Stretching Borders Beyond Sovereign Territories? Mapping EU and Spain’s Border Externalization Policies

Maribel CASAS
Department of Geography
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
macasas@email.unc.edu

Sebastian COBARRUBIAS
Department of Geography
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
sebcob@live.unc.edu

John PICKLES
Department of Geography
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
jpickles@email.unc.edu

Recibido: 31-05-11
Aceptado: 13-07-11

ABSTRACT
The EU’s borders, and those of its member states, are shifting zones of power arranged by novel institutional strategies and the subsequent proliferation of legal texts, maps, technologies and actors, reconstructing where and what the border is. This paper focuses on the phenomenon of “border externalization” in the European Union, in particular the case of Spain, describing it as a stretching of the borderline. Externalization includes the outsourcing of border control to non-EU countries, as well as the spatial extension of where EU governments and forces can patrol, thus a literal expansion of the borderline. The latest EU strategy of border policy and migration control yet to be fully implemented is called “the Migration Routes Initiative” and involves spreading checkpoints, migration control experts and other dispositifs of migration management along shifting migrants itineraries passing through sending, transit and destination countries. In this paper we identify different policies and institutions that constitute this “external dimension” of border management for the EU as a whole and for Spain vis-a-vis its Southern borders with Africa, mainly focusing on the Rabat Process. These changes in migration management practices present possible reconfigurations in the exercise of sovereignty and its relationship to territoriality.

Key words: Border studies; European Union; Spain; immigration policy; border externalization.
¿Se estiran las fronteras más allá de los territorios de soberanía?
Cartografiando las políticas de externalización de las fronteras de la UE y de España

RESUMEN
Las fronteras de la Unión Europea, y las de sus Estados miembros, son territorios cambiantes donde se ejercita el poder a través de estrategias institucionales novedosas y su consiguiente proliferación de textos legales, mapas, tecnologías y actores, reconstituyendo el dónde está y qué es la frontera. Este artículo aborda el fenómeno de la “externalización de las fronteras” de la UE, en concreto del caso del estado Español, describiendo el proceso como un paulatino estiramiento fronterizo. La externalización implica la subcontratación del control fronterizo a países no miembros de la UE, y además, la extensión del espacio de intervención de la UE, incluyendo las áreas donde sus fuerzas de seguridad puedan patrullar, en este sentido, se produce un estiramiento literal del espacio fronterizo. La estrategia más reciente de la UE sobre política fronteriza y control de las migraciones, actualmente en proceso de implementación, se denomina “Gestión de Rutas Migratorias”. Esta gestión involucra el despliegue de puntos de control, expertos en migraciones y otros dispositivos de control migratorio a lo largo de los itinerarios cambiantes de los migrantes a través de países de origen, tránsito y destino. En este trabajo identificamos diferentes políticas e instituciones que constituyen esta “dimensión exterior” de la gestión fronteriza para la UE y para España en particular vis-à-vis sus fronteras del sur con África, centrándose en el Proceso de Rabat. Estos cambios en la gestión de las migraciones sugieren reconfiguraciones en el ejercicio de la soberanía y su relación con el territorio.

Palabras clave: Estudios de fronteras; Unión Europea; España; política migratoria; externalización de las fronteras.

Estendem-se as fronteiras para além dos territórios de soberania?
Cartografando as políticas de externalização das fronteiras da EU e da Espanha

RESUMO
As fronteiras da União Europeia, e a de seus Estados membros, são territórios em mudança onde o poder é exercido através de inovadoras estratégias institucionais e uma subsequente proliferação de textos jurídicos, mapas, tecnologias e atores, reconstituindo o onde estão e o que é a fronteira. Este artigo discute o fenômeno da “externalização das fronteiras” da UE, em particular o caso do Estado espanhol, descrevendo dito processo como um gradual alongamento fronterizo. A externalização implica a subcontratação do controle fronterizo a países não membros da EU e, além disso, a extensão do espaço de intervenção da UE, incluindo as áreas onde suas forças de segurança podem patrulhar. Nesse sentido, produz-se um alongamento literal do espaço fronterizo. A estratégia mais reciente da UE sobre política fronteriza e controle das migrações, atualmente em processo de implantação, denomina-se “Gestão das Rotas Migratórias”. Esta gestão envolve a locação de postos de controle, especialistas em migrações e outros dispositivos de controle migratório ao longo das rotas migratórias itinerantes dos migrantes entre os países de origem, trânsito e destino. Neste trabalho identificamos diferentes políticas e instituições que constituem esta “dimensão exterior” da gestão das fronteiras para a UE e a Espanha, em particular vis-à-vis a sua fronteira sul com a África, com foco no Processo de Rabat. Estas mudanças na gestão das migrações sugerem reconfigurações no exercício da soberania e sua relação com o território.

Palavras-chave: Estudos de fronteiras; União Europeia; Espanha; política migratória; externalização das fronteiras.
Introduction: The Power of Borders

According to Balibar (2004: 121), borders and bordering are constitutive of the new Europe, serving as tools for re-defining transnational identities, spaces of inclusion and exclusion (even of a nascent European “apartheid”). He states that “new sociopolitical entities” are forming borders in an attempt to preserve and obtain for themselves the features of state-like sovereignty. As Balibar himself asserts, these
borders “are dispersed a little everywhere” (2004: 125). The EU border is not only at the edge of those member states forming the outer limit of the Union. The EU border is multiplying both within and without the territories of the EU.

This multiplication of the spaces of control and regulation forces us to ask whether the current formation of an EU external border speaks to the assertion and repetition of a state and territorially based sovereignty or are we dealing with a different political formation? Balibar highlights the important relation between: border, territory and sovereignty, and historians of Cartography (Brussiert, 1992) and of the nation-state (Anderson, 1991) have also stressed this central relationship between the assertion of sovereignty over a territory via the mechanism of borders and their representation, particularly in map-form, in the solidification of the modern nation-state form (as box, as identity, as container and as a limit of politics). In the case of the EU’s external border, there appears to be a break with this historical relationship. Here, this classical notion of sovereignty is challenged as a way of accounting for the current institutional re-arrangements in Europe and its concomitant geographies of overlapping jurisdictions.

In this sense, the current EU’s external border is a domain where a process of de- and re-centering European identity, territory and sovereignty is occurring. Here, the border is no longer the “edge” and limit of political sovereignty, and border and migration policy is not a secondary political issue. The border, where it is, how it includes and excludes, and how it defines people is central to defining the present and in ways that are —we argue here— changing quickly in important ways. In this argument, we are inspired by the work of Mezzadra and Neilson (2008) who defend the centrality of borders to understand current transformations beyond the question of migration itself, what they refer as border as method:

The border for us is not a mere object of analysis, even as we recognize the necessity to specify and analyze the empirical characteristics that pertain at any border or point along it. Rather, [...], the border is for us a method. By this, we mean not that the border provides an abstract methodology that can be detached from its material contexts and applied generally across any number of empirical situations. We understand method to emerge precisely from the material circumstances at hand, which, in the case of borders, are ones of tension and conflict, partition and connection, traversing and barricading, life and death. Border as method thus entails not only an epistemic viewpoint from which a whole series of strategic concepts as well as their relations can be recast. It also requires a research process that continually accounts for and reacts to the multifarious battles and negotiations, not least those concerning race, that constitute the border both as an institution and a set of social relationships (Mezzadra and Neilson, 2008: 1).

Building on the de-colonial notion of border thinking (Mignolo, 2000; Cairo and Mignolo, 2008), Mezzadra and Neilson show how the materiality of the border becomes an epistemological point of departure as well as a reference for research
practice. If borders are indeed unique sites from which to observe larger changes in society, our goal is to look at how transformations in conceptualizing border and migration management are affecting broader notions of sovereignty, nation-state, and citizenship.

This paper is based on a current research project about the blurring of “in” and “out” of Europe through practices of economic integration and border externalization on the part of the EU and its member states (specially Spain) in North and West African countries. The research takes a two level approach to border externalization by mapping out the ways that EU and Spanish interests and institutions coincide or collide in implementing this externalized border regime. The project, called “Non-Accession Integration: Mapping Changing Jurisdictions and Sovereignties in Euro-Med”, is funded by the US National Science Foundation and involves ethnographic and archival work in a series of key points where this border regime is designed and implemented. The multi-sited nature of the border regime focuses on EU foreign policy makers in Brussels, influential think tanks on migration such as the ICMPD based in Vienna, and semi-independent police-military bodies such as FRONTEX in Warsaw. In looking at the Spanish case, we explore the roles of the Ministry of Interior as well as agents of international cooperation in turning traditional border policy in new directions. Key players of the ongoing process of border externalization include non-EU governmental authorities and police corps based for example in Rabat and even further away from the border line such as in Nouakchott or Bamako. In this sense, such “European” borders are evolving as an amalgam of member state policies and EU initiatives, especially given the fact that policy areas such as border management and immigration are areas of mixed competence.

Central for our work is the matrix of institutions, policies, and political notions that are changing the shape, form and content of the EU’s border. In particular we are interested in what we see as a changing understanding of borders and border management: from the policing of a line that demarcates sovereignty over a territory and the people in it; toward a strategy of migration management that begins to understand borders as fluid management of “routes” followed through origin-transit-destination countries. This new understanding is re-articulating practices of border management and policing, creating novel forms of economic cooperation and integration between countries and especially between third countries and the EU. We understand the emerging practices and institutions of border management as having potentially far-reaching consequences for modern concepts of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and nation-state among others.

Following Sousa Santos, one function of borders is that of drawing abyssal lines over a territory. Abyssal, in the sense of invisibilizing whatever realities are on the other side of the “line”, “comprising them as a vast set of discarded experiences, and making them invisible both as agencies and as agents” (2007: 3). This resonates with the bio-political connotations identified by van Houtum and the Nijmegen Centre for Border Research, who advocate for using the verb form when speaking
of borders as: border/ing as order/ing and other/ing (van Houtum, 2010). If the current formation of European border policy is producing an intricate process of border externalization and a multiplication of “bordering” instruments within the limits of territories, then the abyssal function of borders no longer occurs at the edge of a territorially defined social formation, but criss-crosses within and without that particular body politic generating a constant policing and reassertion of what is “inside” and “outside”. The abyssal function is re-inscribed in the itineraries of racialized bodies, the power of administrative documents, such as holding one passport versus another, or the fear of deportation when walking in the city.

What follows is structured into three main sections. First, we outline the formation of the EU external border, pointing how it differs from the creation of “Borderless Europe” and “Fortress Europe”. Second, we engage the EU’s latest border thinking looking at policy frameworks such as The Global Approach to Migration and the strategy of the “Migration Routes Initiative”, one of the potentially most interesting and innovative instruments of new border thinking. We introduce institutions involved in implementing this initiative: FRONTEX and the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This is followed by an examination of Spain’s specific work at externalizing its southern border, identifying the institutions and frameworks facilitating this policy realm. We conclude by revisiting how this emergent matrix of policy design and implementation is creating an innovative way of understanding and “experiencing” borders. We suggest that if borders were important demarcations lines that —for over a century— helped to organize much social and cultural analysis for Anthropology, Geography and the Social Sciences more generally (the creation of an “Other”, the formation of national cultures and boundaries, the roles and identities of migrants and diasporas), the changing nature of the EU’s border regime may require a rethinking of engrained concepts such as national sovereignty and identity, with more nuanced understandings of citizenship and territorial demarcations.

1. The External Dimension of EU Borders

“And we still think and act as if we know what sovereignty means...”

(Sidaway, 2011)

Human mobility and border management are central to the EU building process. The Schengen Process had a notoriously double effect that was fraught with tension and asymmetry. The abolishing of borders between EU member states went hand in hand with the strengthening of an outer EU border (McNeill, 2004). The customs and border guard posts abandoned between member states were replaced by the watch towers and radar detection systems at the outer edges of the EU, leading to
the critique of “Fortress Europe” in the 1990’s. This simultaneous process of both dissolving and reinforcing borders is heightened in the case of a country like Spain, where visa requirements for crossing borders in the mid 1980’s were roughly the same for Morocco as for Portugal and France. The Spanish/Moroccan border is now among the most visible examples of Fortress Europe, via instruments such as the SIVE movement detection system and the armouring around the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla with fences, patrols, and crowd control technology (Ferrer-Gallardo, 2008). Up to this point the development of Schengen may seem like a simple scaling up of the territorial link between border and sovereignty to a suprastate entity while retaining many of the features of a normal nation-state border.

However, this hardening of the “edge” of Europe was complicated by confusion as to where that edge begins and who is in charge of policing it. The Schengen agreement was implemented in 1995 and the outer border of the EU became a reality in subsequent years, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe (and later Malta and Cyprus) while preparing for EU candidacy. While not yet allowed full access to intra-EU human mobility, the main requirements requested from these candidate countries were border control and migration management of their borders with non-EU countries.

Overlapping and running parallel to the double movement of Schengen and its expansion is the hardening of the border through a series of policy mandates, institutional actors and police/military operations. This is what is referred to in official terms as the “external dimension of EU border management” or “EU border externalization” meaning that the very task of border control and migration management is demanded from non-EU countries without the carrot of “European candidacy”. This request has been made explicit under foreign policy programs such as the European Neighbourhood Policy. Such an ongoing process of outsourcing migration control involves the emergence of a series of new border practices, border actors and institutional arrangements in these neighboring countries: from detention centers; to funds for police training; to establishing programs of circular temporary labour migration. Furthermore, the current Global Approach to Migration (GAM) framework of the EU not only involves neighboring countries in the active duty of sharing security concerns related to borders, but involves third countries —of origin and transit— in the burden of migration control. The GAM introduces a new facet of border externalization, which is rethinking borders beyond a dividing line between nation-states towards border as a network, a form of dizzying itineraries crisscrossing several states’ territories. This signals an explicit and planned effort to “stretch the border”, marking a shift in thinking about external borders and a blurring of the “outside/inside” that points to a profound geographic attention and flexibility in thinking about non-EU spaces and their relation to Union dynamics. If borders are what we have come to assume as the limit of legal sovereignty in international law, with border externalization and the shift to seeing borders as itinerar-
ies, where does state jurisdiction and sovereignty begin and who exercises each? Or as Sidaway suggests, “what is sovereignty?” (2011).

2. Recent EU Border Thinking

In recent years, migration has increasingly been articulated by EU policy makers as a security concern, explicitly criminalizing certain kinds of human flows, and especially undocumented ones (Chueca and Aguelo, 2009). The European Security Strategy, in fact, proposes that irregular migration is of concern because it operates as a channel for post Cold War security threats such as terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime (Council of the EU, 2003). While there is evidence that this trend is now being complemented by an emphasis on migration and development (DG Home Affairs interview; Moroccan mission to the EU interview), the security concerns have not disappeared nor have they been significantly reduced. Migration has thus become a question of foreign policy and not just of Home/Internal Affairs. Migration is thus perceived as a key geo-political interest of the EU, whether responding to the needs of the labor market, discussions of a demographic crisis in the EU, or the stability of adjacent countries (Treaty of Lisbon, 2007). One of the key aspects of the EU’s new migration policy is the rethinking of migration as a challenging and necessary phenomenon for Europe.

2.1. Border and Migration Management by non-EU countries: ENP & GAM

The phenomenon of border externalization or the increasing involvement of third countries on EU migration affairs was challenged by a Senegalese member of the Madrid based Association of Undocumented: “Why our countries agree to […] control migration towards Europe, something not at all a priority for our own national needs and often without popular support? (Interview, July 2010). Two policy frameworks are particularly important to understand the EU’s migratory strategy towards human flows coming from the South: the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP); and the Global Approach to Migration (GAM). Under these two frameworks, non-EU countries aligning themselves with ENP and/or GAM, that actively cooperate in border management expect to benefit from: potential financial assistance; improvement of state capacities such as civil registry, police forces and surveillance technologies; facilitation of trade access or agreements. In some cases there is an expectation for visa facilitation.

The first of these two policy frameworks is the European Neighbourhood Policy. Initiated in 2004, the ENP is a distinct program of foreign relations specifically geared to neighbouring, non-candidate, countries. It includes the ring of neighbors just outside the current official limits of the EU: all North African and Eastern
Mediterranean countries, parts of Eastern Europe and the Caucasian states. It involves a series of policy and funding instruments as well as new institutional arrangements dealing with migration matters. On the one hand, managing (and often securitizing) the border is one of the main priorities asking those neighbouring countries to engage in shared border control and to allow joint border management agencies to operate within their territories. As an integration tool for the Mediterranean, ENP effectively asks neighbouring countries to implement a part of the Schengen *acquis*, but without the promise of free circulation in the EU for all their own citizens. On the other hand, one of the ENP’s central long-term goals is to promote mobility of certain kinds of groups: researchers, seasonal workers, tourists or company executives. In these and other ways, Europe is heavily involved in reforms in countries without a “European perspective” to implement migration management. The development of this unique foreign relations policy is transforming the relationship between the EU and its “neighbourhood”, generating a geographical imaginary where border and migration management is being rethought (Casas, Cobarrubias and Pickles, in press).

The second policy framework is specifically focused on the question of migration and border management and reaches over the countries of origin, transit and destination. Called the Global Approach to Migration (GAM), this framework goes beyond the immediate neighbouring countries to also include “neighbours of neighbours”. Although both frameworks advance the notion of externalizing the border, the GAM further develops the question of border work conducted by non EU countries:

The Global Approach to Migration (GAM) brings together migration, external relations and development policy to address migration in an integrated, comprehensive and balanced way in partnership with third countries. It comprises the whole migration agenda, including legal and illegal migration, combating trafficking in human beings and smuggling of migrants, strengthening protection for refugees, enhancing migrant rights and harnessing the positive links that exist between migration and development. It is underscored by the fundamental principles of partnership, solidarity and shared responsibility and uses the concept of “migratory routes” to develop and implement policy (European Commission, 2007a).

The GAM, appearing first in a Council document in 2005 (Council of the EU, 2005), extends the extension of border management beyond traditional nation-state borders into third country territories, including neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries. Under the GAM, border policy is being reframed to include: immigration controls in cooperating states; the extension of “regional protection” regimes to countries outside the EU to manage refugee and migrant movements; and the deployment of EU “border management agencies to third countries” (Hayes, 2009:
These produce a new kind of border process, referred to as “border externalisation” or the “external dimension of border management”.

The GAM is central for the development of border externalization. It is the principal framework for understanding common migration and border policy in relation to third countries, operating to induce and coordinate third party action. GAM is a framework of understanding, a set of tools, perhaps even a benchmark of coordination, rather than a single policy. There is no GAM office or specific programme. Instead, it is a way of understanding migration policy, compartmentalizing it, and strategizing it, coordinating between various agencies, programmes, and regions. The GAM is also the first pan-EU, multi-year process to concretely talk about the need to cooperate on migration and border management across destination, transit and origin countries. It is also one of the principal mechanisms through which migration is understood in its security mode as well as in its economic role and economic potential (both in terms of EU labour markets as well as in the development of “sending” countries).

The GAM introduces a three-pronged approach and language towards migration policy that guides relations with third countries and the development of migration policy in the EU and its member states. They are: (i) legal migration and labour migration; (ii) migration and development (in transit and origin countries); and (iii) combatting illegal migration. They operate in such a way that GAM becomes a key site where border externalization and economic integration of non-EU candidates are thought together in a spatially flexible way that can include integration measures in the EU, managing remittance investment, setting up migration recruitment and skills matching centres in transit and origin countries, patrolling along migration routes with EU forces, purchasing border control technology for neighboring countries, and setting up migration research centers in different countries. All of these dispositifs are put to work for the “migration routes initiative”.

2.2. From Borderlines to Migratory Routes: New Actors in Migration Management

Starting in 2006 with a focus on the Mediterranean and Africa, and now encompassing parts of East and South Eastern Europe, the Global Approach to Migration marks a clear shift in the EU’s own framing of migration and border policy as stretching far beyond its own borders (European Commission, 2006). In the first annual report on the Global Approach to Migration a radical new spatialization of border control was envisioned. Instead of controlling a borderline or outsourcing that control to a neighbouring country (a sort of buffer zone mentality), this initiative proposed a new system to manage migration routes – the migration routes initiatives – in which “work along the main migratory routes through a particular region and towards the EU is identified and takes into account the need to work in
close collaboration with the third countries along these routes.” (European Commis-

The strategy of “migration route” control re-orient border management away

from a focus on a moving front-line to a series of points along an itinerary. This

“migration routes” strategy is based partially on a cartographic initiative called the

i-map project born out of the cooperation between the Mediterranean Transit Migra-

tion Dialogue of the International Centre for Migration Policy Development,

FRONTEX and EUROPOL (Mezzadra, 2009). The i-map project is an interactive

cartography that traces out the multiple and overlapping migration routes into the

EU. The main goal implies not only “moving” the border southward but also “de-lo-

calizing” it from any one point or line to a series of moving itineraries or “routes”

(Bensaad, 2004). I-map was designed as a mechanism to facilitate policy maker

education and police coordination in refocusing the control of migration flows

toward different points of transit. The i-map project advanced a new cartographic

thinking of the border, based on flows rather than hardening lines. At the same time,

a focus on migration routes emerged, requiring a very distinct way to operationalize

border management. These include coordination between multiple non-EU coun-

tries and EU authorities; the deployment of ILO (Immigration Liaison Officers) in

sensitive points along the “routes”; the founding of Migration Research and Man-

agement Centers in different countries; and even proposals to outsource asylum

processing centres from member states to EU reception centres located in five


The International Centre for Migration Policy Development or ICMPD (founded

in Vienna in 1993) and FRONTEX (headquartered in Warsaw and founded in 2005)

are relatively new actors in border management. The ICMPD was created to pro-

vide advice on migration and asylum issues and was one of the earliest institutions

that proposed cooperation on border management between EU and non-EU coun-

tries. Not an official EU agency and something more than an NGO or think-tank,

the ICMPD is one of the key “implementation partners” of the EU in cooperation

on border management with third countries, advising to the European Commission,

Council and various member states. The ICMPD, as an organisation, is the largest

single recipient of EU-related funding for programs on border co-operation involv-

ing third countries (Interview with Council of the European Union, February 2001).

The work of ICMPD includes debating and shifting border management strategy;

creating coordination fora between EU and non-EU agencies on migration man-

agement; developing a pool of EU experts on undocumented migration that can be

deployed to third countries; and, in a recent case (Cabo Verde), even drafting mi-

gration legislation for a non-EU country (Interview with EU Commission on

DEVCO, February 2001).

The formation of an EU border and it externalisation took a qualitative step for-

ward with the creation of the European Agency for the Management of Operational

Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the EU (FRONTEX)
in 2005. FRONTEX is charged with the role of co-ordinating border management among member states, neighbouring states, and neighbours of neighbours (FRONTEX, 2006), and can be understood as the first step in the creation of a common EU border guard service (Carrera, 2010). EU member state border and security policies and institutions are increasingly being coordinated by FRONTEX from their base in Warsaw, Poland. FRONTEX liaises closely with other security organizations (e.g., EUROPOL, CEPOL, customs cooperation) and represents a move away from an understanding of the border as a “line” toward a model of border management that incorporates a much broader “regional” approach (FRONTEXwatch, 2008).

FRONTEX has internalized and developed the migration routes strategy promoted by GAM and the ICMPD. In its work with third countries, as well as at the external limits of the European Union outer member states, FRONTEX closely follows the development and traffic along certain routes. Its quarterly reports give regular updates on “new routes” using a language and graphics that demonstrate cooperation between FRONTEX and ICMPD. In fact, many joint FRONTEX missions are deployed in order to close down or deflect particular routes where undocumented travel is heavy, once identified in i-map and via their risk assessment protocols.

Through the work of these and other organizations involved in migration routes initiatives, the increasingly hardened line of the border (through electrified border fences, motion-detection technology, watch towers, unmanned airplanes, larger units of border guards or gendarmes) is being extended to articulate with a more expansive, porous and mobile set of itineraries and geographically distributed sites. At their heart are new spatial logics that are redesigning the institutions and practices of border management.

3. The Externalization of Spain’s Southern Border

This emerging architecture of border externalization and migration routes management is particularly well developed in the case of the EU external border managed by Spain. While the border fences of Ceuta and Melilla, or the motion-detection system of the SIVE may have gained more media attention, Spain has been central in developing border externalization practices along the migration routes strategy. Nor is Spain simply a “case” of the EU border. Given the fact that border and migration management are areas of mixed competency between member states and the EU, the Spanish state (as well as other member states such as the case of Italy) is a key actor in advancing, developing and implementing its own goals as well as feeding into and developing the EU’s overall border geography (EEAS, Authors’ Interview, February 2011).
Spain is in charge of what is alternatively referred to as the “West African route” or “Western Mediterranean routes” (European Commission 2006: 15, 19). Concretely, the strategy of routes management has been operationalized in the Spanish case through programs such as The Rabat Process (EU Council, Authors’ Interview, February 2011). The Rabat Process provides a forum for coordination between certain EU member states and third states, as well as the EU as a whole, all working along the West African route:

The Rabat Process was launched in Rabat in July 2006 at the first Euro-African Conference on migration and development. The Rabat process brings together the European Union Member States and the West African states, and is a unique and innovative example of regional cooperation in the field of migration between countries of origin, transit and destination on a given migration route (EUROPA-Press Releases, 2008).

At the EU level, Spain, along with France, has taken a leading role in this Process. But what has given the Process extra strength is the principal of “joint responsibility” where the participating transit and origin countries are heavily involved and invested into the process. While many African states have participated in the process, Morocco, Senegal, and Burkina Faso have been particularly important (Matres Manso, 2009; DG Home Affairs, Authors’ Interview, February 2011). Variously referred to as the “Rabat Process on Migration and Development” or the “Euro-African Migration and Development Process” (both reflecting the title of the founding conference in 2006). The Rabat Process structures its activities according to the three areas of work identified in the GAM: legal migration, irregular migration and migration and development (Euro-African Migration and Development Process, 2011).

Border and migration management are areas of mixed competency between member states and the EU. As a result, the dynamics in border policy between individual states and the supra-state entity of the EU are important and complex. This is particularly the case of a country like Spain, which sees migration management as a key national political issue. In fact, Spain’s evolving role in managing these “migration routes” is justified as being in its geo-strategic interest (NGO worker, Authors’ Interview, February 2011). Simultaneously, Spain’s experiments in externalization are perceived by EU officials as being central to the development of the EU’s Global Approach to Migration (DG Home Affairs, Authors’ Interview February, 2011). When implementing externalization policies, overlapping jurisdictions and processes of feed-back are emerging among the Spanish state and the EU. For example, although GAM is an EU-wide approach proposed by the EU Commission, some analysts have pointed to Operation Sea-horse, coordinated by the Guardia Civil, as being central to the initial conceptualization of “routes management” (Wolf, 2009). Furthermore, the Rabat Process has been described by members of
DG Home Affairs of the EU as being the best example to date of the implementation of the GAM (Interview, January 2011), with other countries now trying to copy that model in other places. In cases such as the FRONTEX Hera missions in Senegal and Mauritania, the multiplication of political actors and mixed competencies is playing itself out on the ground. While these were EU missions with an EU body (FRONTEX) at the head, Spanish agencies (such as the Ministry of Interior and the Guardia Civil) played a central role and were important actors in managing borders in those countries before and after those “European Union” missions. An important corollary of the Spain-EU dynamic is how Spain’s externalization policies interact with other non-EU non-governmental agents that are often contracted as “implementing partners” by the EU. Organizations such as the ICMPD, the IOM, and to a lesser degree UNHCR or the Red Cross also intervene in the actions of the Spanish state.

In fact, some actors and policy frameworks are particularly important in shaping the external dimension of Spain’s borders. Four pillars are particularly important in Spain’s external border policy: 1) External Relations (Table 1); 2) International Development and Cooperation (Table 2); 3) Labor Policy (Table 3), and 4) Home Affairs (Table 4).

Table 1. Architecture of Spanish border externalization: External Relations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plan África I</strong> (2006-2008)</td>
<td>“Plan de Acción para el África Subsahariana” or Plan África is a comprehensive plan launched in 2006 reframing Spain-Africa relations, within a larger EU framework. The plan lists seven areas of intervention, including cultural and diplomatic though the most details are contained in the sections dealing with migration management, commercial links and development cooperation (Romero, 2006). Plan África lead to what has been named “migratory diplomacy” (Pinyol i Jiménez, 2008), as Spain opened or expanded diplomatic relations with several African countries simultaneously with an emphasis on signing readmission agreement for the return of nationals from those countries who were residing in Spain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Plan África II</strong> (2009-2012)</td>
<td>Second framework for Spain’s external policy in Africa. It includes strengthening the work achieved in Plan África I and pushing forward different programmes associated with migration management in line with the three themes of migration policy contained within the GAM: legal labour migration; “fight” against clandestine migrations; and migration and development (MAEC and AECID, 2009).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2. Architecture of Spanish border externalization: International Development

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AECID</td>
<td>Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development. Attached to External relations, AECID is the principal agency for implementing and coordinating development policy abroad.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGPOLDE</td>
<td>Dirección General de Planificación y Evaluación de Políticas de Desarrollo (Directorate General for Development Policy Evaluation and Planning). DGPOLDE is an evaluation agency that reviews development programmes as well as designs and establishes the strategies and goals for Spain’s External development policy in coordination with other foreign policy goals (MAEC).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FIIAPP</td>
<td>Fundación Internacional y para Iberoamérica de Administración y Políticas Públicas (Foundation of Public Policy and Administration for International Affairs and Latin America). Despite its name, it is an active player in migration management in Africa and the Mediterranean and is a point of reference for the EU’s development agency (DG-DEVCO) regarding migration and development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Commerce</td>
<td>While not central in migratory policy, due to its role in promoting Spanish enterprise in development efforts and the increasing attempts to link migration and development policy, it is important to take note of Spain’s external commercial policy (Azkona and Sagastagoitia, 2011).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Architecture of Spanish border externalization: Labor Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Work and Immigration</td>
<td>What used to be called the Ministry of Work and Social Affairs changed its name in 2008 to the Ministry of Work and immigration, signaling the importance of immigrant labor and the efforts required at promoting legal labor migration. Due to its role in aspects of promoting legal migration, the attempts to externalize labor recruitment abroad and the importance of these themes as a pillar of the GAM we note this ministry and its areas of competence as one to follow in the development of Spanish externalized border policy.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Secretary of Immigration and Emigration</td>
<td>This is the specific office under the Ministry of Work and Immigration tasked with issues involving immigrant labor.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4. Architecture of Spanish border externalization: Interior/Home Affairs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Policy/Institution</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Guardia Civil (Servicio Fiscal)</td>
<td>The Guardia Civil (Spanish gendarmes) are in general responsible for border and customs officer duties. This has continued in the external dimension of Spain’s border and migration policy. The Guardia Civil has been the principal police arm for missions of patrol, training and police cooperation with third countries regarding migration management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Ministry of Home Affairs</td>
<td>The Ministry of Interior under Rubalcaba’s tutelage has been mentioned as an important reference for the EU’s migratory policy (Interview DG Home Affairs, January 2011)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These four represent an emerging matrix of institutional actors among external relations, development policy, labor policy and interior policy at the heart of Spain’s externalization efforts. This new map of institutions and practices comprising this particular “Iberian” border lead to multiple issues of jurisdiction and sovereignty, mainly different tensions between member states’ borders, the EU’s border and the borders of cooperating third states.

4. Rethinking Borders: Notes for Further Research

This paper points to the process of re-defining territoriality and more importantly, the crisis of the traditional notion of border. By identifying the multiple actors currently implementing border externalization in the EU and Spain, the research focuses on the design and implementation of the Global Approach of Migration, and further investigates the conceptual and cartographic thinking behind its strategy of Migration Routes. The Migration Routes Strategy itself represents a shift from a primary concern with border hardening processes to the overlapping flexibilization of border policy. The latter approach is increasingly focused on the management of flows, linkages, and networks to stabilize local economies as a necessary complement to an equally flexibilizing border management regime. As such, this policy is fundamentally reconceptualising the concept and practice of outer borders. Besides policing a series of fixed boundaries around given territories, the goal is increasingly on monitoring, intercepting and re-directing fluid networks of flows. The question of where migration to the EU begins and when the EU (or its member states) has jurisdiction to intervene in a migrant’s trajectory is, as a result, being reworked. The increasing ambivalence about where and what is considered a legitimate intervention to stop a migratory movement speaks to the creation of new articulations of territory, law, and rights. This is what we want to further explore in...
a future paper on rethinking borders and changing sovereignties. Border externalization, linked to processes of economic integration and international development, might create a potentially deep and far ranging transformation of regional economies and political jurisdictions.

The development of a “European” (or EU) border highlights several important shifts for border studies in particular and social science more broadly. The formation of a supra-state border with its simultaneous processes of border “softening” and “hardening” highlight the complex dynamic between member-states and a supra-state entity that has seen rapid growth in its powers and an increasing awareness of itself as an actor. This dimension of state formation has been widely analyzed in the past decade. The leading role of Spain in implementing border externalization on the ground, miles away from what is traditionally understood as its sovereign territory, still needs to be theorized as a new form of state practice and a new kind of border. The externalization of border policy, and in particular strategies such as the migration routes initiative implemented in the Rabat Process, highlight the limits of our current understanding of how borders are delineated and bounded. While historically the linkage between territory-sovereignty-identity coalesced in everyday items like a national map with a colour distinguishing it from other countries, in these new configurations that identity and equivalence is being recomposed in important ways. Those involved in managing borders are increasingly complex hybrids of state, supra-state, and non-governmental actors acting in spaces that are multiplying in their scope and reach with emerging, yet uncertain, consequences for their inhabitants.

Returning to the idea of Mezzadra and Nielsen of the border as method, by engaging the development of EU border policy and practice, we are gaining powerful insights into how precisely our notions of jurisdiction, sovereignty, territory or even the division of policy into realms such as “interior”, “exterior”, “development”, “commerce”, “labor”, and “immigration” are limited and how these concepts are shifting, intermingling and stretching. The language of globalization and its vernacular use provided us with an imagery of flow or even borderlessness and often produced a dichotomy between “local” and “global” or “national” and “global”. Following the border externalization logic provides a more complex window into how processes of transnationalization are creating new regimes of governance that both facilitate and shut down movement and mobility in precise ways. At the same time, border policy becomes a field occupied by a myriad of actors with at times distinct or even conflicting goals, thus highlighting this transnationalization as a contested site.

Embracing these shifts, we come to an important contribution of this research. Borders have, historically been central to demarcating territory as a container and defining whoever is outside the container as Other. Borders and their demarcating functions are becoming radically re-spatialized: this research shows that rather than disappearing, nor even softening, borders are shifting in shape and content without
abandoning the traditional fences, and patrol towers often represented in visual media. Policies like the GAM and the multiplicity of Spanish, EU and international institutions involved in managing an “externalized border” along a migratory route show that while bordering is still about “ordering and othering populations” (van Houtum, 2010: 959) a single border is no longer the sole purview of a nation-state or an intergovernmental agreement. The spaces of bordering are indeed stretching in unexpected ways, constituting a terrain to be yet fully theorized although for many, intensively experienced in the attempts to cross those abysses.

References


Casas, Maribel; Cobarrubias, Sebastian, and Pickles, John (forthcoming) “Re-Bordering the Neighbourhood: Europe’s Emerging Geographies of Non-Accession Integration”, *Journal of European Urban and Regional Studies*.


Mezzadra, Sandro, and Neilson, Brett (2008) “Border as Method, or, the Multiplication of Labor”. In Transversal, online journal of the European Institute for Pro-