Más allá del “conflicto”: Palestina y las estructuras profundas de la colonización global

Beyond Conflict: Palestine and the Deep Structures of Global Colonization

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RESUMEN
Este artículo relocaliza el análisis de la violencia en Palestina dentro de un marco alternativo que subraya los procesos de la colonización global. Empezando desde la premisa de que Palestina es un sitio no de un “conflicto” sencillo, sino un proyecto continuo de colonialismo de asentamiento (el sionismo), el artículo destaca la situación actual como artefacto de las estructuras profundas que había planteado este proyecto. Utilizando las obras de Paul Virilio como clave teórica, explora la incrustación microcosmica y profética de Palestina dentro de tres modos coloniales: la exocolonización (la colonización de territorios externos), la endocolonización (la colonización de poblaciones específicas dentro de su propio territorio en el contexto de la guerra permanente o “pura”), y la dromocolonización (la colonización de la humanidad por la aceleración techno-científica). Estos tres modos no solamente aclaran los métodos específicos y coloniales del sionismo (e.g., la exclusión y confinamiento de los palestinos), sino también nos empuja a pensar fuera de las concepciones agente-centricas de la política y considerar el impacto de los procesos (e.g. militarización o aceleración) que salgan fuera del control de los actores racionales. En particular, vemos cómo Palestina se ha convertido en un laboratorio de nuevas formas de guerra y control social cuyas implicaciones globales no se puede sobreestimar. Teniendo esto en cuenta, el artículo termina con el argumento que la consideración de los desafíos y las posibilidades de la descolonización en Palestina nos ayuda imaginar el significado de la descolonización global.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Colonialismo de asentamiento, colonización, globalización, Israel/Palestina, violencia, descolonización.

ABSTRACT
This article seeks to relocate the analysis of violence in Palestine within an alternative paradigm that emphasizes long-term processes of global colonization. Beginning from the premise that Palestine is a site of an ongoing settler-colonial project (Zionism) rather than a simple “conflict,” it views contemporary realities as overdetermined by the deep structures that this project has put in place. Using the work of Paul Virilio as a key theoretical touchstone, it explores Palestine’s microcosmic and often prophetic embeddedness in three overlapping colonial modes: exocolonization (the colonization of territories outside one’s own), endocolonization (the colonization of specific populations within the territory under one’s control in the context of permanent or “pure” war), and dromocolonization (the colonization of humanity by techno-scientific acceleration). Examination of these three modes not only sheds light on
Zionism’s specific colonial practices (e.g., the exclusion and confinement of Palestinians), but also encourages us to think beyond actor-centered conceptions of politics and consider the impact of processes (e.g., militarization or acceleration) that stretch beyond the control of rational actors. In particular, we see how Palestine has become a laboratory for new forms of warfare and social control whose global implications cannot be overestimated. With this in mind, the article concludes by arguing that an exploration of the challenges and possibilities of decolonization in Palestine can help us think through what global decolonization might mean.

**KEYWORDS:** Settler colonialism, colonization, globalization, Israel/Palestine, violence, decolonization

**SUMARIO**

SETTLER COLONIALISM AND GLOBAL COLONIZATION

It is a truism of international politics that Israel/Palestine is one of the world’s perpetual «trouble spots,» an exceptional place of “hot contestations” (Stetter, 2008) in the form of seemingly unending violence, enmity, and hopelessness. Over the years, the considerable weight of institutionally-supported public discourse has had the sedimentary effect of reducing the entire dynamic to a single phrase: «the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.» Most journalists, scholars, government officials, and other observers who speak and write about the situation tend to use this piece of shorthand reflexively, a sure indication that it has achieved the status of Gramscian “common sense.” The phrase “Israeli-Palestinian conflict,” however, is both inaccurate and misleading for the simple reason that what is happening in Israel/Palestine is not a «conflict.» To make such a claim is not to deny that there are two or more parties engaging in a sustained, often violent dispute over territory and sovereignty in Palestine. Using the term «conflict» in this case, however, encourages us to believe that the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians is, in some basic way, a relationship between two “sides” that have equal roles in the situation. This assumption is false, on one level, because there is a great imbalance in the relative ability of each “side” to inflict violence: Israel is by far the stronger party. But it is also false on a much more fundamental level because it obscures the fact that Israel/Palestine is the site of an ongoing project of settler colonialism. This project has put into place a set of political, economic, and social structures that form the basis of the current relationship between Israeli Jews and Palestinians, including the violent aspects of that relationship. These structures are, to quote the editors of an important comparative volume on settler colonialism, “the persistent defining characteristic, even the condition of possibility,” of a settler state such as Israel (Elkins and Pederson, 2005: 3). In other words, rather than a “conflict,” what is happening in Israel/Palestine is Zionism.

The deep structural nature of settler colonialism finds its clearest and most provocative scholarly explication in the work of Patrick Wolfe, who argues persuasively against the conventional understanding of settler colonialism as a temporary, episodic process. This dominant perspective is framed by the teleological narratives associated with European expansion and nation-building; by the state-centered and actor-centered orientation of the social sciences; and by the systematic devaluation of explanatory paradigms rooted in indigenous and, more generally, subaltern experiences. For Wolfe (2006), settler-colonial invasion is properly viewed as “a structure rather than an event” (402). In seeking to create a new (settler) society in place of an existing (indigenous) one, he argues, settler colonialism reveals its sine qua non: the radical, long-term, and permanent structural transformation of the territory in question.

This alternative perspective dovetails perfectly with the viewpoint of indigenous people such as John Trudell, former national spokesman for the American Indian Movement. In a single, devastating observation included in a 2005 documentary, Trudell effectively encapsulates the interpretation that the dominant framework so urgently seeks to deny: “We have never really seen the war go away” (Rae, 2005). In Trudell’s world, all of those processes that tend to be separated artificially in social science literature – colonialism, war, capitalism, ecological destruction – are fused into a single amalgam that describes not a phase in a linear process defined by European categories, but rather the very reality that continues to structure all of our lives more than 500 years after the Columbian invasions set modern globalization in motion (Hall, 2003).

The symmetrical language of a “conflict” between two “sides” is thus fundamentally incompatible with the realities of settler colonialism. Throughout the decades-long struggle for majority rule in South Africa, for example, there undoubtedly were those who preferred to view the violence there as a kind of zero-sum game between two opposing sides. Yet from a settler-colonial perspective, it is clear that the violence was a direct function of the structures put into place, quite openly, by the white government, structures that positioned all South Africans in a complex set of social relationships organized according to a logic of strict, racialized hierarchy. What was happening was not a “conflict” – what was happening was apartheid. South Africa’s black population did not enter into a violent relationship with the white settlers.
willingly; they did so because the territory they inhabited was being colonized and they needed to defend themselves against a political project that was increasingly bent on subjugating, displacing, and killing them. By any reasonable calculation, the settlers bear the bulk of the moral responsibility for initiating this system of structural violence. Equally important, there is no question that these structures have outlived the era of formal apartheid (Daniel, Southall, and Lutchmann, 2005); despite the country’s undeniably important and inspiring transition to democracy, there is nothing temporary about settler colonialism in South Africa.

We see a very similar dynamic at work in the United States and Australia, two locations where the white settler population carried out a genocidal process of territorial conquest, provoking understandable resistance from those who were being removed from their land and homes, stripped of key aspects of their culture, and killed in large numbers. The violent structures put in place by settler colonialism in these “new world” territories continue to shape social reality today, as even a brief look at basic socioeconomic indicators for native and non-native populations reveals. To refer to this dynamic, whether historically or currently, as a “conflict” would not only be inaccurate; it would also be an insult to the indigenous people who, along with millions of enslaved Africans brought to North America against their will, were the primary victims of settler colonialism in these two territories.

In contextualizing Palestine in this way, I am drawing on a growing literature that examines Palestine both comparatively and globally through the paradigm of settler colonialism (Piterberg, 2008; Rodinson, 1973; Shafir, 1996; Veracini, 2006; Wolfe, 2006). How did the Palestinians become involved in this so-called «conflict» with Zionism and, later, the state of Israel? The answer, quite simply, is that they became involved because they were already living on the land when the settlers arrived. Consequently, any discussion of Israel/Palestine that does not acknowledge the settler-colonial nature of the situation is an exercise in denial (Cohen, 2001) that is likely to lead to a fundamental misunderstanding of what has already happened, what is happening now, and what needs to happen in order to create a more just future for all who live there.

In this article, I seek to locate the analysis of contemporary Palestine not only within the context of settler colonialism, but also in relation to three overlapping modes that constitute the deep structures of what amounts to an ongoing process of global colonization: exocolonization, endocolonization, and dromocolonization. Rather than the kind of ideal types that tend to populate the scholarly literature on colonialism, these modes represent global impulses and vectors that cut across a range of specific examples, sometimes sequentially and sometimes coterminously. As such, they enable us to lift Palestine out of its exceptionalist prison and place it in a more global context in a way that reveals not only Palestine’s embeddedness in long-term historical processes, but also its often prophetic role as a laboratory pushing these processes forward (Collins, 2007).

My primary purpose in employing these modes is thus to provide a heuristic perspective from which to engage in a principled critique of contemporary social reality.

This critique draws extensively on the work of Paul Virilio, whose underappreciated writings on global politics enrich significantly our understanding of the kinds of processes under discussion here. A sustained engagement with these writings enables us to see global colonization as more than a simple process of expansion undertaken by empires and modern nation-states driven to seek the “endless accumulation of capital” (Wallerstein, 2004: 24). What emerges in Virilio’s work is a recognition that semi-autonomous processes of social acceleration and militarization are also central (if often unacknowledged) motors driving global colonization. Taking this perspective seriously not only transforms our understanding of Palestine; it also sheds new light on the kinds of challenges and possibilities facing those who seek to address the persistent injustices and inequalities that Palestine shares with the rest of the world.

**EXOCOLONIZATION: THE GEOPOLITICS OF EXPANSION AND ELIMINATION**

Virilio uses the term exocolonization to refer to a process of geopolitical expansion that rushes literally to the ends of the earth – the “blank spaces” on the map famously described in Joseph
Conrad’s childhood recollections and later by Marlow, his narrator in *Heart of Darkness* – with the primary goal of incorporating and exploiting territory, labor, resources, and other factors necessary for the stockpiling and generation of wealth. As Marlow says matter-of-factly, “It was just robbery with violence, aggravated murder on a grand scale, and men going at it blind…not a pretty thing when you look into it too much.” The sheer number of types of colonialism found in the highly taxonomic literature on the topic – settler, exploitation, metropole, maritime, dependent, administrative and so forth – can be bewildering, but all of them have played their role in the global operation of this exocolonial mode. The story of this process, as scholars of global political economy have demonstrated, is organically related to the story of how the modern world system emerged through the intertwining of the history of capitalism and the history of empires and, later, the interstate system.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a mode of colonization most commonly associated with the age of imperialism, industry, and “discovery” has passed firmly into history. On the contrary, as Derek Gregory (2004) illustrates, evidence of the “colonial present” is all around us. In addition to Gregory’s chief examples (Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq), the continuing presence of resource wars in Africa and elsewhere is a further indication of the same pattern (Klare, 2002). Recent reports of countries such as South Korea and the United Arab Emirates buying huge tracts of prime farmland in poor countries at bargain prices remind us that exocolonization also takes on subtler, less visible forms. All of this makes abundantly clear that even in a supposedly “postcolonial” era, the externally-directed geopolitical vector of colonization remains an active element in global politics with the potential to inflict tremendous damage on vulnerable communities.

The origins of settler colonialism belong firmly in the mode of exocolonization, with settler projects constituting important thrusts in the trajectories of imperial expansion. In some cases these projects were absolutely central to the direct prosecution of imperial aims, while in other cases settlement was a means to resolve the demographic, economic, and political contradictions that empire produced in the metropolis. Settlers often enjoyed the crucial backing of the imperial state (particularly its military power), but occasionally found themselves at odds with that state at key moments. In all cases, however, the core dynamics of settler projects were deeply immersed in the political economy and geopolitics of exocolonization, in particular the modern dynamics of state formation, racialization, capital accumulation, and genocide.

In addition to what Wolfe terms a general “logic of elimination” aimed at reducing the indigenous presence through a variety of mechanisms (killing, forced removal, biocultural assimilation), settler colonialism is also characterized by a logic of expansion that structures its particular spatial politics, most notably the violent exocolonial politics associated with the frontier. Rather than a fixed location, the settler-colonial frontier is best conceived as a peripatetic structure that facilitates territorial acquisition through the creation of paramilitary vanguards (the frontier “rabble”); the systematic fostering of fear and insecurity in the settler population as a perpetual justification for further conquest; and the strategic use of legal “gray zones” where “frontier justice” can be dispensed with relative

1 From a poststructuralist perspective, the frequent use of binary oppositions in this literature reveals the inherently problematic nature of the strict taxonomic approach to studying colonialism. Udo Krautwurst (2003) argues that such taxonomies betray the desire to establish a “pure positivity [that] also requires an act of exclusion” (56).

2 While some might argue that such actions fall outside the realm of colonization, it is worth remembering that “legal” land purchases have long played a role in many colonial projects (including the Zionist project in Palestine). This is an excellent example of why it is important to stretch one’s angle of vision beyond the state-centered frameworks created and dominated by elites. The land purchasers, in this case, are not engaged in a full-scale process of colonizing the distant territory and would thus dispute the application of the colonial label to their actions. For smallholders in that territory, however, the situation may look quite familiar. The point is that the global structures that constitute the conditions of possibility for such a situation are, in and of themselves, colonial structures.
impunity. Within the ideological framework of settlement, the frontier becomes the site of heroic figures and events (e.g. the Afrikaner “Great Trek,” the westward migration of North America’s European settlers, the “reclaiming” of biblical territory by Jewish settlers) that form the iconic bedrock of nationalist mythology.

The Zionist project nonetheless emerged and grew in the midst of a world dominated by the exocolonial impulse and was deeply shaped by the realities of that world. The role of 19th-century anti-Semitism in creating the conditions for the emergence of Zionism is well known. An additional factor was the influence of European ethno-nationalism, which not only highlighted the difficulty (and, some argued, the impossibility) of Jewish assimilation but also shaped the form that both Zionism’s settler-colonial response to anti-Semitism and the Arab response to European domination would take. Despite starting at the end of the period of open exocolonization, Zionism had more in common with older cases of what Elkins and Pederson call “new world” colonization efforts in Australia and North America, where “Republican freedom and band-of-brothers exclusivity [constituted] the entangled twin ideological poles of the settler colonial state” (18).

More generally, Elkins and Pederson argue that all settler projects share two key characteristics that are clearly identifiable in the structural logic of the Zionist project. The first is the particular four-sided set of relationships among external imperial powers, their local representatives, the settler community, and the indigenous population. For exocolonizing European powers, Zionism served as a useful tool for outsourcing the “Jewish question” while simultaneously aiding broader imperial goals. At the same time, the fact that the Zionist settlers had their own exocolonial agenda – the extension of Jewish settlement and sovereignty throughout as much of historic Palestine as possible – meant that like settlers in other “new world” situations, they often came into tension and conflict with the imperial metropole.

In this sense, Palestine was a site where multiple exocolonial agendas met, sometimes in harmony and sometimes in dissonance. The second structural characteristic is the set of privileges enjoyed by the settlers vis-à-vis the colonized. In the case of Zionism, these privileges were cemented as part of the process of transforming Jews from a victimized minority into a colonizing minority through the perpetuation of the structural logic of anti-Semitism (Massad, 2005). The work of the Israeli sociologist Gershon Shafir (1996) remains a crucial touchstone in illuminating the concrete conditions under which this transformation took place. In particular, Shafir identifies three related processes that animated the period of early Zionist settlement (1882-1914) and laid the foundation for Israeli state and nation formation: the “conquest of labor” strategy (often articulated in terms of “Hebrew labor”) that led to the hegemony of the labor movement in Zionist/Israeli politics; the “conquest of guarding” strategy that fueled structures of vanguardist militarization; and the “conquest of land” strategy, actualized most notably in the creation of Jewish-only collective farms (kibbutzim) that turned workers into agricultural settlers. These three strategies of conquest, Shafir argues, combined to produce a national political culture dominated by the philosophy of militant settlement and the principle of Jewish exclusivism.3

Without the removal of a significant portion of Palestine’s Arab population, however, these strategies could not have borne fruit in the form of a majority-Jewish state. The Nakba (literally “the catastrophe,” the name Palestinians give to their dispossession in 1948-49) thus represents the central element in Zionism’s use of the exocolonial mode. If, as Frantz Fanon famously argued, all colonialism is inherently violent, examples such as the Nakba demonstrate that from the perspective of indigenous populations, settler colonialism is cataclysmically violent. By 1949, more than 500 Palestinian villages and nearly a dozen urban neighborhoods were

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3 While Shafir views the category of settler colonialism as eminently applicable to the case of Zionism, he also distances himself from authors such as Edward Said and Maxime Rodinson, accusing them of placing too much emphasis on an allegedly inexorable logic of settler colonialism. For Shafir, the Zionist settler colonization of Palestine was not inevitable but rather the result of a contingent and complex set of material processes addressed in his book.
emptied of their inhabitants, and roughly 750,000 people were made refugees in what the Israeli historian Ilan Pappe (2006) calls “a clear-cut case of an ethnic cleansing operation, regarded under international law today as a crime against humanity” (xiii).

While nationalist Israeli historiography initially managed to marginalize important Palestinian accounts of the Nakba and to occlude what Shafir refers to as the obvious “demographic interest” behind it, evidence that Israel’s founders actively sought the very demographic reversal that the war effected is now overwhelming. The current division is between those scholars, like Pappe, who object to this “ethnic cleansing” on moral grounds and those, like Benny Morris, who employ an exceptionalist rhetoric of necessity to justify the massacres and expulsions that facilitated Israel’s emergence (Shavit, 2004). In this sense, despite the fact that Zionism has become deeply marked by the second and third modes of colonization discussed in the remainder of this article, it continues to be haunted by the contradictions and uncomfortable truths that its original exocolonial venture produced.

ENDOCOLONIZATION: THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC LOGIC OF “PURE WAR”

With its roots in an impulse toward territorial acquisition, exocolonization tends to be associated with what might be called “extensive” (that is, outwardly-directed) forms of exploitation such as those that take place along the perpetually expanding “frontiers” created by settler-colonial projects. At the same time, given the terrestrial, ecological and ethical realities involved in this kind of exploitation, exocolonization is always confronted by limits that threaten to derail it. The most obvious of these is the limit imposed by the size of the planet itself – at a certain point, Marlow’s map contains no more “blank spaces” – but we may also speak of limits in the availability of specific resources, the rate of return on investment, and the willingness of populations at home to support the kind of structural violence (including, at the extreme, genocidal violence) that exocolonial projects typically inflict upon their objects. All such projects, of course, face various forms of determined resistance from the populations being colonized. In short, colonizers who employ the mode of exocolonization never operate with an entirely free hand.

These limits help explain the existence of a second mode, endocolonization, which effectively represents the inversion of the first mode: a colonizing vector that is directed inward and involves more “intensive” forms of exploitation. While also arguably present in earlier periods (e.g. during the process of European nation-formation), this mode finds its most hospitable home in a post-1945 geopolitical environment marked by the existence of nuclear weapons, the associated doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the growing role of supranational institutions (e.g., the World Bank) in establishing and enforcing new hegemonic standards of social restructuring. A fundamental yet frustratingly opaque concept, 20th-century endocolonization can be defined most concisely as the socioeconomic logic of what Virilio calls pure war – that is, the endless preparation for war that occurs as the process of militarization is extended throughout the social body (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997).

In an economic sense, endocolonization feeds the machine of pure war and the structures, profits, and privileges associated with it by extracting resources from particular local populations that have already been incorporated into the “postcolonial” state; as such, it constitutes a massive transfer of wealth and energy from individuals and communities to a military-industrial complex that represents one set of institutional faces of the “war machine” about which Deleuze and Guattari wrote so provocatively. At the extreme, endocolonization signals the existence of a kind of “suicidal state”: a systematic underdevelopment not of some distant territory, but rather of one’s own economy through policies of privatization and the withdrawal of social services (Virilio 1998).

The social logic of endocolonization tells us a great deal about how global colonization has transformed the nature of war and, by extension, the character of human communities. Specifically, endocolonization operates by promoting a generalized militarization of identity and social consciousness – the creation of “civilian soldiers” (Virilio and Lotringer, 1997: 26) – through the gradual fusion of science, technology, information,
and economy. In the words of Arthur Kroker (1995), this fusion produces “the crystallization of science as the language of power, of the depletion of the energies of society, and their draining away into the war machine.” This unique and frightening system of permanent warfare hides, in effect, in plain sight, defining the horizon of observable and thinkable social reality.

As an example, consider the phenomenon that Ross Glover (2002) provocatively calls the logic of “the war on ________.” During the past half-century we have seen how this logic produces open-ended global campaigns against a host of vaguely-defined enemies (crime, drugs, terrorism, etc.), campaigns that facilitate the spread of militarized structures, practices, and identities across the social field. These “wars on,” argues Glover, ultimately serve as euphemisms for an ongoing war against the poor – that is, an endocolonization of the livelihoods, communities, and the very bodies of the most vulnerable (Feldman, 1991; Virilio & Lotringer, 2002). In keeping with the broader social function of endocolonization, they also provide ready-made platforms for the creation of new scientific knowledge and new technologies (e.g., biometrics, data mining, surveillance techniques) and their diffusion into a wide range of military and social control applications.

Significantly, the “wars on” are also built upon assumptions about the pathological nature of the “cultures” that allegedly support the vaguely-defined enemies being fought. In this sense, the reductionist arguments often mobilized under the banner of the “global war on terrorism” about the violent or undemocratic nature of Islam (as if “Islam” were a unitary, unchanging social fact) are close cousins of the “cultures of poverty” arguments that have long served to deflect attention from the structural nature of poverty. In a kind of discursive sleight-of-hand, the obsessive focus on “culture” in this rhetoric also serves to hide the constitutive role that science, technology, and war (perceived incorrectly as distinct and disinterested entities) play in the processes of endocolonization.

Needless to say, the modes of exocolonization and endocolonization are as organically related as the major and minor modes in a musical score. In many cases, as suggested above, the latter emerges as the former reaches its limits. For metropole colonizers (e.g., the British Empire), the extraction of wealth from foreign territories may be followed by withdrawal and the inward turn of the colonizing vector (e.g., Thatcherism). For settler colonizers (e.g., the white settlers in South Africa or North America), the successful creation of a new society is typically followed by the confinement and systematic structural exploitation of the remaining subaltern population (e.g., the South African “homelands,” the Jim Crow South, the “prison-industrial complex”). Finally, for many of those societies that gained independence from their colonial rulers (e.g., Argentina or Zaire), decolonization ushered in a period of endocolonization in the form of military dictatorships and “kleptocracies” supported and enabled (openly or covertly) by powerful external forces.

The significant distinctions between these first two modes of colonization can be mapped out usefully along a number of axes. Spatially, whereas exocolonization plays itself out in struggles over the incorporation of distant territories often viewed as “empty” spaces (e.g., on Marlow’s map), endocolonization produces desperate, often hidden struggles over spaces that are simultaneously overcrowded, abandoned, and stigmatized: urban ghettos, slums (Davis, 2006), decaying industrial zones, reservations, today’s Gaza Strip. Militarily, exocolonization’s “war of milieu,” enacted in the relatively isolated military “theaters” of land and sea, gives way to endocolonization’s “war on the milieu” enacted against the very habitats that host and sustain life (Virilio, 1998: 30). Likewise, the means of violence and their implications change dramatically: exocolonization is aided by guns, ships, maps, machetes, and other implements that facilitate expansion, while endocolonization occurs under the shadow of aerial warfare, the Bomb, and the claustrophobic techniques of urban social control.

4 Interestingly, such abandoned zones are often described in the “violent cartographies” (Shapiro, 1997) of elite policy discourse in striking, often racialized terms that recall Marlow’s classic exocolonial map, where the “blank” place quickly becomes a place of “darkness” and “horror.” Thus we find growing references to “black spots,” “no-go areas,” and the like.
Palestinians and Jews emerged from the era of inter-imperial total war (arguably the apotheosis of the exocolonial impulse) as populations whose shared vulnerability derived directly from the perpetuation of European anti-Semitism. Through the creation of the Israeli state in the aftermath of the Holocaust, many Jews found a way to avoid continuing on the path of what Giorgio Agamben (1998) calls “bare life,” only to become “civilian soldiers” in a garrison state awash in both traditional, sovereign war and the more saturating practices of pure war. When that state reached the geographical limits of its exocolonial project in 1967, it did so as a new member of the nuclear club. Under the nuclear umbrella and Israel’s military domination of the newly-captured territories, the lives of everyone in Israel/Palestine were transformed in ways that are consistent with the realities of endocolonization. Already oriented toward the preparation for war, Israel’s economy became partially dependent on Palestinian labor (though much less so than was the case in apartheid South Africa) and even more dependent on militarization in the form of perpetual counter-insurgency and, more recently, the high-tech repressive and disciplinary practices of “homeland security” (Klein, 2007). These later developments have coincided with a turn toward neoliberal restructuring that has had deep and predictable effects (Clarno, 2008; Nitzan and Bichler, 2002).

For their part, Palestinians who experienced violent deterritorialization in 1948 found themselves at the mercy of generally unwelcoming Arab governments and also subject to the kind of liberal humanitarianism (symbolized by FDR’s “freedom from want”) that easily slid into a coercive structure designed to keep them “barely” alive and politically neutered (Collins, forthcoming; Peteet, 2005). After 1967, those living under Israeli control found that endocolonization initially meant being ensnared in a system of labor exploitation that involved not only the family disruption associated with migrating to work in Israel, but also the indignity of working to build a new society for others on the ruins of their own (Tamari, 1981). Over time, changes in Israeli economic and security policy, combined with the consolidation of Israel’s exocolonial hold on the West Bank and East Jerusalem, left Palestinians confined to smaller and smaller areas and, in the case of Gaza, reduced to “bare life” guaranteed only by humanitarian assistance and the digging of tunnels under the border with Egypt.

Equally important, having already been test subjects for an international order that constructed refugees as threats to state sovereignty while also leaving them vulnerable to state violence (Benhabib, 2004; Nyers, 2006), Palestinians also became early targets of what would eventually be known as the “global war on terrorism.” The latter campaign, which is deeply shaped by the interests of settler states and their collapsing of external and internal security (Virilio, 1998), has already had devastating consequences for Palestinians (Gregory, 2004). In short, the entire post-Nakba era has coincided with the (re)emergence of an endocolonizing mode that has left Palestinians more confined, their political dreams perpetually “deferred” in the manner described in Langston Hughes’ famous 1951 poem on the black American underclass.

**DROMOCOLONIZATION: AN EMERGENT AND CONFINING REALITY**

Both exocolonization and endocolonization, of course, are aided by capital. The ability of capital to produce a single world-system, combined with the role of nuclear deterrence in enabling endocolonization under a single apocalyptic umbrella, points us toward a creeping politics of acceleration and closure that emerges fully in the third mode of colonization. Following Virilio’s crucial work on dromology (literally the logic of the *dromos* or the race), I will refer to this third mode as *dromocolonization*. In the first place, the term refers to the fact that colonization (like power itself) is inherently “dromocratic”: the advantage typically lies with those who are most effectively able to control the strategic acceleration and deceleration of violence and change. In many cases, the colonizer is the one who has the ability (by virtue of superior technology) to go the fastest and therefore leverage acceleration to his benefit. In other cases, the colonized (e.g., in the form of guerrilla armies) may be able to gain the upper hand by tapping into dromocratic power through lightning-quick assaults and retreats. One could thus argue that
this mode is immanent to any actor-centered conception of colonization.

A full understanding of dromocolonization, however, requires that we also go beyond actor-centered theories and their emphasis on intentionality. If we step outside these theories, we can also see dromocolonization as the colonization of humanity itself by techno-scientific acceleration – in short, the rule of acceleration. On this view, acceleration constitutes a semi-autonomous force in politics that evades, in many ways, the structures of human control (Der Derian, 1990; Virilio, 1986). For this reason, to adopt Raymond Williams’ classic terminology from the field of cultural studies, I argue that dromocolonization is best viewed as an “emergent” reality in relation to which the other two modes appear increasingly “residual,” co-existing uneasily with dromocolonization while always threatening to be eclipsed by it.

One important characteristic of this emergent reality is that, much like globalization itself, its effects are profoundly uneven. To say that acceleration is colonizing humanity is not the same as saying that all human beings experience this process in the same way. For those who are immersed on a daily basis in the accelerated circuits of social media, compulsory multitasking, and “real-time” instantaneity, dromocolonization may appear as a nagging sense that the rhythm of life is steadily changing in a way that leaves one perpetually out of breath and unable to focus.5 Others, however, may experience dromocolonization in a radically different way: when their village is hit without warning by a missile fired from a pilotless aircraft representing a postmodern war machine with the “ability to descend from nowhere without notice and vanish again without warning” (Bauman, 2001: 15); when their life savings disappears in an instant thanks to a financial crash fueled by lightning-quick, computer-aided trading patterns; or when false information about them spreads like wildfire through the information superhighway faster than it can possibly be corrected.

A second important characteristic of dromocolonization is that because it is a truly global process, it begins to take us beyond the question of who is being colonized by whom. For example, in the realm of political violence, there is no question that non-state forces (e.g., those who are the primary targets of the “global war on terrorism”) are now fully capable of moving at least as quickly as traditional military forces. Some might view this development as evidence that dromocratic power (traditionally vested in the state) is weakening, and to a limited extent this is accurate. Yet the entire violent dynamic pitting states against these non-state groups leads one to suspect that all of these actors are being driven by the logic of acceleration as much as (or more than) they are driving it.

The traditional tools of social analysis are insufficient to make sense of this process. With their focus on territory, our frameworks for understanding politics remain very geo-centric in a way that fails to grasp or explain how acceleration is changing the very nature of space and arguably effecting the subordination of space to time (Der Derian, 1990). This is not to say that space and place no longer matter; on the contrary, we are all witnessing and participating in a struggle between the deterritorializing vectors of dromocratic globalization and the human desire to inhabit, defend, and derive meaning from particular spaces.

All three modes of colonization I have described here are important elements of this struggle, but they diverge in a number of key respects, perhaps most notably in their mechanisms of displacement. Exocolonization and endocolonization tend to displace individuals and communities from one geographical space to another through genocide, voluntary or forced removal, the creation of diasporas, de-peasantization and urbanization, and the creation of ghettos and other confined spaces. Settler-colonial exocolonization, for example, removes indigenous people from the land (or from a particular kind of relationship to the land) and pushes them into cities or onto reservations. Endocolonization begins by bringing citizens under the “protective” cover of the state, only to remove that cover systematically, leaving them

5 Such experiences among relatively well-to-do members of the global community have produced a range of efforts designed to slow down the pace of life (Honoré, 2004).
to flee into spaces defined by various forms of fundamentalism (including, of course, market fundamentalism). In other words, both modes deterritorialize, but they also reterritorialize – albeit in ways that enact new hierarchical structures.

Dromocolonization, by contrast, operationalizes the logic of acceleration in politics and takes it to its extreme by displacing people from space into time. In a planetary sense, all human beings are indigenous people for whom dromocolonization represents a direct attack on any meaningful relationship with place. In Virilio’s memorable phrase, it combines with the globalization of insecurity to produce the “bewildered flight of civilian populations in the ‘territories’ of the media,” with the media understood as a literal no-place (utopia). At the extreme, there is no reterritorialization.

These processes may also be expressed, historically and quite pessimistically, as a story of the rise and fall of democratic politics. Exocolonization was, in part, about creating the conditions for the creation of democratic institutions and the selective provision of democratic privileges (e.g. to the white, male, propertied citizen). Endocolonization created the social conditions within which to extend these privileges to others (e.g., the formerly colonized, racial minorities) at precisely the time when popular sovereignty was starting to be superseded by global structures such as the Bretton Woods institutions. Finally, dromocolonization pushes humanity toward the eclipse of democracy by gradually eliminating the time for reflection and popular mobilization, leaving us to drown in the world of instant communication while the world around is buffeted by forces that seem to be beyond anyone’s control.

While there may be ways in which exocolonization, endocolonization, and dromocolonization emerge and operate sequentially, the greatest value of the framework I have been describing lies in helping us understand those cases where the three modes are operating coterminously. Palestine is one such case, but we might also point to those parts of contemporary Africa where nomadic “war machines” are exercising new forms of accelerated “necropolitics” (Mbembe, 2003). The forces of violence in these locations are not simply operating dromatically in the wasteland left by a past colonialism; they are deeply connected with ongoing vectors of exo- and endocolonization. The three modes of colonization combine to fuel patterns of resource extraction that are deeply familiar, yet also somehow novel in their particular execution.

In Palestine, as I have argued elsewhere (Collins, 2008a and 2008b), dromocratic violence – that is, violence that both uses and is used by acceleration – has played a key role in the continued prosecution of Zionism’s settler-colonial project, not least in Israel’s longstanding ability to leverage its considerable advantage in the technologies of ground and aerial warfare. At the same time, Palestinians have also sought and found ways to employ forms of accelerated violence that represent concrete mechanisms through which Palestinians have been gradually displaced from geopolitics into chronopolitics. The hijacker of the early 1970s, for example, responded to deterritorialization by choosing to inhabit, in effect, the virtual territories of the global media (Virilio, 1990), while the suicide bomber responds to what Ghassan Hage (2003b: 78) calls a “premature social aging” that imposes a particularly terrifying form of existential acceleration on a colonized population for whom death is always nearby. Both actions constitute powerful “media spectacles” (Kellner, 2003), simultaneously keeping alive an insistent expression of Palestinian political will while also collaborating unwittingly with Zionism to push forward the dangerous politics of dromocolonization.

Meanwhile, the decades-old struggle against the more traditional kinds of geopolitical displacement fostered by exocolonization continues in the form of place-based resistance on the part of ordinary Palestinians who seek to

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6 For Virilio, the political implications of this process are stark and catastrophic: by pushing the people to occupy a world of instant and endless real-time communication, it produces “a popular opposition that is no longer located anywhere” (Virilio, 1990: 63).

7 For a useful discussion of how acceleration is disrupting the basic structures of liberal democracy, see Scheuerman (2004).
defend their land, trees, and homes. These efforts, however, are taking place within shrinking conditions of possibility thanks not only to settler colonialism’s spatial politics but also to the effects of dromocolonization. One of Virilio’s most important insights is that acceleration produces various forms of confinement. The intense confinement that Palestinians experience while living under Israeli domination is partly a function of literal enclosure (Clarno, 2008) achieved through land confiscations, checkpoints, and the construction of Israel’s “separation wall.” It is also, however, a function of the high-tech, dromocratic umbrella that Israel has constructed in order to enable the efficient surveillance of Palestinian communities, the remote scanning of Palestinian bodies, and the lightning-quick assassination of Palestinian militants (Klein, 2007; Li, 2006).

Despite their privileged position within the settler-colonial structure, Israeli Jews are not unaffected by the processes of dromocratic confinement. On the contrary, confinement is arguably one of the most salient elements that they share with their Palestinian counterparts, albeit in ways that are obviously unequal and hierarchical in their execution. With its deep immersion in the phenomenon of pure war described above, Israel has long subjected its population to a kind of ideological confinement via the kinds of “pathological insecurity” that are endemic to all settler projects (Goldberg, 2008: 38), a sense of insecurity that is aided by the willingness of some Palestinians to employ dromocratic violence. In a further form of confinement, the families that populate Israel’s West Bank colonies live in what Eyal Weizman (2002) calls “panoptic fortresses” and “cul-de-sac envelopes,” benefiting from a special network of “bypass roads” that speed them to their jobs inside Israel in a way that undoubtedly makes an already small territory seem even smaller.

**DECOLONIZATION: A GLOBAL OPPORTUNITY**

What this dromological dynamic indicates is that the entire struggle over settler colonialism in Palestine is increasingly colored by the violent politics of acceleration even as it remains immersed in the modes of exo- and endocolonization. Like settler colonialism itself, to return to Patrick Wolfe’s observation, these modes produce *structures*, not simply “events.” Understanding the depth of these structures is crucial if we are to grasp one of the cardinal realities governing the situation: as the product of these structural transformations rather than a temporary colonial relationship, the “problem” of Palestine was never meant to be “solved” – at least not in the conventional sense. What, then, might decolonization mean in Palestine in the 21st century? Can we even speak of decolonization in such a context?

Our current understanding of decolonization is obviously a product of the world-historical changes that saw much of the so-called “Third World” achieve formal independence from colonial rule in the years following 1945. In Israel/Palestine, the fact that Jewish settlers and their descendants have no clear “mother country” to return to has led to the increasingly widespread acceptance of the “two-state solution” that would create a Palestinian state on the territories occupied by Israel in 1967. One of the primary political advantages of this “solution” is that while it holds out the promise of a certain kind of decolonization (in the form of national sovereignty over part of Palestine) to Palestinians, it does so from within the “conflict” framework with which I began this article. Israeli Jews who support the two-state solution are thus able to maintain their denial of the colonial realities that surround them.

Unfortunately, the two-state solution has been rendered thoroughly unworkable by those very colonial realities and their geopolitical manifestations. Specifically, by settling its Jewish population throughout historic Palestine – a process that continues as of this writing through the expansion of Jewish colonies in and around East Jerusalem – the state of Israel has effectively confirmed Palestine’s status as a single polity marked by the differential provision of rights to its inhabitants on the basis of ethno-religious identity. Carving a viable, truly sovereign Palestinian state out of this territory, as even the most well-meaning political negotiators have discovered, appears to be an impossible task; the only imaginable result is a hierarchical political arrangement in which Palestinians remain subject
to Israeli political, economic, and military domination while Israeli Jews continue to enjoy the colonial privileges they have come to expect. These developments have produced what Ilan Pappe (2008) calls a sense of “navigation fatigue” among liberal Israeli Jews who find themselves occupying a shrinking ideological space as they are forced to confront the exclusivist nature of their national project. Pretending that one can embrace this project while rejecting exclusivism – by allowing for a nominally “independent” Palestinian state in a small fraction of historic Palestine – is less and less of an option at a time when the Israeli government is carrying out policies that leave it increasingly vulnerable to comparisons with apartheid South Africa. What this means is that some traditional supporters of Israel (both inside and outside the state) are starting to break free of Zionism altogether, while others are embracing openly the racist logic of exclusion long associated with right-wing Zionists who advocate the expulsion or further disenfranchisement of Israel’s Palestinian population and the annexation of additional territory to the state.

The ground has also been shifting among Palestinians and their international supporters. Specifically, the growth of a global solidarity movement in the past decade has coincided with a significant turn away from the old national liberation model focused on the taking of state power and toward an anti-apartheid model focused on the creation of a single, democratic state for all who live in Israel/Palestine (Abunimah, 2006; Makdisi, 2008; Tilley, 2005). This “one-state solution,” while still lacking support among policy elites, is nonetheless much more in tune with the realities of settler colonialism. The global boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) movement represents a further step in this direction by seeking to leverage the nonviolent power of civil society against Israeli colonization in much the same way that international pressure hastened the downfall of formal apartheid in South Africa.

All of these emerging elements in the longstanding struggle for justice in Palestine have come under sustained critique not only from strong supporters of Israel, but also from those within the struggle who have strategic objections to BDS and those who view the actions of some international solidarity activists on the ground in Palestine as counterproductive. Nonetheless, what I want to suggest here is that we are seeing the early signs of a collective recognition that 21st-century decolonization in Palestine – or anywhere else – means, first, addressing all of the deep structures of global colonization and their many interlocking manifestations (militarization, deterritorialization, neoliberalism, ecological destruction); and second, fostering what is, in effect, a kind of “Fourth World” (that is, indigenous) consciousness (Hall, 2003).

As Trudell’s observation about permanent war indicates, indigenous people – the original victims of settler colonialism – never had the luxury of seeing war as separate from capitalism or environmental degradation. Like all those who find themselves targeted by colonialism, they are typically constructed in dominant discourses as “underdeveloped” and needing to “catch up” to their colonizers; yet the reverse is more likely to be true. Globalization and global colonization, in this sense, provide an opportunity for all of us to “catch up” to those who have never stopped being indigenous.

What might this mean, in practice, for Palestine? It would mean continuing to foster connections between the “place-based yet transnationalised” (Escobar, 2004: 223) struggle on the ground in Palestine and the broader movement for global justice, a movement crystallized in the emergence of the World Social Forum. It would mean searching for liberating alternatives to the models that continue to inform the actions of nationalist elites who seek state power in Palestine at the cost of meaningful social transformation. It would also mean supporting the efforts of those who are experimenting with new forms of ecological (in the broadest sense) resistance not only to Israeli colonization, but also to the deep structures of global colonization discussed here.

Given Palestine’s ongoing status as a prophetic political laboratory, a successful shift toward “Fourth World” thinking there would have significant global consequences. Nor would it be the first time that settler colonialism has played such a role. Older settler-colonial cases, for example, have given the world a complex and ongoing legacy in a number of areas, two of which are worth highlighting here. First, white...
settler societies such as the U.S. and Australia have been sites of experimentation in a politics of multiculturalism that, while often celebrated in narratives of liberal democracy, has often ratified colonial structures rather than transforming them. As Hage (1999) argues, such a colonizing multiculturalism is only possible once the threat of indigenous sovereignty has been neutralized. Whether viewed as deliberate continuations of settler-colonialism or as well-intentioned but unsuccessful efforts at fundamental social change, such cases represent important cautionary tales.

Given the sharply different demographic realities in South Africa, that society’s particular challenge and contribution to the global politics of decolonization has been to engage in a sustained process of confronting the realities of past violence, most notably through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Once again, we see that this process has been sharply criticized by analysts who question whether it has done anything to dismanle the structural legacy of apartheid. Yet there is little doubt that for all its flaws, the TRC has had important ripple effects throughout the world. By offering a very public, institutionally-supported step toward challenging the politics of denial, it far outstrips the limited nature of the “apologies” offered to the victims of colonization by leaders in the U.S. and Australia in recent years.

In this light, it seems that the challenge in Palestine will be to learn from these earlier examples and to create a truly multicultural society that seeks to leave behind, to the greatest extent possible, the structural legacies of colonization. On one level, these legacies are the same as those found in any settler-colonial situation: landlessness, displacement, structural violence, racism, and the deep-seated resentments and fears born of decades of oppression. On another level, however, as we have seen in this article, settler colonialism in Palestine is particularly marked today by a dynamic of dromocratic violence whose intensity is organically related to the smallness of the territory. When placed in the context of the increasingly claustrophobic realities associated with globalization, the prophetic nature of Palestine – that is, its tendency to be “diagnostic” of “what we are in the process of becoming” (Deleuze 2003) – emerges in sharp relief.

Are we all becoming Palestinians? Are the structures put in place by global colonization inevitably speeding, like war itself, toward some post-political, apocalyptic essence? Where are the spaces that might serve as points of resistance to such a trend? The answers to these questions point us toward what could be Palestine’s most important potential contribution to the world in the 21st century: to help spur a sustained process of confronting the long-term legacies of global colonization and dromocratic violence. Just as it was a mistake to assume that South African apartheid could only lead to a final bloodbath, it would also be a mistake now to assume that Palestine must forever be a laboratory of destruction and instability. Indeed, one could argue that precisely because of past and current trends in this very direction, Palestine is the perfect place to experiment with more liberating alternatives that might have equally liberating ripple effects elsewhere. However difficult and quixotic it may seem, initiating such a process of transformation in Palestine would be a powerful example to a world that is itself in need of profound decolonization.

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