\textsuperscript{51}

Moreover, the German “roof theory” (Dachtheorie) is also very useful circumstantial evidence to contrast with the “1992 Consensus”. The official view of the German Federal Constitutional Court in 1973 was “one nation, two states” (eine Nation, zwei Staaten).\textsuperscript{52} Due to historical and geo-strategic reasons the German Empire was not founded until 1871. Hence the conception of nation, which was vivid for the Germans for centuries, is much deeper rooted in their minds as that of the state.\textsuperscript{53} But as soon as the German state had been founded the balance of power in Europe began to unravel.

As a result of the two devastating world wars, the image of a unified state for most Germans has been changed because a strong state always ended in catastrophe. Although the German people had to suffer from division during the Cold War period between 1949 and 1990, this kind of two-state modus vivendi was more or less accepted by most Germans in the West and the GDR government until unification.\textsuperscript{54} Since Chancellor Willy Brandt took office in 1969 the FRG governments accepted only the de facto existence of the GDR with the aim of not giving up the ultimate goal of reunification.

However, the Chinese experiences regarding nation and state are very different. As a result of historical humiliation brought on by colonial wars for almost a century from 1840 until 1949, the common perception was that unification is to bring dignity and prosperity whereas separation can only mean disgrace and misery. The Chinese people were


\textsuperscript{49} “The position of ‘cross Strait airline routes’ are more precise and perspicuous than ‘direct air routes’”, www.waou.com , April 21, 2008, at http://www.waou.com.mo/see/2008/04/20080421d.htm .


\textsuperscript{53} The conception of “nation” in Germany is very much different from that of France and the United Kingdom because the later two nations became states centuries earlier than the Germans. Gille, Hans-Werner (1977): Nation Heute. Probleme des Staatsbewusstseins und Nationalgefühls, München, Bayerische Zentrale für Politische Bildungsarbeit.

affected by the humiliation so profoundly. Consequently the Chinese find the concept of “one nation” with no problem but they would never accept “two states”.

That is one of the major reasons why the PRC adheres so firmly to the “one China principle” and the policy of “one state two systems”. As for Taiwan, Beijing could at most endure the policy of “one China with different interpretations” which was immerged from the bilateral negotiations in 1992.

To sum up, Ma’s conception of the cross Strait relations is nothing more than a return to the ROC constitution. But what is new is the definition with “special” characteristics. However, it’s significant that the mutual acceptance of the “special relations” formula can serve as the solid basis for the further developments on the both sides. Moreover both Taipei and Beijing accept tacitly the existence of the other on the basis of the “1992 Consensus” but with no de jure binding effect. Accordingly, the German experiences are helpful to manage the cross Strait issue but only have selective implications.

3.3. Diplomatic Tug-of-War: Continuity and Change

In February 2008 the ROC, still under President Chen, attached with generous aid programs, belongs to the first countries which extended official recognition to the newly independent Kosovo. Unfortunately it was rejected by Pristina obviously for fear of Beijing’s repercussion. This is a clear evidence of the critical situation of Taiwan’s diplomatic status. Many observers in the West worried that the establishment of diplomatic ties with Taiwan would torpedo all efforts to settle the Kosovo question in the Security Council.

As for the Ma administration, according to its diplomatic truce policy, it is very much unlikely that they will do the same without prior consultations with Beijing. Hence the state visit of President Ma in August 2008 and May 2009 to South and Central American countries and his transits in the US were all very low profile. Unlike his predecessor President Chen, he didn’t take advantage of these visits to stress Taiwan’s independent statehood in order to refrain from clashing with Washington and Beijing. Surely it is important to secure ties with the only 23 diplomatic allies which recognize the ROC especially because six of them have shown interest in switching official recognition from Taipei to Beijing. It would mean no more than adding flowers to embroidery of the PRC’s 169 friends in the world but it would be a heavy blow to the Ma administration.

Therefore, temporarily, Beijing stopped luring the allegiance of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and chose to delay their above requests in order to echo Taipei’s diplomatic truce. As service in return, Taipei has downgraded its bid to rejoin the UN as a full member and is only aiming to join at its sub-organizations in 2008. On the other hand, the Ma administration has indicated implicitly that it’s cross Strait policy has priority over its foreign policy which proves how much importance it attaches to the relations with the mainland. Therefore despite Beijing’s skeptics over certain aspects of Taipei’s positions the interactions between the two sides are still fruitful and virtuous. In May 2009 Taiwan could join the WHA as an observer under the title of “Chinese Taipei” is the best evidence.

3.4. Trade Aspects with Spillover Effect

For Taiwan in 2007, the cross Strait trade volume amounted to $90.4 billion (+16.1% compared to 2006) which accounted for 19.4% (+1.3%) of its total foreign trade. The trade surplus of $46.2 billion (+20%) exceeds Taiwan’s whole trade surplus of $25.2 billion by $21 billion. Since 2006 the PRC surpassed the US and Japan and becomes Taiwan’s largest trading partner. Adding Hong Kong Taiwan’s trade volume within the greater China area approaches 28% According to ROC statistics, there are over a million Taiwanese people who live in China for the sake of their business interests. Compared to the relations between the two Koreas (bilateral trade in 2007 a mere $1.8 billion), despite both cases of political confrontation it’s a rather unique situation. Is this Chinese pragmatism?

These statistics show, that Taiwan’s dependence on China, with 28% of island’s total trade volume, or $32 billion and 79% more than that of the US, is tremendous. On the one hand it’s a solid fundament with spillover effect for the vigorous development of the cross Strait relations. On the other hand, it gives Beijing a useful vantage tool to manipulate Taiwan in due course. Judging from the neo-functionalist perspective, enormous bilateral trade volume could have a spillover effect to increase the momentum of mutual investment, multi-national cooperation, relevant workforces, law making, images and finally political decisions.


65 “Cai Jie, Zhuang Zonming, Jingmao guanxi dui guoji heping de yingxiang yanjiu——jianlun liangan jingmao guanxi dui liangan heping de zuoyong. The impact of economic and trade relationships on the international peace, with special discourse on the function of Cross-Strait economic and trade relationships to the cross Strait peace”, at www.wise.xmu.edu.cn/youth-forum2008/.../.
Nonetheless, it’s extremely difficult to establish the real extent of these effects. Yet, as Fuller argues, despite massive outflow of Taiwanese capital in form of investments to China (\$9.9 billion, 2007, annual growth 30%), and the transfer of manufacturing branches to the mainland, locals employed in industry between 1992 and 2005 remains almost the same.\(^{67}\) That reveals the contribution of bilateral trade to the successful innovation of Taiwan’s industry.

Moreover leading politicians from both sides claim, although with different intentions, that the bilateral trade and economic relations could narrow the political gap between themselves.\(^{68}\) An inference can be drawn that China wants to improve its image of the Taiwanese to realize reunification while Taiwan tries to bring about peaceful transformation of the communist system on the mainland. Additionally Taiwan’s entrepreneurs in China who support the DPP have been warned by Beijing of the dire consequences of advertising independence.\(^{69}\)

Therefore, the author would argue that promoting the bilateral trade and economic relations serves the best interests of the two sides. In addition, establishing formal channels and legal structures could increase mutual understanding and reduce hostility as well as limit the risk of military conflict just as neo-functionalists claim.

### 3.5. Cultural & People-to-People Aspects

In President Ma Ying-jeou's inaugural speech, he claimed that the people of the two sides belong to the “Chinese nation” together and called the 1.3 billion people on the mainland “compatriots”.\(^{70}\) With this clear definition, he tried to distinguish his position from that of the DPP who consider the Chinese on the mainland as foreigners. Soon afterward rectification measures in this regard were introduced. In stead of “China” the official usage of the government will now be “mainland”, “Chinese Communist Party” or “Beijing Authority” etc. with the implicit implication of “one nation”.\(^{71}\)

This distinguishes the Ma administration policy from that of the DPP that treated China as a foreign country and also differs from that of the German case from SBZ to DDR.\(^{72}\)

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Nonetheless, during the Chen administration, despite serious political confrontation with Beijing, the people to people exchange between the two sides constantly increased. Since the last decade 47 million visits were made from Taiwan to the mainland as opposed to 1.63 million visitors from the Mainland to come to Taiwan.⁷³

From a social constructive perspective, however, there are still dissents over the question of history especially the Sino-Japanese war and the civil war until 1949 as well as the aftermath development in Taiwan. Since the process of reconciliation between the two sides begins it is increasingly compulsive for Beijing to face the reality. Yet, already for some years, Beijing has started a process of public education with films, exhibitions and TV series on the ROC before 1949 with the aim to improve the images of the KMT.⁷⁴

Furthermore, in the current Chinese high school history textbook it illustrates as simple as that the Taiwan Strait separates the people of the two sides since the KMT “retreated” from the mainland in 1949.⁷⁵ Compare to the statement of the White Paper of 2000, replacement by the PRC and ROC ceases to exist, as aforementioned, it sounds almost the same as the term used in Taiwan.⁷⁶ It’s one of the most important social constructive measures that the Chinese government has adopted before it the can truly face reality.

Although it’s still difficult for both sides to reach accord on these issues, Ma’s policy on cultural identity could strengthen the mutual trust. In addition, Beijing has promoted a campaign of Confucius renaissance since 1980’s.⁷⁷ The foundation of the “Confucius Institute” abroad since 2004 is irrefutable evidence which enhances the rapprochement with Taiwan.⁷⁸ On the other hand, it’s still too early to realize the impact of Taiwan’s democracy on the mainland. But the effect of “change through rapprochement” (Wandel durch Annäherung, Egon Bahr, 1963) can not be underestimated.⁷⁹ Once the course is set and the train has departed, it is difficult to make a detour.

4. Conclusion

To sum up, generally speaking, the international environment and the perspective of the cross Strait relations for the Ma administration are both very promising. Many analysts suggest that the Obama administration could start from the relatively good relation basis that President

⁷⁴The exhibition in the “Anti-Japanese War Museum” in Lugochiau rectifies in various aspects the KMT’s war time contribution. Besides, among others, the recent film: “One Man Olympic Games” describes the first Chinese participant in the 1932 Olympic Games in Los Angles with often emphasis of the ROC.
⁷⁶“Chundu gauzhon lishikeban – zhanhao chuchi de Taiwan I: Taiwan guanfu yu ererba shijian. Reread high school textbook of history, Taiwan in early post-war era I: The Taiwan Retrocession and February 28th Event of 1947", Tony Huang39, at www.tonyhuang39.com/tony0566/tony0566.html . In original Chinese textbook is “退” (retreat) whereas in Taiwan “播” means “move” or “remove”.
⁷⁹Vor 40 Jahren...Wandel durch Annäherung, at http://www.fes.de/archiv/ stichwort/wda.htm .
Bush had built with Beijing. Pragmatic cooperation measures between the two great nations are likely to continue especially amid the tremendous challenges of the world financial crisis. In this regard the EU has also stressed its stance by welcoming foreseeable peace and stability in the cross Strait region. Under these circumstances, Taipei’s mainland and foreign policy fit well in this political constellation of the big powers and the trend of globalization.

Given positive developments in bilateral trade and people to people exchanges across the Strait, Beijing’s skeptics over Taiwan can not be reduced until the mutual trust and confidence are (re-) built. Hence, CBM are high on the agenda for the both sides. Not only neo-functionalist but also social constructive approaches are required. The process: “now (it) grows together what belongs together” (Jetzt wächst zusammen, was zusammen gehört), as Willy Brandt formulated in 1989, has just begun.\(^80\)

From another perspective, at least in the foreseeable future, the possibility of a military conflict between the two sides is rather slim so long as the KMT course, not to challenge Beijing’s limits, continues. This would help China greatly in creating a peaceful environment favorable for its development. According to A. Wendt\(^81\) the author would argue that the stand of current relations across the Strait has already moved from in between the Hobbesian (enmity) and the Lockean (rivalry) stadium to that of in between the Lockean and the Kantian (friendship) stage. With willing and cautious intentions the cross Strait relations is moving toward the Kantian dimension.

Last but not least the issue of sovereignty still remains unsolved. For decades some of Taiwan’s politicians and scholars have been advocating for German experiences to be taken as a reference to the cross Strait relations but that has been constantly rejected by Beijing.\(^82\) However, things have also been changed as shown by the recent acceptance of the “special relationship” concept derived from the German Ostpolitik. It’s a good sign of the liberation of Beijing’s mindset. In this sense, there is hope that Taiwan’s international space problem could gradually be solved.

However, Beijing will never abandon its ultimate goal to reunite with Taiwan. But so long as there is no consent among Taiwanese people in this regard, Beijing will still have to take the possible serious consequences into account if it acts rushly. Whether Germany’s past will be the cross Strait’s future still remains to be seen.