GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND THREATS: EUROPEAN AND US APPROACHES

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Abstract:
This article presents the similarities and differences that there are between the European Union and the United States with regard to global security approaches, as well as their implications for NATO. The European Security Strategy emphasises challenges and global threats, leaving aside traditional security problems that are on the European periphery. The United States, on the other hand, which is a global military power, tends to consider European security problems in a more global context. The article covers the policies implemented by the European Union and the United States to tackle global challenges, and explains the similarities and differences in order to understand the crucial problems that NATO Member States need to face to give consistency and permanence to the new NATO Strategic Concept that is being developed.

Keywords: NATO, European Security, European Security Strategy, Global challenges and Threats, National Security Strategy of the US.

Resumen:
Este artículo presenta las similitudes y diferencias que existen en las aproximaciones de seguridad entre la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos, así como sus implicaciones para la OTAN. La Estrategia de Seguridad Europea enfatiza los desafíos y amenazas globales, dejando en un segundo plano los problemas de seguridad tradicional existentes en la periferia europea. Los Estados Unidos, por su parte, que es una potencia militar global tiende a considerar los problemas de seguridad europea en un contexto más global. El artículo hace un recorrido por las políticas puestas en pie por la Unión Europea y los Estados Unidos para hacer frente a los desafíos globales y explica las similitudes y diferencias en orden a entender los problemas cruciales que los estados miembros de la OTAN tienen que abordar para dar consistencia y permanencia al nuevo concepto estratégico de la OTAN que se está elaborando.

Palabras clave: OTAN, seguridad europea, Estrategia de Seguridad Europea, desafíos globales y amenazas, Estrategia de Seguridad Nacional de los EEUU.

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1. Introduction

One of the principal questions to be clarified for the renovation of the NATO Strategic Concept is undoubtedly if NATO is going to be an essentially regional organization or if the global challenges and threats already demand a deep transformation of NATO in order to become a more global organization.

Prior to this, a basic question needs to be clarified. What is the current international system?

The reality is that the international system has passed in one decade from being a unipolar system dominated by the United States, with a strong trend to unilateralism, to a more multipolar system. This sea change was induced by the US weakening in power and leadership as a consequence of bad decisions made by the President Bush administrations and the rise of global powers such as China, India or Russia, regional powers like Brazil, and the decline of the European Union, considered to be an international global player.

This redistribution of power is also induced by the world economic crisis, with large indebtedness and a huge budget deficit in the US, and weak economic growth in the EU and US, in contrast with the economic growth of Asian states, and the questioning of the dollar as the principal reserve currency.

In this context of the relative weakening of the US and the EU, the analysis of the global threats and challenges that can affect NATO are of major interest, as well as the role NATO, the US and EU have to play in the international system to confront and manage these threats and challenges.

2. NATO Enumeration of Global Challenges and Risks

The 1999 NATO Strategic Concept presented a description of security challenges and risks in the first part. Some of them could be recorded in and around the Euro-Atlantic area, including the possibility of regional crises at the periphery of the Alliance.

Others were more global in nature:

- Powerful nuclear forces outside the Alliance
- The proliferation of NBC weapons and their means of delivery
- The global spread of technology that can be of use in the production of weapons
- Information operations by State and non-state adversaries designed to disrupt information systems
- Terrorism, sabotage and organised crime
- The disruption of the flow of vital resources
• The uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people\(^2\)

Some of these were real threats, not merely risks and challenges, and all the list is still relevant and valid more than ten years later. As we will see the majority of them are included in the European Security Strategy.

3. The European Union Definition of Challenges and Threats

Nevertheless, it is important to stress the different approaches that already exist between the European Union and NATO and the United States in some challenges and threats that are considered global in order to understand the difficulties and asymmetries that still exist, and the difficult consensus on NATO as a more global organization.

For the European Security Strategy, Europe still faces security threats and challenges but the approach was not very realistic and convincing. The document does not focus mainly on regional security problems existing on the EU periphery, something that was always considered a priority, although it mentioned the conflict in the Balkans in the beginning as a reminder that war has not disappeared from the continent and there is also a heading in the second part of the document entitled “Building Security in our Neighbourhood”. In the document, Europe sees itself as a global player which should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world.

Thus, a clear asymmetry and contradiction exists. NATO is for the European member states mainly a regional security and defence organization, but the European Union sees itself as essentially a global player which has to focus on global challenges and threats given the context of security presented in the European Security Strategy. Regional security is apparently a secondary part in the three strategic objectives presented in the document that are centred on global threats and challenges “in a world of global threats, global markets and global media”.

The challenges and threats, as defined in the European Security Strategy\(^3\) and the Report on its implementation\(^4\), are the following:

3.1. Challenges

• Challenges created by globalization: European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields.

• Challenges coming from the developing world: poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns.

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Challenges coming from competition for natural resources: notably water, which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions.

Challenges coming from energy dependence: Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports will rise to 75% in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa.

3.2. Threats

- Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: this is potentially the greatest threat
- Terrorism
- Regional Conflicts
- State failure
- Organised Crime including Piracy
- Climate Change
- Cybersecurity

All these challenges and threats, including the approach to regional challenges, are considered global, not merely regional.

4. Addressing the Global Threats and Challenges: the EU and the US

For the European Union none of the new increasingly complex threats and challenges are purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means.

And in a world of “global threats, global markets and global media, the European security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system.”

But another important question to be underlined is that the European Union approach as a “global player” for addressing some threats and challenges is not always the approach

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5 In the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, “Providing Security in a Changing World”, it is stated that “concerns about energy dependence have increased over the last five years”. Five years after the publication of the European Security Strategy, energy security was emphasized, taking into consideration that European imports came “from a limited number of countries, many of which face threats to stability”.

6 Piracy was not included in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

7 Climate change was not included in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

8 Cyber attacks were not included in the 2003 European Security Strategy.

that the US maintains, nor have both maintained the same degree of commitment, the same priorities or used similar tools and policies.

4.1. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

WMD have been developed depending on the growth and expansion of new technologies and the advances in knowledge. At present we have three big challenges in this field:

- The renaissance of nuclear power in developing countries, their technological development and the need to reduce Greenhouse gas emissions.

- The advances in the chemical industry in numerous emergent States\(^\text{10}\).

- And finally the development of biotechnology. In this last case it is necessary to emphasize the notable development of biotechnology faculties and departments besides the development of the big pharmaceutical laboratories of different companies, and plant, food, medicine and environmental biotech\(^\text{11}\).

Close to this it is necessary to underscore the trade of sensitive technologies for WMD's production that can allow its acquisition by non state actors and terrorist groups.

It is necessary to stress that in principle big discrepancies do not exist between the United States and the European Union in the consideration of WMD as a global challenge. Both the US and the EU have approved strategies against the proliferation of WMD. But in the European programme of action, the EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions, in particular the biological weapons convention. On this last point there were strong disagreements with the President Bush administrations.

However the EU as such did not sign any of the treaties prohibiting or limiting WMD, the Chemical weapons convention, the Biological weapons convention, or the NPT, because it

\(^{10}\) “Western commodity chemical companies are shifting to growing opportunities with a focus on the Asia-Pacific region and other areas within the developing world. With a small but growing share, the Middle East has significant potential advantages in low-cost hydrocarbon feed stocks and therefore continues to attract significant new capacity. It is forecasted that China and the Middle East will contribute 78 percent of new capacity by 2013. Meanwhile, the chemical industry continues to play a key role in the economies of the United States and the European Union”. See “Chemical Industry Needs New Strategies to Regain Profitable Growth”, 17 December 2009, at http://www.chemicalprocessing.com/industrynews/2009/131.html.

\(^{11}\) Regarding biotech industries and the biotech revolution that is already underway, Anthony F. Hillen proposes a division of 4 categories of countries:

1. Countries with biotech industries considered to be cutting-edge like the US, Japan, Europe, China, and India.
2. Countries with differing levels of international engagement and commitment to biological weapons conventions. Countries in this category would include those with significant agricultural biotech development like Brazil and Argentina, but would also include states with advanced R&D operations like South Africa, Egypt, Cuba, Israel, and South Korea.
3. Countries with relatively undeveloped biotech industries that are unlikely to bridge the economic and technological expanse between themselves and countries previously mentioned in the foreseeable future. Countries like Dubai, UAE, Kenya, and Thailand act more like tax shelters, labor reserves, or junior partners to multinational biotech companies.
4. Failed-states like Somalia as well as countries with large and ungoverned territories that could potentially provide sanctuary for terrorist activity.

did not yet have its own juridical status. Neither has the EU any status in the control regimes, such as the NSG\textsuperscript{12} or the Zangger Committee\textsuperscript{13}, though the EU Commission is a member of the Australia Group. Nor has it a defined status in initiatives like the proliferation security initiative and it has only an observer status in the global initiative to combat nuclear terrorism.

Important differences have existed in the US and the EU positions in multilateral forums, in particular regarding the implementation of the 1995 NPT Review Conference resolution\textsuperscript{14} and decisions, and the positions maintained in the NPT review conferences, in particular the review conference of 2005.

The EU Strategy emphasises prevention, working through the UN and multilateral agreements, using political and financial instruments and working with third countries and regional organisations to enhance their capabilities to prevent proliferation\textsuperscript{15}.

But the effectiveness of counter proliferation policy (diplomatic, intelligence, and military efforts to combat the proliferation of weapons) goes beyond what the European Union and the US can carry out, as has been demonstrated in the cases of Iran\textsuperscript{16} and North Korea\textsuperscript{17}. Consensus and agreements in the UN Security Council are fundamental.

On the subject of nuclear disarmament the European position has been favourable to nuclear disarmament, seeing it from the perspective of the consensus and agreements adopted in the 1995 NPT Review Conference. But from the practical point of view, the European Union has had an irrelevant role in this field, in spite of having two nuclear states, France and the United Kingdom.

\subsection*{4.2. Terrorism}

Regarding terrorism, EU and US cooperation is closer than ever and the EU is a key law enforcement partner. Both consider international terrorism as a global threat but they differed on how to fight terrorism. The EU responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. After the Madrid and London attacks the EU adopted the 2004 Hague Programme, and in 2005 a new Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs. These measures adopted have made it easier to pursue investigations across borders, and co-ordinate prosecution. The European Union has incorporated the fight against terrorism into all aspects of the EU's external policy but has been reluctant to accept the US approaches on war on terror. The 2005 Counter-Terrorism Strategy is based on respect for human rights and international law. The appointment of the Counter-Terrorism Co-ordinator has been another step although an EU organization similar to

\textsuperscript{12} The Commission of the EU is only an observer.
\textsuperscript{13} The Commission of the EU is only an observer.
\textsuperscript{14} The Resolution on the Middle East has significant consequences. The acceptance of de facto nuclear states in the Middle East is not possible. This also has implications for Iran.
\textsuperscript{15} For the EU “more work is also needed on specific issues, including: EU support for a multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle; countering financing of proliferation; measures on bio-safety and bio-security; containing proliferation of delivery systems, notably ballistic missiles. Negotiations should begin on a multilateral treaty banning production of fissile material for nuclear weapons”. See “Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy”, \textit{op. cit.}, p.3.
\textsuperscript{16} The EU approach towards the Iran nuclear program, once the program was disclosed in 2002, was more sophisticated and sound than the US approach. Nevertheless only North Korea was mentioned as a threat in the European Security Strategy of 2003. South Asia was mentioned as a nuclear risk.
\textsuperscript{17} The European Union is not a member of the six party talks. That is a serious rectification to the EU pretension to be a global player.
the US Homeland Security, a strong coordinating center or a lead agency does not exist. But the European Union never considered itself at war, even after the Madrid and London attacks. Differences in U.S. and European approaches become more salient as Washington broadened the war against terrorism beyond Al Qaeda and Afghanistan. Most EU members have considered terrorism primarily as a law enforcement issue, asking for political action, rather than as a problem to be solved by military means. The European Security Strategy considers that addressing the terrorist threat “may require a mixture of intelligence, police, judicial, military and other means” demanding also inter-cultural dialogue, addressing extremist ideology and tackling discrimination.

The Obama Administration has stopped using the phrase war on terror, widely disliked in Europe, focusing on a war on Al Qaeda and Afghanistan, considered the “central front” in the war on terror, avoiding the accusations of waging a war on Islam. Another significant change is the displacement of military power as the pre-eminent response to terrorism, in favour of employing the full panoply of tools from law enforcement and the justice system to international intelligence networks and diplomacy. Thus the confluence of approaches for addressing terrorism is now a reality, but other agreements on practical steps are needed.

4.3. Illicit Trafficking and Organised Crime

In fighting illicit trafficking and organised crime the common assessment is clear: “Organised crime poses an exceptionally high security risk threatening the stability of the global economic system and, in some states, the political system. Organised crime is characterised by the systematic perpetration of coordinated serious crime by criminal groups or organisations. It is considered by the EU and US as a common threat that requires the expansion and intensification of bilateral cooperation.”

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20 After the attempted act of terrorism on 25 of December 2009 aboard an Amsterdam to Detroit flight, President Obama, remembering the inaugural address, used the phrase “our nation is at war”. He said: “…On that day I also made it very clear our nation is at war against a far-reaching network of violence and hatred, and that we will do whatever it takes to defeat them and defend our country, even as we uphold the values that have always distinguished America among nations”. Obama, Barack: “President Obama Outlines Steps Taken to Protect the Safety and Security of the American People” Weekly Address, White House (02 January 2010), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/weekly-address-president-obama-outlines-steps-taken-protect-safety-and-security-ame.


22 According to Kristin Archick, op. cit in note 14, other aspects of disagreement are the following: the United States expects intelligence from others, but does not readily share its own; the security and legal impediments to using intelligence information in courts of law; the European opposition to the U.S. death penalty or resistance to handing over their own nationals may still slow or prevent the extradition of terrorist suspects, and some differences in the U.S. and EU terrorist lists; and differences in the U.S.-EU data protection regimes that have complicated closer cooperation on border controls and travel security.

23 In the last EU-US summit celebrated in Washington, it was stated that they seek to expand and intensify cooperation notably in the following areas: trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, sexual exploitation of children, including depictions of such abuse of children on the Internet, drug trafficking, trafficking of other illicit goods, financial crime, cyber crime, corruption, tracing and confiscating the proceeds and instrumentalities of criminal activity. See on “Enhancing transatlantic cooperation in the area of Justice, Freedom and Security”, EU-US Joint Statement (28 October 2009).
But this common perception has been hampered by several problems.

In the first place, the lack of unity in action. The European member states cooperate against organised crime in many forums. But operational cooperation and common action are still difficult tasks. The organization of the different EU police services and criminal justice systems are not similar. Added to this is the difficulty of sharing criminal intelligence among the different police services.

Europol cannot overcome these fundamental problems and asymmetries. Its mission is to support and strengthen action by the law enforcement authorities of member states in their fight against serious forms of organised crime. Progress on better coordination, transparency and flexibility across different agencies, at national and European level has been qualified as slow and incomplete.24

The Lisbon treaty has tried to surmount some of these problems, establishing that the European Union shall share competence with the Member States in the area of freedom, security and justice,25 but guarantees that the fundamental principles of Member States' legal systems are respected and will allow "enhanced co-operations" to enable Member States to apply a specific measure if they so wish. The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers will have the power of co-decision, for adopting by qualified majority minimal rules defining the crimes and punishment for a certain number of cross-border crimes, such as terrorism, drugs and arms trafficking, money laundering, sexual exploitation of women, or cyber-crime.

The US would like to use the EU as the interlocutor but clearly sees the present limitations. The US does not take Europol, an incipient European police force, very seriously and prefers bilateral links with law enforcement agencies in almost every EU country, and has negotiated many separate instruments with EU member states on criminal justice cooperation and extradition.26

On the other hand, the EU countries find it difficult to coordinate with over 50 US federal agencies dealing in criminal intelligence.

Another question is the question of priorities. For the US the largest international crime threats, in terms of their potential impact, include (1) smuggling of nuclear materials and technology; (2) drug trafficking; (3) trafficking in persons; (4) intellectual property crimes; and (5) money laundering.27 For the EU, the priorities in the fight against organised crime for 2009/2010 are: (1) drug trafficking; (2) trafficking in persons; (3) fraud, corruption and

25 According to article 83, the European Parliament and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, establish minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the areas of particularly serious crime: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, illicit drug trafficking, illicit arms trafficking, money laundering, corruption, counterfeiting of means of payment, computer crime and organised crime. Other areas can be added depending on the developments in crime, the Council may adopt a decision identifying other areas of crime. And directives may establish minimum rules with regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in an area which has been subject to harmonisation measures.
26 Brady, Hugo: “The EU and the fight against organised crime”, Center for European Reform (April 2007), p. 32-34
money laundering, as well as other activities related to the presence of organised crime in the economy.\textsuperscript{28}

Regarding Piracy, it is considered to be a new dimension of organised crime by the EU and it can also be a result of state failure.\textsuperscript{29} The EU has responded, using different means: diplomatic, political, development assistance, humanitarian aid, reinforcing the security sector, including law enforcement, training of soldiers and launching an ESDP naval mission, Atalanta, off the Somali coast,\textsuperscript{30} alongside NATO, other countries affected and international actors. For the EU an integrated civilian/military approach is needed. For the U.S. it is also a question of bringing stability to Somalia, promoting reconciliation and economic opportunity, bolstering the TFG and its security sector, eliminating the terrorist threat,\textsuperscript{31} and addressing the humanitarian situation.\textsuperscript{32} To do that a multinational and multidimensional approach is needed.

\subsection*{4.4. Climate Change}

Climate change and its security implications arrived late on the US agenda. One of the main problems that the international community had when tackling environmental challenges in previous years was precisely that the United States, considered to be the world’s biggest polluter, had neither signed the Kyoto protocol nor adopted policies to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions.

The EU, on the other hand, has consistently taken the lead in efforts to reduce the impact of climate change. But the linkage of climate change and security was made quite late at the official level. Climate change did not appear in the European Security Strategy of 2003, although the document recognised the link between global warming and competition for natural resources. It was included in the revision of 2008. In March of this year, the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Commission had presented a report to the European Council which described climate change as a "threat multiplier".

Natural disasters, environmental degradation and competition for resources were considered as important drivers for the exacerbation of conflicts in the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, especially in situations of poverty and population growth, with humanitarian, health, political and security consequences, including greater migration.

In the March report, under the heading of “threats”, more detailed information on the forms of conflicts driven by climate change were presented:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Conflict over resources
\end{itemize}


• Economic damage and risk to coastal cities and critical infrastructure
• Loss of territory and border disputes
• Environmentally-induced migration
• Situations of fragility and radicalization
• Tension over energy supply
• Pressure on international governance

In the US, little by little a broad consensus emerged among security experts that global warming was a national security threat. I can quote the 2007 study by the Center for Naval Analysis\(^\text{33}\) that concluded that “projected climate change poses a serious threat to America’s national security”, the joint report by the Center for a New American Security and the Center for Strategic and International Studies\(^\text{34}\), which described conditions arising from global warming and underlined that “left unaddressed, climate change may come to represent as great or a greater foreign policy and national security challenge than any problem” among a list of challenges affecting national security, or the Global Trends 2025 report, which considered that global warming was one of three major threats that could destabilize the international system\(^\text{35}\).

After years of denial, the election of Barack Obama as president of the United States is going to change this panorama.

During the presidential campaign, Barack Obama vowed to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050, and invest $150 billion over 10 years in new energy-saving technologies. He committed the US to start reducing emissions immediately by establishing strong annual reduction targets and promised to implement a mandate of reducing emissions to 1990 levels by 2020. He also promised to make the US a leader in combating climate change around the world, re-engaging with the UNFCCC and working constructively within it, creating a new forum of largest greenhouse gas emitters, based on the G-8 plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, the largest energy-consuming countries. For non-developing countries Barack Obama pledged the creation of a technology transfer program that will export climate-friendly technologies, including green buildings, clean coal and advanced automobiles, to developing countries to help them combat climate change. This last point was considered critical for cutting the emissions of developing countries like China.

The first concrete step was taken in March 2009 when the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) declared that greenhouse gas emissions posed a danger to the public’s health and welfare, thus ending an era of denial on global warming and allowing federal regulation


\(^{34}\) Campbell, Kurt M.; Gulledge, Jay; McNell, J.R.; Podesta, John; Peter, Ogden; Leon, Fuert; R. James, Woolsey; Alexander T.J., Lennon; Julianne, Smith; Richard, Weitz and Derek, Mix: “The Age of Consequences: The Foreign Policy and National Security Implications of Global Climate Change” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Center for a New American Century, (November, 2007) at http://cas.bellarmine.edu/tietjen/Downloads/The%20Age%20of%20Consequences.pdf.

of motor vehicle emissions. And on 26 of June the House passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act. The Act will set a cap on greenhouse gas emissions. They must decline 17 percent by 2020 and more than 80 percent from 2005 levels by 2050.

It was an important and quite pragmatic step, having had to satisfy diverse sectors with opposing interests, but it was not a completely satisfactory step. Various European states, in particular France and Germany, expressed their frustration that the United States had not committed itself to deeper emissions cuts by 2020. Although the Act still has to go through the Senate, this first approval has allowed the United States to show a new face in international discussion forums regarding emissions control and climate change.

Simultaneously, the United States maintained a dialogue with China about emissions reduction that European states have been worried about, fearing a bilateral deal that could circumvent the UN process in Copenhagen, thus causing it to achieve less ambitious targets. Although John Holdren, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, played down this perception on several occasions, that is what really happened in Copenhagen.

What it is important to underline here is that the EU and the US positions were too far apart to be able to reach a satisfactory agreement in Copenhagen. European Union objectives as regards greenhouse gas emissions cuts and their timing are still a long way off.

The EU is committed to reducing its overall emissions to at least 20% below 1990 levels by 2020, and it has committed itself to scale up its emission cut to 30% on condition that other industrialised countries agree to make comparable reductions and developing countries contribute adequately to a global deal. It has also set itself the target of increasing the share of renewables in energy use to 20% by 2020. It supported a binding agreement not a political agreement and pledged to pay 7.2 billion euros over the next three years following the agreement to help developing nations adapt to climate change. Plus a fair share of the estimated additional funding that developing countries would need annually by 202036.

The US position, taking also into consideration the difficulties in passing new cap and trade legislation in the Senate, is that it has pledged to reduce emissions in the range of 17 percent by 2020, and by more than 80 percent by 2050 below 2005 levels. A mechanism to review the commitments, and exchange information in a transparent manner, has been proposed. And finally it has pledged to finance part of the financial resources to be provided by developed countries for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries, a fast-start funding that would reach $10 billion by 2012, and to engage in mobilizing $100 billion annually in financing by 202037.

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In parallel EPA declared carbon dioxide and five other compounds a public danger to public health and safety. The “endangerment” finding cleared the way for capping emissions from major sources such as coal power.
Taking into consideration the negotiations and results in Copenhagen, the EU pretension to be a leader in the process and a normative power suffered a severe correction. The US finally made an agreement with China, India, South Africa and Brazil, putting aside the EU.

Other important difficulties for common agreement will be the establishment of common priorities, taking into account the different consequences of climate change and the proximity to Europe of the most probable impacted regions: Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The increasing desertification, lack of fresh water resources, diminution in crops, natural disasters and sea level rise, in a context of population growth, apart from possible inter-state conflicts, will impoverish many countries surrounding Europe and induce the implosion of political regimes and the increasing of environmentally-induced migration flows. All this will have many security implications, in particular for Europe.\textsuperscript{38} Conflict prevention, “civilian” and military crisis management and contingency planning will become more important in a context of problems that can not be characterized as a simple matter of human security or soft security. The probability of failed states surrounding Europe is high in the medium term if the projections on climate change are finally realized.

The asymmetry with the implications of global warming and climate change for US regional security is clear.

\subsection*{4.5. Energy Security}

For the European Union, energy dependence is a global challenge. There is concern about the EU’s increasing energy dependence on outside countries, many of which are unstable.

In the report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy two questions were also emphasized:

\begin{itemize}
  \item The need for a more unified energy market, with greater inter-connection.
  \item Greater diversification, of fuels, sources of supply, and transit routes.\textsuperscript{39}
\end{itemize}

Previously, in the 2006 Paper from the Commission and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy to the European Council, two other questions were underlined:

\begin{itemize}
  \item Some major producers and consumers use energy as a political lever.
  \item The effects on the internal EU market of external actors not playing by the same market rules because of not being subject to the same competitive pressures domestically.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{39} “Providing Security in a Changing World”, \textit{op. cit.}, p.5.

plants, as well as cars, under the Clean Air Act. The reaction of the Senate was strong and they will try to block this initiative.
In fact the European Union had acted on the fashionable belief since the nineties that energy is all an issue of the market and companies, not of states. Russia happily agreed with this ultraliberal approach and thus Russian state-owned companies simply bought the gas from Central Asia and dominated the supply, through control of pipelines and export routes from Russia and Central Asia. This lack of vision has permitted the desegregation of European companies and EU countries by Russia through bilateral deals. The EU was late and reactive in the face of the thrust of Russia’s policy of divide and rule, even attracting the European state companies. The result is the present chaos in the EU. The geopolitical power Russia can now project is immense.\footnote{See in this regard Marquina Antonio (ed.) (2008) *Energy Security. Visions from Asia and Europe*, Basingstoke; New York, Palgrave MacMillan.}

The measures needed for correcting this situation are not yet implemented, given the strong division of the EU countries on the policies to be developed for dealing with Russia, and also the division of tasks among several EU Commissioners and the High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy. The situation in the EU can be described as really chaotic.

In addition to this and given the competition for energy suppliers, some European countries have tried to court favour with countries in the Middle East that are unfriendly to the United States. This situation will also be aggravated in the future given the high dependence of the UE on outside sources, and the need for diversification to avoid increasingly scarce energy supplies being shipped to Asia.

The US has maintained a more consistent position regarding energy security. However the US national strategy of 2002 did not mention energy security and the US national strategy of 2006 only included a small paragraph on energy security, explaining that “many countries are too dependent upon foreign oil, which is often imported from unstable parts of the world”.

What has differentiated the US position with regard to the EU position has been the role of the US government and its geopolitical approaches with respect to pipelines and energy supplies. This was clear in the case of the Caspian oil and gas and US rivalry with Russia. However the US did not pass any serious warning to the European allies on the suicidal policies they were implementing with regard to Russia. The main interest was twofold, of course the diversification from the Russian supplies, supporting the interests of the US energy companies, and avoiding the integration of Iranian gas reserves in the European Nabucco pipeline. In 2009 the US nominated Richard Morningstar as a special envoy for Eurasian energy to watch the situation in the region.

Apart from a strategic approach to energy, the US position has focused on:

- The economic consequences of energy imports.
- US vulnerability given that a large percentage of oil and gas is controlled by hostile or unstable regimes in the Middle East.
- The manipulation of oil and natural gas supplies by producers seeking political leverage.
• The increased competition for limited resources, most notably, oil.
• The vulnerability of the energy infrastructure to terrorist attack.

In order to manage these challenges the US is trying to break the dependence on oil, producing more energy at home, developing renewables, fuels, carbon capture, storage, and recycling technologies, promoting energy efficiency, reinforcing bilateral relations with key energy producers and improving multilateral cooperation.

The crucial differentiation between the US and UE is in geopolitical approaches. The main sources of European supplies are on its regional periphery, which is not the US case. Thus the geopolitical approaches of the US and Europe will tend to be heterogenous and in some cases contradictory given the incentives existing for a differentiation.

4.6. Regional Conflicts

The rationale for the inclusion of regional conflicts as global threats is clear in EU security strategy. Conflicts had an impact on European interests, directly or indirectly. In particular, violent or frozen conflicts, which persisted on European borders, threatened European regional stability. The experience of the years following the end of the cold war showed that conflict might lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure and it provided opportunities for organised crime. On the other hand it was estimated that regional insecurity could fuel the demand for WMD.

In this regard the approach of the US established in the US security strategy of 2006 was not very different. It stated that “Regional conflicts do not stay isolated for long and often spread or devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. Outside parties can exploit them to further other ends, much as al-Qaida exploited the civil war in Afghanistan. This means that even if the United States does not have a direct stake in a particular conflict, our interests are likely to be affected over time”.

The EU strategy for addressing this “global threat” has focused on development and measures to ensure better security. The rationale was that there cannot be sustainable development without peace and security, and without development and poverty eradication there will be no sustainable peace. Conflict prevention and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction were emphasized by the EU. The US for its part has included three levels of engagement: conflict prevention and resolution; conflict intervention; and post-conflict stabilization and reconstruction. The EU has avoided conflict intervention.

4.7. Failed States and Rogue States

The term “failed state” is a debated term in international relations. There are several attempts to define the term. I can accept the characterization presented by Susan E. Rice as “countries in which the central government does not exert effective control over, nor is it able to deliver

vital services to significant parts of its own territory due to conflict, ineffective governance, or state collapse."\(^\text{47}\)

The National Security of the US, in 2002, identified failed states as a source of threats to US national security\(^\text{48}\) but did not offer any significant analysis or policies to counter the threat. Later, it was presented by USAID as a source of the most significant security threats: international terrorism and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, an urgent matter for US aid, humanitarian assistance and development efforts, requiring close cooperation between US agencies and the non-profit sector\(^\text{49}\).

For the European Security Strategy “Collapse of the State” was initially associated with organised crime or terrorism. Five years later terrorism was dropped. The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy changed the approach stating that “State failure affects our security through crime, illegal immigration and, most recently, piracy.”\(^\text{50}\)

Failed States are considered an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability. In this regard, the European policies for confronting this source of threats emphasize development assistance and measures to ensure better security, including policies to address conflicts and regional instability.

The strategies of both the US and the EU are multi-dimensional. But they were not similar, taking into consideration the different approaches to terrorism in the US and EU.

With the new President Obama administration strategy regarding Afghanistan and the EU dropping terrorism as one of the consequences for security of failed States, the approaches might tend to be more homogeneous. They will try to treat the underlying as well as the immediate drivers of instability and state weakness. However, given the fact that there are thorny issues in these approaches, such as the question of intervention, the deployment of civilians and military forces over long periods of time and the enormous cost of the operations, the dropping of terrorism is understandable.

The European Union does not deal with rogue States as the US does in extenso in the National Security Strategies of 2002 and 2006.

4.8. Cyber Attacks

The European Security Strategy did not mention cyber attacks as a global threat. However, five years later, the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy mentioned Cyber Security, explaining that attacks against private or government IT systems in EU Member States have given a new dimension to the problem, already contemplated, of

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Other approaches underline the difficulties for defining a failed state. See for instance Logan Justin and Preble, op. cit., p. 62-66.


According to Susan E. Rice, the Bush administration showed some continuity with President Clinton’s last National Security Strategy, issued in December 1999, which identified failed states as among the threats to U.S. “interests” not to national security. See Susan E., Rice, op. cit.


internet-based crime. It was necessary to consider the attacks as a potential new economic, political and military weapon. For dealing with this threat the EU demanded a comprehensive approach, the raising of awareness and to enhance international cooperation.

Five pillars were proposed to tackle these challenges in an action plan51.

The problem is dispersion and lack of sufficient coordination in the European Union. The action plan was prepared by Viviane Reding, the European Union's Commissioner for Information Society and Media, rather than by Javier Solana or the Vice-President of the European Commission responsible for Justice, Freedom and Security52.

In the US, cyber security has been considered a major administration priority during the Obama Presidency. During the Bush administration, no single agency was charged with ensuring government cyber security, but the NSA was the principal agency in cyber protection efforts, bypassing and sidelining the Department of Homeland Security. A bipartisan commission of computer security experts urged the President-elect Barack Obama to set up a powerful national cyber security coordinator reporting directly to the president.

In the first months of his presidency a review of US cyber security was made by a team led by Melissa Hathaway, a former Bush administration official who has been serving as the interim White House cyber security adviser. And the document, Cyber Space Policy Review, was published on the 29th of May 2009. The review team recommended a short-term and a mid-term action plan53.

To coincide with the release of the findings of the comprehensive review, President Obama made a speech presenting the review54. But the nomination of the cyber security coordinator, in the person of Howard Schmidt, was made late, on the 22nd of December 2009.


52 In the Communication COM(2009) 149 final, Brussels, Belgium (30 March, 2009), it was stated that the actions proposed “complement existing and prospective measures in the area of police and judicial cooperation to prevent, fight and prosecute criminal and terrorist activities targeting ICT infrastructures, as envisaged inter alia by the Council Framework Decision on attacks against information systems13 2005/222/JHA and its planned update,14 COM(2008) 712. This initiative takes into account NATO activities on common policy on cyber defence, i.e. the Cyber Defence Management Authority and the Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence”.


54 Barack Obama said his administration will pursue a comprehensive new approach to securing America's digital infrastructure and that he planned to: 1. create a new office at the White House that will be led by the Cybersecurity Coordinator to coordinate interagency development of cyber security-related strategy and policy; he will be a member of the National Security Staff as well as the staff of the National Economic Council. The office should also include an official with a portfolio specifically dedicated to safeguarding the privacy and civil liberties of the American people. 2. develop a new comprehensive strategy to secure America's information and communications networks. 3. designate cyber security as one of his key management priorities and establish performance metrics. 4. work with all the key players -- including state and local governments and the private
Apparently the US and EU approaches are not substantially different. The main reason is that NATO’s policy on cyber defence was approved in January 2008 and was endorsed by heads of state and government at the Bucharest summit in April 2008. It provides direction to NATO’s civil and military bodies in order to ensure a common and coordinated approach to cyber defence and any response to cyber attacks. It also contains recommendations for individual NATO countries on the protection of their national systems.\textsuperscript{55}

However the new High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will need to clarify her responsibilities in this matter.

5. Conclusion

After this presentation of the global challenges and risks as defined by the European Security strategy I can explain what are, in my view, the crucial points for improving collaboration between NATO and the EU.

The first question to be underlined is that the European Security Strategy does not focus on illegal migration flows, considered by NATO to be a very pressing problem and increasingly securitized in the EU Justice and Home Affairs meetings and documents with important external consequences.\textsuperscript{56}

The second is the difficulties in achieving a single policy in the EU. The distribution of responsibilities among the EU Commissioners, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the EU States prevents the appearance of a single international agent with a consistent policy to manage these global problems. All this creates incentives for the US to deal bilaterally with the EU states.

Third, in none of the global challenges and threats presented in this article is the European Union a decisive actor in their management.

The EU pretension of leadership and of being a normative power in challenges like climate change has been shown to be an illusion. On the contrary in energy security issues neither leadership nor normative power can be projected by the Union. The EU is plunged into an authentically chaotic situation.

\textsuperscript{55} “Defending against cyber attacks”, \textit{North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO)}, at \url{http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm}.

Fourth, the European Security Strategy considers that “none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments”. The question is that hard power is in the hands of the EU states and the soft power is in the hands of the EU. Even the Petersberg tasks, included in the Lisbon treaty, are considered soft security by very significant European States. This limits very substantially the scope of the European Security Strategy.

Fifth, probably the most important question is the following one. Provided that the European Union has at its disposal a set of civil and military tools to face these global challenges and threats, even counting on the weakness of its expeditionary forces and the need for intergovernmental decision-making, apparently the EU, as a global player, is going to be the most adequate actor for dealing with these challenges and threats.

Here lies the problem. The principal questions for EU regional security that in principle constitute its priority, are managing the conflicts and possible conflicts on its periphery or relations with Russia. These topics surpass the civil and military capabilities of the EU. However, according to the European Security Strategy, where it can make an important contribution is in tackling global challenges and threats.

NATO as a political-military organization does not have the civilian instruments the EU has for dealing with all these global challenges and threats and in consequence can not deal properly with many global security issues. Military (and political) tools are important and crucial tools but are considered complementary measures in most of the global challenges presented, such as terrorism, WMD or organised crime. Even for regional conflicts and failed states, where the role of the military can become paramount, the approach tends to be multidimensional and the EU prefers to speak about conflict prevention, not conflict intervention as the US does.

This general approach can imply that all these threats and challenges being global are not a clear responsibility of NATO as a priority agent. But, given the importance of the regional conflicts affecting the European periphery and the weakness in the EU approach to them, NATO has to deal mainly with these regional defence problems. Thus NATO is condemned to be mainly a regional organization with some global roles.

This division of functions turns out to be a little bit aberrant for the US.

The reason for this apparent contradiction is, in the first place, the Washington treaty. NATO is defined in the treaty as a political and military organization.

To this, it is necessary to add the theoretical approaches underlying EU common and security policy in this decade.

- A post-modern approach to security, where the competition among states and the reconfiguration of the international system with the raising of new global and regional players were not considered. These problems had become old fashioned and nineteenth century style questions.

- The emphasis on human security.

- A vision of the EU as a civil or normative power.
• Kantian and idealist approaches much nearer to the traditionally neutral European States than to the approaches of the “Old Europe” or the Eastern European Member States of the Union.

And finally, different EU and US approaches on how to deal with Russia, the Mediterranean and the Middle East.

I can say that important differences still exist between the European Union and the United States in perceptions, approaches, priorities, incentives and possibilities in regional security problems and in the instruments and tools to face global challenges and threats. The European Union has to define not only its values but in particular its interests and what are the necessary means to be developed for shaping, according to its values and interests, the international system that is in the process of creation.

NATO needs to clarify some of these apparent asymmetries in the Strategic Concept.

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