REGIONALIZATION AND IDENTITY: 
THE SUBJECTIVITY OF KALININGRAD

AUTHOR: ANNA KARPENKO
Immanuel Kant State University of Russia, 
Kaliningrad

Introduction

Among the obvious effects of regional networks of cooperation, which are non-hierarchical in 
their principle of social organization, are the changes in the number of actors in world politics 
and their roles. The ever growing role of localization and regionalization requires new 
research methods and tools. Models based on identities, on multiple belongings of human 
beings, can be useful in explaining regionalization as a phenomenon in international relations.

In this paper the issue of Kaliningrad is examined. Most of the time Kaliningrad is treated 
as an object of international politics. However, in the context of regionalization it might be 
helpful to change the perspective and to look at the region’s subjectivity. Successful 
promotion of a new regional identity largely depends on already existing patterns of inter-
group behaviour. What kind of cultural pattern is represented in the Russian exclave? To what 
extent does it correspond with the pluralistic values, norms and attitudes of the “European 
brand”? In particular, the issues of ethno-religious relations in the oblast’ will be addressed.

1. New Regionalism, Regionalization and Identity

After the end of the Cold War and under the impact of globalization, the role of regional 
actors in European and Russian political spaces is changing; their increasing influence has 
been widely discussed and recognized. Regionalization is not a new phenomenon in 
international relations. It already existed during the Cold War and was connected mostly with 
the domains of economic integration and security. However, there is a significant difference 
between old and new regionalism.

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2 Las opiniones expresadas en estos artículos son propias de sus autores. Estos artículos no reflejan 
necesariamente la opinión de UNISCI. The views expressed in these articles are those of the authors. These 
articles do not necessarily reflect the views of UNISCI.

3 One of the different categories of territorial entities in the Russian Federation; usually translated as “region” 
(Ed.).
The research project on New Regionalism was born in the mid-1990s and is aimed to analyze the emergence of new regions in the 1990s and new forms of regional cooperation. Hettne defines the new regionalism as a “multidimensional form of integration which includes economic, political, social and cultural aspects and thus goes far beyond the goal of creating region-based free-trade regimes or security alliances.” In old regionalism a region is understood as created from above as a geographic area where states organize cooperation. New regionalism focuses on another type of region, created from below, where states do not play a central role in cooperation and integration. Such regions will attempt to become a subject of international politics. Regionalization is seen as a response to globalization, which homogenizes global space. Regionalization is a more varied phenomenon than globalization, but still it has the similar effect of homogenization of regional space and reducing the sovereignty by changing the role of nation-states. Regionalization is a dynamic, multidimensional process. Regions are not defined a priori by states or military blocs; they rather evolve through a bottom-up process and define themselves in the making. Some key dimensions of regionalization include cultural identity, the degree of economic and political homogeneity as well as security order.

According to Hettne, there are five degrees of “regionness”, or regionality, which is understood as the result or current state of regionalization: (1) region as a geographical unit, this first degree is referred to as a “proto-region”; (2) region as social system, which is characterized by various types of cross-border relations between human groups, this level is called a “primitive” region; (3) region as organized cooperation in cultural, economic, political or military fields, this degree is defined as a “formal” or “real” region, 4) region as civil society, in which the organized forms of cooperation promote social communication and convergence of values between different cultural areas of a region, this level indicates a “regional anarchical society” and 5) region as acting subject with a certain identity and legitimacy as well as capability and other qualities of an actor within international politics, thus defined as a “region-state”.

One of the most vivid examples of the new region building is the Baltic Sea region, “a dynamic third of Europe.” The concept of the Baltic Sea region and the Northern Dimension of Europe implies the integration of the countries belonging to this geographical and geopolitical unit into a cross-border network of cooperation. These networks are aimed to create “efficient economies and political stability, co-operation in planning and constructing infrastructures, the conservation of ecological systems, and the exchange over cultural, social and educational policies.”

The newly built regions are still minorities in the political game. Success in exerting more influence in international relations depends not only on material power. Ideas, innovation and

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8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., pp. 10-11.
creativity are among key factors which make minorities influential. Dynamic development of regionalization in the Baltic Sea area is closely connected with questions of identity. Kaliningrad is a part of the Baltic Sea region; therefore, a closer look at the particular patterns of ethnic and religious relations in the exclave will follow below. However, prior to the Kaliningrad identity, the issue of Kaliningrad in the relations of Russia and the European Union will be addressed.

2. Kaliningrad as an object of international politics

Kaliningrad is a special region of Russia. In May 2004 it became an exclave, i.e. a territory which has no common borders with the mainland of Russia, within the European Union (EU). It is unique in its geographical separation from the rest of Russian Federation and its neighbourhood with the EU member states. Such spatial and territorial positioning has several important aspects, such as economic, social, environmental and security-related challenges.  

The “Kaliningrad problem” constitutes a rather special item on the joint EU-Russia agenda, since both actors have different interests and approaches in regard to this region. For the EU, the “post-modern” supranational entity, the main risks associated with the exclave lie in the area of “soft security”. Kaliningrad is perceived as a potential source of instability, rooted in economic underdevelopment and a considerable difference in living standards when compared with the neighboring states. The environmental, health, and criminal problems of the region are seen as the most important security risks. The notion of sovereignty and territorial integrity does not occupy a central place in the European political discourse.

Representing a different type of political culture, Moscow, with its emphasis on the role of state sovereignty as a defining institution of the international system, is more concerned with the geopolitical implications, which have been brought to the security agenda by the exclave. Russian views on the region are often interpreted in traditional realist terms. Although the EU is not generally regarded as a “hard” military threat to the Russian borders, the “Kaliningrad issue” is however linked to the potential challenge to Russian security in a more subtle fashion: being embedded in the European economic and social space and isolated from the main territory of Russia, the oblast’ may well be gradually de facto “drifting to the West,” notwithstanding the absence of deliberate intentions from the European Union to violate Russian sovereignty. Such a situation may cause a potential impulse toward the further disintegration of Russia on a large scale, which would in turn threaten the stability of the global international system.

Yet, while attempting to explain Russia’s position on Kaliningrad, one has to keep in mind that the territorial sovereignty perspective is just one source of foreign policy thinking.

though undoubtedly a salient one. There exists another major national priority, namely, economic growth. Such growth can be achieved only by means of integrating into the world economic space and by the development of different forms of global and transnational cooperation. In spite of the commonly used positive rhetoric, referring to cooperation, in practice this process has proved to be not an easy and smooth way, since it is often connected with concessions – not always mutual – and compromise – not always symmetrical – from both sides, Russia and the EU. Certainly, it would be straightforward to conclude that the priorities of sovereignty and economic development are incompatible with each other. Rather, such asymmetry between geopolitics and geo-economics may give reason to assume that the balance and interplay of political and economic factors would exert certain influence on a state’s behavior.

The exclave situation, to a greater or lesser extent, contains potential for conflict. In the case of Kaliningrad, both sides, the EU and Russia, have common interest in preventing such conflict and in the sustainable development of the region. For Russia, such stability cannot be achieved by pursuing the isolationist federal policy toward the oblast’, first of all, considering the incentives and logic of the post-industrial economy. Autarky would lead to ossification and the speedy decline of the region. For the EU, the strategy on minimizing “soft security” risks means the involvement of the region in the structures of cooperation with the EU member states, first of all, in the Baltic Sea region. Interdependence, although partly asymmetrical in an overlapping area of interest, under certain conditions might lead to cooperation strategies chosen by both parties. In this particular case, the perceptions of Kaliningrad as a “pilot” region in the area of the EU-Russia “strategic partnership,” or as a “testing case” for the EU-Russian relations reflect the understanding by both parties of their mutual interests in the region, thus recognizing the special role played by the exclave in the international agenda. Both sides, Russia and the European Union, define their strategies in achieving a desired state of stability in terms of the dynamic development of multilateral cooperation.

3. Kaliningrad: periphery or margin?

Traditional approaches in international relations assume that states or, to be more precise, their centers, are the main actors in the political game. The names of states and the names of their capitals are routinely used in public and official discourse interchangeably, confirming this pattern. The centers of states concentrate all political power, whereas regions or

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17 On national priorities of Russian development, see President Putin’s Annual Addresses to Federal Assembly (e.g. 2005, in http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029_87086.shtml).
18 See Klemeshev, op. cit., pp. 88-104.
peripheries are treated as objects in the international game. In compliance with this pattern, in the most recent academic and politic debate Kaliningrad is seen as an object of political bargaining between Moscow and Brussels.

At the same time, the alleged status of a powerless periphery to a certain extent contradicts the stated goal of dynamic development through multilateral network cooperation since successful implementation of such cooperation policies largely depends on the active participation and influence of Kaliningraders on this process.

This is why it is methodologically helpful to view Kaliningrad from another angle, to look at the subjectivity of the exclave. Such change in perspective, suggested by Browning and Joenniemi in their study of the identity of Kaliningrad, explains how “edges, peripheries and margins can play important constitutive role in shaping the perceptions and identities of various centres.”

The authors draw on the difference between peripheries and margins given by Noel Parker. Margins and peripheries “are not merely the product of external powers,” or of the centers, but they exist in two-way relationships with those powers. Whereas periphery is subordinated to the center, margins “possess much greater autonomy and potential power.” Browning and Joenniemi explore the conditions under which a periphery becomes a margin, analyzing through the case study of Kaliningrad the following three variables: (1) the presence (or lack) of agency and identity within the margin, (2) the structure of the international/ regional environment and (3) the structuring role of the attitudes of the centre(s) towards the margin.

The authors argue that Kaliningrad is moving from the position of a periphery, which it occupied during the Soviet period, toward the position of a margin, which is characterized by much more constitutive power and influence. By no means is “successfully capitalizing on marginality” an easy task. “If a margin is able to convince the centre(s) of its uniqueness and difference, and if the margin is able to sell its marginal status as also being beneficial to the centre(s), then the centre(s) may well pick up the idea and promote its further development.” Otherwise, “a marginal status may be denied and the peripherality of a region re-inscribed.” The case of Kaliningrad, which is playing on “in-between” marginality, is complicated, since it needs the acceptance for its identity not just from one centre, but at least from two, since the EU is not a typical nation-state but a set of multilateral institutions consisting of different actors, including member states that might well have their own interests towards Kaliningrad. Moreover, the acceptance of marginality will be dependent on the character of relations among the centers involved.

Browning and Joenniemi recognize the complexity of playing on marginality. For them, the success of the enterprise depends on processes of trial and error and learning. At the same time, it is obvious that errors and mistakes are costly, especially under the conditions of

24 Ibid., p. 60.
26 Ibid., p. 7. Cited in Browning and Joenniemi, op. cit., p. 61
27 Browning and Joenniemi, op. cit., p. 62.
28 Ibid., p. 64.
29 Ibid., p. 66.
relative material powerlessness of the actor and various types of sensitivities and vulnerabilities imposed by the “in-between” marginal position. To facilitate blundering margin’s way along, I would suggest drawing closer attention to the study of identity-building and, in particular, to the theories of social influence by Serge Moscovici.

4. Social identity and communication of ideas

On all levels of social interaction cooperation is enabled by institutions, norms, rules and identities. A social identity can be defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.”30 The instrumentalist approach to identity-building that is favored by the Russian tradition of ethno-sociology31 does not view group identity with ethnicity as one of its central elements as based on people’s common origin, blood relations and territory, thus as something innate, primordial and historically determined.32 Indeed, nation and ethnicity are proved to be invented phenomena constructed by an elite and imposed on a group in order to promote certain group interests.33 Thus, identity can be deliberately re-created and reconstructed. At the same time, a set of ideas and values cannot just be imposed upon the people. Constructed identity would work only if it corresponds to the interests and attitudes of people, whether such attitudes are explicitly articulated or not.

The issue of communication becomes the central problem in identity-building. According to Moscovici, a system of group values, ideas and practices, or a social representation, has a twofold function: first, to establish an order which enables individuals to orientate themselves in their material and social world and to master it; and secondly to enable communication to take place among the members of a community by providing them with a code for social exchange and a code for naming and classifying unambiguously the various aspects of their world and their individual and group history.34 Moscovici’s social representations are not a static concept, but rather a dynamic phenomenon. Focusing on the inner structure of social institutions, on the interplay of culture and the human mind, Moscovici emphasizes the social character of cultural production. A minority can act on people and exert its influence “by a skilful handling of symbols, by the semantics of behavior and words, eliciting from its audience specific emotional and intellectual responses.”35

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Regional identity-building largely depends on the activity of a minority (elite) which seeks to construct and promote new identity as a means for group integration in order to achieve group interests. Successful communication of new ideas depends not only on their correspondence with rational interests, but also with the attitudes and cultural patterns of the majority. New images should establish emotional ties within a group.

The patterns of ethnic and religious relations of the majority are especially important in identity-building. As it will be shown below, Kaliningrad represents a rather special case in this respect.

5. Kaliningrad identity: ethno-religious patterns

Kaliningrad became a part of the Soviet Union, the predecessor of today’s Russia, quite recently, in 1945. From the very beginning, it was set aside to become a new Soviet town in the former territory of East Prussia. In the 1990s, when ethnic and religious revival came into being, Kaliningrad’s sociocultural situation was an odd amalgam of the wide-spread official Soviet and denied by officials, yet alluring, German past. That mixture made a perfect setting for post-modernity.

Königsberg and the surrounding area of East Prussia were annexed to the Soviet Union after the World War II. The demands for annexation of the German territory from the side of the Soviet Union were justified by Stalin on the grounds of fair compensation and revenge for German aggression and the sacrifices which the Soviet Union had made to win the war. Within a few years after the end of war, the German population was evicted from the region. The newcomers, many of whom came from the parts of the Soviet Union Soviet devastated during German occupation, set out for a new life. For the new authorities, it was important to naturalize a connection of the former German territory with the Soviet Union as soon as possible. Yet it was a challenging task. If appealing to traditions and history is usually regarded as an important instrument during identity-building in a time of change, then, in our case, the history was problematic. It was obvious that Russian connections to the region were limited at best. What resulted was a rather radical process of historical erasure and replacement, with the complete denial of the region’s German heritage, which in turn was substituted for the region’s Sovietization… Kaliningrad was to become a place without history, or rather a place where history was limited to the post-war period.

It was to become a truly Soviet place. History of the region was allowed to appear only with World War II. After 1945, Kaliningrad became “the most Western Soviet garrison.” A high proportion of the population was constituted by military personnel, numbering up to 100,000 of the approximately 900,000 inhabitants by the end of the 1980s. In this respect, the war epic and heroism were also important in the ideological discourse to support the status of Kaliningrad as a military fortress and outpost.

Yet Kaliningrad ceased to become a reference model for a new truly Soviet region. There were several factors which contributed to that failure. First, the high level of migration, which

37 Browning and Joenniemi, op. cit., p. 70.
was connected with the presence of military personnel and seamen, turned out to be a factor which prevented people from making roots in the region and participating in identity building. Second, despite their intentions and hard efforts, the Soviet authorities were never able to erase the past physically and mentally. The remnants of German architecture and material culture, the findings by archeological diggers, the mystified memories, myths and legends about Königsberg created a certain spirit of fascination and nostalgia for the imagined past of the destroyed town. Forbidden Königsberg was bound to become a captivating phantom. Third, despite closed borders with the West and Poland, Kaliningraders had many contacts with its not fully “sovietized” neighbors, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Besides, Kaliningrad was a large sea port. The impressions and the consumer goods, which were brought by the seamen from their voyages to the other side of the “iron curtain,” contributed to the coming into being of a kind of distinct identity for Kaliningraders, who were not perceived and did not feel themselves as “fully Soviet.” Later in the 1990s, this image began to transform into the “Western/European” type of Russians or “in-between” identity of the region. 

Social identity by its nature is multiple; there are many affiliations in its structure since each individual starts off with a cultural inheritance that might well come from many sources. Objective characteristics can be subdivided in two groups: basic or private features, which include gender, family, age, professional identifications, and broader societal or ethno-political features, which include nationality (ethnicity), subculture, religion, citizenship, or civil identities. Subjective characteristics are linked with self-estimation, self-attitude, motivations etc. Basically, for most people personal basic identities are of the greater importance; and this is true for 50-70 percent of respondents in Russia regardless of their nationality. At the same time, it is not enough to obtain just family or professional characteristics to be fully included and integrated in the society. In Soviet times the most important ideological category shaping societal behavior and attitudes was the category of sovetskij chelovek, or a “Soviet person.” It was constructed on the basis of Communist internationalism and helped to diminish ethnic tensions. In the late Soviet era its primary importance had already been largely diminished, and with the collapse of Communist system this category totally disappeared from the hierarchy of identities of the minority and majority groups. 

What identity took the place of the former category of sovetskij chelovek in mass and individual consciousness in the 1990s? From the research analysis of identity conducted by Russian sociological centers, one can draw on two relevant conclusions. First, the internationalism of the Soviet era was replaced by ethnicity. When the sense of collective identity within the Soviet state was lost, the myths and heroes of Soviet history were rapidly destroyed, and many previous national achievements were questioned. People started to think of ethnicity as something unchangeable in this time of chaos. Second, although the sense of belonging to one multicultural nation is strengthening among the citizens, ethnic identity still ranks first in the hierarchy of both the Russian majority and national minorities. In the multi-nation federal state, it might imply a potential threat for future ethnic conflicts. In this respect, it would be instructive to look at the history and present day ethno-religious scene in the exclaves Russian federal unit.

38 Ibid., p. 73.
39 See Drobizheva, op. cit.
41 See Drobizheva, op. cit.; Soldatova, op. cit.
Ethnic and religious relations in the "oblast' during the Soviet period were marked by a high degree of toleration and an absence of ethnocultural conflicts. Among others, one can name the following background of this peaceful setting. First, although altogether there were 110 ethnic groups in the "oblast' by the end of the 1980s, the largest ethnic groups were constituted by Slavic peoples, by Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who constituted in 1989 correspondingly 78 percent, 8.5 percent, and 7.2 percent of the population. Second, Kaliningrad used to be a region of Sovietization, and thus sustained the image of the Communist internationalism of the Soviet era. It would be misleading to think that the people were tolerant due to the Communist ideology imposed on them. Rather, this ideology to some extent corresponded to the much more profound and deep patterns of social communication which were characteristic for all-Russian culture. Those patterns of toleration were sustainable enough to overcome the ideological breakdown. Last but not least, what made for the remarkable tolerance of Kaliningraders, was the fact that the whole territory was settled by migrants; therefore, none of the ethnic groups could really claim a dominant status on the historical grounds of being a more rooted, or traditional community.

During the Soviet period of Kaliningrad’s history, there was no religious tension. This was largely because of the fact that there was no institutionalized religion in the "oblast' until 1980s. Religious activity was not encouraged by the atheist ideology of Communism. The planned Sovietization of the former German territory did not anticipate the construction of new churches, temples, mosques or synagogues. The requests of the post-war newcomers to establish an Orthodox parish were consequently denied by the local authorities. Although there were small communities of Baptists, Adventists and Pentecostals, by the 1980s Kaliningrad became a territory of successful “atheistization.”

Situations started to change only with perestroika in the middle of the 1980s. The first orthodox congregation was registered in 1985; in the early 1990s, the communities of Lutherans, Catholics, Muslims, Buddhists and others were institutionalized as well. At the moment, there are 42 officially registered religious organizations in the "oblast'. The dominant majority is represented by the Russian Orthodox Church. The Roman Catholics, Evangelical Lutherans, Muslims, Charismatics, Baptists, and Mormons are among the most active in the regional religious life. The history of Islam and Orthodox relations in Kaliningrad since the beginning of the 1990s demonstrates that there are some certain grounds to believe that the historical pattern of harmonious coexistence of two great world religions, characteristic for Russia, will have a good chance to be reproduced and further enriched in the "oblast'.

At the same time, while talking about religious affiliations in the post-Soviet period in Russia, it is important to consider the so called “Orthodox non-believer” paradox demonstrated by the public opinion polls, when the results show that the number of people who say that they believe in God is less than the number of whose who identify themselves with one or another traditional confession. Thus, in the 2000 poll there were 46.9 percent

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believers against 69.5 percent of whose who considered themselves Orthodox or Muslim.\textsuperscript{45} Or, according to another poll of 2002, only 77.7 percent of Orthodox claim that they believe in God.\textsuperscript{46} Such paradox allows one to assume that religious and ethnic identities are mixed; either Orthodoxy or Islam is considered by many as an essential sign of broader ethno-cultural, but not necessarily, religious identity: “If I am Russian, then I am Orthodox; If I am Tatar, I am Muslim.”\textsuperscript{47} Thus, religious identity in Russia is being defined by ethnicity and culture. Therefore, taking into account the tolerant ethnic background in the region, religious affiliations cannot be seen as one of the potential conflict-generating factors in the exclave.

**Conclusion**

Kaliningrad is usually seen as a location “where Russia is exposed not just to the forces of European integration but also to globalization at large.”\textsuperscript{48} The Europeanization of culture is one of the aspects of such exposure. Moreover, the future of the oblast’ is connected with its development within the Baltic Sea region. Successful regionalization of the Baltic Sea area will depend on the dynamic process of identity-building. However, a new identity cannot just be imposed upon the people; it should correspond with their interests, expectations, values, attitudes and emotional affiliations.

In this paper I have argued that the ethno-religious relations in the oblast’ represent a pluralistic model which allows maximum room for inclusion of people from different backgrounds. Such a model does not conflict with the liberal models of multiculturalism which are based on a “thin” conception of national identity. In such models a national identity is seen as having instrumental role. The nation provides the context within which people pursue their individual goals.\textsuperscript{49} A new European identity is also seen as being formed on the “civic”, rather than on chauvinistic platform: “Europe’s identity should be based on its celebrated diversity, its openness and inclusiveness… European identity is an act, which can experience the continuous redefinition of itself only through relationships with others.”\textsuperscript{50}

Dynamic development and growth of investments in the exclave will largely depend on how successfully a new image and reputation of Kaliningrad as a “little Russia” within the European Union will be implemented. It is a matter for further research and analysis to look at the whole variety of aspects of Kaliningrad’s identity-building where the social influence theory could be applied. As it was shown above, Kaliningrad represents a multicultural and tolerant setting for successful implementation of those challenging and ambitious tasks.

\textsuperscript{46} ROMIR-Gallup poll results in http://www.sedmitza.ru/index.html?id=200&did=2643.
\textsuperscript{47} See Mtridgev, op. cit.