The “Moscow as the Third Rome” Concept: Its Nature and Interpretations since the 19th to Early 21st Centuries¹

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Abstract. The authors seek to identify the main specific features of the “Moscow as the Third Rome” concept (Philotheus) and its later interpretations, geopolitical as well, in modern Russia. The historical and interdisciplinary research conducted based on the source made it possible to propose a new vision of possible grounds for Russian foreign policy strategy. The “Third Rome” notion, from the perspective of its impact on Russian foreign policy and its geopolitical dimension, has been addressed in the works of many authors. It conveys both a historiosophic phenomenon, a national idea and the vision of a fair state. The concept, being in tune with the mood of Russian society, has had an impact on both the inner structure of the state and its foreign policy, which allows us to suggest that the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome may be considered Russia’s informal geopolitical doctrine.

Keywords: Russia; Orthodoxy; Philotheus; foreign policy; geopolitical doctrine.

[es] El concepto de “Moscú como la tercera Roma”: su naturaleza e interpretaciones desde el siglo XIX hasta principios del XX

Resumen. El objetivo de los autores es identificar las principales características del concepto de “Moscú como Tercera Roma” (Filoféi) y sus interpretaciones posteriores, incluyendo las geopolíticas, en la Rusia moderna. La investigación histórica de carácter interdisciplinario a partir de esta fuente hace posible la propuesta de una nueva visión sobre los fundamentos posibles de la estrategia de política exterior rusa. Muchas obras de diversos autores han explorado la noción de “Tercera Roma” desde el punto de vista de su impacto en la política exterior rusa y sus dimensiones geopolíticas. Esta se refiere tanto a un fenómeno historiosófico como a una idea de nación y la visión de un Estado justo. Consonante con el estado de ánimo de la sociedad rusa, el concepto ha tenido impacto en la estructura interna del Estado ruso y su política exterior, lo que nos permite sugerir que opera en Rusia como doctrina geopolítica informal.

Palabras clave: Rusia; ortodoxia; Filoofi; política exterior; doctrina geopolítica.

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O conceito de "Moscou como a terceira Roma": sua natureza e interpretações do século XIX ao início do século XX

Resumo. O objetivo dos autores é identificar as principais características do conceito de “Moscou como a Terceira Roma” (Filoféi) e suas posteriores interpretações, incluindo geopolítica na Rússia moderna. A pesquisa histórica, de caráter interdisciplinar, possibilita, mediante tal conceito, a proposta de uma nova visão sobre os possíveis fundamentos estratégicos da política externa russa. Trabalhos de vários autores exploraram a noção de "Terceira Roma" do ponto de vista de seu impacto sobre a política externa russa e suas dimensões geopolíticas. Isso refere-se tanto ao fenômeno historiosófico, quanto à ideia de nação e visão de um estado igualitário. Em harmonia com o estado de espírito da sociedade russa, o conceito tem impactado a estrutura interna do Estado russo e sua política externa, fato que nos permite sugerir que opera, na Rússia, enquanto doutrina geopolítica informal.

Palavras-chave: Rússia; ortodoxia; Filoféi; política externa; doutrina geopolítica.


Our focus is primarily on the geopolitical interpretations of the “Moscow as the Third Rome” concept, which are reflected in Russian and Western historiography of the mid 19th to early 21st centuries. The main goal of the article is to identify the peculiarities of those interpretations of the elder Philotheus’ idea in different epochs that are important for understanding the logic of the development of Russian geopolitical and foreign policy thought. Particular attention is paid to the views of the Russian authors of the 1990s who are little-known in the West, like V. L. Tsymburskiy (1995; 2007), I. V. Artemov (1996), A. N. Klimenko (2011; 2013a; 2013b) and others. At the same time, the authors sought to show that the identity of Russia as a great power does not need a direct reference to the Moscow as the Third Rome concept. Furthermore, the Messianic derivatives of this idea cannot lead to the justification and legitimation of intervention against other countries. Therefore, the key points of the Moscow as the Third Rome concept are considered in their textual context specifically, which is usually omitted in published materials and allows the authors, at times, to use the meanings present in the original Epistles.

1. Political Context of the Emergence and the Essence of the Concept

Prior to any reflection on the topic, it is important to understand its essence and the original context of its emergence. Such a historical analysis helps ensure consistency of modern interpretations of the concept. Otherwise the Moscow as the Third Rome notion comes to be used as but an eloquent expression filled with one’s very
own meaning. 4 So which concept was in fact formulated by Philotheus in his Epistles? What line of reasoning was Philotheus sticking to when he claimed that “two Romes have fallen,”5 which of the many causes of the fall was singled out by him as principal?

Credits for the idea belong to a monk, *hegumen* Philotheus of Pskov (early 16th century), who outlined the Moscow as a Third Rome concept in his Epistles to the Grand Deacon of Pskov M.G. Mysur Munekhin and to the Grand Prince of Moscow Vasily III (1505–1533). The idea arose from the contemporary international situation of the time and the way it was understood in Russia. In 1453 the Byzantine Empire was conquered by the Turks, which triggered the process of revision of formerly stable relations within the Christian world.

Earlier system of international relations (until 1453), which include Muscovy, was based on the concept of “Byzantine Oecumene” with its centre in Constantinople. The Byzantine Emperor was looked upon as “Basileus of the Romans”, that is, all Christians, the father of the family of nations baptized by Byzantine (Sinitsyna, 1998: 61, 62). But at that moment (after 1453) the entire structure of the Byzantine Orthodoxy was destroyed. Archpriest Alexander Schmemann writes: “Byzantium was ‘the measure of Orthodoxy’, Russians could securely … develop their own state, it was effectively guaranteed by universal Byzantine Orthodoxy, its undeniable authority. But now with this measure gone, the authority collapsed” (Schmemann, 1993: 359). So Rus’ faced the necessity of self-determination in the new international environment (Stremooukhoff, 1953: 88).

Obviously, Philotheus believed that after the fall of the Byzantine Empire, responsibility for the mere existence of Orthodoxy, its norms and values entirely passed on to Russia (then Russian Muscovy). The Third Rome for the Pskov elder is not a city, but “the Tsardom of our sovereign”, the Moscow – Russia as a whole as a spiritual space, embracing the Orthodox Church and its children – Russian people, whose faith is different from the faith of Muslims – “Hagarene descendants”, and Catholics – “Latinos”.

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4 For example, attempts to identify Philotheus’ Epistles with Rosetta Stone inscription (Poe, 2001).

5 “So let thee, o Tsar, observe this with the fear of God... And if orderly is put thy Kingdom, thou shalt be the son of light and the dweller of Heavenly Jerusalem, and as written above, I am telling thee: bend thine ear and remember, pious Tsar, that all Christian kingdoms have merged in one of thine, that two Romes have fallen, the third stands, and there will be no fourth.” // Epistle to Grand Duke Vasili, “On Sign of The Cross Correction and Sodomy Fornication” // [URL: <http://www.krotov.info/acts/16/1/filofey.html>]. Accessed on: 6 October 2018.

6 Philotheus – a monk, *hegumen* of Yelizarov Convent in Pskov who lived in the 16th century. He is known as the author of the Epistles: to the Pskov secretary M.G. Mysur-Munekhin (3 Epistles), to a “certain nobleman” and the tsars Vasily III and Ivan IV. In his Epistles Philotheus first formulates the idea of Moscow as the “Rome” or “Basileia Romaion”, i.e. the guardian of Orthodoxy (Full Orthodox, 1992: 2246-2247). Philotheus also is regarded as one of the authors of the Russian Chronograph of 1512 (Shakhmatov, 1899).

7 “He who comes from the most high and almighty all-enclosing hand of God by which the kings reign, honour for the great and probrity for the mighty, who are glorifying his Highness our high-throned sovereign, Grand Prince, Orthodox Christian Tsar and ruler of all, holding the reins of the thrones of all the God’s Saints and of the Holy Catholic Conciliar Apostolic Church of the Blessed Virgin, her honest and glorious Assumption; he who shone over Roman and Constantinopolis sovereigns as the Church of old Rome fell for unbelief and Apollinarius’ heresy, while in the second Rome, Constantinople, Church doors by Hagarene descendants were split open with axes, and now of this third, new Rome, thy majestic Kingdom, the Holy Conciliar Apostolic Church throughout the world in the Orthodox Christian faith is shining over the Sun – so let them all know, pious Tsar, that all Orthodox kingdoms of the Christian faith are unanimous in thy Tsardom: thou art the one Christian Tsar beneath the Sky.” // Epistle to Grand Duke Vasili, “On Sign of The Cross Correction and Sod-
Philotheus Epistles are based upon theological-prophetic perspective. In his attempts to understand what Russia is destined for, the elder views historic events of the past and present in Christian history (the Great Schism, the fall of Constantinople) through the prism of prophecies found in the Scriptures, in particular Daniel the Prophet’s apparitions and the Apocalypse. It is also not to be forgotten that the 15th century was dominated by the “last times” mindset conditioned by beliefs that the world was coming to an end in the year 7000 (1492). “The end of times” concept is consistent with the subject of “Eastern Roman Empire” transition, which, as Philotheus believed, then furthered its existence in the territory of Muscovy, and, in fact, was to be regarded as that very katechon, which would keep the Orthodox faith “at the last stage before the end of the world” (Laatz, 2011: 109). In its interpretation, made by St. John Chrysostom, many scholars (Sinitsyna, 1998, 2010; etc.) saw a direct link between “restraint” (katechon) and the Third Rome concept: “when the existence of the Roman state ceases, then he (the Antichrist) will come. And rightly so, because as long as they fear this state, no one will soon obey (the antichrist); but after it is destroyed, it will lead to anarchy” (Fedoseenko).

In the series of “ideological predecessors” to the Third Rome concept, apart from “katechon,” there is another ancient Christian concept of protection: “the Dragon-Slayer and Holy Wisdom.” Their union symbolises Russia’s ideal statehood and spiritual integrity. Holy Wisdom – Sophia (feminine) keeps the faith, traditions and national peculiarities and foundations. Sofia is a religious symbol with several consonant meanings: Sophia as faith, Sophia as the Church and as the Wisdom of God. The Dragon-Slayer – George (masculine) – is the image of the king as a spiritual warrior, who is called to protect Sofia and keep order on earth.

On semantic foundations of katechon and “The Dragon-Slayer and Holy Wisdom”, the concept of “Moscow as the Third Rome” came to have a defensive, protective nature (primarily in a spiritual sense: a single Orthodox state by its very existence does not allow the Antichrist to conquer the world (Troitsky, 2007: 28).

When Philotheus identified the Grand Duchy of Moscow as the Third Rome, he emphasized that spiritual wealth and culture in all its forms inspired by Christian faith and Christian perception of the world and man were inherited from the Roman Empire of Apostolic times by Byzantium and then by Russia. In the process of transition invaluable experience of ancestors was taken further and enriched by contributions from descendants. The essence of this relationship between the old and the new is such that the absence of the former makes the latter impossible. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that the fact that Russia adopted Orthodoxy which, in turn, gave birth to Russian national culture in all its riches, is directly linked to the path by which Baptism came to Ancient Rus’, namely from Byzantium, whose influence on Russia turned out very fruitful, which is thoroughly stud-

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8 We must specially note here, that ideologically the Third Rome concept was preceded by the concept of katechon. Katechon (literally meaning “withholding” or “restraining” in Greek) is a factor that protects sanctity in the face of evil and spiritual decay. The etymology of the word katechon goes back to the Second Epistle to the Thessalonians by Apostle Paul: “For the mystery of iniquity doth already work: only he who now restrains will restrain, until he be taken out of the way”. (2 Thess. 2, 7).
ied in works by such profound thinkers as I. Kireevsky (2006) and N. Danilevsky (2008).

Following its liberation from the Golden Horde and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, Russia furthers its existence, and it is its loyalty to Orthodoxy that makes it possible. Notably, Moscow was regarded by Philotheus as a successor to Rome and Constantinople and the new centre of the Orthodox world. Thus Philotheus appears to have expressed Russia’s destiny taken in a broad historical context from the very first centuries of Christian Church existence, while geographically it covered the entire Christian world (not just Byzantium-centred – Orthodox – Oecumene).

The understanding of Russia as the new sacred centre of the Christian world was not new. In fact, Philotheus generalized and abstracted the essence of the works of his predecessors. In the late 15th century, Metropolitan Zosima in “Paschal Cycle Presentation”, referring to the end of the world and urging his countrymen to become true Christians, described Moscow as the “new Jerusalem”. A few years later, as A. Tikhaniuk observed, Trinity Hegumen Simon Chizh (Siskin) likened Moscow to Rome.

However, Philotheus took the concept further, he was the first to introduce a three-part formula: Rome – Constantinople – Moscow. Another salient feature of his Epistles in comparison with the works of his predecessors is that the former are based upon theological-prophetic perspective. Studying quotations from Daniel the prophet's apparitions and from Apocalypse, analyzing Sacred History and prophecies, Philotheus was trying to understand Russia's place in contemporary Christian Oecumene. The fact that Russia was perceived as God's chosen nation was not a basis for expansion or world domination – Philotheus had not written a word of this kind in his Epistles. The Moscow as the Third Rome concept was aimed to plant another task in the minds of Russian rulers: to care for Church and cherish Orthodoxy (Sinitsyna, 1998: 244; Kozhinov, 1999: 406; Kartashev, 1996: 52; Narochnitskaya, 2003: 120).

It should be noted that those times were marked by growing awareness by Muscovy of itself as “a small island” with that very form of pure Christianity which was passed over directly from Christ, Apostles and the very first Christians. Philotheus lived in the city of Pskov on the North-West frontier of the Byzantium world, and his reflections were aimed to understand the role of Muscovy as surviving integrity of the world, which could (and should) fill the gap on the map of Pax Christiana, the one that emerged after the fall of Constantinople in 1453.

Dividing world history into periods, Philotheus draws attention primarily to their spiritual content. He divides the time into two segments: the first is the existence of a single Church; the second is that of a divided Church. For 770 years, the Catholic Church “had been with us in connection” and then 735 years back “defected from the True Faith”. Against these two periods Philotheus singles out three stages – three “Romes”.

Philotheus believed that the first Rome fell in 8-9 AD centuries, rather than in the 5th century. Thus, the Pskov elder had in mind not the political (historical) downfall of the Roman Empire, but its spiritual decline. It is not clear though what

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9 By analogy with the “Islands of Christianity” in the pagan Roman Empire, which, according to one interpretation, were the true “First Rome”, mentioned in Philotheus Epistles (Kozhinov, 1999: 406; Leontiev, 1996: 223).
specific historical event he meant. We will review the versions, since this helps to reveal the logic of the Philotheus reasoning.

According to one interpretation of Philotheus Epistles, it might be the Second Council of Nicaea (787 AD) (Goldberg, 1974: 7). The Second Council of Nicaea was the last (Seventh) Catholic Council, followed by a canonical split between the Western and Eastern churches, regarded as a breakaway by Roman Catholics from Catholic Orthodoxy. In this case, Philotheus Epistle to Grand Duke Vasili III can be dated back to 1522. But there is no direct reference to the event in the text. Moreover, it means that the Church was established in the year 17 AD, which disagrees with historical realities.

Another interpretation of the “first Rome” decline that might be suggested is based on a common assumption that Church origination dates back to Pentecost (i.e. the fiftieth day after the Resurrection of Jesus Christ), which gives approximately the year 800 AD as the date. This was when Charlemagne was crowned Holy Roman Emperor (Imperator Romanum) on December 25, 800 AD. Such an attempt to restore the Roman Empire on the initiative of Pope Leo III was a challenge to its legitimate heirs – emperors of Byzantium and might be regarded as a sign of destruction of Church communion. Philotheus himself named the name of Charlemagne in his epistles along with the name of Pope Formosus and Apollinarius heresy. We, however, should not be confused by the fact that Apollinarius (4th century), Charlemagne (late 8th – early 9th century) and Pope Formosus (late 9th century) belong to different historical epochs. Philotheus unites them not on chronological but, rather, on ontological basis to form a generalized image of heresy, of a rupture with Orthodoxy. In the eye of Philotheus such was the image of the Western Church which, in turn, symbolized for him the contemporary Roman Empire, which he held unable to protect “Basileia Romaion” (Sinitsyna, 1998: 226-235).

However, this gives the date of 1535, the year when the Grand Prince of Moscow was Ivan IV (1533-1584), which is not consistent with the addressee of the Epistle.

“Ninety years” mentioned in the first Epistle allow to associate the fall of the “second Rome” with the Council (re-Union) of Ferrara-Florentine (1438-1439), which meant for Philotheus spiritual decline of the Greek Church.

The “ninety years” mentioned in the first Epistle allow us to associate the fall of the “Second Rome” with the Council (re-Union) of Ferrara-Florentine (1438-1439), which meant, for Philotheus, the spiritual decline of the Greek Church.

Philotheus believed that the Grand Prince of Moscow faced a challenge not only to defend Orthodoxy and the Church, but also to embody the high evangelical ideals of mercy, justice, etc. With his clear vision of the fact that secular power in Moscow took over the power of the Church, the monk laid all the responsibility for the spiritual life of society upon the very Grand Prince of Moscow as a distinctive compensation for the fact that Church influence was gone. In addition, Philotheus himself continued the “pre-Muscovian” line, with its separation of the Church and the state, spiritual mentoring of those in power (by, for example, such outstanding

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10 There is another closer date, 809 AD, when Charles the Great ordered to include “filioque” in the Creed, but the Roman Church did not do that until 1014.
figures as Sergius of Radonezh and Kirill Belozersky) and the right to “intercession” (Goldberg, 1974: 83-84) for the people. The medieval Russian nation put an enormous emphasis on the Christian ideal of Holiness, which affected its spiritual, cultural and political development as well as its national identity. Russia’s thirst for asceticism, selflessness, kindness, modesty, suppression of pride, etc., was passed on from generation to generation as a distinct “token of Holiness” (Sakharov: 2010, 90-91).

Russia’s aspiration to become the centre of communion for all the Orthodox Christians persisted from the time of the emergence of the Moscow as the Third Rome concept, throughout the reign of Tsar Alexei Mikhailovich (1645-1676) (A. V. Solovyev, 2012: 251), and further. In the 18th century N. N. Sukhotin wrote that Peter the Great ingeniously tied the problem of turning the Black Sea into the Russian Sea to the task of liberating and protecting the Balkan Slavs. N. N. Sukhotin also referred to the “Eastern Question” as “Peter the Great’s legacy” (Sukhotin, 1898: 12-13). In 1774, Russia and Turkey signed the Peace Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which guaranteed Russia’s right to protect Christian subjects of Turkey (The Treaty). Further evolution of international relations around the Balkans either confirmed (and extended) the terms of that Treaty, or cancelled Russia’s right of patronage. The latter usually entailed degrading Russia’s position not only in the Balkans but also in the world (Kudryavtseva, 2007: 195).

2. The “Moscow as the Third Rome” Concept Echoed in the Works of Russian Writers and Philosophers of the 19th to Early 20th Centuries

In the 19th – early 20th centuries, the “Moscow as the Third Rome” concept gave rise to a kind of belief that Russia is destined to lead and protect universal Orthodoxy and Christian faith. The belief, being in tune with the mood of Russian society, had an impact on both the inner political structure of the state (including its Soviet period) and its foreign policy. This allows us to suggest that the Moscow as the Third Rome concept may be seen as Russia’s informal geopolitical doctrine.


It is worth noting one important point. Scholars researching the Third Rome concept revealed that Philotheus Epistles, remaining long unheeded, were first published in the 1860s (Nazarenko, 2000: 140-141; Ghidirinsky, 2010: 73;

11 In order to soften the temper of Ryazan Prince Oleg Ivanovich, “the elder with his words, quiet and gentle, his godsent grace and piety, was much reasoning with him of virtues of soul, peace and love. Prince Oleg turned down his rage for lenity and obedience...” (Kloss, 2003: 35; Kontsevich, 2009: 172).
12 Kirill Belozersky called on the Grand Prince Vasily Dmitrievich to have “infallible pious thoughts,” “to hate all authority, which involves sin” and “not to pursue temporary glory in vain arrogance” (Narochnitskaya, 2003: 138).
Sinitsyna, 1998: 33). Thus, almost certainly neither F. I. Tyutchev, nor the Slavophiles (A. S. Khomyakov, I. V. Kireevskiy) were familiar with Philotheus concept. Technically, Philotheus Epistles could catch the eye of N. Y. Danilevsky, who wrote his work “Russia and Europe” in 1869, I. S. Aksakov and K. N. Leontiev. Besides, F. M. Dostoevsky and V. S. Solovyov directly appealed to the Moscow as the Third Rome concept. N. I. Danilevsky (1822-1885) focused on the uniqueness of Orthodoxy, on its ability to give singularity to Slavic cultural-historical type, while V. S. Solovyov (1853-1900) put emphasis on moral subject-matter of Christianity (both Western and Eastern), noting that “Russia came to Christ all but later than other European nations, but adopted His doctrine passionately and sincerely” (V. S. Solovyev, 2012).

Philotheus concept include both these aspects (civilizational uniqueness and moral purity requirement), so it is possible to suggest that N. I. Danilevsky and V. S. Solovyev developed and amplified them. In terms of applicability of these concept to geopolitical analysis, V.S. Solovyov’s interpretation is broader than that of N. I. Danilevsky, who spoke of the need to unite all Orthodox Christianity. In his conception V.S. Solovyov argued that unique mission of the Third Rome is to restore the unity and complementarity of Western and Eastern Churches, through which it becomes possible to reconcile the West and the East. V.S. Solovyov believes that opposition to the West (i.e. Europe) was inherent to the Byzantine Empire, that is, the “Second Rome”. Russia, in turn, follows it in real politics taking anti-Western, anti-European stance, while the task of the “Third Rome” is different – to reconcile “the two hostile entities”, the West and the East, Europe and the Mediterranean (Solovyov, 1989: 72), which should become, according to V. S. Solovyev (2012: 266), “Russia’s new pronouncement”.

F. I. Tyutchev (1803-1873), sometimes dubbed a “Russian European” (Svyatopolk-Mirsky, 2002: 121-124), compiled a whole international project, unprecedented in its scope. In fact, the project (set forth in part in his work “Russia and Germany” and, mainly, in the outline of the treatise “Russia and the West”) is a “first-in-time well-known declaration of Russian pan-continentalism (Alekseeva, Zelenev and Yakunin, 2001: 97; Tsymbursky, 1995: 88)”. V.L. Tsymbursky, an expert in geopolitics, understood F. I. Tyutchev’s project as a gradual implementation of three stages. The first stage envisaged Russia’s consolidation within its current borders. The second provided for the pan-Slavic project implementation (also called “Eastern Empire”) with Eastern Europe and the Balkans integration (Tyutchev, 1992: 97). The third stage entailed a complete European re-organization under the aegis of Russia: absorption of Austria, Germany, Italy, reunification of the Churches with Orthodoxy established in Rome and, consequently, papal subjection. Ideally Russia would embrace “with the exception of China, the entire Eurasian continent, in particular the Mediterranean with a core Europe” (Tsymbursky, 1995: 88, 92, 93). It should be noted that F. I. Tyutchev’s concept was as bold and original as it was utopian. Of Philotheus ideas it took, like the works by most other thinkers, a spiritual (Orthodox) component and a perception of Russia as a sacred center of the world.

It is impossible not to mention an outstanding Russian writer Fyodor Dostoevsky (1821-1881), who was obviously a follower of Philotheus concept. “Russia – he wrote in “a Writer’s Diary”, – is a natural magnet which irresistibly attracts the
Slavs, thus keeping alive their integrity and unity” (Dostoevsky, 1984a [1877]). As Rev. Justin (Popovich) noted, the writer was convinced that “people have a firm belief that Russia only lives to serve Christ, to protect Ecumenical Orthodoxy against the infidels” (Rev. Justin, 2013; V. S. Solovyev, 2012: 261-262). Moreover, apart from V.S. Solovyov, it was only F.M. Dostoevsky who directly referred to the Third Rome concept, believing that Philotheus providential ideas had not been given effect to (“Moscow has never been the Third Rome so far...”) and that it would only happen when Russia became “leader of Orthodoxy”, “its patron and protector” (Lazari, 1992: 153-154; Dostoevsky, 1984a [1877]).

3. The Philotheus’ Concept in the 19th Century

Only in the middle of the 19th century did the Moscow as the Third Rome concept begin to form, as a result of these intellectual efforts. This concept is largely based on Russia’s perception of itself as a spiritual centre of the world. The word “Moscow” here is seen from different angles. Moscow is regarded as a sacred city; in a broader sense it means Russia (with its capital in Moscow), or the Russian Orthodox Church with Russian people. Metaphysically, the Third Rome concept implies that, with Constantinople fallen, the Orthodox world has its centre in Russia and is under its care and patronage. As the Third Rome, this concept set forth a number of spiritual and geopolitical (i.e. civilisational) tasks for Russia – to ensure inner, primarily spiritual, stability, as well as patronage over all Orthodox nations. Thus, Russian geopolitical effort was most notably focused on securing a single Orthodox space.

As for the first, domestic, tasks, these were largely associated with the need to strengthen the Christian ethos of a Russian ruler. As for foreign policy implications of the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome, it became, so to speak, an informal geopolitical doctrine backed by both the masses and the elite. However, throughout the entire existence of the Holy Alliance (from 1815), Russia with its very serious attitude to its inter-alliance commitments for some time estranged itself from the Moscow as the Third Rome concept. It was Russia then who proposed building international relations in Europe on the principles of Christian morality. Such a proposal was made when Russia was at the peak of its prestige as the country that made, in comparison with other European states, the greatest contribution to the victory over Napoleon. While creating the post-Napoleonic international system, Russia took the initiative to develop the “Treatise of Christian Brotherly Union” (the Holy Union) as a founding document for the new form of European security. However, the period of dual priorities of the early 19th century, followed by Russia’s participation in the Holy Union, ended when Russia unequivocally took a position of clear support for the Balkan Slavs – Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman Empire. In foreign policy this perspective was manifested, in particular, in the Russo-Turkish wars of the 19th century.

The 19th century manifestation of the Moscow as the Third Rome concept was specifically characterised by an outward-focused effort to protect Orthodoxy, as opposed to the 16th century, when it was directed inward. Back in 16th century, as Philotheus wrote, all Orthodox kingdoms came together in Muscovy. It seemed to
have absorbed their spiritual, metaphysical sense. Then, in the 19th century, the reverse process began: the restoration of the post-Byzantine space in its physical, geographical boundaries. Such was the objective of both theoretical (e.g. Pan-Slavic Union Project by N. I. Danilevsky, 2008: 485-529) and practical (the Russo-Turkish wars of the 19th century) efforts to resolve the so-called “Eastern Question:” to “unfold” and restore the “Third Rome” geographically (Tsymbursky, 2007: 361).

In the mid-19th century, Russia continued to make concessions on the Eastern Question during the so-called “dispute over the keys” (1852), which became the overture to the Crimean war (1853-1856). It was a religious (Orthodox-Catholic) dispute with political rationale. For Russia, the outcome of the dispute over the keys would effectively imply the possibility of restoring its influence in the post-Byzantium Oecumene. When it started the Crimean war, Russia sought to conquer Constantinople – the centre of that world. There were hopes for a spectacular victory, which would be symbolic in the year of the 400th anniversary of the Turks’ conquest of Constantinople. It was also seen as a linking together of ages (from the 14th to the 19th centuries), and a parallel between the two Holy Empires, Byzantium and Russia (V. S. Solovyev, 2012: 209).

Needless to say, Russia had its own strategic interest in the Balkans. However, as we have tried to show briefly, the factor of spiritual solidarity with the Balkan nations prevailed, which might be seen as a peculiar implementation of the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome in the context of the 19th century.

Throughout the 1860s European states acted together in the interests of pro-Turkish solidarity, while Russia was effectively left in isolation (despite its formal alliance with Austria). But even then, in such a weakened and isolated position, Russia (the one among former European allies13) took an unambiguous stance of support for the Balkan nations (Pokrovsky, 1925: 256). The Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs A.M. Gorchakov wrote to Alexander II in his note “On Russian Foreign Policy between 1856 and 1867” of December 23 (Julian Calendar), 1867:

We need to continue our mission as patron of the Eastern Christian nations, ensuring them that Russia is their only sincere, constant and unmercenary friend... It is only through Russia that the liberation of the Christian East can be achieved efficiently and durably. Only... Russia can become a link between these very different nations... Without Russia they may fall into confusion and anarchy [...] (Grigorash, 2005: 78-79).

Yet another Russo-Turkish war occurred in 1877-1878, with its purpose being (as it was stated in the Manifesto on Declaring War against Turkey) to “improve the plight of the oppressed Christian population of Turkey” (Pushkarev, 2001: 533). Once again Russia’s geopolitical effort was meant to embody the conception of “Moscow as the Third Rome”, which might be exemplified by provisions of the Treaty of San Stefano (1878) at the end of the war. Russia as the winner granted independence to Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina. Another

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13 Except the war of 1858 between Montenegro and Turkey, when France was fighting on Montenegro’s side along with Russia.
key point of the Treaty was the creation of a single state – Greater Bulgaria – headed by a Christian government (The Preliminary Treaty, 1952: 159-175). Regarding Russia's involvement in Bulgaria's destiny, Alexander Gorchakov wrote in a statement of April 10, 1878: "[...] Russia's governing in this country can only be for a short term... your every effort must seek to awaken the proper Bulgarian elements of life and quickly consolidate its independence [...]" (Grigorash, 2005: 79). In addition, in order to facilitate Bulgarian sovereignty recognition, Russia had written off the Sublime Porte the entire Turkish debt for the 1877-1878 campaign (Grigorash, 2005: 91).

The Treaty of San Stefano proves that Russia's stance on the “Eastern Question” was not dictated by profit, but by Christian morals, not by “divide et impera” principle, but by the aspiration to render assistance to fraternal Orthodox Slavic nations in the establishment of independent political regimes in the Balkans (Orlov et al., 2004: 266). If speak about the Russian position towards the Balkans at the end of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 clearly indicate that Russia based its foreign policy upon Christian values, which was basically manifested through its fraternal, protectionist attitude towards the Balkan Slavs in line with the conception of “Moscow as the Third Rome”.

However, adherence to this conception did not guarantee Russian success in the international arena, as the outcomes of the Congress of Berlin (1878) showed. Historian M. N. Pokrovsky described the ultimate outcome of the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 in the most pessimistic tone: “Not only did we not hoist the Orthodox cross upon St. Sophia, but failed to secure open gates to the Mediterranean: the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 gave less than the Treaty of Hünkâr İskesesi of 1833” (Pokrovsky, 1925: 273).

Following the Congress of Berlin, in the late XIX century Russian influence in the Balkans started to grow markedly weaker. The Balkan states, one after another, tended to incline towards Europe. This process of geopolitical transformation was gradual and stable; it was still underway in the early 20th century.

Although in the early 20th century the struggle of the Balkan Christians against Turkey gained new life, at that point Russia, who had been their patron throughout the 19th century, refrained. Russia’s main interest in the Balkans was then not to liberate and consolidate Christian subjects of the Ottoman Empire, but strengthen its own strategic and economic position in the first place. Bearing that in mind the Minister of Foreign Affairs A.P. Izvolsky even advocated an alliance with Russia's long-established enemy – Turkey (Tupolev, 2002: 38). This union did not take place, but the emergence of the very idea indicated the primacy of Russia’s economic interests in the Balkans over the aspiration to protect same-faith fraternal nations (Werth, 2001: 61; Sacher, 1924: 49, 54, 58). Russia's loss of status as the spiritual centre of post-Byzantium space found its further manifestation in the fact that in 1912 it openly competed with Bulgaria for the control over Constantinople and the Straits (Sacher, 1924: 50; Tupolev, 2002: 39). In addition, as mentioned above, the Balkan States themselves, having achieved independence with Russia's assistance, began to incline towards Europe, with Montenegro being the only exception.

According to M. A. Meerson, the October Revolution of 1917 put an effective end to the entire cycle of Christian history, the one which began under Emperor Constantin, i. e. the Revolution virtually signified the fall of the Third Rome.
(Meerson, 1991: 210). However, one might prefer to regard 1917 not as the fall of the Third Rome, but as its crisis. In the international arena a Russian Empire’s successor, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was no longer engaged in “gathering” the Orthodox space, but acted under the slogan: “Proletarians of All Lands, Unite!”, with Moscow designated as the centre of this union. This very image of Moscow as the centre of unique ideological space might have been borrowed from Philotheus, be it consciously or not. The concept of combining all the Orthodox realms in one in Moscow Principality was replaced by another concept – to unite in Moscow all the Communist states (Berdyaev, 2010: 359).

4. New Interpretations

The Soviet Union (1917-1991), in its initiatives to build the new system of international relations on the basis of justice and peace, seemed to be stuck on itself, leaving behind the whole of Russian history (including the Third Rome concept, the Holy Alliance, Russia’s position on the Eastern Question, etc.). Withdrawing from Russian geopolitical tradition, limiting national consciousness to “half a century of experience,” and substituting almost 2000-year-old ethical values for “Lenin’s Legacy” (Report of CPSU, 1976: 40), along with pursing an ideological course toward atheism – all these were a kind of “shapeshifter” deformation of the Moscow as the Third Rome concept (Nazarenko, 2000: 142; Berdyaev, 2010: 369). We may assume that this very renunciation of Russia’s historical and spiritual heritage became one of the many causes that made the collapse of the Soviet Union as a geopolitical project inevitable.

Notably, new interpretations of Philotheus’ concept followed shortly after the collapse of the Soviet Union (mid-1990s). One of these was the concept of “state-civilisation” proposed by I. V. Artemov, who maintained that

Russian civilisation is, no doubt, the Orthodox civilisation. Russian ethnus as a spiritual and cultural phenomenon took shape through the consolidation of disparate Slavic tribes with the adoption of Christianity. Russians managed to rise to the level of a nation capable of architecting a great world power through implementing, in the period of Muscovy, the Third Rome concept of the state as the guardian of eternal Christian truths. After the Byzantine Empire (the Second Rome) fell in 1453 under the crushing blows of the Ottoman Turks, Russian Muscovy remained the only world centre of Orthodoxy, assuming both the spiritual power of Byzantium and the state mission of the Roman Empire (the First Rome) […] – and emphasised –, this very notion shaped Russians into a nation fulfilling its historic mission till the end of days, protecting the Truth from the infidels and carry its Light to neighbouring countries. This notion is what helped create a world Empire, since the Third Rome concept embraces the idea of nations gathering as its core, spiritually consistent principle (Artemov, 1996: 118-119).

At the beginning of the 21st century, G. Dijkink gave an analysis of the influence of “national impulses” on the people’s trust or hatred of external entities,
which also defines the position of their political leaders. Concerning Russia, the significance “of a particular geopolitical vision: the theory of the Third Rome” as the Imperial tradition coming from the days of the Byzantine Empire has been noted. Yes, in Russia believers consider themselves successors of “The Byzantine branch of Christianity.” Unfortunately, such a “theory” has not yet taken hold in Russia.


In turn, the Geopolitics journal published in 2006 an extensive article by D. Sidorov entitled “Post-Imperial Third Romes: Resurrections of a Russian Orthodox Geopolitical Metaphor” (Sidorov, 2006: 317, 318, 339-341) in which the thesis of alleged geopolitics / geopolitical metaphor of the Russian Orthodox [Church] was presented. Probably, the author was imprisoned in his own initially incorrect premise (which determined all further inaccurate discourse): “the Russian Orthodox monk [Philotheus] nominated Russia as the “Third Rome” (Sidorov, 2006: 317, 323). On the whole, this is not true not only in fact (Philotheus spoke of Moscow), but also from the point of view, first of all, the Church. In practice of Church activity the international relations, as they are commonly understood in secular science, “lose their international character and become ‘inter’confessional, i.e. ‘over’international or global”. The main function of Church consists in a spiritual nourishment of believers. It is possible to speak about geopolitics only in case the global political (geopolitical) goals are pursued, but participation of ROC in the world ecumenical movement or in activity of local Orthodox Churches isn't that as has to correspond to internal church interests. And as we know, the Russian Orthodox Church therefore is called “Russian” as pursues the purpose of Russians by birth and to consciousness of believers, that is unambiguously insignificant part of world's population (Andreeva, 2004: 119). Finally, the very conceptual field “Russia as the Third Rome” is not primary and not identical to the idea/concept “Moscow as the Third Rome”.

M. T. Poe named Roman empire “As the Rosetta Stone of the Russian historical process”, yet it is also the name given any political entity charged with the protection of the universal church”. “«Translatio imperii» could be interpreted as a triumphal ode to the sovereign of the newly born universal empire” and “Filofei suggested, must stamp out heresy and protect the church” and “to make this more palatable Filofei compared Muscovy to the “Roman” empire”. However contrary to M. Poe’s statement that “the Lord had settled in the Roman land”, Philotheus (Filofei) didn't speak about that, “temporal Rome had not fallen and could not fall, for no matter how heretical the Catholics were” and also didn't consider “Russian /
“Roman” imperium within a theory of religio-political succession” (Poe, 1997: 5). But M. T. Poe truly notices that “in the Muscovite period, as it often claimed in the textbooks. Moscow did expand, but it had no “expansionist” ideology.” The author noted also that on this basis “several Russian philosophers of the late nineteenth century developed the thesis that Russia was a “messianic” nation” and “More recently Russians have begun to explore “Third Rome” as a way to comprehend what they believe is their national psychology.” (Poe, 1997: ii).

Although Philotheus Epistles do sound somewhat messianic, for him the whole messianic idea is about the rapture of confessing the Truth, seen as the essence of Russia’s very existence, rather than a mere reason to conquer new territories (Iglesias, 1992: 447; Antoshchenko, 2003: 263; Dugin, 2000: 611; Berdyaev, 2010: 243-244; Novikova and Sizemskaya, 1995: 70; Ghidirinsky, 2010: 70, 78; V. S. Solovyev, 2012: 262; Molotkov, 2010).

In one form or another, the “Russian Question” and thus the concept Moscow as the Third Rome, is of interest to a wide range of global players. It is included in the global strategic scenario analyses by the ruling circles of the USA, China, Japan, Europe and the Islamic world. This topic continues to interest researchers; there are more and more new books (Campbell, 1992; Brunn, 2015; etc.).

Conclusion

Following its liberation from the Golden Horde and the fall of the Byzantine Empire, the early Russian state faced the question of its place and role in the Christian world. It was then that the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome took shape, centering on the notion that, with the fall of the Roman and Byzantine Empires, Russia became the new centre of the Christian Orthodox world. Furthermore, its further existence was conditioned by its loyalty to Orthodoxy. The concept was not the idea of some kind of political “unity.” As many researchers note, this concept had little influence on Russian book culture, effectively remaining “within the walls of Church” up until the middle of the 19th century. Later on, starting from the late 19th century, the Moscow as the Third Rome concept gave rise to the idea that Russia’s mission in the world is to lead and protect Orthodoxy and Orthodox Christians.

The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome, which grew almost legendary and has received many interpretations over the centuries, generated a renewed interest at the turn of the century, on the eve of the millennium. Its depth and aphoristic nature drew the attention of many modern researchers. But most importantly, its relevance, alongside the necessity for further studies, is conditioned by the practical value it holds in the effort to develop a national idea and policy for Russia in 21st century in terms of its axiological foundations.

Throughout the 20th century, Russia went through two ideological strata: Christianity and Communism. Probably, both approaches were different geopolitical refractions of the same characteristic of the Third Rome concept – Messianism, which has been pointed out by many, both Russian and foreign researchers (historians, philosophers, geopolitics), who clarified that Messianism is not a reason for conquering new territories. It is the joy of identifying Orthodoxy with the meaning of the existence of Russia. Russia’s modern Eurasianism shares quite a number of
fields with the two approaches mentioned above. At the beginning of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, the main node of the Russian Federation’s strategic challenges was tied to the issue of preserving it as a sovereign and integral Eurasian state, the natural leader of Eurasian integration. In the sphere of geopolitics too, there is a certain parallel in the way Russia has seen international relations and its own role in them. The ecclesiastical idea of Russia as the centre and guardian of Orthodoxy has experienced a transformation throughout the centuries into a non-documented, but nevertheless tangible in geopolitical practice concept of Russia as the centre and patron of areas largely populated by Orthodox Christians in the historical perspective.

At the same time, regarding the Moscow as the Third Rome concept as a basis for geopolitical doctrines and/or general policy in modern Russia, one must reason with caution, bearing in mind what meaning its author, hegumen Philotheus, attached to the notion of “Rome,” and try to avoid possible misinterpretations. Rus’ determined its civilizational identity based on Orthodoxy, and has kept it throughout hard times of external threats. In this regard, it might be argued that on the level of conception, the Moscow as the Third Rome concept indicates Russia’s geopolitical code\textsuperscript{14} as a historically developed system of its foreign relations, which may seemingly serve as the basis for formulating Russia’s new national security doctrine.

The findings show that the Moscow as the Third Rome concept is deeply rooted in the Russian historical tradition. In addition, there is public consent from both the masses and the elite to use its potential in formulating Russia’s national geopolitical doctrine. This has been evidenced throughout different historical periods of Russia’s existence. This paper suggests that every time Russia estranged itself from this doctrine, there were, as a rule, serious consequences for both the state and society. It is logical to conclude that for its successful development, modern Russia has to stick to the principles elaborated in line with the Moscow as the Third Rome concept in its domestic and foreign policies. Focused primarily on its domestic issues, the Russian Federation in many ways has already defined its foreign policy strategy, generally advocating Eurasian confederalism, that is, a strategic unity of Eurasian countries. Russian foreign policy also manifests a priority of universals over particulars, and the supremacy of the principles of dialogue and constructive effort. As history has repeatedly shown, Russia’s utmost geopolitical task is to protect the geographical and spiritual boundaries of Orthodoxy.

It is important to note that knowledge of historical and contemporary interpretations of the concept of Moscow as the Third Rome gives the key to understanding the principles of Russia’s strategic coalitions. The tradition of these interpretations enshrines the following: Russia is aware of itself as the spiritual centre of the world, the vital activity of which is based on Christian values, offering life-affirming and creative perception to all participants in the global dialogue. This means openness of the Orthodox Oecumene to both West and East.

In conclusion, we would like to emphasise once again that the very essence of the Moscow as the Third Rome concept is of a purely spiritual nature. Philotheus associates the idea of “Rome” neither with the Empire, nor with imperial ambitions, nor with the idea of moving the centre of the world Empire (\textit{translatio imperi-}

\textsuperscript{14} For “geopolitical code” definition see Dergachev (2010).
rion). Philotheus also makes no association between the idea of “Rome” and a justification for Russia’s global rule (“dominium mundi”). He associates it solely with Russia’s responsibility for Orthodoxy survival. According to Philotheus, Russia’s well-being alongside that of the entire world is not conditioned by political, economic or any other of Russia’s advances. Rather, it is conditioned by the spiritual sanity of its Orthodox inhabitants, including rulers, manifested in the fact that Orthodox dogmas remain firm and intact and life is organised in line with its doctrine.

The concept of Moscow as the Third Rome at the beginning of the 21st century is again highly relevant. Hovering in the air once again are questions about the importance of Russia to the world, about its potential. This seems to be no coincidence. In today’s world, globalisation is gaining strength, and one of its new characteristics is the actualisation of the continental component of world geopolitics as an objective phenomenon. And Russia among others has the necessary prerequisites to become a spiritual and geopolitical centre of the world.

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