Heraclitus B 32 Revisited in the Light of the
Derveni Papyrus

El Fragmento B 32 de Heráclito a la luz del
Papiro de Derveni

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One the only wise is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus.

Clement, Stromateis V, 115, I

‘But one must not think ill of the paradox, for the paradox is the passion of thought, and the thinker without the paradox is like the lover without passion: a mediocre fellow.’

S. Kierkegaard, Practice in Christianity

1 I take moûnon with the subject (‘one the only wise’) implying a supreme God, as in Xenophanes. Zeos in the genitive permits H to use the old poetic form and recall the verb to live: zên (instead of Dios, perhaps rejecting, with the name ‘Zeus’, his ordinary cult and poetical description). The etymological play was evident in Pherecydes Fr. 1; Aeschylyus, Suppliants (584 f.), Cratylus (396 a 7; 410 d: Zeus is called so ‘because he is the cause of life’ and ‘through whom life belongs in every case to all living things’. (Cf. Kahn, 1979, 269-70).
Abstract

The objective of this article is to consider whether the Commentator of the Derveni Papyrus can contribute to our understanding of the double divine will to reject and accept the name of Zeus. After examining some inconsistencies that the traditional readings raise, the authoress appeals to the Derveni Papyrus in order to offer an alternative diachronic interpretation. On this reading, the unique wise one, in the first place, does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus because this name ascribes birth and diversification to it, while it is, as such, eternal and simple. On the other hand, as it cyclically becomes multiple, it is also willing to be identified with Zeus, the God who, according to the Papyrus, swallowed his Grandfather’s phallus along with Mind, got pregnant of everything and re-created the universe. This account fits with Heraclitus’ doctrine that there is no creation of the world but some kind of derivation of it from the one, and vice-versa.

Key words: one wise, Zeus, cosmos, anthropomorphism, diachronic reading.

Resumen

Se trata de determinar si el Comentador del Papiro de Derveni puede arrojar alguna luz sobre el problema de cómo interpretar la doble y contraria ‘voluntad’ de lo divino de rechazar y aceptar la atribución del nombre de Zeus. Se examinan las incongruencias que plantean las interpretaciones corrientes, y se apela al papiro para ofrecer una interpretación alternativa diacrónica. Según ésta, en primer lugar, lo uno sabio no desea ser llamado con el nombre de Zeus, porque este nombre atribuye nacimiento y diversificación a un principio que es eterno y simple. Por otra parte, en cuanto deviene múltiple cíclicamente, también admite ser identificado con Zeus, el dios que, de acuerdo con el Papiro, tragó el falo de su abuelo junto con Metis, quedó embarazado de todo y re-creó el universo. Esto concuerda con la doctrina heraclítea según la cual no hay creación del mundo sino una cierta derivación de todas las cosas a partir de lo uno y viceversa.

Palabras Clave: uno sabio, Zeus, cosmos, antropomorfismo, lectura diacrónica.

I. The paradox

The aim of this paper is to consider whether the Commentator of the Derveni Papyrus, who offers an allegorical interpretation of an orphic poem, and feels in a
position to make sense of many riddles with regard to the triumph of Zeus, can contribute to our understanding of the meaning of Fr. 32. The main hermeneutical problem that this fragment raises is the hidden sense in which contrary wills can be attributed to ‘the only wise one’. At first sight, as it has been assumed by many scholars, being a principle, it must be unwilling to be called by the name of a god, for the intention of the fragment seems to imply the rejection of anthropomorphic accounts to the supreme principle. However, the principle does also exhibit willingness to accept the name. Therefore, the paradox remains and urges us to attempt to clarify the following questions:

1. why should this neutral, unique, wise principle reject being called by the name of Zeus in the first place;
2. in which sense should it accept being called by this name and be identified with this particular god, rather than with any other.

We should be cautious not to fall into Aristotle’s trap here, whose complaint was that Heraclitus ‘did not use the categories of formal logic, but tended to describe the same thing (or roughly the same thing) now as a god, now as a form of matter, now as a rule of behaviour or principle which was nevertheless a physical constituent of things’.

As we shall see, the same complaint can be addressed to the Commentator of the Derveni Papyrus. The key to comprehension seems to lie in between, by assuming a kind of intelligent supremely wise principle that, only in a second stage, would wish to be identified with the King of the gods.

In order to make this fragment understandable, it has been argued that the name ‘Zeus’ contains a reference to the verb ‘to live’ (zên), which turns out to be appropriate for the characterization of an ever-living principle that keeps the universe alive (Fr. 30). In this sense the supreme principle would admit being called by the name of life. It has been argued that no name can be privileged, for the supreme wise principle is also supposed to be a principle of death, and as such, will not be willing to accept the name of life in the first place. Therefore the only wise one is effectively being described as Life-Death.

However, the association between Zenós and zên needs linguistic justification for Zeus is rather regarded as the God of the bright sky (cf. fr. 120), by contrast with the God of the underworld, who rules over a kingdom of darkness. He is alive, of course, like all the gods, but one may wonder whether he is dominantly seen as the God of Life. On the other hand, if no name were really suitable, the wise cosmic principle should not ‘be willing’ to be called by any particular name. Moreover, this

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2 See for example Mondolfo (1966) and Robinson (1987).
interpretation does not seem to account for the fact that the negative wish precedes the positive one: the unique wise one would not -in the first place- wish to be called by the name of Zeus (Life) because (we are to assume) it is also and in the first place, a principle of Death. Does this interpretation make sense? In my view, it seems bizarre and we should attempt to find a better one.

II. Mining Heraclitus’s fragments

1. The god subsumes opposite aspects of the world

Hyppolitus (Refutation of All Heresies 9.10.8) is the source of problematic Fr. 67 which says:

The God <is> day <and> night, winter <and> summer, war <and> peace, satiety <and> famine, and undergoes change in the way that <fire?>, whenever it is mixed with species, gets called by the name that accords with <the> bouquet of each <spice>.5

In the light of it, at least two points are certain:
1. the god is the source of multiple oppositions, and
2. it gets called by the name that accords with the nature it presents.

The god subsumes all the ‘opposite’ features that the universe exhibits, but this does not mean that Heraclitus is out to tell us that Zeus is as much a god of death as he is of life, and there is no particular stress on the opposites ‘life’ and ‘death’, for in fact these do not even get a mention on Heraclitus’ list.

If this is the case, and name follows aspect, one may wonder whether the sense of the fragment exhausts itself in the metaphorical use of the name, or whether it is the other way round: the use of the name points out to a hidden equation of the wise unique principle with the god Zeus, as he was traditionally conceived6.

2. Zeus: the Sky and the Direction of the universe

a. The only fragment where Zeus is mentioned is fr.120 (Strabo 1.6), and there he is associated to the bright sky:

5 Translations throughout are those of Robinson (1987).
6 The question of names and classifications does not seem to belong to the one wise in itself, but rather to our understanding, for the real, while differing, is said to be in agreement with itself, as there it lies a back-turning connection between the opposites (Cf. Fr. 51). It seems that any name emphasizes only one isolated aspect and so it remains blind to manifest the essential hidden harmony that lies behind. In the light of this, Heraclitus should be saying that the unique wise one is not willing to be called by any particular name, rather than affirming the paradox of Fr. 32.
<The> limits of dawn and evening are the Bear and, opposite the Bear, <the> Watcher (?) of bright Zeus (aithríou Diós).

b. Zeus seems to be clearly alluded to also in fr. 64 (Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.10.7):

And thunderbolt steers the totality of things.

c. Finally, it is worth noting that in fr. 53 (Hippolytus, *Refutation of All Heresies* 9.9.4) the attributes traditionally ascribed to Zeus are transposed to war:

War is father of all, and king of all. He renders some gods, others men; he makes some slaves, others free.

3. **Sophón: the intelligent plan is separated (and not separated)**

It is worth remarking that fr. 41 (Diogenes Laertius 9.1) starts with exactly the same words as does our fragment, except for the omission of the adverb ‘only’:

He says that the wise <thing> is a single <thing> (or, differently punctuated: one thing, the wise thing, <is->) knowing the plan (gnômen) +which steers+ all things through all things (pánta dià pánton).

The wise attitude for men is to get to know and master the intelligent plan that steers the cosmos. I cannot analyze this difficult fragment in full here but would like to observe that, on the one hand, the fragment shows that there is an evident connection between wisdom and planning, while on the other hand, the government associated to it, which is attributed to Thunderbolt in fr. 64, seems to come at a second ‘stage’ or, at least, due to the corruption, we cannot know how it is related to the plan.

The adjective ‘wise’ (sophôn) is also present in fr. 108 (John Stobaeus 3.1.174):

Of all the accounts I have listened to, none gets to the point of recognizing that which is wise, set apart (kechôrismenon) from all.

Here a new feature is provided: what is wise is separated from all things or, in Curd’s words7, it is different from the phenomena. The category of ‘difference’ or

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7 Curd (1991) 534-5: ‘It is here, in the images of separation and difference, that a Heraclitean distinction between being and becoming begins to emerge’.
'separation' is not an absolute one in Heraclitus. For another paradox, let us consider fr. 72 (Marcus Aurelius 4.46): 

They are separated (diaphérontai) from that with which they are in the most continuous contact.

This is likely to mean that the majority of mankind are ‘separated’ from lógos, while lógos, being common (fr. 2), is present to them. It has been suggested that Lógos encompasses both being and becoming. Following an analogous line, we could argue that the only wise principle is willing to accept the name of Zeus, when this name is appropriate to it, namely, when it takes on a new presentation. For according to Heraclitus, the name both hides and reveals the thing. The hypothesis I shall try to defend, in the light of the Derveni Papyrus, is that the principle does not want to be called ‘Zeus’ when identified with ‘the wise plan that remains separated’ or, to say it in a word, when identified with ‘its being one’, and it is also willing to be called ‘Zeus’ when it ‘becomes multiple’ as the universe.

Two other fragments support the thesis that it is the same one that becomes multiple. On the one hand, fr. 50 (Hippolytus, Refutation of All Heresies 9.9.1) which contains both hén and sophón, ascertains that not listening to Heraclitus himself, but to the lógos, it is wise to agree that ‘all things are one’.

This epistemological main thesis is closely connected to the end of fr. 10 ([Aristotle] De Mundo 5.396 b 20) where it is said, in a more cosmological key, that:

‘out of all <comes?> one, and out of one, all’,

a claim which agrees with the interpretation presented in the Derveni Papyrus, and also with fr. 30 (Clement, Stromateis 5.103.6) where it is said:

<The ordered> world, the same for all, no god or man made, but it always was, is and will be an ever-living fire, being kindled in measures and being put out in measures.

I take this fragment to mean that there is no mythological demiourgós in a strict sense, but an eternal unique wise principle that transforms itself: when it becomes multiple, it can be called by the name of Zeus (i.e. Thunderbolt: Bright Fire Sky).

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8 See also Fr. 34: ‘absent while present’.
9 Curd (1991) 543: ‘As the principle that explains, it is being; as the manifestations of the content of that principle, it is becoming and change’.
III. The evidence in the Derveni Papyrus

Heraclitus is not an Orphic but he adopts Orphic writings describing the world through opposites and their unity. The Derveni Commentator does not regard himself as a Heraclitean, but turns out to be an eclectic religious author who shows some influence from different Presocratic sources, such as Anaxagoras, Diogenes of Apollonia, Democritus and Empedocles. However, he not only seems to have had access to Heraclitus’ book\(^{10}\) but mentions and quotes Heraclitus in col. IV. 5-10\(^{11}\).

Could this anonymous Commentator of an Orphic poem in a badly fragmented text, who is likely to have produced the text around 400 B.C., possibly throw light on the background to fr. 32, in order to overcome the difficulties that most interpretations face? I am aware that this is a risky task\(^{12}\) for two reasons: on the one hand, because the reconstructions of the text of the Derveni Papyrus are far from definitive, and on the other hand, because there is no fixed code for deciphering the sense of a fragmented piece, be it attributed to Heraclitus or to Orpheus. And yet, it is likely that the brief Poem being commented upon, which is addressed to the initiated, belonged to the beginning of the –V century or even earlier\(^{13}\). In my view, he can at least provide us with essential information that could open our minds to a new approach to the fragment, which seems to fit with the fragments considered above\(^{14}\).

As Heraclitus himself did, the Commentator constantly opposes his own view to another interpretation which he regards as the obvious, primary, literal one that satisfies the ignorant. He treats the poem as allegorical in a strong sense, and urges us to go beyond the surface meaning, while he is critical of certain religious rites because they deprive people of belief, hope and learning (cf. Col. XX). This criticism places the Commentator very close to Heraclitus’s own position on the point (cf. fr. 5).

10 According to Sider (1997).
11 The quotation corresponds to DK Fr. 3 and Fr. 94.
12 For a record of the authors, such as Macchioro and Nestle, who were censored for showing common features between Heraclitus and the Orphic tradition, and those who, like Guthrie, have found an ‘extraordinary parallelism’ between them, see Casadesús (1995). The author understands that the names and functions of the main principle in Heraclitus (i.e. Lógos, Justice, Fire, Thunderbolt) evoke the powerful Zeus that appears in the Orphic poetry, while emphasizes the common methodology, based on linguistic analysis of concepts.
14 In looking for points of contact between the papyrus and Heraclitus, Sider (1997) observes in passing that Fr. 32 ‘fits in easily with the pervasive allegorizing which we find throughout but especially in cols. XVII-XVIII’. (135-136). He also suspects there is a reference to Heracliteans in col. XXIII. 9 f. as if the Commentator knew the phrase ‘mighty fluxers’ was applied to them from outsiders (136). In conclusion, Sider finds that Heraclitus ‘adopts and adapts many Orphic writings for his own purposes’; the Commentator mines Heraclitus’s text for comparanda, and Clement (Strom. 6. 2. 27. 1) and Plutarch (De def. oracul. 415 f.) exaggerate Heraclitus’s debt to Orpheus (147-8).
Let us summarize the main points that could help us make fr. 32 understandable:

a) the Commentator suggests the idea that when the *one* becomes *multiple* it gets the *form* and *name* of *Zeus*, and he gives an etymological account of *Zeus’s name* as ‘*born’*;

b) he indicates that *Zeus* acts wisely with an *intelligence that precedes him*, an intelligence which is identified with *Mêtis* in Col. XV, with *Noûs* in Col. XVI and with *Moîra (Phrônesis toû theôû)* in Col. XVIII.

c) he also points out, on many occasions, that there is a *continuity in identity between that first intelligent principle and *Zeus*.*

In col. VIII. 4 *Zeus* appears for the first time, and is called the ‘*mighty king*’ from whom things were born. The goal of the Commentator here is to persuade us that *Zeus* inherited his *arché* (which, as has recently been emphasized, means both ‘*power*’ and ‘*principle*’) from his father Kronos legally, not by force, nor contrary to prophecies. Then *Zeus* visits Night, the primordial divinity who knows everything, to get to know how to keep his power. He starts his reign by devouring Uranus’s phallus. This way he avoids the possibility of being dethroned and gets the chance to re-create the world as well. In order to be the supreme god forever, *Zeus* cannot be preceded by anyone, or be followed by anyone more powerful. By having the first God’s phallus inside, he becomes pregnant of the whole. Once it has been shown, from the mythical point of view, that there must only be *one* god, the Commentator devotes his work to consolidating the authority of *Zeus*.

### 1. Col. XV: *Zeus is Mêtis*

In col. XV, after quoting a line of the poem, the Commentator explains that *Zeus* is not a different one but, we can assume, is to be identified with *Noûs*:

‘following him (*ek toû*) in turn was Kronos, and then *Zeus* the contriver (*metíeta*)’:

He means something like ‘from that time (*ek toûde*) is the beginning (*arché*), from

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15 The implications that lie behind the three adjectives are as follows: 1. *hén* contrasted to ‘*multiple*’ should account for the negative will of the unique principle to be named after a god that people think that belongs to change and becoming; 2. *Zenôs* (expression which also appears in the Papyrus) is identified with ‘*birth*’ by those who do not understand that ‘*Moîra*, ‘*Mêtis*’, ‘*Noûs*’, ‘*Air*’ and many other names mentioned in Col. XX, are just a multiplicity for one and the same reality, which people call ‘*Zeus*”; 3. *sophôn moíanon* would be the common denominator of both ‘*states*’ of the same reality, for *Zeus* is not just one god among others, but the wise King that steers the world.


17 I am using the Tsantsanoglou-Parassoglou translation into English in Kouremenos-Parassoglou-Tsantsanoglou reconstruction and commentary (2006).
which this magistracy (arché) reigns’. It has been related that Noûs, striking the ónta to one another and setting them apart toward the present transformative stage, [created] from different things, not different ones, but diversified ones. As for the phrase ‘and then Zeus the contriver’, that he is not a different one but the same is clear. And this indicates it:

Metis…royal honor
…sinews… (Col. XV. 6-15)

When Zeus takes over, he receives, together with the royal dignity of the gods, also métis, a complex concept that combines cleverness, prevision, flexibility and simulative powers18. After devouring his Grandfather’s phallus he has the power to replace the original chaotic creation with a planned organized universe. Thus this kind of ‘universal mother and father’, to say it with Bernabé, goes back to the origin and turns out to be the first in the sequence of all the gods, as he reverses the order of time. It is not difficult to perceive that the Commentator, coming from an Orphic background, is making efforts to offer a syncretic outlook which might turn out to be acceptable both to enlightened religious men and women and philosophers as well. Might Heraclitus be sharing a similar outlook, while departing from philosophical background, starting from a unique wise principle towards the allowance of a kind of ‘second sense’ identification of it with the well known King of the Gods?

2. Col. XVI: The King is Noûs19

The Commentator quotes four verses from the poem20 and then he says:

In these verses he indicates that the ónta always existed and that the present ónta come to be from the existing ones. As for the phrase ‘and he himself became the sole one (moûnos égento)’, by saying this he makes it clear that Noûs, is always worth everything being alone (món[o]n ónta), as if the rest were nothing. For it is not [possible] for the present ónta to exist [because of] them (sc. the existing ones) without Noûs. [Also in the verse] after this [he said that Noûs] is worth everything:

18 Bernabé (2009) 60. The author also finds here the resolution of the philosophical problem of unity and multiplicity (63). For a full development of this aspect, see also Betegh (2004).

19 This column starts in mediis rebus saying that the sun was called a genital organ (i.e. the phallus did not fall into the sea as in Hesiod’s Theogony but remained suspended between Uranus and Gea).

20 ‘And in support of the fact that the present ónta come to be from existent ones, he says:
Of the First-born king, the reverend one; and upon him all
the immortals grew, blessed gods and goddesses
and rivers and lovely springs and everything else
that had then been born; and he himself became the sole one (moûnos égento)’. (Col. XVI 1-6)
[And now he is] king of all [and will be] afterwards.

[It is clear that] ‘Noûs’ and [‘king of all’ are the] same thing. … (Col. XVI. 7-15)

Obviously the Poem says nothing about Noûs but only speaks about the King that was first born, and ends by remarking that he was ‘the sole one’, i.e. no god will ever be able to dethrone him because he is the first one, and everything else depends on him for existence. The Commentator identifies the Protogónou basiléos with Noûs, and then he explains why he ‘became the sole one’. It is so because of Noûs’ dignity and power to plan and generate all the things that exist. While the final identification of Noûs and the King is unfortunately perversely lacunose, we can still have some confidence about the implications of what the Commentator is saying.21

3. Col. XVII: Air is Zeus

In col. XVII, the Commentator identifies Air and Zeus. He writes:

it (sc. Air) existed before it was named; then it was named. For air both existed before the present ἐόντα were set together and will always exist. For it did not come to be but existed. And why it was called Air has been made clear earlier in this book. But after it had been named Zeus, it was thought that it was born, as if it did not exist before. He also said that it will be ‘last’, after it was named Zeus and this continues being its name until the present ἐόντα were set together into the same state in which they were floating as former ἐόντα. And it is made clear that the ἐόντα became such because of it and, having come to be, [are again] in it. He indicates in this words:

Zeus is the head, Zeus the middle, and from Zeus is everything fashioned.

Head… he allegorizes that the ἐόντα … head … beginning of constitution… to have been constituted … (Col. XVII 1-15)

It is clear that Air is the eternal principle, but when it was named ‘Zeus’ confusion arose and it was thought to have been born, which means that ‘Zeus’ is the name used to emphasize a different moment or stage of the same principle, namely, ‘the beginning’ or birth of a new configuration. On the other hand, the name ‘Zeus’ also refers to its being ‘last’. In other words, when the eternal principle (air) is called ‘Zeus’ we should understand we are talking of the period when the eternal

21 The Socrates of the Phaedo would have nothing to complain about, for now, in the light of the Commentator’s remarks, Noûs is the real cause.
principle transformed itself into a multiplicity of beings. Thus the Commentator seems to reveal to us that this period, which had a beginning, will also have an end, when the present beings will go back to their previous unformed floating state. Therefore, when we say ‘Zeus’ we are still naming the eternal principle but mainly denoting its multiple appearance of beings which belong to the realm of becoming, (and, as such, are sentenced to being generated and to dying, to being assembled and disassembled).

It has been observed that the Commentator uses a ‘systematic terminology’ to explain the causes of Zeus’s powers, when he places on the same level his divinity and two principles: air and Noûs, which belong to a more ‘philosophical’ field. However, it is not just the case that ‘Zeus becomes a unique generation principle, while in the form of air or Noûs, being present in all beings in order to dominate them at will’, but the sequence seems to be just the other way round: when the eternal principle, which we are allowed to call either Noûs or Air, receives the name of ‘Zeus’, it is associated both with ‘being born’ and also with ‘dying’.

4. Col. XVIII: *Pneûma, Moîra and Phrónesis toû theoû*

Here the Commentator adds new names and identities to the divine. First he asserts that everything in the air is breath or wind. Then he affirms that Orpheus called it ‘Moira’. And he adds:

‘… before it was called Zêna, Moira existed, being the thought of God eternally and [d]ià pantós. But after it had been called Zeus it was thought that it was born, though it existed before too, but it was not named. [This is why] he says

Zeus was born first.

For first was [Moira the thought], later it was held to be sacred Zeus. But people [not understanding] the meaning of what is said [come to view] Zêna as being the first born [god] … Col. XVIII.9-15

5. Col. XIX: All things were called Zeus, for the air dominates them all

The Commentator reveals that the expression ‘Moira spun’ means that the thought of Zeus ratified in what way what will exist, what exists and what will

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22 See Casadesús (1996) 75-88 for a full analysis of the way Zeus absorbs all the powers and becomes the only one, in the light of Proclus’ commentary. The author emphasizes the presence of gignomai to denote Zeus’s birth which supports our interpretation.
cease, must be so. He quotes a verse of the poem where Zeus is king, the ruler of all and ‘he of the bright bolt’ which correspond to the descriptions that Heraclitus presents in fr. 53 and fr. 64.

6. Col. XXI.5-7: Ouranian, Aphrodite, Zeus, Peitho and Harmonia

All these names denote the same god, for each one is connected to the way the eônta join and separate in their process of coming to be and ceasing. Again, the Commentator and Heraclitus have a point in common: the same god admits different names, either according to the element that prevails (Heraclitus, fr. 67) or the function it performs (DP).

7. Col. XXIII: The same Zeus contrived himself

Here the Commentator interprets a misleading verse of the poem. It is not the case that Zeus contrived Oceanus as something different from itself, but:

‘Oceanus is the air, and that air is Zeus. Therefore, it was not another Zeus who ‘contrived’ Zeus, but the same one (contrived) for himself ‘great might’.

(Col. XXIII.3-5)

8. Col. XXV. 14: The mind (phrén) of Zeus devised all things

The same ideas advanced at the beginning are repeated using a new word: phrén.

9. Col. XXVI. 1: Noûs is the Mother of the other things

This final column presents many difficulties, but we can be sure that the Commentator intends to persuade us that Zeus does not want to mingle in love with his own mother, but he is likely to do so with his own Mind, if we follow an analogous argument in XXIII.
IV. Conclusion

On this background, we can understand fr. 32 as denoting a peculiar pantheistic account in a nutshell. There is a unique wise one that does not want to be called ‘Zeus’ in the first place, for it is eternal. But, as we learn from the Derveni Papyrus, the eternal principle diversified itself and became multiple, and things were born to their present state. In this sense, it does want to be named ‘Zeus’, for ‘from this perspective’, the name is applicable. In addition, the Papyrus also seems to suggest that it admits that name associated to the birth of everything, during the time that change takes place, till everything goes back to the first state, denoting a kind of cycle that goes from pure eternal singularity to cosmic multiplicity. This fits with Heraclitus’s doctrine that there is no creation of the cosmos, but a kind of derivation of all things from the one and vice-versa (cf. fr. 10). On the other hand, it could be objected that Heraclitus does not appeal either to noûs or air, in our fragment. Although he does not use either of these names to refer to his neutral principle, and though he emphasizes the role played by fire in other fragments (such as frs. 30, 31, and 90), he clearly points out that it is ‘the god’, and not the one only wise, who takes opposite forms and appearances, as it undergoes change (cf. fr. 67).

Furthermore, the connection with air is somehow present, for the bright sky is the realm of Zeus (cf. fr. 120), and the movements of the stars are the way he seems to control the universe by perfect predictable movements.

It is time now to go back to the partially anthropomorphic reading and consider whether it can be saved in the light in the Papyrus. Is it the meaning of fr. 32 to claim that on the one hand, a neutral principle will, in the first place, expect that the instructed only call it ‘one and wise’, for they are those who should really know where wisdom and ultimate divineness of the cosmos lies, (i.e., in the upper domain of the stars, which are made of aither, i.e. air at its hottest, driest and therefore ‘purest and best’), while on the other hand, ‘on second thoughts’, it would also tolerate an anthropomorphic description of himself as ‘Zeus’ by the uninstructed?

Our fragment is a privileged text in which the authentic divine will is revealed. In general terms Heraclitus is reluctant to accept religion as the best treatment of the divine. Therefore it turns out to be hard to imagine that the only wise one would be really willing to be treated in a (wrong) religious anthropomorphic way by the uninstructed.

In my view, the diachronic interpretation offered in the Papyrus offers an outlook that fits better with the surviving fragments of Heraclitus. On this reading, we might assume that fr. 32 may mean that the unique wise one, in the first place, does not wish to be called by the name of Zeus because this name ascribes birth and diversification to it, while it is, as such, eternal and simple. On the other hand, as it cyclically becomes multiple, it is also willing to be identified with Zeus, the God
who, according to the Papyrus, swallowed his Grandfather’s phallus along with Mind, got pregnant of everything and re-created the universe, in order to become first, end and centre of the world, while being the Ethereal component that gives life to everything and the Intelligence that steers the whole.

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