Hegel’s Non-Metaphysical Idea of Freedom

(La idea no-metafísica de la libertad de Hegel)

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Abstract

The article explores the putatively non-metaphysical – non-voluntarist, and even non-causal – concept of freedom outlined in Hegel’s work and discusses its influential interpretation by Robert Pippin as an ‘essentially practical’ concept. I argue that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom must be distinguished from that of Kant and Fichte, since it does not rely on a prior understanding of self-consciousness as an originally teleological relation and it has not the nature of a claim ‘from a practical point of view’.

Keywords: German Idealism, Kant, Fichte, Spirit, postulate, teleology, mechanism, naturalism, self-legislation, autonomy, assumption, faith, Science of Logic, Idea, intentional stance, transcendental philosophy, voluntarism, compatibilism, objectivity, action.

Resumen

El artículo explora el concepto supuestamente no metafísico – no voluntarista, incluso no causal – de la libertad que se perfila en la obra de Hegel y discute la influyente interpretación que de él hace Robert Pippin como concepto ‘esencialmente práctico’. Razono que la afirmación de Hegel de la libertad debe ser distinguida de la de Kant y la de Fichte, pues no está basada en un entendimiento previo de la autoconciencia como relación originalmente teleológica y no tiene la naturaleza de una afirmación ‘desde un punto de vista práctico’.

Palabras clave: Idealismo alemán, Kant, Fichte, espíritu, postulado, teleología, mecanismo, naturalismo, autolegislación, autonomía, suposición, fe, ciencia de la
Desde 1989, Robert Pippin ha estado promoviendo una interpretación influyente ‘no-metaphísica’ de Hegel, una interpretación que enfatiza las similitudes entre su trabajo y el de Kant, y donde el sistema entero gira alrededor de una doctrina de autoconciencia.1 Según Pippin, y a pesar de apariencias, el trabajo de Hegel desarrolló el proyecto Kantiano de establecer las condiciones que permiten la conciencia de toda la subjetividad, por medio de una corrección del – racionalista – corrección que Fichte ya había hecho.2 En su comentario, el espíritu no es considerado como una entidad sobrenatural, principio o sustancia cartesiano que se manifiesta motu proprio, a lo largo del tiempo, en las vidas de individuos y pueblos, de alguna manera comprendidas o más bien sin comprensión – manifestación.3 Para Pippin, el espíritu es el espacio de las normas que se establecen los individuos para regular sus propias vidas, y, por extensión, el espacio de los individuos mismos, sus vidas y todas las dimensiones de sus vidas – como la arte, la religión y la filosofía – de tal manera que se adhieran a esos reglamentos, sean o no obedecidos con mayor o menos amplitud y éxito.4

Hay una extensión natural de esta interpretación general en las analíticas más recientes de Pippin a la teoría de la libertad de Hegel.5 En ese caso también, puede discernir un concepto no-metaphísico de la libertad en el pensamiento de la espiritualidad de Hegel y un proyecto (descendiente de Kant) de entender las condiciones que deben ser satisfechas para que nuestro (moderno) autoentendimiento como agentes que establecen sus propias normas (o nuestro razonamiento con nuestra acción, lo que es equivalente según su análisis). Además, Pippin también percibe una adhesión a un modelo de Kant, a pesar de una radicalización que puede ser considerada fichtean, y, finalmente, a pesar de la existencia de una irredutibilidad original de Hegel. En este sentido, se puede decir que tanto la interpretación general y su extensión a la filosofía de (subjetivo y objetivo) el espíritu identifican una línea continua

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1 See Pippin (1989), pp. 6, 92, 166f.
3 Among the targets of his critique of metaphysical readings is the interpretation of Charles Taylor (1975), which had considerable resonance in the English-speaking world. At any rate, Taylor’s reception – especially in Taylor 1985 – has a decisive influence on Pippin’s work, as I will later point out.
4 The spirit would be “a certain form of collective mindedness” (Pippin 1999, p. 202) or “the achievement of a collective normative mindedness” (2008, p. 17; see pp. 14 n. 14, 122). By and large, this understanding of ‘the spiritual’ is shared by other relevant contemporary vindicators of Hegel’s thought, such as Vittorio Hösl (1987) and Robert Brandom (2009).
between the thought of those three German idealists, one that does not break but partly changes its direction and substance. The result is a suggestion that Hegel’s idealism cannot be clarified without specifying its dialectical relationships with the work of his predecessors, Kant and Fichte.

In the following, I wish to question Pippin’s specific way of understanding this continuity and, therefore, the way he views Hegel’s philosophical project as well as the idiosyncrasy of his idealism. Nevertheless, I shall not propose to forsake the whole of his non-metaphysical interpretation but only his understanding of Hegel’s non-metaphysical concept of freedom and, more precisely, his way of representing and accepting what we could call Hegel’s affirmation of freedom.

I think that Hegel does distance himself, as Pippin claims, from the traditional voluntarist and metaphysical concept of freedom (the one that can be found, for instance, in the fourth of Descartes’ Meditations on First Philosophy), but without resorting to an ‘empirical’ compatibilist concept like Hume’s, which might not be metaphysical but still remains causal (in fact, one can observe how Hegel literally and simultaneously wishes to avoid empirical and metaphysical understandings). Textual proofs of this can be sought, as Pippin has done, in key passages where Hegel argues against the notion of free will, denies that the category of causality can be used to understand the connection between the subject and her actions, questions the necessary existence of antecedent intentions – which could serve as causes – in deeds and, above all, does not define spirit as an entity and freedom as a power – or the quality of a power – that characterises this entity, but defines both, spirit and freedom, as an achievement.

What I wish to debate is that, immediately after, such a non-metaphysical concept is said to be ‘essentially practical’. Of course, one could think that when Pippin characterises the concept as practical, even essentially practical, he is only claiming that it is neither a causal-metaphysical nor a causal-empirical concept, because it is the concept of a status, of an identification relationship, the – precisely practical – effect of certain historically consolidated social relations of mutual recognition among equals. But Pippin overburdens the characterization of the concept as practical by aligning his interpretation on the idealist idea of a ‘primacy of practical reason’. It is, I think, such a line of interpretation that leads him to sustain that Hegel

7 A condensed presentation of the concept of freedom Pippin attributes to Hegel can be found in Pippin (1999) and Pippin (2008), chap. 1.
8 See Pippin (2008), pp. 37 n. 4, 104. Although Pippin occasionally equates the ‘primacy of the practical’ with the undeniable ‘primacy of the ethical’ in the Rechtspolitik, the sense in which his interpretation highlights a Fichtean vein (see Pippin 2008, p. 37) is one where the ‘authority of the concept’ is established “by experiencing over time the practical impossibility of denying such authority” (Pippin 2008, p. 104), which is a variation of a historical sort on the basic Kantian experience of not being able to act except ‘under the idea of freedom’.
eludes or avoids one of the most intractable and pressing problems for Kant and Fichte, that which consists in understanding and successfully assuming the possibility of the effectiveness of practical reason’s imperatives. And this is also what leads him to clarify the way in which Hegel refers to concepts that give themselves their own actuality by resorting to Kantian arguments.

As I understand him, Pippin thinks that when we follow Hegel in conceiving the self-legislation of the will as a collective and historical achievement, the problem of the content of rational practical imperatives – the so-called problem of formalism – as well as the problem of its binding nature – its authority – and of its feasibility are solved once and for all. Consequently, Pippin requires the reader to distinguish between the primacy of practical reason Kant and Fichte subscribe to and the primacy that supposedly binds Hegel. According to his reasoning, Kant and Fichte assumed the validity and ‘reality’ of moral imperatives based on the view that we cannot act but under the idea of their feasibility and, thus, according to a moral judgement of our situation, impossible to avoid. Hegel’s originality would rest on the fact that he does not see this as a trait of human psychology, namely, in a Kantian way, but rather as a ‘logical’ obligation, a consequence of the impossibility to make sense of intentional actions, starting with our own, without adopting the perspective of freedom. But to the extent that, arguably, Fichte’s rationalist correction of Kant already leads us to perceive such a logical necessity, Hegel’s novelty should strictly and definitely be found in the sort of historical and phenomenological argument he puts forward to account for the binding and not unrealisable nature of self-legislation.

In my view, the problem with this interpretation, which as we shall see relies heavily on a phenomenological argument, is that it subjects the affirmation of the perspective of freedom in Hegel’s work to the condition that it should make intelligible the intrinsically teleological nature of consciousness, a nature that is taken for granted from the outset. This is the point of view from which the problem of the effectiveness of the ‘moral law’, rather than dissolving, turns out to have been dissolved in advance, although we have only become aware of this historically. And yet, it could be argued that Hegel builds his Logic in order to prove, precisely, without such a presumption of subjectivity, the ‘truth of teleology’. It seems to me that, consequently, the examination of the affirmation of teleology in the Logic shall end up suspending the interpretation of Pippin, a reading that certainly deserves the label of Fichtean and is itself guided by a commitment to the primacy of practical reason.

In this essay, I start out by explaining the original – Kantian and Fichtean – meaning of the ‘practical’ reality of freedom (section 1). I then offer a short account of Hegel’s general reception of Kant and Fichte’s philosophy, which leads to the

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9 See Pippin (2008), pp. 18f., 57.
conclusion that Hegel does not accept that reality (section 2). Next, I relate Pippin’s efforts to express the continuity, in spite of appearances, between the practical reality of freedom as Kant and Fichte understand it and the – also practical – reality it would have, in his opinion, for Hegel (section 3). In the last section (4), I attempt to show that the argument in the final part of the Science of Logic obliges us to deny that Hegel’s affirmation of freedom follows a Kantian model and, from there, to conclude that Hegel’s concept of freedom may be non-metaphysical, but not based on the ‘primacy of the practical’.

1. Kant and Fichte on the practical reality of freedom

In Hegel’s Practical Philosophy, Pippin sometimes depicts Hegel’s conception of freedom as unprecedented, a historical novelty. Nevertheless, in other and not less significant places, Hegel’s concept is presented as a successor – albeit an evolved one – of the Kantian concept of autonomy. What is more, Pippin’s book defends that Hegel’s doctrine obeys to a Kantian ‘model’ and connects with some foundational claims of the Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten, in particular with the Kantian demonstration of the supreme and inevitable authority of reason in matters of practical deliberation and action.

Certainly, the concept of free will outlined by Hegel in the introduction of the Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts is a formally Kantian one in the sense that it is the concept of a will whose object is freedom itself, a freedom that somehow consists – as in the Kantian view – in the ‘elevation of the particular to the universal’. However, it is more or less beyond doubt that Kant perpetuated the Augustinian and Cartesian voluntarist tradition by embracing an incompatibilist dualist conception, and that his concept of freedom is causal since for Kant, undoubtedly, the freedom of the will is the property by which it determines itself – or can determine itself – with independence of everything empirical. As a matter of fact, the Critique of Practical Reason is an attempt to prove that we do possess that power of leeway freedom or, lacking such a demonstration, that we cannot – in some way to be clarified – stop believing in it.

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12 More exceptionally, Pippin acknowledges a neo-Aristotelian dimension in Hegel’s philosophy of spirit, something Hegel himself observes, as is well known, in the Encyclopedia, but Pippin nevertheless wants to emphasise the non-naturalist character of Hegel’s concept, so that he tends to downplay that influence (see Pippin 2008, pp. 15, 57ff., 115). On the originality of the Hegelian concept, see Rorty (1999), p. 214.
13 See Pippin (2008), pp. 18ff., 69 n. 4, 105ff.
14 See Kant (1788), p. 97.
15 See Kant (1788), p. 30. Much has been said about a putative Kantian compatibilism (see, for instance, Wood 1984), but my traditional reading follows the perspective defended in Allison (1990).
Pippin sees in Hegel a continuity with the Kantian approach in the sense that Hegel, like Fichte before him, is not satisfied by a concept of freedom where the ends of the subject are strictly pre-established or alien to her (deep-rooted desires, innate inclinations, adventitious goals, etcetera). Such an ‘empiricism of freedom’, as we could call it, is precisely what Hegel finds unbearable about the concept of free will (Willkür), a concept he characterises as inherently contradictory, since it contains the idea of an ‘infinite’ choice among inevitably ‘finite’ alternatives.16

However, Pippin’s Hegel also distances himself from the contradictory, putatively Kantian idea of a freedom that sets its own ends – or norms – out of nothing. It could very well be said that Kant, Fichte and Hegel represent successive attempts to overcome the latter contradiction without falling into what I call an empiricism of freedom. Another way of framing the issue faced by all three, one that is favoured in Pippin’s work, is the following: reason obliges me to give myself a law that I can consider universally valid, but what obliges me to be rational in this sense? Note that such a law prevents the agent from immediately embracing any end that could appeal to her. This is a different way to formulate the same question, for in all cases the difficulty lays in understanding the step that leads from the absence to the presence of an obligation.

Later on I will return to this problem. For now, let us mention that the idealists also agreed, at least in principle, that philosophy must not only explain how a rational norm binds us and what content it has (a matter on which, as is well known, Kant and Hegel did not agree at all, to the extent that Hegel always thought Kant had been unable to give content to his moral philosophy, accused him of formalism and considered his aspirations to a ‘complete determination’ of the imperative as frustrated), but also how that norm can, at least to a certain extent, be observed and effectively govern our lives.

It is in this respect that the concept of freedom itself became, in the Critique of Practical Reason, ‘practical’ in a very specific sense. For this is where Kant gave birth to the so-called ‘postulates of practical reason’, which are claims made without any knowledge – any experience – of their objects, but anyhow made and even taken to be true by virtue of a practical necessity. Seven years earlier, Kant had defined the ‘practical’, in a very general sense, as all that was linked to a will that is answerable to reasons, all that was not exclusively determined by passions (that is to say, ‘pathologically’), all that had to do, as Aristotle would say, with ‘what could be otherwise’ as a result of human action and production.17 In this sense, a practical necessity was a necessity that stemmed from our capacity to respond to reasons when acting, at least to the extent, metaphysically neutral in principle, that the considerations and reflections of others could change our opinion on our cir-

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16 See Hegel (1821), § 15.
17 See Kant (1781/87), A 802.
cumstances, our view of the future and our intentions (in the first Critique, Kant labelled this capacity as ‘practical freedom’). In the Foundations, this disposition to heed reasons was interpreted by Kant as a ‘practical’ obligation to accept that we are agents, that we can autonomously bring about states and that consequently, when acting, we can escape neither prudential considerations (is this in my interest?) nor moral ones (should I do it? am I allowed to?).

The postulates of practical reason rescued some of the objects of inherited metaphysics from the questionable privilege of being – in Kantian terminology – ‘ideas of reason’. In the first Critique, the ideas of reason had turned out to be impossible to cancel, but also unknowable: as may be recalled, the book made room for faith, but not for the knowledge of the objects of faith. As for freedom, Kant had come in 1781 to view it as a virtually unintelligible idea, since it violated the ‘principle of the understanding’ according to which all events (as objects) were temporally determined by the incidence of other events. In 1788, however, when developing the Foundations’ observation that we could not act except ‘under the idea of freedom’, Kant came to the conclusion that the moral law to which we subject our deliberations could be considered as ratio cognoscendi of freedom. However, the objective reality he then attributed to freedom – as well as to God and the immortality of the human soul – did not imply the existence of freedom or the objects of other ideas but the practical need to take them as true.

The Foundations’ foundational claims invoked in Pippin’s explanation of the Hegelian doctrine are precisely those that link our usual situation as non-pathologically obliged beings (practically free beings, in the terminology of the first Critique) to what will later be called the postulate of freedom. In the second Critique, where the argument is clarified, Kant explains why our awareness of the dictates of a reason we conceive as categorically imposing norms of conduct establishes – although always only from a practical perspective – that we cannot deny being subjected to that law and even that we can act accordingly, if only because the mere intellectual contemplation of the law produces a favourable disposition of the will. This, says Kant, is the relationship that extends the theoretical knowledge of the will, although only ‘in a practical sense’, as is clarified there as well.

If we consider that Hegel, in his Logik, defines ‘ideas’ as concepts that give themselves their own actuality, there is at least a verbal coincidence between his work and the doctrine of the postulates of reason in Kant’s second Critique. The

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18 See Kant (1781/87), A 533, A803 and Kant (1785), p. 448.
19 See Kant (1788), pp. 134f. Willascheck comments: “when Kant says that these ideas of God, freedom and immortality ‘receive [...] objective reality’ (e.g. 5:135), this does not mean that their objects really exist (even though that is what the postulates postulate), but rather that the content of these ideas is specific enough in order to refer to determinate objects” (2010, p. 191).
20 See Kant (1788), pp. 46, 65f., 105f. and Kant (1785), pp. 401f.
21 Kant (1788), p. 135.
question that seems to me much less clear and nevertheless important is whether the coincidence is more than verbal.

In my opinion, more visible continuities can be found between the Kantian doctrine and that of Fichte, the intermediary, to which I will briefly turn. If the basic intentions of the first Critique can be summarised as making room for faith in freedom (and the moral meaning of human life), the motivations of the Doctrine of Knowledge might well be summarised, at least in its first versions, as strictly refuting Spinoza’s dogmatism, precisely because of its denial of freedom. A small indirect proof of this is Fichte’s suspicious reception of the Philosophical Letters published by his admirer Schelling (in two 1795/1796 issues of the Journal edited by Fichte and a colleague) precisely because he saw Schelling’s opposition to dogmatism as lukewarm. As the ‘Introductions’ to the Wissenschaftslehre in 1797 and 1798 made clear, Fichte then thought the dogmatic position somehow undermined itself and could be proven untenable.

However, in the 1800 writing on The Vocation of Man – which supposedly reiterates and divulges the positions outlined in the Doctrine of Knowledge, the Foundations of Natural Law and the System of Ethics of the Jena period (as a matter of fact the formulae of the 1800 writing inspired a large part of Hegel’s 1802 critique of Fichte’s early philosophy) – Fichte interprets the principles of his doctrine as perfectly concordant with the Kantian account of ‘pure practical rational belief’. As he argues in that work, what knowledge cannot settle about our nature as intelligent and moral beings, even about intelligence and freedom as ‘non-natural powers’, is established precisely by an organ called ‘faith’, a faith aroused, as in the Critique of Practical Reason, by the consciousness of the moral law.

Thus, when Pippin traces back to Fichte’s arguments – as he does in 2008 – what he calls Hegel’s ‘non-naturalism’, denoted by Hegel’s putative view that natural – scientific – explanations of our activities in terms of natural properties could not be satisfactory, one gets the arguably misleading impression that Hegel follows Fichte – and also Kant – along the path that goes from the consciousness of a moral law to the faith in freedom, and that he neither aspires to nor has a different argument which could allow for an affirmation of freedom that would not be ‘necessary but purely practical’, in the sense Kant and Fichte support it.

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22 By that time, Jacobi had taken it upon himself to highlight this, in case it was not already notorious (see Jacobi 1785, Appendix vii). As is well known, Fichte was driven by the Critique of Practical Reason to abjure a deterministic and fatalistic worldview that he earlier had considered inevitable.
23 See Fichte (1797), p. 510.
24 I take the expression from Kant (1788), p. 144.
25 See Fichte (1800), p. 98.
2. Hegel’s originality

However, the sharp critiques Hegel devotes to his idealist predecessors in the Jena ‘critical writings’ – especially in the Differenzschrift and in “Glauben und Wissen” – renders a reading of this sort highly implausible. The problem we must now address is how to understand Pippin’s insistent claim that the concept is practical, ‘essentially practical’, and that there is a line, albeit one ‘complex and knotty’, that leads from Kant to Hegel in this respect, while acknowledging Pippin’s awareness of this critique, an awareness which leads him to say that Hegel could not have been satisfied with the ‘practically unavoidable assumption of freedom’.27

If the issue at hand were a marginal one, if it had not been an essential part of a core of transcendental philosophy later to be overcome by post-Kantian idealism, perhaps one could admit this specific continuity without having to reject the global discontinuity. As is well known, however, one of the main areas of friction between the transcendental system and the non-transcendental one, which Hegel called speculative and defended, was the epistemological standpoint adopted by both Kant and Fichte, faithful heirs of the Cartesian paradigm, when discussing all knowledge-related issues, including the origin and status of our non-empirical ideas such as freedom.28 Hegel thought that this framework gave rise to intractable difficulties and irremediably left out of sight, in favour of scepticism, the authentic scientific perspective. His Phenomenology of Spirit set out to counteract that modern orthodoxy by, in a way, criticising the critique, in order to transcend the perspective of ‘consciousness’. This operation could not be indifferent to the balance between theoretical knowledge and practical philosophy Kant had envisaged in an original way.

That epistemological standpoint led Kant to an open dualism, to the separation of the conditions of all experience from the conditions of all speculation (in other words, to the separation of the conditions of sensibility from the conditions of intelligibility); in fact, Kant occasionally weighed, at the fringe of critical discourse, ‘metaphysical’ materialist possibilities that reason – he thought – could not resolve in either way.29 Therefore, the critique of practical reason Kant made public in 1788, including the so-called moral arguments in favour of freedom, immortality and divinity (the main themes of Descartes’ metaphysical meditations) necessarily had to be received as a palliative that connected and harmonised concepts the Critique of Pure Reason had originally set apart. As early as 1801, Hegel judged

27 Pippin (2008), pp. 13f., 41. See the concise way in which this is anticipated in Pippin (1989), p. 288 and also Pippin (2008), pp. 45, 277. Remarkably, in other occasions he tries to play down the Jena critiques by saying that Hegel then knew which idealism was unacceptable, but not which form a ‘true’ one needed to have (see Pippin 1989, p. 61).

28 Some proofs of Fichte’s acute epistemological Cartesianism can be found, for instance, in Fichte (1798/99), pp. 430, 435, 439.

29 For two famous examples of those speculations, see Kant (1781/87), A 803 and Kant (1790), B 351.
that Kant’s ideas ‘lacked reality’, a conclusion he thought should be reached after a thorough study of Kant’s moral philosophy.

Fichte tried to get rid of dualism, scepticism and the space Kant left to materialist speculation by finding his way, ascending, to what he considered the basic principle of the *Critique*: the self-consciousness of one’s spontaneous activity (or, more precisely, the underlying unity of that self-consciousness). But that ascent also ran into some obstacles. From the outset, the nature of the principle became an object of controversy and consequently required successive clarifications. Schelling understood that invoking an intellectual intuition as a principle did not disfigure the practical and postulatory nature of the activity to which the intuition was applied. After all, as the *System of Ethics* highlighted, the principle was no more and no less than a certainty (of subjectivity) on one’s activity: “I find myself to be acting efficaciously in the world of sense. All consciousness arises from this discovery. Without this consciousness of my own efficacy [Wirksamkeit], there is no self-consciousness; without self-consciousness, there is no consciousness of something else that is not supposed to be I myself”.30

If Hegel ever doubted it (he found out about Fichte’s theoretical and public rise in part indirectly as well as belatedly, while working as a tutor in Bern and Frankfurt, immersed in the study of Kant’s work), things must have been cleared up by the atheism controversy and the publication of *The Vocation of Man*, the short work mentioned above. If Fichte had reduced the space of speculation, it was not through a theoretical extension of knowledge. With all we knew, he wrote, it was perfectly compatible for the self to be a fiction, a mere representation, similar to that of any other phenomenon.31 From that abyss, he continued, we could only be saved by an unavoidable moral consciousness and a corresponding faith in the idea that we were the adequate targets of its appeals, true agents of our destiny and, thus, liable to moral judgement.32

However, Hegel apparently perceived an incongruity between the aspirations of Fichte’s system – including its accompanying declarations – and its results. In 1802, he wrote that Kant’s system was preferable to Fichte’s, since Kant at least was aware of the restricted, qualified nature of his claims. What I have called Kant’s materialist speculations were a proof of that consciousness. In Hegel’s opinion, however, Fichte ignored or pretended to ignore that the principle of his *Doctrine* – as for Kant, faith – was a subjective one: he did not recognise the subjective character of the initial postulate.33 For many readers – including Schelling who, during his polemic correspondence with Fichte, appealed to what he took to be the percep-

30 Fichte (1798), p. 22.
31 See Fichte (1800), p. 83.
32 See Fichte (1800), pp. 94, 128.
33 See Hegel (1802), p. 345.
tive analysis in Hegel’s *Differenzschrift* – Hegel’s conclusion definitively sealed the fate of the *Wissenschaftslehre*.\(^{34}\)

Particularly in the light of “Glauben und Wissen”, it is difficult to accept that Hegel endorsed the primacy of practical reason in the affirmation of freedom, based on the lack of any argument – as was apparently the case for Kant and Fichte – that would lead to its affirmation without assuming the (subjective) certainty of one’s activity or the inevitability of a postulate (as difficult as to accept that Hegel deeply misunderstood the relationship between his system and Fichte’s). What would need to be cleared up is which other argument he relied on in order to avoid renouncing to freedom. In my opinion, this must be sought in the *Science of Logic*, a work Hegel himself saw as containing an ‘ontological argument’ that was not in favour of the traditional God but precisely of ‘personality’, ‘Ichheit’ and ‘freedom’ *in general*.\(^{35}\) It was in the *Logic* that Hegel tried to resolve the antinomy between freedom and determinism in a way that differed from Kant’s.\(^{36}\)

Pippin, on the contrary, thinks that a non-Kantian strategy to affirm freedom can mainly be found in the *Phenomenology*, although it ultimately leads, whether we like it or not, to a practical sort of affirmation. For all these reasons, I will devote the next two sections to comparing and contrasting his interpretation of the originality of the – neither Kantian nor merely Fichtean – phenomenological argument with what I think we should learn about freedom in the final sections of the *Logic*.

### 3. Pippin’s ‘primacy of the practical’ affirmation of freedom

The hermeneutical paradox raised by Pippin’s interpretation is this: what does Hegel have to deplore about Kant’s and Fichte’s arguments if his concept of freedom is, in the end, ‘essentially practical’?

Now, Pippin thinks that Hegel’s corrections do not have so much to do with the practical nature of the affirmation of freedom as with the argumentative strategy used to make sense of the idea that some concepts give themselves their own actuality. In particular, he sees Kantian freedom as bootstrapping itself out of the waters of heteronomous ends, with Kant failing to go beyond the metaphorical character of the operation under scrutiny and reduce – eventually sweep away – its mystery. In 2008, he finds that such metaphors and obscurities are supported by a so-called ‘logical’ argument whereby the control, vigour and effectiveness of reason over

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\(^{34}\) It is no coincidence that Pippin combats that destiny in order to show the putative dependence of Hegel’s philosophy on the *Doctrine of Science* (see Pippin 2000a).

\(^{35}\) See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 549.

\(^{36}\) See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, pp. 442f.
spirit are affirmed by Kant and Fichte without qualification. The argument concludes with the observation that we cannot act but under the idea of freedom, which means, for Kant and Fichte, that we cannot act but under the supreme authority of reason over actions. More concretely, Pippin calls logical (or deductive) the Fichtean argument that shows how the dogmatic attempt to think of and obey norms that are not self-imposed undermines itself, for in order to legitimate that subjection, we must previously give in to the authority of the criteria about what we rationally need to do.

According to Pippin, Hegel, unlike his predecessors, did not accept that ‘logical’ argument as such but did accept its conclusion, all of which would have caused him to offer an alternative ‘developmental’ argument. That other argument – Pippin also calls it narrative, dialectical or internal – must let us see how we can radically oblige ourselves to behave rationally (in the Kantian sense where reason is an end in itself that daily imposes concrete ends) in a way that makes it impossible for this obligation to be unrealisable or remain as a matter of fact unrealised. The argument views the obligation of self-legislation as a historical achievement, to the extent that the individual, over time, has come to live consciously and almost exclusively according to self-established norms. Unlike Kant seemed to think, it is not that I, or any other particular subject, dictate what should be done and why from a normative vacuum, but rather that we give ourselves our own norms as we get involved as participants in activities defined and regulated progressively and jointly by our ancestors and peers.

Hegel’s intention would therefore consist in reaching the Kantian conclusion of autonomy through an original analysis of real, historical, previously frustrated attempts to abide by external norms found in nature or in – internal or external – supernatural voices. Pippin compares this strategy to the initial argument of Hobbes’ *Leviathan*. According to Hobbes, we can imagine a state of nature where each individual’s desire for security would produce growing threats, fears, uncertainties and, ultimately, insecurity, so that there arises a need for an absolute power to undercut actual and latent violence. During this process, we see how certain norms give way to new ones – first, all seek their own satisfaction, ‘do their own thing’, then they postpone that satisfaction in order to threaten and attack, and finally they reject the politics of hostilities in favour of absolute power and general submission – because of the practical difficulties of abiding by one or the other. In the

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37 Despite my claim, in the introduction of this essay, that a psychological point can be attributed to Kant based on the fact that he – at least sometimes – interprets transcendental conditions as imposed by the idiosyncrasy of our cognition and not by the rationality of human beings (see again Kant 1790, B 351), Pippin usually tends – for good reasons I think – to take Kant’s argument as a logical one.
38 See Pippin (2008), pp. 90, 109f., 126.
same way, the Hegelian phenomenological argument reconstructs – with tolerable idealisations – the historical process through which man emerges ‘from his self-incurred immaturity’, in Kant’s words, and understands that the norms he can and must abide by are human creations whose only authority is the one he confers them. In this way, the argument supposedly exposes the partiality of pre-modern historical attempts to establish normative authorities.40

We cannot deny Pippin that Hegel did choose such a historical path in order to explain the emergence of material norms where they did not exist and how, in this sense, the enlightened ideal of autonomy, whose main theorist allegedly was Kant, can be realised.41 Since these norms are collective historical products, habits, practices and established institutions, aspects of what Hegel calls ‘the ethical’ (die Sittlichkeit), this account can be said to explain why the individuals never face a normative void and how the norms that govern their activities nevertheless are truly human creations.

But as I have reminded, one of the central questions of Kantian (and Fichtean) practical philosophy, not to say the main one, is that of how we, particular individuals, solicited as we are by passions or by the senses generally speaking, can obey the norm (or norms) of reason, and it would need to be seen how the developmental argument resolves or – if not – dissolves this difficulty.

In what I understand as key parts of his argument, Pippin reasons as if Hegel considered that the difficulty was, as a matter of course, dissolved, and he ultimately defends that Hegel does not accept – as a whole – ‘post-Kantian’ issues such as the ‘problem of spontaneous causation in action’.42 In my opinion, the most paradoxical aspect of this assessment is that Hegel’s rejection of those problems is assimilated to, precisely, the practical solution of his predecessors, which Pippin sees, as we have said, as a ‘model’. What is more, I do not think it can be said, considering the Science of Logic, that some of the most relevant Kantian problems in the area of the foundations of the ‘metaphysics of morals’ were disregarded by Hegel. On the contrary, I understand that when he asks, particularly in the Logic, whether mechanism is the truth of teleology, teleology is the truth of mechanism or neither of these, Hegel is seeking arguments to address the basic Kantian questions about the reality of freedom and, as a matter of fact, he connects his discussion to that on the ‘third antinomy’ in the Critique of Pure Reason.43

Pippin thinks that Hegel’s crucial observation is that the attempts to provide a naturalist explanation of the events we see as actions are bound to fail in the same

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41 A good summary of Pippin’s reconstruction of this path can be found in Pippin (2005), pp. 391ff.
42 See again Pippin (2008), p. 57.
43 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, pp. 437, 441ff. Hegel sees that exploration as an elevation to the ‘essential viewpoint’ on the matter (Hegel 1812-1816, vol. 6, p. 443).
way and for the same reasons as the attempts to abide by norms that we have not set ourselves. Of course, he accepts that we can find naturalist explanations of actions, but not that they can be infinitely generalised, since we cannot extend them to the actions that correspond or lead to those explanations (a large part of our actions, certainly). This is how he interprets the thesis of the Logic according to which “teleology is the truth of mechanism”.44 Pippin thus attributes to Hegel the exact step by which Kant and Fichte linked the intelligibility of events – natural phenomena or of any other kind – to the possibility of self-consciousness, understood as a special relation of self-knowledge (as I mentioned at the outset, this move characterises his global interpretation of Hegel). Generalisation is ultimately impeded, Pippin assumes, for Fichtean reasons.45

One question that could be asked is whether the (Fichtean) argument that Pippin reconstructs is Hegel’s, and another, different of course, is whether the argument is binding. The dubious character of the latter statement can be suggested by the way it recalls the argument of those who disdain the possibility of determinism because, whether we like it or not, we can neither act nor react except in the light of the idea of freedom. This can obviously be true, it can even, if I may use the expression, realise freedom in practice, or to put it differently, it can be sufficient to explain the cultural practices of praise and blame we are so familiar with, but ex hypothesi it does not do away with the realistic speculative fears of those who think that our relation to our fellow human beings and to ourselves is based on an illusion, as recalcitrant and culturally insuperable as such an illusion may be.46 In the same way, Pippin’s Fichtean argument also brings to mind the easy confusion that can arise between the possibility of explaining some events in a naturalistic way and the possibility of predicting them: even if the former were relatively straightforward a posteriori, the latter could very well turn out to be unworkable.47

Even more dubious is the Hegelian nature of the argument, since it seems to presuppose, by virtue of a subjective certainty, what it had set out to explain: the effi-

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44 See Pippin (2008), p. 45 n. 13. His interpretation generally coincides with those of Kreines (2004) and Stekeler-Weithofer (2005), as I have argued elsewhere (see Maraguat 2013).
45 In this case as well, Pippin occasionally labels such reasons as ‘logical’, which I think betrays a lack of precision in the terminology of his work (see Pippin 2008, pp. 47 n. 15, 103). He might have been induced to such a use by Sellars’ recourse to the term in an argument that, by the way, reminds Fichte’s (see Sellars 1963), as Pippin himself points out (2008, pp. 41 n. 8, 62 n. 34).
46 Of course, I am thinking about one of the aspects of the critical reception of Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment” (1974). Just how recalcitrant is the idea, at least for those who have inherited the Jewish or Christian culture, is brilliantly testified by Kafka’s Brief an den Vater (1921) and Baroja’s El árbol de la ciencia (1911), but there have been noteworthy literary attempts to imagine it was less recalcitrant than Kafka, Baroja or Strawson felt (the greatest of which is probably Camus’ L’étranger, 1942).
47 This kind of explanation is rigidly resisted on the basis of putatively Hegelian principles in Pippin (2010), p. 9 and Pippin (2013), p. 12.
cacy of the subjective ends of which we are aware. In my opinion, Hegel aspires to avoid precisely that principle, since “the Concept is to be regarded not merely as a subjective presupposition but as the absolute foundation”, although “it can be so only insofar as it has made itself the foundation”.\(^{48}\) I personally think that Pippin’s interpretation of the ‘truth of mechanism’ does fit in with the arguments of Fichte and others, but not with those of the \textit{Science of Logic}.\(^{49}\) What I would agree with, however, is that Hegel’s thesis on teleology, whose justification is provided in that book, is key to a correct understanding of the affirmation of freedom.\(^{50}\) For this reason, I now wish to point out what I think would be a more appropriate interpretation of that part of the \textit{Doctrine of the Concept}.

4. Hegel’s neither Kantian nor Fichtean affirmation of freedom

In the \textit{Logic}, the claim that teleology is the truth of mechanism has at least two meanings: one that supports the transition between the sections on “Chemism” and “Teleology” (and more specifically on the teleology of subjective ends or, in other words, on the ‘external end’ as the first form of teleology) and another that applies to the transition from the section on ‘Teleology’ to the chapter on ‘the Idea’ (and more specifically to its first part, devoted to life as an internal end or an end-in-itself [\textit{Selbstzweck}]).\(^{51}\) That teleology is the truth of mechanism means, first, that what Hegel calls the ‘externality’ of natural explanations – which amounts to what Hume saw as the contingency of natural laws, the contingent way in which the objects we regard as causes relate to those we regard as effects – corresponds to what we call the externality of subjective ends as contrasted with the recalcitrant objectivity in which we try to realise them.\(^{52}\) For that reason, the teleology discussed in ‘Objectivity’ (the penultimate part of the \textit{Wissenschaft der Logik}) is, in the first instance, a teleology of the intentional action of subjects facing a world that is not

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\(^{48}\) Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 245. Pippin does not ignore this claim, far from it. But contrast his commentary in (2008), p. 101.

\(^{49}\) Kant was arguably much more sceptical on this point, at least in principle, so that he would have deserved Hegel’s different and less critical judgement in “Glauben und Wissen”. Without going any further, remember that in the 1785 \textit{Foundations} Kant accepts the possibility that no one might ever have acted according to the moral law \textit{purely by virtue of the representation of his duty} (see Kant 1785, p. 407).

\(^{50}\) It is symptomatic that Hegel’s \textit{Idealism}, Pippin’s first presentation of his interpretation of Hegel’s philosophy – whose third part was devoted to the \textit{Logic} –, substantially disesteemed the section on ‘Teleology’ (see Pippin 1989, p. 245).

\(^{51}\) A broader discussion of Hegel’s thesis on teleology can be found in Maraguat (2013).

\(^{52}\) See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 444. On the externality of natural explanations, see Kreines (2004).
of their doing and where they try, with necessarily limited success and without any certainties, to realise their own ends. Hegel thus puts the comprehension of intentional action (the realisation of concepts in action) at the service of the explanation of natural phenomena or, to be more precise, at the service of the general explanation of the nature of natural events and causal relations (the realisation of concepts in nature), albeit only provisionally (for he does it without mentioning what he properly calls ‘ideas’, concepts that give themselves their own actuality, to which he only devotes the last part of the work) and only to the extent that the externality with which subjective ends are defined by reference to the objective space of their realisation (and vice versa) serve as model for understanding the reciprocal externality of causal antecedents and their mechanical effects or, from a different perspective, the externality that separates objects and events as a whole from the way we conceive them.

Ideas make an appearance in the last chapter, although initially also in a provisional way, when the real natural ends incarnated by the living can subsequently be discussed. For Hegel, living beings are the prime example of concepts that give themselves their own actuality. The first point I would like to highlight in the short space at my disposition is that the notion of ‘concepts that give themselves their own actuality’ stems from the consideration – formulated in the section on ‘Teleology’ – that any attempt to realise subjective ends necessarily presupposes means that already obey to a concept. Right from the start, Hegel points out that the ‘external end’ – typically associated to productive human action – can only realise its goals through the intervention of some objective means. But such an intervention, upon reflection, deserves a reiteration of this consideration: means cannot become effective as means without being by themselves ‘end’ realisers. This can be illustrated, for instance, with the observation that I can only try to reach a butterfly with a butterfly net to the extent that the butterfly net is serviceable, that is to say, as it must be; otherwise, the attempt to catch the butterfly will not get under way, however much I might wish to get my hands on the insect. At the same time, I can only move the butterfly net appropriately if the hand that clasps it obeys me, and I can only move the hand if certain nervous impulses that run through my body produce appropriate muscular contractions and the like. In general, we must say mere attempts presuppose some kind of success (what Hegel calls, according to my reading, the ‘immediate subsumption’ of the presupposed object and the ‘disappearance of mediation’), but not a properly intentional or personal one. On the contrary, our ability to realise subjective ends depends on the existence of means that are ‘preordained’ to their realisation, not intentionally but – in a way – by themselves (after all, one does not move one’s muscles in order to move the hands but rather

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53 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 458.
moves the hands *directly*). I think this is the key teaching of the final part of the ‘Teleology’ section, which lays out the argument that leads to consider the internal end as the ‘truth’ of the external end\(^{54}\) and, in this sense, the internal end as the truth of the mechanism as a whole. Hegel considers that the idea of an instrumental teleology – where the ends are external to the matter in which they must be realised, the teleology discussed, fundamentally, in the chapter on ‘Objectivity’ – presupposes the idea of a non-instrumental teleology, in other words, of ends that are as a matter of fact realised – to which the final chapter of the *Science of Logic* on ‘the Idea’ is devoted. It must however be noted that this does not involve *subjective* ends that are realised simply or absolutely, as is sufficiently indicated by the fact that the internal end is embodied, at least initially, by living beings in general. Only by virtue of the impossibility for immediately realised ends to be treated as subjective ends that presuppose an objectivity they actually lack can Hegel conclude that a teleology which does not belong to subjective ends, namely, the teleology of the living, is the ‘truth’ of the teleology which actually does characterise the ends that are ‘externally’ related to what is objective.

Even if I were mistaken about this, namely about what I take to be the thrust of the main argument in the ‘Teleology’ section, and in particular about how we must interpret the effective realisation of ends that any attempt to realise an end must presuppose, I think the clear sequence that goes from the concept of mechanism to that of ends, first subjective but then real ones (those Kant labelled ‘natural ends’), casts doubt upon the idea that the truth of teleology – the affirmation of teleology – should be interpreted according to the third part of Kant’s *Grundlegung* (what we could call the psychological argument) or Fichte’s *Second Introduction to the Doctrine of Science* (what I called the logical argument in the previous section), as Pippin wishes. In fact, nowhere in the section on ‘Teleology’, where Hegel upholds precisely the adoption of an ‘essential’ viewpoint on teleology, that is to say, one that does not settle for the Kantian manoeuvre of the third *Critique* by which the principle of finality becomes purely subjective and ‘interpretive’, does Hegel seem to assume that there are subjective ends whose realisation is evident and undeniable. Nor does he seem to assume, as other interpreters do, that what could be called the teleological truth of the mechanical is guaranteed by the frame of predictive and pragmatic interests that make up the context of the investigation into the mechanisms of nature.\(^{55}\)

Subsequently, Hegel certainly notes that living beings realise their non-instrumental ends – their end is self-conservation, survival, growth and reproduction – in the inevitably precarious and perishable manner that their physical incarnation tol-

\(^{54}\) See again Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 458.

erates. But this does not foreclose, according to him, the possibility of affirming the reality or effectiveness of natural ends through what he calls the ‘process of the genus’, any more than does the fact that the animal – like the tool or the machine – wears down or gets old precisely by realising its end, so that the moment where it will cease to realise it, where it will die – or break down – draws ever and ever nearer by virtue of realisation itself. This is the second – and, for the time being, the last – point that I would like to highlight about the appearance of the idea of the ‘concept that gives itself its own actuality’ in the Logic. If it is right to say that the wear induced by realisation and the resulting provisional character of realisation does not ultimately impede us to speak of realisation, then an explicitly imperfect realisation of the concept in the living does not leave pending – for subsequent sections of the Logic – the affirmation of concepts that give themselves their own actuality and, therefore, it does not contradict what we have already said: that Hegel’s argument in favour of the indispensability of thinking in terms of ends or realised concepts is absolutely not based on a certainty with regard to subjectivity, on the certainty that there obviously are or would be purposes – and therefore concepts – that subjects realise (that I realise), even if in a purely ‘intelligible’ world like the one Kant and Fichte imagined.

In my opinion, the problem with Pippin’s Fichteanising interpretation is that it associates Hegel’s idealism to a fundamental obligation – an obligation that should not go unheeded – to conceive ‘some kind of reflexive self-relation’ as the basis for all consciousness and intentionality, that is to say, a teleologically organised self-consciousness, ‘spirit’s own purposiveness’, and understand all theoretical judgments and practical inferences under the condition of such a real relation of perception that, according to Kant, must be able to accompany all consciousness. This is an interpretive focus that, in my opinion, hardly fits in with the Logic’s argument about the ‘truth of the mechanism’ that we must seek and can find in the teleology of the living.

56 This partial incarnation cannot be discussed here with the attention it deserves. See Wolff (1992), pp. 133f., DeVries (1991), p. 66 and Kreines (2004), pp. 59, 70. As Wolff has highlighted, one of the main difficulties faced by the interpretation of Hegel’s doctrine on the living is to reconcile his criticism of the way Kant downgrades the ‘principle of finality’ to a subjective maxim with his reluctance to accept a purely objective finality of the organisms (see Hegel 1807, p. 143 and Hegel 1812-1816, vol. 6, p. 468).

57 See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 457. On the other hand, remember that Hegel explains, in the Logic, that the finite in general – be it mechanical (or chemical) or intentional – can either be said to be according to its concept (one or the other) or not to be according to its concept (see Hegel 1812-1816, vol. 6, pp. 464f.).

58 See Pippin (2008), p. 49. On the central importance of this notion in his interpretation, see Pippin (1989), p. 35. In the aforementioned 2008 page, Pippin speaks of the “centrality for Hegel of spirit’s own purposiveness”. This point reveals the greatest continuity between the interpretation Pippin advocates and Taylor’s ground-breaking work on Hegel’s philosophy of mind (Taylor 1985). On the putatively essential relationship between perception and teleological character, see Pippin (1987).
Besides, it might be possible to conceive reasons for the indispensability of teleological judgements that do not stem from a primordial and fundamental commitment to what Fichte called an intellectual intuition of oneself as an agent. And if it is so, we might be able to make sense of an affirmation of teleology that does not depend on our undeniable familiarity with the realisation of subjective ends, an affirmation such as the one Hegel, in my opinion, promotes. For instance, some people nowadays think that without an intentional interpretation of what Darwin called natural selection – one in which nature, the natural selection process, is endowed with ‘perceptions’, ‘reasons’ and ‘choices’ (an attribution that allows us to speak, precisely, of a ‘selection’) – we could not understand why living organisms are as they are and what functions their organs carry out (and as a matter of fact, if we did not observe functions, in other words, ends that are served by the organs and systems of living beings, we would observe no organ, organic system or living being). This would happen simply because the natural processes realise meaningful patterns that are interpreted as perceptions, choices and reasoned actions and, in a prior and more fundamental way, meaningful patterns that are interpreted as functions. In fact, the Darwinian idea of evolution incorporates a process in which ‘mechanical’ relations result in a global effect that, since it realises a concept, we could properly – from an idealist, Hegelian point of view – call ‘teleological’. Similarly, the Hegelian idea of the realisation of an end or purpose implies its production through mechanical and chemical processes:

A house, a clock, may appear as purposes with respect to the instruments employed in their production; but the stones, the crossbeams, or the wheels, the axles, and the rest that make up the actuality of the purpose, fulfill this purpose only through the pressure which they suffer, through the chemical processes to which they are exposed with air, light, and water, and from which they shield the human being; through their friction, and so on. They fulfill their vocation (Bestimmung), therefore, only through their being used up and worn out, and only by virtue of their negation do they correspond to what they are supposed to be.

This is obviously not the place to explore non-eliminationist naturalising programs in detail, but they can serve to illustrate arguments in favour of the indispensability of what has been called ‘the intentional stance’ without relying on the presupposition of the ‘original intentionality’ – to use John Searle’s term of art – of human subjectivity (or realised subjective ends, or, in the words of Fichte,

60 This is a fundamental thesis of Daniel Dennett’s theory of intentionality (see, for instance, Dennett 1987, pp. 314ff.).
61 Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 457 (translation by George di Giovanni).
‘Thathandlung’). In my opinion, if there is an argument in favour of the indispensability of that ‘stance’ in Hegel’s work, it must rather be of that second type, one that does not downgrade ‘the concept’ to a subjective presupposition – as necessary as it may be, as historically established as it may seem – and requires a conception of the teleological to be found halfway between the objective one propounded by dogmatic realism and the subjective one put forward by transcendental philosophy.\textsuperscript{62} At any rate, I assume that Hegel’s resistance to pre-Darwinian evolutionism\textsuperscript{63} does not necessarily impede the argument of the Logic to be interpreted in a way that anticipates a naturalist conception of ‘final causes’.\textsuperscript{64}

Against this conclusion, it could be argued that if the intentional stance were nothing more than a perspective from which some patterns become visible, the Hegelian claim that teleology is ‘the truth of mechanism’ would not be totally meaningful; in fact, Pippin seems to think that to downgrade the intentional – as well as the living – to a pattern is to incur in naturalist physicalism, an excess Hegel would absolutely not tolerate.\textsuperscript{65} I personally think it must be granted that, for Hegel, teleological relations in general cannot be only apparent.\textsuperscript{66} But the arguments for indispensability I am thinking about – those of Daniel Dennett, for instance – precisely insist that ‘intentional’ patterns – like functional ones – are real, that they are out there to be discovered, and that if we do not adopt the intentional stance towards them, we cease to understand natural regularities that are mechanical from a certain perspective, but not from all perspectives.\textsuperscript{67} Furthermore, I think Hegel’s conviction that any realisation of concepts is partial and precarious\textsuperscript{68} is an invitation to open up to a conception of rule following – of the theoretical and practical application of

\textsuperscript{62} A middle term of this sort is the one Emmanuel Renault attributes to Hegel when he speaks of his desire to retain “the primacy of the social without falling in the traps of antinaturalism” (Renault 2012, p. 248). Although Yeomans does not interpret the ‘truth of the mechanism’ as I do, it is interesting to note that his study on the logical background of Hegel’s philosophy of action also rejects Pippin’s point of view because of the way it ignores the importance Hegel attaches to the discussion of post-Kantian issues which connect causality and freedom (see Yeomans 2012, p. 260).

\textsuperscript{63} See Hegel 1830, § 249.

\textsuperscript{64} In this case as well it might be said, as Nietzsche does in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, that ‘without Hegel there is no Darwin’.


\textsuperscript{66} This is stated explicitly in Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 437.

\textsuperscript{67} See Dennett (2013), pp. 196, 239, 387. What is more, I think those arguments even make sense of the notion of concepts that give themselves their own actuality, since it is claimed that all that is needed to be intentional (or generally functional) is to be meaningful and intelligible from an intentional (or generally functional) point of view.

\textsuperscript{68} See Hegel (1812-1816), vol. 6, p. 465.
concepts – that neither implies a need to assume any sort of perfect realisation nor, therefore, the ‘primacy of practical reason’.

Regardless of whether those contemporaneous arguments on the indispensability of the ‘intentional stance’ (the Kantian ‘principle of finality’) can overcome the objections they receive, an issue that should be left for another occasion, I hope to have clearly indicated the reasons why an argument in favour of the indispensability like the one Pippin attributes to Hegel does not fit in with two key dialectical advances in the *Wissenschaft der Logik*.

One can therefore accept, as I do, that Hegel favours a non-metaphysical conception of freedom in Pippin’s sense, but I think we should resist an interpretation of that non-metaphysical character which entails a purely practical affirmation of freedom – an affirmation based on the putatively irreducible nature of the first-person point of view, on the ‘primacy of the practical’, within the horizon of self-consciousness satisfaction – similar to the one Kant and Fichte apparently espoused and subjected themselves to.69

**References**


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